Chapter LIII: Section 57: of the Weimar Constitution). The Reich-Ministers who act as (3)

Mine damage of the Gneisenau only very insignificant. One destroyer may be recalled from Drontheim, as a second one is still ready for sailing.

Fuehrer very much agitated about new postponement, as there is danger of treachery particularly in brown leaflets [in braunen Blaettern]. Talk of the Belgian Envoy to the Vatican to Brussels permits the deduction that treason has been committed by a German personality who left Berlin for Rome on April 29th.

Fuehrer again emphasizes that the greatest achievement of endurance [Dauerleistung] is that of the foot-slogging combat-soldier.

_8 May_:

Alarming news from Holland, canceling of furloughs, evacuations, road-blocks, other mobilization measures; according to reports of the counterintelligence service the British have asked for permission to march in but the Dutch have refused.

According to reports the measures of the Dutch are partly directed against the coast and partly against us. It is not possible to obtain a clear picture, whether the Dutch don’t work hand in hand with the English or whether they actually want to defend their neutrality against the first attacker. Evaluation of the weather shows slow improvement of the whole situation, but development fog in the next days still have to be taken into consideration.

Fuehrer does not want to wait any longer.

Field Marshal wants postponement until the 10th, at least.

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command presses for early action. Fuehrer is very agitated; then he consents to postponement until May 10th, which is against his intuition, as he says. But not one day longer. Departure of Envoy Kieritz, who was scheduled to leave at 12.57 hours is stopped at the last minute. Is not supposed to leave until May 9th.

In the evening, I arrange the different telegrams with him.

_9 May_:

Fuehrer decides to fall in on May 10th for sure. Departure with Fuehrer train at 17.00 hours from Finkenkrug.

After report Jeschonnek that weather situation will be favourable on the 10th, the code word Danzig is given at 2100 hours.

The same to Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

_10 May_:

Morning arrival in Emskirchen still during darkness. At 0530 hours in the Eagle’s nest.

_11-13 May_:

The operations take a course favorable beyond expectation. The Dutch offer desperate resistance. Bridges at Maastricht, and all bridges north of it, are blown up. Only the railroad bridge at Gemrep falls into our hands undamaged. Fort Eben Emael is taken and the bridges in Mordeyk south of Dortrecht as well as the important ones over the Albert Canal west of Maastricht are taken over by parachutists and glider-borne personnel and are held by them. Airborne operation of the Sponek Division is met by heaviest resistance and is badly mauled. However, the different units hold out. On the R., the junction of the 9th armored division with them is effected. The citadel of Luettich is being broken into.

_14 May_:

Order number 11 issued, which orders the concentration of all armored and mechanized units in front of the 4th army.

Holland capitulates.

_16 May_:

Fuehrer insists very much on transfer of all armored and mechanized units from Army Group B to A, and on speediest bringing up of strong reserves behind the 4th and 12th army. OKH gives orders to pull these units out from B and to add them via F ... to the fifteenth corps as new Armored Group Hoeppner. According to report Reichau, there are indications that the enemy is giving up the Dyle position or its Southern part, at least. Therefore, Army High Command receives the option to carry out the junction of Armored Group Hoeppner also in front of Nanner, which the enemy seems to be evacuating.

Engle reports after visit at 4th army that that army has reached the French-Belgian border near Beauchmont, after a heavy tank battle.

_1600-1830 hours_: Field Marshal Goering with the Fuehrer, talk with Jeschonnek about forthcoming tasks of the Air Force and intentions concerning Narvik, utilizing the new airdrome near * * *

_17 May_:

_18 May_:

Day of great tension. The commander-in-chief of the Army has not carried out the intention of building up, as quickly as possible, a new flanking position to the South. Instead of turning march to the west. For this reason the 10th Armored Division and the 2nd and 29th Motorized Divisions are still entrenched in the defensive flanking positions.

The commander-in-chief of the Army and General Holdes are called immediately and ordered to adopt the necessary measures immediately (see note in the files).

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command is flying immediately by plane to General Rundstedt at Bastogne.

I further give an order supplementing the previous directive. It veers the 1st Mountain Division and the rear echelons of the 4th Army, to the South and South-West for an attack.

_19 May_:

_20 May_:

Break-through becomes more and more clearly outlined. True, Army Group “B”, respectively Chief are very vexed because their Armored Corps was taken away from them, but it was the right thing to do. On the 20th, we already have all armored and mechanized divisions, except the 9th one, in the middle of the break-through wedge. While we were still afraid on the 19th that the bulk of the French-English army might have escaped to the South, it becomes increasingly evident on the 20th that more than 20 divisions are still north of the Somme.

