Chapter XVI: The Preliminaries to the Conference of Algeciras (2)

In the first place, since the Ambassador had spoken to me a good deal of progress has been made. Our military and naval authorities had been in communication with the French, and I assumed that all preparations were ready, so that, if a crisis arose, no time would have been lost for want of a formal engagement.

In the second place, a week or more before Monsieur Cambon had spoken to me, I had taken an opportunity of expressing to Count Metternich my personal opinion, which I understood Lord Lansdowne had also expressed to him as a personal opinion, that, in the event of an attack upon France by Germany arising out of our Moroccan Agreement, public feeling in England would be so strong that no British Government could remain neutral. I urged upon Monsieur Cambon that this, which I had reason to know had been correctly reported at Berlin, had produced there the moral effect which Monsieur Cambon had urged upon me as being one of the great securities of peace and the main reason for a formal engagement between England and France with regard to armed co-operation.

In the third place, I pointed out to Monsieur Cambon that at present French policy in Morocco, within the four corners of the Declaration exchanged between us, was absolutely free, that we did not question it, that we suggested no concessions and no alterations in it, that we left France a free hand and gave unreservedly our diplomatic support on which she could count; but that, should our promise extend beyond diplomatic support, and should we take an engagement which might involve us in a war, I was sure my colleagues would say that we must from that time be consulted with regard to French policy in Morocco, and, if need be, be free to press upon the French Government concessions or alterations of their policy which might seem to us desirable to avoid a war.

I asked Monsieur Cambon to weigh these considerations in his mind, and to consider whether the present situation as regards ourselves and France was not so satisfactory that it was unnecessary to alter it by a formal declaration as he desired.

M. Cambon replied that a war might break out over some Moroccan incident so quickly that if it were necessary for the British government “to consult, and to wait for manifestations of English public opinion, it might be too late to be of use.” He repeated his request for some form of verbal assurance. Sir Edward Grey pointed out the difficulties of giving this assurance—that it would be a “solemn undertaking,” that it would have to be put in writing and submitted to the cabinet and also to Parliament. He said that it would constitute the transformation of the entente into a defensive alliance, that it could not be given unconditionally, and that the conditions “would be difficult to describe.” He again asked M. Cambon “whether the force of circumstances bringing England and France together was not stronger than any assurance in words which could be given at this moment.” He added that German pressure “might eventually transform the ‘Entente’ into a defensive alliance,” yet at the time he did not think that the change was needed. When M. Cambon emphasized the fact that Sir Edward Grey had expressed his personal opinion that in case of a German attack upon France, no British government could remain neutral, the latter replied that he had said this first to Count Metternich and not to him,

because, supposing it appeared that I had overestimated the strength of feeling of my countrymen, there could be no disappointment in Germany; but I could not express so decidedly my personal opinion to France, because a personal opinion was not a thing upon which, in so serious a matter, a policy could be founded. In speaking to him, therefore, I must keep well within the mark. Much depended as to the manner in which the war broke out between Germany and France.

Sir Edward Grey believed that the British people would be unwilling to fight in order to put France into possession of Morocco. But if “it appeared that the war was forced upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French ‘Entente,’ public opinion would undoubtedly be very strong on the side of France.” He said, however, that British sentiment was much averse to war, and that it was not certain whether this aversion would be overcome by the desire to aid France. While he was ready to reopen the conversation at any time in the future, he did not think that the situation justified such a radical change at that time.[1068] M. Cambon appeared to be satisfied with that answer.[1069]

Thus, Sir Edward Grey laid down the policy which he followed until the outbreak of the World War. He was open and frank with both France and Germany. To the German government he emphasized the probability of British intervention in favor of France in case of war. To the French government he gave the promise of full diplomatic support; while permitting preparations for any emergency, he refused to give to the French assurance of active aid in case of war or even to speak as firmly on that score as he did to the German government. Instead of binding Great Britain and France in an alliance—an act which would have forced him to keep a hand on France’s policy toward Morocco and Germany—Sir Edward Grey kept British hands free. In giving France sufficient assurance to maintain Anglo-French intimacy and co-operation, he depended upon the uncertainty of British support in a crisis to hold France back. He relied upon the same uncertainty—this time, however, that Great Britain might enter a Franco-German conflict—to restrain Germany. By this apparently simple but really intricate policy he sought to satisfy the needs of British foreign relations.

