Chapter VIII: French Policy After the Making of the Entente Cordiale

As friend of Great Britain and ally of Russia, France was in an uneasy situation after the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. Hostility between those two Powers was increasing. Thereby the influence of Germany in St. Petersburg was greatly augmented, and Germany was assiduously courting Russia. M. Delcassé had to show enough sympathy and give enough help to Russia to prevent Germany from usurping France’s position at St. Petersburg and at the same time hold to the Anglo-French entente.

The task did not prove to be unduly arduous, for Russia did not require much of her ally. M. Delcassé sought to maintain harmony between Great Britain and Russia by helping them settle their disputes.[342] He also did what favors he could for Russia, such as permitting the Russian Baltic fleet to use French ports on the way to the Far East. But otherwise he left Russia to her own resources and devoted himself to other tasks.

The Anglo-French accord did not complete M. Delcassé’s work of establishing France’s right to preponderance in Morocco and of elevating her position in Europe, but it made the completion possible. The Foreign Minister still had to negotiate an agreement with Spain, to exclude Germany from the Moroccan settlement, and to execute the policy of pacific penetration in the Sherifian Empire. During the succeeding months he was occupied with these problems.

I. THE FRANCO-SPANISH AGREEMENT, 1904

When M. Delcassé, in accordance with Article VIII of the Anglo-French declaration, proposed to the Spanish government in April, 1904, that they negotiate over the Moroccan question, he immediately met with difficulty. Relying upon promises by Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé, the Spanish government had expected to be consulted before the conclusion of the bargain. It therefore complained because the negotiations had not been conducted _à trois_.[343] The Spanish Queen Mother branded the act as an “unfriendliness” to Spain, and the Marquis del Muni (M. Leon y Castillo), Spanish ambassador at Paris, “clinched his fist in his pocket” at the two Powers.[344] When the Cortes met, the Liberals took occasion on June 6, 7, and 9, to expose the main terms of the Franco- Spanish accord of 1902 which the Conservatives had refused to sign, and to accuse that party of having inadequately upheld Spain’s interests. As the nation remained apathetic, M. Maura, the prime minister, had no difficulty in defending his government.[345] Urged by the British government,[346] he accepted M. Delcassé’s overture.

The course of the negotiations, which began in April, was a rocky one. The Spanish accused the French of being too-hard bargainers; the French thought that the other party was too prone to alarm.[347] The Spanish government, ignorant of the secret articles in the Anglo-French agreement by which the Spanish sphere was already limited,[348] demanded the territorial terms which had been informally agreed upon in 1902. But M. Delcassé refused to give them, for, he asserted, Spain ought to bear her part of the sacrifice which France had had to make to Great Britain. Aroused by this reply, the Spanish government appealed late in April to the German government for an “active expression” of “sympathy . . . . at the opportune moment.” Although the German Chancellor was eager to give it,[349] Spain aimed to use this intimacy merely as a threat. While continuing the conversations more or less dilatorily with Germany, she asked for and relied chiefly upon the support of Great Britain to obtain satisfactory terms with France.

Through Lord Lansdowne’s mediation, M. Delcassé agreed in May to extend the Spanish sphere of influence in the north from Melilla to the mouth of the Moulouya—a particularly sore spot with the Spanish since they owned islands just off this coast—and to expand the limits of the Spanish sphere in Southern Morocco. The French Minister made these concessions dependent upon Spain’s accepting his other conditions, and asserted to the Spanish Ambassador that “he was not prepared to prolong the discussion of these details, and his offer was _à prendre ou à laisser_.”[350]

This bold speech did not impress the Spanish government, which, knowing France’s need for an agreement with it, followed Count Bülow’s advice of drawing out the negotiations.[351] Its views differed from those of M. Delcassé in that it desired Spanish control in Tangier, full commercial liberty throughout Morocco without any time limit, and the publication of the agreement—all of which the French Minister refused.[352] However, by the last of June accord was virtually reached, when M. Delcassé brought forth a new condition to the effect that Spain should be precluded from taking any action in her prospective sphere until the _status quo_ in Morocco came to an end.[353]

M. Delcassé was confronted with the problem of how to maintain a unified Franco-Spanish policy in the peaceful penetration of Morocco, how to retain the initiative in that work in French hands, how to minimize Spain’s rights in Morocco in favor of France. Mistrusting Spain’s competence to handle subject peoples, he wished to prevent her from taking any action in her sphere that would arouse the Moroccans to a war not only against Spain but also against France and thus ruin the work of pacific penetration. He feared that Spain might precipitate the liquidation of Morocco so as to obtain full control of her area. The French policy was to postpone that event until a suitable occasion, in the meantime undermining Morocco’s integrity and independence while pretending to maintain them. He was legally within his rights in taking this line toward Spain, and was fortified against British intervention in the latter’s favor, because secret Article III of the Anglo-French agreement provided that the specified area should come within the sphere of influence of Spain and be administered by her “whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it.”[354]

