Chapter XII: The Moroccan Crisis From the Visit to Tangier to the Fall of Delcassé (2)

In spite of M. Rouvier’s public assertion, June 6, that his policy toward the Anglo-French understanding would remain the same as before,[722] the Entente Cordiale had received a hard blow.

While expressing satisfaction that France had repudiated the anti-German Minister, the German press, under official guidance,[723] kept its discussion of the affair within the bounds of propriety. But German obtuseness to the feelings of other nations was manifested when on the day of M. Delcassé’s fall the German Emperor made Count Bülow a prince.

Thus, the first period of the crisis was closed. Germany had gained her objective in winning the Sultan’s acceptance of the project of a conference and in overthrowing M. Delcassé. While playing with war, the German government had had no desire to start one, and, gauging correctly French sentiment toward M. Delcassé and war, it had achieved success in Paris merely by a liberal use of threats. In the Moroccan affair the German foreign office had reached the peak of its power. But it had aroused so many complications that the crisis continued as acutely as before.

[Footnote 597: _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 516.]

[Footnote 598: Radolin to F. O., April 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 317, No. 6612; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622. After having talked with President Loubet early in April, Edward VII wrote to Lansdowne as follows: “President Loubet was most amiable . . . . but I could see from his manner that he considers the German conduct at Tangier, if not a direct menace to France, at any rate a covert insult” (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 341). The Schnäbele affair brought France and Germany almost to war in 1887.]

[Footnote 599: Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 232 ff., No. 6536; Chérisey to Delcassé, Feb. 11, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 196, No. 225; Delcassé to Bihourd, Feb. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 196 f., No. 226; Bihourd to Delcassé, Feb. 15, 1905, _ibid._, 197 f., No. 227; Lowther to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67, No. 81.]

[Footnote 600: Nicolson to Lansdowne, D. Feb. 12, 1905, R. March 4, 1905, _B.D._, III, 59, No. 66.]

[Footnote 601: Bertie to Lansdowne, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, 60, No. 67. For the uncertainty about the Emperor’s proposed action see Lascelles to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 61, No. 69; Nicolson to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 62, No. 70.]

[Footnote 602: Delcassé stated to Bertie, June 10, that “his policy had been to be ready to make commercial concessions to Germany if she were willing to discuss with the French Government the question of Morocco, but not to yield anything politically or territorially” (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 78, No. 96).]

[Footnote 603: Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 206 f., 231; Imperial Foreign Office, _Reports of the Belgian Representatives in Berlin, London, and Paris to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brussels, 1905-1914. European Politics during the Decade before the War as Described by the Belgian Diplomatists_ (. . . ., 1915), No. 3 (hereafter cited as _Belg. Docs., 1905-1914_); _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 517; Henry Wickham Steed, _Through Thirty Years, 1892-1922: A Personal Narrative_ (London, 1924), I, 229. Delcassé also made strenuous efforts during the succeeding weeks to mediate peace between Japan and Russia so that the latter Power could resume its obligations as France’s ally. See Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 345, No. 6635; Lansdowne to MacDonald, April 19, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 76 f., No. 68; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 176 f.]

[Footnote 604: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._ (Sénat, March 31, 1905), pp. 540 f.]

[Footnote 605: Articles in _Temps_ of April 3, and in the _Dépêche de Toulouse_ of April 10. Mévil, the official apologist for Delcassé, asserts that the latter article was based on the “best” information (pp. 218 ff.).]

[Footnote 606: By April 13 the Sultan had expressed his general approval of the French proposals, and the details for military reorganization in six of the Moroccan towns were ready for final formulation and signature (Mévil, p. 200 n.; Vassel to Tattenbach, April 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 339 ff., No. 6631; and the various dispatches from Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé during Feb., March, April, 1905, in _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 228-31, 233, 240, 243, 248, 266).]

[Footnote 607: Delcassé instructed the Minister to make the following statement to the Sultan: “We cannot conceive that, changing from the way of accords which he [the Sultan] has followed for several years, he will decide to assume an attitude which will oblige us to consider strict right alone as the basis of our relation with him” (Delcassé to Saint- René Taillandier, April 9, 1905, _ibid._, 208, No. 239).]

[Footnote 608: Egerton to Lansdowne, April 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, 66, No. 78. The French government was afraid that Spain would not loyally uphold their agreement if some other Power intervened in Morocco (Nicolson to Lansdowne, Feb. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 59, No. 66). But with M. Villa-Urrutia at the foreign office, Spain remained entirely on the French side (Nicolson to Lansdowne, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 66, No. 79).]

