Chapter VI: The Making of the Entente Cordiale

I

The Boer War had revealed to Great Britain the depth of antagonism toward her among the European nations and the haphazard inadequacy of her defensive preparations. The British government had therefore sought the support of Germany and of Japan. But the alliance with the second had not compensated for the rebuff from the first; and in 1902 the future direction of the British foreign policy, particularly with reference to Europe, remained undecided.

In February, 1903, Mr. Balfour, who succeeded Lord Salisbury as premier in 1902, appointed as a permanent body a Committee of Imperial Defence, whose duty, he said, was

to survey as a whole the strategical military needs of the Empire, to deal with the complicated questions which are all essential elements in that general problem, and to revise from time to time their own previous decisions, so that the Cabinet shall always have at its disposal information upon these important points.[251]

Great Britain also wanted to maintain peace, to settle her outstanding international difficulties, and to form ententes. In the first part of 1903 the government tried to co-operate with the various Powers. In January and February it asked the aid of Austria-Hungary and Italy in preventing Russia from sending ships of war through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. The two states refused although both were cordial friends of Great Britain.[252] Moreover, the British government associated itself with Germany in the Venezuela affair and expressed its willingness to participate in the Bagdad Railway. British public opinion protested strenuously, however, for it mistrusted Germany, regarding her as so chauvinistic, so hungry for colonies, so bold in her naval ambitions as to be not a friend but a rival. Hence the government had to settle the one affair as quickly as possible and, in March, to recede entirely from its stand on the other.[253]

Anglo-Russian relations were most troublesome. Early in 1903 the antagonism of these two Powers became acute all along the line from the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Persia to Afghanistan to Tibet to China. The British government offered in March to negotiate over Afghanistan, but Russia refused.[254] Still more pressing for Great Britain was the problem which resulted from the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In April, 1903, the renewal of Russian activity in Manchuria and its extension into the Yalu Valley caused a grave increase of tension between Russia and Japan.[255] The revived danger of war between those two states brought home to the British government the urgent need of assurance that it would not become involved if hostilities did ensue. By the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, the _casus foederis_ would arise only in case of an attack upon one of the allies by two or more Powers. Manifestly it would depend upon France and upon the nature of her obligations as ally to Russia whether Great Britain could preserve neutrality in case of a conflict.[256] Hence the British government, which in the previous year had refused to touch the dangerous Moroccan question, now concluded to accept the French proposal for a Moroccan accord and to liquidate the various differences with France. It would thereby win a friend who could act as mediator between Great Britain and Russia and would make certain that a Russo-Japanese war would not involve the allies of those Powers.

The way toward France instead of Germany was indicated clearly by the drift of British public opinion; for while the animosity between the British and German peoples had increased in 1902 and 1903, the flow of vituperation between the British and French press over the Boer War and the Dreyfus case[257] had practically ceased, and concerted movements were on foot to create a popular basis for an “entente cordiale.”

Political and business groups took the lead in this work. By 1903 King Edward, who two years previously had desired an alliance with Germany, advocated strongly a _rapprochement_ with France. His personal dislike and mistrust of his nephew, William II, and of Germany, his wide knowledge of men and of international affairs, his sensitiveness to currents of public opinion, caused him to incline toward France.[258] His willingness to take the initiative in clarifying public opinion and in defending British interests enabled him to play an important rôle in transforming British foreign relations.[259] One of his advisers was Lord Esher, a man who held no official position but who exerted quiet influence upon court, government, and press. Particularly interested in naval and military problems, he was instrumental in creating the Committee of Imperial Defence, of which he became a permanent member. Through him the press leaders were kept informed about the needs of defense and were guided toward friendship with France.[260] The influence of the business world in the same direction was represented by Mr. Thomas Barclay, former president of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris and an active worker for the improvement of international relations. In 1901 he began a campaign in both France and England for a _rapprochement_, to which during the next two years he devoted his entire time and fortune.[261] In England these efforts had complete success.[262] In France they encountered more difficulty, for France had usually been the loser in Anglo-French diplomatic battles. However, the _revanche_ anti-German group, the socialists and internationalists, and the commercial and business elements approved. Then, after the French people at large became convinced that Great Britain was not so thoroughly egoistic and chauvinistic as they had supposed, and that she really felt amicable toward France, they heartily welcomed a _rapprochement_ as flattering and beneficial to their country.[263] Nevertheless, they remained skeptical about the durability of any entente with their old rival. The French press laid down as conditions for one that the Dual Alliance should not be weakened thereby and that Great Britain should convince France of her serious intentions by treating her equitably in the settlement of their colonial differences, particularly the Moroccan question.[264] This mistrust was not entirely dispelled for several years.

Informal conversations for an agreement were resumed in April, 1903, between representatives of the two governments.[265] Then King Edward visited Paris (May 1-5); and, although at first he was met with cold silence, his felicity of speech and act soon won the French people. As a French Anglophobe said to a friend: “I can’t think what has come over the population of Paris. The first day they behaved well; the second day, they merely displayed interest; but the third day, _c’était attristant—ils ont acclamé le Roi!_”[266] This visit, so unexpectedly successful, created a favorable atmosphere for further negotiations.[267] Later in the month, at M. Cambon’s initiative, the project of a treaty of arbitration was taken up.[268] In July, when President Loubet, accompanied by M. Delcassé, returned the King’s visit, the newspapers reported a statement by King Edward to the effect that M. Loubet would be more heartily welcomed in England than any chief of state had ever been. The President was able to speak of the Entente Cordiale as established.[269]

During the visit the foreign ministers agreed that the time was “in every way propitious for a frank exchange of opinions.” They began that long negotiation from which the Entente Cordiale was to result. They discussed the question of the fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland, the question of Siam, of the New Hebrides, of Sokoto, of the treatment of British firms in French Congo, and of Morocco. The French Minister frankly stated that if they could come to terms over Morocco, “all other difficulties would disappear, or become comparatively easy to deal with.” While denying any desire “to get rid of the Sultan or to annex his country” or to “force the pace,” he declared that in view of the rapidly waning authority of the Sultan, France could not regard with indifference the prevalence of chronic disorder in Morocco or permit any other Power to undertake the task of regenerating the land. What France wished, said M. Delcassé, was a “reasonable assurance that their policy would not be obstructed by Great Britain.”

