Chapter LI: Section 57: of the Weimar Constitution). The Reich-Ministers who act as (1)

advisers to the Fuehrer owe him loyalty and obedience in accordance with the oath they have to take by virtue of the law of 16 October 1934. The Fuehrer is therefore not “primus inter pares” (first among equal ones), as it was featured in the colleague-like system, but he is absolutely superior to the other Reich-Ministers. But, if therefore the principle of authority prevails within the Reich-Cabinet it is not permitted in this case in the least to become a formal bureaucratic mechanism like the one that characterized the Chancellor System of Bismarck. In the latter, the collaborators of the Reich-Chancellor, the State-Secretaries, were not independent and responsible chiefs of their departments, but they were the subordinates of the Chancellor and administered in his name and by his orders the various Reich-Offices, at the top of which stood the Chancellor. Even the law of 17 March 1878 concerning deputies did not change that state of affairs to any extent. Such a bureaucratic system does not permit the collaborators to develop a sense of enjoying responsible action and power of resolution and prevents genuine deliberation, the prerequisite of which is independence of the advisor. This is characteristic of an administrative state, where everything depends on the authoritarian technical functioning of the State apparatus. In the Reich of the Fuehrer the decisive factors are that the collaborators are subordinate leaders, that they are therefore possessed themselves with the desire for creative leadership and responsibility.

The Fuehrer does not avail himself of the Reich-Ministers as subordinate executive organs. The Reich-Cabinet is not a technical apparatus. It is therefore inadmissible to consider the Reich-Ministers as mere “Chiefs of Reich Offices” who preside over bureaucratic institutions, rather Reich-Ministers in particular must become genuine sub-leaders if the entire Reich is to be imbued with the spirit of the Fuehrer system. In the Reich Cabinet, the Fuehrer procures for himself the independent and responsible collaborators who do not only technically direct the various offices but who are also capable to act in a constructive and creative manner, within the scope of their assignments. The Reich-Ministers are therefore not only advisors but at the same time responsible creative assistants of the Fuehrer, who administer their offices independently under the direction of the Fuehrer. The prerequisite for the Fuehrer Principle which has been realized in the Reich-Cabinet, is independent cooperation based on confidence and responsibility, of the Fuehrer’s closest followers. Thus, the Fuehrer Principle presents far higher requirements than the bureaucratic absolutism and its not too different Chancellor System of Bismarck.

In view of this structure of the Reich-Cabinet it is only natural that the counter-signature, prescribed in Section 50 of the Weimar Constitution for all decrees and regulations issued by the Reich-President, becomes unnecessary for the decisions of the Fuehrer. They do not require the counter-signature of the Minister of the respective department. Compulsory counter-signature was an institution of the constitutional and parliamentary system. The Minister who counter-signed the orders of the Chief of State assumed thereby responsibility before parliament. The counter-signature was thus inseparably connected with the parliamentary responsibility of the Ministers; it lost its political foundation with the revolutionary elimination of parliamentarianism of any form. However, also in the New Reich during the period of Reich President Hindenburg’s administration, counter-signature of presidential acts by the Reich-Chancellor was maintained. Of course, the counter-signing Reich-Chancellor or Reich-Minister did not assume any more the “responsibility before the Reichstag”, as was the case within the limits of the Weimar parliamentary system. The counter-signature was used in this case rather as a suitable technical form for safeguarding the unified direction of the State as long as a dual Chief of State existed. This technical reason for maintaining the counter-signature was rendered unnecessary with the assumption of the presidential powers by the Fuehrer. Today, it is not necessary any more according to constitutional law. The decrees of the Fuehrer have legal force, even if they are not counter-signed by a Reich-Minister. Such was particularly the order of execution of the 4 Year Plan of 18 October 1936 (RGBl I, 887) which in fact contains a law issued by the Fuehrer alone without any counter-signature.

As a rule, the decrees of the Fuehrer, are on the other hand, even today co-signed by the Minister of the department concerned. Authorized to co-sign are the Reich-Ministers, within the limits of their departments. Furthermore the Chiefs of the Presidential-Chancellery and of the Reich-Chancellery for their departments (Decree of 22 November 1934, not published), and also the State-Secretaries of a Reich-Minister who is temporarily unavailable (Decree of 20 March 1935, RMinBl. 423). The decrees concerning the party are co-signed by the Deputy Commander of the Fuehrer, decrees concerning the range of problems of the 4 Year Plan by the Deputy of the 4 Year Plan and the military decrees by the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. The Chiefs of the Supreme Reich-Bureaus who are not Reich-Ministers are not authorized to co-sign.

Co-signature is being regularly maintained for two reasons. For once, the co-signature brings out the fact that the Minister of the department is more than a mere technical auxiliary tool of the Fuehrer, that he performs rather independent and objective work which requires of course the approval of the Fuehrer but which is nevertheless the Minister’s own work and performance. Thus, the co-signature gives prominence to the fact that the Minister is an independent collaborator and not only an executive instrument. Also, the co-signature is therefore documentary proof--and this is the second reason--for the responsibility of the Minister of the department, naturally not before the Parliament but before the Fuehrer himself. By co-signing the Minister accepts the responsibility before the Fuehrer that the decree is practical, has been carefully considered and thoroughly worked out. Such a responsibility of the Minister before the Chief of the State could not exist under the radical parliamentary Republic. The independence of the Minister from the Chief of State and his responsibility before the Parliament would have been weakened in that way. Under the old constitutional system, on the other hand, (as well as under the presidential system formed after the constitutional system) this responsibility of the counter-signing Minister also before the Chief of State was in existence. This type of “Minister responsibility” is indispensable under the Fuehrer Constitution. In view of the number and the importance of affairs, it is self-evident that the Fuehrer needs the advice, the suggestions, and the proposals of his collaborators; political leadership is impossible without reliable collaborators. The Ministers are responsible to the Fuehrer by their oath for competent and reliable counsel and preparation of his decisions. This responsibility of the Ministers of the various departments finds its public expression by their counter-signature. This counter-signature is not necessary, nevertheless. The Fuehrer can do without it and issue all decrees and decisions which have full legal effect by his own accord.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1775-PS

The OKW is asking the Fuehrer’s decision, concerning the following proposals:

Orders will be given immediately, after the detailed numbers and letters have been released by the Leader, for accomplishment.