[Footnote 609: On March 22 Bihourd advised Delcassé to “establish by an exchange of notes the bearing of the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish accords on the commercial and industrial interests of Germany,” adding that “until then we shall remain under the menace, very clearly formulated by the German press, of some inopportune surprise” (Bihourd to Delcassé, March 22, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 202 f., No. 232). On March 28 an article by André Tardieu, a journalist with close governmental connections, stated that the French Foreign Minister would give satisfaction to Germany if she wished it on the subject of Morocco, “provided it is a question solely of commercial interests” (Flotow to F. O., March 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 282 f., No. 6584). On April 4 Billy, a press writer in the French foreign office, sounded Theodor Wolff, Paris correspondent for the _Berliner Tageblatt_, upon how the German government would receive a French overture (_ibid._, p. 305 n.). On April 7 Hedeman, London correspondent of _Matin_, talked with Hammann to the same effect (memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 310 ff., Nos. 6608 f.).]

[Footnote 610: Quoted in _Quest. dipl et col._, XIX, 511 f.]

[Footnote 611: Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 331, No. 6622.]

[Footnote 612: Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 328 ff., No. 6621; Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622; Mévil, pp. 238 ff.; Delcassé to Bihourd, April 14, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, pp. 211 f., No. 244; Bihourd to Delcassé, April 18 and 25, 1905, _ibid._, 214, Nos. 246 f.; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 332 f., No. 6623. Saint-René Taillandier’s denial that he had ever claimed to have a mandate of Europe must be balanced against the Sultan’s personal assertion that he had claimed it. The truth would seem to be that the French Minister had sought to make more out of France’s international accords over Morocco than the facts justified by speaking vaguely and by not clearing up misunderstandings in the Sultan’s mind (_L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 214, 231, 238, 263; _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6621, 6631, 6658, 6662, 6551 n.; _Aktenstücke über Marokko, 1905_, Nos. 1, 3). Cf. the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris, Dec. 19, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 96.]

[Footnote 613: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67, No. 80.]

[Footnote 614: Michon, _L’alliance franco-russe 1891-1917_, pp. 117 ff.]

[Footnote 615: As already shown, the Russian defeat at Mukden had nothing to do with the change of Germany’s policy.]

[Footnote 616: _Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ (Chambre, April 19, 1905), pp. 1543 ff. Cf. Bertie’s estimate on April 25: “The general feeling in Paris is that the chief object which the German Emperor has had in view in his recent proceedings is to show to the French people that an understanding with England is of little value to them and that they had much better come to an agreement with Germany. To this end ‘il fait la guerre à l’Angleterre sur le dos de la France’ and the French Public realizing that the Emperor’s wrath is against England for enabling France to carry out her Morocco policy and not against France for taking advantage of her agreement with England feel that if they keep their heads nothing really serious will come of His Majesty’s ill temper which they believe is not entirely shared by the German Government and still less so by the German people” (Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, _B.D._, III, 75, No. 93).]

[Footnote 617: Mévil, pp. 257 ff.]

[Footnote 618: Memo. by Holstein, April 4, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 304, No. 6601. Olmütz signified the humiliation of Prussia by Austria in 1850; Fashoda, that of France by Great Britain in 1898.]

[Footnote 619: Memo. by Holstein, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 297 ff., No. 6597.]

[Footnote 620: The suggestion of a conference was first made by Kühlmann in a dispatch of March 2 (_ibid._, p. 293 n.). On March 27 Bülow still thought it possible of execution only in case Great Britain accepted it (Bülow to Kühlmann, March 27, 1905, _ibid._, 293 f., No. 6591). After the Emperor’s visit, however, he accepted the proposal. In Feb., 1904, Lascelles had reported a conversation with Bülow in which the latter had opposed calling a conference on the Macedonian question, arguing as follows: “A Congress was excellent at the end of a war when both belligerents were more or less exhausted and desired peace, but it was a most dangerous thing at any other time, and would only accentuate more strongly any difference of opinion which might exist and thus cause greater complications, unless indeed the Great Powers should have decided beforehand exactly what was to be done, and should have appealed to the Congress, to give the sanction of Europe to the decisions they had already taken” (Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 26, 1904, _B.D._, V, 72). A year later Bülow had apparently forgotten this very accurate judgment. Or possibly he saw no other way out, and faced the facts with his usual optimism.]

[Footnote 621: In a memorandum by Hammann on April 7, this statement appeared: “Naturally the result would be greater if there followed from a conference a breach in the Anglo-French accord over Morocco.” Bülow’s minute to that assertion was: “We do not desire that at all, or at least we should in no instance show such an aim. We only wish to preserve our rights in Morocco” (_ibid._, XX, 312 f., No. 6609; cf. Chirol, _Fifty Years in a Changing World_, p. 300).]