Now everything depends on sealing off the Abbeville gap and the Army Corps Kleist reaches it in the evening of the 28th. In the forenoon of the 20th, at the Army High Commands conference, the Fuehrer declares the new directive for continuation of operations against the French Army.

1. Annihilation of the enemy north of the Somme and gaining of the sea coast.

2. Sudden thrust forward between Oise and sea, until Seine river is reached.

3. Principal Attack on both sides of Reims in south-westerly direction, accompanied on the right flank east of Paris by heavy forces.

4. For secondary reasons penetration of the Maginot line by lighter forces between St. Avold and Sarreguemines in direction of Nancy-Luneville.

General von Stuelpnagel is ordered, not to follow up any more former intention, to attack the Plateau of Langres with 20 Italian Divisions crossing the Upper Rhine. The Italians rather should attack the French Alpine Front and pin down French forces on the Upper Rhine. This they can prepare already now, without having commenced hostilities.

Fuehrer is beside himself with joy. Talks in words of highest appreciation of the German Army and its leadership. Is working on the peace treaty, which shall express the tenor only: Return of territory robbed over the past 400 years from the German people, and other values.

First negotiations in the forest of Compiegne like in 1918.

British can get a separate peace any time after restitution of the colonies.

A special memorandum of the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command containing the emotion-chocked words of the Fuehrer when receiving the telephone report of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army about the capture of Abbeville, is in the files.

_21 May_:

Commander in Chief of the Army together with Halder reports at 09.45 about situations and later intentions. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army wants to operate by-passing Paris on the West with the entire Armored and mechanized units under Reichman’s command, and in addition to this to attack with he wants to attack the Upper Rhine with 18 divisions. This would change the intentions of the Fuehrer, expressed by him on the 20th. Fuehrer declares his agreement for the time being.

* * * * * * *

In the afternoon the Fuehrer explains to Chief of the Armed Forces High Command and to me, that he had changed his mind. He believes, that it is wrong to employ all Armed and Mechanized Divisions West of Paris, that it would be better to direct the main thrust, also with the bulk of Armored Forces, to by-pass Paris in the east (transmitted by me to Greifenberg in the evening).

Report of Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to Fuehrer at 1200 hours. In the afternoon Field Marshal and Jeschonnek.

The Fuehrer is a little nervous in the evening about the fact, that infantry divisions are not pushed forward fast enough. Possibly they are being held back in order to obtain improvements of position of the VIth and VIIth Corps. If possible, one must employ transport groups.

Fuehrer stays in map room until 0130 hours.

_22 May_:

Chief of the Armed Forces High Command decides after that to fly to Army Group A in Charleville early on the 22nd. Brings back a report much more pleasant than the situation map indicates. It becomes apparent that Headquarters of 4th Army has ordered General Kluge to commit the 1st Army Corps south of Sombre, so that it will be in front rather than in the rear of the French border fortifications.

The Fuehrer approves at 1300 hours directive, submitted by me, concerning sparing of human lives of the 10th Army by disengagement from the Maginot line, cessation of unnecessary attacks, bringing up of all Divisions and mobile GHQ troops to the rear of 4th Army.

Sharp pressure of Army Group B towards the West. The Fuehrer furthermore approves commitment of an airborne Battalion already in readiness and of 2 companies Mountain troops, with short training, in Narvik.

Army High Command draws a very optimistic picture of the situation at 1700 hours and intends to continue at 1200 hours on left wing West of Arras towards North.

But Jeschonnek reports at 1900 hours, that French tanks reached point 3 kilometer in front of Arras and were stopped only there by dive bombers, pursuit planes and Anti Aircraft Artillery.

_24 May_:

The Fuehrer flies together with me and Schmundt to Army Group A to Charleville.

He is very happy about the measures of the Army Group, which correspond entirely with his ideas. He learns to his surprise that the Army High Command, without informing the Fuehrer and the High Command of the Armed Forces, has subordinated the 4th Army and a number of Divisions to its rear, to Army Group B. Fuehrer is very much displeased and thinks this regulation is a mistake not only in military respect but also psychologically wrong. Commander-in-Chief of the Army is ordered to report, and shifting of dividing-line is rescinded. New crisis of confidence, especially since Field Marshal reports earlier that an order of the Army High Command in no way pushes the Army Group B onward, but even invites it to make available reserves that can be spared.

For that reason a new order is issued in the evening (a) not to advance beyond the line Sandez-St.Omer-Graveline towards the East. Besides that each change regarding the Chain of command among the Armies is subject to approval of the Fuehrer.

The Fuehrer signs Order #13 regarding continuation of operations.