In reply, Lord Lansdowne made three conditions for an accord over Morocco. First, British interests in the Mediterranean seaboard of Morocco, particularly in Tangier and the neighboring coast, must be protected. Second, Spanish ambitions must be fairly dealt with. Third, complete equality of economic opportunity in Morocco must be assured. M. Delcassé unhesitatingly accepted all three stipulations. Then the British Minister proposed that they make the settlement a comprehensive one by including the Egyptian question. Again the French Minister agreed, provided they reached accord “as to the position of France and Morocco.”[270]

A few days later M. Cambon made to the British Minister a more detailed statement of the French proposal. Concerning Morocco, he said, the two governments could agree that the existing constitution _au point de vue politique_ as well as _au point de vue territorial_ should be maintained. But the British should acknowledge that France “has a peculiar interest in maintaining peace within that country, and in assisting the Moorish Government to bring about the administrative, economical, and financial improvements of which Morocco stands so much in need.” The French, in turn, should expressly attest that these improvements would not infringe in any way upon the principle of commercial liberty. The two governments, continued M. Cambon, might co- operate in securing a free passage through the Straits of Gibraltar by preventing the erection of any fortifications on the southern shore. When Lord Lansdowne raised the objection that Great Britain was interested in other parts of the Moorish littoral besides that abutting on the straits, the Ambassador readily acknowledged this point, and remarked that France wished to prevent any Power from establishing itself at any strategic position on the Moroccan coast.

As M. Cambon did not mention the Egyptian problem, the British Minister immediately stated that its inclusion was an absolute condition to any consideration of the Moorish question. The Ambassador proposed that they leave Egypt alone for the present; but, when this suggestion was refused, he declared that if the French government, by acknowledging the permanency of the British hold upon that land, extracted this “big thorn from the foot of Great Britain,” it would expect _une grosse compensation_. This, he said, “might take the shape of greater liberty of action in Morocco—something less remote and conjectural . . . . than she [France] had yet asked for.”[271]

After this agreement upon the questions to be included in the negotiation there remained the other preliminary matter of how to deal with Spain. Lord Lansdowne thought that “it would not be difficult for us to come to terms with France if Spain were out of the way.”[272] But, bound by the promise of the previous March to that Power and more desirous of having weak and decadent Spain than powerful France control the south shore of the straits, he upheld Spain’s interest in Morocco. M. Cambon declared that his government acknowledged this position, mentioning the Franco-Spanish negotiations of 1902 as proof. At his suggestion they decided on August 5 that a subsequent settlement between France and Spain in harmony with the proposed Anglo-French accord be made and be communicated to the British government.[273]

The negotiations over these complex problems lasted almost ten months. Two months passed before the British answer was ready; for the members of the cabinet were on their vacation, a ministerial crisis occurred in September as a result of which several resigned,[274] and Lord Cromer, British consul-general and agent in Egypt, had to be consulted. This influential official had previously received permission to send Sir Eldon Gorst, financial adviser to the Egyptian government, to Paris in the autumn in order to sound the French government about converting the Egyptian debt and abolishing the _caisse de la dette_. Foreseeing the failure of that effort unless the British government made concessions in Morocco, Lord Cromer urged it to do so. He realized that thereby Morocco would “to all intents and purposes become before long a French province”; none the less he supported the proposed accord fully to strengthen British control in Egypt, and played a major rôle during the negotiations in determining the British policy.[275]

On October 1 Lord Lansdowne stated to M. Cambon the British conditions for an arrangement.[276] He accepted the French proposal about Morocco with slight modifications. He suggested that France should agree not to erect any military or naval works along the Moroccan coast from Algeria to Mazaghan, and that the two Powers should engage not to permit any others to do so; that a certain amount of territory in Northern Morocco “should be recognized as destined to fall under Spanish influence” and that “in the event of a complete collapse of the Sultan’s authority,” Spain should be intrusted with the administration of the Moroccan seaboard as far south as Mazaghan. However, Spain was to “be precluded from fortifying this portion of the coast, and also from alienating it or her existing possessions in Morocco to another Power.” As the _quid pro quo_ for these concessions to France, the British Minister required in Egypt the lifting of the time limit to the British occupation and the French sanction of the abolishment of the _caisse de la dette_, the reorganization of the railway administration, and the conversion of the Egyptian debt. He also requested the consent of the French government to examine at some future time proposals abolishing the capitulations in Egypt and “tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative and judicial systems to those in force in other civilized countries.” “His Majesty’s Government would, on their side,” he continued, “be ready to examine, in consultation with the Government of the French Republic, similar proposals with regard to Morocco, if at any future period France should acquire so predominant a position in Morocco as to become outwardly responsible for the good government of the country.” The other questions considered in the Minister’s reply, those of Newfoundland, Siam, New Hebrides, Nigeria, Zanzibar, and Madagascar, were less significant.[277]

With the offers of each party known, the bargaining began. On October 27 M. Cambon replied. He was still averse to dealing with the Egyptian affair so fully, and declared that the terms offered were unequal; for, whereas France received “hopes” alone in Morocco, Great Britain would enjoy immediate and concrete benefits in Egypt. Moreover, France would have to settle with Spain, and might even have to reckon with the pretensions of Germany. So he suggested that the proposed changes in Egypt be introduced _pari passu_ with correlative ones in Morocco. He also objected to giving Spain control over any seacoast farther south than the Sebou River. He further suggested that Great Britain and France undertake “to maintain, save for the consequences of the present accord, the territorial _status quo_ within a radius of 500 miles around the straits.”[278]

When these terms were submitted to Lord Cromer, he was pleased with the progress that had been made. “Who would have imagined, only a short time ago,” he wrote Lord Lansdowne, November 1, “that we should ever have got so far? . . . . We _must_ manage to come to terms. . . . . I regard this as by far the most important diplomatic affair that we have had in hand for a long time past. . . . . _We must not fail_.” He added that Great Britain was asking for much more in Egypt than she offered France in return in Morocco. Lord Lansdowne agreed with him; but, he said, the French “are extremely anxious to have their position in Morocco recognized, and we must turn this feeling to account.” His suggestion to Lord Cromer that consideration of the conversion of the Egyptian debt be postponed so as to diminish the difficulties was not carried into execution.[279]

On November 19 Lord Lansdowne replied to M. Cambon that he was willing to limit the Spanish and the neutralized portions of the Moroccan coast to those between Melilla and Rabat; but he refused the French proposal concerning the simultaneous introduction of changes in Egypt and Morocco, particularly the change by which the “abandonment of financial control by France in Egypt would proceed _pari passu_ with the acquisition of financial control by France in Morocco.” He likewise wished the French government to join Great Britain “in addressing the other Powers for the purpose of securing their assent” to the suggested British changes in Egypt. And he held out for absolute guaranties of full economic liberty in Morocco.[280]

In the French response of December 9 M. Cambon reported that his government agreed to assist the British government in obtaining the assent of the other Powers to the Egyptian changes; but he objected strongly to the exclusion of Rabat from the French sphere. Moreover, he desired that the period of commercial liberty in Morocco be limited to fifteen or twenty years, and that the construction and administration of railways and ports there be kept under governmental control. In explaining the five-hundred-mile proposal, M. Cambon pointed out Germany’s designs upon Morocco which had recently been renewed, in all probability under the encouragement of Spain. He recalled the Spanish proposal in 1887 for the assembly of a European conference to discuss the Moroccan question, and added:

It was quite likely that some such proposal might now be revived. It was in view of these circumstances that the French Government had proposed the maintenance of the _status quo_ within a radius of 500 miles from the Straits—a radius which would include the Balearic Islands, in which Germany might perhaps desire to obtain a footing.[281]

Both Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cromer knew that Germany was interested in the fate of Morocco, and they fully anticipated a request from her for some territory there, for example, Rabat or some other port. They also realized that the French expected Great Britain to help in keeping Germany out of Morocco, and Lord Cromer gathered from conversations with French officials in Egypt that the French would like to embroil Great Britain and Germany, bring about an Anglo-Russian agreement, and isolate Germany. As both statesmen felt that a demand on the part of Germany for a coaling station would be very awkward to meet, Lord Lansdowne did nothing to clarify the situation beyond refusing M. Cambon’s anti-German project.[282] He thereby left to the French the possibility of forcing Great Britain to aid them in case Germany did try to intervene in the Moroccan question.

