Chapter LIX: Book 11: , Reichsfuehrer SS HEINRICH HIMMLER (1)

The Security Squadron as an Anti-Bolshevist Battle Organization. 1936.

Central Publishing House of the NSDAP., Franz Eher, Succ. Munich

OBEDIENCE.

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The fourth directive and virtue, which applies to us, is that of obedience; of obedience, which arises unconditionally through the highest spontaneity, through the service to our ideology [Weltanschauung], which is ready to make every necessary sacrifice of pride, superficial honors and of everything, which is dear and valuable to us; of obedience, not hesitating once, but following every order, which is given by the Fuehrer, or has lawfully been given by one of the superiors; the virtue of obedience, which keeps silent even during the time of the political fight, when the will of freedom believes to have to rise indignantly, which, with wide-awake senses and with strict attention toward the enemy, does not raise a finger, which also obeys unconditionally, and goes over to the attack, even if it should believe, in its heart, that it cannot conquer.

We are so honest, that we do not claim about ourselves, that all these laws are understood by the very last man, and in their last deepest sense. But we believe to be able to claim, that now for six years, the SS has generally assembled according to these directives, was organized and lives according to them. We know, that year for year, we will accept more of these virtues, and that they will more and more become the natural property of every SS man. We are convinced, when fate determines sooner or later, that as the first generation of the SS, we are no more, then we can hand down these virtues as a full heritage, as the best tradition to those, who are SS men after us.

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BLOOD and SOIL

I, as Reichsfuehrer SS, who am myself a peasant according to ancestry, blood and being, would like to state this second fact in front of you, German peasants: The idea of blood, advocated by the SS from the beginning would be condemned, if it were not tied eternally with the conviction about the value and holiness of the soil. From the beginning, the Race and Settlement Main Office [Rasse- und Siedlungs-Hauptamt], has incorporated the term “Blood and Soil” in its name, although with different words, but in the same meaning. I can assure you, that it is not a coincidence, that the Reich Leader of Peasants [Reichsbauernfuehrer des Deutschen Reiches] has belonged to the SS as a leader for years, and that he, as a SS Lt. Gen. is Chief of its Race and Settlement Main Office, as much as it is no coincidence, that I am a peasant, and belong to the Reich Council of Peasants [Reichsbauernrat]. Peasants and SS men both do not belong to those kind of men, who speak superfluously many kind and friendly words. But let it be said here clearly and plainly, as it was until now, so it should be according to our will in the future. Wherever Adolf Hitler’s peasants stand, they shall always have the SS at their side as their most faithful friend, just as we know, that wherever Adolf Hitler’s SS stands, it will have at its side the German peasant as its best friend and comrade. That is how it is today, and that is how it will be forever.

[Page 29]

I know that there are some people in Germany who become sick when they see these black coats; we understand the reason for this and do not expect that we shall be loved by too many. All those who love Germany close at heart will and shall respect us; those who shall fear us, in any way or at any time, must have a bad conscience toward the Fuehrer and the nation. For these persons we have established an organization called Security Service, and likewise, we the SS, place the men for the service in the Secret State Police. We shall unremittingly fulfill our task, the guaranty of the security of Germany from the interior, just as the Wehrmacht guarantees the safety of the honor, the greatness, and the peace of the Reich from the exterior. We shall take care that never again in Germany, the heart of Europe, will the Jewish-Bolshevistic revolution of sub-humans be able to be kindled either from within or through emissaries from without. Without pity we shall be a merciless sword of justice for all those forces whose existence and activity we know on the day of the slightest attempt, may it be today, may it be in decades or may it be in centuries.

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Every one of us knows, that he does not stand alone, but that this tremendous force of two hundred thousand men, who are bound together by oath, gives him unmeasurable strength, and he knows as well, that he, as a representative of the black corps, must do honor to this community by his best performance at his place. Thus we assemble and march according to unalterable laws as a national socialist, soldierly order of distinctly Nordic men, and as a sworn community, of its clans, on our way into a far future, and we wish and believe, that we do not only want to be the descendants who fought it out better, but above that the ancestors of later generations, necessary for the eternal life of the German, Germanic people.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1852-PS

“THE GERMAN POLICE” by Dr. Werner Best, Pp. 14-20 1940 edition.

_III. LAW._ The conception and formation of “police” law, which governs the duties and activities of the “police” in detail, is based on the conception of the law and its formation in general.

1. Law. a. The personal-human (individual-human) conception of law.

For the personal-human (individual-human) conception, “law” is only that law laid down by those who are concerned with the validity of the law or those commissioned by them, in accordance with the rules of the fundamental law--the “constitution”--or a legal decree based on law, whereas the administrative decree which governs the actions of the authorities is not regarded as law. Every action which is not based upon the law and does not come within its framework, is wrong and illegal, insofar as it concerns individual men, because their agreement to such action cannot be stated or supposed.

b. The people’s conception of “Law”.