The Spanish government, protesting that this proposal would reduce its position to that of a subprotectorate, demanded the same rights in its sphere of influence as France would enjoy in hers. It desired particularly that Tangier be policed by Spanish altogether. The Spanish Foreign Minister asserted that Spain was averse to disturbing the _status quo_ in Morocco, but he and his colleagues suspected that France would never acknowledge a change in the political status in Morocco and would thus exclude Spain from any share in the land. The Spanish Minister declared that he “would not sign an agreement which abandoned Spanish rights,” and in complaining to the British government he threatened to “appeal to the Powers.”

Lord Lansdowne knew that by “Powers” was meant Germany, who was just then showing marked interest in helping Spain in the Moroccan affair. Wishing to obviate German intervention, he advised the Spanish to make concrete proposals to France concerning ways of exercising an influence in the proposed Spanish sphere—for instance, as to “the construction of railways and other useful works.” He also cautioned Spain against undertaking to police Tangier. At the same time he urged M. Delcassé to be more conciliatory toward Spain so as to avoid the possibility of “international difficulties.”[355]

M. Delcassé was willing to permit Spanish participation in the economic development of Morocco and also to associate Spanish officials with French ones in two of the three ports whose customs revenues were to be collected as security for the recent French loan. He refused to recede on the other points.[356] This reply so excited the Spanish that when M. Delcassé proposed a clause whereby Spain would be prohibited from alienating the Moroccan territory over which she should have control, the Spanish government rejected it as beneath its dignity. It offered instead to give France a right of preference in case Spain wished to alienate any or all of that area. Lord Lansdowne, who did not want France to gain this preferential right, persuaded the Spanish to accept the French proposal.[357]

The main issue, however, that of Spain’s independence of action in her sphere, remained unsolved. In the middle of July, while leaving the impression that the cause of difference was the question of full commercial freedom, the Spanish government informally asked the German government to give Spain a _coup d’épaule_ in Paris. As the German government desired a more definite proposal, it did not carry out the request.[358] Nor was much support to be obtained from Great Britain. But as both French and British governments knew of Germany’s interest in the negotiations, M. Delcassé, in August, agreed to restrict Spain’s action for fifteen years only.[359] The Spanish government rejected that concession, but offered to take no action for that period without previous accord with France, provided France recognized that she “ought to proceed in accord with the Spanish Government in that which touches the zone of influence reserved to Spain.” Lord Lansdowne supported this proposal. So while M. Delcassé held to his previous stand, he agreed that “France would take no steps within the Spanish Sphere without giving previous notice to Spain.” Thus, although the Marquis del Muni thought that the two parties had reached a deadlock, there was in reality no great difference between the two demands. On October 3 the agreement was signed.[360]

The accord consisted of a published declaration and of sixteen secret articles. The former merely expressed the fact that Spain adhered to the Anglo-French declaration of April 8 concerning Morocco and Egypt and that Spain and France were in agreement “to fix the extension of their rights and guaranty of their interests” in Morocco.[361] The secret articles were of a far different caliber. Spain received as her sphere of influence not only the area from the Moulouya to Larache in Northern Morocco but also the coastal territory and hinterland extending from her possession Rio de Oro northward to the Wad Sus, just south of Agadir. The rest of Morocco constituted the French sphere (Arts. II, IV, V). Provision for a future change was included.

In case the political state of Morocco and of the Sherifian Government are unable to subsist, or if by the feebleness of the Government and by its continued impotence to introduce security and public order, or for any other cause to be stated in a common accord, the maintenance of the _status quo_ becomes impossible, Spain will be permitted freely to exercise her action in . . . . her sphere of influence [Art. III].

