Chapter 4: Work Abroad pp. 154-162 (2)

For the first time in this war, the German soldier is encountering not only a military opponent, but one, at the same time, politically educated, who sees in communism his ideal and in National-Socialism, his most provocative enemy. In the fight against National-Socialism, every method is, to him, legal: sniping, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, incendiarism, seditious propaganda, murder. Even a Soviet soldier in captivity, however harmless he may appear on the surface, will snatch any opportunity to show his hatred of everything German. It is quite possible that the PWs received corresponding instructions on how to act in captivity. It is essential, therefore, to treat them with the utmost vigilance, the greatest caution and complete mistrust.

The principles to be followed by guard personnel are:

1. Ruthless action at the slightest indication of insubordination or disobedience. Weapons are to be used unsparingly to put down resistance. PWs attempting to escape are to be fired on immediately (without a challenge) with the firm intention of hitting them.

2. Any _conversation_--even on the march to and from the place of work--unless it concerns absolutely necessary official instructions, is _utterly forbidden_. No smoking at all is allowed on the march to and from the places of work--as well as during work. In the same way, all conversation between PWs and _civilians_ is to be prevented, if necessary by force of arms--even against the civilians.

3. At the place of work also, a constant and careful supervision by German guard personnel is required. Each guard must always _keep a sufficient distance_ from the PWs to enable him, at any time, to use his weapons _without delay_. Never turn your back on a PW.

4. Slackness is out of place even with a _PW who is obedient and willing to work_. He interprets it as weakness and draws his own conclusions.

5. When German soldiers are ruthlessly carrying out given orders with all severity and harshness, any arbitrary action, maltreatment and, above all, the use of clubs and whips is forbidden. This would be out of keeping with the honour of German soldiers as armed men.

6. The appearance of seeming harmless on the part of bolshevist PWs must never lead to the slackening of the above instructions.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1520-PS

Notes about a discussion with the Fuehrer at the Fuehrer Headquarters
on the 8th of May 1942.

Present at first Reich Minister Dr. Lammers [also Bormann and
Rosenberg, the author of the notes].

I began with reporting to the Fuehrer about the results of the 1941/42 collection of the NSDAP of books for the German Armed Forces resulting in more than 9 million books, from which 46,000 libraries were formed.

Then I dealt with certain reproaches raised against the Ministry East. The article in the “information service” of the Ministry for Propaganda concerning construction and aims of the Ministry East appeared without any knowledge whatsoever on my part. I had, as a matter of principle, agreed with the Ministry for Propaganda that no publications whatsoever regarding the occupied Eastern Territories should be published without my express consent. This became essential because even ministers talked about the “_Policy of Colonisation_” in the East.--Then it was also said that I had declared 650 men as unfit for war service and thus deprived the armed forces of them, and that I also left 90 officers without work as an advance command in Taganrog. I want to state that, because of the newly reinforced decree, the Ministry East has handed over 650 men; however, up to a few weeks ago only 240 men have been called away. As concerns the 90 men in Taganrog, this is not a measure taken by me but by the Economic Staff East and the armed forces armament staff, resp. Therefore, this matter was none of my affair. Furthermore, this advance commando has been dissolved.

As regards the resettlement of the Germans from Lithuania, the Fuehrer said that he was under the impression that people who had already settled here would have to be resettled again. I told the Fuehrer that it was not so, this was a matter concerning more than 30,000 settlers capable of resettlement who were still detained in camps and who were worn down by the prolonged camp life.

At last I referred to the new Molotov memorandum regarding supposed horrors and our economic measures, which, as a matter of fact, refers to some statements in the so-called “Green Folder” of the economic staff East of the 4-year Plan. Presumably such statements had been discovered on the body of a shot agrarian leader; a year ago I had already expressed my concern about the too-clearly expressed tendencies of those statements. A number of agrarian leaders already had been killed, also three territorial commissioners already have been killed fighting the partisans.

Thereafter I described to the Fuehrer the considerations which caused me to grant _self-administration_ to the Baltic countries. First of all this was not proclaimed by Law, but it was only my _decree_ to the Reich Commissioner with the corresponding directives. In practice it meant nothing beyond a confirmation of an already existing state of affairs and the abolition of a certain uncertainty. We were very short of officials and were thus forced to be most economical with human material. However, frequently efforts were noticeable to meddle with the trivialities of life which necessitates new demands and withdraws too many soldiers from the armed forces. It left the doors open for some people to escape army service. Furthermore, self-administration was connected with an increased willingness to work. After all there were enough safety clauses whereby the self-administration could not undertake anything without the sanction of the Commissioner General. In order to eliminate any possible political danger, an exception has been made with _Riga_. Riga has 10-12,000 officials and was to receive a German mayor who is not subordinated to the Lithuanian self-administration. Thereby a personal political policy of the Lithuanian Directorate would be avoided. By this measure Riga would be an experiment for annexed administration.

We also created an historical alibi and had demonstrated that we were meeting the Baltic nations more than half way. If at a later date this would not be acknowledged, we had every justification to proceed more drastically. The Fuehrer kept all decrees and regulations in order to examine them. Yet during the whole of the report he made no comments.