According to the people’s conception, law is every rule which fulfills the unity of the people’s “organs”--organizations and individuals--and which is sanctioned or approved by the leaders. There is, therefore, no difference between stronger and weaker “rules”, between “constitutional Law” and “common law”, between “law”, “orders” and “decrees”, between “public” and “private” law. The will of the leaders, in whatever form it is expressed whether through law, order, decree, single order or collective order, regulation of an organization or regulation of competence, etc., administers law and alters all theretofore valid law.

2. “Police” law. There is no written “Police” law of the German Reich, which rules the duties and activities of the Police (actual “Police” law).

The only government ruling, in which the “police duties” are mentioned, without any more detailed specification, is in the Fuehrer’s and Reich Chancellor’s decree concerning the appointment of the Chief of the German Police and Reich Ministry of the Interior, dated 17th June 1936 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 487):

For the unification of the police duties in the Reich, a chief of
German Police of the Reichs Ministry of the Interior is appointed
who will be commissioned with the leadership and organization of
all police matters in the administrative sphere of the Imperial and
Prussian Ministry of the Interior.

The contents of the “police duties”, which in this are specifically recognized by the leader as special State duties, must be gathered from the written and unwritten “law”, through which the action of the police is at present determined.

a. The written “police” law.

Written “police” law, which governs the duties and activities of the “police” exists at present only as common law of the individual German states. As an example, the Prussian Police Administration Law of 1.6.1931 (Prussian Law Manual, p. 77) is referred to.

The extent to which this written law can still be regarded as valid, evolves upon two points of view, insofar as differences of common law definitions can be established, firstly, to exercise duties uniformly in the German Reich, different rules in different districts cannot be recognized; secondly, in differences of common law, the laws drawn up by the national socialist regime take precedence over the laws of earlier times which are still valid.

The most important national socialist ruling on duties for a part of the “police” is contained in the Prussian Law of 10.2.1936 (Prussian Law Manual, p. 21) about the Secret State Police. Clause 1 of this law reads:

The Secret State Police has the task of investigating and combatting
all activity dangerous to the state within the whole territory
of the state, of collecting and evaluating the results of the
investigations, of giving information to the government of the state,
of keeping other authorities posted as to facts important for them,
and of supplying them with suggestions. The Chief of the Secret State
Police in agreement with the Minister of the Interior decides what
individual matters come within the sphere of the Secret State Police.

The sphere of competence of the organs of the ordinary administration
of justice remains unaffected.

Thus the “police” task for a branch of the “police” has been defined according to the law of the land, in such a way that it conforms to the task which forms the basis of the people’s conception of “police”: the safeguarding of national order against disturbance and destruction.

The decree for the protection of people and state of 28.2.1933 (Reich Law Publication I p. 83) is to be regarded not as “police” law, i.e. as the direction of police duties and activity, but as the expression of the changed conception of “state” after the national socialist revolution, out of which arose the new conception of “police”. Paragraph 1 of this decree reads:

The articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124 and 153 of the constitution
of the German Reich are annulled until further notice. Therefore
restrictions as regards personal freedom, the right of free
expression of opinion including freedom of the Press, the right of
forming unions and holding meetings, infringements on the secrecy
of letter, post, telegraph and telephone communications, orders for
house-searches and confiscation of property, as well as restrictions
on property, even beyond the limits already fixed by law, are
admissible.

By means of this legal statement it was formally made clear at the very moment of the revolution, that individual decisions of the law valid until then, even of constitutional law, are no longer to be used, as they are incompatible with the new conception of “state”; since that time countless other legal decisions of the past--even those of constitutional law--have been regarded as being no longer applicable without formal repeal or annulment, because they are no longer compatible with the new constitution of the state. The decree of 28.2.1933 for the protection of people and state was not a “legal foundation”, i.e. a statement of their duties and their activity, but only the confirmation of the fact that the duties which they had already begun to undertake were in accordance with the will of the highest governing body to set things right.

Both the second clause of the law of 18.3.1938 (Reich Law Publication I p. 262) dealing with the reunification of Austria and the German Reich and the third clause of the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor of 22.10.1938 (Reich Law Publication I p. 1453) dealing with the administration of the Sudeten-German territories, served as the desired formal clarification, in the territories newly acquired by the Reich, that the restrictive legal decisions of the past must not stand in the way of the fulfilling by the “police” of their duties in Reich territory. The first paragraph of both these clauses is practically identical and reads:

The Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police in the Reich
Ministry of the Interior can take the necessary measures for the
maintenance of security and order (in the decree of 22.10.1938:
administrative measures) even beyond the legal limits otherwise laid
down for this purpose.

b. The unwritten “Police” law.

Not only the legal regulations drawn up by the national socialist regime, but also the whole activity of the German police since the year 1933 sanctioned by the highest governing body of the Reich--and partly on its sole instructions--as well as the rearrangement of the “police” regulations, show that the duty of the “police” is conceived by the government in the sense represented here, and that any other conception of the duty of the “police” can no longer be valid.

