Chapter III: The Franco-Spanish Entente, 1898-1903

The close of the nineteenth century found Spain at one of the lowest points in her history. She was disorganized, isolated, defeated in 1898 by the United States; her navy was destroyed; her colonial empire was shattered. Spain was particularly embittered toward Great Britain, whose Premier had openly spoken of “moribund nations” with direct reference to her, and whose attitude during the recent war had been strongly pro- American.[101] Fearful that the British might seize a Spanish port,[102] M. Silvela, head of the Conservative government, with the approval of the Liberal leaders, early in 1899 determined upon a change of policy by which Spain would seek to bring about a secret defensive alliance with France, Germany, and Russia.[103]

The sympathy of those Powers had been on the side of Spain during the recent war. But when the Premier laid the plan before them,[104] the German government was encouraging but skeptical; the French government, dilatory; the Russian government seemed not to favor it and advised Spain instead to hold closely to France.[105] Nevertheless, during the next few years the Spanish government continued its effort to realize this program, particularly a Franco-German _rapprochement_.

One of the main objects of this grouping was the defense of Spanish interests in Morocco. In spite of Spain’s colonial losses in the war of 1898, her concern over the future of that Islamic land remained active. Spain claimed a special position with reference to it, just as France did. Economic interests, the number of her subjects resident in Morocco (larger than that of any other foreign nation), geographic proximity, historical attempts at conquest, and Spanish pride were all advanced in support of this claim. Strategic reasons, reinforced by her actual possession of small bits of territory in Northern Morocco, also prompted Spain to seek control of at least the northern part of the land and above all to prevent that area from falling into the hands of France or Great Britain.[106] The Spanish leaders recognized the French interests in Morocco and the British right to participate in any settlement of the problem of the straits. But, conscious of their weakness in dealing with other Powers, they preferred to maintain the _status quo_ as long as possible unless the larger Continental grouping was consummated.

In 1899 and 1900, when M. Delcassé showed a willingness to negotiate an accord over Morocco, the Spanish government evaded the overture,[107] and settled with him only the long standing dispute over the boundary of Rio de Oro.[108] During 1901 events moved faster. In March a Liberal ministry under M. Sagasta with the Duke of Almodovar as foreign minister came into office. It saw France, unchecked by Great Britain, pushing her frontier steadily forward in the desert region back of Morocco. So it suspected the existence of a secret accord between those two Powers. The British government denied it,[109] but Spain feared that an accord might be made to her exclusion and injury. The Franco-Italian entente also aroused her alarm. In this uncertainty the Spanish government endeavored to use the presence of the Moroccan missions in Europe in June and July to bring about a _rapprochement_ between France and Germany.[110] The move failed. In August, M. Silvela published an article in _La Lectura_ advocating a solution of the Moroccan problem by agreement with France. Encouraged by this expression and urged on by M. Leon y Castillo, Spanish ambassador in Paris, the Spanish government determined to open direct negotiations with M. Delcassé on the subject.[111] And that minister was ready to listen. The negotiations progressed slowly, not only because M. Delcassé was disinclined to concede to Spain the territory which she desired,[112] but also because he was treating with Italy and, to the disgust of the Spanish Ambassador, with Great Britain at the same time.[113] By September, 1902, the main lines of the accord were agreed upon. Then came further discussion over details; and, after a last effort (October, 1902) by M. Leon y Castillo to bring France and Germany together had failed, the accord was ready for signing early in December.

By the terms of the agreement Spain was to receive the region of the Sus in the south and almost all of the old kingdom of Fez, including the capital and Tangier in the north, as her sphere of influence, while the rest was to constitute that of France. The two governments agreed upon a policy of pacific penetration of the land, and the French government promised its diplomatic support to Spain in the execution of the treaty.[114]

The failure of this agreement was an accident. On December 1 the Duke of Almodovar was called away from Madrid. Before he could return and issue instructions to sign the treaty, his government unexpectedly fell (December 3).[115] The incoming Conservative ministry under M. Silvela with M. Abarzuza at the foreign office refused to complete the accord. Although they recognized its advantages to Spain, they feared the possible attitude of Great Britain and decided to sound her out before completing the treaty. Upon doing so they were informed by Lord Lansdowne, early in January, 1903, that in case of a break-up of Morocco, Spain “would be entitled to a voice in any new international arrangements” over that land, but that the British government was strongly opposed to any discussion of such an eventuality at that moment.[116] In February, 1903, M. Abarzuza revealed the nature of the Franco-Spanish negotiations to the British Ambassador, and asked for an official British objection to it so that he (M. Abarzuza) would be in a firmer position to refuse his signature.[117] Lord Lansdowne replied as follows:

We regard it as of the utmost importance that Spain and Great Britain should act together in regard to Morocco. . . . . I have more than once informed French Ambassador here that we deprecated attempts to bring about a virtual partition of Morocco. . . . . We should certainly not tolerate an attempt to deal with Morocco without regard to British interests.[118]

