Chapter LX: Book 11: , Reichsfuehrer SS HEINRICH HIMMLER (2)

In regard to France’s situation--the Fuehrer said that in a general conflict after the expected conquest, within a short time, of Poland, Germany would be in a position to assemble 100 divisions at the Westwall, which would force France to assemble all available forces from the colonies, from the Italian border, and elsewhere at the Maginot line for the life and death struggle which would then begin. Moreover, it is his opinion that the French cannot overrun the Italian fortifications any more than the Westwall.

At this point Count Ciano showed signs of extreme doubt.

The Polish Army varies greatly in its value. Besides several crack divisions there are a number of inferior units. Poland is very weak in AA and anti-tank defense. At present France and England cannot supply her. If, however, Poland is supported economically for a considerable period of time by the West, she could acquire these weapons, and Germany’s superiority would be reduced. The fanatics of Warsaw and Cracow are opposed by the indifferent peasant population of other districts. Besides, the composition of the population of the Polish state must be considered: out of 34 million inhabitants 1½ million are German, about 4 million are Jews, and an estimated 9 million Ukrainians, so that there are considerably fewer real Poles than the total population, and even these, as mentioned before, have to be differently evaluated in regard to fighting power. Under these circumstances, Poland would be conquered by Germany in a very short time.

As Poland makes it clear by her whole attitude that in case of conflict she will in any event be on the side of the enemies of Germany and Italy, quick liquidation at this moment would only be of advantages for the unavoidable conflict with the western democracies. If a hostile Poland should remain on Germany’s Eastern frontier, not only the 11 East Prussian Divisions, but also further contingents would be tied up in Pomerania and Silesia, which would not be the case in the event of previous liquidation. Generally speaking, it would be best to liquidate the pseudo-neutrals one after the other. This is fairly easily done, if one Axis partner protects the rear of the other, who is just finishing off one of the uncertain neutrals, and vice versa. Italy may consider Yugoslavia such an uncertain neutral. At the visit of Prince Regent Paul he (the Fuehrer) suggested, particularly in consideration of Italy that Prince Paul clarify his political attitude toward the Axis by a gesture. He had thought of a closer connection with the Axis and Yugoslavia’s leaving the League of Nations. Prince Paul agreed to the matter. Recently the Prince Regent was in London and sought reinsurance from the western powers. The same thing was repeated that happened in the case of Gafencu, who was also very reasonable during his visit to Germany and who denied any interest in the aims of the western democracies. Afterwards it was learned that he had later assumed a contrary standpoint in England. Among the Balkan countries the Axis can completely rely on Bulgaria, which is in a sense a natural ally of Italy and Germany. That is why Germany has supported Bulgaria as much as possible with supplies of weapons and will continue to do so. Yugoslavia would stay neutral only as long as it would be dangerous to take the side of the western democracies openly. At the moment when there would be a turn to the worse for Germany and Italy, however, Yugoslavia would join the other side openly, hoping thereby to give matters a final turn to the disadvantage of the Axis. Rumania is afraid of Hungary and is militarily very weak and internally corrupt. King Carol would doubtless not give up his neutrality unless absolutely necessary.

Hungary is friendly and Slovakia is under German influence and even has German garrisons in some parts.

Returning to the question of Danzig, the Fuehrer explained to Count Ciano that it is impossible to yield on this point. He has agreed with Italy to withdraw the Germans from South Tyrol, but for that very reason he must carefully avoid everything that could give the impression that a precedent has been created by the withdrawal of the Germans from South Tyrol, which could be applied to other regions, too. Besides, his justification to the German people of the withdrawal of these Germans from Italy is the German policy, which is in general, directed toward the east and the north-east. The east and the north-east--i.e., the Baltic countries--have always been Germany’s uncontested sphere of interest, just as the Mediterranean is Italy’s own sphere. Germany needs the grain and wood-producing countries of these eastern regions for economic reasons as well. Danzig is not only a case of material interests, however, although this city is the biggest Baltic port. The turn-over amounts to 40% of the tonnage of Hamburg.

Danzig, the Nordic Nurnberg, is an old German city, which awakens sentimental feelings in every German, and just this psychological element forces the Fuehrer to respect public opinion. To make the situation easier to understand for an Italian, Count Ciano should imagine that Trieste is in the hands of Yugoslavia and a strong Italian minority on Yugoslavian territory is being treated with brutal force. It can hardly be supposed that Italy would look on calmly for very long.

_Count Ciano_ replied to the Fuehrer’s explanations by first pointing out the great surprise among the Italians at the absolutely unexpected seriousness of the situation. Neither in the Milan conversations nor in the talks on the occasion of his visit to Berlin was any indication given by the Germans that the situation with regard to Poland was so serious. On the contrary, the Reich foreign minister had declared that in his opinion the question of Danzig will be settled in the course of time. On the basis of this state of affairs, the Duce decided, true to his conviction that a conflict with the western democracies is unavoidable, to make his preparations for that eventuality and made his plans for a certain period of time of 2 to 3 years. If a conflict is unavoidable now, Italy would of course be on Germany’s side, as the Duce re-emphasized just before Count Ciano’s departure, but for various reasons, enumerated in detail, Italy would welcome a postponement of the general conflict.