He prohibits the proposed talk by General von Melsch in the Foreign Office to foreign journalists about the war situation, if necessary this shall be done by W PR [Armed Forces Propaganda?]

Very favorable report of the Commander in Chief of the Air Force and the Commander in Chief of the Army about the situation.

It becomes obvious, that the surrounded enemy is no longer capable of concerted action.

Situation in the East becomes threatening because of Russian concentration of forces against Bessarabia.

_25 May_:

In the morning the Commander-in-Chief of the Army arrived and asks permission armored mechanized division to push forward from the High terrain Vimy-St.Omer-Graveline towards in the West into the level terrain. Fuehrer is against it, leaves decision to Army Group A. They decline for the time being because tank, shall rest a while, to be ready for tasks in the South.

At noon, Commander of 22 Divisions (Parachute Divisions) Count Sponek, reports about his experiences between the Hague and Rotterdam. He had heavy losses, but accomplished the incredible.

Air Force reports great successes near Narvik.

The unlimited expansion plan of the SS causes general apprehension. Lutz protests in a letter to the General [Generaloberst] against mentioning of the Armed-SS [Waffen-SS] in Armed forces High Command communiques. But this came from the Fuehrer in a proclamation to the troops in the Dutch theater of operations. General Dietl has received parachuted mountain troops in Narvik after a course of training lasting only 10 days, no losses.

_26 May_:

In the morning the Fuehrer sends for Commander-in-Chief of the Army and agrees because 18th and 6th army advance slowly and because, resistance in the South in front of the 2nd Army Corps has stiffened, that tank units and infantry divisions push forward in direction of Tournai, Cassel and Dunkerque from the West, especially because the enemy on their part do not advance against the mountain positions but dig themselves in defensive positions and improve them. In conjunction therewith the Commander-in-Chief of the Army reports about his intentions for further conduct of the operations (All sketch). Of the 12 Divisions, committed for the first push northwest of Paris, 6 shall join Army Group B (9th and 4th Army). First push possible around 31 May. 2nd push 6 to 8 days later (Main attack A and B), 3rd push at C will be in readiness starting 15 June.

The problem Paris is to be considered, not only from a military, but also from a political point of view.

* * * * * * *

If Paris is surrendered or if revolutionary features come to the fore, then Paris must be occupied at once. If Paris is defended, we will strongly disengage ourselves for the time being.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1814-PS

ORGANIZATION BOOK OF THE NSDAP

Editions of 1936, 1938 and 1940.

Editor, the Reich Organization Leader of the NSDAP (Dr. Robert Ley).
Published by the Central Publishing House of the NSDAP, Franz Eher
Successor, Munich. Pages 86-88.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THE NSDAP AND ITS AFFILIATED ASSOCIATIONS

The Party was created by the Fuehrer out of the realization that if our people were to live and advance towards an era of prosperity they had to be led according to an ideology suitable for our race. They must have as supporters men above average, that means, men who surpass others in self-control, discipline, efficiency, and greater judgment. The party will therefore always constitute a minority, the order of the National Socialist ideology which comprises the leading elements of our people.

Therefore the party comprises only fighters, at all times prepared to assume and to give everything for the furtherance of the National Socialist ideology. Men and women whose primary and most sacred duty is to serve the people.

The NSDAP as the leading element of the German people control the entire public life, from an organizational point of view, as well as from that of affiliates, the organizations of the State administration, and so forth.

In the long run it will be impossible to let leaders retain responsible offices if they have not been recognized by the Party.

Furthermore, the party shall create the prerequisites for a systematic selection of potential “Fuehrers”.

The reconstruction of the National Socialist organizational structure itself is demonstrated by the observation of the following principles:

The Fuehrer Principle.

The subordination and coordination within the structure of the entire
organization.

The regional unity.

The expression of the practical community thought.

I. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE [Fuehrerprinzip]

The Fuehrer Principle requires a pyramidal organization structure in its details as well as in its entirety.

The Fuehrer is at the top.

He nominates the necessary leaders for the various spheres of work of the Reich’s direction, the Party apparatus and the State administration.

Thus a clear picture of the tasks of the party is given.

The Party is the order of “Fuehrers”. It is furthermore responsible for the spiritual-ideological National Socialist direction of the German people. The right to organize people for their own sake emanates from these reasons.

This also justifies the subordination to the party of the organizations concerned with the welfare of the people, besides the inclusion of people in the affiliates of the party, the SA, SS, NSKK, the Hitler Youth, the NS Womanhood, the NS German Student Association and the NS German “Dozentenbund” [University teachers association].

This is where the National Socialist Fuehrer structure becomes more strongly apparent.