In reply to M. Cambon on December 11 Lord Lansdowne signified his apprehension that if Rabat were not neutralized France might later transform it into a torpedo-boat station. The other points concerning Morocco he agreed to, except that he extended the limit for commercial equality to fifty years.[283]

Thus far the negotiations had proceeded smoothly. The Anglo-French arbitration treaty had been signed on October 14. Agreement over the two main questions, those of Egypt and of Morocco, had practically been reached.[284] And on November 23 M. Delcassé had been able to declare in the French Chamber, with evident reference to Great Britain, that “when one speaks today of a Moroccan problem, the idea that in the solution the decisive word pertains to France has become almost familiar and appears almost natural, even to those who in the past would have believed themselves obliged to oppose it with the greatest vigor.”[285]

II

These discussions had been closely connected with another diplomatic movement. The Anglo-French _rapprochement_ was logically followed by attempts at an Anglo-Russian settlement which in turn would have an alleviating effect upon Russo-Japanese relations. The British and French governments immediately recognized this fact, as did also Count Lamsdorff, Russian foreign minister. In July, just after M. Delcassé’s visit to England, conversations began, at the instigation of the French Foreign Minister,[286] between Lord Lansdowne and the Russian Ambassador. The British Foreign Secretary remarked to Count Benckendorff, July 29, as follows: “If Russia would put us in full possession of her ideas, and if she would bear in mind that for any concessions which she obtained from us we should expect corresponding concessions from her, I believe that we might put an end to the unfortunate rivalry which had so long prevailed between us in China and in the other parts of Asia.” But he declared a few days later that until he was “thoroughly satisfied” by Russia, especially as to Manchuria, he “must remain observant and critical.” The Ambassador, who seemed favorable toward a general agreement, left in August for a visit to St. Petersburg, and did not see Lord Lansdowne again until November 7.[287]

An understanding along the lines mentioned by Lord Lansdowne would have settled both the Anglo-Russian and the Russo-Japanese problems. As an inducement to a _rapprochement_ the British Foreign Secretary was showing compliance with Russia’s policy in the Balkans,

even to the extent [wrote on October 26 Sir Louis Mallet, précis writer to Lord Lansdowne] of suggesting reforms which will give them [Russia] a foothold in the Balkans. H. M. G. are therefore committed to a certain extent to a policy of not opposing Russia’s advance to Constantinople. At least, I read it in that light. . . . . It’s a chance Russia will never get again of buying off our opposition to their advance to Constantinople.[288]

Russia, however, continued her Asiatic activity, so objectionable to Great Britain and Japan. She dallied with the Japanese offer of agreement over their Chinese differences while she made new demands on China, extended her interests in the Yalu Valley and in Seoul itself, and seemed on the way to take Korea.[289] She asserted her right to send agents into Afghanistan at will, contrary to the old understanding with Great Britain; and on October 5 made a communication to the British government on that subject which Sir Charles Hardinge, assistant undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, regarded as “peremptory in tone, and almost discourteous in its terms.”[290]

In this grave situation Lord Lansdowne besought the help of the French government in restraining Russia. On October 26 he expressed regret to M. Cambon over the absence of frankness in Anglo-Russian intercourse. “Their conduct [the Russian government’s],” he complained, “placed us in a very embarrassing position.” The pledges which they gave—for example, with respect to the evacuation of Manchuria—remained unfulfilled. “We were . . . . told that the obstructiveness of the Chinese was to blame. There might be some truth in this, but it was impossible to test the truth of the assertion unless the Russian Government would really tell us what they wanted.” Lord Lansdowne expressed the hope that during Count Lamsdorff’s forthcoming visit to Paris (October 29-31) his conversations with M. Delcassé “might indirectly have an effect upon the attitude of the Russian Government towards that of this country.”[291]

M. Delcassé took the hint. Count Lamsdorff agreed with him on the value of an arrangement with both Great Britain and with Japan.[292] He also expressed publicly Russia’s satisfaction with the Anglo-French and the Franco-Italian _rapprochements_.[293]

This intercession had an immediate result. When Count Benckendorff returned to London, Lord Lansdowne summed up his assertions, November 7, as follows:

Count Lamsdorff felt strongly that it was of importance that an endeavour should be made to remove all sources of misunderstanding between the two Governments, and that there should be “a change for the better” in our relations. Count Benckendorff was therefore instructed to discuss frankly with me the various questions outstanding between Great Britain and Russia, with the object of arriving at an agreement as to the manner in which they should be dealt with. In the meantime, the Russian Government would be careful to avoid any action bearing the appearance of hostility to this country.

Lord Lansdowne was pleased at this response, for, as he said, he “had been seriously concerned at the position into which the two Powers were apparently drifting.” The two men then discussed in general terms the questions dividing their countries.[294] On November 17 and 25 they returned to the subject, and on November 22 King Edward and Sir Charles Hardinge each had an interview with Count Benckendorff. The Count stated that “the moment was riper now for a friendly understanding than at any time during the past twenty years.” He said that the matters for consideration “seemed naturally to group themselves into (1) questions concerning China in which Russia had a special interest (2) questions concerning India, in which Great Britain had a special interest and (3) questions concerning Persia in which both Powers were interested.” But it became clear from these conversations that the Ambassador was instructed merely to discuss the problems, that he had no definite proposals to make. Nor were the discussions satisfactory. The Ambassador could make no statement about Russian aims in China. He objected to the division of Persia into spheres of influence. He protested strongly against the British expedition to Tibet announced in that month. He refused to put anything on paper about Afghanistan.