[Footnote 622: When the _Nowoje Wremja_ denounced the German action Bülow, on March 27, protested strongly to Lamsdorff against this anti- German attitude. Russia was expected to remain neutral in this affair, he declared (Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, _G.P._, XX, 277 f., No. 6577).]

[Footnote 623: Those three had criticized the Anglo-French accord.]

[Footnote 624: The signatory Powers were those which had participated in the conference of Madrid in 1880 over Moroccan affairs.]

[Footnote 625: Quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 303, No. 6599; and from a memo. by Holstein, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 304 f., No. 6601.]

[Footnote 626: Memo. by Hammann, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 300 f., No. 6598.]

[Footnote 627: Memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 311 f., No. 6609.]

[Footnote 628: On April 8 Bülow sent Hammann the following instructions for directing the press: “All criticism and attacks should, under the greatest possible consideration for the French national feeling, be directed against the systematically anti-German, insolent, and inept policy of Delcassé” (minute by Bülow to a memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 313, No. 6609). On April 4 he had issued instructions to restrain the German press from war with the British press (Mühlberg to Metternich, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 603 and note, No. 6839).]

[Footnote 629: That Holstein wished to turn loose a _Kriegsfanfare_, as Hammann later asserted, seems unlikely, for German policy at that time was not bellicose. But Holstein did propose to exert great pressure by vigorous words and threats, and his program might very likely have had the result which Hammann foresaw. On this controversy between the two men see Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 35 f.; Otto Hammann, _Der neue Kurs. Erinnerungen_ (Berlin, 1918), pp. 104 ff.; Hammann, _Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, pp. 210 f.; memo. by Holstein, April 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 297 ff., No. 6597; memo. by Hammann, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 300 f., No. 6598; memo. by Holstein, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 308 f., No. 6606; memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 309 f., No. 6607.]

[Footnote 630: Durand to Lansdowne, March, 1905, quoted in Brigadier General Sir Percy Sykes, _The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand: A Biography_ (London, 1926), p. 280; Spring Rice to Roosevelt, undated though written in the first half of Jan., 1905, quoted in Dennett, pp. 152 f.; Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 573 ff., No. 6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1905, _ibid._, 580 f., No. 6293; Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 576 ff., No. 6290; and others in _ibid._, chap. cxxxix; Dennett, pp. 45, 73 ff.; Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 393; Joseph B. Bishop, _Theodore Roosevelt and His Times_ (New York, 1920), I, 378 f., 468 f., 473; Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 406 ff., and chap. xiii.]

[Footnote 631: Sternburg to Bülow, Feb. 10, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 573 f., No. 6288; Sternburg to F. O., March 7, 1905, _ibid._, 580 f., No. 6293.]

[Footnote 632: So Roosevelt asserted to Sternburg. See Sternburg to F. O., April 1, 1905, _ibid._, 590, No. 6300; Sykes, p. 280; Dennis, pp. 397 f.; Gwynn, Vol. I, chap. xiii; Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, p. 322.]

[Footnote 633: On March 21 Roosevelt declared to Sternburg: “My earnest wish is that we use as much as possible the four years which stand before me in office to improve the relations between our countries. I believe in the German people” (Sternburg to F. O., March 21, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 583, No. 6295).]

[Footnote 634: Bülow to Sternburg, April 3, 1905, _ibid._, 592 ff., No. 6302; Bishop, I, 468 f.]

[Footnote 635: Bishop, I, 469.]

[Footnote 636: See below.]

[Footnote 637: In the absence of a regular minister at Tangier, Tattenbach had remained there after the Emperor’s visit. See Tattenbach to F. O., April 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 313 f., No. 6610; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 9, 1905, _ibid._, 315 f., No. 6611. O’Conor, British ambassador at Constantinople, reported to Lansdowne, May 1, 1905, that Germany was trying to induce the Sultan to send a mission to Morocco with a view to establishing closer relations. The Sultan eventually refused. On Feb. 12, 1906, O’Conor was able to state why. The Sultan had sent secret emissaries to Morocco, but the Sultan of Morocco became suspicious and refused either to send a formal mission to Constantinople or to receive one thence. O’Conor also heard that the Sultan had written to Abd-el-Aziz recommending the German Emperor as the friend and protector of Islam whose advice was well worth following. See O’Conor to Grey, Feb. 12, 1906, _B.D._, III, 248, No. 277. Tardieu states that the Sultan’s letters to his Moorish colleague were written in Feb.-March, 1906 (_La Conf. d’Algés_, p. 259 n.). Nothing further is known of this affair.]

[Footnote 638: No. 6612; Bülow to Alvensleben, March 27, 1905, _ibid._, 277 f., No. 6577.]