Every single affiliate is cared for by an office of the NSDAP.

The leadership of the individual affiliates is appointed by the Party.

The Reich Organization Leader [Reichsorganisationsleiter] of the NSDAP is simultaneously leader of the DAF. The NSBO is the organization bearer of the DAF.

The Leader of the Head-Office for Public Welfare also handles within the “Personalunion” the National Socialist Welfare and the Winter Relief.

The same applies to:

The Reich Justice Office [Reichsrechtsamt] for the NS
“Rechtswahrerbund”,

The head office for public health for the NS. German Medical
Association,

The head office for educators for the NS Teachers Association,

The head office for civil servants for the Reich Association of Civil
Servants,

The head office for war victims for the NS. War Victim Relief,

The head office for technology for the NS. Association of German
Technology.

The Racial Political Office handles the Reich Association of families with many children, the NS Womanhood [Frauenschaft] and the “Deutches Frauenwerk”.

The Reich Office for agrarian politics of the NSDAP remains furthermore in closest touch with the “Reichnaehrstand” [Reich Nutrition Office] which is anchored in the State. Direct handling and personal contact of the leaders is also provided in this manner.

All attached affiliates, as well as the offices of the Party, have their foundation, in the same manner as in the Reich direction, in the sovereign territories, in the “Gaue” and furthermore in the districts (Kreise) and if required in the local groups of the NSDAP. This applies also to cells and blocks in the case of the NS Womanhood, the DAF, and the NSV. The members of the attached affiliates will be included in local administrations, respectively district sectors or district comradeships which correspond geographically to local groups of the Party.

II. FUEHRER PRINCIPLE. SUBORDINATION AND COORDINATION WITHIN THE TOTAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The Fuehrer structure would be split, though, if all subdivisions, including attached affiliates were completely independent in their structure from the smallest unit up to the “Reichsfuehrung” and were they to come only at the top directly under the Fuehrer.

Like a four-story building, if we consider the four Sovereign territories [Reich, Gau, etc.] whose pillars and walls go up to the roof without having supporting joists (wooden stays) or connections on the various floors. Furthermore, it would not be reconcilable with the Fuehrer principle, which assumes complete responsibility, to assume that the Leader of a subdivision, as well as of an affiliated organization, would be in the position to guarantee beyond a professional and factual responsibility the political and ideological attitude of _all_ the sub-leaders down to the smallest unit on the basis of his Reich leadership. The total independence of individual organizations would necessitate furthermore, the creation of an organizational, personal and educational apparatus for each one of them. This, in turn, would create eventually, in spite of the best will of the responsible “Reichsleiters” [Reich Leaders], central offices and office leaders in the Reich Leadership [Reichsfuehrung] of the party, differences in the various organizations. Those differences would later on of necessity take the shape of completely different systems in regional, vertical, and personal respects, etc. within the National Socialist regime.

The Subdivisions NS German Student Association, NS Womanhood Association, NSD [Dozentenbund] and the affiliates and their leaders come therefore under the authority of the competent sovereign leaders of the NSDAP. At the same time their structure is professionally effectuated from the bottom up and they are subordinated to their immediately superior organization in the sovereign divisions of the Party, from a disciplinary point of view, that is to say insofar as organization, ideology, politics, supervision and personal questions are concerned.

Thus a solid anchorage for all the organizations within the party structure is provided and a firm connection with the sovereign leaders of the NSDAP is created in accordance with the Fuehrer Principle.

[In the 1943 edition the text remains the same, but the topical sentences “I. Fuehrer Principle” and “II. Fuehrer Principle. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational Structure” are changed to “I. Construction of the Organization” and “II. Subordination and Coordination within the Total Organizational Structure”.]

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1815-PS

Berlin 12 May 1941

R.S.H.A.
IV B I
To all Staatspolizei-leit-stellen

_For information_:
The SD-Leit-Abschnitten
The Inspekteuren der Sipo/SD

Concerning: The Study and Treatment of Church Politics

The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has issued an order, which is to come into immediate operation, in which the Sipo and SD Study and Treatment of Church Politics, which has hitherto been divided between the SD-Abschnitte and Stapostellen, shall now be taken over entirely by the Stapostellen. (See the plan for the division of work issued by the R.S.H.A. on 1.3.41. In addition to combatting opposition, the Stapostellen thus take over the entire ‘Gegnernachrichtendienst’ in this sphere.)

In order that the Stapostellen should be in a position to take over this work, the Chief of the Sipo/SD has ordered that ‘Church Specialists’ hitherto employed in the SD-Abschnitten, should be temporarily transferred to the same posts at Stapostellen, and operate the Nachrichtendienst (Intelligence Service in the Church Political Sphere) there.