Afterwards the Fuehrer asked how all those economical measures were looked upon by the part of the Germans, whereupon I replied that, of course, the entire economical management was in German hands, and that this fact had produced a deterioration of the morale. Generally speaking the monopolistic companies and the ZHO [Zentralhandelsges. Ost--Eastern Central Trade], are fundamentally necessary, only they have to be supervised. Dr. Lammers interjected that private profits had to be throttled in order to avoid too strong a group of profiteers. I once more referred to the question of monopolies and wished to ascertain whether the Fuehrer intended an absolute tobacco monopoly for here, whereupon he declared that he was particularly interested in the retail monopoly. The question of arranging for the producers could still be settled at a later date. I replied that the economic leaders have not yet agreed upon the question of the producers. The opinion is frequently prevalent, that the production itself need not necessarily be a direct state monopoly. I told the Fuehrer that I shall have the whole question examined once again.

Then the problem of _religious freedom_ for the occupied Eastern territories was discussed. The Fuehrer consulted Reichsleiter Bormann, who already had gathered much experience by the preparations for the Wartheland and for Austria. I explained the situations in the East was that various large ecclesiastical groups being formed, but that one should not allow such development to take place without supervision, but that one ought to direct same and that the intended decrees, respectively orders, were for the purpose of protecting us from unanticipated surprises. Bormann entirely agreed with this attitude, he merely questioned if the Reichminister East, who also had some standing in Germany, would not produce too close a dependency by a law which might have repercussions inside the Reich. What was to be understood under “religious freedom” was to be interpreted _by the Churches_, and he could anticipate, that such a law would produce hundreds of new letters and complaints on the part of the churches within the Reich. The Fuehrer considered a number of twists and forms which would eliminate such a danger, and after discussing its suitability the Fuehrer read the decree and gave his consent. Finally it was agreed that the whole question was not to be settled _by myself_ in the form of a law, but that the Reich Commissioners take the existing religious freedom so to speak for granted and would decree the necessary executive orders. I was then to watch the development continuously and retain the executive control. It is easily possible that the leaders of the churches in the Ukraine would combine in order to elect a patriarch. I pointed out that this was already the case for all practical purposes and that a steering of the matter is necessary. The Fuehrer asked me if I really thought that all the Ukrainians were faithful adherents of the church. I replied that with the older generation and the women it was certainly the case, the youth were already somewhat unaccustomed to church. Furthermore I had transported from Kiev to Berlin the “Atheist Museum”. In this the writings of the national writer of the Ukraine, Schewischenko, are quoted and may be possible to publish them in the Ukrainian language in a sense which in truth was not for the church. Also such freedom of expression of opinion has also to be guaranteed. Moreover the Fuehrer emphasized that after the war he would proceed against the churches with the fitting measures; he believed that he was still able to do something because of his authority which at a later date would be difficult for anybody else. He would not forget the attitude of the church during the war. I told the Fuehrer that I carried out church political lectures in a small circle in my lecture house in Dahlem, in which the whole problem was thoroughly examined, so that in the future the necessary ideological fight would also be carried out with the necessary knowledge and on the necessary scale.

Then the treatment of the countries which were Germany’s wards was discussed. I pointed out that some representatives interpreted the point of view of the master race, by travelling up and down the country with the whip. It is true, formerly one used to say of the Slavs that they liked to be thrashed. But this had changed radically. Now the situation was that the public thrashing meant the same as for the Orientals “the losing of face.” Even the Bolshevics mistreated the prisoners abominably behind the walls, but never in public view. A number of incidents had occurred caused by thoughtless talk. It is necessary that our foreign representatives also know how _to keep silent_. The Fuehrer read the draft of my decree for the Reich Commissioner Ukraine and gave his consent to it.

I then described to the Fuehrer the reception of the _three delegations of farmers_ in grateful acknowledgment of our agrarian legislation and produced all our propaganda, such as circulars, pamphlets, posters, translations of German writings, etc. The difficulty here, too, was that it had taken a long time until the 18 waggons could be transported. A part had remained in the Government General. The whole action was very successful. I then submitted to the Fuehrer photographs of Ukrainian men and women who were working in the Heinkel works. The Fuehrer expressed his surprise at the extraordinary good looks and even beauty of the people.

I then dealt with the _employment of foreign workers_ in the occupied Eastern territories. I had appointed a special delegate for this who had been very active lately to cultivate all those existing connections and to institute new ones. At first the Danish minister Larsen had travelled the Eastland with the General-Director Junker who was the chief of the Danish committee for employment in the East. This journey already had produced tangible, practical results: in Port Kunda a large cement works was being rebuilt, the machinery would be delivered within a few weeks. After an initial starting time about 75,000 tons of cement will be produced annually. Further erections of cement works would be possible. The completion of peat works could now be prepared in order to benefit from it in the following year. Two experts had to be sent there, and within a few weeks one could start with the installations. The same applies to large plaster factory, to the completion of concrete and wooden shoe factories. Since it will probably become impossible in the future to continue to provide the population with leather shoes. The factory will be capable of a daily output of 10,000 shoes. Furthermore, a number of other business plannings are also being considered. Especially the oil factory at Libau is ready to be taken over, also creameries, shipbuilding plants, etc. All those works thus promise a considerable increase in production for the coming years. Negotiations had taken place also with the Dutch, and Reich Commissioner Seyss Inquart had just now submitted a first draft regarding the employment of Dutch people in the region of Libau. It is planned to hand over to the Dutch people 500,000 ha of land to be cultivated under stipulation that after delivery of all that is claimed by the German administration, they are permitted to export the surplus to Holland. Some of the details had still to be settled. The Fuehrer thought one could as a matter of principle admit Dutchmen to the East, because if there were not more than 1000 people, then they would be absorbed. He did not wish large colonies. The matter was left undecided, to be thoroughly investigated. Moreover the DAF German Workers Front had bought a wharf at Varna in order to tackle the building of concrete ships.