Thus all legal definitions which are at odds with this must be considered as altered in the sense of this new conception, without formal cancellation or alteration of the individual earlier laws. For the making of laws as a result of popular “voices” working together, of actively operating organizations and of “actively” or “passively” cooperating individuals, for the fulfilling of a definite task--here the task of the “police”--must not be contradictory in itself, or only because an individual law drawn up at an earlier date has not been formally altered, and to which laws at variance with the will of the government remain tied. At an early date this conception became evident in the administration of justice of individual German High Administrative Courts. The High Administrative Court of Saxony has already explained in a decision of 18.1.1935 (published in the Reich Administrative Publication of 1935, p. 117 ff.):

According to it (the national socialist conception of state and law),
law is not the sum total of the single regulations expressly laid
down by the legislator. Legislation is rather only the expression of
the ideas of right which are rooted in the people. Not legislation
but these ideas of law (“conceptions of right”), according to which
laws are formed in steady development, represent “law” * * * In this
sense, “law” as common law, i.e. as the orderly way in which the
people lives as a community, is recognized as taking precedence over
the statutes themselves.

This means that the orderly or regular way in which the people fulfills the “police” task through its “voices”--organizations and individuals--is “police” law, which takes precedence over statutory law, insofar as this does not reproduce the contents of the “police” law which is valid at the time but which belongs to an earlier date and has meanwhile been altered.

The unwritten “police” law, i.e. law which is not laid down in statutory form, by means of which all “police” action is determined, does not however consist of mere “ideas of law” which are “rooted in the people”, but of many sorts of regulations which in different forms--law, order, decree, single command, general command, organizational and competence regulations, etc.--were laid down by the highest governing body of the Reich or with its sanction. The “police” never acts in a lawless or illegal manner so long as it acts according to the rules laid down by its superiors--up to the highest governing body. The High Administrative Court of Hamburg rightly states in its judgment of 19.11.1937 (published in the Juristischen Wochenschrift 1937, p. 3335 f.):

According to its nature, the police must only deal with what the
government wants to know is being dealt with.

What the “government” wants to know is being “dealt with” by the police is the essence of “police” law, and is that which guides and restricts the actions of the police. As long as the “police” carries out the will of the government, it is acting legally; should it overstep the will of the government, then it is no longer a matter of “police” action, but it is a case of a breach of duty by a member of the police.

Whether the will of the government lays down the “right” rules, i.e. those possible and necessary for police action--thus the “police” law suitable for and beneficial to the people--is no longer a question of law, but a question of fate. For actual misuse of the “right-to-put-right” on the part of a people’s government, whether it consist of harmful severity or of harmful weakness, will be punished more surely before history by fate itself with misfortune and overthrow and ruin, because of the violation of the “laws of life”, than by a State Court of Justice.

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As the intelligence service of the German National Socialist Labor Party, the Security Service has first of all the task of investigating and keeping a watch over all forces, events and facts which are of importance for the domination of the National Socialist idea and movement in German territory. With this task follows that duty laid down by the Reich Minister of the Interior--the duty of supporting the Security Police--which is fulfilled, so far as it goes, under State orders. In support of the task of the Security Police in securing the ranks of the German people against interference and destruction of any kind, the Security Service has to watch over every sphere of life of the German people with regard to the activities of inimical forces and the result of state and political measures, and to inform continually the competent State authorities and offices about the facts which have come to light. Finally, it has to investigate politically and explore fundamentally the activities and connections of the great ideological arch-enemy of National Socialism and the German people, in order thereby to render possible a purposeful and effective fight against it.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1855-PS

ORGANIZATION BOOK OF NSDAP, Page 418.

Bravery is valued by the SS man as the highest virtue of men in a struggle for his ideology.

He openly and unrelentingly fights the most dangerous enemies of the State: Jews, Free Masons, Jesuits, and political clergymen.

However, by his example, he recruits and convinces the weak and inconstant, who have not been able to bring themselves to the National Socialistic ideology.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1856-PS

HERMANN GOERING, SPEECHES AND ESSAYS.

Edited by Dr. Erich Gritzbach, Third Edition. Published by Central
Publishing House of the NSDAP Franz Eher Successor, Muenchen. (1939)

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Excerpt from speech entitled: “We Bear the Responsibility”, delivered at an NSDAP demonstration on 3 March 1933, at Frankfurt am Main [page 27]:

Fellow Germans, my measures will not be crippled by any judicial
thinking. My measures will not be crippled by any bureaucracy. Here
I don’t have to give Justice, my mission is only to destroy and
exterminate, nothing more! This struggle, fellow Germans, will be
a struggle against chaos and such a struggle I shall not conduct
with the power of any police. A bourgeoise state might have done
that. Certainly, I shall use the power of the state and the police
to the utmost my dear Communists, so that you won’t draw any false
conclusions but the struggle to the death, in which my fist will
grasp your necks, I shall lead with those down there,--those are the
brown shirts.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1857-PS

_VOELKISCHER BEOBACHTER_, 26 July 1934 p.I.

The Fuehrer elevates the SS to a standing of an Independent
Organization.

Munich, 25 July

The Reich Press Office announces the following order of the Fuehrer:

In consideration of the very meritorious service of the SS, especially in connection with the events of 30 June 1934, I elevate it to the standing of an independent organization within the NSDAP. The Reichsfuehrer SS, like the Chief of Staff, is therefore directly subordinate to the highest SS fuehrer. The Chief of Staff and the Reichsfuehrer SS are both invested with the party rank of Reichsleiter.