On the orders of the Chief of the R.S.H.A., and after reaching agreement with the heads of Amts III, II, and I, these ‘Church Specialists’ specified in the attached lists will thus be transferred from the SD-Abschnitten to the Stapostellen, quoted. Further instructions for transference or removal will be issued by Amt. I. Those Stapostellen which are unable to obtain any SD-‘Specialists’ must immediately train those of their specialists who appear most suitable for Nachrichtendienst work.

The Chief of the R.S.H.A. has furthermore ordered that ‘Nachrichtendienst’ files concerning Church Political Opposition, hitherto the property of the SD-Abschnitte should be handed over to the Stapostellen. However, material concerning Confessional influence on the lives of the people is to remain with the SD-Abschnitten. In doubtful cases the Stapostellen are to be given an opportunity of making copies or photostats of these reports.

Since it is essential that in this particular sphere the opposition should be kept under constant observation, with no possibility of loopholes, I am endeavoring to ensure that the change-over in organization should take place immediately.

On I.VI.1941 all Stapostellen are to send in reports on the completion of the actual change-over of organization, and, at the same time, draw up a list of personnel, giving the names of those ‘Specialists’ who, after the reorganization, are doing executive work in the Stapostellen, and of those who are conducting the intelligence proper of the Nachrichtendienst.

I then intend, at the end of June, to summon all these specialists to a conference [Arbeitstagung] in Berlin, at which they will receive important instructions for the carrying-out of their work.

Signed Mueller
Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte

# # # # #

Berlin 14.8.1941

R.S.H.A.
IV B
To all Stapo-leit-stellen

_Information_: From the Inspectors of the Sipo/SD

_Concerning_: Conference of the Specialists in Church Affairs
[Kirchenbearbeiter] attached to the Stapostellen.

On 22d and 23d of September 1941 a Conference for Church Specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen will take place in the Lecture-Hall of the Stapoamt, Prinz-Albrechtstrasse 8, Berlin SW II. Date of arrival: 21.9.41. Uniform: Brownshirt and trousers worn with jackboots.

I leave it to the heads of the Stapo-leit-stellen as to whether they send those officials responsible for the entire ‘Kirchenbearbeitung’ (Treatment and Study of Church Politics) to this conference, or officials in charge of both the executive and intelligence branches (SD-members). In each case those taking part in the conference must have their names sent in before 10.9.1941, in order that accommodation may be found for them. Billeting forms will be issued on arrival in Berlin on the 21st at the Stapoamt Watchroom, Room I. Passes are to be given up at the entrance of the lecture-hall at the opening of the conference at 9 hrs.--22.9.41.

Heydrich
Beglaubigt: Kanzleiangestellte

# # # # #

Aachen, 8 October 1941

Report of Hammes on Conference dated 8 October 1941 at Aachen

_Notes on the Conference of Church Specialists attached to
Stapo-leit-stellen_

On the 22d and 23d September 1941 a Conference of Church Specialists attached to Stapo-leit-stellen was held in the Lecture-Hall of the R.S.H.A. in Berlin, in which 141 Specialists took part.

I. _On 22.9.1941_

1. The latest developments in the Church Political situation, and our outstanding tasks at this moment--SS-Stubaf. Hartl.

2. Sipo measures for combating the Political Church and Sects--Regierungsrat Rotu & Reg. Ass. Harnensbruch.

3. Nachrichtendienst tasks in the conflict with Political Catholicism in the Reich--SS-Ostuf. Kunze.

4. Vatican world-politics, and our Nachrichtendienst tasks--SS-Untersturmfuehrer Jakobs.

II. _On 23.9.1941_

5. Present conditions within the German Protestant Church--SS-Obersturmfuehrer Stiller.

6. Treatment of the Sect problem, and the combating of Sects--SS-Hauptscharfuehrer Ehrhardt.

7. World-Protestantism and the Oxford Movement--Nachrichtendienst work evolving from these subjects--SS-Obersturmfuehrer Stiller.

8. The problem of the Church in the Eastern regions, and Nachrichtendienst measures--SS-Untersturmfuehrer Wandesleben.

9. The present Nachrichtendienst problem of Freemasonry--SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer Kolrep.

10. Summary of the most important points in the treatment of Church Political opposition--SS-Sturmbannfuehrer Hartl.

In the absence of SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Heydrich, the Conference was opened by SS-Brigadefuehrer Mueller, who, after a short speech of welcome, and introduction handed over to the first lecturer. The most important lectures--those under I, items 2 and 3, have been noted down and filed.