[Footnote 639: Radowitz to F. O., April 12, 1905, _ibid._, 326 f. and note, No. 6619; Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_, p. 165.]

[Footnote 640: Bülow to Monts, April 3, 11, 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 295 f., No. 6594; 318 ff., No. 6613; 322 f., No. 6616; Monts to F. O., April 12, 1905, _ibid._, 324 ff. and notes, Nos. 6617 f. Tittoni, the Italian foreign minister, had to feel his way carefully. On April 14 he sounded the Spanish government on its attitude, and was informed that Spain would remain loyal to her agreement with France and would accept the conference only if France and Great Britain did (Nicolson to Lansdowne, April 14, 1905, _B.D._, III, 66, No. 79).]

[Footnote 641: Bülow to Metternich, April 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 605 ff., No. 6843; Metternich to F. O., April 19, 1905, _ibid._, 608 f., No. 6845. On April 10, however, Radolin reported a statement by Eckardstein, which he himself seemed to think correct, to the effect that “in case of a serious Franco-German conflict England would undoubtedly stand actively on the French side and would even advance with enthusiasm against Germany” (_ibid._, 607 f., No. 6844).]

[Footnote 642: By that answer Bülow aimed to show the French government that “we do not consider separate Franco-German negotiations as adequate to the situation.” See Radolin to F. O., April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 328 ff., No. 6621; memo. by Mühlberg, April 19, 1905, _ibid._, 332 f., No. 6623; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, _ibid._, 333 f. and note, No. 6624.]

[Footnote 643: Bülow to Tattenbach, April 18, 1905, _ibid._, 333 f., No. 6624; Tattenbach to F. O., April 21, 1905, _ibid._, 335, No. 6625; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 22, 1905, _ibid._, 336 f., No. 6626; Tattenbach to F. O., April 23, 1905, _ibid._, 337 f., No. 6627; Bülow to Tattenbach, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, 338, No. 6628.]

[Footnote 644: On April 3 Balfour repeated his denial in the House of Commons of the likelihood of a German attack.]

[Footnote 645: Lee, II, 340.]

[Footnote 646: Newton, p. 334.]

[Footnote 647: Radolin to F. O., April 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 311, No. 6608.]

[Footnote 648: Mühlberg to Metternich, April 4, 1905, _ibid._, 604, No. 6840; Metternich to Bülow, April 6, 1905, _ibid._, 604, No. 6841; memo. by Hammann, April 7, 1905, _ibid._, 311, No. 6608.]

[Footnote 649: Metternich to Bülow, March 28, April 6, 1905, _ibid._, 601 ff., Nos. 6837, 6841.]

[Footnote 650: Metternich to Bülow, March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 602, No. 6837; Kühlmann to Bülow, March 19, 1905, _ibid._, 261 f., No. 6562; Lascelles to Lansdowne, March 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 61, No. 69.]

[Footnote 651: April 9, 1904 (Newton, p. 334).]

[Footnote 652: Viscount Grey of Falloden, _Twenty-five Years, 1892-1916_ (New York, 1925), I, 115.]

[Footnote 653: Lee, II, 342.]

[Footnote 654: Lansdowne to Lascelles, April 23, 1905, _B.D._, III, 67, No. 80; Lansdowne to Bertie, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, p. 73.]

[Footnote 655: Tattenbach to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 348, No. 6639.]

[Footnote 656: Lansdowne to Bertie, April 22, 1905, _B.D._, III, 72 f., No. 90; and following documents; Spender, _Life of Campbell-Bannerman_, II, 248; Grey, I, 106 f.]

[Footnote 657: Bertie to Lansdowne, April 25, 1905, _B.D._, III, 74 f., Nos. 92 f.]

[Footnote 658: The offer was so stated by Monts (Monts to F. O., May 2, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 362, No. 6648).]

[Footnote 659: Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, April 26, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 215, No. 248; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, May 3, 1905, _ibid._, 217, No. 251; Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 309. Ben Sliman was Moroccan minister of foreign affairs.]

[Footnote 660: On Rouvier see Mévil, pp. 253 ff.; Victor Bérard, _La France et Guillaume II_ (Paris, 1907), p. 296; Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 345, No. 6635; Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 373 f., No. 6657. Rouvier’s policy was certainly more in keeping with French opinion.]

[Footnote 661: Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 344 f., No. 6635. To Rouvier’s assertion that “France would do everything necessary to live on the best terms with Germany” Bülow commented as follows: “Then the French Government should cease its efforts to isolate us, to break up the Triple Alliance, to incite England against us” (Bülow’s minute to the foregoing dispatch).]

[Footnote 662: Radolin to F. O., April 27 and 28, 1905, _ibid._, 346, No. 6636; 348 f., No. 6640.]