Munich, 20 July 1934.

/s/ Adolf Hitler.

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1861-PS

1934 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 45

Law Regulating National Labor of 20 January 1934

The Government of the Reich has decided to enact the following law which is hereby made public:

_SECTION I_

The Leader of the enterprise and the board of employee representatives.

_Paragraph 1_

The entrepreneur works in the factory as leader of the enterprise together with the employees and the workers who constitute his followers for the furtherance of the aims of the enterprise and for the common benefit of people and state.

_Paragraph 2_

1. The leader of the enterprise makes the decisions for the employees and laborers in all matters concerning the enterprise, as far as they are regulated by this law.

2. He is responsible for the well-being of the employees and laborers. The employees and laborers owe him faithfulness according to the principles of the factory community.

_Paragraph 3_

1. In the case of legal persons and personal groups the legal representatives will be the leaders of the enterprises.

2. The entrepreneur or in the case of legal persons or personal groups, the legal representatives can appoint a person who participates in the management of the enterprise in a responsible capacity as their deputy. This must be done if they do not direct the enterprise themselves. In matters of lesser importance they can also appoint another person.

3. Should the court of honor legally deprive the leader of the enterprise of his qualifications to be a leader, then a new entrepreneur must be appointed.

_Paragraph 4_

1. Administrations are also considered as enterprises in the sense of this law.

2. Subordinate enterprises and parts of the enterprise which are connected with the main enterprise through common direction will only be considered as independent enterprises if they are situated far away from the main enterprise.

3. The regulations of this law, with the exception of paragraphs 32 and 33, do not apply to Ships, Inland navigation and Air-transport and their crews.

_Paragraph 5_

1. Representatives recruited from the employees and laborers act in an advisory capacity to the leader of an enterprise with, in the rule, at least 20 employees. They constitute with the leader and under his direction the board of representatives of the enterprise.

2. To the employees and laborers in the sense of the regulations concerning the board of representatives belong also the persons who do piece work at home, who work mainly for the same enterprise either alone or with their families.

_Paragraph 6_

1. It is the duty of the board of representatives to increase the mutual confidence within the enterprise-community.

2. It is the task of the board of representatives to discuss all measures concerning the improvement of the output, the form and execution of the general labor conditions, especially the enterprise regulations, the execution and the improvement of enterprise-protection, the strengthening of the ties between the members of the enterprise among themselves and toward the enterprise as well as the welfare of all the members of the community. It is furthermore their task to liquidate all quarrels within the enterprise-community. They must also be heard prior to the determination of punishment for violation of the plant-rules.

3. The board of representatives can charge certain representatives with the execution of certain of its tasks.

_Paragraph 7_

(1) The number of representatives is as follows:

in enterprises with 20- 49 employees 2
in enterprises with 50- 99 employees 3
in enterprises with 100-199 employees 4
in enterprises with 200-399 employees 5

(2) These numbers are increased by one representative for each 300 supplementary employees until they reach the maximum of ten representatives.

(3) An equal number of deputies shall be designated.

(4) Employees, workers and those who do piece work at home are to be considered in the choice of trustees.

The Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler

The Reich Minister of Labor
Franz Seldte

The Reich Minister of Economic Affairs
Dr. Schmitt

The Reich Minister of Justice
Dr. Guertner

The Reich Minister of Finance
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk

The Reich Minister of Interior
Frick

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1862-PS

1936 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 887

Ordinance for the Execution of the Four Year Plan of 18 October 1936.

The realization of the new Four Year Plan--announced by me at the Party Congress of Honor--requires homogeneous leadership of all forces in the German nation and the strict coordination of all competent authorities in Party and State.

The execution of the Four Year Plan, I intrust to Minister-President General Goering.

Minister-President General Goering shall take all steps necessary for the execution of the task put before him; he is authorized to issue decrees of ordinances and general administrative directives. He is empowered to receive reports from all governmental agencies, including the highest agencies of the Reich and from all Party offices, their departments and attached organizations--and issue orders to them.

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 36

The Fuehrer and Chancellor of the Reich
Adolf Hitler

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1866-PS

Record of the conversation between the Reich Foreign Minister and the
Duce in the Palazzo Venezia on the 13th May 1941, in the presence of
Count Ciano.

To begin with the Reich Foreign Minister conveyed the Fuehrer’s greetings to the Duce.

He would shortly propose to the Duce a date for the planned meeting, which he would like to take place as soon as possible. As the place for the meeting he would probably prefer the Brenner. At the present moment he was, as the Duce well understood, still busy with the Hess affair and with a few military matters, but could be at his disposal after that for a meeting.

The Duce replied that he would agree with all the Fuehrer’s proposals concerning the place and date of this meeting. That he was prepared to go to Germany, to meet him at the Brenner, or to arrange for the conversation to take place anywhere else in Italy.

The Reich Foreign Minister then said that the Fuehrer had sent him to the Duce, in order to inform him about the Hess affair and the conversation with Admiral Darlan about the Hess affair. He remarked that the Fuehrer had been completely taken aback by Hess’ action, and that it had been the action of a lunatic.