The main aim and object of the conference has been to familiarize the specialists as thoroughly as possible with their material, and, by stimulating their interest, enable them to fulfill their duties to the best of their ability.

Nothing of great moment came to light in the discussions. Finally SS-Stub. Hartl, also deputizing for the absent Heydrich, summed up the most important points in the treatment of Church Political affairs. He summarized the culminating points as follows:

1. Avoidance of all sweeping measures and actions against the Church and its establishments.

2. Suspension of measures taken against monasteries/convents, including “camouflaged” measures of this type.

3. Action is still to be taken as before in individual cases, but the R.S.H.A. is to be informed in each case. In particularly serious cases the decision of the Fuehrer will be sought.

4. Above all it must be ensured that the Church does not win back any lost ground. We must see to it that we retain any position won.

5. The greatest importance is to be attached to Church Political activity. Any material that is of the slightest significance, or could become of significance, is to be carefully examined. On the Fuehrer’s instructions photostats are to be made of all documents seized, and other material of this type, as in such cases duplicate copies are in no way sufficient for the introduction of decisive measures.

The “Nachrichtennetz” is to be fostered with the greatest of care, and enlarged through the recruitment of new V-Personen. Particular value is attached to contacts between Church circles and “Staatsstellen.”

The lecturer closed with the following words:

Each one of you must go to work with your whole heart and a true fanaticism. Should a mistake or two be made in the execution of this work, this should in no way discourage you, since mistakes are made everywhere. The main thing is that the enemy should be constantly tackled with determination, will, and effective initiative.

Signed: HEINZE
Kriminal-Secretaer

Signed: HAMMES
Kriminal-Kommissar z. Pr.

# # # # #

Aachen, 26 September 1941

Report of Regierungsrat Roth’s speech before Conference dated 26
September 1941

_Sicherheitspolizei measures for combating Church Politics and Sects_

While describing the aim and methods of the Political Church in its oppositional activities, the executive measures which, in accordance with the Concordat, are at the disposal of the Stapo, were discussed.

a. Punishable offences and infringements of the law by members of the Church are to be submitted to the Kripo for processing. Nachrichtendienst evaluation, and the compiling of evidence for a final breakdown is the responsibility of the Stapo.

b. It has been demonstrated that it is impracticable to deal with political offences (malicious) under normal legal procedure. Owing to the lack of political perception which still prevails among the legal authorities, suspension of this procedure must be reckoned with. The so-called “Agitator-Priests” must therefore be dealt with in future by Stapo measures, and, if the occasion arises, be removed to a Concentration Camp, if agreed upon by the RSHA.

c. Offences and crimes against the “Sammlungsgesetz” [Order to contribute to Party Funds] and the “Flaggenerlass” [Order to beflag Churches etc.,] come under normal procedure. [A penciled note states that this is not always so, and that it depends on the case in question.]

d. The necessary executive measures are to be decided upon according to local conditions, the status of the person accused, and the seriousness of the case--as follows:

1. Warnung (Warning)

2. Sicherungsgeld (Fine)

3. Redeverbot (Forbidden to preach)

4. Aufenthaltsverbot (Forbidden to remain in parish)

5. Betaetigungsverbot (Forbidden all activity as a Priest)

6. Kurzfristige Festnahme (Short-term arrest)

7. Schutzhaft (Protective custody)

The instructions for the application of individual measures are known. The following points must be remembered:

_The Aufenthaltsverbot_ (Forbidden to remain in parish) is very much feared by all the clergy. In one case a Vicar-General appealed to the RSHA for the lifting of the ban, and begged that they would rather place the priest under short-term arrest. The “Aufenthaltsverbot” is to be enforced in any case where the continued stay of the priest in his former parish is likely to bring about dissension and disquiet among the population. It should be applied, for instance, in the event of a priest returning from arrest, in order to prevent him from being feted as a martyr. Care must be taken that the measure is only enforced where really expedient (encumbering of another Stapostelle).

_Redeverbot_ (Forbidden to preach) is intended chiefly as a measure against itinerant preachers, and will only be brought against residential ones when they exceed their normal offices as priests, and preach much injurious matter.

_Betaetigungsverbot_ (Forbidden all activities as a priest) has not yet been applied, but is possible.

_Schutzhaft_ (Protective custody). As already stated, in accordance with the Order issued by the RSHA on 24.8.36 the “Agitator Priest” is to be taken into long-term imprisonment. The technical execution of this lies in the hands of the Referat IV C 2, while it is IV B I’s responsibility to present the charges.