Although the same rights of action were permitted to Spain in her sphere as to France in hers, yet for a period of not over fifteen years from the date of signing the convention Spain was prohibited from taking action in her sphere without previous understanding with France. The latter, however, could take action unrestricted by Spain in the French zone, and could also act in the Spanish zone after having notified Spain of her intention. After that first period expired and as long as the _status quo_ obtained, France could not act in the Spanish zone without previous agreement with Spain (Art. II). By Articles VII and VIII Spain agreed not to cede or to alienate in any form any of the territory assigned to her or to seek the aid of a foreign Power other than France in taking any military action in her sphere of influence. Article IX preserved “the special character” of Tangier “which the presence of the diplomatic corps and the municipal and sanitary institutions give it.” Article X ran as follows:

So long as the actual political status continues, the enterprises for public works, railroads, roads, canals . . . . shall be executed by such companies as may be formed by French and Spanish. In the same manner it will be permissible for French and Spanish in Morocco to co-operate for the exploitation of mines, quarries, and, in general, of enterprises of an economic order.[362]

The two Powers immediately communicated the agreement to the British government, which accepted it.[363] The Spanish government thanked both British and German governments for their aid during the negotiations, and briefly informed the latter that by the treaty Tangier had been neutralized and complete equality and freedom of commerce and trade had been guaranteed.[364]

In Spain the agreement, grudgingly approved by the government as the best that it could obtain, was shown by the Premier to the various party leaders, and received their indorsement.[365] M. Delcassé informed none of the French politicians of the content of the treaty. During the debates in the French Parliament on the Anglo-French accord in November and December, however, the Franco-Spanish agreement was also accepted on faith.[366] The convention was a logical extension of the accord of April 8. Both agreements anticipated a change in the political status of Morocco and made provisions for a future division of the land. The one permitted commercial restriction at the end of thirty years; the other arranged for a Franco-Spanish monopoly of all economic enterprises. Both accords violated the principle of the open door. In fact, had the secret articles of the two agreements been known, they would have proved that the clauses concerning the independence and integrity of Morocco and the sovereignty of the sultan were complete shams. In declaring to the other Powers that commercial freedom would be absolutely respected, M. Delcassé was equivocating and attempting to disarm suspicions concerning his real intention of destroying economic freedom in Morocco.[367]

II. DELCASSÉ AND GERMANY, 1904

It was manifest during the Anglo-French negotiations that the French government planned to prevent Germany from gaining any foothold in Morocco or the Western Mediterranean.[368] Fearing that that Power might try to share in the Moroccan settlement when the Anglo-French accord became known, M. Delcassé endeavored to avoid a discussion of the agreement with it.[369]

When, therefore, on March 23, Prince Radolin asked the French Minister an “indiscreet question” about the reported Anglo-French negotiations, the latter replied that they had been going on for some time and would probably be successfully concluded. He said that they treated of Newfoundland, Egypt, and Morocco (the other questions he did not mention); and he explained the terms of the proposed agreement concerning the last-named land. “You know already our point of view on this subject. . . . . We wish to maintain in Morocco the existing political and territorial status; but that status, to endure, must manifestly be sustained and improved.” After citing the many occasions for intervention of which France had taken no advantage, he stated that the Sultan had already requested French aid. “It is now a matter of continuing it to him,” he said, and he assured the Prince that commercial liberty would be “rigorously and entirely respected. . . . . France wishes no special rights in Morocco, but it should be her task in the interest of all nations trading there to put an end, according to her power, to the anarchy in that land.” Moreover, the free passage through the straits should be secured by neutralizing their southern shore. As for Spain, her “positive interests and legitimate ambitions” in Morocco would be amicably treated. He did not mention either the clause limiting commercial freedom to thirty years or Article IX assuring mutual diplomatic support in the fulfilment of the accord. And of course he gave no hint of the existence of the secret articles.[370]

This informal and incomplete notification misrepresented the true aims of the agreement with respect to Morocco. M. Delcassé expected that by avoiding an official notification of the accord to the German government and by omitting to request an expression of opinion from it he would cause the German government either to permit him a diplomatic victory or to take the initiative for a Franco-German understanding.[371] He felt safe in his policy,[372] because France, in addition to her alliance with Russia, whose victory over Japan M. Delcassé and the French people confidently expected,[373] now enjoyed with her ally’s public approval[374] the friendship of Great Britain, Italy, and Spain, whereas the Triple Alliance was weakened by internal strife. Moreover, the French Minister learned on March 30[375] that at Vigo a few days before the Emperor William had denied having any territorial interests in Morocco. Hence by shunning the word “protectorate” he hoped to avoid the responsibility for endeavoring to establish one.[376] In October his notification of the Franco-Spanish agreement to the German government was even more perfunctory.[377]