I then reported to the Fuehrer the planning of central office for planning in the East, and I gave him the names on the committee for the general policy, economics, etc. The supreme authorities of the Reich had sent their emissaries. Naturally nothing would be done at this stage in which might somehow hamper the war production.

Then the discussion turned to Caucasia and _the policy of the AA_ [Foreign Ministry] towards the Eastern territories. I reported to the Fuehrer that, for some time, we had picked out the best of the prisoners by commissions of the Ministry East. The OKW had now established the Turkestan Legion through direct collaboration with us. According to my information received from the manager of chief section “Policy”, the camp is in perfect condition, the Commander has learned the Turkestan language, and the Turkestans have accepted German military terms and have an anti-Bolshevist attitude. The legions of the Caucasians would be modeled on similar lines. If one had not in the beginning on the part of the SD, called all those peoples “Asiatics”, had them shot or left to their fate, there would be more troops at the disposal of the German Reich today. A new flag was created for the Turkestan legion, the half moon was done away with and in its place put bow and arrow. I showed the Fuehrer the individual symbols for the designs for flags for the Georgians, Armenians, Aserbeidschanians, Cubancossacks, and Kalmucks. The Fuehrer had no objections against these designs, however, he asked my opinion about the Armenians. I stated that Armenia was the best bolt between Turkey and Aserbeidschan, and thus could stop a Panturanian movement towards the East. Generally speaking the Armenian people themselves are stationary, a people of farmers who had considerable industrial skill.

I then described to the Fuehrer our relationship with the Foreign Ministry. The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs claimed the political handling of the Eastern territories, in as far as it has not been taken over directly within our administration. I said that the Reich Foreign Minister had formed a large Eastern committee and had despite our protests convoked in increasing measure the most varied emigrants. I read to the Fuehrer a list of emigrants from Turkey, from Paris, from Switzerland, all of whom were staying at the Adlon Hotel in Berlin. Two of them, according to our information, were well-known espionage agents. I thought it extremely risky to assemble here these emigrants from all parts of the world. The Fuehrer listened in surprise. I said that we prepared years ago already for the Eastern question. In this connection we had made possible the studies of Dr. Benzing and assigned him upon request for a certain period to the AA. The AA then created for him a separate department for planning and appointed him to be a Regierungsrat [Advisor of the Government].

It subsequently refused to return him to us. The same applies in the case of the Turkestanian Kayum. The questions had long been discussed with him. We had merely loaned him to the AA for the purpose of broadcasting propaganda. Now the AA was sending him to Paris, in order to collect emigrants. The Fuehrer gave the strictest instructions to the Reich Minister Dr. Lammers, to inform the AA officially that it had to discontinue its activities in the East instantly. It was also to release the retained personalities to the Ministry East, and he did not wish any further inquiries. I further explained that I had talked to State Secretary v. Weizsaecker a few weeks ago and requested him to inform the Reich Foreign Minister that I was looking forward to speaking to him personally. Weizsaecker said that the two points of view differed. When Weizsaecker was asked about it after some time, he said that he did not understand from this talk that _he_ was to arrange the meeting between Ribbentrop and myself. We have interpreted this remark that the matter was to be put off until after the Congress of emigrants had been convoked in Berlin. Some days ago we were informed by a liaison man of the AA that they did not at all consider the attitude which I had reported to the Fuehrer in regard to the Caucasian people, as binding for them but that it was of a purely private character. The Fuehrer once more emphasized his point of view.

I then reported to the Fuehrer on the work of the preparatory reconstruction staffs. With the exception of a few personalities whom the Fuehrer preferred not to have employed or preferred to be used in Germany the Fuehrer accepted the proposed list of personalities. The tasks of Reich Minister Speer and his relationship with me were then thoroughly discussed. The Fuehrer said that he, for example, had made the worst experiences in regard to the matters of railroad traffic by the fact that the Government General had its own railroad administration between the front lines and the Reich. Because of these circumstances a lot of misunderstandings and frictions were caused. The separate administrations did not function and interfered with the uniform technical direction so that very nearly catastrophic conditions resulted, if the _entire_ administration of railroad traffic had not been transferred to the Reich Ministry of Communication. Only by these means had it become gradually possible to increase the daily number of trains from 125 to 220. For the construction of main thoroughfares and armament works it is also necessary that a central office has control, and Speer already proved at the beginning of his official duties that he knew how to tackle a job well. He succeeded to solve many a technical task in very short time, which normally would have taken months, and he, the Fuehrer, was most satisfied with this choice. I told the Fuehrer that I had promised my utmost support to Speer from the very beginning and that I had accepted in principle his first drafts for an arrangement, with the only exception of two points, that is this arrangement should remain in force beyond the duration of the war and secondly, that the department Chief of the O.T. [Organisation Todt], who should have a rank of about Oberregierungsrat, should be able to pass a decision against the Reich Commissioners.

