Chapter IX: Germany and the Entente Cordiale, 1903-4

I

In the early part of 1903, although one of Germany’s allies was rent by nationalistic conflicts[399] and the other was no longer reliable, and although British and German public opinion remained so hostile that the former prevented Anglo-German co-operation,[400] Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein were untroubled about the international situation. Upon the announcement of King Edward’s forthcoming visit to Paris, the latter wrote to his chief, on April 2, that an Anglo-French alliance was “music of the future,” and that the Franco-Russian alliance was slowly breaking under the strain of conflicting interests in the Balkans. “We have blocked M. Delcassé’s policy in Turkey as well as in Morocco,” he stated. The Chancellor agreed with him.

Delcassé’s coquetting with England [he wrote] would become serious for us only in case he should also succeed in bringing about a _rapprochement_ between England and Russia. . . . . Otherwise his wooing of England will . . . . strengthen Count Lamsdorff in the thought that the former League of the Three Emperors is, all things considered, the best combination for Russian autocracy. But the present groupings will not change soon, and in my opinion, we cannot take things too coolly.[401]

Soon after King Edward’s visit to Paris the equanimity of the German government was somewhat disturbed by a dispatch of May 10 from Baron Eckardstein, formerly first secretary of the German embassy in London. The Baron expressed his belief that a general Anglo-French settlement of colonial differences including that of Morocco was under way; and that since the two nations were reconciled, it would very likely be concluded. He denied that this agreement would cause a breach in the Dual Alliance, as was supposed in Germany; rather, he wrote, “a new Triple Alliance is being formed, which, although it may assume no written form and perhaps may endure only for a number of years, will for a time cause us everywhere at least economic and political difficulties.”[402]

This dispatch was referred by Count Bülow to the German ambassadors at St. Petersburg, Paris, and London, and to the first secretary of the embassy in London for consideration. Not one of these men believed possible an Anglo-Russian settlement or the formation of a new Triple Alliance. The Chancellor and Prince Radolin, the ambassador at Paris, were both very skeptical about the prospects for an Anglo-French agreement; but the German representatives in London thought that one might be achieved. Count Metternich’s opinion was that Great Britain and France were merely negotiating another colonial accord, which he admitted might lead to closer co-operation between them, but which need not cause alarm so long as Great Britain, already pacifically inclined, enjoyed only the fickle friendship of France and was confronted by the antagonism of Russia.[403]

In September the German government believed that the Anglo-French settlement was already far advanced;[404] and, learning from the Spanish Queen Mother, who was visiting in Austria, that France and Spain were also negotiating over Morocco,[405] it resolved to intervene. To that end on September 24 it instructed Herr von Radowitz, German ambassador at Madrid, as follows:

By virtue of our political international position and especially by virtue of the great significance of our economic interests in Morocco, we must seek to be considered also in a division of the land by obtaining territorial compensation, for example in the region of the Sus, or elsewhere in the colonial world, perhaps by the cession of Fernando Po. Your Excellency should weigh thoroughly the means by which we should best reach that goal, whether through direct negotiations with Spain, through breaking the way for participation in the negotiations of the most interested states, or through proposing a conference.[406]

Thus the German government, realizing the improvement in the diplomatic position of France and the decline in its own, was apparently willing to make a division of Morocco with Great Britain, France, and Spain.

When Herr von Radowitz immediately unfolded the German desire to the Spanish Foreign Minister, the latter, admitting the German right to a share, agreed to study the proposal.[407] After this the conversations appear to have ceased.

Simultaneously with these efforts, in the autumn of 1903 the German government planned by maintaining strict reserve to allow the Franco- Russian antagonism about the Balkans and the Russo-Japanese hostility in the Far East to grow. It thought that any German leanings toward Russia would pull France back into line and cause Japan to recede before the danger of a new Continental triple entente.[408] On the Chancellor’s advice, William II, during his meeting with the Czar at Wiesbaden and Wolfsgarten on November 4-5, 1903, kept Germany’s hands entirely free. Nevertheless, after the Czar’s approval of the Anglo-French and the Franco-Italian _rapprochements_ was made public late in October, the Emperor began to suffer from the “nightmare of the coalitions.” During the visit he sought to incite Nicholas II against France and Great Britain and to urge him further into far eastern enterprises. In his correspondence with the Czar in December and January he continued these tactics.[409] Count Bülow remonstrated, but the Emperor, haughtily replying that these were private letters, advised the Chancellor to mind his own business.[410]