III. “PACIFIC PENETRATION,” 1904

After the signing of the Anglo-French agreement, the French Parliament voted 600,000 francs with which to carry on the work of pacific penetration in Morocco.[378] The French government immediately dispatched a preliminary mission to Fez under Count de Saint-Aulaire, first secretary of the legation in Tangier. The Count gave the Sultan an exact Arabic translation of the published declaration of April 8; and, after setting forth the need for progressive reforms in Morocco and the special interest of France in executing them, he offered the friendly co-operation of his government to that end.[379] Thus, in spite of the persistent Moroccan raids across the Algerian border, the Sultan was asked to believe that France was once more manifesting her patience and good will.[380]

The Sultan scarcely knew what line of policy to take toward the Anglo- French agreement.[381] His subjects, from the religious groups to the merchants of Fez, were all hostile to any form of foreign control. Alarmed at the news of the agreement, they feared an immediate invasion by the Christians. Suspecting their ruler of conniving with the French, they became even more rebellious; many denied that he possessed the _baraka_, the divine benediction. At court the Conservative party, led by Si Feddoul Gharnet, grew stronger in its opposition to all French actions and policies. The Sultan realized the precariousness of his position, and was very anxious about the effects of his acts upon his people. He was uneasy and angry at having been ignored in the negotiations over his land. Nevertheless, as he did not comprehend the full significance of the accord, particularly since the French had explained it to him in soothing terms, he soon became calmer. Some of his officials were not opposed to the French, as they realized that the present conditions could not last and that the French had the power to change them. Furthermore, certain practical considerations prevented him from closing his ear to the French altogether. His ambition was, with the help of Europeans selected by himself, so to strengthen his land as to enable it to maintain its independence.[382] The Sultan had no funds; the small French, English, and Spanish loans of the previous year were exhausted, and he could not collect taxes or maintain an army. Forced to seek foreign aid, he had begun negotiations with the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas for a large loan late in January, and had besought the help of the French government in obtaining it. M. Delcassé had readily promised his support.[383]

In this situation the Sultan neither accepted nor rejected the Anglo- French agreement and Count de Saint-Aulaire’s explanation of it although he showed favor toward them.[384] On June 12 with the aid of the French government he concluded the transaction for the loan.

The loan, made by a consortium of eleven French banks headed by the Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, fulfilled political as well as economic purposes, for it was backed by the French government and was admirably adapted to the work of pacific penetration. The amount was 62,500,000 francs (Art. I), of which 80 per cent was actually to be credited to the Sultan (Art. XXIV). The interest was set at 5 per cent (Art. III). The loan was to be redeemed within thirty-six years, but the schedule of amortization was fixed and could not be hastened during the first fifteen years (Arts. IV, VII). The loan, guaranteed by the customs duties in all the ports of Morocco, was to have preference and priority over all other loans which might be similarly guaranteed (Art. XI). Sixty per cent of the customs revenues were reserved for the repayment of the obligation. If the necessary amount was not obtained thereby, the Moroccan government was to make up the deficit (Art. XVII). Two million francs were left in the bank at Paris to cover short payments; if withdrawn, this amount was to be re-established immediately by the Sultan’s government (Art. XXI). The remainder, after the Sultan’s outstanding loans were liquidated, was placed at the ruler’s disposal to be drawn upon at will (Arts. XXV, XXXV). By Article XIV the existing customs treaties and arrangements of Morocco with the Powers were guaranteed. Article XXXII prohibited the Sultan from using the customs receipts at his disposal to guarantee any other loan without a previous agreement with the French banks. By Article XXXIII those banks were given the right of preference in contracting new loans, coining money, or buying and selling gold and silver for Morocco, provided the conditions they offered were equal to those offered by others. The collection of the customs was to be supervised by a special group of French officials under the protection of the French legation. Their director should communicate with the Moroccan government through the French Minister at Tangier. Furthermore, if the stipulated funds were not turned over to the supervisors, the agents could appeal to the French Minister; and, with his consent and with due notification to the Sultan, they could collect the sums themselves. Thus, when by the last of July those officials were installed, the control of the customs was practically lost to the Sultan.[385]

In May an act of banditry occurred in Morocco which convinced public opinion everywhere that reform in that land was immediately necessary and which enabled France to take another step in her work of penetration. On May 18, Raisouli, a sherif, ex-cattle thief, robber and rebel, avenger of wrongs, opponent to Europeans—in short, a Moroccan Robin Hood—took prisoner an American citizen, Ion Perdicaris, and his English son-in-law, Varley, in their home near Tangier. As the price of their release he demanded a large ransom, the dismissal and punishment of certain of the Sultan’s loyal officials who were his enemies, and his own appointment as pasha for the district around Tangier. The Sultan had to accept his terms. On June 24, through the good offices of the French government, working through some of its Algerian religious leaders with followers in Morocco, the release was effected.[386] But the panic- stricken foreigners in Tangier, fearing that Raisouli would continue such lucrative business and that he would have imitators, demanded protection.[387] Thereupon the French government stationed two warships in Moroccan waters and secured the appointment of French and Algerian officers over the Tangier police.[388] The work of “pacific penetration” was most auspiciously under way.