The Fuehrer thereupon stated repeatedly that the Reich Ministry Speer would be dissolved on the very day peace was declared and all his present tasks would be split up. The management of the artery roads through the East, however, had still technically to be centrally conducted. They are, therefore, tasks for the immediate war effort. Speer also neither has the intention nor the commission to start building houses now, but he must be empowered to prevent the building anywhere of large administrative palaces or similar buildings, which are not war essential. Dr. Lammers suggested to include by way of agreement or decree of the Fuehrer, that this decree was only for the duration of the war. I then described to the Fuehrer the present general situation, according to which new plenipotentiaries-in-chief endeavoured to carry out direct actions in the occupied Eastern territories, overlooking those dignitaries who were appointed by the Fuehrer himself. At the moment the problem of the employment of labor was under discussion. In those places where the commissioners-in-chief had been informed in good time and had the possibility to enlighten the populations concerned, it was possible to achieve a considerable voluntary readiness for work. In many other instances one adopted measures of enforcement immediately, without taking any consideration of the commissioner-in-chief, with the result that in certain towns a flight into the woods took place, in order that they would not be--to use their own phrase--deported. Those men would decidedly increase the number of partisans and thus endanger our lines of supply. Other forced laborers had left the trains going into the Reich during the night, with the result that they arrived half empty at the frontier of the Government General. They, too, would constitute a danger. As a result at places which were included in the Four Year Plan themselves, the very Four Year Plan had withdrawn workers who were partially lost, and thus the opposite result was achieved, that is a noticeable deterioration of the situation and ill feeling of the population. I already received a number of reports from the Ukraine and from Latvia which confirm this state of affairs. If now medium or lower technicians proceeded similarly without regard of the commissioners-in-chief, these conditions would deteriorate considerably without thereby achieving the technical effects. I point out that development. If Reich Minister Speer would retain his authority in its old form, I would be forced to decline the responsibility for conditions in the future and, in any case, could not be subjected to criticism if the political situation would worsen very decisively thereby. The Fuehrer listened to the report most attentively, as was my impression, and then he said that, in any case, the arterial roads had to be secured by technical means in order to supply the frontier with guns and ammunition. The matter was then discussed once more. I pointed out what great effort it took me to restrain the supreme Reich authorities from interfering with the occupied Eastern territories; the arguments, however, were so convincing, that one realized to a large extent that the direction of the East could only be carried out centrally. If this painfully achieved position was now to be broken by such a far-reaching decree for Speer, the tendency would revive everywhere to interfere with the occupied Eastern territories disregarding the Ministry East. The Fuehrer said that under no circumstances should that happen, and he instructed Dr. Lammers, that he was to reject such demands on the Fuehrer’s orders.

Dr. Lammers was ordered to draft a formulation of the tasks of Reich Minister Speer in the occupied Eastern territories in relationship to myself for the duration of the war.

In the course of the discussion a number of other matters were also dealt with. The Fuehrer approved the final version regarding uniforms of the occupied territories. I reported to him the results of the exhibition in Agram, Bruxelles and of the work progress of the exhibition “Fight for Europe”.

The question of the awarding the iron cross to the Estonians, Lithuanians, and Latvians to a problem of the OKW. The Armed Forces are in favor of such awards. However, there are some political objections. The Fuehrer believes to see a danger in it, that in case of future complications the bearer of the EK [iron cross] might have to be subjected to disciplinary punishment. I explained that soldiers of the Baltic nations--according to many utterances--looked upon an award as a guarantee for Reich citizenship. Thereby the political effect of a Germanisation and on the other hand the skimming of nationalistic forces would become possible. The matter was to be examined once again.

I informed the Fuehrer of my intention to start my first official journey into the Eastland on the 14th May. The Fuehrer authorized me to extend his greetings to the appointed administrative corps.

I then reported to the Fuehrer the results of metal collection in the Eastland which produced 2,500 tons. By collecting those metals still available in the economy, the figure would be raised to 3,500 tons. The collection of wools too had reached the average of the Reich.

I handed the Fuehrer a file note regarding the development of rubber plantations, which has been fostered by the foreign policy office of the NSDAP since 1936. Despite all the official refusals the plants were at first cultivated in Athens, later on the Reich Food Minister granted a few acres of land in Germany. Now it is cultivated in the Wartheland and in the Government General, and later on in the Ukraine where from 1943 on more than 100,000 ha will be worked. The harvest will then provide enough to fill the gap which is still open from synthetic rubber production.

During the report I turned the conversation toward the planning departments of the ministry. I said that after nearly one year no high official had yet been appointed because of the many discussions with the competent Reich departments. I mentioned the case of party member Cranz who was supposed to be my immediately subordinated chief of press in the East, but whom the ministry of finance did not want to grant to me as a Ministerialdirektor. Dr. Lammers was of the opinion that one could not start right away with the highest ranks. If Cranz was now appointed Ministerialrat then he could be promoted within a year. I said that Cranz was already a year in the Ministry. Nor was it a question of appointing the _major_ Cranz, but of the journalist who had followed this profession for nearly 20 years. I said that the ministry also had to be on an equal footing in its negotiations with the Reich Commissar. This was not an ordinary Special department ministry [Ressortministerium], but it had other, far more extended tasks. The Fuehrer agreed with this point of view and asked about how large the Reich Commissioners Offices were. After mentioning the number of rooms I added that a Reich Commissioner was in reality like a minister president, who was governing a large country. Here, too, the Fuehrer agreed, and he said that to begin with he was not much in favor to create a ministry for the East Commission. I was surprised, because Dr. Lammers had made out to me that just the creation of a ministry was the wish of the Fuehrer. I told the Fuehrer that at that time I had made special propositions. I then requested Dr. Lammers to give me his support in this matter.