To the satisfaction of the German government,[411] the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February, 1904. In anger at Great Britain, Russia immediately drew nearer to her neighbor;[412] and, with a war in progress, the German statesmen planned by a wise manipulation of their power to improve their international position and to gain concrete advantages.[413] For the time, however, they endeavored by assuring the British government that Germany would preserve strict neutrality to obviate the need for Great Britain to come to terms with France, arguing that a neutral Germany would entail a neutral France.[414] Moreover, carrying out a suggestion of the Prince of Monaco, the _Wilhelmstrasse_ sought to effect, through the mediation of the Italian government, a meeting between the Emperor William and President Loubet of France during their visits to Italy in March and April.[415] But on March 23 Prince Radolin surprised his government[416] by reporting a conversation with M. Delcassé which showed that the Anglo-French agreement was near completion. By March 26 it became evident that the French had refused to permit the proposed meeting.[417] So Count Bülow recommended to the Emperor on March 30 the dispatch of three small warships to Tangier as a direct intervention in the Moroccan affair. By thus arousing French animosity, Germany would show Great Britain that the formation of a Continental _bloc_ was impossible, that there was no cause for her to sacrifice her interests in Morocco.[418] The Emperor regarded the move as “entirely inopportune”; for, he argued, since France, Great Britain, and Spain were about to settle the Moroccan question, “a one-sided bellicose action by Germany . . . . would undoubtedly arouse the suspicion of those Powers, would undermine belief in our repeatedly expressed assurance, reiterated to the King of Spain at Vigo, that we claim no exclusive rights in Morocco, and would put the stamp of duplicity upon our policy.” He suggested that if the government wished to take action in Morocco, it should first consult those three Powers and secure their co-operation.[419]

Without relinquishing the idea, Count Bülow had to content himself for the time with a renewed declaration to the British Ambassador on April 6 of neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War.[420] On April 8 the Anglo- French accord was signed.

II

German public opinion was disquieted by the Anglo-French agreement and by the Franco-Italian intimacy. Apart from the “lunatic fringe” as represented by the Pan-German League, which demanded an immediate seizure of a portion of Morocco,[421] no one expressed particular concern over the loss of that country.[422] The scandals in the colonial administration and the costly war with the natives of German Southwest and German East Africa had momentarily turned the nation against further colonial ventures.[423] The new international alignments, however, were viewed by the nation with some alarm. In the Reichstag on April 12 Herr Sattler, a National Liberal and a supporter of the government, expressed satisfaction that the Triple Alliance remained firm; but, he continued, “one has the feeling that otherwise a transformation has occurred in the relations of the great Powers which can be of the gravest influence also on German relations.” On the next day the Nationalist Count Reventlow sarcastically remarked that he could not understand why Germany should rejoice since France and Great Britain had settled their differences. “If the world is divided, we must assume a somewhat different attitude thereto,” he declared; “even in prudent circles of our people the course of our foreign policy is being followed with national sorrow,” for the government was trying to be overcordial to all without gaining anything. Herr Bebel, the Social Democratic leader, greeted the Anglo-French settlement on April 14; but he also regarded it as weakening the Triple Alliance and strengthening the Dual Alliance. Like Count Reventlow, he said that Germany’s international position in the last few years had in no way improved, acknowledging with regret the increasing antipathy to Germany in foreign lands.[424]

Count Bülow endeavored to calm the public opinion by declaring in the Reichstag, April 12 and 14, that “we have no reason to suppose that the Anglo-French colonial accord is directed at any other Power.” To this apparently “amicable understanding . . . . from the standpoint of German interests we have nothing to object.” As to Morocco, “in the main” Germany had economic interests which “we must and shall protect. . . . . We have no cause to fear that these . . . . could be disregarded or injured by any Power.” While scoffing at the allegation that Germany was isolated, he added: “If we keep our sword sharp, we need not fear isolation very much. Germany is too strong not to be able to make alliances. Many combinations are possible for us.” Denying any thought of waging a war over Morocco, he upheld a policy of “prudent quiet and even of reserve”; but he concluded with the significant statement that “if one wishes to arouse friction in the world, one does not shout it from the house-tops. Frederick the Great may now and then have made a Machiavellian move in politics, but he previously wrote the Anti- Machiavelli.”[425]

The Chancellor’s speech expressed only a temporary acquiescence in the Anglo-French agreement, an intimation to France and Great Britain to consult Germany over Morocco.[426] The German government liked that accord less than the German people did, even though it knew nothing of the content of the secret articles. The Emperor feared that now Great Britain “would put every consideration for us more and more into the background.”[427] And Count Bülow, who knew that the new alignment placed Germany in no actual danger,[428] admitted that “doubtlessly both Powers [France and Great Britain] win in international influence and in freedom of movement by this accord and by their _rapprochement_, and that the drawing force of the Anglo-French Entente on Italy will also be strengthened.”[429] The prospective loss of Morocco to Germany and the general dissatisfaction within Germany over the conduct of her foreign affairs accentuated Count Bülow’s ill will toward the new agreement.