Private French enterprise did not lag behind that of the government. Moroccan towns swarmed with hungry fortune-seekers eager to enjoy the opportunities for quick wealth which the opening of Morocco was expected to bring. The Comité du Maroc, formed in the preceding December from the ranks of the larger Comité de l’Afrique française, engaged energetically in directing and expanding the work of scientific exploration in the Sherifian Empire and of disseminating propaganda in France.[389] It received the financial support of the chief banks, maritime companies, steel works, railway companies, and some of the leading newspapers of France.[390] The list of guests present at a banquet held by it on June 15 to enlist public support reads like a French _Who’s Who_.[391]

In the autumn and early winter the French government made preparations to send a larger mission to Fez under the resident minister, M. Saint- René Taillandier, to obtain the Sultan’s approval of the French program of reforms. According to M. Delcassé’s instructions on December 15,[392] the Minister’s foremost task should be to institute police reforms similar to those inaugurated in Tangier, first in the towns already in contact with Europeans and then gradually in the other areas. In the border region order should be preserved by extending the co-operation of the two governments. The establishment of a state bank, the construction of means of transportation and of communication, the improvement of harbors, the support of philanthropic works, the spread of the French language, and the settlement of claims for damages inflicted on Algeria by Moroccan raiders were the other matters to be taken up. It was a comprehensive program, the achievement of which would end Moroccan isolation and independence.

The departure of the mission was delayed by the long negotiations for an accord with Spain and by the fact that the French Chamber did not approve the Moroccan accords until November. When the mission was prepared to start in December, the situation in Morocco, apparently favorable for France in the spring, had become adverse. The natives had grown bolder in their attacks upon foreigners, venting their hatred upon them even in Fez. The Sultan had begun to show signs of resisting. In September he had disgraced the pro-foreign minister el Menebhi and confiscated his property. Later in the year he had supplanted his pro- French ministers by anti-foreign ones, such as Si Feddoul Gharnet. In December he had dismissed all foreign employees at Fez and Rabat.[393] These signs augured trouble for the French. While assuming an optimistic manner publicly, M. Saint-René Taillandier acknowledged to his chief on December 12 that he might “be powerless to make the Sultan accept the minimum of reforms that the present state of Morocco demands.”[394] But as firmness was the best means to “recall the Moroccan government to a sense of reality,”[395] he immediately countered the dismissal of the French officers by a sharply worded letter to the Moroccan Foreign Minister. After reminding the latter of the _acte international_ by which France had “assumed the task of aiding” the Makhzen[396] to reform the land, he stated that the Sultan’s co-operation was expected and desired, but that

if that co-operation were not forthcoming, France would know how to accomplish the work alone. Dangerous counselors [he wrote] have led the Sultan astray as to the true state of affairs. And in consequence the French Government has decided to postpone the departure of the mission, and to recall to Tangier from Fez within ten days the French military mission, vice-consul, and all French subjects resident there.[397]

The Sultan’s opposition wilted immediately. The French vice-consul at Fez reported that the Makhzen was “ready to welcome all French counsels and to accept all the reforms,” that it “withdrew all the actions which have offended us.”[398] But the Sultan’s submission was not so complete as it seemed. Although France was the victor in this encounter, the conflict had only begun.

[Footnote 342: On Oct. 28, 1904, at the height of the Dogger Bank crisis, Lansdowne reported the following assertion by Cambon: “His Excellency [M. Cambon] said that he did not himself know precisely what obligations France had undertaken in virtue of that understanding [the Dual Alliance]. He did not however believe that if there was a collision, France would join Russia against us, but if a collision occurred, and particularly if it were brought on by unreasonable demands on our part, there would be a _revirement_ of public feeling, and the Anglo-French _entente_ could not fail to suffer” (Lansdowne to Monson, Oct. 28, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 22, No. 21).]