Signed: R.

Berlin, 13th May 1942.
R/H.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1521-PS

BAVARIAN POLITICAL POLICE

Copy

Munich, Briennerstr. 50, August 24th, 1934

Telephone 28341-46

Reg. No. 33668 I 1 Nh must be quoted in further correspondence. To the Bureau of Secret State Police--Central Office

_Berlin S.W. 11_
Prinz Albrecht St. 8.

Reference

National mourning on the occasion of the death of Reich President and
Generalfeldmarschall von Hindenburg; here--the carrying out of para.
III of the decree of the Reich Government dated 2.8.34.

Enclosure

1 Copy

Several telephone reports which reached here as early as the evening of the 2nd of August, 1934, from offices of the Party and regional [Bezirk] authorities, concerning refusal to sound the funeral knell ordered by the Reich Government, and also numerous written reports, caused the Bavarian Political Police to come to the decision, a copy of which is enclosed, and which has already been submitted to your office.

The result was as follows: In more than 70 parishes bells were not tolled on the 2nd of August, in 20 parishes on the 2nd and 3rd of August, and in 4 parishes on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th of August. The reason given in about 56 cases was that no definite order had been issued from the responsible diocesan office, or dean’s office. Of the clergy involved, 32 in all are politically tainted--two of them read holy mass on the 26th of July for the deceased Chancellor of the Austrian Confederation Dollfuss, or remembered him in a sermon and had prayers said for him. It appears that no special order of the senior church authorities was necessary for this. In one case the sacristan was interrupted in ringing the knell by the priest.

When asked for an explanation by enraged fellow Germans and fellow party members, every possible excuse was used--let us only call attention to the following ones, to show what type they were:

Alleged disturbance of the religious service.

Nothing is done on orders from lay authorities.

Absence, either accidental, or alleged to be by reason of duty.

Alleged state of decay of the belfry.

Alleged defectiveness of the bells.

Alleged ignorance of the decree of the Reich Government.

Hindenburg was a Protestant; by a decree of the Bavarian Ministry of Public Worship and Education (Resolution of the State Minister for Education and Public Worship, dated 29.6.34, No. I 19763) the vicar was only pledged to obey the order of the church authorities with respect to the ringing of church bells.

Alleged incompetency.

Bells had only been rung in the morning on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the outbreak of war.

On his own authority, the bishop of Wuerzburg, Matthias Ehrenfried, a _sufficiently well-known_ cleric, fixed the ringing of bells for the morning, between 11-0 and 12-0 o’clock. [pencil note referring to underling] How so?

Another minister had the incredible lack of taste to point out that the enforced ringing of church bells when Kurt Eisner was shot, had been the occasion of the order that this should in future only be done by order of the church authorities. The mentioning of the name of the immortal President of the Reich von Hindenburg in the same breath as an incident connected with Eisner, the traitor and Jew, is the most despicable feature [Gemeinheit] of the affair.

From the foregoing it is not difficult to see that the Catholic clergy in their intolerance, have done their utmost to disturb the peace between laymen and clergy. There is no doubt that the obstructive attitude of the clergy is due, on the one hand, to that fact that the deceased Reichpresident was a Protestant, and on the other, to the fact that the Catholic Church was to obey a suggestion made by the National-Socialist Reich Government. The conduct shown in this case provides once more a clear evidence of the international attitude and lack of German feeling and perception in Catholic clerical circles.

In three cases the taking into protective custody, in order to guarantee them personal safety, of refractory clergy could not be avoided, in the interests of the maintenance of public security and order, and on account of the anger of the people.

The following clergy are in question:

The Parish priest, Father Johann Quinger of Altenkunstadt BA., Lichtenfels. He was taken into protective custody on 3.8 on the express order of the State Ministry of the Interior, because he assaulted SA leaders and SA men who were ringing the bells against his wishes. He was released from custody on 10.8.34.

The Parish priest, Father Ludwig Obholzer of Kiefersfelden BA Rosenheim. For his personal safety he was in police custody from 2400 hours on the 2.8.34, till 1000 hours on 3.8.34. On 5.8.34, he said sarcastically in his sermon, referring to the SA men who had carried out the ringing of the funeral knell on their own account, “Lord forgive them, for they know not what they do!”

The Parish priest, Father Johann Nepomuk Kleber of Wiefelsdorf, BA., Burglengenfeld, refused to ring the church bells on the 2nd and 3rd. He is badly tainted politically and had to be taken into protective custody from the 5th to the 8th of August 34 in the interests of his own safety.

The behaviour of the diocesan office of the _archbishopric of Munich and Freising_, [underlined in red pencil], which is in accordance with the principle “Attack is the best defence” deserves special note. In two letters of the 10th and 11th of August 1934 a touching complaint is lodged about the behaviour of members of the SA and the Party on ringing the church bells without authorization, and also about the fact that the clergymen named above were restricted in their personal liberty. In this connection it should be stressed that the clergy concerned were treated with extreme leniency. We could refer here to the case of Quinger, where the SA men, in spite of the injuries which the clergyman inflicted on them, with exemplary discipline did not return the assaults. The State authorities did everything to ensure the continuance of worship undisturbed. Moreover, the length of imprisonment was confined in all cases to the minimum.