1. To take no real preparatory measures in the Army or Luftwaffe. No troop movements or redeployments.

2. Spread false, but quite credible news, which may lead to the conclusion of military preparations against Austria,

_a._ through V-men [V-Maenner] in Austria,
_b._ through our customs personnel at the frontier,
_c._ through traveling agents.

3. Such news could be:

_a._ Furloughs are supposed to have been barred in the Sector of the
VII A.K.

_b._ Rolling stock is being assembled in Munich, Augsburg, and
Regensburg.

_c._ Major General Muff, the Military Attaché in Vienna has been
called for a conference to Berlin. (As a matter of fact, this is
the case).

_d._ The Police Stations located at the frontier of Austria, have
called up reinforcements.

_e._ Custom officials report about the imminent maneuvers of the
Mountain Brigade in the region of Freilassing, Reichenhall and
Berchtesgaden.

4. Order a very active make-believe-wireless exchange in Wehrkreis VII and between Berlin and Munich.

5. Real maneuvers, training flights, and winter maneuvers of the Mountain Troops near the frontier.

6. Admiral Canaris has to be ready beginning on February 14th in the Service Command Headquarters in order to carry out measures given by order of the Chief of the OKW.

7. An answer is requested to Lt General Keitel through the Reich-Chancery.

Signed--Keitel.

14.2 7:30 Captain Eberhardt gives the information by phone,
that the Fuehrer has given his approval in all points.
Answer came only around 2 at night through Reich-Chancellery.

9:00 Telephone message transmitted to Admiral Canaris in
Munich.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1778-PS

THE POISONOUS MUSHROOM [Der Giftpilz]

A Stuermer book for young and old Fables by Ernst Hiemer
Pictures by Fips
Published by Der Stuermer--Nurnberg copyright 1938

* * * * * * *

[P.6] “It is almost noon,” he said, “now we want to summarize what we have learned in this lesson. What did we discuss?”

All children raise their hands. The teacher calls on Karl Scholz, a little boy on the first bench. “We talked about how to recognize a Jew.”

“Good! Now tell us about it!”

Little Karl takes the pointer, goes to the black board and points to the sketches.

“One usually recognizes a Jew by his nose. The Jewish nose is crooked at the end. It looks like the figure 6. Therefore it is called the “Jewish Six”. Many non-Jews have crooked noses, too. But their noses are bent, not at the end but further up. Such a nose is called a hook nose or eagle’s beak. It has nothing to do with a Jewish nose.”

“Right!” says the teacher. “But the Jew is recognized not only by his nose...” The boy continues. The Jew is also recognized by his lips. His lips are usually thick. Often the lower lip hangs down. That is called “sloppy”. And the Jew is also recognized by his eyes. His eyelids are usually thicker and more fleshy than ours. The look of the Jew is lurking and sharp.

[P.9] Then the teacher goes to the desk and turns over the black board, on its back is a verse. The children recite it in chorus:

From a Jew’s countenance--the evil devil talks to us,

The devil, who in every land--is known as evil plague.

If we shall be free of the Jew--and again will be happy and glad,

Then the youth must struggle with us--to subdue the Jew devil.

[P.32] Inge sits in the reception room of the Jew doctor. She has to wait a long time. She looks through the journals which are on the table. But she is much too nervous to read even a few sentences. Again and again she remembers the talk with her mother. And again and again her mind reflects on the warnings of her leader of the BDM [League of German Girls]: “A German must not consult a Jew doctor! And particularly not a German girl! Many a girl that went to a Jew doctor to be cured, found disease and disgrace!”

When Inge had entered the waiting room, she experienced an extraordinary incident. From the doctor’s consulting room she could hear the sound of crying. She heard the voice of a young girl: “Doctor, doctor leave me alone!”

Then she heard the scornful laughing of a man. And then all of a sudden it became absolutely silent. Inge had listened breathlessly.

“What may be the meaning of all this?” she asked herself and her heart was pounding. And again she thought of the warning of her leader in the BDM.

Inge was already waiting for an hour. Again she takes the journals in an endeavor to read. Then the door opens. Inge looks up. The Jew appears. She screams. In terror she drops the paper. Frightened she jumps up. Her eyes stare into the face of the Jewish doctor. And this face is the face of the devil. In the middle of this devil’s face is a huge crooked nose. Behind the spectacles two criminal eyes. And the thick lips are grinning. A grinning that expresses: “Now I got you at last, you little German girl!”

And then the Jew approaches her. His fleshy fingers stretch out after her. But now Inge has her wits. Before the Jew can grab hold of her, she hits the fat face of the Jew doctor with her hand. Then one jump to the door. Breathlessly Inge runs down the stairs. Breathlessly she escapes the Jew house.

[P.61]

The pimpf [Hitler boy between 10-14] so far has not said anything. Suddenly he stops. Then he grasps his two friends by the arm and pulls them away. They stop in front of a bill-board. They read a large poster. It says Julius Streicher makes an address in the People’s Hall about “The Jews are our misfortune”.

“That is where we go!” shouts Konrad, “I wanted to hear him speak for a long time.” “I have heard him once before at a meeting two years ago,” says Erich. “Do tell us all about it!” the two pimpfs beg.