[Footnote 343: According to a speech in the Spanish Senate on March 21, 1904, by M. Abarzuza, who had been a member of Silvela’s cabinet from Dec. 6, 1902, to July 20, 1903, both the British and the French governments promised Spain in the first half of 1903 not to touch the Moroccan question or to make any alterations in North Africa without Spain’s previous knowledge and acquiescence. The speech is quoted by Becker, _Historia de Marruecos_ (Madrid, 1915), pp. 440 f. See above for Lansdowne’s promise. The Spanish government did try to participate in the Anglo-French negotiations by way of both London and Paris; but it was put off with general assurances of friendship by both Lansdowne and Delcassé. See Lansdowne to Durand, Aug. 11, 1903, _B.D._, II, 309 f., No. 366; Lansdowne to Monson, Jan. 23, 1904, _ibid._, 341, No. 388; Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, III, 25 f., No. 24; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18, 1904, _G.P._, XVII, 354, No. 5199, and the following documents. For expression of Spanish public opinion over the Anglo- French accord see the _London Times_, April 11-16, 1904; Gay, _España ante el problema del mediterráneo_, pp. 31 ff.; Maura, _La Question du Maroc, etc._ (Paris, 1911), pp. 32 f.; Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_ (Madrid, 1918), pp. 149 ff.]

[Footnote 344: _G.P._, XX, 169 f.]

[Footnote 345: The debates in the Cortes are to be found in the _Diario de las sesiones de Cortes_. Congreso de los Diputados (_Legislatura de 1903_), pp. 4883 ff., 4917 ff., 4944 ff., 4959 ff. Also see Maura, pp. 85 ff.]

[Footnote 346: Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, _B.D._, III, 25 f., No. 24; Egerton to Lansdowne, April 11, 1904, _ibid._, 26 f., No. 25.]

[Footnote 347: Egerton to Lansdowne, May 6, 1904, _ibid._, 34, No. 35.]

[Footnote 348: The British government kept these articles secret (Lansdowne to Egerton, April 11, 1904, _ibid._, 25 f., No. 24).]

[Footnote 349: Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 169 f., No. 6481, and following documents.]

[Footnote 350: Lansdowne to Monson, April 20, 1904, _B.D._, III, 29, No. 28, and following documents.]

[Footnote 351: Bülow to Radowitz, May 22, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 173 f., No. 6484. Bülow repeated his offer of aid on May 31. Bülow to Radowitz, May 31, 1904, _ibid._, 175 f., No. 6487. The Spanish Ambassador at Paris remarked to Monson that if Great Britain did not help Spain the latter “would be done out of half her rights in that country [Morocco]” (Monson to Lansdowne, May 20, 1904, _B.D._, III, 37, No. 41).]

[Footnote 352: Romanones, _Las responsabilidades politicas, etc._, pp. 49 ff.; reports from Madrid, June 15 and 21, 1904, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 121; see also _G.P._, Vol. XX, chap. cxliv.]

[Footnote 353: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, _B.D._, III, 38, No. 43; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 1904, _ibid._, 38 f., No. 44.]

[Footnote 354: _Ibid._, II, 393 f.]

[Footnote 355: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 1, 1904, _ibid._, III, 38, No. 43; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 2, 6, 1904, _ibid._, 38, No. 44; 40, No. 46; Lansdowne to Monson, July 4, 1904, _ibid._, 40, No. 45; Leon y Castillo, _Mis tiempos_, II, 182 ff.]

[Footnote 356: Lansdowne to Monson July 8, 1904, _B.D._, III, 41, No. 47.]

[Footnote 357: Lansdowne to Monson, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 42, No. 49; Lansdowne to Egerton, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 43, No. 50; Egerton to Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, _ibid._, 44, No. 52.]

[Footnote 358: Memo. by Richthofen, July 16, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 186 f., No. 6503; and other documents in _ibid._, Vol. XX, chap. cxliv.]

[Footnote 359: At first Delcassé said thirty years.]

[Footnote 360: Egerton to Lansdowne, July 31, 1904, _B.D._, III, 44, No. 52, and following documents; also Leon y Castillo, II, 183 f.]

[Footnote 361: _L.j., 1901-5_, 164, No. 187.]

[Footnote 362: The text of the agreement, which became public in 1909, is to be found in _British and Foreign State Papers_, CII (London, 1913), 432 ff.; and in _B.D._, III, 49 ff., No. 59.]

[Footnote 363: Lansdowne to Adam, Oct. 5, 1904, _B.D._, III, 52, No. 60.]

[Footnote 364: Radowitz to F. O., Oct. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 191 f., No. 6509.]

[Footnote 365: Maura, p. 54; Radowitz to F. O., Oct. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 191 f., No. 6509.]

[Footnote 366: Maura, p. 78; Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques_, 1904, pp. 75 ff.; Millet, _Notre politique extérieure 1898-1905_, pp. 179 ff.; and the French debates cited above.]