_Count Ciano_ then explained, with the aid of a map, the Italian position at the outbreak of a general conflict. Italy believes, he said, that a conflict with Poland would not be restricted to that country, but would grow into a general European war.

_The Fuehrer_ remarked that opinions differ on that point. He personally is firmly convinced that the western democracies will in the end shy away from precipitating a general war.

_Count Ciano_ replied that he hoped the Fuehrer was right, but he did not believe it. In any case, one should adapt one’s reflections to the worst possibility, i.e., to general conflict. Since the Abyssinian conflict Italy has actually been constantly living in a state of war and therefore urgently needs a breathing spell. Count Ciano proved with the aid of figures how great Italy’s material effort had been, especially in the Spanish conflict. Italy’s stock of raw materials is now exhausted. She needs time to restock her warehouses.

She must also transfer her war industries, all of which are in an exposed location, to the south, in order to be better able to defend them. In the same way the Italian artillery, particularly the AA defense, is greatly in need of modernization. The long coast line and other exposed points are not sufficiently defended.

The strength of the fleet is also extremely unfavorable. At the moment Italy can put against the combined English and French 11 to 12 battleships only 2 of its own, while in a few years a total of 8 battleships will be available.

At this point the Fuehrer remarked that of course England and France will have additional battleships of 35,000 and 40,000 tons.

_Count Ciano_ pointed out the long Italian coastline, which is hard to defend and the numerous bases at the disposal of the English and French fleets, giving particular attention to the Greek ports.

The Italian colonies are especially vulnerable at present. Lybya is hard to attack from Egypt, it is true, while from Lybya there is the possibility of advancing to Marsah Matru. The situation in regard to Tunisia is quite different. The proportion of the Italian and French Arab population is 1 to 20, while the strength of white troops is 1 to 5 to Italy’s disadvantage. Besides, the Italian fortifications on the French frontier are quite inadequate. Only recently new armored bunkers were delivered.

Though Abyssinia is almost pacified, with the exception of certain regions along the border of the English territory, where the English create difficulties among the population with their money and propaganda, this pacification is only on the surface. It would be sufficient, in a general conflict for a few English airplanes to drop leaflets over Abyssinia, saying that the world had risen against Italy and that the Negus would return, to make the revolt of the Abyssinians flare up again. Besides, Abyssinia would be cut off completely from the motherland in case of a conflict, and the fate of the 200,000 Italians in Abyssinia would be very uncertain. In a few years there would be an army of 4 to 500,000 men in Abyssinia, and if a conflict should break out then it would be possible to attack the Sudan, Kenya, and French Somaliland successfully.

The islands of the Dodecanese would be in difficulties because of the attitude of Turkey. Of course Leros and Rhodes could defend themselves for years.

Albania is a completely undeveloped country and would make an effective base for operations against the Balkans only after several years. First roads have to be built and the natural resources (iron, copper, chromium, and petroleum) have to be exploited, and then one could consider, as the Fuehrer had indicated, advancing successfully on Saloniki and in other directions of the Balkans, as along the five fingers of an outstretched hand.

Italy has plans of economic autarchy which cannot be realized for several years and which would then put Italy in a position to withstand even a prolonged war without difficulties. Another reason for the Duce’s desire to postpone the conflict is the Italians abroad, who were to be brought back to Italy according to plan. One million Italians live in France, of whom about 700,000 are definitely lost for Italy. The other 300,000, however, would be used by France as hostages in case of a conflict, as could be seen from some measures taken by France in September of last year.

Besides, the Duce personally attaches great importance to the orderly execution of the world’s fair in 1942, for which Italy made big preparations and from which she hopes for good results in the economic field, especially as regards the inflow of foreign currency.

Besides these considerations, which are based on Italy’s position, there are others of a general political nature which recommend postponement of a general conflict. The Duce is convinced that the encirclement system of the western democracies would doubtless work at the present time. But after a certain length of time the points of friction and the seeds of disunity would come to the fore among the partners of the encirclement front, and the front would gradually disintegrate.

Moreover, the Duce is convinced that the present enthusiasm in England and France will not last very long. Soon, particularly in France, the union sacree will once more be replaced by party discord, on condition that the Axis keeps quiet for a time. At the present time it is only due to the Axis that internal differences have been buried in the respective countries.

Japan’s position would also be much stronger after the termination of the China conflict, which is to be expected in two years, while Roosevelt’s position in America would be seriously weakened after a period of calm in the field of foreign politics, so that he could not be elected president for a third time, which would certainly be the case if a conflict should break out soon.

Spain, which has just acquired government friendly to the Axis (Serano Suner, Beigbeder), needs peace after the civil war, but would stand at the side of the Axis in 2 to 3 years as a power not to be neglected. Thus, for example, within 2 years Spain would build 4 battleships of 35,000 tons each, the plans for which have just been taken to Spain by an Italian General. The construction is to take place in El Ferrol.