The Hitler youth recounts:

“The meeting was overcrowded. Many thousands of people attended. To begin with, Streicher talked of his experiences in the years of struggle, and of the tremendous achievements of the Hitler Reich. Then he began to talk about the Jewish question. All he said was so clear and simple that even we boys could follow it. Again and again he told about examples taken from life. At one time he talked most amusingly and cracked jokes, making all of us laugh. Then again he became most serious, and it was so quiet in the hall that one could hear a needle drop. He talked of the Jews and their horrible crimes. He talked of the serious danger which Judaism is for the whole world.

“Without a solution of the Jewish question there will be no salvation
of mankind.”

That is what he shouted to us. All of us could understand him. And when, at the end, he shouted the “Sieg-Heil” for the Fuehrer, we all acclaimed him with tremendous enthusiasm. For two hours Streicher spoke at that occasion. To us it appeared to have been but a few minutes.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1780-PS

Excerpts from General Jodl’s Handwritten Diary, February 1937-August
1939.

_1937_

_4 February_:

Decisive conference about the scarcity of raw materials by the Commissioner of four-year plan.

Only 50% of steel and iron available, therefore rationing necessary. Full allotment only for export. Armed forces and constructions for four-year plan must be cut down by about 40%. Therefore, requests for money have to be converted into requirements for raw materials. Three branches of the Armed Forces and L. for R.V. special resources must make up a priority sequence. Until further notice no more orders to be placed with industry so they will have a chance to fill the many orders previously placed with them.

The sentence “Money is an unimportant factor” has come true, even in another sense. The main part is the raw materials.

Bad harvest and [illegible], especially bread grain [Brotgetreide], demand considerable use of foreign currency for the feeding of the people.

_31 March_:

Report to the Minister about the maneuvers of the Armed Forces. The Field Marshal emphasized the necessity to bring some influence to bear (on the maneuvers) in so far as a special Armed Forces problem has to be dealt with daily. These exercises are to be designated as “Armed Forces Maneuvers” (army, etc.). After two years, a two front war i.e., two maneuvers, should be presented.

_5 November_:

Hitler develops his ideas of future development, intentions, and conduct of policy to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force.

There is a divergence in the recording of his ideas as made by the Chief of the Armed Forces Office (War Department) [des Chef WA (R Kr. Min)] and by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (Directive to the Chief of the General Staff of Air Force). (No minutes were kept).

Intention of L to put ideas on paper and transmit them to the Services (C-in-C Air Force); furthermore, to incorporate them into mobilization instructions.

_1938_

_11 February_:

In the evening and on 12 February General K., with General v. Reichenau and Sperrle, at the Obersalzberg. Schuschnigg together with G. Schmidt are again being put under heaviest political and military pressure. At 2300 hours Schuschnigg signs protocol.

_13 February_:

In the afternoon General K. asks Admiral C. and myself to come to his apartment. He tells us that the Fuehrer’s order is to the effect that military pressure by shamming military action should be kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers are drafted and submitted to the Fuehrer by telephone for approval.

_14 February_:

At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Fuehrer arrives. Canaris went to Munich to the Counter-Intelligence office VII and initiates the different measures.

The effect is quick and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.

_15 February_:

In the evening an official communique about the positive results of the conference at the Obersalzberg is issued.

_16 February_:

Changes in the Austrian government and general political amnesty.

_22 February_:

At 1300 hours General K. sees the Fuehrer in order to inform him about the planned advances [Vorstoesse].

_3 March_:

The Austrian question is becoming critical. 100 officers shall be dispatched there. The Fuehrer wants to see them personally. They should not see to it that the Austrian Armed Forces will fight better against us, but rather that they do not fight at all.

_10 March_:

By surprise and without consulting his ministers, Schuschnigg ordered a plebiscite for Sunday, 13 March, which would bring strong majority for the Legitimists in the absence of plan or preparation.

Fuehrer is determined not to tolerate it. The same night, March 9 to 10, he calls for Goering. General v. Reichenau is called back from Cairo Olympic Committee. General v. Schebert is ordered to come, as well as Minister Glaise-Horstenau, who is with the District leader [Gauleiter] Burckel in the Palatinate. General Keitel communicates the facts at 1:45. He drives to the Reichskanzlei at 10 o’clock. I follow at 10:15, according to the wish of General v. Viebahn, to give him the old draft.

“Prepare case Otto.”

1300 hours: General K informs Chief of Operational Staff (and) Admiral Canaris. Ribbentrop is being detained in London. Neurath takes over the Foreign Office.

Fuehrer wants to transmit ultimatum to the Austrian Cabinet. A personal letter is dispatched to Mussolini and the reasons are developed which force the Fuehrer to take action.

1830 hours: Mobilization order is given to the Command of the 8th Army (Corps Area 3), 7th and 13th Army Corps; without reserve Army.

Air puts 300 JU-52 in readiness for dropping of propaganda pamphlets. In addition, one Pursuit Squadron [Jagdgruppe], 3 bomber groups [Kampfgeschwader] and two companies as airborne troops with transport planes are held ready at civilian airports [Friedensflugplatze] in Bavaria.

Subordinated to the Army are: one commander of the Air Force, 2F, 3H Squadrons, courier squadron, 1 heavy AA Bn., Regt. General Goering.

_11 March_:

Instruction No. 1 of the Fuehrer is given on 11 March at 2:00 without signature; at 1300 hours with his signature.

The Army is joined by the SS Military Units (V. T.) by regiments, 40,000 men of the police and the Totenkopf Unit Upper-Bavaria as second wave.

1700 hours: The Navy has ordered all ships back home.

1800 hours: Schuschnigg has resigned; Seyss-Inquart is chancellor. SA and SS perform duty in uniform. Own movements have commenced. Frontier will not be crossed at the moment. Air Force plans large scale propaganda flights for tomorrow. The police force will be needed in any case and will be mixed with the troops.