In order to make some headway, Lord Lansdowne made a frank exposition of the British desires. On December 11 Count Lamsdorff voiced “much satisfaction” with this “ready response.” The British Ambassador urged him to make “an early and equally frank expression of the views of the Russian Government,” which might “lead to a satisfactory understanding.” Count Lamsdorff promised to try to reply before February 2, when Parliament was to reassemble. And Count Benckendorff planned to go to St. Petersburg early in 1904 for consultation.[295]

Just as Lord Lansdowne had expected, the negotiations did not proceed beyond that point; Russia would not limit her Asiatic ambitions. She would not accept the British terms, which of course included stipulations concerning China satisfactory to Japan, nor would she settle with Japan alone. Count Lamsdorff was willing to do so; but, as was well known by the other governments, he had no control over Russia’s far eastern policy. Since August this policy had been directed by the viceroy in the Far East, back of whom stood the Czar and the coterie around him interested in Russian expansion into Manchuria and Korea. Count Lamsdorff’s hands were tied; Russian activity made war with Japan a certainty. Toward the end of 1903 this menace grew so ominous that on December 11 Lord Lansdowne warned M. Cambon as follows:

H. E. [His Excellency] was no doubt aware that, under the Agreement with Japan, our intervention could only be demanded in case that Power were assailed by two others. On the other hand, public opinion here might render it extremely difficult for us to remain inactive if Russia were to find some pretext for attacking Japan and were to endeavour to crush her out of existence.

It seemed to me in these circumstances that it was the duty of our two Governments, which were, I rejoiced to think, at this moment in such friendly relations, to do all in their power to keep the peace.[296]

The French government reciprocated this wish, and let the British government perceive that it would not enter a Russo-Japanese war. Early in January the other Powers also asserted their intention of remaining neutral.[297]

Having been fully informed about Russo-Japanese relations, the British government had recognized the danger of war since July and had in consequence not let the negotiations with France lag or fail.[298] But since it now felt reasonably certain of not being drawn into the impending struggle, it allowed the transactions with France, on January 13, 1904, to come to a deadlock over a question hitherto cursorily considered. M. Delcassé requested territorial indemnity for the relinquishment of certain fishing rights off the coast of Newfoundland; and the British government refused to give the amount desired. The difficulty imperiled the entire settlement since both sides were so fearful of public opinion that they refused to make concessions.[299] But on February 10 the Russo-Japanese War began. Admiral Fisher was certain that Japan would be defeated.[300] Rumors were abroad concerning Russo-German negotiations for closing the Baltic Straits,[301] and some British officials had misgivings that a coalition of Russia, France, and Germany might be formed against their country.[302] Moreover, the British government feared that a Balkan war might break out in the spring.[303] Under these circumstances the British government could not afford to risk alienating France.[304]

M. Delcassé was surprised by the outbreak of the war.[305] His ambition had been for the Anglo-French _rapprochement_ to be supplemented by an Anglo-Russian one. Then as Italy was also trying to approach Russia, a more or less loose grouping of France, Russia, Great Britain, Italy, Spain, and Japan would be created.[306] Busy with the Anglo-French negotiations, he had been misled by the optimism of the Russian government into thinking that war would not occur.[307] He had not appreciated fully the weakness of Count Lamsdorff’s position. Not until January, 1904, did he perceive the danger and make belated efforts to maintain peace. But Great Britain refused to aid him.[308] Immediately after the war began he tried again to secure British co-operation in stopping it. When the British government again refused, M. Delcassé became incensed, for he saw the defeat of his larger program.[309] His better judgment soon calmed him, however, for with France’s ally eliminated from European affairs, he needed British co-operation more than ever in order to keep the war from spreading[310] and to offset the increased power of Germany. Late in February both parties were therefore ready to compromise.[311] And, after a threat by Lord Lansdowne on March 31 to break off negotiations when the French Foreign Minister, alarmed by French public opinion, attempted to reopen the Newfoundland question,[312] the accord was finally completed on April 8, 1904.

This agreement consisted of three documents: first, a convention which settled the Newfoundland question, modified certain boundaries between French and British colonies in Africa, and gave the Iles de Los to France; second, a declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides; and third, a declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco. Only the convention had to be submitted to the two parliaments, since it alone provided for territorial changes in the existing possessions of the two states. While the solution of all these difficulties established the Entente Cordiale, the last-named declaration gave to the entente its great significance in international affairs; for through it two of the old sore spots in Anglo-French diplomacy were healed, and the basis for the future co-operation of the two Powers was laid.

By the terms of this declaration France relinquished her rights and interests in Egypt in favor of Great Britain; Great Britain, in favor of France in Morocco. Only the clauses concerning Morocco are of interest here. Article II read as follows:

The Government of the French Republic declare that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

His Britannic Majesty’s Government . . . . recognize that it appertains to France . . . . to preserve order in that country, and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms which it may require.

They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of Treaties, Conventions, and usage, enjoys in Morocco. . . . .

Article IV provided for full commercial liberty, which, however, should obtain for only thirty years. Each government reserved the right “to see that the concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc. [in Morocco and Egypt], are only granted on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest.” By Article VII the free passage and non-fortification of the south shore of the Straits of Gibraltar were assured. According to Article VIII the interests of Spain in Morocco were to be respected, and the compact over them to be worked out between the Spanish and French governments was to be communicated to the British government. Article IX was included at the insistence of the British government, which planned thereby to enjoy French support in obtaining the acquiescence of the other Powers to the proposed changes in Egypt. Although the French reluctantly agreed to it, it eventually proved to be of the greatest value to them. It read as follows: “The two Governments agree to afford to one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco.”

Five secret articles supplemented the public agreement. Article I was as follows:

In the event of either Government finding themselves constrained, by the force of circumstances, to modify their policy in respect to Egypt and Morocco, the engagements which they have undertaken towards each other by Articles IV, VI and VII of the Declaration of to-day’s date would remain intact.

Article II was included at the wish of the British:

His Britannic Majesty’s Government have no present intention of proposing to the Powers any changes in the system of the Capitulations, or in the judicial organization of Egypt.

In the event of their considering it desirable to introduce into Egypt reforms tending to assimilate the Egyptian legislative system to that in force in other civilized countries, the Government of the French Republic will not refuse to entertain any such proposals, on the understanding that His Britannic Majesty’s Government will agree to entertain the suggestions that the Government of the French Republic may have to make to them with a view of introducing similar reforms in Morocco.

Articles III and IV marked out the portion of Morocco which should come within the “sphere of influence” of Spain “whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it,” and provided for the validity of the Anglo- French declaration in case Spain refused to make an agreement.[313] Article V concerned the Egyptian debt.