Thus while M. Delcassé was assuring the Spanish government that their agreement could be concluded without fear since Great Britain was interested only in Tangier,[119] the Spanish Foreign Minister was being informed to the contrary by Lord Lansdowne himself. As M. Abarzuza did not believe in the possibility of an Anglo-French agreement over Morocco, he let the negotiations with France fall through.[120]

Immediately thereafter, however, arose a report of Anglo-French conversations for that very purpose. In alarm the Spanish government questioned the British Foreign Secretary and received the following assurance: “We are quite willing to enter into an agreement with the Spanish Government that neither will commit itself to any settlement of Moorish question without previously consulting the other.”[121]

As it developed later, Spain lost by relying upon Great Britain and not concluding this accord. For the British promise was too general to be of much value, and after the Anglo-French agreement was made, Spain had to accept the territory which the two Powers had reserved for her. Her portion was naturally not as large as before, nor were the terms as favorable. For France and M. Delcassé, on the other hand, it was fortunate that the project failed. The resulting agreement would have been strongly opposed by the French as too advantageous to Spain.[122] France obtained better terms by first arriving at a settlement with Great Britain. But the _rapprochement_ between the two Latin Powers was an actuality, and that had been one of M. Delcassé’s main objects.

[Footnote 101: In 1898 Chamberlain publicly advocated an alliance with the United States. See Jerónimo Becker, _Historia de Marruecos_ (Madrid, 1915), pp. 414 f.; Wolff to Salisbury, May 15, 1898, _B.D._, II, 253, No. 300.]

[Footnote 102: Early in 1899 Silvela asserted to the ambassadors of Germany, France, and Russia that if Great Britain and France had gone to war in the previous year, the former had intended to occupy Vigo (_G.P._, XV, Vol. Nos. 4205-8). When this fear was brought to the attention of the British government, by an exchange of notes with the Spanish government it denied any such intention. See Wolff to Salisbury, March 10, 1899, _B.D._, II, 255 f., No. 305; Salisbury to Wolff, March 16, 1899, _ibid._, 256, No. 306; Conde de Romanones, _Las responsabilidades politicas del antique régimen de 1875 á 1923_ (Madrid, ——), p. 36; Becker, pp. 415 f. The British and Spanish governments also found by an exchange of views in January, 1899, that they both wished to maintain the _status quo_ in Morocco. The Spanish diplomat and historian, Becker, has written that they were about to make an agreement to that effect when the Liberal government in Spain fell from power (March, 1899) (_op. cit._, p. 415; Salisbury to Wolff, Jan. 11, 1899, _B.D._, II, 255, No. 304).]

[Footnote 103: The plan was approved by Sagasta, leader of the Liberals, by Leon y Castillo, the Liberal ambassador at Paris, and by the Queen Regent. See Alberto Mousset, _La politica exterior de España, 1873-1918_ (Madrid, 1918), chap. v; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, April 15, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 115 ff., No. 4205; Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, _ibid._, 119 ff., No. 4206; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _ibid._, 125 ff., No. 4210; and others in _ibid._, chap. ic. Cf. F. de Leon y Castillo, _Mis tiempos_ (Madrid, 1921), II, 255, written after the World War.]

[Footnote 104: Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 28, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 125 ff., No. 4210; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Aug. 12, 1899, _ibid._, 127 ff., No. 4211.]

[Footnote 105: Bülow to Radowitz, April 27, 1899, _ibid._, 119 ff., No. 4206; Bülow to Radowitz, May 16, 1899, _ibid._, 124 f., No. 4209; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899, _ibid._, 130 ff., No. 4214; Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 24, 1899, _ibid._, 133 f., No. 4213; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Feb. 4, 1900, _ibid._, 134 f., No. 4214.]

[Footnote 106: Romanones, pp. 34 f.; Gabriel Maura, _La question du Maroc au point de vue espagnol_ (Paris, 1911), pp. 1 ff.; Becker, pp. 446 ff., esp. chap. lxi; Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._, pp. 123 ff.; Emile Vidal, _La politique de l’Espagne au Maroc_ (Montpellier, 1913), pp. 1 ff.; M. Ribera, “L’Espagne et la question du Maroc,” _Questions diplomatiques et coloniales_, Jan. 1, 1902, pp. 46 ff.]

[Footnote 107: This is asserted by Becker although he does not cite his authority. See Becker, pp. 414, 419; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, May 10, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 123 f., No. 4208; Radowitz to Hohenlohe, Oct. 5, 1899, _ibid._, 130 ff., No. 4212; Tschirschky to Hohenlohe, Oct. 23, 1899, _ibid._, 133 f., No. 4213; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, XVIII, 301 f., No. 5157; Wolff to Salisbury, Oct. 11, 1900, _B.D._, II, 258, No. 311; Becker, p. 426; Romanones, p. 39.]