1835 hours: Department L. has been informed. Colonel Winkler and Oberfuehrer Petri have also been informed. The Air Force has its doubts if it should initiate the movements that have not yet started.

Decision: yes.

2030 hours: Briefing received from Major General Viebahn that the situation has changed once more. The occupation will take place.

_Later undated entry._

After annexation of Austria, the Fuehrer mentions that there is no hurry to solve the Czech question because Austria has to be digested first. Nevertheless, preparations for Case Green will have to be carried out energetically; they will have to be newly prepared on the basis of the changed strategic position because of the annexation of Austria. State of preparations (see memorandum L I a of 19 April) reported to the Fuehrer on 21 April.

The intention of the Fuehrer not to touch the Czech problem as yet is changed because of the Czech strategic troop concentration of 21 May, which occurs without any German threat and without the slightest cause for it.

Because of Germany’s self-restraint, its consequences lead to a loss of prestige of the Fuehrer, which he is not willing to take once more. Therefore, the new order is issued for “green” on 30 May.

_22 May_:

Fundamental conference between the Fuehrer and K. Henlein (see enclosure).

_23 May_:

Major Schmundt reports ideas of the Fuehrer. Further conferences, which gradually reveal the exact intentions of the Fuehrer, take place with the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command (OKW) on 28 May, 3 and 9 June, see enclosures. (War Diary L)

_30 May_:

The Fuehrer signs directive Green, where he states his final decision to destroy Czechoslovakia soon and thereby initiates military preparation all along the line. The previous intentions of the Army must be changed considerably in the direction of an immediate break-through into Czechoslovakia right on D-Day [X-Tag], combined with aerial penetration by the Air Force. Further details are derived from directive for strategic concentration of the army. The whole contrast becomes acute once more between the Fuehrer’s intuition that we must do it this year and the opinion of the army that we cannot do it as yet, as most certainly the Western Powers will interfere and we are not as yet equal to them.

_10 August_:

The Army chiefs and the chiefs of the Air Force groups, Lt. Col. Jeschonnek and myself are ordered to the Berghof. After dinner the Fuehrer makes a speech lasting for almost three hours, in which he develops his political thoughts. The subsequent attempts to draw the Fuehrer’s attention to the defects of our preparation, which are undertaken by a few generals of the Army, are rather unfortunate. This applies especially to the remark of General Wietersheim, in which to top it off he claims to quote from General Adams [die er noch dazu dem General Adams in den Mund legt] that the western fortifications can only be held for three weeks. The Fuehrer becomes very indignant and flames up, bursting into the remark that in such a case the whole Army would not be good for anything. “I assure you, General, the position will not only be held for three weeks, but for three years.” The cause of this despondent opinion, which unfortunately enough is held very widely within the Army General Staff, is based on various reasons. First of all, it (the General Staff) is restrained by old memories; political considerations play a part as well, instead of obeying and executing its military mission. That is certainly done with traditional devotion, but the vigor of the soul is lacking because in the end they do not believe in the genius of the Fuehrer. And one does perhaps compare him with Charles XII. And since water flows downhill, this defeatism may not only possibly cause immense political damage, for the opposition between the Generals’ opinion and that of the Fuehrer is common talk, but may also constitute a danger for the morale of the troops. But I have no doubt that [?] the Fuehrer will be able to boost the morale of the people in an unexpected way when the right moment comes.

_21-26 August_:

Visit to Germany of the Hungarian Regent [Reichsverweser]. Accompanied by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Honved Minister v. Raatz [?].

They arrive with the idea that in the course of a great war, after a few years, and with the help of German troops, the old state of Hungary can be reestablished. They leave with the understanding that we have neither demands from, nor claims against them, but that Germany will not stand for a second provocation by Czechoslovakia, even if it should be tomorrow. If they want to participate at that moment, it is up to them.

Germany, however, will never play the role of arbitrator between them and Poland. The Hungarians agree; but they believe that, when the issue arises, a period of 48 hours would be indispensable to them to find out Yugoslavia’s attitude.

_6 September_:

Chief of General Staff, General of Artillery Halder, has a conference with the Hungarian Chief of General Staff Fischer.

Before that he is briefed by me on the political attitude of the Fuehrer--especially his order not to give any hint on the exact moment. The same with OQI, General v. Stuelpnagel.

_8 September_:

General Stuelpnagel OQI asks for written assurance that the Army High Command will be informed five days in advance if the plan is to take place. I agree and add that the over-all meteorological situation can be estimated to some extent only for two days in advance, and that therefore, the plans may be changed up to this moment. (D-day-2) [X-2 Tage].

General Stuelpnagel mentions that for the first time he wonders whether the previous basis of the plan is not being abandoned. It presupposed that the Western Powers would not interfere decisively. It gradually seems as if the Fuehrer would stick to his decision even though he may no longer be of this opinion. It must be added that Hungary is at least moody and Italy reserved.

I must admit that I am worrying too, when comparing the change of opinion about political and military potentialities, according to directives of 24 June, 5 Nov 37, 7 Dec 37, 30 May 38, with the last statements.

In spite of that one must be aware of the fact that the other nations will do everything they can to apply pressure to us. We must pass this test of nerves, but because only very few people know the art of withstanding this pressure successfully, the only possible solution is to inform only a very small circle of officers of news that causes us anxiety, and not to have it circulated through anterooms as heretofore.

1800 hours to 2100 hours: Conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force (present were Jeschonnek, Kammhuber, Sternburg and myself).

We agree about the promulgation of the D-day order [X-Befehl] (X-1, 4 o’clock) and preannouncement to the Air Force (D-Day-1, 7 o’clock). The “Y time” has yet to be examined; some formations have an approach flight of one hour.