[Footnote 663: Radolin to Bülow, April 25, 1905, _ibid._, 615, No. 6847.]

[Footnote 664: Tattenbach to F. O., April 23, 24, 25, 1905, _ibid._, 337 f., No. 6627; 339, No. 6629; 341, No. 6632; Vassel to Tattenbach, April 21, 1905, _ibid._, 339 ff., No. 6631.]

[Footnote 665: Bishop, I, 469 ff.; Sternburg to F. O., April 25, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 342, No. 6633.]

[Footnote 666: Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 342, No. 6634.]

[Footnote 667: Bülow to Radolin, April 28, 29, 1905, _ibid._, 346 f., No. 6637; 349 f., No. 6641.]

[Footnote 668: Holstein to Mühlberg, April 24, 1905, _ibid._, 339, No. 6630; Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 342 ff., No. 6634.]

[Footnote 669: Radolin to Bülow, April 14, 1905, _ibid._, 330 ff., No. 6622. Monts also regarded Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati as signifying victory for Germany in her Moroccan campaign and as giving the opportunity “for a definitive friendly agreement with France” (Monts to F. O., May 2, 1905, _ibid._, 362, No. 6648).]

[Footnote 670: Tattenbach had on the previous day talked to Lowther, British minister at Tangier, and had found him strongly opposed to a conference and in favor of a direct Franco-German settlement (Tattenbach to F. O., April 29, 1905, _ibid._, 251 f., No. 6642).]

[Footnote 671: Bülow to Tattenbach, April 30, 1905, _ibid._, 352, No. 6643.]

[Footnote 672: The article was by Professor Schiemann, who was known to be in close touch with the German government (reprinted in Schiemann, _Deutschland und die grosse Politik 1905_, pp. 110 f.).]

[Footnote 673: Radolin to F. O., April 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 347, No. 6638; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 576 ff.]

[Footnote 674: Bihourd to Delcassé, April 28, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 215, No. 249.]

[Footnote 675: Rouvier also assured Radolin that “he disapproved of much that had happened” and that he himself had taken over the general control of foreign affairs. It had cost him some effort to save Delcassé in the Chamber, he said, but he had thought it wiser to do so (Radolin to Bülow, April 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 360 ff., No. 6647).]

[Footnote 676: Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, _ibid._, 355 ff., No. 6645; Bülow to Radolin, May 1, 1905, _ibid._, 353 f., No. 6644.]

[Footnote 677: Eckardstein was informed to this effect on May 4, 1905, by Rouvier’s intimate friend, Armand Levy, a Parisian financier (Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 106; Lee, II, 342).]

[Footnote 678: Radolin to Bülow, May 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 616 f., No. 6848. The King may have put this question to Radolin at the desire of Delcassé, who was complaining of Germany’s lack of response (Bertie to Lansdowne, April 27, 1905, _B.D._, III, 68, No. 84). On May 11, 1905, Lansdowne wrote to Knollys, King Edward’s private secretary, as follows: “The King’s Mediterranean tour left matters in excellent shape so far as we are concerned” (Lee, II, 342).]

[Footnote 679: _Belg. Docs., 1905-14_, No. 4.]

[Footnote 680: Wilhelm Betzold was an international financier with wide political connections (Eckardstein, I, 243 ff.). The instructions were given to Eckardstein, May 4, by Armand Levy, like Betzold, an intimate friend of Rouvier, just after an interview between the two and the Premier, Levy had made a note of the various points which he now laid before Eckardstein, explaining that naturally Rouvier could not speak directly to him of these delicate affairs but adding that his statements were “rigorously exact” (Eckardstein, III, 100 ff.). Only Eckardstein’s account of the interview with Bülow contains anything about the Moroccan proposal, but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of his statement (see also Prince Lichnowsky, _My Mission to London, 1912-1914_ [London, 1918], p. 3).]

[Footnote 681: Memo. by Holstein, May 2, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 357 ff., No. 6646. Paul von Schwabach’s account of arranging the interview for Betzold is given in _Berliner Tageblatt_, March 21, 1922. See also Bülow to F. O., May 5 and 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 368 ff., Nos. 6652 f.]

[Footnote 682: On May 2 the Chancellor also refused to consider Delcassé’s offer through Luzzati; and when a few days later he heard that Barrère wished to be sent to Berlin to arrange affairs, he immediately advised Rouvier that he would not be received. See Bülow to Monts, May 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 363 f., No. 6649; Radolin to Holstein, May 8, 1905, _ibid._, p. 372 n.; Bülow to Radolin, May 9, 1905, _ibid._, 372, No. 6656.]

[Footnote 683: Bülow to Radolin, May 4, 1905, _ibid._, 366 f., No. 6650; Radolin to F. O., May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 371 f., No. 6655.]