III

The Chancellor’s prophecy about Italy came true almost immediately.

Italy’s policy was, of course, to play between the Triple Alliance and France for her own advantage. Italian opinion interpreted the Anglo- French _rapprochement_, following upon the Franco-Italian entente, as a setback to Germany, and became more independent toward its allies. After Italy’s special interest in the future of Tripoli was recognized, the Italian people raised the irredentist question in the summer and autumn of 1903. In the winter relations with Austria became so tense that war clouds loomed up.[430] Count Goluchowski, the Austrian foreign minister, desired to replace the Triple Alliance by the old League of the Three Emperors, and declared that if the present relations with Italy continued, Austria could not renew the alliance.[431]

Count Bülow succeeded in patching up the raveling fabric of the Triple Alliance.[432] He suspected that Italy had made a reinsurance treaty with France after the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1902, by which the alliance was nullified in case of a Franco-German war.[433] Neither he nor General Schlieffen, German chief of staff, expected Italy to support Germany in that instance or even to hold inactive the French troops on the Italian frontier. None the less, at the request of the Italian chief of staff, the Chancellor permitted the German-Italian military conversations to continue as before.[434] He endeavored to preserve at least the outward appearance of harmony.[435]

But in the spring of 1904 the Triple Alliance almost went on the rocks over an intrinsically insignificant affair—whether or not the entertainment of the French and of the German chiefs of state, who were both to visit Italy at about the same time in March and April, should be on a similar scale.

After the Emperor’s visit on March 26-27 had passed off quietly enough[436] the French government sought to expand the program of reception for President Loubet in order to demonstrate the great popularity of France in Italy,[437] while the German government endeavored to restrict it. Under threat of breaking the alliance, the latter forced M. Tittoni, the Italian foreign minister, to promise that Italy’s loyalty to the Triple Alliance would be warmly mentioned in the toasts.[438] But when the visit occurred, April 24-28, the Italian King, playing his own hand, helped the French to enjoy an unbroken triumph.[439] On April 25 and 26 affection for them was extravagantly displayed by the Italians while no mention of the Triple Alliance was made.[440] In an endeavor to stop further exchange of toasts, the German ambassador, Count Monts, complained bitterly to M. Luzzati, Italian secretary of the treasury, of the pro-French attitude of the King, government, and press; of the non-fulfilment of promises; of the King’s ignoring him at the festivals; of the failure to mention the alliance in the speeches. “My training and instructions prohibit me from using that tone toward the _Consulta_ which would correspond with its behavior,” he declared. He demanded that no more toasts be made.[441]

Doubtless this peremptoriness would have produced the desired result if at the crucial moment the German Emperor had not sent a telegram of warm thanks for his reception to the Italian government and nullified the entire effect of the Ambassador’s indignation.[442] At Naples the King again exchanged toasts with M. Loubet without mentioning the alliance.

Although the demands of the German government had been flouted, it could not execute its threat; for a dissolution of the Triple Alliance, occurring so soon after the conclusion of the Entente Cordiale, would have been too great a victory for France. “One would say,” wrote Count Bülow, “that our policy since the retirement of Bismarck has lost us first the alliance with Russia, then good relations with England, and finally the Triple Alliance itself.”[443] So, feigning cool indifference toward the renegade ally, he remarked to the Italian Ambassador that as the conditions out of which the Triple Alliance had developed no longer obtained, Germany had no need of Italy’s aid, nor, he supposed, had Italy of Germany’s.[444] Then came apologies. On May 18 M. Tittoni declared in the Italian Chamber that “the policy of Italy is not one of balancing, which would be unworthy of a great state, but one of loyal honesty. The alliance with Germany is not incompatible with friendly relations with France.”[445] Although the German government did not believe him, it accepted his excuses. The Triple Alliance resumed its precarious course.[446]

As a result of this episode, the anger of the German government at France, already aroused over the diminution of German influence through the Entente Cordiale, was increased. The Emperor, who had tarried near the Italian coast in the persistent hope of a chance meeting with M. Loubet,[447] returned home feeling like the poor kinsman uninvited to the feast. On May 1, at the opening of the new Rhine bridge at Mainz, he gave vent to his chagrin in the following warning: “I desire sincerely that peace . . . . be kept. But I am convinced that if this bridge should have to be used for more serious transports, it would stand the test completely.”[448]

IV

“We need a success in our foreign policy,” wrote Prince Lichnowsky, councilor in the German foreign office, on April 14, “because the Anglo- French understanding as well as the Franco-Italian _rapprochement_ is generally considered a defeat for us.”[449] The German government immediately took steps toward obtaining that success.