_10 September_:

General Halder back from Nurnberg. He reports that the Fuehrer signed decree subordinating the Reich Labor Service to the Army High Command, as of 15 September. Furthermore it was decided that the 13th and 2nd motorized divisions would join the Reichenau Army and their place would be taken by two other divisions [3 words illegible].

_11 September_:

In the afternoon conference with Secretary of State Jahnke from the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda on imminent common tasks.

The joint preparations for refutation [Wiederlegung] of our own violations of international law, and the exploitation of its violations by the enemy, were considered particularly important.

_15 September_:

In the morning conference with Chief of Army High Command and Chief of General Staffs of Army and Air Forces; the question was discussed what could be done if the Fuehrer insists on advancement of the date, due to the rapid development of the situation.

_16 September_:

General Keitel returns from the Berghof at 1700 hours. He graphically describes the results of the conference between Chamberlain and the Fuehrer. The next conference will take place on the 21st or the 22nd in Godesberg.

With consent of the Fuehrer, the order is given in the evening by the Armed Forces High Command to the Army High Command and to the Ministry of Finance, to line up the V.G.A.D. along the Czech border.

In the same way, an order is issued to the railways to have the empty rolling stock kept in readiness clandestinely for the strategic concentrations of the Army, so that it can be transported starting 28 September.

_17 September_:

Contrary to the previous intention to transfer all Sudeten Germans with previous military training to the Replacement Army, the Fuehrer issues order to unite them into a Sudeten German Free Corps. The Armed Forces High Command puts Lt. Col. Koechling (reporter on youth questions) at the disposal of Konrad Henlein as advisor to Henlein.

_19 September_:

Order is given to the Army High Command to take care of the Sudeten German Free Corps.

_20 September_:

England and France have handed over their demands in Prague, the contents of which are still unknown. The activities of the Free Corps start assuming such an extent that they may bring about, and already have brought about, consequences harmful to the plans of the Army. (Transferring rather strong units of the Czech Army to the proximity of border). By checking with Lt. Col. Koechling, I attempt to lead these activities into normal channels.

Toward the evening the Fuehrer also takes a hand and gives permission to act only with groups up to 12 men each, after the approval of the Corps HQ.

_21 September_:

The motorized reinforcements by the L. take effect.

1130 hours: Telephone call from the Adjutant of the Fuehrer, Captain Engel, (it is submitted during the conference with the Chiefs by Captain Eberhardt). “The Fuehrer has received news five minutes ago that Prague is said to have accepted unconditionally.”

1245 hours: Department heads are informed and directive is given to continue preparation for “Green”, but nevertheless to get ready with everything necessary for a peaceful penetration. Orders to the Ic and Ib of Navy High Command and Chief of General Staff of the Air Force; General Stumpf to be informed.

_22 September_:

1920 hours: Ia reports about a telephone call from Godesberg by General von Stuelpnagel on behalf of Keitel. Subject: a) Date cannot yet be ascertained (D-Day); continue preparations according to plan. In case “Green” occurs, it will not be before 30 September. If it occurs sooner, it will probably be improvised.

_25 September_:

By order of the Fuehrer, two Death Head [Totenkopf] SS battalions have moved into the panhandle territory near Asch [Acher Zipfel] to the rear of the Free Corps.

_26 September_:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, acting through the Army High Command, has stopped the intended approach march of the advance units to the Czech border, because it is not yet necessary and because the Fuehrer does not intend to march in before the 30th in any case. Order to approach towards the Czech frontier need be given on the 27th only.

In the evening of the 26th, fixed radio stations of Breslau, Dresden and Vienna are put at the disposal of the Reich. Ministry for Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda for interference with possible Czech propaganda transmissions.

Question by department “Foreign Countries” whether Czechs are to be allowed to leave and cross Germany. Decision from Chief of the Armed Forces High Command: yes.

1515 hours: The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command informs General Stumpf about the result of the Godesberg conversations and about the Fuehrer’s opinion. In no case will X day be before the 30th.

It is important that we do not permit ourselves to be drawn into military engagements because of false reports, before Prague replied.

A question of Stumpf about Y hour results in the reply that on account of the weather situation, a simultaneous intervention of the Air Force and Army cannot be expected. The Army needs the dawn, the Air Force can only start later on account of frequent fogs.

The Fuehrer has to make a decision for the commanders in chief who is to have priority.

The opinion of Stumpf is also that the attack of the Army has to proceed. The Fuehrer has not made any decision as yet about commitment against Prague.

2000 hours: The Fuehrer addresses the people and the world in an important speech at the Sportspalast.

_27 September_:

1320 hours: The Fuehrer consents to the first wave of attack being advanced to a line from where they can arrive in the assembly area by 30 September.

_28 September_:

Stapf (?) reports about a conference with Goering where the latter states that a Great War can hardly be avoided any longer. It may last 7 years, and we will win it.

1700 hours: Tension relaxes. The Fuehrer has decided on a conference with Chamberlain, the Duce, and Daladier in Munich.

_29 September_:

The pact of Munich is signed. Czechoslovakia as a power is out. Four zones as set forth will be occupied between the 2nd and 7th of October. The remaining part of mainly German character will be occupied by the 10th of October. The genius of the Fuehrer and his determination not to shun even a World War have again won the victory without the use of force. The hope remains that the incredulous, the weak and the doubtful people have been converted and will remain that way.

_1939_

_23 August_:

Received order from Armed Forces High Command to proceed to Berlin and take over position of Chief of Armed Forces Executive Office. (WFA).