It must again be pointed out, most emphatically, that the unspeakable behaviour of the clergy concerned in this matter leads us to deduce the existence of a very special frame of mind, and spotlights the true internal attitude of the Catholic clergy to the National-Socialist State. It is not to be wondered at if here and there, in face of the incredible behaviour of the clergy and the threadbare excuses they used, the people and the SA resorted to an act of self-defense which was not perhaps in conformity with strict law, but was very understandable. Narrow-minded jurisprudence, as the elders of the church choose to practice it, is not in place here, and is not understood by the mass of the people, as events have shown.

Since the diocesan office of the archbishopric of Munich and Freising has announced that it will also “report” the incidents to the Reich Ministry of the Interior, it is absolutely necessary to acquaint the above office with the contents of the present report.

By order

signed Brunner
[Stamp]

Reich Governor of Bavaria
28 Aug. 1934 1/1
enclosures
Mark Ge 2/28.8

(Above) _Copy_ to the Reich Governor of Bavaria, for the attention of State Secretary Hofmann, Munich, requesting that it should be noted.

By order

Jenner [?]

Copy checked 24.9.34. [Several illegible initials]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1526-PS

Copy

Prof. Dr. Wolodymyr Kubijowytsch,
Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee.

Cracow, February 1943.

To the Governor General, Reich Minister Dr. Frank.

Your Excellency:

Complying with your wish I send you this letter, in which I should like to state critical conditions and the painful happenings, which create especially grave conditions for the Ukrainian population within the General-Government. As to the German-Ukrainian relations and the general situation of the Ukrainian people, I have included all that in my letter, known as well to you, which I addressed to the Secretary of State Dr. Buehler as far back as December 1942. In that letter I stressed mainly the alarm of the Ukrainian population in regard to the uncertainty about their national future within the New Europe. Here I would like to quote some real happenings and add my reflections on them.

The center of these is the question: Shall the Ukrainians work successfully in favor of final victory; they must be granted the security which, while absolutely necessary to them, unfortunately does not exist. For under the present conditions the Ukrainians are neither sure of their possessions nor of their lives. The matter of re-privatisation has not yet been settled. Inhuman treatment, severe pressure to forced labor, unfounded arrests, and lastly the shootings of great numbers are happenings not too infrequent these days.

I. _Question of Re-privatisation._

Of primary importance for the further shaping of German-Ukrainian relations is the problem of re-privatisation. The whole Ukrainian people have connected with the German victory in the East their hope that now all remainders of the Bolshevist Regime shall be extinguished finally.

The views of the Ukrainian people are basically those of private property and economy. The Ukrainian peasant is prepared to undergo the greatest privations and sacrifices in favor of the State, if only he be allowed to work in tranquility; this feeling of inner tranquility he can but gain in the knowledge that the soil on which he and his ancestors have toiled, will remain his property in the future. The Ukrainian population received with gratitude the proclamation of your Excellency of 1 August 1941 in which, you Sir, have solved this problem at its roots and have stated re-privatisation to be the general rule for the economy of the State. Now, however, the attitude of some authorities looks as if the re-privatisation would be questioned still and as if in the new social order there was no place for private property. This situation is very cleverly made use of by the hostile whispering propaganda. Especially widely has the rumor been spread that private property has not yet been reintroduced for the reason that a large action of resettlement of the Ukrainians from Galicia to the East is to be expected.

Actions, such as measures of adjusting real property at the expense of peasant property (in the districts of Tarnopol, Rawa, Ruska, Kalusch, etc.), survey of real property of peasants (in the district of Czortkow) and imposing of fees for the use of land (Czortkow, Zloczow, etc.) give such rumors the appearance of probability (enclosure 1).

It is clear that for this reason there appears a great alarm and nervousness amongst the rural population which must badly influence the inclination for work and the output of agricultural production.

The uncertainty as well as all the consciously false interpretations of such measures through the whispering propaganda, could only be ended by a definite carrying out of the principle of the Proclamation mentioned.

_II. Measures for finding labor._

The general nervousness is still more enhanced by the wrong methods of finding labor which have been used more and more frequently in recent months. The wild and ruthless man-hunt as exercised everywhere in towns and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants. Everybody is exposed to the danger, to be seized anywhere and at any time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and to be brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has happened to him only months later one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard.

I beg to mention some instances with their respective proofs:

_a._ During such an action a pupil in Sokol lost his life and another
one was wounded (enclosure 2).

_b._ 19 Ukrainian workers from Galicia, all provided with identity
cards, were assigned in Cracow to a transport of “Russian
prisoners-of-war” and delivered into a punitive camp in Graz
(enclosure 3).

_c._ 95 Ukrainians from Galicia, recruited for work in Germany by
the labor offices in the middle of January, were sent to Pskow in
Russia, via Eastern Prussia, where most of them died under
distress (enclosure 4).

_d._ Seizure of workers under pretext of military recruitment
(Zalesczyki); kidnapping schoolboys during school time (Biala
Podloaska, Wlodawa, Hrubieschow) (enclosure 5).

_III. Question of Personal Security._

Treatment of human beings.