For these reasons the Duce wishes strongly (le Duce insiste) that the Axis powers should make a gesture which would emphasize anew the will of peace of Italy and Germany. This could be done by the publication of a communique which Count Ciano had given to the Reich foreign minister on the previous day and which he now presented again in the following English (and French version): * * *

Count Ciano said in connection with this tentative communique that the Duce had at first contemplated a proposal for a conference, but conscious of the Fuehrer’s misgivings, he now makes another suggestion in a milder form and is very much interested in its acceptance.

_The Fuehrer_ declared concerning the conference plan that in future meetings of the powers it will not be possible to exclude Russia. In the German-Russian conversations the Russians made it plain, with reference to Munich and other occasions from which they had been excluded, that they would not tolerate this any more. Besides the 4 main powers, Poland and Spain would also have to be included in such a conference, besides Russia. This means, however, that Italy, Germany, and Spain would oppose England, France, Russia, and Poland, which certainly is an unfavorable position.

_Count Ciano_ replied that the Duce is of the opinion that the one who wins at a conference is the one who is ready to let the conference fail if necessary and to accept war as a possible result. Moreover, the Duce took the Fuehrer’s misgivings into consideration and modified his proposal. He sees in an Italian and German peace gesture, as suggested in this proposal, the advantage that the western powers, which are internally not at all ready for war--but would surely start it at the present moment, if they were, so to speak, forced to the wall by the Axis and saw no other way out, according to the conviction of the Duce, based on very reliable information from the democracies. [Translator’s note: This sentence is incomplete--possibly something was omitted in copying]. The suggested gesture of Germany and Italy represents a face-saving way out for the western powers, which they will certainly use, for there are wide circles which warn against war and which would be backed up by a peace gesture. This means, however, that Poland, which would doubtless be abandoned by the western powers, would be isolated after a time and would have to agree to reasonable solutions of the existing difficulties.

_The Fuehrer_ replied that there is no time to be lost in the solution of the Polish problem. The further we get into fall the harder military operations in the east of Europe will be. The air force could hardly be employed at all after the middle of September in those regions because of the weather conditions, while the motorized forces would also be unusable because of the condition of the roads, which are rapidly turned to mud by the rains which set in in the fall. From September to May Poland is one big swamp and absolutely unsuitable for any military operations. Thus Poland could simply occupy Danzig in October--and she probably intends to do so--without Germany’s being able to do anything against it; for it is out of the question to shell and destroy Danzig.

_Count Ciano_ asked by what time the question of Danzig will have to be settled, in the Fuehrer’s opinion. _The Fuehrer_ replied that this question will have to be settled one way or the other by the end of August. The Fuehrer replied to Ciano’s question as to how the Fuehrer imagined the solution, that Poland will have to give up Danzig politically, whereby her economic interests will of course be preserved, and that she will have to contribute by her general attitude to a release of the tension. It is doubtful whether Poland will be willing to do so; for hitherto she had rejected the German proposals. The Fuehrer personally made these proposals to Beck on the occasion of his visit to Obersalzberg. They were very favorable for Poland. In exchange for the political return of Danzig to Germany, with complete preservation of Polish economic interests and the establishment of a connection between East Prussia and the Reich, Germany conceded a border guarantee, a 25-year friendship pact, and Polish participation in influence on Slovakia. At that time Beck acknowledged the proposal with the remark that he wanted to examine it. The sharp refusal was only the consequence of English intervention. Poland’s aims can, moreover, be seen clearly in her press. All of East Prussia should be occupied, they want to advance to Berlin, etc. In the long run it is unbearable for a big power to tolerate such a hostile neighbor at a distance of only 150 km from its capital. The Fuehrer is therefore determined to use the opportunity of the next political provocation, in the form of an ultimatum, brutal mistreatment of Germans, an attempt to starve out Danzig, or something similar, to attack Poland within 48 hours and to solve the problem in this way. This would mean a considerable strengthening of the Axis, just as an Italian liquidation of Yugoslavia would mean a considerable increase of power for the Axis.

_Count Ciano_ asked when such an undertaking against Poland is to be expected, since Italy must of course prepare for all eventualities. The Fuehrer replied that under the prevailing circumstances an attack on Poland is to be expected at any moment.

A telegram from Moscow and one from Tokyo were handed to the Fuehrer during this exchange of opinions. The conference was interrupted for a short time, and then Count Ciano was informed of the contents of the Moscow telegram. The Russians agreed to the sending of a German political mediator to Moscow. The Reich foreign minister added that the Russians were completely informed about Germany’s intentions against Poland. He himself had informed the Russian charge d’affaires, by order of the Fuehrer.

_The Fuehrer_ remarked that in his opinion Russia would not be willing to pull chestnuts out of the fire for the western powers. Stalin’s position is endangered as much by a victorious Russian army as by a defeated Russian army. Russia is, at the most, interested in enlarging her access to the Baltic a little. Germany has no objection to that. Besides, Russia would hardly take the part of Poland, whom she hates from the bottom of her heart. The sending of the English-French military mission to Moscow has only the purpose of averting the catastrophic state of political negotiations.