[Footnote 108: Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre, etc._, p. 237; Mousset, pp. 121 ff.; Romanones, p. 38; Delcassé’s statement in the French Senate, Feb. 11, 1901, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 295; Leon y Castillo, II, 143 ff.]

[Footnote 109: Durand to Lansdowne, April 13, 1901, _B.D._, II, 259 f., No. 314; Lansdowne to Durand, April 16, 1901, _ibid._, 260, No. 315.]

[Footnote 110: See below.]

[Footnote 111: Romanones, pp. 40 ff.; Mousset, pp. 132 ff.; Becker, pp. 425 ff.; Vidal, p. 138; Leon y Castillo, II, 173 ff., 122 ff. See also a speech of the Duke of Almodovar in the Spanish Chamber, June 8, 1904, _Diario de las sesiones de Cortes, Legislatura de 1903_ (Congreso de los Diputados), pp. 4919 ff.; speech by Romanones in the same, June 7, 1904, _ibid._, p. 4883; Radolin to Bülow, June 15, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 777 f., No. 5870.]

[Footnote 112: Romanones, p. 41.]

[Footnote 113: _G.P._, XVII, 343, editor’s note; Becker, p. 427.]

[Footnote 114: Leon y Castillo was allowed a free hand in those negotiations. See Romanones, pp. 41 f.; Becker, pp. 427 f.; Mousset, p. 135; speeches by Almodovar and Romanones in the Spanish Chamber, June 7, 8, 1904, _Sesiones del Congreso, Legislatura_, pp. 4883, 4944 f., 4917 ff.; exchange of letters between Silvela and Almodovar published in _L’Imparcial_, June, 1904, and reprinted in Leon y Castillo, II, 185 ff. The result was shown to Silvela early in September, 1902, and received his entire approval, “provided one treats of a work of peace and concord guaranteed against all suspicion and opposition of friendly Powers.” The exact terms of the proposed accord are not known, only the main points. See R. Gay de Montella, _España ante el problema del Mediterráneo_ (Barcelona, 1917), pp. 40 ff., quoting an article by Leon y Castillo in _Mercurio_, May 27, 1917; André Tardieu, “France et Espagne, 1902-1912,” _Revue des deux mondes_, Dec. 1, 1912, pp. 635 f.; Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 14, 1903, _B.D._, II, 279, No. 336; Lansdowne to Monson, Aug. 5, 1903, April 29, May 13, 1904, _ibid._, 306 ff., No. 364; III, 33, No. 34; 35, No. 37; Monson to Lansdowne, May 20, 1904, _ibid._, 37, No. 41; Lansdowne to Egerton, April 27, 1904, _ibid._, 31 f., No. 32; Leon y Castillo, II, 177 ff.]

[Footnote 115: Mousset, p. 135; Leon y Castillo, II, 128.]

[Footnote 116: On this question see a speech by Maura, minister of foreign affairs, in the Spanish Chamber, June 9, 1904, _Sesiones del Congreso, Legislatura_, p. 4959; Becker, pp. 429 f.; Tardieu, p. 635; Durand to Lansdowne, Jan. 3, 1903, _B.D._, II, 276 f., No. 332; Lansdowne to Durand, Jan. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 277, No. 333; Durand to Lansdowne, Jan. 17, 1903, _ibid._, 278, No. 335; Metternich to F. O., Dec. 31, 1902, _G.P._, XVII, 247 f., No. 5192; Groeben to F. O., Sept. 17, 1903, _ibid._, 353 f., No. 5198 and note; Monson to Lansdowne, April 22, 1904, _B.D._, III, 30, No. 30; Leon y Castillo, II, 179 f. There is a story that Silvela tried to change the basis of the accord in such a way as also to obtain Russian support for Spain against Great Britain and that he was willing to enter the anti-British camp. His proposal to spend eight hundred million _pesetas_ in the building of a navy pointed in this direction; but that there is anything to the tale seems doubtful. See Mousset, pp. 137 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 635 f.; Anonymous, “Una nouva alleanza,” _Nouva antologia_, Aug. 1, 1903, pp. 511.]

[Footnote 117: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 14, 1903, _B.D._, II, 279, No. 336.]

[Footnote 118: Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 16, 21, 1903, _ibid._, 279 f., No. 337; 280, No. 339.]

[Footnote 119: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, _ibid._, 280, No. 338.]

[Footnote 120: See Tardieu, p. 635; Leon y Castillo, II, 179 f.]

[Footnote 121: Durand to Lansdowne, Feb. 21, 1903, _B.D._, II, 280, No. 338; Lansdowne to Durand, Feb. 21, 1903, _ibid._, 280, No. 339; Lansdowne to Durand, March 29, 1903, _ibid._, 282, No. 334; Leon y Castillo, II, 180.]

[Footnote 122: Maura, p. 88; speeches by Ribot and Deschanel in the French Chamber, March 11, Nov. 19, 1903, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, pp. 793, 1111 f.; Millet, _Notre politique extérieure_, pp. 193 ff.; Pinon, _France et Allemagne_, pp. 143 f.]