[Footnote 959: Memo. by Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 14 f., No. 6900.]

[Footnote 960: Rouvier was apparently led astray by William II’s instructions to the Prince of Monaco in October to tell Rouvier that “he would lay no hindrances whatever in the way of the French policy” (Radolin to F. O., Oct. 18, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 596 f. and note, No. 6836). Rouvier sounded the German embassy first through a third person and then unofficially through M. Louis of the foreign office.]

[Footnote 961: Memo. by Mühlberg, Nov. 30, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 20 ff., No. 6906.]

[Footnote 962: On this episode see _ibid._, Nos. 6901, 6903 ff. The editors of _G.P._ assure us that there is no indication in the documents that Rouvier followed up the subject (_ibid._, p. 23). Joseph Caillaux states that Rouvier was back of the overture made through Vaffier- Pollet. He also asserts that in Nov., 1905, Rouvier offered the port of Mogador and its hinterland to Germany, but that the latter refused (_Agadir, ma politique extérieure_ [Paris, 1919], p. 25). There is no reference to this proposal in _G.P._ Caillaux is probably referring to the offer made through Eckardstein in May, 1905.]

[Footnote 963: Bülow, _Reden_, II, 250 ff., 272 ff.; see also Hammann, _Bilder_, pp. 43 f. At the opening of the Reichstag on Nov. 28 the Emperor declared that Germany stood with all Powers in “correct relations” and with the most of them in “good and friendly relations” (Schulthess _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 132 f.).]

[Footnote 964: Report from the Belgian Minister at Berlin, Dec. 2 and 11, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 92 ff.]

[Footnote 965: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre), pp. 4034 ff. Rouvier received a vote of confidence of 501 to 51 (_ibid._, p. 4050).]

[Footnote 966: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XX, 662 ff.]

[Footnote 967: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 693, No. 6887; Flotow to Bülow, Nov. 23, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 15 ff., No. 6901; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 52, No. 6924.]

[Footnote 968: So Ojeda, Spanish undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, declared to Cartwright on Jan. 22, 1906 (Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252). There is no indication in _G.P._ that those terms were known.]

[Footnote 969: Memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 25, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 28 f., No. 6914. It contained the conclusions of a conference by Bülow with Richthofen, Mühlberg, and Klehmet.]

[Footnote 970: On Jan. 8 the government published a _Weissbuch_ on Morocco of thirty-nine pages substantiating the German accusations against the French policy. According to Bülow it was intended to supplement the French _Livre jaune_ (_G.P._, XXI, 24 n.). Its appearance made a painful impression in France. Rouvier found it “scarcely courteous” and hardly indicative of the conciliatory spirit which Germany professed to have (report from Paris, Jan. 11, 1906, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 99 f.). It was well received by the German press (Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 10, 1906, _B.D._, III, 215 f., No. 235.).]

[Footnote 971: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 3, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 38 ff., No. 6922 and Anlage.]

[Footnote 972: Metternich was very pessimistic about the outcome. See Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 672 ff., No. 6881; Bülow to Metternich, Nov. 6, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 673, No. 6364.]

[Footnote 973: Tattenbach to Bülow, Nov. 4, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 12, No. 6898.]