Actions against societies are not at the moment possible as a widespread State measure. However, in cases where the Society has been involved in anti-state activity, or appears superfluous or undesirable, local measures may be applied. Small funds/properties may be liquidated. Funds may also be handed over to the NSV. In cases of activities against the State the only method is confiscation of funds. Proposals for “Declaration of Enmity to People and State” with the object of confiscation of property, are principally to be directed to the RSHA, which works nonexecutively, and directs the necessary negotiations with the MdI.

_Monasteries/Convents._ It is not expected at the present that they will be declared as hostile to the State. During the process of “Dissolution” it should be remembered that the Law of 10.2.36 suffices as a legal basis for the disposal. It is not essential that the Order of 28.2.33 should be quoted, and it will only be brought up if the Stapo measures are to come under “legal justification” (Betaetigungsverbot 4).

_Actions against Monasteries/Convents._ About 100 monasteries in the Reich have been dissolved. Various incidents which may be traced back to bad tactical procedure by Stapo officials, have led to disagreeable consequences. Should the inmates of the monasteries put questions to the appointed officials, those officials must refer them to the Aktionsleiter [officer in charge of the proceedings].

Churches are to be seized at the same time, but, if possible, should not be closed. As long as the confiscation is not absolute, any action which interferes with property, or causes any alteration to it should be avoided. The principle to be followed during the period of “Sicherstellung” is that life should go on within the framework of an ordered administration.

Further points made were:

Retreats, recreational organizations, etc., may now be forbidden on grounds of industrial war-needs, whereas formerly only a worldly activity could be given as a basis.

Youth camps, recreational camps are to be forbidden on principle. Church organizations in the evening may be prevented on grounds of the black-out regulations.

Processions, pilgrimages abroad are to be forbidden by reason of the overburdened transport conditions. For local events too technical traffic troubles and the danger of air attack may serve as grounds for their prohibition (one Referent forbade a procession, on the grounds of it wearing out shoe leather).

There are no new regulations regarding the despatch of Confessional literature to the troops, and the restrictions on Confessional publications.

Visas are always to be denied where the applicant cannot offer the excuse that he will dedicate himself unreservedly to working for the Fatherland while abroad. There are, however, possible exceptions. In principle the intention still holds good, that no foreign priest should enter the Reich, and that no German priest should travel abroad, above all, not to the “Aufbaugebiet.”

In the meantime the Church Ministry has adopted the view of the RSHA, in which it was decided that Polish civilian workers and prisoners-of-war must definitely be separated at Services.

The RSHA requests that questions of policy should be submitted to them, but that, on the other hand, they should not be bothered with unnecessary inquiries. Above all, definite proposals on how to handle the case in question should always be given, and not just requests for direction or decision.

The immediate aim: The Church must not regain one inch of the ground it has lost.

The ultimate aim. Destruction of the Confessional Churches to be brought about by the collection of all material obtained through Nachrichtendienst activities, which will, at a given time, be produced as evidence for the charge of treasonable activities during the German fight for existence.

Signed: HAMMES
Kriminal-Kommissar z.Pr.

# # # # #

SECRET

Excerpt from Note 16 concerning the Conference held by the Inspector in
Dusseldorf on 23.9.41. (Pp. 26, 27, 28.)

14. _Cooperation between Stapo/and SD in the sphere of Church Politics_

The study and treatment of the efforts of the Catholic Church in its opposition to the present State is, from both a communication and executive angle, the responsibility of the Stapo (‘Gegnerbekampfung’). The treatment of the efforts of the Church, and their repercussions in the sphere of ‘religious life’ is, however, the task of the SD.

From this it can be seen that a close cooperation in the future within the sphere of the “Catholic Church” is especially necessary. It is the duty of the Stapostellen to inform the SD-Abschnitte of any general points to be observed during the course of ‘Gegnerbekampfung,’ in order that the SD-Abschnitte can evaluate these facts from a religious angle. The SD-Abschnitte are to inform the Stapostellen of any observations which might be of assistance to them in their fight against the church as an opponent of the State. Gegnerbekampfung and research in the religious sphere must go hand in hand. The SD-Abschnitte must hand over to the Stapostellen those V-Maenner who are working entirely, or for the greater part, in ‘Gegnerbekampfung.’ However, if mutually agreed upon, the SD-Abschnitte, who may still have a certain claim on these V-Maenner by virtue of their work in the religious sphere, may retain one or another of them to contribute work in this sphere. It is desirable, however, that the appropriate official attached to the Stapostelle should start taking over the direction of the V-Maenner by stages as soon as possible.