Hess had been suffering for a long time from a bilious complaint and had fallen into the hands of magnetists and nature cure doctors who allowed his state of health to become worse.

All these matters were being investigated at the moment as well as the responsibility of the aides-de-camp who had known about Hess’ forbidden flights. Hess had for weeks carried out secret practice flights in a M.E. 110. Naturally he had acted only from idealistic motives. His being unfaithful to the Fuehrer was utterly out of the question. His conduct had to be explained by a kind of mysticism and a state of mind caused by his illness.

The Reich Minister went on to say that Hess was undoubtedly convinced that England was facing imminent defeat, but that the English could not take the step of drawing the necessary conclusions.

Being sympathetically inclined towards England Hess had conceived the crazy idea of using Great Britain’s Fascist circles to persuade the British to give in. He had explained all this in a long and confused letter to the Fuehrer. When this letter reached the Fuehrer, Hess was already in England. It was hoped in Germany that he would perhaps have an accident on the way, but he was now really in England and had tried to contact the former Marquis of Clydesdale, the present Duke of Hamilton. Hess quite wrongly considered him as a great friend of Germany and had flown to the neighbourhood of his castle in Scotland. He had thus carried out his plan at the risk of his life. The Fuehrer who was naturally and personally deeply stricken by these events, took up a very severe attitude under the circumstances, demoted Hess immediately and stated that he would have Hess shot immediately if he returned to Germany. The investigation of the event was continuing, but it was quite clear that Hess had not acted out of lack of faithfulness towards the Fuehrer.

The Duce replied that he was also of the opinion that Hess was no traitor. From the political point of view he did not consider the results of his action serious. He was wondering what Hess intended to say in England. It was said that his first words after being found were to the effect that he had always had a great sympathy for England.

Without failing to see that the psychological results of Hess’ flight were not slight, one could nevertheless say that the prosecution of the war and public opinion in the Axis countries remained untouched by it. In 3 or 4 days the whole affair would gradually subside. The question arose as to whether anyone in Germany knew about Hess’ attitude to England, and whether Hess had perhaps wanted to save England.

The Reich Foreign Minister remarked here that in Germany Hess had had supporters mainly among the * * * [illegible] party members, but that now every German was wondering how it was possible that Hess could have done such a thing. The Fuehrer would want first to see in what way enemy propaganda would make use of this affair. Considering England’s morale and its situation, Churchill could naturally not use Hess’ peace idea as propaganda material; this would immediately cause trouble among his own people. The British would probably rather direct their propaganda tactics towards making out that they regarded the whole event as a sign of discord and internal division and as an outcome of an allegedly difficult position of the Reich, and would also maintain that Germany would now no doubt have to make peace soon. If it should be necessary, the Fuehrer would carry out an energetic counter-attack against this propaganda and would, if necessary, summon the Reichstag, in order to clarify the whole situation there.

The Duce repeated his unworried view of the affair and remarked that to him also it seemed best that the whole truth should be told about the whole affair.

Going on to the matter of the talks with Admiral Darlan, the Reich Foreign Minister explained to the Duce that two subjects especially had been discussed:

1. the assistance which France could give in Syria for the support of
Iraq, and

2. the facilities she could provide for German-Italian supplies to
North Africa.

Darlan had agreed to deliver to Iraq certain quantities of arms and war materials out of the stocks stored in Syria under Italian control. Part of these arms would, no doubt, already be on their way to Iraq. Ambassador Rahn and a French official had flown to Syria and had submitted a directive of the Vichy Government to the local Government Commissioner, General Deuz, according to which he was to provide all the deliveries and other facilities recommended by the two delegates. Darlan had, furthermore, put landing places for German aircraft and stocks of petrol at their disposal.

At the same time, Ambassador von Papen had been recalled to Germany and been instructed, as he, the Reich Foreign Minister, could inform the Duce confidentially, to endeavour to obtain from the Turks permission for the secret passage of arms for Iraq through Turkish territory.

According to the impression he left, Darlan would certainly do all that was possible to help the Axis. Although, of course, one could not look into his heart, he yet definitely appeared to be an enemy of the English.

Should a large-scale transport of arms reach Iraq it would be possible to move airborne troops into the regions, who could then advance against the British with the material found there and who could, under certain circumstances, attack Egypt from the East from Iraq.

The Duce stated his point of view on the Iraq question:

1. One must definitely help Iraq, as a new front against the British would be created in this way and the indignation, not only of the Arabs, but also of the great number of Moslems would be aroused. Already the Grand Mufti had summoned the Arabs of the world to a holy war against England. In answer to an interpellation by the German Foreign Minister, the Duce declared that he ascribed a certain importance to these events in any case.

2. It would be necessary to get possession of Crete and Cyprus (the “anteroom” of Syria). If one could then obtain, from the French, permission to land troops and planes in Syria, the Axis powers help to Iraq could be very substantial. The Italians had already prepared five planes, which would proceed to Baghdad via Rhodes, in order to transport their 400 machine-guns, as well as 20 anti-tank guns. In addition, 12 fighter planes were ready for action.