To manifest its dissatisfaction at being excluded from the Moroccan settlement and to force M. Delcassé to agree with Germany on that question, the German government first considered in April the project of dispatching a warship to Tangier, ostensibly to settle certain grievances against Morocco.[450] As a precaution, General Schlieffen, chief of staff, was consulted, April 19, about the possibility of success in case of a Franco-German war. Herr von Holstein summed up the General’s reply as follows: “In case of the outbreak of a Franco-German war at the present, Russia’s participation would be improbable, but England’s attitude would be uncertain.”[451]

The proposal was not executed at the time,[452] for Count Bülow had other plans. The first one was to test the strength of the Entente Cordiale, to weaken its force, and to include Germany among the Powers making ententes by endeavoring to negotiate an arbitration treaty and a general settlement with Great Britain similar to the Anglo-French ones. If accord, even in principle, were reached on Anglo-German difficulties, the Chancellor was willing to propose a naval agreement. He felt certain that by careful handling he could win the Emperor’s approval of the whole transaction.[453]

The opportunity to make the proposal was afforded when about the first of May the British government asked the other Powers interested in Egypt to approve the changes which France had accepted in the declaration of April 8. The German foreign office replied that Germany must receive the same guaranty of her rights in Egypt that France had received, and proposed to include in the negotiations the Anglo-German troubles concerning Samoa, Transvaal indemnities, and the Canadian preferential tariff.

The British government refused to broaden the basis of negotiations, declaring that the Egyptian affair must be settled on its own merits. How Lord Lansdowne regarded the German proposal was shown in his letter of May 6 to Sir Frank Lascelles.

The proposal of the German Government to make their concurrence in regard to the Khedivial Decree dependent upon an all-round settlement [he wrote] . . . . looks to an ordinary observer like a great piece of effrontery. . . . . The suggestion that the consent of the German Government to a perfectly innocuous arrangement in Egypt can only be bought at the price of concessions elsewhere does not become more palatable when we find it connected with an intimation that Germany is hesitating whether “she shall turn to the East or to the West.” This is a veiled threat of which I remember Hatzfeldt used to be fond.[454]

Pointing out the fact that Germany held only a very small per cent of the Egyptian bonds (he said only ¼ per cent), that the other Powers had agreed to the Egyptian changes unconditionally, and that France had made reciprocal concessions to Great Britain in return for the guaranty of her rights in Egypt, Lord Lansdowne refused to give Germany the special guaranty which she requested.[455]

Count Bülow agreed (May 28) to confine the negotiations to Egypt alone; but he would not recede from the other demands. For, he argued, France had been given large compensation in return for her renunciations in Egypt while Germany merely asked an equal assurance of her rights and interests in that land, particularly of her commercial interests. Thus the two governments reached a deadlock. Each felt that it had a just grievance.[456] Herr von Holstein, considering the occasion a “test of strength,” thought that if Germany receded, the world would perceive that sharp handling was sufficient to vanquish her.[457] Count Metternich reported, however, that the British refusal was caused not by any malign designs against Germany, but rather by the fact that the government was opposed to weakening or endangering the Entente Cordiale by treating Germany in the same way as France, and by the fact that it saw no reason for making an exception of Germany after the other Powers had unconditionally accepted the modifications. Above all, he wrote, the British government feared another outburst of vituperation against Germany from British public opinion and of indignation against the British government itself for permitting Germany again to browbeat it.[458] So about the middle of June at the Count’s suggestion, a compromise was effected. The British government gave Germany a guaranty of its Egyptian interests in return for an acceptance of the French obligations in that land. The other Powers were to be asked to approve this new agreement.[459]

Late in June King Edward enjoyed a pleasant visit as the Emperor’s guest at a naval review at Kiel; on July 10, at the King’s suggestion, some German warships touched at Plymouth; and on July 12 an arbitration treaty was signed between the two Powers. Their relations seemed to be improving. At Kiel, Count Bülow once more assured the King that Germany intended to guard strict neutrality during the Russo-Japanese War; and Edward VII declared that “no special agreements were needed between England and Germany since no conflict of political interests divided them.” He also stated that he wished a settlement with Russia, in fact, that he desired to diminish animosities among all Powers; but he added that he had no thought thereby of isolating Germany.[460]

In spite of the King’s cordial words, the fact remained that Germany was still regarded with marked mistrust and antipathy by the British people, while the British government had shown a preference, not yet appreciated by Germany, for the friendship of France. Germany’s bid to participate in the formation of ententes had failed.