[Footnote 684: The British and the Russian governments were also supporting Delcassé. See Radolin to Bülow, May 8, 1905, _ibid._, 373 ff., No. 6657 f.; Betzold to Eckardstein, May 9, 1905, quoted in Eckardstein, III, 204.]

[Footnote 685: Sternburg to F. O., June 2, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 607, No. 6311, Bülow’s minute.]

[Footnote 686: Radolin to Bülow, May 13 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 376 f., No. 6659; 378 f., No. 6661.]

[Footnote 687: So related by the Spanish Foreign Minister to Nicolson (Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _B.D._, III, 70 f., No. 87). Although there is no account of the conversation in _G.P._, the language is entirely in keeping with German policy. The episode referred to the possible departure of Spain’s new minister in Morocco to Fez.]

[Footnote 688: So reported by Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _ibid._, 71, No. 88. Cf. Bülow to Monts, May 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 363 f., No. 6649; Bülow to F. O., May 6, 1905, _ibid._, 368, No. 6651.]

[Footnote 689: Bülow to Sternburg, April 27, May 10 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 342 ff., No. 6634; 620 ff., No. 6851; XIX, 600 ff., No. 6306; Bishop, I, 469 f.]

[Footnote 690: _Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918_ (New York, 1925), II, 123. See also Dennett, pp. 88 ff.]

[Footnote 691: The President’s statements were so formulated by Sternburg. See Sternburg to F. O., May 13 and 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 622 f., No. 6852; _ibid._, XIX, 603 f., No. 6308; Dennett, pp. 184 f., 88 ff., 75 f.]

[Footnote 692: Tattenbach to F. O., May 15, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 379 f., No. 6662.]

[Footnote 693: Tattenbach’s version of the threat was as follows: “The French Government would consider it an injury to France’s interests if the French proposals for reform were submitted for consideration to the signatory Powers. No Power possessed the right to intervene in the Moroccan affair, especially in the frontier question. . . . . The French Government would continue to watch sharply the affairs in Morocco, and reserved the right to act according to circumstances.” See Tattenbach to F. O., May 17, 1905, _ibid._, 380, No. 6663. Cf. with the original threat quoted above. See also Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, 1905, _ibid._, 399 f., No. 6676.]

[Footnote 694: Bülow to Radolin, May 22, 1905, _ibid._, 382 f., No. 6665.]

[Footnote 695: Miquel was chosen for this work because he was just being transferred to St. Petersburg. See Bülow to Radolin, May 30, 1905, _ibid._, 388 ff., No. 6669; memo. by Miquel, May 30 and 31, 1905, _ibid._, 393 ff., Nos. 6674 f.]

[Footnote 696: Bülow to Monts, May 31, 1905, _ibid._, 390 f., No. 6670, and note citing a dispatch from Monts of June 2, 1905; Mévil, p. 272. Egerton was informed by Barrère that Monts had said to Tittoni that “if the French Minister maintained his threat of military measures against the Sultan of Morocco, a German army would cross the French frontier” (Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, _B.D._, III, 95, No. 122).]

[Footnote 697: Tattenbach to F. O., May 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 392, No. 6672.]

[Footnote 698: Bülow to Radolin, June 1, 1905, _ibid._, 392 f., No. 6673; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 407, No. 6685.]

[Footnote 699: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _ibid._, 401, No. 6678.]

[Footnote 700: The _Gaulois_ published articles on June 9 and 17, 1905, asserting that Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck had also been sent by the German government to Paris about June 1 to warn Rouvier that Delcassé must be dismissed (Mévil, pp. 273 ff.; Bourgeois et Pagès, p. 310). The editors of _G.P._ state that this story is “exaggerated”; Donnersmarck was mentioned only once in the documents, they assert—in a dispatch from Radolin on June 17, 1905, describing the assertions of Donnersmarck given in _Gaulois_ as apocryphal (_G.P._, XX, 390 n.). According to Eckardstein, Rouvier declared to him on May 4 that some time previously Donnersmarck had asserted to him, apparently at Bülow’s request, that there were only two possibilities, a Franco-German alliance or war. On the other hand, Eckardstein saw Donnersmarck in Berlin on June 6 and found him eager for news from London and Paris (Eckardstein, III, 103 f., 127 f.). It seems clear that Donnersmarck’s assertions, whatever they were, were made on his own responsibility; that, as the editors of _G.P._ state, Bülow issued his warnings directly to Rouvier (_G.P._, XX, 390 n.).]

[Footnote 701: Nicolson to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _B.D._, III, 70 f., No. 87; Egerton to Lansdowne, May 5, 1905, _ibid._, 71, No. 88; Lansdowne to Bertie, May 3, 1905, _ibid._, 69 f., No. 86.]