After further discussion of the communique proposed by Count Ciano, the Fuehrer said that he wanted to think over for a day, this proposal as well as Count Ciano’s explanation of the general situation, and he therefore suggested that the discussion be resumed the next day.

Salzburg 12 August 1939

signed Schmidt.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1874-PS

Notes on the Conference Between General Field Marshal GOERING and the
DUCE in the Presence of Count CIANO

15 April 1939

[_Page 4, par. 2_]

However, the heavy armament of Czechoslovakia shows, in any case, how dangerous this country could have been, even after Munich, in the event of a serious conflict. Because of Germany’s action the situation of both axis countries was ameliorated, among other reasons because of the economic possibilities which result from the transfer to Germany of the great production capacity (armament potential) of Czechoslovakia. That contributes toward a considerable strengthening of the axis against the Western powers. Furthermore, Germany now need not keep ready a single division for protection against that country in case of a bigger conflict. This, too, is an advantage by which both axis countries will, in the last analysis, benefit.

[_Page 5, par. 2_]

* * * the action taken by Germany in Czechoslovakia is to be viewed as an advantage for the axis in case Poland should finally join the enemies of the axis powers. Germany could then attack this country from 2 flanks and would be within only 25 minutes flying distance from the new Polish industrial center which had been moved further into the interior of the country, nearer to the other Polish industrial districts, because of its proximity to the border. Now by the turn of events it is located again in the proximity of the border.

[_Page 6, par. 2_]

Furthermore the Fieldmarshal happened to talk about the date at which Germany would be prepared best for a greater test of strength. In this connection he pointed out that Germany at the moment was comparatively weak on the sea because both the new battleships which had been launched recently would be ready for commissioning only next year and two additional battleships would be launched only next year. In the airforce also, regrouping and adaptation of a new bomber type “JU 88”, the production of which had yet to begin, was taking place. This new German bomber had such a range that it would be possible to attack not only England herself, but moreover that would push forward into a western direction, in order to bomb the ships which come from the Atlantic to England. Of course, Germany was ready for action, if suddenly some conflict should come up. But if one was considering at what period of time the armament situation was most favorable, both the facts mentioned above--the insufficient armament at sea and the reconversion of the airforce to the new type of bomber--should not be disregarded. Besides in the fall already a monthly production of 280 planes of the “JU 88” and at the end of the year of 350 planes, could be counted upon. On the basis of these calculations he came to the conclusion that in 9 months or one year the situation for the axis, from a military point of view, would be more favorable. On the other hand it was true that the rearmament in England and France had not made very much progress. In many cases, the factories for the production of war material were only in a state of construction. England would most likely not be able to show any results worth mentioning before 1942 for her new beginning high pressure rearmament in the air.

Furthermore, the Fuehrer considered it almost out of the question that England and France would not stand together. According to the German point of view, both countries would in any conflict eventually support each other to the utmost. Only if England should execute a complete reversal of her policy, and the costs and risks of her present political line should become too high, she would perhaps adapt herself to confining her efforts to the preservation of the empire and give the authoritarian countries a free hand for the securing of their vital necessities. At the present time England had a weak government which had yielded to the pressure of the leftist circles. England had deviated from her old line in a way that it offers assistance only on the basis of her own judgment of the situation in question from case to case and she had, in completely turning away from her traditional policy of giving support from time to time only on the basis of her own judgment of the situation at the time, now obliged herself in advance to render support, and that under conditions which could be determined by the other partner. It was another question, of course, how England could fulfill her guarantee obligation in fact. How was she going to help Poland or Rumania, for instance? She did not have the possibility of sending troops and could actually fulfill her obligations only by setting ablaze a general war.

All in all, however, it had to be stressed, that the situation of the axis was very strong and that it could defeat all possible opponents in a general conflict.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1877-PS

Report RAM 19/41

REPORT ON THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH MINISTER FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS [RAM] AND THE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER MATSUOKA IN BERLIN ON
29 MARCH 1941.

The RAM resumed the preceding conversation with Matsuoka about the latter’s impending talks with the Russians in Moscow, where they had left off. He expressed the opinion, that it would probably be best, in view of the whole situation, not to carry the discussions with the Russians too far. He did not know how the situation would develop. One thing, however, was certain, namely that Germany would strike immediately, should Russia ever attack Japan. He was ready to give Matsuoka this positive assurance, so that Japan could push forward to the South on Singapore, without fear of possible complications with Russia. The largest part of the German army was anyway on the Eastern frontiers of the Reich, and fully prepared to open the attack at any time. He (the RAM) however believed, that Russia would try to avoid developments leading to war. Should Germany however enter into a conflict with Russia, the USSR would be finished off within a few months. In this case, Japan had of course even less reason to be afraid than ever, if it wants to advance on Singapore. Consequently, it need not refrain from such an undertaking because of possible fears of Russia.