Already the kind of treatment meted out to our compatriots by the lower instruments of the German authority, adds much to make the general situation more grave. The Ukrainians expected the treatment of members of those nations who fought against Germany, because they belong to a people who have never done anything against the Germans and their interests. Now every Ukrainian cannot fail to become convinced that most of the Germans do not make any distinction, and that they are accustomed to treat all peoples of the East similarly, whether friend or foe. Too often the Ukrainian is exposed to the danger, when dealing with the lower authorities, to be personally insulted, to be slandered, even to be ill-treated. Innumerable instances could be mentioned proving this sort of treatment. In the enclosure I give only a small selection of especially grave cases (enclosure 6).

Wholesale shootings.

Of much worse character are the wholesale shootings of absolutely innocent persons, such as happened in Lubycza Koroliwska and then in Lwow and Czortkow.

In Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa Ruska, 46 peasants, including 31 Ukrainians, were shot without trial (4 October 1942) (enclosure 7).

During the second half of November 1943, 28 Ukrainians were shot in Lwow, 56 in Czortkow, also without trial. (enclosure 8).

Arrests in December 1942.

In December 1942 the police undertook a cleansing action among the so-called disturbing elements, leading very soon, however, to wholesale arrests of innocent, quiet citizens. They are under arrest and in danger to lose their good health for certain, if not their life. (enclosure 9).

How acute and well founded this fear is, is proved by what happened to 6 Ukrainian girls from Kolomea, who were arrested in February 1942 and who disappeared without leaving any trace. (enclosure 10).

Revision in the St. George Cathedral, Lwow.

In connection with the cleansing action mentioned above a raid was carried out even in the St. George’s cathedral in Lwow. The fact itself, especially because of the behavior of the police at this place which is sacred to the Ukrainians, produced a deep resentment and bad feelings amongst the population. This was used by hostile propaganda at once. Generally, it is pointed out that not even during the Bolshevist occupation raids took place on the hill of St. George, and that several visits by Bolshevist professors and students were always undertaken with great respect for the place and the person of the Metropolitan.

Special action against the asocial elements.

Since 15 January a special action began against the so-called asocial elements in Galicia. In the whole area about 5,000 persons were arrested. The purpose of this action was said to be the removal of those elements, who did not wish to work, were active in the black market and by so doing made the work of the authorities more difficult. This action however, did not obtain the right result, and the victims were leading personalities of the Ukrainian cultural and economic life as well as employees of several state authorities and members of the Ukrainian Aid Committee.

These wholesale arrests raised an extraordinary nervousness and anxiety among the delegates of our committee and in large spheres of the Ukrainian population.

_IV. Irregular conditions and Partisan nuisance in the District of
Lublin._

[This chapter deals with partisan activity and the risks to which the loyal Ukrainian population is exposed thereby. Irrelevant].

_V. Collective responsibility._

General remarks.

The Ukrainian people consider as particularly painful the application of methods of collective responsibility. The large masses of the people generally have no understanding for the principle of collective responsibility; they take it as absence of justice to be punished for a deed one has neither done nor approved of. Generally, the principle of collective responsibility may be considered as justified if applied to a racial community which is homogenous. The partisan nuisance, however, is particularly spread out in the mixed Polish-Ukrainian areas, and the Ukrainian community can by no means bear any responsibility for misdeeds done by Poles. But even in areas with the almost homogenous population, as e.g. in Galicia, the Ukrainian people could only be held responsible if they were possessed of some means of executive power towards those members. Today they have no such means. For the reasons stated, the application of the principle of collective responsibility against the Ukrainian people is unjust and inexpedient in its present state of organization and especially in the mixed areas. The collective responsibility often hits the leading circles in town and country whose feelings are pro-German, but who are powerless against both the Polish dissenters and against their own irresponsible hot-heads and despairing persons.

Thus it happens that the collective responsibility which has the purpose of exterminating anti-German elements quite to the contrary annihilates or weakens positively pro-German elements and creates bad feelings and bitterness. Thus in the district of Lublin about 400 such Ukrainians perished.

We mention but some of the most convincing instances:

Wholesale shootings.

On 25 December 1942 the military police surrounded the village of Przewale, in the district of Zamose, area of Lublin, herded together a large number of Ukrainians and Poles. When the manager of the estate declared he needed the Poles for work, the Poles were set free, the Ukrainians, however, numbering 16, were shot dead; among the persons shot was a 15 years old girl, Eugenie Tybyczuk (encl. 15).

In the village of Nodosow (district of Lubin) 8 pro-German Ukrainians who had been persecuted by the Poles because of their patriotic views in pre-war time, were shot on 30 October 1942.

On 29 January 1943 in the village of Sumyn (collective community of Tarnowatka, district of Lublin) 45 Ukrainians, including 18 children between the ages of 3 and 15 were shot, and on 2 February 1943 in the villages of Pankow and Scharowola (collective community of Tarnowatka) 19 Ukrainians were shot, including 8 children, aged 1 to 13 years (encl. 16).

The greatest bitterness is created by the killing of innocent children, because the population is unable to understand that the German authorities could consent to or order such deeds.

The tragic events in Lubycza Koroliwska and Kubycza Kniazi (districts of Rawa Ruska, area of Lublin) have been mentioned above (encl. 7).

Conclusion.

The happenings in Galicia mentioned in this report have been submitted to Governor Dr. Waechter and the Department Head Dr. Bauer in writing and verbally. We repeat them herein, in order to complete the picture of the General Government.