[Footnote 367: For an estimate of this accord see Tardieu, _Revue des deux mondes_, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 637 ff.; Stuart, _French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)_ (New York, 1921), pp. 154 ff.]

[Footnote 368: See, among others, the dispatch from Lansdowne to Monson, Dec. 9, 1903, _B.D._, III, 332, No. 378.]

[Footnote 369: Lansdowne to Monson, March 11, 1904, _ibid._, II, 353, No. 398. One day long after signing the accord Radolin remarked to Delcassé that he “had heard of an apparent treaty with England but had never read the text of it in any authentic form.” The Minister replied that he could find it in the _Livre jaune_ (letter from Radolin, apparently to Holstein, March 25, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 266 n.).]

[Footnote 370: In repeating these assertions to the German government on April 26 the French Ambassador added that “the Anglo-French entente was directed against no other Power and in no way menaced the German commercial interests.” See Delcassé to Bihourd, March 27, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 122, No. 142; Radolin to Bülow, March 23, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 5 ff., No. 6368; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 27, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 131, No. 155.]

[Footnote 371: See Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 60, No. 67.]

[Footnote 372: Bihourd, the French ambassador at Berlin, warned Delcassé in April that Germany had not said her last word on the Moroccan question and that more complete guaranties of commercial liberty should be given to her; but Delcassé disregarded the warning. See Bihourd to Delcassé, April 18, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 128, No. 151; Delcassé to Bihourd, April 18, 1904, _ibid._, 129, No. 152; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 21, 1904, _ibid._, 129 f., No. 153; cf. Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 338.]

[Footnote 373: Michon, _L’alliance franco-russe, 1891-1917_, pp. 101 f.]

[Footnote 374: Statement made by Nelidow, Russian ambassador to Paris, to a reporter of the _Temps_, reprinted in _Quest. dipl. et. col._, XVII, 607 f.]

[Footnote 375: Radolin to Bülow, March 30, 1904, _G.P._, XVII, 365, No. 5210.]

[Footnote 376: There is some evidence, however, that Delcassé did make some vague attempts to approach the German government on the Moroccan affair in 1904. Bülow, in a dispatch of March 22, 1905, stated that if Delcassé should declare that he had discussed Moroccan affairs “thoroughly with German diplomats passing through” Paris, Radolin was to reply that those conversations were only private ones and showed plainly the inclination to avoid the official and proper authorities. See Bülow to Radolin, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 267, No. 6568. Theodor Wolff, at that time Paris correspondent of the _Berliner Tageblatt_, also has written that in the spring of 1904 Delcassé said to Lichnowsky, an official in the German foreign office, that they should come to an understanding over Morocco. According to Wolff, Holstein became furious at the dispatch from Lichnowsky (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 154 f.; cf. Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_, p. 342). Lichnowsky may have been the person to whom Bülow referred, although, if any such conversation occurred, it was not mentioned later by either the French or the Germans.]

[Footnote 377: The French Ambassador merely left a copy of the published declaration and added verbally that the accord in no way infringed upon commercial liberty in Morocco. See Richthofen to Radowitz, Oct. 7, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 191, No. 6508; memo. by Richthofen for Bülow, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 230, No. 6534; Delcassé to Bihourd, Oct. 6, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 164, No. 187; Bihourd to Delcassé, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 166, No. 190; Delcassé to Bihourd, Oct. 8, 1904, _ibid._, 167 f., No. 193.]

[Footnote 378: This was done on a motion by Jaurès, made on Nov., 1903, and passed on April 25, 1904 (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, p. 35).]

[Footnote 379: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April 14 and 24, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 124, No. 146; 130, No. 154; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, April 27, 1904, _ibid._, 131, No. 156; Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, May 19, 1904, _ibid._, 133, No. 159 and annexe; Lansdowne to Nicolson, April 19, 1904, _B.D._, III, 28, No. 27.]

[Footnote 380: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 148, 157, 158, 183, 186, 189, 194-98, 202-7.]

[Footnote 381: On the Moroccan reaction see report by A. Bernard, who was in Morocco at the time, in _Bulletin_, June, 1904, pp. 203 f.; Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Jan. 1 and 24, Feb. 22, April 24, May 19, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 119 ff., Nos. 135, 137, 140, 154, 159.]

[Footnote 382: Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 31, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 250, No. 6553.]

[Footnote 383: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Jan. 29, 1904, _L.j. 1901-5_, 119, No. 138.]