He could not know of course, just how things with Russia would develop. It was uncertain, whether or not Stalin would intensify his present unfriendly policy against Germany. He (the RAM) wanted to point out to Matsuoka in any case, that a conflict with Russia was anyhow within the realm of possibility. In any case, Matsuoka could not report to the Japanese Emperor upon his return, that a conflict between Russia and Germany was impossible. On the contrary, the situation was such, that such a conflict, even if it were not probable, would have to be considered possible. * * *

Next, the RAM turned again to the Singapore question. In view of the fears, expressed by the Japanese, of possible attacks by submarines, based on the Philippines and of the intervention of the British Mediterranean and Home fleets, he had again discussed the situation with General-Admiral Raeder. The latter had stated, that the British Navy during this year would have its hands so full in the English home waters and in the Mediterranean, that it would not be able to send even a single ship to the Far East. General-Admiral Raeder had described the U.S. submarines as so bad, that Japan need not bother about them at all.

Matsuoka replied immediately, that the Japanese Navy had a very low estimate of the threat from the British Navy; it also held the view, that in case of a clash with the American Navy, it would be able to smash the latter without trouble. However it was afraid, that the Americans would not take up the battle with their fleet; thus the conflict with the United States might perhaps be dragged out to five years. This possibility caused considerable worry in Japan.

The RAM replied, that America could not do anything against Japan in the case of the capture of Singapore. Perhaps for this reason alone, Roosevelt would think twice before deciding on active measures against Japan. For while on one hand he could not achieve anything against Japan, on the other hand there was the probability of losing the Philippines to Japan; for the American President, of course, this would mean a considerable loss of prestige, and because of the inadequate rearmament, he would have nothing with which to offset such a loss.

In this connection, Matsuoka pointed out, that he was doing everything to reassure the English about Singapore. He acted as if Japan had no intention at all regarding this key position of England in the East. Therefore it might be possible, that his attitude toward the British would appear to be friendly in words and in acts. However, Germany should not be deceived by that. He assumed this attitude not only in order to reassure the British, but also in order to fool the pro-British and pro-American elements so long, until one day he would suddenly open the attack on Singapore.

In this connection, Matsuoka stated, that his tactics were based on the certain assumption, that the sudden attack against Singapore would unite the entire Japanese nation with one blow. (“Nothing succeeds like success,” the RAM remarked.) He followed here the example of the words of a famous Japanese statesman, addressed to the Japanese Navy at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war: “You open fire, then the nation will be united”. The Japanese need to be shaken up to awaken. After all, as an oriental, he believed in the fate, which would come, whether you wanted it or not. * * *

Matsuoka then introduced the subject of German assistance in the blow against Singapore, a subject which had been broached to him frequently, and mentioned the proposal of a German written promise of assistance.

The RAM replied, that he had already discussed these questions with Ambassador Oshima. He had asked him to procure maps of Singapore in order that the Fuehrer--who probably must be considered the greatest expert on military questions at the present time--could advise Japan on the best method of attack against Singapore. German experts on aerial warfare, too, would be at their disposal; they could draw up a report, based on their European experiences, for the Japanese on the use of dive-bombers from airfields in the vicinity against the British fleet in Singapore. Thus the British fleet would be forced to disappear from Singapore immediately.

Matsuoka remarked, that Japan was less concerned with the British fleet, than with the capture of the fortifications.

The RAM replied, that here too, the Fuehrer had developed new methods for the German attacks on strongly fortified positions, such as the Maginot Line and Fort Eben Emael, which he could make available to the Japanese.

Matsuoka replied in this connection, that some of the younger expert Japanese naval officers, who were close friends of his, were of the opinion, that the Japanese naval forces would need three months until they could capture Singapore. As a cautious foreign minister, he had doubled this estimate. He believed, he could stave off any danger which threatened from America, for six months. If, however, the capture of Singapore required still more time and if the operations would perhaps even drag out for a year, the situation with America would become extremely critical and he did not know as yet how to meet it.

If at all avoidable, he would not touch the Netherlands East Indies, since he was afraid that in case of a Japanese attack on this area, the oilfields would be set afire. They could be brought into operation again only after 1 or 2 years.

The RAM added, that Japan would gain decisive influence over the Netherlands East Indies simultaneously with the capture of Singapore. * * *

Berlin, the 31st of March 1941.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1881-PS

Notes Fueh 20/41

NOTES

regarding the discussion between the FUEHRER and the Japanese Foreign Minister MATSUOKA in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister and of the Minister of State MEISSNER in Berlin on the 4th of April 1941.

Matsuoka further mentioned, that he was induced to make those endeavors for peace particularly in view of the personality of Cardinal Caspari.

Furthermore he had endeavored to convince the Pope, that the United States and particularly the American President prolonged the war in Europe and in China. It was not the question to determine, if America or its President were right or wrong. They certainly had their definite reasons for their policy. Notwithstanding the question of right or wrong, one had to state the fact that they prolonged the war in Europe and in China. In regard to China, he tried to convince the Pope that Japan was not fighting the Chinese or China herself, but merely the Bolshevism which threatened to spread in China and in the entire Far East. It is regretful that America and England sided with Bolshevism.

The Fuehrer interrupted that both countries also sided in Spain with Bolshevism.