* * * * * * *

Cracow, 25 February 1943.

# # # # #

_Table of Enclosures._

1. The surveying measures in the area of Czortkow.

2. The events at Sokal.

3. The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office.

4. Minutes (fate of the Ukrainian workers in Pskow).

5. Memorandum for the files (false recruiting of workers to the
Reich).

6. Memorandum for the files (ill-treatment of Ukrainians).

7. Shooting of 46 peasants in Lubycza Koroliwska, district of Rawa
Ruska.

8. Shootings in Lwow and Czortkow in November 1942.

9. Arrests in Galicia in December 1942.

10. Uncertain fate of arrested Ukrainian women students from Kolomea.

11. List of some well-known Ukrainian citizens, arrested in January
1943 in the area of Kolomea, Stryj, and Kamionka Strumilowa.

12. Arrests and shootings of persons unfit for work in the district
of Sanok.

13. Anti-Ukrainian activities of persons unfit for work in the
district Biljoraj.

14. Activities of partisans in the district of Biala Podlasko during
the second half of the year 1942.

15. Shooting of 16 Ukrainians in the village of Przewale.

16. List of the Ukrainians shot in the village of Sumin, community of
Tarnowatka on 29 January 1943.

_Enclosure 1._

_The Surveying Measures in the District of Czortkow._

In September of last year the Chief Inspectorate of agricultural land [Hauptlandinspektion] in Czortkow was formed under the management of the former District Surveyor [Kreislandinspektor].

Employed were the engineers-surveyor Jwanenko, a Russian, and the draughtsman Sach, a Pole; further the land-surveyors from Brzezany and Tarnaopol and some other German employees who were brought to Czortkow. Travelling in the district of Czortkow they drew maps showing the position of the communities with special regard to all farms and marking the better farms. About the middle of December the activities of this institution ceased, probably up till the end of April 1943. Rumor has it that German peasants to the number of 50,000 who are to be transferred from Germany into this district should be settled on these better farms.

_Enclosure 2._

_The Events at Sokal._

On 24 October 1942 between 13 and 14 hours, when the school boys went home from school, they were stopped by detachments of military police on the street and together with other people were formed into one unit. There was a panic as nobody knew what was going to happen to these people. People began to flee from the streets. The school boy Jaroslau Meda who was just passing with his father, the secretary of the collective community of Parchacz also started to run. The father tried to calm him and called him back as there was no danger. A military policeman, however, saw him fleeing and shot at him wounding him fatally, so that he died in the local hospital half an hour later.

At the same time two military policemen went into the Ukrainian hostel for schoolboys and took away some boys. The others were at lunch in the dining-room and therefore remained unnoticed. In front of the schoolboys’ hostel the schoolboy Wassyl Krawtschuk was caught by a military policeman and wounded so seriously in the thigh by a bayonet that he had to be taken to hospital.

The student of theology Osyyp Karawan was severely beaten until he fainted.

The public school teacher Michael Duliba was beaten publicly.

It is to be stressed that nobody knew that this action of collecting people was to procure workers to load carrots at the station. When the headmaster of the public school informed the manager of the local labor office by phone and asked for his help, the latter replied he had no time to spare for this matter at the moment. Thereafter, the headmasters of the Ukrainian schools informed the manager of the local labor office that they would put their boys at the disposal of the authorities in every case there was unforeseen and undelayable work to be done in town after having received fair warning provided no other labor was available.

_Enclosure 3._

Copy

Zborow, 6 Oct. 1942

Ukrainian Aid Committee, Branch Zborow.
To the Ukrainian Main Committee in Lwow.
Department for food.

Subject: The behavior of the Polish employees of the labor office in
Cracow towards our laborers.

We present the minutes prepared by our office together with Mr. Procyk Lukas on 28 September 1942 who returned from Germany.

He reports:

Ukrainian laborers coming to Cracow, though provided with certificates and identification papers, are being transferred by the Polish employees of the labor office together with the transports of Russian civilian and brought to punitive camps.

Many Ukrainians fell victim to such Polish provocations. The situation of these people is all the more tragic, as they do not know the German language and their certificates and identification papers were destroyed by the above mentioned Polish employees.

Below we give a list of the Ukrainian laborers who are in the punitive camp in Graz as Russians and refugees:

[Follows a list of 19 names].

The situation of the above named is tragic. I was lucky to escape. With complete confidence in me and tears in their eyes they asked me to report their condition to the Committee.

[signed] Procyk Lukas.

_Enclosure 4._

Minutes.

Michaljlo Kost, Bohdan Janiw, Iwan Baran (son of Iwan), Iwan Baran (son of Mykola) and Olexa Chimjak, all from Koniuschky, Koroliwiski, district of Komarow, were sent by the labor office for work to Germany on 12 January 1942.

They came to Pwzemysk, where they stayed for a whole week awaiting medical inspection. After the medical inspection they were joined to the transport which was to go to Germany. However, they were driven via Warsaw, East Prussia to Russia and were brought to the town of Pskow. With them were 95 Ukrainian lads from Galicia, including 18 lads from the village of Koniuschky, Koroliwiski. They were accompanied by a military escort. On 28 January 1942 they arrived in Pskow. At first, they worked in the woods felling trees, later building a bath-house.

In the beginning they received half a loaf of bread as daily ration, and later one loaf for seven persons daily, black coffee at breakfast and supper and soup at dinner time.