Should the passage of arms through Turkey prove impossible, one would have to march against England from Syria. The great advantage here lay in the 100 km stretch of desert which had to be overcome in the event of an attack on Egypt from Syria, as compared with the 500 km stretch of desert in the case of an attack on Egypt from the West.

In answer to an interpolation by the Reich Foreign Minister as to how long Iraq would be able to hold out against the British, the Duce replied that the Head of the Iraq Government had declared that he could hold his own against the British, provided only he received some war material. If, however, he received no aid, opposition would, in the Duce’s opinion, be overcome by the British in 3 or 4 weeks. He was also wondering whether the de Gaullist movement in Syria would not perhaps put difficulties in the way of French assistance. The Reich Foreign Minister replied to that that Darlan appeared convinced that he could carry out the business in Syria as planned.

With regard to Tunis, the Reich Foreign Minister, reported on the purchase of lorries and the recent concession that these lorries could be sent to Tripolitania with freight. Darlan had agreed to place an Algerian harbour, Baume, at their disposal for the unloading of the materials transported by sea, (as these things could be carried out more easily in Algeria than in Tunis). The Reich Foreign Minister also mentioned, in this connection, that Darlan had told him that he would like it, for personal reasons, if lorries were sold to Germany only. Should Italy wish to obtain such vehicles from the French, he proposed that the sale should first take place to Germany, and that the trucks should then be given by the Reich to Italy. The Duce and Count Ciano agreed to this procedure.

In reply to the Duce’s question as to what Germany had conceded to France in exchange for these concessions, the Reich Foreign Minister pointed to the lowering of the occupation costs from 20 to 15 millions which, although it had not yet been definitely fixed, was expected, as well as to certain facilities with the regard to the Line of Demarcation. Further the rearming of some torpedo boats.

The Fuehrer had laid down as a principle that France could be granted facilities to the extent to which she on her part made the war against England for the Axis easier.

The Reich Foreign Minister answered the Duce’s question as to whether concessions had been made regarding French prisoners of war in the negative and mentioned that the Fuehrer had first of all reminded Darlan of how the German prisoners of war had only been released in the year 1920, when the World War had already been over a long time.

The Reich Foreign Minister further pointed out that he had suggested to Darlan that if France should now grant facilities for the continuation of the war against England, such an attitude would be taken into account when the peace was signed. Furthermore he had stressed to Darlan the necessity that France choose now, and place herself unambiguously on the side of the Axis. Germany had certain wishes concerning naval bases in Morocco for the maintenance of her submarines and surface vessels. If France agreed to that, she (Germany) would allow her some destroyers to arm, as she had long requested to do. Beyond this, Germany did not, for one moment, anticipate assistance from France on a larger scale, just as she did not expect the possible assistance of the French Fleet against England.

It had been made clear to Darlan that in future the Axis powers would be the decisive centre of power in Europe and that France would have to toe the line in this respect.

It was also pointed out that France must, of course, count on having to make concessions in the Mediterranean in the peace treaty; the Italian demands were indeed known to them. She might, however, receive compensation for the concessions elsewhere, e.g. in Africa, at the expense of England.

In a private tete-a-tete conversation, Darlan declared to the Reich Foreign Minister that he wished to assist the Axis powers against England under all circumstances, after the Reich Foreign Minister had analysed to him the three possibilities which offered themselves to France, namely, that France could either work against Germany, in which event she would be destroyed, or she could adopt a waiting attitude, which, however, would also be to her detriment. Finally she could give clear evidence of her will to cooperate with the Axis, and would then receive an honourable position amongst the peoples of Europe.

The Duce replied that there were two camps in France, those who wanted to wait, and those who were in favour of collaboration. When the Yugoslav campaign began, people in France had hoped that it would end unfavourably for the Axis. The opinion of French politicians was beginning to waver. Typical of the trend of public opinion was the fact, that in those days the monument of King Alexander of Yugoslavia in France had been decked with flowers by the population. But when the French saw how quickly Germany was victorious in the Balkans, they immediately turned round towards collaboration again. In Vichy the majority belonged to the camp that wanted to await events. Count Ciano here added that the only difference between Vichy and Paris was that in Paris people were saying: “Let us hope the British win,” whilst in Vichy people were saying, “Let us hope those British swine win”. To this the Reich Foreign Minister added, that of course chauvinists continued to exist in France and would have to be weeded out according to a plan yet to be laid down. In his opinion Pétain was an old fox, whose memory deserted him just at the moments when it best suited him. A few days before, and in connection with the invitation to Admiral Darlan to come to the Berghof [Hitler’s residence in Berchtesgaden], he had written a letter to the Fuehrer, which factually contained nothing of importance, but which nevertheless indicated that in France people were gradually becoming more and more certain that the war was finally lost. It was the Fuehrer’s opinion that final victory against England must under all circumstances be achieved. For this purpose he wanted to obtain from France a maximum of facilities, without in any way binding himself. The French questions would be dealt with on this basis, and it would now have to be seen how far Darlan was prepared to go along this road. But, as already stated, France would only be granted concessions in proportion to facilities for the battle against England. When the French would participate on a large scale in the battle against England was still undecided.