[Footnote 974: Bülow to Sternburg, Oct. 29, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 641 f., No. 6341 and note; Sternburg to F. O., Nov. 3, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 9 f., No. 6896; Bülow to Sternburg, Nov. 7, 1905, _ibid._, 11 f., No. 6897; memo. by Mühlberg, Dec. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 23 f., No. 6909; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, pp. 398 f., 499. Mr. Choate, ambassador in London, had been selected as American delegate in August (_Roosevelt-Lodge Correspondence_, II, 172 ff.); but the final choice rested on Mr. White, ambassador at Rome.]

[Footnote 975: Bülow to Wedel, Dec. 22, 1905, _G.P._, XXI, 27 n.; cf. Steed, _Through Thirty Years_, I, 234.]

[Footnote 976: According to a minute by the Emperor William to a dispatch from Stumm on Feb. 20, 1906 (the only reference to this incident which _G.P._ contains), during the visit of the King of Spain to Germany in the previous November the Emperor had “proposed to the Spanish King to renew the agreement with his father and a convention regarding the common action of our armies! Whereupon the King said that he knew nothing of that matter, but would look into it upon his return.” Nothing came of the matter. See _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024. See also Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160, No. 197; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 26 and 27, 1905, _ibid._, 165, No. 205; 167, No. 208.]

[Footnote 977: Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 14, 1906, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No. 192.]

[Footnote 978: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 54, No. 6925.]

[Footnote 979: So expressed by San Giuliano, Italian foreign minister. (Monts to Bülow, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 34 ff., No. 6921).]

[Footnote 980: Bülow to Monts, Jan. 5, 1906, _ibid._, 53 f., No. 6925; Monts to Bülow, Jan 6, 1906, _ibid._, 56 ff., No. 6928.]

[Footnote 981: Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 8, 1906, _ibid._, 59, No. 6929.]

[Footnote 982: Bülow to Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 30 f., No. 6916; memo. by Radolin, Dec. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 31, No. 6917; memo. by Bülow, Dec. 30, 1905, _ibid._, 32, No. 6918.]

[Footnote 983: Flotow to F. O., Dec. 20, 1905; _ibid._, 25 f., No. 6911; Radolin to F. O., Jan. 8 and 10, 1906, _ibid._, 60 f., No. 6931; 64 f., No. 6934; Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 697 f., 6888; Radowitz to Bülow, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, XXI, 32 f., No. 6919 f.; Bülow also remained willing to negotiate directly with the French government over the Moroccan affair (Bülow to Radolin, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 67, No. 6936).]

[Footnote 984: Report from Berlin, Dec. 24, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 97 f.; report from Berlin, Dec. 31, 1905, _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 14; Metternich to Bülow, Nov. 2, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 672 ff., No. 6881; 685 ff., No. 6886; Bülow, II, 434; Schulthess, _1905_, p. 154. The Emperor refused twice to help before Bülow won him over. See Bülow to William II, Dec. 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 679 ff., No. 6882, and the Emperor’s minutes.]

[Footnote 985: So D. M. Wallace, special representative of the _London Times_ at the conference, asserted to Radowitz (Radowitz to F. O., Jan. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 95 n.).]

[Footnote 986: Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 524 ff.; Edward VII to William II, Jan. 23, Feb. 5, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 108 f., No. 6961; 111 f., No. 6963; William II to Edward VII, Feb. 1, 1906, _ibid._, 110 f., No. 6962.]

[Footnote 987: “If England restricts herself to the diplomatic support of the French claims, peace and the permanent open door are assured. But as soon as France has reason to count on the armed help of England for the conquest of Morocco and for any results therefrom, then both peace and the open door will be endangered” (Bülow to Radowitz, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, 94, No. 6950). A similar thought was expressed by Bülow to Lascelles, Jan. 24, to Sir Edgar Speyer, London banker and friend of Grey’s, on Jan. 18, by Metternich to Grey, Dec. 20, Jan. 23, and was given out to the press. See _ibid._, 96 ff., Nos. 6953 f.; 106 ff., No. 6960; 103 ff., No. 6959; _ibid._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.]