1100 hours-1330 hours: Discussions with Chief of Armed Forces High Command. X day has been announced for 26 August. Y time has been announced for 0430 hours.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1786-PS

WAR DIARY OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OPERATIONS STAFF

WF. St. KTB (1) 1943
14 Mar. 1943

The treatment of captured partisans has been laid down in the combat directive for the combatting of partisans in the East [Kampfanweisung fuer die Bandenbekaempfung] of 27.11.42 (cf. 27.11/11/1) and Hitler’s order [Fuehrerbefehl] of 16.12 (cf. 16.12/1). On the basis of the foregoing the Reichsfuehrer SS ordered on the 30.12 that persons suspected of being partisans or their assistants, who are not to be executed, are to be transferred to concentration camps in Germany.

This order, which corresponds to the terms of reference already decreed, differs from an order already given on the 30.10.42 by the Commander in Chief [Oberbefehlshaber] of the 18th Army, which calls for the shooting without discrimination of all members of partisan groups and which is covered by the subsequent orders of the 15.11 and 16.12 only on their strictest interpretation. The Reichsfuehrer SS therefore sent to the Armed Forces Operations Staff [Wehrmachtfuehrungstab] on the 21.1 a letter of the Chef der S.P. and S.D. in which it is requested that, in the area of the 18th Army also, partisan helpers and persons suspected of such activity, should be dealt with in accordance with the terms of reference of 30.12.

The Armed Forces Operations Staff handed the matter over on the 25.1 to the Army General Staff [Generalstab des Heeres] competent for the combatting of partisans, and thereby conforming with the ruling given by the Reichsfuehrer SS. This decision was confirmed by the Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces [Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht].

Since the ruling of the combat directive, figs. 85, 86 & 104, provides for work in Germany as a punitive measure for partisan helpers and suspects and has proved to be disadvantageous for the enlistment of voluntary workers, the General Plenipotentiary for Labour [Generalbevollmaechtigter fuer den Arbeitseinsatz], has requested that no threat of forced labour in Germany as a punitive measure should be made, or that at least, suspects should be described as such to the labour authorities for the purpose of supervision.

The General Quartermaster together with the Economic Staff (East) [Wirtschaftsstab Ost] has proposed that the deportees should be sent either to prison camps or to “training centers in their own area”, and that deportation to Germany should take place only when the deportees are on probation and in less serious cases.

In view of the Armed Forces Operations Staff this proposal does not take sufficient account of the severity required and leads to a comparison with the treatment meted out to the “peaceful population” which has been called upon to work. He recommends therefore transportation to concentration camps in Germany which have already been introduced by the Reichsfuehrer SS for his sphere and which he is prepared to introduce for the Armed Forces [Wehrmacht] in the case of an extension to the province of the latter. The High Command of the Armed Forces [Oberkommando der Wehrmacht] therefore orders that partisan helpers and suspects who are not to be executed should be handed over to the competent Higher SS and Police Leader and orders that the difference between “punitive work” and “work in Germany” is to be made clear to the population.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1796-PS

7 April 1941

W Kr Gesch.

Copy

3 Copies, 3rd Copy

Major of the General Staff Deyhle

Berlin, 18 October 1940
2 Copies, 2nd Copy

Notes to the War Diary

1st. End of March 1939:

The Fuehrer decides to make military preparations for the gradual, seemingly unavoidable conflict with _Poland_, in such manner that these can be executed in late summer 1939. Thereby the Fuehrer hopes only to have to wage war on one front (“Fall Weiss”).

2nd. The following months: _Minutes under the Fuehrer’s influence_:

_a._ Attack by the forces from East Prussia;--OKH will first of all deploy the forces from South West Part of East Prussia in order to eliminate the Corridor as soon as possible. The Fuehrer considers attack further East more suitable in order to reach a decisive solution at the very beginning (causing the Vistula line to fall, thereby preventing the Poles from making a new stand behind the Vistula).

_b._ Forming of 14 divisions. Fourth wave (Welle) to consist of E units.

_c._ All preparations to be camouflaged as defensive measures.

_Basis_ for 1st and 2nd:

_a._ Directive for “Fall Weiss” OKW/L of April 1939.

_b._ “Chronological table” for Weiss OKW/L of July 1939.

_c._ Correspondence OKW/L with sections of the Armed Forces.

_d._ Beginning of the War diary L.

3rd. August 1939:

_In spite of the English guarantee to Poland_, and thereby a war on 2 fronts becoming almost unavoidable, the Fuehrer decides to settle the account with Poland after having prevented encirclement by means of _an agreement with Russia_.

4th. September 1939: _Polish Campaign mainly under the Influence of
the Fuehrer_:

_a._ “Great Pincers” (strongly motorized forces to attack the Eastern part of East Prussia towards South behind Vistula, moreover motorized forces to push forward in plenty of time across lower Vistula towards East Prussia).

_b._ Capture of Warsaw. Must be carried out _before_ the Russians reach the Vistula.

_c._ Reinforcement of the Western Front. Extension northwards to the Belgian/Dutch border, in order to incite the French/British Army to march into Holland and Belgium; in addition to this also hasten the construction of the Northern part of the West Wall.

5th. End of September 1939:

_Decision of the Fuehrer_, to attack _in the West_ and this as soon as possible since the French/British Army is not yet ready. Intention of attacking through Belgium and Holland (at least southern part) is certain from the start. From the very beginning it is the Fuehrer’s idea not to repeat the Schlieffen-plan but to attack in approximately a west-north western direction through Belgium and Luxembourg under strong protection of the Southern flank, and to gain the Channel coast.

After conclusion of the Eastern campaign the restrictions hitherto existing in regard to warfare in the West are progressively being lifted. They served the purpose, while the Eastern campaign was in Progress, of not inciting the enemy in the West to greater action, by German measures.