Matsuoka then also expressed the request, that the Fuehrer should instruct the proper authorities in Germany to meet as broad-mindedly as possible the wishes of the Japanese Military Commission. Japan was in need of German help particularly concerning the U-boat warfare, which could be given by making available to them the latest experiences of the war as well as the latest technical improvements and inventions. Japan would do her utmost to avoid a war with the United States. In case that country should decide to attack Singapore, the Japanese navy, of course, had to be prepared for a fight with the United States, because in that case America probably would side with Great Britain. He (Matsuoka) personally believed, that the United States could be restrained by diplomatic exertions from entering the war at the side of Great Britain. The Army and Navy had, however, to count on the worst situation, that is with war against America. They were of the opinion that such a war would extend for five years or longer and would take the form of guerilla warfare in the Pacific and would be fought out in the South Sea. For this reason, the German experiences in her guerilla warfare are of the greatest value to Japan. It was a question how such a war would best be conducted and how all the technical improvements of submarines, in all details such as periscopes and such like, could best be exploited by Japan.

To sum up, Matsuoka requested that the Fuehrer should see to it that the proper German authorities should place those developments and inventions concerning navy and army which were needed by the Japanese at their disposal.

The Fuehrer promised this and pointed out that Germany too considered a conflict with the United States undesirable, but that it had already made allowances for such a contingency. In Germany one was of the opinion that America’s contributions depended upon the possibilities of transportation, and that this again is conditioned by the available tonnage. Germany’s war against tonnage, however, means a decisive weakening not merely against England, but also against America. Germany has made her preparations so that no American could land in Europe. She would conduct a most energetic fight against America with her U-boats and her Luftwaffe, and due to her superior experience, which would still have to be acquired by the United States, she would be vastly superior, and that quite apart from the fact that the German soldiers naturally rank high above the American.

In the further course of the discussion the Fuehrer pointed out that Germany on her part would immediately take the consequences, if Japan would get involved with the United States. It did not matter with whom the United States would first get involved if with Germany or with Japan. They would always try to eliminate one country at a time, not to come to an understanding with the other country subsequently, but to liquidate this one just the same. Therefore, Germany would strike, as already mentioned, without delay in case of a conflict between Japan and America, because the strength of the tripartite powers lies in their joint action, their weakness would be if they would let themselves be beaten individually.

Matsuoka once more repeated his request, that the Fuehrer might give the necessary instructions, in order that the proper German authorities would place at the disposal of the Japanese the latest improvements and inventions, which are of interest to them, because the Japanese navy had to prepare immediately for a conflict with the United States.

As regards Japanese-American relationship, Matsuoka explained further that he has always declared in his country, that sooner or later a war with the United States would be unavoidable, if Japan continued to drift along as at present. In his opinion this conflict would happen rather sooner than later. His argument went on, why should Japan, therefore, not decisively strike at the right moment and take the risk upon herself of a fight against America? Just thus would she perhaps avoid a war for generations, particularly if she gained predominance in the South Seas. There are, to be sure, in Japan many who hesitate to follow those trends of thought. Matsuoka was considered in those circles a dangerous man with dangerous thoughts. He, however, stated that, if Japan continued to walk along her present path, one day she would have to fight anyway and that this would then be under less favorable circumstances than at present.

The Fuehrer replied that he could well understand the situation of Matsuoka, because he himself was in similar situations (the clearing of the Rhineland, declaration of sovereignty of armed forces). He too was of the opinion that he had to exploit favorable conditions and accept the risk of an anyhow unavoidable fight at a time when he himself was still young and full of vigor. How right he was in his attitude was proven by events. Europe now was free. He would not hesitate a moment to reply instantly to any widening of the war, be it by Russia, be it by America. Providence favored those who will not let dangers come to them, but who will bravely face them.

Matsuoka replied, that the United States or rather their ruling politicians had recently still attempted a last maneuver towards Japan, by declaring that America would not fight Japan on account of China or the South Seas provided that Japan gave free passage to the consignments of rubber and tin to America to their place of destination. However, America would war against Japan the moment she felt that Japan entered the war with the intention to assist in the destruction of Great Britain. Such an argument naturally did not miss its effect upon the Japanese, because of the education oriented on English lines which many had received.

The Fuehrer commented on this, that this attitude of America did not mean anything but that the United States had the hope that, as long as the British World Empire existed, one day they could advance against Japan together with Great Britain, whereas, in case of the collapse of the World Empire, they would be totally isolated and could not do anything against Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister interjected that the Americans precisely under all circumstances wanted to maintain the powerful position of England in East Asia, but that, on the other hand, it is proved by this attitude to what extent she fears a joint action of Japan and Germany.