V

Count Bülow’s second plan was to share in the settlement of the Moroccan problem. He had made preparations to that end in the previous autumn, but his policy had been repudiated by the German Emperor (who personally had no interest in Morocco)[461] during an interview with the King of Spain at Vigo on March 16, 1904. In one of his expansive and oracular moods William II advised the youthful King to keep on good terms with France and to make his first foreign visit to Paris, to be on his guard against Great Britain and her satellite, Portugal, but to maintain friendly personal relations with King Edward, and to come to an agreement over the future of Morocco with the other nations, especially France, interested in North Africa. Germany, he said, aimed at no territorial acquisitions in North Africa, but only the maintenance of the open door for, among others, “railway concessions, open ports, and importation of manufactured articles.”[462]

In spite of the Emperor’s renunciation, Count Bülow did not relinquish his ambitions although the difficulty of realizing them was enormously increased. The indefiniteness and apparent duplicity of the German policy on the Moroccan question were caused by Count Bülow’s dilemma of gaining a share in Morocco without violating the Emperor’s assertions.

Late in April, 1904, the Chancellor was afforded an opportunity to intervene through Spain, whose government asked for Germany’s sympathy and “practical proof of it at the opportune moment” during the Franco- Spanish negotiations then under way. Count Bülow was eager to fish in troubled waters by lending aid, and in his optimism went so far as to instruct Herr von Radowitz on April 29 as follows:

Port Mahon we leave entirely out of consideration. Primarily Fernando Po interests us, for which under circumstances we would also pay well. If, moreover, a harbor in West Morocco is obtainable, that would be very useful. Perhaps Your Excellency can use the prevailing opinion in Spain against the Anglo-French accord in this direction.[463]

The Chancellor advised the Spanish government to draw out the negotiations; for, he argued, if Great Britain were given time in which to recover from her fear that the far eastern entente of 1895 might be renewed, she would begin to rue her bargain, and would at least passively support Spain or acquiesce in the latter’s receiving better terms from the more powerful France.[464] When the Chancellor heard of difficulty between the two negotiating Powers over the control of Tangier, he decided to give diplomatic support to Spain in obtaining that port and its hinterland provided Great Britain was not obliged to aid France diplomatically in acquiring them. In other words, he was making it very easy for Great Britain to sin against her obligations to France. When the German Ambassador sounded Lord Lansdowne early in June, the latter, while not objecting, made it evident that he preferred and expected a satisfactory settlement directly between the two Powers themselves.[465] By June 10 the German government learned that this matter had been arranged, but that trouble had arisen over the question of publishing the agreement. Count Bülow immediately urged Spain in favor of it.[466] On June 17 Herr von Radowitz reported that Spain was insisting upon complete commercial freedom in Morocco without the thirty years’ limitation. As this was also a sensitive point for Germany Count Bülow on the next day instructed the Ambassador to advise Spain strongly to insist upon the assurance of the fullest economic freedom even for obtaining government contracts and concessions. He left it to Herr von Radowitz to determine “whether it would be advantageous for the achievement of the German goal to let the Spanish perceive that Germany would assume and maintain the same standpoint at the proper moment.” “Naturally,” he added for the Ambassador’s personal information, “it would be . . . . a great help to us for Spain to take the lead.”[467]

By July, however, there seemed little prospect of Germany’s profiting from the Franco-Spanish negotiations.[468] German grievances against Morocco remained unsettled. German firms trading there demanded protection against the French monopolistic actions. In June, France practically gained control over the Sultan’s finances, and she was preparing an important mission to Fez in the autumn. Nor did M. Delcassé show any inclination to open negotiations with Germany. Already disgruntled at the French Foreign Minister, the German government came to feel itself slighted and humiliated by his disregard. Its resentment toward him became concentrated upon the one grievance which could be best supported in public, that he was infringing upon Germany’s economic interests in Morocco. It therefore decided to assume a more active policy, and late in July held a discussion of ways and means. The government did not follow up a hint from the Sultan for co-operation because of its unsettled claims against Morocco. Nor could it tender him financial support or begin an economic penetration of the land similar to that of France because, as Baron Richthofen wrote late in July, “the German banks all strike immediately when one mentions Morocco. The German Foreign Secretary advised against keeping pace with every act of the French in Morocco as too venturesome; while to take the initiative directly with the French government by requesting guaranties for economic freedom he regarded as both doubtful of success and beneath German dignity. So at the Baron’s suggestion a “gradual, purely matter- of-fact advance, ignoring as long as possible a special position of France,” was decided upon. German warships should appear from time to time in Moroccan waters, and during one of these visits the grievances against Morocco should be settled.[469]