[Footnote 702: Durand to Lansdowne, April 26, 1905, _ibid._, 67 f., No. 82; Lansdowne to Durand, April 27, 1905, _ibid._, 68, No. 83. Durand did not follow that line exactly. He left the impression with Roosevelt that the Anglo-German opposition was bitter, but that nevertheless Great Britain did not want Roosevelt interfering—thus letting the latter think that Great Britain was more bellicose than she was (see above). One reason for the British government’s slowness about helping Roosevelt mediate between Russia and Japan was, no doubt, that it wished to exclude all opportunity for the President to mediate between Great Britain and Germany. On April 26 Spring Rice asked Roosevelt not to support the idea of a conference (Gwynn, I, 469).]

[Footnote 703: Lansdowne added: “I had heard fears expressed that, in order to put an end to a state of things which could not fail to be highly inconvenient to them, the French Government might be induced to purchase the acquiescence of Germany by concessions of a kind which we were not likely to regard with favour, in other parts of the world. I had myself no such misgivings, and felt convinced that each side might continue to rely upon being treated with absolute frankness by the other. His Excellency [M. Cambon] expressed his entire concurrence in what I had said.” See Lansdowne to Bertie, May 17, 1905, _B.D._, III, 76, No. 94; Spender, II, 248; _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, III, 342 f.]

[Footnote 704: “During our last conversation about Morocco you . . . . added that . . . . if circumstances demanded it, if for example we had serious reasons to believe in an unjustified aggression on the part of a certain Power, the British Government would be entirely ready to concert with the French Government on the measures to take” (Cambon to Lansdowne, May 24, 1905, _B.D._, III, 77, No. 95, inclosure).]

[Footnote 705: Lansdowne to Cambon, May 25, 1905, _ibid._, 77 f., No. 95, and inclosure.]

[Footnote 706: Bradford, _Life of Wilson_, p. 199. Nothing more was heard of this order, which probably came from Sir John Fisher. Fisher was in favor of “Copenhagening” the German fleet and also of landing soldiers in North Germany in case of a war (_Memories_; Newton, pp. 334 f.). In 1922, Lord Sanderson wrote as follows concerning the events of this time: “There were no doubt preparations by our military authorities for defending Belgium in case of an attack by Germany on France through Belgian territory, and these preparations must have been known to the French military attaché in London. There was also a good deal of loose talk in naval circles and some high quarters of a possible expedition to Schleswig in the possible event of war. I do not believe such a measure was ever seriously entertained, and I looked upon the report as put about for the purpose of a warning” (Sanderson to Temperley, Aug. 17, 1922, _B.D._, III, 87, No. 105).]

[Footnote 707: Grey, I, 74. The British press supported the French loyally for the sake of maintaining the balance of power. See O. Eltzbacher, “The Balance of Power in Europe,” _Nineteenth Century and After_ (May, 1905); Steed, I, 230 ff. It is difficult to state exactly what were the British motives for supporting France so whole-heartedly in this crisis. One has to deduce them from acts, for, unlike the Germans, the directors of the British policy did not write down their reasons. As to King Edward’s view of the international situation, especially of the German danger, see Spring Rice to Lansdowne, D. May 7, 1905, R. May 13, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 77 f., No. 69, and King Edward’s minute thereto. On July 10 Spring Rice, in a memo. written after talking with Lansdowne, stated that British policy aimed at maintaining the balance of power (Gwynn, I, 476).]

[Footnote 708: Tattenbach to F. O., May 31, June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 399, No. 6676; 400, No. 6677; Metternich to F. O., June 8, 1905, _ibid._, 422, No. 6697; Lowther to Lansdowne, D. May 31, 1905, R. June 3, 1905, _B.D._, III, 88, No. 106; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 1 and 5, 1905, _ibid._, 88, No. 107; 89, No. 109; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 89, No. 108.]

[Footnote 709: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 89, No. 109; Lansdowne to Durand, June 5, 1905, _ibid._, 90, No. 110.]

[Footnote 710: Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 29, 1905, _ibid._, 109, No. 136. The editors of _B.D._ promise to publish more information about this offer in a later volume.]

[Footnote 711: That treaty read in part as follows: “The two Governments declare that they will take counsel together upon every question of a nature to jeopardize the general peace; in case that peace should be threatened with an aggression, the two parties undertake to reach an understanding on the measures whose immediate and simultaneous adoption would be imposed upon the two Governments by the realization of this eventuality.” See _Livre jaune: L’alliance franco-russe_, p. 16, No. 17, annexe; Pribram, _The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary_, II, 213; Bernadotte E. Schmitt, “Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914,” _American Historical Review_, XXIX, 459 f.]