To this the Duce remarked that France could give many small, but very important bases to the Axis. In this connection he stressed the fact that France always drew closer to the Axis when the Axis gained a victory. But as soon as things were not making any proper headway, she made eyes at England and the United States. The latter, particularly, would have to be watched closely in this connection. The Reich Foreign Minister agreed with this and remarked that if France was to attach herself in any way to the Axis organization, this fact would make a deep impression on the United States.

The Duce agreed with this conception, and referred in this connection to the policy, expressed by the Fuehrer, of the unity of all Europe against England. Russia and Spain were alone absent from this united front. Serrano Suner had actually stated that Spain would march after this year’s harvest. But this seemed to him to be extremely doubtful. To this the Reich Foreign Minister remarked that at the beginning of this year Franco had unfortunately left the Axis completely in the lurch. This he had to note with regret again and again. If he had cooperated at that time, Gibraltar would today not be in the hands of the British, and the Spanish people would probably have far more to eat than now, when alms from England and America could not save them either.

The Duce returned to his remark concerning the united front of Europe against England and the two countries, Spain and Russia, that were absent from it, with the remark that, to him, it seemed that it would be advantageous if a policy of collaboration with Russia could be carried out. He asked the Reich Foreign Minister whether Germany excluded such a possibility, i.e. collaboration with Russia. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that Germany had treaties with Russia, and that the relations between the two countries were in other respects correct. He personally did not believe that Stalin would undertake anything against Germany. But should he do so, or should he carry out a policy that was intolerable to Germany, then he would be destroyed within 3 months.--The Duce agreed to this.--The Fuehrer would certainly not look for any quarrel, but he had nevertheless taken precautions for all eventualities. He had in no way come to any decision, but as a result of certain occurrences and want of clearness on the part of the Russians, he had become suspicious. Thus, for example, the Russians had strengthened their forces along their western Frontier, which of course caused Germany to reinforce her troops too, but only after the Russians started it.

But Russia would never be a problem that could have any influence on the final victory against England. She would never be able to interfere with Germany, for Germany had such a large number of troops available that she could easily deal with any eventuality.

The Duce then enquired whether Germany was not receiving deliveries of raw materials from Russia, whereupon the Reich Foreign minister mentioned the figures 1 million tons of oil and 1½ million tons of corn, and added that these deliveries were coming in relatively well.

During the further course of the conversation, the subject of Japan, and in particular the Japanese-American exchange of opinions, was touched upon. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister stressed the fact that the principle that Japan shared a common destiny with Germany and Italy had been so clearly understood by the Japanese that he (the Reich Foreign Minister), did not think Japan would pursue a policy which would not in the end align itself once more with the policy pursued by Germany and Italy. In this connection the Reich Foreign Minister referred to Matsuoka’s remarks that he was forced into frequent manoeuvres for reasons of home politics, and that on occasion he might be forced to do things that would not be easily understood in Germany. At any rate he (the Reich Foreign Minister) trusted Matsuoka, although of course he could not know what was going on inside his heart. It was unfavourable that the discussions with Roosevelt were being conducted via Admiral Nomura, for at heart Nomura inclined rather towards the Anglo-Saxons. Matsuoka had, for the time being, made the following further enquiries:

1. Whether the United States were willing to enter into an undertaking not to enter into the European conflict, and

2. What was the attitude of the United States on the problem of the Philippines.

If against all expectations, Japanese policy should follow a course which does not correspond with the spirit of the Tripartite agreement, great opposition would certainly arise all over Japan and Ambassador Oshima would probably become the soul of such a real revolution. But these affairs should be handled carefully, and we should avoid creating unnecessary difficulties for Matsuoka.

The whole affair shows that Roosevelt is beginning to get alarmed, probably because he is gradually realizing that, in case of warlike complications, he can accomplish nothing, because of America’s bad armament position, and therefore wishes to keep his back free.

The Duce remarked, in this connection, that it would without doubt be favourable to Germany, and Italy if Matsuoka were in this manner to prevent the United States entering the war. On the other hand, the motive of his actions could, of course, also be Japan’s desire to keep out of the war herself.

To that, the German Foreign Minister remarked that, if a forcing hand were played and it were laid down that the American system of protecting convoys meant war, the Americans would most probably hesitate, because American rearmament was the biggest bluff in the world’s history.

In this connection the Duce referred to the split which had appeared in the United States and quoted speeches by Hoover and Lindbergh as the most prominent opponents of Roosevelt’s policy. As against this, the Jews and their propaganda were so strong that they had brought the whole of America under their influence. But if in a country a War party fights against a Peace party the War party usually wins, because war is much nearer the soul of man than peace.

The German Foreign Minister replied that the same naturally went for Japan as well, and that it was his conviction that sooner or later Japan would enter the war on the side of the Axis to exploit the opportunities offered. Anyhow he was absolutely certain that Japan would meet her treaty obligations.

The Duce went on to speak about Turkey, which he called Germany’s and Italy’s trump card. He asked the German Foreign Minister whether he believed that Turkey would go with Germany and Italy.