Matsuoka continued that it seemed to him of importance to give to the Fuehrer an absolutely clear picture of the real attitude inside Japan. For this reason he also had to inform him regretfully of the fact that he (Matsuoka) in his capacity as Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs could not utter in Japan itself a single word of all that he had expounded before the Fuehrer and the Reich Foreign Minister regarding his plans. This would cause him serious damage in political and financial circles. Once before he had committed the mistake, before he became Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, to tell a close friend something about his intentions. It seems that the latter had spread these things and thus brought about all sorts of rumors, which he as Foreign Minister had to oppose energetically, though as a rule he always tells the truth. Under these circumstances he also could not indicate, how soon he could report on the questions discussed to the Japanese Premier or to the Emperor. He would have to study exactly and carefully in the first place the development in Japan, so as to make his decision at a favorable moment, to make a clear breast of his proper plans towards the Prince Konoye and the Emperor. Then the decision would have to be made within a few days, because the plans would otherwise be spoiled by talk.

Should he, Matsuoka, fail to carry out his intentions, that would be proof that he is lacking in influence, in power of conviction, and in tactical capabilities. However, should he succeed it would prove that he had great influence in Japan. He himself felt confident that he would succeed.

On his return, being questioned, he would indeed admit to the Emperor, the Premier and the Ministers for the Navy and the Army, that Singapore had been discussed; he would, however, state that it was only on a hypothetical basis.

Besides this, Matsuoka made the express request not to cable in the matter of Singapore because he had reason to fear that, by cabling, something might leak out. If necessary he would send a courier.

The Fuehrer agreed and assured him, after all, that he could rest entirely assured of German reticence.

Matsuoka replied he believed indeed in German reticence, but unfortunately could not say the same of Japan.

The discussion was terminated after the exchange of some personal parting words.

Berlin, the 4th of April 1941.

Signed: SCHMIDT

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1882-PS

Aufz RAM 21/41

Notes on the talk between the Reich Foreign Minister and the Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin on 5 April 1941.

[Pages 2 to 3]

Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is to be expected with certainty.

In answer to a remark by Matsuoka, that Japan was now awakening and, according to the Japanese temperament, would take action quickly after the previous lengthy deliberation, the Reich Foreign Minister replied that it was necessary, of course, to accept a certain risk in this connection, just as the Fuehrer had done so successfully with the occupation of the Rhineland, with the proclamation of sovereignty of armament, and with the designation from the League of Nations. * * *

[Pages 9 to 11]

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the new German Reich would actually be built up on the basis of the ancient traditions of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which in its time was the only dominant power on the European Continent.

In conclusion, the Reich Foreign Minister once again summarized the points he wanted Matsuoka to take back to Japan with him from his trip:

1. Germany had already won the war. With the end of this year the world would realize this. Even England would have to concede it, if it had not collapsed before then, and America would also have to resign herself to this fact.

2. There were no conflicting interests between Japan and Germany. The future of both countries could be regulated for the long run on the basis that Japan should predominate in the Far East, Italy and Germany in Europe and Africa.

3. Whatever might happen, Germany would win the war. But it would hasten victory if Japan would enter the war. Such an entry into the war was undoubtedly more in the interest of Japan than in that of Germany, for it offered a unique opportunity which would hardly ever return, for the fulfillment of the national objectives of Japan, a chance which would make it possible for her to play a really leading role in East Asia.

Matsuoka replied that he himself could only repeat that he had long been of the opinion that every nation would be offered an opportunity only once in a thousand years. Japan was confronting such an opportunity, and she would have to assume the risk connected with it. She would have to act decisively at the right moment in order to take advantage of this unique opportunity.

Berlin, the 7th of April 1941
Sig. Schmidt

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1889-PS

_Account_ Concerning the conference of the Fuehrer with the Italian
Ambassador Attolico on August 31, 1939 at 1900 hours.

The Fuehrer handed the Italian Ambassador a copy of the German proposals and a press notice, pointing out that because of the Polish Government the proposals are now void. The mediation attempt of England must, therefore, be considered as having failed.

Ambassador Attolico recalled that the Fuehrer on the occasion of a mediation offer made a few days ago by Mussolini had declared that England had just made a proposal and that one would wait for its result. Since the Fuehrer had stated himself now, that the English proposal must be considered as having failed, the question arises now if the Duce on his part could not take over a mediation. He asks, therefore, the Fuehrer if it were all right if the Duce would mediate from now on.

The Fuehrer replied, one had to wait first of all for future developments. He is not in the mood to be slapped in the face time and again by Poland, and does not want to bring the Duce into an uncomfortable position through acceptance of his mediation. He is certain that because of the spiritual conception of the Poles, they wouldn’t listen to the Duce either.

To the question of Attolico whether herewith everything is at an end, the Fuehrer answered yes.

Herewith submitted to the Foreign Minister as per instructions. Berlin, 1 September 1939

(signed) Dr. Schmidt
Ambassador

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1893-PS

Organization Book of the NSDAP 1943 edition, Editor the Reich
Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley), Published by the
Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher Successor, Munich.

[Page 6 e.]

3. Resignations.

* * * * * * *

Authorized to decree dismissal on the basis of a lawful decision of a party court are:

(_a_) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter].
(_b_) The County Directors [Kreisleiter].
(_c_) The District Directors [Gauleiter].
(_d_) The Fuehrer.

[Page 7]

6. Duties of the Party Members.

The commandments of the National Socialists:

The Fuehrer is always right.