[Footnote 712: Thayer, _The Life and Letters of John Hay_, II, 404 f.; Eckardstein, III, 115 ff.; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 497 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78, No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that date.]

[Footnote 713: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 400 f., No. 6678.]

[Footnote 714: Delcassé’s formal denial of the rumor had no effect. See Mévil, pp. 284 f.; Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 406, No. 6684.]

[Footnote 715: Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 407 ff., No. 6685; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 770.]

[Footnote 716: Delcassé informed Bertie, June 10, that the Spanish Foreign Minister “had told him that he thought that Spain, France and England, should reply to the Government of Morocco in identic terms declining the proposal” (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78, No. 96).]

[Footnote 717: The report spread in 1905 that at the French cabinet meeting on June 6 Delcassé had stated that the British government had offered an alliance to France. Lansdowne and Sanderson denied to the German government that Great Britain had ever done so. See Metternich to F. O., June 16, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 630 ff., No. 6858; Metternich to F. O., June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 635 ff., No. 6860; see also _B.D._, III, 87, No. 105; Metternich to F. O., Oct. 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 663 f., No. 6873. According to Mévil, the official apologist for Delcassé, just before the arrival of the King of Spain in Paris on May 30, the British government assured Delcassé that “the British military forces were ready to march with us [France] against Germany if that Power attacked us. Moreover, the principle of defensive co-operation once admitted, the English Government declared itself ready to sign in the shortest time an accord which would definitely fix that co-operation” (Mévil, p. 268). In a letter of March 20, 1922, Delcassé wrote as follows: “From the Entente it was possible for us in 1905 to proceed to a formal alliance with England. . . . . On June 6th the British offer of assistance had been only forty-eight hours in my possession” (quoted in the _London Times_, March 27, 1922). In connection with the Grey-Cambon correspondence of 1912, Poincaré has written: “Thus to make a joint study of the situation was the sole engagement which was made [in that correspondence]. In communicating to me the result obtained, M. Paul Cambon wrote me that at the time of Lord Lansdowne an entente of that kind would have been only a beginning. Now, however, it was the last word for the Liberal cabinet. The forced resignation of M. Delcassé had perhaps made us lose in 1905, stated M. Cambon, the opportunity for a real alliance with England. All that we were able to obtain today was this engagement to confer in the presence of danger and this hypothetical approval of the programs drawn up by the general staff.” See also J. A. Farrer, _England under Edward VII_ (London, 1922), pp. 127 f.; Mévil, pp. 269 f.; _G.P._, XX, 632 n., 664 n.; Raymond Poincaré, _Au service de la France. Neuf années de souvenirs: I. Le lendemain d’Agadir, 1912_ (Paris, 1926), p. 221. Later Lansdowne wrote on his dispatch to Bertie of May 17, 1905, as follows: “I suppose this was the origin of the offensive and defensive alliance” (_B.D._, III, 76, No. 94). His inference is probably correct only in part. The exchange of notes between Cambon and Lansdowne was sent to Bertie on May 31, 1905, and received by him on June 3. It is not apparent whether he communicated that exchange to the French government, although the “offer of assistance” which Delcassé has written of as having received only forty-eight hours before the cabinet meeting on June 6 may have been the notice of this exchange from Bertie. Word to Delcassé through the Governor-General of Algeria from King Edward, who was then cruising in the Mediterranean, urging the Foreign Minister not to resign also strengthened the latter’s hand. The King took that step on his own initiative (Newton, p. 342).]

[Footnote 718: On that cabinet meeting see the following: Mévil, pp. 293 ff.; Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 164 f.; Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 407 ff., No. 6685; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 91, No. 114; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 78, No. 96, recounting a conversation with Delcassé on that date; Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 167 ff. Cf. Bertie’s explanation of Delcassé’s fall (Bertie to Lansdowne, June 15, 1905, Newton, pp. 341 f.).]

[Footnote 719: Flotow to Bülow, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 406, No. 6684; 625, No. 6854. Cf. the report from the Belgian Minister at Paris to his government, June 8, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 62 f. See also _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 770 ff.]

[Footnote 720: Cf. _Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy_, III, 341.]

[Footnote 721: Quoted in Lee, II, 344. See also a letter from John Hay, who was then in London, to Henry Adams, June 7, 1905, quoted in Thayer, II, 405; Bertie to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _B.D._, III, 78, No. 96. Lansdowne’s reaction is expressed in Newton, p. 341.]

[Footnote 722: Bertie to Lansdowne, June 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 90, No. 111.]

[Footnote 723: Bülow’s minute to a dispatch from Flotow, June 5, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 403, No. 6681.]