The uncertain international situation also caused the German government to proceed warily. On June 3 the Belgian Minister at Berlin had stated to the German foreign office that he suspected the presence of a secret article in the Anglo-French accord concerning the Rheinish frontier. Although believing that the agreement did contain secret clauses regarding Egypt, Count Metternich refused to credit this suspicion. Upon mentioning the rumor to Lord Lansdowne on June 19, he received a full denial that the accord contained any articles which concerned European complications.[470] Nevertheless, the Chancellor realized that “any attempt on the part of Germany to interfere in the Moroccan question in its present phase can lead to an action with far-reaching consequences and therefore deserves special precaution.”[471] For that reason he first sought to learn how the British government regarded its obligations to France with respect to Morocco.[472]

On August 15 Count Metternich declared to Lord Lansdowne that “the French effort aimed at a monopolization in Morocco. We could not permit this.” Asserting that Germany was in no way bound by the Anglo-French agreement, he said that Germany’s economic interests in regard to governmental concessions and industrial enterprises in Morocco were endangered by France. “We could very soon be put in a situation in which we should have to protect our commercial interests [in the widest sense] against France.” He asked Lord Lansdowne how the British government interpreted the last part of Article IV of the Anglo-French declaration stating that concessions for roads, etc., in Morocco were to be granted “only on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the State over these great undertakings of public interest,” and Article IX obliging Great Britain to lend diplomatic aid to France.

Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain had renounced her right to share in the concessions in Morocco, but he refused to interpret Article IX until a concrete instance arose. He declared that in the French agreement

we [Great Britain] made no attempt to dispose of the rights of other Powers, although we made certain concessions in respect of the rights and opportunities to which we were ourselves entitled. I could at any rate say that it was not at all probable that, if any third Power were to have occasion to uphold its Treaty rights, we should use our influence in derogation of them.

Count Metternich inferred from that interview that Lord Lansdowne would limit the scope of Article IX, and that in case Germany’s actions did not infringe upon the Sultan’s authority Germany would be safe in opposing France in Morocco. However, he wrote, if Germany sought, for instance, to acquire control of a harbor there, Great Britain would support France. He warned his government that Great Britain would not connive at blocking the French advance in Morocco or endanger her friendship for the sake of that land. If a third Power disputed politically the French position there, both government and people would support France. Within those limits Germany could execute her Moroccan policy. But, he continued, “in the present international situation, it will be difficult for us to arrest the process of France’s establishing herself in Morocco.”[473]

Even before receiving Count Metternich’s reply, the Chancellor proposed to dispatch an ultimatum to the Sultan demanding under threat of a naval demonstration that he satisfy the German claims within three months.[474] But the Emperor, who remained strongly opposed to active interference in the Moroccan affair, refused his consent for the third time, and upset the Chancellor’s policy.[475] In September the foreign office discussed the plan to seize the Moroccan transport ship and even Agadir, but nothing was done.[476] Early in October Baron Richthofen suggested that since the Emperor was so averse to intervention the government should take up the Moroccan question directly with the French government. This project also came to naught.[477]

While no action was taken German feeling continued to smolder. The noncommittal communication from the French government about the agreement with Spain early in October[478] and the repeated petitions of German firms for the defense of their interests in Morocco[479] augmented the bitterness against France. So while the German government itself played the sphinx, it showed its resentment through the semiofficial press and through conversations between German and French officials in Morocco and elsewhere. By the end of the year the Moroccan question was still very much alive. As an influential Moor remarked, “Germany has not yet spoken, and so long as that has not occurred, we cannot believe that anything definite has been decided.”[480] Before Germany did speak, she endeavored to solve her difficulties by an effort to ally with Russia.

[Footnote 399: See among others Richard Charmatz, _Österreichs äussere und innere Politik von 1895 bis 1914_ (Leipzig and Berlin, 1918).]

[Footnote 400: On the state of British public opinion see Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, II, 397 f.; and the various dispatches from Metternich and Eckardstein, _G.P._, XVII, Nos. 5046, 5071, 5094, 5104, 5371, 5375, and others.]