6th. October 1939:

Attack to begin at the earliest about 10 Nov. OKH is of the opinion that the preparations of the Army will not be absolutely complete by this time. Frequently the opinion is advocated--by no means shared by the Fuehrer--that an attack in the West is unnecessary, the war could perhaps be won for us satisfactorily if we were to wait a little.

Fuehrer is determined to attack in November only if the _weather_ will permit operations by the mass of the Luftwaffe since only then can one of our most important trumps become effective.

How situation would turn out if _France/England_ march into _Belgium/Holland_, is constantly the concern of the Fuehrer. Immediate attack of the German Western Army [Sofortfall] must be prepared for this event.

7th. End of October 1939: _Influence of the Fuehrer_:

_a._ Employment of _motorized_ forces in direction Sedan is suggested by the Fuehrer. Preparations are under way for moving Army group B and concentrating them at A after, in accordance with previous deployment of troops, main concentration had been at Army Group B.

_b._ Re-occupation of Holland, it has been decided that Holland is not to be occupied for the time being, rapid occupation in case of English landing should however be possible at any time.

_c._ Question of using parachute and airborne troops is being taken up by the Fuehrer.

8th. Beginning of November 1939: Mainly under _Influence of the Fuehrer_:

_a._ Permanent reinforcement of the southern mot. group, which is to advance against Sedan.

_b._ Reinforcement of the Western Army to the utmost capacity.

The weather conditions prevent the execution of the attack in the West.

9th. 23 November 1939: _Speech by the Fuehrer_ to the Generals and Admirals.

10th. End of November 1939: _Influence of the Fuehrer_ above all

_a._ Holland is to be occupied immediately.

_b._ Shifting of the main concentration of Army Group B to A appears to have even better prospects.

_c._ Deployment of 7th FL. Div. (Deliberation of further possibilities).

_d._ Important to maintain element of surprise, therefore motorized units which are still all located at home will be moved up to the Rhine in order not to betray to the enemy the imminent beginning of the attack, by the moving up to the front.

_e._ Capture of the bridges at Maastricht and of the Fort Eben Emael, since destruction of the bridges would render impossible the fast advance of the sixth Army.

First directive for _warfare against England_ (no. 9) is issued. Purpose: concentration of all combat weapons for important targets.

At a conference in the map-room of the OKW (Supreme Command of the Armed Forces) in the Reich Chancellery, the Fuehrer expresses anew his opinion that _the attack planned in the West_ will lead to the greatest victory in world history.

11th. December 1939:

In spite of the _severe winter_ the Fuehrer as always still continues to consider it desirable to carry out the _attack in the West_ as soon as possible and not to delay it until spring. Reasons:

_a._ England/France must not be allowed under any circumstances to steal a march on us by occupying Belgium and Holland since then--on account of the danger to the Ruhrbasin--the war could hardly be won.

_b._ Time is not on our side but on the enemy’s (see notes of Major Deyhle).

The Fuehrer is carefully watching the Russo-Finnish war (on account of the possibility of the Western powers joining in to the advantage of Finland).

12th. Beginning of January 1940:

The introductory movements in _preparation for the big attack_ are ordered anew by the Fuehrer, soon however checked again on account of the weather condition, although most important operational basis fall into Belgian hands and thereby there is a possibility of our intentions becoming known.

For the deployment of the 7th FL. Division a new possibility becomes more and more probable: Capture of the “Fortress Holland”.

13th. Middle of January 1940:

During the past weeks probable _dates_ for our attack in the West _have become known_ in Belgium and Holland. The reason can not be determined, the main fault lies possibly in the long waiting time just before the attack (issue of order 7 days beforehand).

In order better to maintain the _surprise_ element beyond the time of attack, the Fuehrer orders therefore a _change in the alert procedure_.

The idea that the decisive point of the attack will have to be reached by breaking through Southern Belgium (thus the total attack to be concentrated on the left) is being worked out by the Fuehrer in even greater detail.

The occupation of the whole of Holland is ordered. For this also the 7th FL. Division is to be employed. Extensive deceptive measures are ordered. The “Sofortfall” remains in effect.

The Fuehrer _makes up his mind_ to utilize the Danish and _Norwegian space_ for the German warfare.

The Fuehrer considers what possibilities exist for forming new units. The setting up of the division’s 7th and 8th wave is then ordered. * * *

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1799-PS

War Diary; Armed Forces Operations Staff (L/K.T.B. WFSt, Volume 6A, 1
Aug. 1940-26 Mar. 1941)

ANNEX 1

Report to the Fuehrer on 5 December 1940

The Chief of the General Staff of the Army then reports about the planned operation in the East. He expanded at first on the geographic fundamentals. The main war industrial centers are in the Ukraine, in Moscow and in Leningrad.

* * * * * * *

The Fuehrer declares that he is agreed with the discussed operational plans and adds following: The most important goal is to prevent that the Russians should withdraw on a closed front. The eastward advance should be combined until the Russian air force will be unable to attack the territory of the German Reich and, on the other hand, the German air force will be enabled to conduct raids to destroy Russian war industrial territories. In this way we should be able to achieve the annihilation of the Russian army and to prevent its regeneration.

The first commitment of the forces should take place in such a way to make the annihilation of strong enemy units possible.

* * * * * * *

It is essential that the Russians should not take up positions in the rear again. The number of 130-140 Divisions as planned for the entire operation is sufficient.

1 August 1940-March 26, 1941

PARTIAL COPY OF DOCUMENT 1800-PS

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON GERMANY’S CRIMES AGAINST NORWAY

[Prepared by the Royal Norwegian Government.]

[Page 17]

Other Violations.

In different places in Norway the Germans appeared in Norwegian uniforms during battles. This was the case in the district of Bergen according to a Communique of the 14th of April, 1940, during the struggles in Valdres and in Narvik. Reports have been received that at one place the Germans even put on women’s clothes, in order to reach a favourable position.