The contradictions in the accord are apparent. The “political status” in Morocco was to be preserved, but it would take a statesman trained in diplomatic casuistry to explain how this was possible with France alone making all the proposed internal reforms. Of course, what was meant was that the “international status” of the land should be respected. However, the terms of the secret articles foresaw a future change even in that; and it can hardly be called showing a nice regard for Morocco’s international and sovereign independence for two alien Powers to set a time limit to the right of commercial liberty in that land. The doctors were agreeing upon a division of the patient’s property before they began to operate. That Morocco, an independent state, would eventually be partitioned into French and Spanish protectorates was evident to anyone with an understanding of contemporary political practices. To preserve peace and amity between themselves, Great Britain and France had simply made a division of spoils at Morocco’s expense.[314]

The new accord was most cordially welcomed by all parties in Great Britain. In the House of Commons on June 1, Earl Percy, speaking for the government, and Sir Edward Grey, speaking for the opposition, both emphasized the need for Great Britain henceforth to follow a policy of “administrative concentration and consolidation” of her empire, and declared that similar agreements should be made with other Powers. Not all troubles with France had been disposed of, said Earl Percy, but the chief ones had been, and the others could now be more easily settled. As to the terms dealing with Morocco, while he admitted that the Sultan had not been consulted beforehand, he declared that Morocco needed setting to rights and that France had a better claim to execute that work than anyone else. He also emphasized the unique quality of the Entente Cordiale.

The parties pledge themselves not merely to abstain from poaching on each other’s preserves but to do all in their power to further one another’s interests. We promise to give to one another, as friends, advantages which are ordinarily given only to allies, and it is as a pledge of friendship rather than as the terms of a compromise between jealous and exacting litigants that we ask the House to consent to these concessions.

Sir Edward Grey approved of the relinquishment of Morocco to France. Together with other speakers, he praised the spirit of the agreement, and he expressed the hope that Article IX would enable the two nations to draw closer together by increasing the “opportunities for the interchange of international courtesies between them.”

During the debates Mr. Gibson Bowles declared that the agreement amounted to a “partition of three new Polands” (Egypt, Morocco, and Siam), “a compact of plunder.” But from a European point of view he considered it of “the highest import,” for it signified a “return to the . . . . system of the balance of power.” “There are stalking through Europe,” he stated, “ambitions which must be curtailed and which may be developed to a greater extent than seems at present. Against such it is well to raise a visible barrier in England and France.” Mr. Balfour, the premier, however, denied that there had been “any reversal of the traditional policy of our party,” or that anything had been done “prejudicial to the interests of Germany or any other Power.”

The _Times_ did not agree with him. Its Paris correspondent wrote on April 14 as follows:

The Triple Alliance has long since ceased to be the European bogey which it once was. . . . . There is the Dual Alliance, the Anglo-French Agreement, and the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_, with benevolent diplomatic neutrality on the part of Russia. Now, in the midst of this happy family, the Triple Alliance only appears as the ghost of its former self.

The editorial comment of that paper was in a similar tone.

The days have gone by when the Germans could assume with some shadow of plausibility that in the larger questions of international politics Great Britain must follow in the wake of the Triple Alliance, and that the attitude of France might be ignored. There is no alliance between them, but there is a cordial understanding which will induce both to discuss all subjects affecting them fairly and without jealousy or suspicion, and which, combined with the relations in which they stand to Italy, must exercise a great influence upon all States, and, it may be, a great attraction upon some of them.

Events soon proved that the _Times’s_ estimate of that entente was more accurate than that of Mr. Balfour.[315]

Although happily surprised by the conclusion of the Anglo-French agreement, French public opinion did not accept the accord as whole- heartedly as did the British. Opposition to various parts of the settlement was expressed by extremists who regretted the final renunciation of French ambitions in Egypt and who thought that French interests in Siam and elsewhere had not been adequately upheld; by those in the maritime districts of Northern and Northwestern France who criticized the terms concerning Newfoundland as disastrous to French fishing interests in that region; and more or less openly by the enemies of M. Combes, the premier, whose stringent anticlerical policy had aroused bitter antagonism among the French. These critical forces, however, were more than offset by the elements who praised the agreement. “It is equitable, the equilibrium of the accord is irreproachable,” wrote M. de Caix. The recognition of France’s special interests in Morocco was especially commended by almost all parties. The strengthening of France’s international position was also acknowledged with satisfaction. In reporting the agreement to the Chamber of Deputies on November 3 M. Deloncle declared: “We do not wish a . . . . passing entente between our two countries. We think . . . . of the formation of accords always more intimate and durable, which, loyally executed by both parties, . . . . on the basis of reciprocal confidence, will cement the community and solidarity of the two countries.” Alliance with Russia, friendship with Great Britain, was the popular formula.

Nevertheless, the convention over Newfoundland was accepted by the Chamber only on condition that M. Delcassé attempt to reopen the question with the British government. Many warned M. Delcassé not to trust Great Britain too far, not to permit the entente to assume in any way the character of an alliance, and not to involve France in the Anglo-German rivalry. In the Chamber on November 8 M. Delafosse declared that the accord signified a “detente,” not an “entente.” M. René Millet, former governor of Tunis, wrote that the arrangement was “a retreat in good order” which “does not justify the enthusiasm with which it has been received.” M. Millet found insufficient the diplomatic preparation for the French action in Morocco.

It is not possible [he wrote] for France to undertake anything without knowing the thoughts of Germany. . . . . Our bad will toward the Germans will only render them more imperious, and, without declaring war, they will have more than one means of being disagreeable to us, especially at the time when Russia . . . . is unable to help us. . . . . Of all pretensions, the most foolish would be to wish to isolate the German Empire, as certain musketeers of the press advise.[316]

Alarmed by the criticism of the Newfoundland convention, M. Delcassé tried in June and July to obtain some further concessions from the British government.[317] Although he had no success, he felt compelled during the debates in the French Chamber, November 3-10, to promise to reopen negotiations on the Newfoundland question. Otherwise, he feared a rejection. This meaningless concession, together with the fact that the entente had already proved its value by enabling M. Delcassé to mediate between Great Britain and Russia in October for a peaceful settlement of the Dogger Bank episode,[318] smoothed the path for parliamentary approbation. Hence M. Delcassé, in his speech of defense, was able to confine himself to generalities. He reviewed his achievement of the ententes with Italy, Spain, and Great Britain, by which the Moroccan question had been settled in favor of France and by which the French position in the world had been elevated. He advocated a policy of peace and conciliation, but he also declared that France must maintain her defenses.

And this is what procures for France [he concluded], augmented in her credit and prestige, the trust and sympathy of the world. The world is convinced to-day that French policy does not seek the advantage for France other than in the harmony of French interests with the interests of others. And she is happy to affirm that that harmony, which no one believes or pretends to believe unrealisable, is being realised each day to the benefit of all.

It will be the honor of our democracy to have practiced that policy.

He was roundly applauded, and his achievements were approved by both Parliament and people. The accord was ratified in the Chamber by a vote of 443 to 105, and in the Senate by one of 215 to 37.[319]

[Footnote 251: 4 Hansard, Vol. CXVIII, col. 1579.]

[Footnote 252: See Rodd to Lansdowne, Jan. 9, 1903, _B.D._, IV, 41 f., No. 32, and following documents. However, an extract from _Defence Committee Paper 1b_ (Feb. 11, 1903), read as follows: “What difference would it make to the balance of power in the Mediterranean if Russia were to obtain, through possession of Constantinople, free egress from the Black Sea through the Dardanelles, these remaining closed, as at present, against other Powers?