[Footnote 401: Holstein to Bülow, March 30, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 573 n.; memo. by Holstein, April, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 802 ff., No. 5888; Holstein to Bülow, April 2, 1903, _ibid._, 838 f., No. 5910; Bülow to F. O., April 3, 1903, _ibid._, 839 f., No. 5911.]

[Footnote 402: An ardent advocate of the proposed Anglo-German alliance and a sufferer from the “nightmare of coalitions,” Eckardstein had resigned his position in October, 1902, because he disapproved of the diplomatic method and the policy of his foreign office and “saw black ahead” for his country; also perhaps because of personal pique at not having been appointed ambassador in London upon the death of the aged Count Hatzfeldt (Eckardstein, II, 412 f.). For his dispatch to Bülow see _G.P._, XVII, 567 f., No. 5369; also published with minor changes in Eckardstein, II, 425 f. The few changes from the original which occur in some of the documents in Eckardstein’s memoirs are not of any great importance. On the whole his judgments were sound.]

[Footnote 403: The dispatches are to be found in _G.P._, Vol. XVII, chap. cxv. In July, however, the German Emperor could not conceal from the French Ambassador his irritation at Delcassé’s success in the Anglo- French _rapprochement_. After expressing the wish that French vessels might repeat the visit of 1895 to Kiel, he remarked to M. Bihourd, July 16: “‘I know well that nothing is to be accomplished with M. Delcassé. The advances to England are the work of M. Delcassé and M. Cambon. . . . . But the Russians are not content with that and some day they will make you. . . . .’ Here a gesture of disappointment, concluded M. Bihourd, made clear the prediction” (quoted from a dispatch from Bihourd in Bourgeois et Pagès, _Les origines et les responsabilités de la grande guerre_, p. 293).]

[Footnote 404: Groeben to F. O., Sept. 17, 1903, _G.P._, XVII, 353 f., No. 5198; Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 28, 1903, _ibid._, 357 ff., No. 5202.]

[Footnote 405: Bülow to F. O., Sept. 18, 1903, _ibid._, 354, No. 5199; Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 24, 1903, _ibid._, 354 ff., No. 5200.]

[Footnote 406: Richthofen to Radowitz, Sept. 24, 1903, _ibid._, 355, No. 5200.]

[Footnote 407: Radowitz to F. O., Sept. 29, Oct. 4, 1903, _ibid._, 359 ff., Nos. 5203, 5205.]

[Footnote 408: Radolin to F. O., Oct. 17, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 845 ff., No. 5915; Bülow to William II, Oct. 19, 1903, _ibid._, 847 ff., No. 5916.]

[Footnote 409: William II wrote to Nicholas II, Dec. 1, 1903, as follows: “The visit of the hundred British Parliamentary—gentlemen and ladies—to Paris shows how ‘the Crimean combination’ is warming to its work. Your ally is making rather free with his flirt [with Great Britain]. You should pull him up a little.” Again on Jan. 3, 1904, he wrote to the same: “Therefore it is evident to every unbiassed mind that Korea must and will be Russian. When and how that is nobody’s affair and concerns only you and your country.” See Bülow to F. O., Oct. 31, 1903, _ibid._, 853 f., No. 5918; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 7, 1903, _ibid._, 70 ff., No. 5422; Walter Goetz (ed.), _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren, 1894-1914_ (Berlin, 1920), pp. 330 ff.; Savinsky, _Recollections of a Russian Diplomat_, pp. 63 ff. William II addressed Nicholas in various letters as “Admiral of the Pacific” and signed himself “Admiral of the Atlantic.” In spite of these words, to hold the Emperor responsible for the Russo-Japanese War is to underestimate the force of Russian foreign policy.]

[Footnote 410: See _G.P._, Vol. XIX, chaps. cxxviii, cxxix, especially Bülow to William II, Jan. 4, 1904, _ibid._, 87 ff., No. 5972, and the Emperor’s minutes; memo. by Bülow, Feb. 14, 1904, _ibid._, 62 f., No. 5961.]

[Footnote 411: Bülow to Holstein, Jan. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 33 f., No. 5942; memo. by Eckardstein, Jan. 17, 1904, _ibid._, 38 ff., No. 5945, and the Emperor’s minutes thereto.]