[Footnote 384: Ben Sliman, Moroccan minister of foreign affairs, wrote to Saint-René Taillandier on June 17 as follows: “The Sultan . . . . has instructed me to reply to you that he does not doubt your favorable sentiments nor those of your Government, either the humanity of your actions or the sincerity of your counsels. . . . . Your letter is an argument the more in favor of the reaffirmation of that conviction and a testimony of your good intentions, conforming to the desire of the two countries. This is confirmed also by the conversations which we have had with your secretary to clarify the difficult points of the accord. . . . . I express to you in his [the Sultan’s] name the fullest thanks for your happy efforts past and present which, we hope, will characterize the conduct of our future relations” (_ibid._, 156 ff., No. 177, annex; Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._ [Paris, 1909], pp. 172 f. n.).]

[Footnote 385: The prominent part played by the French government in making this loan is attested as follows: As already stated, in January, at the Sultan’s request, Delcassé promised his help in making the loan. Furthermore, Saint-Aulaire and his interpreter, in Fez at the time, took an active part in bringing the negotiation to a satisfactory conclusion, being consulted on various points and helping in the formulation of the terms (Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 30, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 162 f., No. 184.). The contract was signed and sealed by the French Consul at Fez (_ibid._, 142 f., No. 170, Annex I). And the terms of the loan were such as could never have been obtained without the approval of the French government. The contract is printed in _ibid._, 143 ff., No. 170, Annex II. On the instalment of customs officials see the dispatches from Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 24, and 30, 1904, _ibid._, 159 ff., Nos. 181, 184; also Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques, 1904_, pp. 60 ff.]

[Footnote 386: On this episode see the various dispatches in _L.j., 1901-5_, 135 ff., Nos. 160 ff. On Raisouli see Rosita Forbes, _El Raisuni, the Sultan of the Mountains_ (London, 1924). On June 22, 1904, Secretary of State Hay cabled to the American Consul at Tangier, “We want Perdicaris alive or Raizuli dead.” See William Roscoe Thayer, _The Life and Letters of John Hay_ (Boston and New York, 1915), II, 383; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 443 ff. Both the British and the American governments requested the good offices of the French government in effecting the release. Mr. Hay, the American secretary of state, gave assurance that if more serious action were subsequently necessary in Morocco, it would not take place “without a previous exchange of views” with France. Thus he acknowledged France’s special position with reference to that country. See Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, May 30, 1904, _ibid._, 137, No. 163; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, May 31, 1904, _ibid._, 137, No. 164; Jusserand to Delcassé, June 20, 1904, _ibid._, 152, No. 171; Porter to Delcassé, June 27, 1904, _ibid._, 155, No. 176; Mévil, pp. 172 f.]

[Footnote 387: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, June 2 and 27, July 2, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 137 ff., Nos. 165, 175, 178.]

[Footnote 388: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, June 11 and 27, July 2, 1904, _ibid._, 140 ff., Nos. 168, 175, 178; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 26, 1904, _ibid._, 160, No. 182; Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 160 f., No. 183, and annex.]

[Footnote 389: _Bulletin_, Dec., 1903, p. 377; Jan., 1904, pp. 3 ff.; March, 1904, pp. 76 f.; and others.]

[Footnote 390: See the list of the large subscribers in _ibid._, July, 1904, p. 224.]

[Footnote 391: The names of those present, 355 in all, are given in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVIII, 62 ff. See also _Bulletin_, June, 1904, p. 185.]

[Footnote 392: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Dec. 15, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 179 ff., No. 209. In October a conference had been held in Paris with Jonnart, governor-general of Algeria; Gen. Lyauty, commander of the French troops at Ain-Sefra in Southern Oran; and Saint-René Taillandier, on the Moroccan question (Monson to Lansdowne, Oct. 7, 1904, _B.D._, III, 54 f., No. 63.)]

[Footnote 393: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 199, 210-12, 215, 218-20, 222-24; _B.D._, III, 55, No. 64; _Bulletin_, Sept. and Oct., 1904, pp. 279, 320.]

[Footnote 394: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 12, 1904, _ibid._, 179, No. 208; Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques, 1904_, pp. 78 ff.]

[Footnote 395: The words are Delcassé’s (Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Dec. 20, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 186, No. 213.)]

[Footnote 396: The term is used to designate the Moroccan court and government.]

[Footnote 397: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 19 and 24, 1904, _L.j., 1901-5_, 185 f., No. 212; 186 f., No. 214.]

[Footnote 398: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Dec. 30, 1904, Jan. 2, 1905, _ibid._, 188 ff., No. 216 f.]