“The answer to this question unanimously accepted by the Committee was that, while Russia would no doubt obtain certain naval advantages from the change, it would not fundamentally alter the present strategic position in the Mediterranean.”

An extract from _Defence Committee Paper 2b_ of the same month read as follows: “It may be stated generally that a Russian occupation of the Dardanelles, or an arrangement for enabling Russia to freely use the waterway between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, such as her dominating influence can extract from Turkey at her pleasure, would not make any marked difference in our strategic dispositions as compared with present conditions” (_B.D._, IV, 59 f.). This opinion was approved on April 22, 1904, by King Edward and by Sir Charles Hardinge, who had just been appointed ambassador at St. Petersburg (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 289 f.). It apparently led to a change of policy in the autumn of 1903 (see below).]

[Footnote 253: Chirol, _Fifty Years in a Changing World_, pp. 276 ff.; _G.P._, Vol. XVII, chaps. cxii, cxiv, Part A; _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. xii. See also Lansdowne to Curzon, April 24, 1903, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 254.]

[Footnote 254: See _B.D._, IV, 41 ff., Nos. 32 ff.; memo. on British policy in Persia, Oct. 31, 1905, _ibid._, 365 ff., No. 321; memo. respecting Russia and Afghanistan, Oct. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 512 ff., No. 465; Newton, pp. 271 ff.]

[Footnote 255: The Japanese Foreign Minister, in communicating to the British Minister on April 27 the Russian demands to China, spoke “with unwonted seriousness” and asserted “that he considered the situation exceedingly grave” (MacDonald to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, _B.D._, II, 198 ff., No. 226. The dispatch was received first on June 2, but there is no reason to doubt that the view expressed therein was immediately known to the British government since the two governments were in constant communication. See Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 29, 1903, _ibid._, 200 f., No. 228; memo. communicated by Hayashi, Japanese minister to London, to Lansdowne, April 27, 1903, _ibid._, 201 f., No. 228, inclosure; William L. Langer, “Der Russisch-Japanische Krieg,” _Europäische Gespräche_, June, 1926, pp. 310 ff.; Tyler Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_ (New York, 1925), pp. 139 f., 355 ff.]

[Footnote 256: When Russo-Japanese relations became strained early in 1901, Lansdowne asked Monson whether he thought “that France is under any engagement to take part on the side of Russia in the event of war, or that without such obligation she would attempt to do so” (Lansdowne to Monson, March 8, 1901, _B.D._, II, 40, No. 49). Monson replied that he did not know whether the Dual Alliance laid down the obligation of military aid outside of Europe, and that while the French people showed little zeal for far eastern affairs, yet nationalistic hatred against Great Britain might be aroused at any time and might make the French stand uncertain (Monson to Lansdowne, March 13, 1901, _ibid._, 44 f., No. 56). The Franco-Russian declaration of 1902 in reply to the Anglo- Japanese Alliance stated that the Dual Alliance was extended to the Far East, although a few days later Delcassé cast doubt upon the significance of this engagement. While French public opinion was opposed to becoming involved in the Far East for the sake of Russia, yet this ambiguity left the French position in case of a war in doubt (see above).]

[Footnote 257: See Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 79 f.; Jean Darcy, _France et Angleterre. Cent années de rivalité coloniale: L’Afrique_ (Paris, 1904); Barclay, _Thirty Years: Anglo-French Reminiscences, 1876-1906_, chaps. xiii-xvi.]

[Footnote 258: Philippe Crozier, who in 1903 was French minister at Copenhagen, states that to his intimate friends King Edward “even foresaw the hypothesis of a positive alliance” with France (“L’Autriche et l’avant guerre,” _Revue de France_, April 15, 1921, p. 271).]

[Footnote 259: Lee, II; Newton, pp. 292 f. Early in 1915 Balfour wrote to Lansdowne denying that King Edward was the author of the Entente Cordiale. “Now, so far as I remember, during the years which you and I were his Ministers, he [King Edward] never made an important suggestion of any sort on large questions of policy” (Newton, p. 293). This estimate may be true, but it does not give the King credit for what he actually did.]

[Footnote 260: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 185 ff. Esher had been furnishing information to Spender, who was editor of the _Westminster Gazette_, a Liberal paper, since 1900. Spender denies that the British foreign office inspired the newspapers (_op. cit._, I, 185).]

[Footnote 261: J. L. de Lanessan, _Histoire de l’entente cordiale franco-anglaise_ (Paris, 1916), pp. 218 ff., 229, 234; Barclay, chaps. xvii-xx.]

[Footnote 262: The _Times_, the Northcliffe Press, the Chamberlain Press, the _National Review_, _Fortnightly Review_, _Contemporary Review_, the Liberals as well as the Conservatives, supported the movement. See _G.P._, XVII, Nos. 5081-83, 5087-88, 5094, 5026-27; Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 175 f.; Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, p. 135; Barclay, pp. 177 f.]

[Footnote 263: See Barclay, chaps. xvii, xx.]

[Footnote 264: Reports from the Belgian ministers in Paris and London, May 4, 1902, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 105 f. Impressed with the unanimity of friendliness toward France among the British, M. Delcassé expressed to Monson his regret that the French did not fully reciprocate this feeling. See Monson to Lansdowne, July 24, 1903, _B.D._, II, 302 f., No. 361; _Bulletin_, July, 1903, pp. 211 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XV, 656 f., XVI, 147; articles from _Figaro_ and the _Temps_ quoted in the _London Times_, May 5, 1903; article by Etienne in the _National Review_, July 1, 1903, esp. p. 748_a_.]

[Footnote 265: So Eckardstein asserts, _Lebenserinnerungen, etc._, II, 337; cf. Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 249.]

[Footnote 266: King Edward’s trip was a bold move, for Paris was the center of anti-British feeling, and some members of the British government were doubtful about its success. But the King initiated the visit and took the entire responsibility for it, feeling certain that he would be well received. In his first public speech, more optimistically than truthfully, he declared: “There may have been misunderstandings and causes of dissension in the past [between the two countries], but all such differences are, I believe, happily removed and forgotten, and I trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between the peoples of the two countries. The achievement of this aim is my constant desire.” Quoted in the _London Times_, May 2, 1903, M. Paul Cambon’s estimate of the significance of the King’s visit is as follows: “Of course, King Edward helped immensely. His visit to Paris in the spring of 1903 really made it [the Anglo-French entente] possible. . . . .” See interview with Cambon in _ibid._, Dec. 22, 1920. On the visit see Captain the Hon. Sir Seymour Fortescue, _Looking Back_ (London, 1920), pp. 279 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XV, 656 f.; Lee, II, 221 ff., 236 ff.; Barclay, p. 218; Viscount Esher, _The Influence of King Edward and Essays on Other Subjects_ (London, 1915), pp. 57 ff.; Pinon, p. 114; Herbert H. Asquith, _The Genesis of the War_ (New York, 1923), p. 30; Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 590 ff., No. 5376; Crozier, pp. 272 ff.; Newton, pp. 275 f., 278 f.]