The German Foreign Minister replied that Germany was in the act of trying to influence Turkey in this sense. The preliminary conditions were favourable, in so much as it was not in Turkey’s interests to let great masses of English troops assemble in Iraq, so that Germany hoped to be able to draw the Turks over to her side. A certain improvement in the attitude of the Turkish press could already be noted.

Later on in the discussion the German Foreign Minister spoke about a great intended propaganda drive in the British Empire, with the motto that the Axis would support the liberation of all peoples oppressed by the British. In this connection he mentioned the presence in Germany of the Indian Nationalist leader--Bose--news which the Duce received with surprise and great interest. The Duce agreed to this kind of propaganda.

In conclusion, the German Foreign Minister explained the plans according to which he intended to employ Bose for Indian propaganda and he emphasized that the development of any antagonism between Bose and Ghandi should be avoided. Besides, Ghandi had written a very good article against the British a short while before.

In conclusion, the Duce mentioned in this connection that Italy was in contact with the Fakir of Ipi and was attempting by means of large sums of money to get him, as well as the Grand Mufti, to carry on some activity in the interests of the Axis. Even if these actions were not very extensive, they would nevertheless create some unpleasant difficulties for the English.

When parting, the possibility of having another discussion next morning shortly before the return flight of the German Foreign Minister, was left open.

This discussion took place in a very cordial spirit.

Fuschl, the 14th May 1941.

SCHMIDT.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1871-PS

Minutes of the conference between the Fuehrer and the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, in the presence of the Reich Foreign Minister of Obersalzberg on 12 August 1939.

At the beginning of the conference the Fuehrer with the aid of maps explained to Count Ciano the present situation of Germany from the military standpoint. He emphasized particularly the strength of the German fortifications in the west. There are three break-through points in the west at which the French had in former times always attempted to break through for geographical and strategic reasons, which have now been protected with particular care, so that a break-through seems impossible here as well. Moreover, fortifications have also been built along the Luxemburg and Belgian borders up to the Dutch border, so that a violation of Belgian neutrality would no longer give France any military advantages, but would only involve the danger that Belgium would join the German side in order to defend her neutrality and under pressure from the Flemish part of the population. The only remaining possibility of attack is therefore theoretically through the Netherlands. But they too would, in the opinion of the Fuehrer, defend their neutrality energetically because they would know that if they should participate in a general conflict they would lose their East Asiatic colonies, which are almost undefended, to Japan. Moreover, the Netherlands are completely unsuitable as an assembly area for a large army because of the numerous rivers and the possibility of flooding large parts of the land which lies below sea level. In case of a breach of Dutch neutrality Germany would of course move into the country immediately and would have the possibility of reaching the Meuse in a few hours because of its proximity to the German border. Besides, the Rhine which is 1 to 1½ km wide in Holland offers natural protection against attacks from this direction.

The third possibility of attacking Germany is a blockade by the British Navy. But it must be kept in mind the ships used for the blockade would be attacked from the air from Germany, since all of England is within the radius of attack of the German air force, because of the long range of the latest German bombers. There are no further possibilities of attack on Germany. The Nordic countries would no doubt remain neutral and are safe from air attack from any side, since there is hardly any question of occupying such large areas as Norway and Sweden. In the same way Switzerland would certainly defend her neutrality to the last against any invader.

Germany has likewise built strong fortifications in the East. The Fuehrer showed Count Ciano the various fortification systems of East Prussia (Koenigsberg, Heilsberg triangle, border fortifications). On the rest of the German frontier (Grenzmark, Silesia) strong fortifications are also being built, which have been developed, particularly on the Polish border opposite Berlin, into an impregnable system of lines lying one behind the other. Of course the capital is exposed to air attacks, since it lies only 150 km from the Polish border, particularly since because of its size (28 km north to south and 45 km east to west) the city could be bombed from a very great altitude (8 to 9,000 meters) without the possibility of attacking certain targets but with the certainty that the bombs would hit somewhere within the city.

Proceeding to the military situation of the western powers and Poland the Fuehrer again pointed out England’s vulnerability from the air. Although some progress has been made in air craft production, the anti-aircraft defense is still quite backward. It is known that England decided on a certain type of anti-aircraft gun only last fall, and we have enough experience on the basis of our own 7 years of rearmament to know that mass production is possible only a long time after the choice of a prototype, so that effective anti-aircraft defense can be expected in England only after 1 to 2 years. Moreover, London and other great cities and industrial centers have the same disadvantage which characterizes Berlin’s position in regard to Polish air attacks: from high altitude, out of range of the present English AA guns which are left from the war, bombing can be carried out in absolute safety, which would be successful in any case in the general target area.

At the present time England has no increase in sea power to record. The first units of the ships under construction cannot be put in service for some time. As for the land army, 60,000 men have been called up since the introduction of compulsory military service. If England keeps the necessary troops at home, she will be in a position to put at the disposal of France only two infantry divisions and one armored division. Furthermore she can transfer a few groups of bombers to France but hardly any groups of fighters, since the German air fleet would attack England immediately upon the outbreak of war, and the English fighter planes would be urgently needed for the protection of their own country.