Where the Germans passed, the civilians found their homes in an indescribable condition after the battle, even if the Germans had not set fire to the houses. The so-called German “informal requisitions” which actually meant plundering and destruction, were later compensated for to the extent of about 9 million kroner in all, partly by Norwegian authorities and partly by German authorities, that is, by money drawn out of the Bank of Norway [Norges Bank] by the Germans.

On 25th April, 1940, Ulvik in Hardanger was reduced to ruins, as a reprisal measure, as the Germans claimed that civilians there had fired on German troops. Damage was done to more than 400 buildings and chattels amounting to a total of 2.3 million kroner. [Page 26]

B. CRIMES AGAINST NORWEGIAN PROPERTY

a. Wanton ravaging and destruction.

4. As a result of the advance of the Russian troops and the retreat of the German Army in Finnmark, October-November 1944, the Germans practised the “scorched earth” policy for the first time in Norway. Orders were issued that the civilian population was to evacuate and that all houses, transport and stores were to be destroyed. As a result of this about 30,000 houses were damaged, apart from 12,000 items of damage to chattels, amounting to a total of about 176 million kroner (Appendices 31 and 32).

[Page 62]

Appendix 31.

TO THE POPULATION:

The evacuation of a part of North Norway has been rendered a military necessity as a result of the treachery of a Finnish Government clique.

This evacuation necessitates the removal of the civilian population, as the enemy has proved that, in those territories occupied by him, he ruthlessly and brutally forces the civilian population to give him active assistance in achieving his aims.

This means that no shelter or means of existence of any kind can be left to the Bolshevisk enemy in the fighting zone. All such installations as housing accommodation, transport facilities and food stocks must be destroyed or removed.

The population in these districts will therefore be deprived of the basis for their existence so that in order to be able to survive they must evacuate to those Norwegian territories which are still protected by the German Wehrmacht.

For this reason, the German occupation authorities have declared themselves prepared to support, by all means at their disposal, the civil evacuation which the Norwegian authorities are carrying out.

In the interests of the people themselves all means by which they can effect their own evacuation are to be used to the greatest possible extent.

It is above all essential for a successful evacuation that all fishing smacks and other craft which are available in this area shall be fully employed. Owners of craft who try to evade evacuation must be prepared for severe counter-measures such as the shooting and sinking of craft and crew.

He who does not comply with these unequivocal instructions exposes himself and his family to possible death in the arctic winter without house or food.

(signed) Terboven.
Reichskommissar for the Occupied Norwegian Territories.

(signed) Rendulic.
Colonel-General
Commander-in-Chief 20th Army.

Proclamation by Terboven and General Rendulic on the evacuation
of Finnmark.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1807-PS

[EXTRACT FROM JODL’S DIARY.]

16.6.42.

The operational staff of the Navy [Skl], applied on the 29th May, for permission to attack the Brazilian sea and air forces. The Skl considers that a sudden blow against the Brazilian naval and merchant ships is expedient at this juncture (_a_) because defence measures are still incomplete (_b_) because there is the possibility of achieving surprise and (_c_) because Brazil is to all intents and purposes fighting Germany at sea.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1808-PS

Address by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, Col. Gen.
Jodl to the Officers and Officials of the Armed Forces Operations
Staff. July 24, 1944: 19:30 hours, page 4.

Those making the attempt may have thought also that the men around Hitler were climbers and servile characters. But how did matters really stand? I, for example, was drawn in, even though I knew the movement before 1933 but little and could do nothing for it for the very reason that I was a soldier. Rather, I was against any relaxing of the discipline, bound as I was by my oath to the Reich President. Of course, my aims were, by and large, the aims of the movement, since my thinking was always nationalistic, social, and anti-Catholic, and since loyalty and obedience were the bases of life for me. And thus this train of thought is also disposed of.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1809-PS

General Jodl’s Diary (Armed Forces Operational Staff) from 1 February
to 26 May 1940

_1 February 1940_:

The Fuehrer requests that Major Kieritz be sent from here in good time with special mission.

Col. Schmundt and Capt. Deyhle are back from the West.

Conclusion:

1. Morale and discipline--excellent

2. Tactical mobility is impossible because of the weather. One cannot
withdraw more than 15 km. Army Group B, on the contrary, deems
weather excellent to overcome floods.

3. In all divisions, formerly committed in the East, the automotive
position is very bad. Up to 40% are missing--each of these 40
divisions should be provided with up to 100 vehicles.

1700 hours General Jeschonnek.

1. Attitude of parachute units. In front of the Hague, they have to
be strong enough to break in even forcibly. The 7th division
intends to drop units near the town.

2. Political mission contrasts to some extent with violent action
against the Dutch air force.

3. Walcheren Ioland will have to be occupied as soon as possible.

4. Immediate use requires some arrangements.

To be eliminated:

Commitment of K against Eben Emael

against bridge C

“Fieselor Stork” airplane in front of Army Group A.

The ground Forces already will take up position at dusk, if
possible.

7th Fl. Division is to be in readiness, but will not take up
position without further orders.

5. Question about general intentions? Time.

6. Is it not possible to tackle H alone; that would already be a
tremendous improvement in conducting aerial warfare.

7. The Air Force wants permission to attack every kind of commercial
shipping in the 30-mile zone as well as everything anywhere making
use of arms: French vessels, cargo boats.

_2 February_:

Fuehrer is furious about presentation by Ordnance Bureau which needed 8 days to demonstrate to him--not by actual constructing but only theoretically--that the Czech 4.7-cm anti-tank gun is not usable with armored car 3.

Fuehrer decides as to Jeschonnek’s questions of 1 February:

_a._ one has to employ in the Hague [d.H.] forces of such strength that they will be able to take over command there. In order to achieve that, a landing can be made in the center of the Hague.