[Footnote 267: Shortly before this visit Chamberlain remarked to Eckardstein: “Here in England the King’s visit to Paris is very popular, and if France gives him a good reception then everything will go well between us in the future.” See Eckardstein to Bülow, May 10, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 568, No. 5369; Metternich to Bülow, June 2, 1903, _ibid._, 590 ff., No. 5376.]

[Footnote 268: Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 20, 1902, _B.D._, II, 261 f., No. 319; Lansdowne to Monson, May 19, 1903, _ibid._, 289, No. 352; Monson to Lansdowne, May 22, 1903, _ibid._, 290, No. 353; Monson to Lansdowne, May 29, 1903, _ibid._, 290 f., No. 354; Lansdowne to Monson, July 21, 1903, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 360, and inclosures; _Annual Register_ (1903), pp. 216 f.; Barclay, pp. 235, 242; expressions of public opinion on this project contained in _Quest. dipl. et col._, July 1 and 15, Aug. 1, Sept. 1 and 15, 1903.]

[Footnote 269: King Edward’s assertion had direct reference to the German Emperor, with whom he had never agreed (_Zur europ. Politik_, I, 110; Lee, II, 244 ff.; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVI, 147 ff.).]

[Footnote 270: On this interview see the dispatch from Lansdowne to Monson, July 7, 1903, _B.D._, II, 294 ff., No. 357; also Delcassé’s interview in _Petit Parisien_, April 10, 1904, reprinted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, April 16, 1904, pp. 616 f. Delcassé’s conversation with Lansdowne had been prefaced by the talks between Cambon and Lansdowne during the previous year and also by a long talk on July 2, 1903, between Lansdowne and Etienne. Etienne had stated one of the reasons for an Anglo-French entente as follows (the account is from the hand of the British minister): “M. Etienne expressed his belief that the most serious menace to the peace of Europe lay in Germany, that a good understanding between France and England was the only means of holding German designs in check, and that if such an understanding could be arrived at, England would find that France would be able to exercise a salutary influence over Russia and thereby relieve us from many of our troubles with that country” (Lansdowne to Monson, July 2, 1903, _B.D._, II, 293, No. 356).]

[Footnote 271: Lansdowne to de Bunsen, July 15, 1903, _ibid._, 298, No. 358; Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, Aug. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 304 ff., Nos. 363 f.]

[Footnote 272: Lansdowne to Durand, July 14, 1903, Newton, p. 280.]

[Footnote 273: Then Lansdowne notified the Spanish government of the steps which he had taken and asked for a statement of its views on the Moroccan question. Whether Spain replied is not evident. See Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 5, 1903, _B.D._, II, 306 f., No. 364; Lansdowne to Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 309 f., No. 366; Newton, p. 280.]

[Footnote 274: J. A. Spender, _The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman_ (London), Vol. II, chaps. xxiii-xxiv.]

[Footnote 275: Cromer to Lansdowne, July 17, 1903, _B.D._, II, 298 ff., No. 359; memo. by Cromer, Aug. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 307 ff., No. 365; Newton, pp. 280 ff.]

[Footnote 276: Lee, II, 245 f.; Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, _B.D._, II, 311 ff., No. 369; 400 n.]

[Footnote 277: Lansdowne to Cambon, Oct. 1, 1903, _ibid._, 311 ff., No. 369.]

[Footnote 278: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 317 f., No. 370; Cambon to Lansdowne, Oct. 26, 1903, _ibid._, 320 ff., No. 373.]

[Footnote 279: Cromer to Lansdowne, Nov. 1, 1903, Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 17, 1903, Newton, pp. 283 ff.]

[Footnote 280: Cromer to Lansdowne, Oct. 30, 1903, _B.D._, II, 323, No. 374; Lansdowne to Cambon, Nov. 19, 1903, _ibid._, 324 ff., No. 376.]

[Footnote 281: The French government, Cambon said, knew that “the Queen of Spain during her recent visit to the Continent had been in communication with the German Emperor upon the subject of Morocco” (Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1903, _ibid._, 329 ff., No. 378).]

[Footnote 282: Lansdowne to Cromer, Nov. 17, 1903, Cromer to Lansdowne, Nov. 27, 1903, Newton, pp. 285 f.]

[Footnote 283: Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 333 f., No. 380. It was evident that in view of the monopolistic tendencies of the French, British trade in Morocco would practically cease at the end of the time limit (Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 332 f., No. 379).]

[Footnote 284: Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 13, 1904, _ibid._, 338, No. 384; Cromer to Lansdowne, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 332, No. 379.]

[Footnote 285: Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, Dec. 1, 1903, p. 821.]

[Footnote 286: Delcassé had received the hint from Chamberlain (see next reference).]

[Footnote 287: Lansdowne to Scott, July 29, Aug. 12, 1903, _B.D._, II, 212 f., Nos. 242 f. In September, Lansdowne wrote in a memorandum for the cabinet as follows: “A good understanding with France would not improbably be the precursor of a better understanding with Russia” (Lee, II, 246). In July, Lansdowne also sought the co-operation of the United States in checking Russia in the Far East (Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 359).]

[Footnote 288: Mallet to Spring Rice, Oct. 26, 1903, Gwynn, _Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 366 f.]

[Footnote 289: Lansdowne to MacDonald, July 3, 13, 1903, _B.D._, II, 206 ff., Nos. 237 f., and the following documents. See MacDonald to Lansdowne, Sept. 4, Oct. 1, 1903, _ibid._, 214 ff., Nos. 246, 248; Alfred von Hedenström, _Geschichte Russlands von 1878 bis 1918_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922), p. 170; _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, III, 324 f.; Langer, pp. 312 ff.]

[Footnote 290: _B.D._, IV, 621; memo. respecting Russia and Afghanistan, Oct. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 518 f., No. 465; memo. on Russo-Afghan relations, Oct. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 519 f., No. 466; Hardinge to Lansdowne, Nov. 22, 1903, _ibid._, 194, No. 181 (_b_). There was also trouble over Tibet and the Persian Gulf (see Newton, p. 287).]

[Footnote 291: Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 26, 1903, _B.D._, II, 217 f., No. 250.]

[Footnote 292: Lansdowne to Monson, Nov. 4, 1903, _ibid._, 221 f., No. 257.]

[Footnote 293: Spring Rice to Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, _ibid._, IV, 224, No. 209; Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903, _G.P._, XVIII, 853, No. 5918.]

[Footnote 294: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 1903, _B.D._, II, 222 ff., No. 258.]