The Inspector has asked for a general ruling from RSHA concerning the direction of the ‘Kirchenreferat’ by the Stapo offices, and at the same time expressed the opinion that it was not absolutely essential that the responsibility of this should rest principally on the executive officials. The RSHA has made a corresponding decision in which it shall be left to the Stapoleiter in every individual case to choose who should be entrusted with the general direction and control of the ‘Kirchenreferat.’ It is therefore up to the Stapo leader [leiter] to decide, by the efficiency of his work, who is the more capable, and to appoint him head of the Referat. (Order of the Chief of Sipo/SD 18.9.41 IV B.) The Inspector is to be informed as soon as possible of the subsequent decision.

# # # # #

Berlin, 22 October 1941

Reichssicherheitshauptamt IV B 1--2744/41 g
_To all Stapostellen_
_For information to_:

a. The Fuehrers of all SD-(Leit) Abschnitte

b. To all Inspectors of the Sipo/SD

c. To the “Befehlshaber der Sipo/SD in Generalgouvernement KRAKAU”

d. To the “Kommandeure der Sipo/SD--KRAKAU, LUBLIN, RADOM, WARSCHAU.”

_Concerning_: Present Conditions within the Organization of the
Catholic Church.

_Enclosure_: 1 Report.

_Minute_

I am inclosing a report on the present position of the Organization of the Catholic Church. This report is designed to serve as a basis for:

a. The education of the appropriate Specialist.

b. To aid “Nachrichtendienst” activity.

The following directions must be followed concerning Nachrichtendienst activity:

1. If at all possible to verify that Bishops are using the papal nunciate courier to deliver their report to Rome, and vice versa, we should be informed.

2. It should be found out which priests, members of Holy Orders, and Laymen are used by the Bishops to bring their reports to and from Rome. Wherever possible, attempts should be made to intercept this method of reporting through V-Maenner.

3. If possible, the reports submitted to Rome every 5 years should be intercepted, especially when an opportunity arises in connection with Stapo action.

4. Where tension is known to exist between Bishops, the Bishop and Nuncio, or the Bishops and the “Instanzen” subordinate to them, this is to be utilized for Nachrichten purposes.

5. Since there are at the moment 13 Arch- and Bishoprics vacant in Greater Germany, efforts must be made to obtain the lists of Bishop candidates.

6. If not already known, it must be found out with what particular department the individual Bishops are concerned, under the aegis of the Bishops Fulda Conference. Those Stapostellen in whose area there is a Bishop entrusted with special duties--(The Bishop of Berlin with Press work, the Bishop of Mainz with “Jugendseelsorge,” the Archbishop of Freiburg with charity work, the Bishop of Passau with work connected with the Church in the Eastern regions ... etc. ...) have Nachrichtendienst tasks of especial Reich importance.

7. Points discussed during the Diocesan Synodes are to be obtained wherever possible, and should be immediately submitted to IV B 1 at the R.S.H.A.

8. The following directive is given for local Nachrichtendienst activity--

a. In every case where a Sachbearbeiter attached to a Stapostelle has an Archbishopric in his area, he must have a thorough knowledge of the particular sphere of work in which the individual Referenten of the appropriate Ordinarists are engaged.

b. The Episcopal Chancery is of particular importance within the Episcopal Ordinariat. Similarly, and especially in the case of an “Action,” the diocesan archives and the Episcopal secret archives are of especial significance.

c. The Deans are of particular importance to Aussenstellen, since they are described as the eyes and ears of the Bishop. Should the opportunity arise, the yearly reports which they have to submit to the Bishop, should be obtained and evaluated locally.

d. In order to ensure that the Nachrichtendienst organization is as comprehensive as possible, an all-embracing Nachrichtennetz should be spread among the more insignificant members of the clergy.

9. It must be discovered which of those members of Orders, and priests of German origin are employed in important posts at the Vatican--other than those named in the report; we must be immediately informed of this.

10. The Specialists of the individual Stapo(leit)stellen have to extract the names of those Papal “Protonotare,” Chamberlains, Prelates, and Chaplains who are officiating in their districts, and devote extra attention to them in the course of their Nachrichtendienst duties. Especial watch must be kept in order to discover to what extent they are employed as “agents” to and from the Vatican.

11. Reports are also to be submitted on those theological students destined for Papal Institutes, and Priests returning from such institutes to Germany. Should the opportunity arise of placing someone for Nachrichtendienst purposes in one of these institutes, in the guise of a theological student, we should receive immediate notification.

Signed: Heydrich
Attested: KLANN [?]
Chancellery Clerk

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1816-PS

STENOGRAPHIC REPORT OF THE MEETING ON “THE JEWISH QUESTION” UNDER THE
CHAIRMANSHIP OF FIELD MARSHALL GOERING IN THE REICHS AIR FORCE

(12 November 1938--11 o’clock)