[Footnote 988: For Bülow’s reasoning see his dispatch to Moltke, Jan. 24, 1906, _ibid._, XXI, 77 ff., No. 6943.]

[Footnote 989: A report of a partial French mobilization on the eastern frontier did alarm Bülow, but it was immediately proved to be untrue (_ibid._, 71 ff., Nos. 6937 ff.).]

[Footnote 990: The German government had announced a new navy bill, which would have been proposed anyway, and was only hastened because the visit of the British fleet to the Baltic and the revelations in _Le Matin_ insured it a favorable reception by the German public. Aside from that Germany took special pains to avoid leaving the impression that she was preparing for a conflict. Moltke, at his own suggestion, postponed his visit to Vienna to announce himself as the new chief of staff until after the conference closed so as to avoid suspicion. See Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 79 and note, No. 6944. See also Philip Fürst zu Eulenburg-Hertefeld, _Aus 50 Jahren. Erinnerungen, Tagebücher, und Briefe_ (ed. Johannes Haller; Berlin, 1923), p. 311. Moltke, however, did not expect the French to recede, writing to Bülow on January 23 as follows: “In my opinion the French now consider further concession on the Moroccan question as incompatible with the honor of their land, after they have already receded once and have let Delcassé fall.

“They fear therefore that as a result of their firm stand the conference may not only end without result but may also lead to war. They themselves wish no war and do not think of attacking. But they wish to be armed against an attack from Germany” (_G.P._, XXI, 75, No. 6942).]

[Footnote 991: William II to Bülow, Dec. 29, 1906, _ibid._, XX, 690 ff., No. 6887. The account of the Emperor’s conversation with Laguiche was published in _Le Temps_ on Dec. 28. Richthofen spoke to a similar effect to the Belgian minister (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 14).]

[Footnote 992: Radolin to Bülow, Jan. 8, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 60 f., No. 6931; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 4, 1906, _ibid._, 51 f., No. 6924; _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 95 f., 99; Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés._, pp. 92 ff. See also Bompard’s analysis of the German policy toward France (Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, II, 58 f.).]

[Footnote 993: According to Moltke, France was making military and financial preparations for defensive purposes. “The fortifications on the eastern frontier are being strengthened and put in a more defensive condition. Their provisions in munitions and food are being replenished. The forces of the frontier defence troops are apparently being brought approximately to the legal number for peace time by the addition of troops from the interior. Moreover, reserves are here and there being called up to undergo their legal drilling.

“The training of the troops on the frontier is being furthered in every way. Numerous trial mobilizations by the various garrisons and drilling of the border troops by day and night are occurring.

“But all these preparations are not to be regarded as preparations for an intended mobilization but only as precautionary measures, which are easily explained” (Moltke to Bülow, Jan. 23, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 75, No. 6942).

According to the Belgian Minister at Paris, Jan. 16, 1906, the sum of 270,000,000 francs was being devoted to the defenses (_Zur europ. Politik_, II, 103).]

[Footnote 994: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 498; _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 99 f.]

[Footnote 995: The Russian delegate, Count Cassini, declared that in forty years he had never received such positive instructions (Tardieu, p. 88; Witte, _Memoirs_, p. 298; Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 204, No. 223). Rouvier repeated the refusal of that loan just before the conference (Witte, pp. 295 ff., 429 f.; Nicholas II to William II, Jan. 21, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 125 f., and note). Concerning that loan Sir Edward Grey wrote to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, as follows: “. . . . Russia has demanded a loan on improper terms as the price of her support [at the conference]” (_B.D._, III, 178, No. 216).]

[Footnote 996: Meyer to Root, Jan. 9, 1906, Dennis, p. 498. Witte apparently offered to obtain this promise in return for an immediate French loan, but the Czar refused to give it—at least, that was Spring Rice’s inference (Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 57 f.).]

[Footnote 997: Dennis, pp. 498 f.; Durand to Grey, Jan. 11, 1905, _B.D._, III, 217, No. 236.]

[Footnote 998: Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905; _B.D._, III, 165, No. 204.]

[Footnote 999: See Rouvier’s assertion to Hardinge on Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 227 and inclosure, No. 245.]

[Footnote 1000: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 193 ff.; Grey, _Twenty-five Years_, I, 60 ff., Richard Burdon Haldane, _An Autobiography_ (London, 1929), pp. 157 ff., 168 ff.]

[Footnote 1001: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 178, No. 216.]

[Footnote 1002: Cf. Spender, _The Public Life_ (1925), I, 112 ff.; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 215 f.; cf. Hermann Lutz, _Lord Grey und der Weltkrieg_ (Berlin, 1927).]

[Footnote 1003: Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 218, No. 204; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.]

[Footnote 1004: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _B.D._, IV, 219 f., No. 205; 221, No. 207; and Gwynn, II, 54 f., 57; Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 3 and 16, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 22, 26.]

[Footnote 1005: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, Gwynn, II, 55 f.]

[Footnote 1006: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _B.D._, IV, 222 ff., No. 208; Grey to Spring Rice, Dec. 22, 1905, Gwynn, II, 53 f.]

[Footnote 1007: See Lansdowne to Hardinge, Oct. 20, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 213 f., No. 200; Hardinge to Grey, Jan. 6, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 622 f.]

[Footnote 1008: _Ibid._, chap. xxvii, Part III. Nicolson suspected that Russia acted so loyally because she had no money with which to make the loan (Nicolson to Grey, Sept. 12, 1906, _ibid._, 242, No. 228).]

[Footnote 1009: Grey to Spring Rice, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 323, No. 304.]

[Footnote 1010: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _ibid._, 220, No. 205.]

[Footnote 1011: Spring Rice to Grey, Jan. 26, 1906, _ibid._, 223, No. 208; Lee, II, 564; Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61 f.]

[Footnote 1012: Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 215.]

[Footnote 1013: Grey, I, 100 f.]

[Footnote 1014: Cf. memo. by Crowe, Jan. 1, 1907, _B.D._, III, 397 ff.; memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, pp. 420 ff.; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 215.]

[Footnote 1015: Grey, I, 100 f.]

[Footnote 1016: _B.D._, III, 162, No. 200.]

[Footnote 1017: Lucien Wolf, _Life of the First Marquess of Ripon_ (London, 1921), II, 292 f.; see also Spring Rice to Mallet, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 61.]

[Footnote 1018: Metternich gives the date of the conversation as Dec. 18. See Grey to Whitehead, Dec. 20, 1905, _B.D._, III, 160 f., No. 198; Metternich to Bülow, Dec. 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 685 ff., No. 6886.]

[Footnote 1019: On this conversation between Grey and Metternich see the following: Grey to Lascelles Jan. 9, 1906, Grey to Campbell-Bannerman, Jan. 9, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 80 ff., 114, and in _B.D._, III, 209 ff., No. 229; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 3 and 4, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 45 ff., Nos. 6923 f. Grey repeated his statement to Metternich on Jan. 10, 1906. See Metternich to F. O., Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 64, No. 6933. See also Bülow to Sternburg, Jan. 24, 1906, quoting a dispatch from Metternich, _ibid._, 103 ff., No. 6959. However, Van Grooten, secretary of the Belgian ministry in London, reported to his government on Jan. 14 as follows: “Of late the Minister of Foreign Affairs has repeated at various occasions to the different Ambassadors accredited in London that Great Britain has engaged herself towards France in the Moroccan question and that she will meet her obligations fully even in case of a Franco-German war and at all costs. The press and public opinion give proof of the same sentiments” (_Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, p. 19). The report is exaggerated, but it is significant that it was current.]

[Footnote 1020: Lascelles to Grey, Jan. 3, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206 ff., Nos. 225 f.; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163, No. 203.]

[Footnote 1021: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257 f.]

[Footnote 1022: Acton to Grey, Dec. 31, 1905, _B.D._, III, 167 f., No. 209.]

[Footnote 1023: Rouvier denied that he had done so. Notes by Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 and inclosure, No. 245 (see above).]

[Footnote 1024: On this episode see Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 3, R. Jan. 6, 1905, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15; dated Jan. 12, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 207 f., No. 226; 217 ff., Nos. 237 f.; 222 f., Nos. 240 f.; Grey to Lascelles, Jan. 9 and 15, 1906, _ibid._, 211 f., No. 230; 225, No. 243; Bertie to Grey, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 224, No. 242; memo. by Holstein, Jan. 18, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 96 f., No. 6953.]

[Footnote 1025: Bertie to Grey, D. Dec. 22, R. Dec. 27, 1905, _B.D._, III, 163 ff., No. 204; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 162, No. 200. “Nous serons biens sûrement avec vous,” Grey stated to Cambon (Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197).]

[Footnote 1026: Tardieu, pp. 81 f.]

[Footnote 1027: Nicolson thought that he would have been “an admirable selection.” King Edward’s comment to the report of Germany’s veto was, “a case of bullying as usual!” See Nicolson to Grey, D. Dec. 14, R. Dec. 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 150 f., No. 192.]

[Footnote 1028: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 178, No. 216.]

[Footnote 1029: Minutes to dispatch from Nicolson to Grey, D. Jan. 5, R. Jan. 13, 1906, _ibid._, 209, No. 227.]

[Footnote 1030: Grey stated to the Spanish Ambassador, Jan. 3, 1906, as follows: “All the four Powers most directly interested in the Mediterranean had made arrangements with each other which were satisfactory to themselves and it was most undesirable that they should allow these arrangements to be disturbed” (Grey to Nicolson, Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 215, No. 234). On this Spanish affair see also Grey to Bertie, Dec. 20, 1905, _ibid._, 160, No. 197; Grey to Nicolson, Dec. 14, 20, 21, 1905, _ibid._, 151, No. 193; 161 f., Nos. 199 ff.; Nicolson to Grey, Dec. 22, 25, 27, 1905, Jan. 5 and 9, 1906, _ibid._, 163, No. 202; 165, No. 205; 167, No. 208; 208 f., No. 227; 212, No. 231; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _ibid._, 163 ff., No. 204.]

[Footnote 1031: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 225, No. 244; Grey to Egerton, Dec. 27, 1905, _ibid._, 166, No. 206; Egerton to Grey, Dec. 27, 1905, Jan. 9, 1906, _ibid._, 166 f., No. 207; 212 f., No. 232.]

[Footnote 1032: Gorst to Bertie, Dec. 13, 1905, _ibid._, 149 f. and inclosure, No. 191; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 158 f., No. 195.]

[Footnote 1033: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226, No. 244 and inclosure; Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, 228 f., No. 247.]

[Footnote 1034: Lascelles to Grey, D. Jan. 11, R. Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 217 ff., No. 237.]

[Footnote 1035: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 205 f., No. 224; Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, _ibid._, 213 ff., No. 233. See also Bompard’s conversation with Spring Rice as reported by the latter to Grey, Jan. 16, 1906, Gwynn, II, 59 f.]

[Footnote 1036: Rouvier to Révoil, Jan. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 220 ff., No. 239; Tardieu, pp. 101 ff., 244; Bertie to Grey, Dec. 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 164, No. 204. In talking to Sir Charles Hardinge on Jan. 15 Rouvier added a third alternative—“a mandate to France, Spain and a third Power to study and elaborate a scheme for submission to the Powers” (notes by Hardinge, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 226 f., No. 245 and inclosure).]

[Footnote 1037: Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 23, 1906, _ibid._, 233 f., No. 253.]

[Footnote 1038: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906; _ibid._, 172, No. 211.]

[Footnote 1039: This display of doubt about Great Britain’s loyalty was one of France’s best means of gaining that Power’s support. See Bompard’s assertions as reported by Spring Rice to Knollys, Jan. 31, 1906, Gwynn, II, 62; also see below.]

[Footnote 1040: The story is given in Lieutenant-Colonel Charles à Court Repington, _The First World War, 1914-1918: Personal Experiences_ (London, 1920), I, 2 ff.]

[Footnote 1041: Général Huguet, _L’intervention militaire britannique en 1914_ (Paris, 1928), p. 15.]

[Footnote 1042: Nicolson to Grey, Jan. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 206, No. 224.]

[Footnote 1043: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff.; Grey, I, 70 f.; _B.D._, III, 170 f., No. 210_a_.]

[Footnote 1044: This document is sufficient proof against the accusation of the editors of _G.P._ that Grey went further in his assertions to the French Ambassador in his first conversation with the latter, and that afterward, apparently restrained by the more pacific Premier, he qualified his position in the interview of Jan. 31. It is apparent that Grey’s statements of Jan. 10 and 31 do not differ in kind or degree, except that in the latter the Foreign Secretary expanded the conditions which he had already formulated in the earlier interview (see _G.P._, XXI, 48 f. note; see also below).]

[Footnote 1045: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 10, 1906, quoted in Grey, I, 70 ff., in Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 249 ff., and in _B.D._, III, 170 f., No. 210. Cambon’s account to Rouvier of the conversation is given in _ibid._, 173 f., No. 212. Sanderson was present at that interview.]

[Footnote 1046: Grey, I, 72, 114; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 251 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.]

[Footnote 1047: Grierson to Sanderson, Jan. 11, 1906, _B.D._, III, 172, No. 211.]

[Footnote 1048: Grey, I, 72 f.]

[Footnote 1049: “C-B was a fine old Tory in Army matter” (Repington, I, 13). On this affair see Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253, 256 f.; Repington, I, 12 f.; Viscount Haldane, _Before the War_ (London, 1920), p. 184; Grey, I, 70 ff., 83; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, pp. 189 f.]

[Footnote 1050: Grey, I, 70 ff.]

[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, pp. 73 f.; Repington, I, 13; _B.D._, III, 169, editor’s note, 438 ff. In 1911 Grey wrote to Asquith that he never knew anything more of the course of those conversations (Grey, I, 92).]

[Footnote 1052: Sydenham, _My Working Life_, pp. 186 f., 190; Haldane, _Before the War_, p. 45; Repington, I, 3. The British based their belief on the German construction of obviously unnecessary railroads to the Belgian frontier (_Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_ [1915], pp. 365 f.).]

[Footnote 1053: Sanderson to Grierson, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 176 f., No. 214; Grierson to Barnardiston, Jan. 16, 1906, _ibid._, 179, No. 217_b_.]

[Footnote 1054: In a dispatch to Grierson on Jan. 19 Barnardiston wrote that he had told Ducarne at their first meeting that Sir C. Phipps, the British minister in Brussels, had already mentioned the matter to the Belgian Foreign Minister (_ibid._, III, 188). In some notes by Barnardiston deposited in the war office, he stated that Phipps would speak to the Belgian Foreign Minister. The Belgian government asserts that there is no record of such a communication; rather, that the Foreign Minister learned of the military conversations from the Belgian Minister of War. There is no report of any conversation on this subject between Phipps and the Belgian Minister in the papers in the British foreign office, nor is there any record of instructions on it being sent to Phipps. On March 17 Barnardiston wrote to Grierson that both the Belgian Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs knew of the conversation (editor’s note, _ibid._, p. 203; _Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, p. 355; Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 f.). There is no doubt but that the conversations were approved by both foreign ministers.]

[Footnote 1055: Barnardiston to Grierson, Jan. 19, 1906, _B.D._, III, 187 f.]

[Footnote 1056: Barnardiston to Phipps, Jan. 17, 1906, _ibid._, pp. 179 f.]

[Footnote 1057: On these negotiations see the correspondence between Grierson and Barnardiston in _ibid._, pp. 187 ff.; _Collected Diplomatic Documents Relating to the Outbreak of the European War_, pp. 350 ff.; Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 201 ff.]

[Footnote 1058: Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 193; Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191.]

[Footnote 1059: _B.D._, III, 203.]

[Footnote 1060: Haldane, _Before the War_, pp. 45 f.]

[Footnote 1061: Statement written by Lord Sydenham, July 19, 1927, _B.D._, III, 185, No. 221_a_; memo. by Brigadier General Nicholson, Nov. 6, 1911, _ibid._, pp. 186 f.; Admiral Ottley to First Sea Lord, Jan. 13, 1906, _ibid._, p. 186; Sydenham, p. 186.]

[Footnote 1062: Memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906; _B.D._, III, 193, No. 220_a_.]

[Footnote 1063: Haldane, _Before the War_, chap. iv.]

[Footnote 1064: Grey informed Cambon of the approval of the naval and military conversations on Jan. 15, but postponed answering the larger question (Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _B.D._, III, 177, No. 215; 225, No. 244.)]

[Footnote 1065: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253, 256 ff.; Grey, I, 84. Grey’s omission to consult the entire cabinet has been severely criticized. He has admitted in his memoirs that he did wrong. See especially Haldane, _An Autobiography_, p. 191; Earl Loreburn, _How the War Came_ (London, 1919), pp. 80 f.; cf. Spender, _Life, Journalism and Politics_, I, 193.]

[Footnote 1066: Bertie to Grey, D. Jan. 13, R. Jan. 18, 1906, _B.D._, III, 174 ff., No. 213.]

[Footnote 1067: Grey to Bertie, Jan. 15, 1906, _ibid._, 177 f., No. 216; Grey, I, 75.]

[Footnote 1068: Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 253 ff.; Grey, II, 76 ff.; _B.D._, III, 180 ff., No. 219. Cambon and Grey exchanged memoranda of that conversation. According to Mr. Eyre Crowe, senior clerk in the British foreign office, Cambon’s account differed from Grey’s on the following points: “(A) The French note alludes to the intention of the British Admiralty in case of a conflict with Germany, to bar the Channel against the German squadrons. This passage does not occur in Sir E. Grey’s draft. . . . . (B) The French note contains no allusion to the argument given in the following passage of Sir E. Grey’s draft: ‘I did not think people in England would be prepared to fight in order to put France in possession of Morocco. They would say that France should wait for opportunities and be content to take time, and that it was unreasonable to hurry matters to the point of war’” (Crowe’s minute to the memo. by Cambon, Jan. 31, 1906, _ibid._, 183 f., No. 220_a_). On Feb. 1 Sanderson talked over the two drafts with Cambon, who made some changes in his. Sanderson again emphasized the reasons why the British government could not give the desired assurance, speaking in part as follows: “I told him [Cambon] that I thought that if the Cabinet were to give a pledge which would morally bind the country to go to war in certain circumstances, and were not to mention this pledge to Parliament, and if at the expiration of some months the country suddenly found itself pledged to war in consequence of this assurance, the case would be one which would justify impeachment, and which might even result in that course unless at the time the feeling of the country were very strongly in favour of the course to which the Government was pledged” (memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, _ibid._, 184 f., No. 220_b_).]

[Footnote 1069: So thought Sanderson, and Grey’s secretary (Grey, I, 85; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 257; memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 2, 1906, _B.D._, III, 185, No. 220_b_). Grey was absent from the foreign office for some time owing to the sudden death of his wife, Feb. 1.]