[Footnote 295: Lansdowne to Spring Rice, Nov. 7, 17, 25, 1903, _ibid._, 222 ff., No. 258; IV, 183 ff., Nos. 181 f.; 306 f., No. 289; Scott to Lansdowne, Dec. 22, 1903, _ibid._, II, 226, No. 262; Lee, II, 280 f.; Lansdowne to Cromer, Dec. 7, 1903, Newton, p. 287.]

[Footnote 296: Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 224, No. 259.]

[Footnote 297: In Dec., 1903, Delcassé informed the Japanese Minister in Paris that he did not approve of all of Russia’s designs in the Far East (Dennis, p. 385). Hayashi, Japanese minister in London, believed as early as Dec. 23 that France would remain neutral. See Eckardstein, III, 62, 188; see also Metternich to F. O., Jan. 8, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 20 f., No. 5931; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, 1904, _ibid._, 38 ff., No. 5945; Langer, p. 317; Bülow to William II, Jan. 12, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 26, No. 5936.]

[Footnote 298: Lee, II, 282; Langer, pp. 316 f.; Dennis, chap. xiii. However, as late as Nov. 4, 1903, Lansdowne did not expect war, nor did Sir Charles Hardinge as late as Dec. 25. By Jan. 5, the latter did (Gwynn, I, 391 f.).]

[Footnote 299: Cambon to Lansdowne, Dec. 27, 1903, _B.D._, II, 336, No. 382; and the following documents, particularly the dispatch from Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 339, No. 386. The British were also surprised to learn early in January that Delcassé had kept his colleagues in the dark concerning the details of the arrangement, and feared some trouble on that account. It seems that as late as March 2 Delcassé had not consulted the French Colonial Minister (Lansdowne to Cromer, Jan. 5, 1904, Monson to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, Newton, pp. 287 ff.).]

[Footnote 300: _Ibid._, p. 307.]

[Footnote 301: _G.P._, XIX, 89 f., editor’s note, and the documents in _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chap. cxxix; Gwynn, I, 391.]

[Footnote 302: Spring Rice to Ferguson, Feb. 4, 1904, Spring Rice to Roosevelt (no date given, though written in Feb. or March, 1904), Gwynn, I, 392 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., March 21, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 112, No. 5992. See also the dispatch from Alvensleben to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 18, No. 5929. Sir Charles Dilke summed up the danger of the situation as follows: “If Germany were to declare war on Japan, Great Britain would be forced by her treaty engagement to declare war on Russia and Germany; and France, it is understood, to declare war upon Great Britain and Japan” (Dilke, “The War in the Far East,” _North American Review_, April, 1904, quoted in Dennett, p. 94).]

[Footnote 303: Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 17, 1904, _B.D._, V, 67 f., and following documents.]

[Footnote 304: Lansdowne to Monson, Feb. 25, 1904, _ibid._, II, 346, No. 391, and following documents; on March 1, King Edward wrote to Balfour strongly advising in favor of the territorial sacrifice asked by the French on the Newfoundland question, for, he wrote, “_more than ever now_ [in italics in the original] we must leave no bone of contention between ourselves and the French Government” (Lee, II, 248). See also Holstein’s keen analysis of the situation on Jan. 23, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 48 ff., No. 5951. Cromer also urged his government to make concessions (Newton, p. 289).]

[Footnote 305: Tardieu, _La France et les alliances_, p. 23; E. J. Dillon, _The Eclipse of Russia_ (New York, 1918), pp. 330 ff.; Eckardstein, III, 57 ff., 187 ff.; Crozier, pp. 282 f.; Mévil, _De la paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 83 ff.; Radolin to F. O., Feb. 11, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 60 f., No. 5960.]

[Footnote 306: Mévil, p. 82.]

[Footnote 307: For an illustration of that optimism see Nicholas II to William II, Jan. 24, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 53, No. 5952.]

[Footnote 308: Lansdowne to Scott, Jan. 19, 1904, _B.D._, II, 237, No. 280; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 27, 1904, _ibid._, 240, No. 283.]

[Footnote 309: In July, 1905, Spring Rice reported to his friend Roosevelt a conversation which he had recently had with Lansdowne, as follows: “In speaking in general terms of our relations with Japan, he [Lansdowne] pointed out that from the very first our political interest had been to prevent the war [between Russia and Japan] which would not only expose us to great dangers of loss in Asia itself, but would seriously imperil our good understanding with France. . . . .” Then after explaining why Great Britain refused to press Japan to maintain peace, he continued: “As a result we all but lost our agreement with France” . . . . (Dennett, pp. 213 f.). Cf. Eckardstein to Schwabach, Feb. 10, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 60, No. 5959. Spring Rice’s assertion was no doubt exaggerated in order to prove to Roosevelt that Great Britain really desired peace between Russia and Japan.]

[Footnote 310: See Radolin to Bülow, March 15, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 3 f., No. 6366.]

[Footnote 311: See Lansdowne to Monson, March 1, 1904, _B.D._, II, 347, No. 393, and following documents.]

[Footnote 312: See Monson to Lansdowne, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, 357, No. 405; Lansdowne to Monson, March 30, 31, 1904, _ibid._, 358, No. 406; 359 f., No. 408; Newton, pp. 289 f.]

[Footnote 313: The first two articles were kept secret at Delcassé’s desire; the next two for obvious reasons.]

[Footnote 314: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. Accords conclus, le 8 avril, 1904, entre la France et l’Angleterre au sujet du Maroc, de l’Egypte, de Terre-Neuve, etc._ (Paris, 1904); _Parliamentary Papers. Declaration between the United Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco, together with the Secret Articles Signed at the Same Time. Signed at London, April 8, 1904_ (Cd. 5969), Vol. CIII (1911); _B.D._, II, 373 ff., No. 417. The secret articles were first revealed in 1911.]

[Footnote 315: On the reaction of the British people to the accord see Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 188 ff.; _London Times_, April 12 and 14, 1904; _Spectator_, quoted in Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalendar 1904_, p. 223. For the debates in the British Parliament see 4 Hansard, Vol. CXXXV, cols. 502 ff. Adverse opinion was expressed by Lord Rosebery, the _Daily Chronicle_, the _Morning Post_, and Mr. Aflalo who had lived in Morocco and was particularly interested in the fate of the land; but their voices were lost in the general applause (Metternich to Bülow, April 9, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 13 f., No. 6375).]

[Footnote 316: _Bulletin_, April, 1904, p. 107: Millet, _Notre politique extérieure 1898-1905_, pp. 168, 173. Millet was a follower of Hanotaux, Delcassé’s predecessor at the foreign office, and a consistent critic of the latter.]

[Footnote 317: Count de Montferrand, who in company with M. Cambon talked with Sanderson about the Newfoundland question, remarked that “if M. Delcassé was not able to inform the French Chambers that they had secured this right, the Convention would be rejected” (memo. by Sanderson, June 30, 1904, _B.D._, III, 6, No. 5; see _ibid._, chap. xvi,