* * * * * * *

The program be your dogma:

It demands your utter devotion to the movement:

* * * * * * *

Right is, what serves the movement and thus Germany which means the
Nation.

* * * * * * *

[Page 13]

The aims of the Party are Only Ideological Ones.

It must be attempted to transfer all professional duties which, during the reconstruction in connection with the rebuilding of the Reich, are still being executed by the Party, to the affiliated organizations or, if possible, to the State administration in due time. If necessary, and if possible, directives to this effect will be issued by the competent officers of the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung].

The party as an instrument of ideological education, must grow to be the Leader Corps [Fuehrerkorps] of the German nation.

This Leader Corps is responsible for the complete penetration of the German Nation with the National Socialist spirit and to overcome the dependence on the international influences in which the nation is still partly rooted.

It will further be the duty of this Fuehrerkorps to see that the professional and general duties within the affiliated organizations and within the State administration will be handled according to National Socialist directives.

[Page 14]

The Political Director [Der Politische Leiter].

The basis of the Party organization is the Fuehrer thought. The public is unable to rule itself either directly or indirectly. The man best suited for the job will be a Fuehrer. He will be carried by the confidence of the people. All Political Directors stand as appointed by the Fuehrer and are responsible to him. They possess full authority towards the lower echelons. In choosing the Political Director the main consideration will be to put the right man in the right place * * * . In principle this is to be noted: Only a man who has absorbed the school of subordinate functions within the Party has a claim to the higher Fuehrer offices if he should be otherwise suited. We can only use Fuehrers who have served from the ground up. Any Political Director who does not conform to these principles is to be dismissed or to be sent back to the lower offices, as Blockleiter, Zellenleiter, for further training.

Each Political Director must be conscious always, as a Political Fuehrer, that leadership does not only confer greater powers, but first and foremost higher duties * * * .

[Page 15]

The Type of the Political Director.

All this shows the character of the Political Director. The Political Director is not an office worker but the Political Deputy of the Fuehrer * * * . With the Political Director we are building the political leadership of the State * * * . The type of the Political Director is not characterized by the office which he represents. There is no such thing as a Political Director of the NSBO, etc., but there is only the Political Director of the NSDAP.

[Page 16]

The Oath of the Political Director.

The Political Director is sworn in yearly. The oath is worded as follows:

“I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge unconditioned
obedience to him and the Fuehrers appointed by him.”

The Political Director is inseparably tied to the ideology and the organization of the NSDAP. His oath only ends with his death or with his expulsion from the National Socialist community.

[Page 17]

The Protection of the Honor of the Political Director.

The leading personalities of State and Party are protected against vicious attacks upon State and Party. (See Section 6).

This law primarily protects leading Party members from District Directors on up.

Should, however, a situation exist which is liable to degrade the Party and its institutions (for instance an allegation of embezzlement by a Kreisleiter in which matter nothing was being done which would mean, in other words, that bad conditions were tolerated) the prosecution may be directed by authority of paragraph 1 of the law.

In case of attacks which are liable to degrade the Party and its officers prosecution may be requested through the competent State prosecutor after consultation with the proper law office of the Party.

[Page 19]

The Appointment of Political Directors.

1. The Fuehrer appoints the following Political Directors:

(_a_) Reichsleiter and all Political Directors to include the Directors of the Women’s Leagues within the Reich Directorate [Reichsleitung].

(_b_) Gauleiters to include the Directors of an office of the Gau Directorate, as well as the Directors of the Women’s League’s of the Gau.

(_c_) Kreisleiters.

Their appointment will be published in the official paper [Verordnungsblatt].

2. The Gauleiter appoints:

(_a_) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues within the Gau Directorate, and the Directors of the Main Offices up to Associate Directors [Mitarbeiter].

(_b_) The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues in the Kreis Directorate.

(_c_) The Local Chapter Directors [Ortsgruppenleiter].

3. The Kreisleiter appoints: The Political Directors and the Directors of the Women’s Leagues of the Local Chapter [Ortsgruppen] to include Block and Cell Directors and Block Helpers, as well as the Political Directors in the factories (inasmuch as they are Party members). All Political Directors and Directors of the Women’s Leagues will be issued an identity card.

[Page 24]

All political directors irrespective of the local chapter, the county, or the district in which they may be in office will wear a uniform office suit.

All political directors irrespective in what party offices they execute their duties, be it in the political directorate, the administration, the party courts, the affiliated associations or in the factories, will wear a uniform office suit.

[Page 49]

_MEETINGS OF MEMBERS AND PUBLIC MEETINGS_

The bearers of sovereignty of the party are responsible for the membership meetings planned by all party offices and affiliated associations. They will be approved:

1. By the local chapter director if they do not go beyond the local chapter in their importance.

2. By the county directors if they do not go beyond the county in their importance.

3. The district directors if they have a general political significance for the district.

The meetings will be conducted along the lines laid down by the local organization and propaganda offices.

[Page 50]

_CELL EVENINGS OF THE NSDAP_

1. Time of meetings:

Cell evenings of the NSDAP will be held once a month.

2. Conduct of the Cell Evenings: