Chapter XII: The Moroccan Crisis From the Visit to Tangier to the Fall of Delcassé (1)

I

The visit to Tangier, because of its very unexpectedness, did not at first alarm the French, who refused to credit the German Emperor with hostile intentions.[597] Better-informed personages in Paris, however, interpreted the event more accurately. They were asking seriously whether war would ensue and were declaring that “no such critical moment has occurred since the Schnäbele affair.” The Austrian Ambassador was reminded by the Franco-German press war of the days immediately preceding the conflict of 1870.[598]

The French government had been warned by both German and British representatives of Germany’s interest in Morocco. As early as November, 1904, Herr von Kühlmann had declared to the French chargé d’affaires at Tangier that Germany had expected France to acquaint her with the new situation in Morocco created by the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish accords, but that she had since realized that she was being “systematically excluded.” “The Imperial Government is ignorant of all the accords made over Morocco and does not consider itself bound in any way on that question,” he said. The French chargé d’affaires had not regarded these remarks as sufficiently significant to report until the following February. Upon direct inquiry in Berlin the French government had had them corroborated by the German foreign office.[599] On February 12, 1905, Sir Arthur Nicolson, British ambassador at Madrid, had remarked to his French colleague that “the attitude assumed by the German Government in response to the petition of their subjects in Morocco was an invitation to the French Government to initiate some discussion with a view to obtain their concurrence with the provisions of the Convention.”[600] M. Delcassé had not heeded this advice. By March 22 he had become uneasy over the German policy, about which he was so uncertain.[601] He was determined, however, to maintain intact France’s accords with the other Powers and her position in Morocco.[602] Ascertaining on the eve of the voyage to Tangier that Great Britain, Spain, and Italy would hold loyally to their agreements,[603] he declared in the Senate on March 31, the same day on which William II spoke at Tangier, that

nothing in our Moroccan policy, nothing in our execution of the accords of April 8 and October 3, 1904, can explain the movements of the German press. . . . . You may legitimately hope that in the western basin of the Mediterranean . . . . France will succeed, without ignoring any right, without injuring any interest, in assuring her future.[604]

The semiofficial French press threatened the formation of a new Dual Alliance between France and Great Britain supported by Italy and Spain in case Germany attempted to gain any special advantages in Morocco.[605] At the same time, M. Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier, who since March 24 had been making substantial progress in the negotiations with the Sultan,[606] to warn that monarch against following the proposal of the German press for an international conference over the Moroccan question.[607] He also informed the Italian government, April 12, that France could not entertain such a proposal.[608]

The Emperor’s move nevertheless forced M. Delcassé to open negotiations with Germany for an understanding regarding Morocco. From March 28 he endeavored indirectly to approach the German government.[609] On April 7 a threatened interpellation in the Chamber forced him to state publicly that France was “ready to dissipate any misunderstanding which . . . . may still exist.”[610] Under pressure from the French cabinet[611] as well as from public opinion M. Delcassé, while dining at the German embassy on April 13, repeated that statement directly to Prince Radolin. He denied that M. Saint-René Taillandier had ever claimed before the Sultan to have a mandate of Europe. He excused his failure to transmit the Anglo-French agreement to the German government; and, while admitting that the conversation of March 23, 1904, had been unofficial, he declared that his intention had been to show special favor to Germany by communicating the contents of the accord to her beforehand. He had also believed, he said, that freedom of commerce for all nations had been completely safeguarded in that agreement and in the one with Spain.[612] Immediately thereafter the French government informally asked the British government to “help to convince the Emperor that German interests were in no way threatened” in Morocco.[613]

To carry out his policy, M. Delcassé needed the loyal support of all France. That he did not have. Political jealousy because of his long tenure in office, dislike of his secretiveness, enmity between him and M. Rouvier (the premier), hostility because of his defending the Russian government in the massacre of January 22, 1905[614]—all these forces of opposition were now strengthened by the fact that the Foreign Minister had blundered and that, aroused by the fear of complications, France sought a victim whose sacrifice might dispel the danger. Quickly deserting M. Delcassé, the nation pressed him on too rapidly to take the initiative with Germany. As time passed with nothing settled, nothing known, the French grew more and more alarmed, until on April 19 the Chamber denounced the Foreign Minister for having neglected to consult Germany, and demanded information. M. Deschanel declared that the Foreign Minister should have heeded Germany’s well-known imperialistic ambitions by negotiating with that Power about Morocco. “There are not lacking in England people who desire to utilize the French power against Germany,” he said. “And there are not lacking in Germany people who will try to utilize the French power against England. We should not offer ourselves to that play.” M. Tournade accused M. Delcassé of having hoped that if he “juggled the question with Germany” and confronted her with a _fait accompli_, she would venture no opposition. M. de Pressensé, charging him with deliberately having avoided an official notification to Germany of the Moroccan accords, asserted: “You have not followed an exact conception of the interests of France. Your policy is unworthy of a great country.” M. Delafosse, sensing the reason for the German action in the Anglo-French entente rather than in Morocco, expressed the general demand that “it is necessary to ask Germany what she wishes of us.” No one, however, believed that Germany would question France’s special position in Morocco.

Although not a voice was raised in his behalf, M. Delcassé refused to impart any new intelligence in answer to these accusations and demands. If M. Rouvier had not come to his rescue, he would have been repudiated by all parties. In defending the Foreign Minister M. Rouvier declared that not France but Germany had altered her Moroccan policy since the previous year, attributing this change to the defeat of France’s ally.[615] The initiative toward conversations with Germany, he said, had already been made. “We have closed our ear to no proposal,” he avowed; “anything which is in harmony with the formula . . . .: to safeguard the honor of our country and to maintain peace, . . . . we are ready to consider.” He made the retention of M. Delcassé a cabinet question, but he assured the Chamber that in the future he would supervise the foreign policy.[616]

Upon receiving this check, M. Delcassé would have resigned had it not been for the appeals of President Loubet and of MM. Paul Cambon and Barrère, both of whom were in Paris at the time.[617] His policy of treating with Germany on an equal footing was checkmated. French public opinion had forced an almost complete surrender in the face of the German menace. It remained to be seen how far M. Rouvier could yield before French desire for peace would conflict with French national honor.

II

The Emperor’s injudicious assertions at Tangier compelled the German foreign office to take some positive action in Morocco instead of leaving the initiative to the Sultan. Herr von Holstein contended that “a retreat would stand on the same level with Olmütz and cause Fashoda to be forgotten.”[618] By April 2 the Chancellor decided upon the following policy:[619] first, to continue denying any territorial ambitions in Morocco; second, to demand economic equality for all nations, the open door “in the widest sense”; third, and this he considered Germany’s “trump card,” to advocate calling an international conference like that at Madrid in 1880 for deliberating upon the entire question of Moroccan reform.[620] Of course no separate negotiations with France would be considered.

The Chancellor and Herr von Holstein believed that the proposal for a conference would give Germany an unassailable position. Protected by the appearance of absolute legality and disinterestedness, they hoped to break the ententes and accords between France and the other Powers, especially Great Britain, or at least to show that Germany could force them to submit the results of their agreements to the consideration of a general conference.[621] They did not doubt that the proposal would be accepted and that the conference would refuse to turn Morocco over to France. For, they argued,

in case a conference meets, we are already certain of the diplomatic support of America in favor of the open door. . . . . Austria will not quarrel with us over Morocco . . . . Russia is busy with herself.[622] . . . . The English Government—between Roosevelt and those English groups which think as the _Morning Post_, _Manchester Guardian_, and Lord Rosebery[623]—will not stir. Spain is of no importance, and also has a strong party in favor of the _status quo_. We shall certainly be able to hold Italy in order, if necessary by a gentle hint that while we settle with France, Austria will perhaps settle the irredentist question. . . . . If France refuses the conference, she will put herself in the wrong toward all the signatory Powers[624] and thereby will give England, Spain, and Italy a probably welcome excuse to withdraw.[625]

Immediately after the Emperor’s speeches at Tangier, Herr von Holstein proposed advocating a conference in the semiofficial press. The Chancellor approved; but Herr Hammann, director of the press bureau in the foreign office, objected. Inasmuch as the Emperor and the Chancellor had both declared that Germany would next communicate directly with the Sultan, he argued, this abrupt change would expose German policy to the accusation of unsteadiness. He advised preparing public opinion for a conference, for, he maintained, the government had “to combat a much stronger aversion to a serious conflict with France and England over Morocco in the public than in the press.”[626] On April 7 he predicted a “press storm” if the menace of war arose.[627] So, for the time a milder note was sounded in the press. The grievances against M. Delcassé, who was made personally responsible for Germany’s action,[628] the necessity for defending the German economic interests in Morocco, and the intimacy of German-American relations were emphasized. Little by little the proposal for a conference was brought to the fore.[629]

The main basis for the optimism of the German government was its friendship with President Roosevelt. Since the early part of the year both the British and the German governments had been endeavoring to win the President’s support and to arouse his suspicions by accusing each other of aggressive intentions.[630] Needing the support of both to effect peace between Russia and Japan, Mr. Roosevelt had refused to believe the tales of either. He had diagnosed their trouble as a case of “jumpy nerves,” and had tried in February and March, 1905, to bring them together in a new triple entente.[631] The German government had responded favorably to his suggestion; but the British government, taxing the President with being hoodwinked by the Emperor, had replied that better relations with that hostile Power were scarcely possible.[632] This lack of success with Great Britain, combined with mistrust of France, caused the President to draw closer to Germany.[633]

On April 3 the German government confidently asked Mr. Roosevelt to lend “moral support” for the maintenance of the _status quo_ in Morocco and for the peaceful settlement of the Moroccan difficulty by speaking “calmly and academically,” particularly to Great Britain, for the equal treatment of all Powers in the Sherifian Empire.[634] Ten days later it asked the President to speak to Great Britain in favor of an international conference on the Moroccan question.[635] Not delaying for a definite reply or heeding the signs of the drawing together of Great Britain and France,[636] the German government, on April 9, determined to send Count Tattenbach to Fez to combat the efforts of the French mission and to win the Sultan’s approval of a conference. The Count had telegraphed that this move was essential, since the Sultan was a weakling, his advisers incompetent and venal, and since the French were otherwise likely to gain the acceptance of their plans of reform.[637]

On the same date (April 9) upon which the German government made this decision, it began to sound the other Powers concerning a conference. Austria-Hungary and Russia could be excluded from consideration although both showed disapproval of Germany’s action.[638] When the Spanish government was asked on April 12 to support the proposal for a conference, the foreign minister, M. Villa-Urrutia, replied that he could accept it only if France and Great Britain did so. He suggested that the German desires be fulfilled not by a conference but by an exchange of notes and declarations between the Powers.[639]

With Italy the German government was more brusque. While reassuring that Power that Germany had no intention of becoming a rival in the Mediterranean, Count Bülow demanded under threat of breaking the alliance that Italy support the German policy in the Moroccan affair. But on April 12 the Italian government, evading a definite position, urged a direct settlement of the Franco-German discord. Count Monts, German ambassador at Rome, reported that only in case Great Britain showed coolness toward France might Germany expect any support from her ally, who would otherwise endeavor to remain neutral.[640]

Since the German government thought that Great Britain had relinquished her Moroccan interests, it intended to ignore her and deal solely with France. On April 19 Count Metternich merely explained to Lord Lansdowne the German views in the Moroccan affair without asking for any expression of opinion. In this conversation he received the impression that the British Foreign Minister disapproved of the German action and that, against his desire, he could easily be forced to give France diplomatic support.[641]

Without waiting for either the British or the American reply, the German government, on April 18, responded to M. Delcassé’s offer “to dissipate any misunderstanding” with the suggestion that “the simplest and most natural means” of settling the question of Moroccan reform would be to bring about “an exchange of ideas between all the signatory Powers” of the Convention of Madrid.[642] At the same time, through messages to the Sultan the Chancellor sought to prevent him from making any decisions before the German mission arrived, and he pressed Count Tattenbach to hasten his departure for Fez. Count Bülow realized that if the French succeeded in gaining the Sultan’s acceptance of their program of reforms, the entire German action would be rendered absurd. In fact, until Count Tattenbach could persuade the Sultan to issue an invitation for a conference, the latter held the fate of Germany’s policy in his hands.[643]

III

The German Emperor’s visit to Tangier aroused bitter antagonism in Great Britain, where government and people believed that Germany had struck as much at Great Britain as at France in an effort to break the Entente Cordiale. Alarm over a possible German attack upon the British Isles was revived.[644] Public feeling was well expressed by King Edward who, on April 15, wrote indignantly to Lord Lansdowne:

The Tangier incident was the most mischievous and uncalled for event which the German Emperor has ever been engaged in since he came to the throne. It was also a political theatrical fiasco, and if he thinks he has done himself good in the eyes of the world he is very much mistaken. He is no more or less than a political “enfant terrible” and one can have no faith in any of his assurances. His own pleasure seems to wish to set every country by the ears.[645]

The Foreign Secretary’s criticism was also severe.

I am afraid that we can hardly regard this Tangier ebullition [he wrote, on April 9, to Sir Frank Lascelles] as an isolated incident. There can be no doubt that the Kaiser was much annoyed by the Anglo-French Agreement, and probably even more so by our refusal to vamp up some agreement of the same kind with Germany over the Egyptian question.

We shall, I have little doubt, find that the Kaiser avails himself of every opportunity to put spokes in our wheels. . . . .[646]

This staunch pro-French sentiment was not concealed. Early in April an exchange of visits by the British and French fleets was announced for the summer. King Edward had an interview with MM. Loubet and Delcassé on April 6 while passing through Paris on his way south.[647] In Berlin at the same time Sir Frank Lascelles spoke in private “very disapprovingly” of the German action, and strongly opposed the idea of a conference.[648] And British public opinion, the true guide of the foreign policy, gave entire support to France.[649] So although the British government admitted that M. Delcassé had blundered in his handling of Germany[650] and although it knew that the secret articles of the two Moroccan accords were not in keeping with the public ones, it felt obliged both by honor and by interest to help France out of her difficulty. Its official attitude was expressed by Lord Lansdowne to the Ambassador at Berlin as follows:

My impression is that the German Government have really no cause for complaint either of us or the French in regard to the Morocco part of the Agreement. We made no secret of its existence. It dealt exclusively with French and British interests in Morocco, and so far as the other Powers were concerned, it provided adequate security for their interests, and for the integrity of Morocco itself. What else does the Kaiser want?[651]

Particularly since British policy aimed at preventing Germany from obtaining ports anywhere in the colonial world[652] did the British government desire to keep that Power out of Morocco. And, while Sir Francis Bertie, British ambassador at Paris, reported the French government as “solid on Morocco,” he added the ill-omened statement of M. Delcassé, that the German government was “turning him out.”[653] Lord Lansdowne did not follow up the French suggestion of intervening in Berlin in favor of France for fear of doing more harm than good by arousing the Emperor’s resentment.[654] But he did send the British Minister at Tangier to Fez to offset the effects of the German mission.[655] And on April 22 he instructed Sir Francis Bertie as follows:

It seems not unlikely that German Government may ask for a port on the Moorish coast.

You are authorized to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should be prepared to join French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised French Government will afford us a full opportunity to conferring with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it.

German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having regard to M. Delcassé’s attitude and we desire to give him all the support we can.

On April 25 the Ambassador handed M. Delcassé the following _aide- memoire_ (dated April 24):

The British Government finds that the conduct of Germany in the Moroccan question is most unreasonable in view of M. Delcassé’s attitude, and it desires to give to His Excellency all the support in its power. It seems not improbable that the German Government may ask for a port on the Moroccan coast. In that event the British Government would be willing to join the French Government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal, and it asks M. Delcassé, in case the question is raised, to give to the British Government full opportunity to concert with the French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that demand.[656]

By inverting the order of the sentences, the Ambassador gave to Lord Lansdowne’s communication a force and a meaning which were originally lacking. He changed the emphasis from that of helping France to oppose the German acquisition of a port to that of helping her to oppose Germany in the whole Moroccan question. The one document limited the scope of the support and stressed the point of conferring beforehand as well as that of offering strong opposition. The other document began with a blanket offer of aid, and then used the present instance as one example of that offer. Moreover, the statement “to concert with the French Government upon the measures which might be taken to meet that demand” was stronger than the one used by Lord Lansdowne, “of conferring with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it.” Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-memoire_ was so colored by his own very pro- French feeling that it did not accurately reproduce his chief’s proposal.

IV

M. Delcassé was “most grateful” for this support. He denied that Germany had made any such request, although he remarked that some years ago Count Hatzfeldt had approached the British government on the subject. He promised to communicate with the latter if he heard of any German aspirations for a port and to warn the Sultan against giving any concession to Germany.[657] Thus, by virtue of the British offer, the French Foreign Minister was able to hold to his policy in spite of Germany’s refusal to consider his overture and in spite of his unpopularity with the French Parliament. On May 2, he again attempted to approach the German government, offering through M. Luzzati, Italian minister of finance, to give “any satisfaction desired by Germany in order to settle the Moroccan question in a way which would not wound French honor too deeply.”[658] At the same time he continued the French action at Fez. When on April 26 the Sultan, emboldened by the German intervention, requested an international guaranty of the proposed Franco-Moroccan agreement over military reforms, M. Delcassé immediately refused. “You may declare peremptorily to Ben Sliman,” he instructed the French Minister on May 3, “that there can no more be intermediate Powers between France and Morocco than there are intermediate countries between Morocco and Algeria.”[659]

The Foreign Minister’s policy was disapproved by the French Premier, who since April 19 had assumed general control over foreign affairs. Whereas M. Delcassé, a skilled diplomat, was secretive, pro-British, and anti- German, the inexperienced M. Rouvier, a business man who sought to employ business methods in the conduct of foreign relations, suspected Great Britain of attempting to use France as a cat’s-paw against Germany. Realizing that the British navy “did not have wheels,” M. Rouvier favored treating Great Britain and Germany alike.[660] When the German government, instead of replying to M. Delcassé’s proposal of April 13, prepared to send a mission to Fez and the German newspapers advocated an international conference on the Moroccan affair, M. Rouvier intervened personally in an effort to reach a settlement.

On April 26, while Prince Radolin’s guest at dinner, the Premier brought up the Moroccan question. Protesting that the French really preferred the Germans to the English, he intimated that he appreciated Germany’s defense of her Moroccan interests, and said: “We will do everything possible and will give every desired explanation and satisfaction.” Denying that France was seeking to change the _status quo_, he upheld her right to suppress the anarchy in Morocco along the Algerian frontier. He offered to drop the thirty-year limitation to freedom of commerce, which, he added, was in fact already invalidated by the existing treaties between Morocco and other states. At the close of the conversation he exclaimed passionately: “It is impossible, it would be criminal for two states that are intended to agree and to approach each other to become embroiled, and especially over Morocco!” The Ambassador coldly responded that a collective settlement of the question seemed to him the simplest solution.[661]

On the following day M. Rouvier proposed indirectly to Prince Radolin a settlement of the Moroccan problem by an exchange of notes between France and the other Powers. If the majority of the Powers opposed the French program of reform, it would not be carried out. M. Rouvier had no objection to Count Tattenbach’s making new commercial treaties with Morocco. But he did ask that, in case Germany were satisfied by his offer, the Emperor, on his return from the Mediterranean, should announce publicly the forthcoming settlement of the Franco-German dispute.[662]

When these offers were made, the anxiety of the German government was relieved. To be sure, on April 25, Prince Radolin heard from a “usually well-informed person just returned from England” that King Edward would, on his way home from the South, declare officially to the French government that “Great Britain was ready to support the French policy in Morocco and the execution of the Anglo-French accord with her whole power.”[663] But at the same time the German government learned definitely that the Sultan had made no final promises to the French and that he had agreed to postpone all decisions until the arrival of Count Tattenbach.[664] Equally satisfactory, the answer from Washington arrived.

As the President had been absent on a hunting trip in Colorado, he had not replied until April 20, when he had explained his policy to Mr. Taft, acting secretary of state, as follows:

I do not feel that as a Government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in Morocco. . . . .

At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany. Each nation is working itself up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure that England intends to attack him. The English Government and a large share of the English people are equally sure that Germany intends to attack England. Now, in my view this action of Germany in embroiling herself with France over Morocco is positive proof that she has not the slightest intention of attacking England. . . . . I do not wish to suggest anything whatever as to England’s attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so. . . . . If we find that it will make the English suspicious—that is, will make them think we are acting as decoy ducks for Germany—why, we shall have to drop the business. . . . . I should advise your being absolutely frank with both Speck [von Sternburg] and the British people. . . . . Remember . . . . that both parties are very suspicious. You remember the King’s message to me through Harry White and his earnest warning to me that I should remember that England was our real friend and that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the same way the Germans are always insisting that England is really on the point of entering into a general coalition which would practically be inimical to us—an act which apart from moral considerations I regard the British Government as altogether too flabby to venture upon.

In a letter to the German Ambassador on the same date, Mr. Roosevelt had reiterated that the United States had no direct interest in Morocco, had offered to serve as mediator between Germany and Great Britain and to advise the British “to arrive at an understanding over Morocco and to work in harmony” with Germany.[665]

The German Chancellor regarded this statement as “satisfactory to a high degree.”[666] On April 27 he instructed Prince Radolin to uphold the project for a collective settlement and to postpone further negotiations with the French government until Count Tattenbach could send exact information from Fez concerning the actions of the French Minister.[667] In other words, he put the French off until the Count could block their efforts in Fez and secure the Sultan’s acceptance of a conference. Otherwise, he feared, M. Delcassé might try to break the Moroccan resistance by intimating to the Sultan that his supposed friend, Germany, was now deserting him for a direct understanding with France.[668]

This hazardous policy was not approved by either Prince Radolin or Count Tattenbach. The former advised his chief to accept M. Delcassé’s offer of April 13.[669] The Count also expressed his preference for a direct agreement with France. “In my opinion,” he wrote to the Chancellor on April 29,

the condition for a separate understanding with France would first be given if the other Powers reject the idea of a conference and the Sultan also acts unreliably and declines to heed our advice and wishes,—as is to be expected. In this case we must receive Southern Morocco as our sphere of influence. . . . . We must therefore decide whether we wish . . . . to fight a long diplomatic battle of doubtful issue against France, either through supporting the Sultan with money and weapons or through relying upon the conservative, fanatically anti-French party in Morocco, or whether we wish to gain through an understanding with France a substantial pledge for a large-scale African colonial policy which aims at the acquisition of all the French African possessions.[670]

The Chancellor’s reply to Count Tattenbach contained the explanation for Germany’s proposal of a conference. He wrote:

Your last idea guided Germany’s Moroccan policy in the past and under proper circumstances can guide it again in the future if you keep the future free. For the present, the German policy must be governed by the fact that His Majesty the Emperor . . . . declared to the King of Spain that he has enough African possessions and wishes no territory in Morocco but only the maintenance of commercial freedom. This declaration naturally does not bind us forever; but in the year which has passed since those remarks, the effect of the Southwest African events has been of a nature to increase the antagonism to colonial acquisitions by military force as well with His Majesty as with a great part of the German people. Even if, therefore, France were inclined to permit us to conquer a part of Morocco, we would for the present perhaps not be in a position to take advantage of this overture. In reality, we are confronted with the alternative either of relinquishing Morocco now to France without adequate compensation to Germany or of working for the extension of life of the Sherifian Empire in the expectation of a turn of events favorable to us. Thus, I perceive your important task to be in holding the future free for the profit of German interests. I sum it up in stating that you should bring the Sultan to declare that he could consider the French demands only if they were advised by a conference of all the signatory Powers. The reference to the conference I consider for the Sultan the easiest and for us the most favorable form of refusal. That the Sultan refuse the French demands is naturally the main thing.[671]

This frank document furnished the key to the German refusal of the French offers and to the persistent demands for a conference. Count Bülow’s embarrassment was caused by the Emperor’s renunciations at Vigo and even more by the temporary apathy if not antagonism of the German people toward further colonial acquisition. Pursuing an objective undesired by German public opinion, the Chancellor was still bent on acquiring a share in Morocco or compensation elsewhere. To delay and postpone, to “hold the future free” until public opinion veered into a more chauvinistic channel, to relieve Germany of the restrictions imposed by the Emperor’s assertions, Count Bülow thought that a conference was the best means. The continuation of the crisis was a logical result of this ambition.

On the same day upon which Count Bülow penned this dispatch M. Rouvier made another offer. He was led to this move by the increasing excitement in France. The lack of response from Germany and the uncertainty about her objective, the publication of an article in the _Kreuzzeitung_ on April 26 and of one in _Matin_ on the next day hinting at war,[672] caused a panic on the Paris stock exchange on April 27.[673] M. Bihourd telegraphed on April 28 of the presence of “bellicose counselors” in the _entourage_ of the Emperor who would have an excellent opportunity “to advocate the present time as propitious for war against France.”[674] So in a conversation with Prince Radolin on April 30 M. Rouvier indorsed the Emperor’s assertions at Tangier and the principles of the Convention of Madrid, except with respect to the Algero-Moroccan frontier. He offered to “make an agreement similar to the Anglo-French one, where all doubtful points, including Morocco, would be settled.” The Ambassador made no reply.[675]

The next day an intermediary explained to Prince Radolin that the Premier regarded a conference as hardly acceptable since France had engaged herself so fully in the Moroccan affair. M. Rouvier would be willing, however, to include in a general settlement such questions as those of boundaries in Africa and the Bagdad Railway. In return, the two governments should agree upon a mode of adjusting the Moroccan affair directly with the Powers. The German government refused the offer.[676]

On May 1 King Edward VII arrived in Paris where he remained for four days. Strongly supporting M. Delcassé’s views, he assured the French government that Germany would not dare a war; in case of conflict, he said, France could rely on British support.[677] To the German Ambassador he praised the French for seeking a direct settlement of the Moroccan difficulty, abruptly demanding, “Why does not Berlin reply to the last French overture?”[678] His interference, however, was of no avail. In fact, French public opinion, suspecting the King and British press of attempting to estrange France and Germany, was more than ever anxious for an agreement with Germany.[679]

Distressed by refusals and silence from the German government and fearful of war, M. Rouvier sought to restore connections with Germany by sending his friend, M. Betzold, to Berlin to interview Herr von Holstein, and by persuading Baron Eckardstein, then living privately in England, to lay the French proposals directly before Count Bülow and the Emperor at Karlsruhe. These men were to inform the German officials that the French cabinet, disapproving of M. Delcassé’s secretiveness, hoped to bring about the Minister’s downfall over some domestic difficulty in the next three or four weeks. They were to state that while in case of war the French Government knew for a certainty that Great Britain would interfere in France’s favor, the cabinet, except M. Delcassé, preferred not to seek this support. As an inducement for a direct settlement, the two emissaries were to offer Germany “a coaling station and eventually also a strip of land on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.” They were especially to urge the Emperor against making any inflammatory speeches on his return from the Mediterranean.[680]

Neither M. Betzold nor Baron Eckardstein had the least success. While Herr von Holstein assured M. Betzold on May 2 of Germany’s desire for good relations with France, he observed that for the time he saw no possibility of making a direct agreement with her. For, even apart from Germany’s official declaration in favor of a collective settlement of the Moroccan question, the German government did not trust M. Delcassé sufficiently to negotiate with France. That Minister’s policy toward Germany, he asserted, had been “dishonest,” “hostile,” “insidious,” and in this affair “disrespectful.” “Slow tempo, temporary truce, and removal of Delcassé would be the next,” he concluded. In Karlsruhe, on May 5, Count Bülow rebuffed Baron Eckardstein with the bold assertion: “The English inciting does not impress us. In case of a conflict the game would be played between Germany and France. . . . . We are in a position to await further developments with composure.” The Baron was not allowed to see William II at all.[681]

Thus every offer for a direct settlement was refused.[682] Indeed, the German government even suggested to M. Rouvier on May 7 that France take the initiative in calling a conference, arguing that “the advantage of a conference lies in that it can have no positive results. It will neither divide Morocco nor check her continuing decay. It will fulfil its object in removing the danger of an acute conflict, at the same time holding the future open.”[683]

M. Rouvier of course would not consider the suggestion. Nor was he any longer so willing to eliminate M. Delcassé. On May 8 he informed the German government through M. Betzold that while he had been unable to convince the Foreign Minister of the faults of his policy, the latter was needed in the work of mediating between Russia and Japan. It might, therefore, take weeks or even months to achieve his dismissal. M. Rouvier hoped, said M. Betzold, to settle the Moroccan and other difficulties with Germany after Count Tattenbach convinced himself of the French Minister’s proper conduct at Fez and after M. Delcassé had been eliminated.[684]

More unfortunate words could hardly have been chosen. The German government was opposed to an early peace between the warring Powers,[685] and its mistrust of M. Delcassé was increased by his continued justification of his policy. Since French public opinion had repudiated the Minister, since M. Rouvier, known to be weak and easily influenced, had practically offered the Minister’s head, the German government determined to press the frightened and pacifically inclined French Premier until the objectionable Foreign Minister was overthrown. To that end, on May 16, Prince Radolin announced to M. Rouvier “that the prerequisite for the _rapprochement_ desired by him [M. Rouvier] is for us [Germany] to have full trust in the foreign policy of France. . . . . After what has happened, this trust is lacking.” The Premier replied, “I understand you fully. Leave it to me.” But through M. Betzold he urged the German government to wait until he could accomplish the act by some internal crisis.[686]

Meanwhile, the German government was pressing Spain, Italy, and the United States for support. Early in May Herr von Radowitz warned the Spanish government against sending a mission to Fez at that time, and remarked that “it would be wise for Spain not to intervene in the present Moorish difficulties, and that it was to her interest to be on friendly terms with Germany, who could be of greater assistance to her than any other Power.”[687] At the same time Count Monts in Rome was using “menacing language,” hinting at “the possibility of war.”[688] In both places this talk made a deep impression.

To President Roosevelt the German government asserted that, although certain voices had been raised in France in favor of a conference, Great Britain still resisted the project. It asked the President to inform the British government that its attitude justified the suspicion that “in the accord with France they [the British] had wished to dispose not only of English rights but also of the rights of the other signatory Powers.” The German government further informed Mr. Roosevelt that if the proposal for a conference became hopeless, it would then think of its interests alone and would be forced to choose “between the possibility of a conflict with France and the consideration of conditions which France might perhaps propose to avoid a conflict.”[689]

Criticizing sharply the British hostility to the conference, Mr. Roosevelt promised to repeat his advice to the British government to settle its differences with Germany. Upon doing so he was again accused by the British leaders of being under German influence. He stoutly denied this accusation, writing to Senator Lodge, then in England, on May 15, as follows:

It always amuses me to find that the English think that I am under the influence of the Kaiser. The heavy witted creatures do not understand that nothing would persuade me to follow the lead of or enter into close alliance with a man who is so jumpy, so little capable of continuity of action, and therefore, so little capable of being loyal to his friends or steadfastly hostile to an enemy. Undoubtedly with Russia weakened Germany feels it can be fairly insolent within the borders of Europe. I intend to do my best to keep on good terms with Germany, as with all other nations, and so far as I can to keep them on good terms with one another; and I shall be friendly to the Kaiser as I am friendly to every one. But as for his having any special influence with me, the thought is absurd.[690]

Nevertheless, the British government rejected his advice. On May 19 Mr. Roosevelt had to report to Baron Sternburg that “the British Government had given him to understand that it did not wish better relations with Germany,” and that “it had even hinted broadly to the secretary of state that Great Britain could take care of her affairs alone.” He could not do more, he said, without exposing himself to an incivility.[691] The German government was well pleased with the result, however, for it placed Mr. Roosevelt on the German side.

On May 13 Count Tattenbach arrived in Fez. He found that the French party was still strong, with some of the Moroccan ministers bought over to that side. He accomplished his object with some difficulty. He reported immediately that the Sultan himself affirmed the accusation against the French Minister of having claimed to enjoy a mandate of Europe.[692] A few days later the Count telegraphed that upon his arrival the French Minister, under instructions from M. Delcassé, had issued a veiled threat of violence against Morocco if the Sultan agreed to a conference.[693] Upon receiving these dispatches Count Bülow immediately warned M. Rouvier against M. Delcassé’s “stormy and violent . . . . Moroccan policy.”[694] As that Minister still remained in office, the Chancellor instructed Herr von Miquel, councilor at the German embassy in Paris, to inform M. Rouvier amicably but firmly that the Foreign Minister would have to go, that Franco-German relations would not improve as long as he remained in office. Indeed, if M. Delcassé’s anti-German and bellicose policy became known to the German people, he was to state, it would have an effect for which Count Bülow refused to be responsible. “A change in the present situation is above all to be made possible by a change in the direction of the French foreign policy.”

When Herr von Miquel carried out these instructions on May 30, the Premier realized the necessity for eliminating the Foreign Minister. In his despair he cried: “I cannot cause M. Delcassé to fall because Germany frowns. I would be reproached always . . . . always.”[695] The German pressure, however, did not cease. In a telegram on May 25 Count Tattenbach reported French assertions to the Moroccans that in the face of the united action of the Mediterranean Powers, “who would never suffer an interference by Germany in Mediterranean questions,” Germany would desert the Sultan. In sending this report to Rome, on May 31, the German Chancellor requested the Italian government to favor publicly the collective settlement of the Moroccan question. “No matter what turn Moroccan affairs take, Germany will follow up the consequences of the advice which His Majesty sent to the Sultan,” he wrote. “Thus the possibility that the Sultan will remain isolated in this difficulty need not be considered.” The Italian Foreign Minister immediately denied France’s right to speak of a common policy of the Mediterranean Powers, and, as Count Bülow probably intended, he passed on the German warning to the French government.[696]

On May 28 Count Tattenbach telegraphed the Sultan’s official rejection of the French proposals and his approval of an international conference.[697] Thereupon, through M. Betzold, the Chancellor warned the French Premier, June 1, that in as much as the Sultan had accepted the German point of view, Germany “would follow up the consequences if France continued the policy of intimidation and violence hitherto pursued by M. Delcassé.”[698] On June 3 Prince Radolin described the situation to M. Dupuy, an intimate friend of M. Rouvier’s, as “very serious.”[699] Thus the German government struck blow after blow to force an immediate dismissal of the French Foreign Minister.[700]

On the French side, M. Delcassé remained as adamantine as the Germans. Fearing an intention on the part of Germany to force his dismissal, hearing of Germany’s pressure on Spain and Italy and of bellicose talk by the German Ambassador at Rome,[701] he made a bid on May 17 for British support. On that date M. Cambon apprised Lord Lansdowne of Germany’s endeavor to arouse discord between Great Britain and France “all over the world.” Although he did not regard the relations with Germany as “profoundly dangerous,” he pictured them as serious enough to cause him “much preoccupation.”

Lord Lansdowne wished to lend the pro-British Foreign Minister all possible support. Late in April, for the sake of France and the Entente Cordiale, he had run the risk of antagonizing President Roosevelt by instructing the British Ambassador in Washington not to give him an opportunity to mediate between Great Britain and Germany. He realized that the President’s interference encouraged Germany and worked to the detriment of France and Great Britain. He had therefore denied to the President that there was any “subject of dispute” between Great Britain and Germany, and had expressed his inability to see “why any international complication should be created [over Morocco], unless German Gov[ernmen]t is determined to take advantage of what was at most a diplomatic oversight in order to make mischief or to disturb the _status quo_, e.g. . . . ., by demanding cession of a Moorish port.”[702] But Lord Lansdowne also sought to correct any erroneous impression which Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide-memoire_ of April 25 may have made. Lord Lansdowne said to M. Cambon:

The moral . . . . seemed to me to be that our two Governments should continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, should keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge, and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the course of events find themselves confronted. As an instance of our readiness to enter into such timely discussions, I reminded H[is] E[xcellency] of the communication which had recently been made to the French Gov[ernmen]t by you [Sir Francis Bertie] at a moment when an idea prevailed that Germany might be on the point of demanding the cession of a Moorish Port.[703]

To avoid all misunderstanding this communication was put in writing in an exchange of notes between the British Foreign Secretary and M. Cambon on May 24-25. When the former perceived that M. Cambon still interpreted the British policy in the light of Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide- memoire_,[704] he reiterated his correcting statement as follows:

I do not know that this account [of their conversation of May 17] differs from that which you have given to M. Delcassé, but I am not sure that I succeeded in making quite clear to you our desire that there should be full and confidential discussion between the two Gov[ernmen]ts, not so much in consequence of some acts of unprovoked aggression on the part of another Power, as in anticipation of any complications to be apprehended during the somewhat anxious period through which we are at present passing.[705]

At some time in this crisis, the British fleet was commanded to be “in readiness to make a descent on the German coast at short notice,”[706] and conversations were begun between the French and British military and naval officers looking toward active co-operation in case of war.[707]

When news arrived of the Sultan’s proposal for a conference, M. Delcassé opposed it vigorously. At his instigation the British government on June 5 ordered Mr. Lowther, who had just arrived in Fez, to advise the Sultan against the idea and to refuse the invitation.[708] The French Minister also reported Mr. Taft’s remark that the American government would probably not be favorably disposed toward a conference. Thereupon Lord Lansdowne on June 5 added his support in trying to convince the American government that “the proposal was unsound and should not be entertained.”[709] To bring Spain into closer intimacy with the Entente Cordiale, the British Foreign Secretary offered early in June to effect an understanding with her over the Spanish interests in the Mediterranean and elsewhere.[710]

In spite of Lord Lansdowne’s correcting statements about the British policy, M. Delcassé apparently continued to interpret the British communication of May 17 in the sense of Sir Francis Bertie’s _aide- memoire_ of April 25. He was impressed by the practical identity of that communication with the political clauses of the Franco-Russian alliance.[711] Reassured by the British support and by the adverse attitude of the British, Spanish, and American governments toward the project of a conference, and believing with the British that Germany was bluffing, he was in no mood to recede. M. Rouvier, who was receiving all the German threats, took a different view of the situation. With some of the other members of the cabinet, he prepared for the retirement of the offending Minister.[712] During the visit of the King of Spain to Paris, May 30-June 4, little could be done. But by June 3 M. Delcassé’s resignation was anticipated in parliamentary circles.[713] On June 5 the Chamber was thrown into excitement bordering on panic by the rumor of a report from M. Barrère at Rome that if an Anglo-French alliance were concluded Germany would attack France.[714] On the same day M. Rouvier explained the gravity of the situation to President Loubet;[715] on June 6 he laid his controversy with M. Delcassé before the cabinet.

At that meeting, although well aware of his isolation, M. Delcassé valiantly defended his policy of the past seven years, a policy which he declared had been opposed by Germany alone.[716] He claimed that in a very recent exchange of notes, one of which he read, France had received from Great Britain assurance of support in case of a German attack. Asserting the possibility of a formal alliance with Great Britain, he urged acceptance of the British offer.[717] He proposed that the French, British, and Spanish governments should address identical notes to the Sultan declining the conference. He assured the cabinet that Germany confronted by this Anglo-French-Spanish opposition with Italy neutral would not fight. But M. Rouvier declared that the German government had threatened war if France accepted the British offers. Turning to the ministers of war and of navy, he asked if France were prepared for that contingency. They both replied emphatically “No.” As M. Delcassé was not supported by a single minister, he resigned, and M. Rouvier took over his position. Before leaving M. Delcassé prophetically warned the cabinet that after this abdication before the demands of Germany, that Power would become “more insolent and more exacting than ever”; it had not opposed his person, he said, but rather the French policy of accords. He declared that the cabinet’s pusillanimity would give rise to new dangers.[718]

French public opinion was almost unanimous in its approval of M. Delcassé’s downfall. This approbation was noted by Herr von Flotow, first secretary of the German embassy in Paris, who on June 7 reported to his government as follows:

The history of the downfall of M. Delcassé shows that without a doubt there is a latent under-current in France which wishes . . . . a satisfactory understanding with Germany. It is after all significant that in the entire press of all parties there is hardly a paper which does not censure the anti-German policy of M. Delcassé. The second interesting point in the history of the past few days is the fact that in spite of the continued and almost importunate offers of English aid, . . . . French public opinion has never shown a real inclination to accept this support. Wherever one has opportunity here . . . . to observe public feeling, one meets the view that England is only endeavoring to engage the French power for her differences with Germany, and that in case of a crisis France would have to pull the English chestnuts out of the German fire.[719]

Great Britain was disgusted. The British government had made strenuous endeavor to save M. Delcassé, for it was certain of his loyalty to the entente, whereas it was dubious of the more pro-German M. Rouvier. It had intimated its willingness to oppose by force the German aggression;[720] but so far had met with no encouragement.

Delcassé’s dismissal or resignation under pressure from the German Government [stated Mr. Balfour to King Edward on June 8] displayed a weakness on the part of France which indicated that she could not at present be counted on as an effective force in international politics. She could no longer be trusted not to yield to threats at the crucial moment of a negotiation. If, therefore, Germany is really desirous of obtaining a port on the coast of Morocco, and if such a proceeding be a menace to our interests, it must be to other means than French assistance that we must look for our protection.[721]