[Footnote 412: Count Benckendorff, Russian ambassador at London, spoke of the Dual Alliance as going to pieces, and there was talk among other Russian diplomats of renewing the former League of the Three Emperors. See Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 165 ff., No. 6028; Metternich to Bülow, March 14, 1904, _ibid._, 167 ff., No. 6029; Alvensleben to Bülow, March 18, 1904, _ibid._, 172 ff., No. 6030; memo. by Holstein, Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 35 ff., No. 5944.]

[Footnote 413: “Because of the importance of German neutrality we shall perhaps find opportunity to utilize our central position in case of further sharpening of the hostility in the same way that M. Delcassé intends doing with reference to Morocco,” wrote Holstein in a memo. on Jan. 23, 1904 (_ibid._, 48 ff., No. 5951). Also see memo. by Holstein, Jan. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 48 ff., No. 5951.]

[Footnote 414: Bülow to Metternich, Jan. 9, 1904, _ibid._, 22, No. 5932; Lascelles to Lansdowne, Jan. 8, 1904, _B.D._, II, 232, No. 273. Bülow later complained that the British had offered very weak resistance to the French demands (Bülow to Metternich, June 4, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 28, No. 6383).]

[Footnote 415: Radolin to Bülow, Feb. 4, 1904, _ibid._, 105 f., No. 6431; Bülow to Radolin, Feb. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 106 f., No. 6432, and following documents.]

[Footnote 416: For proof that the German government had not expected the signing of the accord then see Eckardstein, II, 426 f.; Otto Hammann, _Der misverstandene Bismarck. Zwanzig Jahre deutscher Weltpolitik_ (Berlin, 1921), p. 110.]

[Footnote 417: Monts to F. O., March 26, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 116, No. 6439.]

[Footnote 418: Although Bülow did not say so, it is manifest that this was one of his intentions (Bülow to William II, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, 197 ff., No. 6512).]

[Footnote 419: Tschirschky to Bülow, April 3, 1904, _ibid._, 199 ff., No. 6513. On the interview at Vigo see below.]

[Footnote 420: Bülow to Tschirschky, April 3, 1904, _ibid._, 8 f. No. 6370; memo. by Bülow, April 6, 1904, _ibid._, 10 f., No. 6372; Bülow to Tschirschky, April 6, 1904, _ibid._, 201 and note, No. 6514. The last dispatch was not sent, for on April 8 the accord was signed.]

[Footnote 421: _Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe_, pp. 219, 233, 235, 238 f.]

[Footnote 422: See, for instance, _Berliner Tageblatt_, April 17, 1904; Dr. Th. Schiemann, _Deutschland und die grosse Politik, 1904_ (Berlin, 1905), p. 118, and others; _Grenzboten_, June 23, 1904, p. 668.]

[Footnote 423: Alfred Zimmerman, _Deutsche Kolonialpolitik_ (Berlin, 1914), pp. 241 ff.]

[Footnote 424: _Stenographische Berichte von den Behandlungen des Reichstages_, CXCIX, 2019, 2053 f., 2058 f.; Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, p. 42; reports from the Berlin correspondent to the _London Times_, April 11 and 16, 1904.]

[Footnote 425: Bülow, _Reden_, II, 74, 84, 90 f.; see also Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_, pp. 42 f.]

[Footnote 426: This was Sanderson’s opinion. He was at the time British permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs. See memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 25, 1907, _B.D._, III, 421.]

[Footnote 427: William II to Bülow, April 19, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 22 ff., No. 6378.]

[Footnote 428: From London, Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy, reported that the British were entirely pacific in their intentions and inclinations (Bernstorff to Bülow, April 16, 1904, _ibid._, 14 ff., No. 6376). The Emperor considered this report “excellent.” Alvensleben also wrote from St. Petersburg that Russia was not so well satisfied with the Anglo-French accord as French newspapers would have one believe (Alvensleben to Bülow, April 15, 1904, _ibid._, 21 f., No. 6377).]

[Footnote 429: Bülow to William II, April 20, 1904, _ibid._, 24, No. 6379.]

[Footnote 430: On Austro-Italian relations see Wedel to Bülow, Sept. 14, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 621 ff., No. 5779; memo. by Bülow, Sept. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 624 ff., No. 5780; Monts to F. O., _ibid._, XX, 47 f., No. 6399; Monts to Bülow, April 25, 1904, _ibid._, 54 ff., No. 6404; Monts to Bülow, April 30, 1904, _ibid._, 64 ff., No. 6412.]

[Footnote 431: Memo. by Bülow of conversation with Goluchowski at Vienna, Sept. 20, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 625 f., No. 5780; Wedel to Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 627 f., No. 5783.]

[Footnote 432: An interview between the Italian and the Austrian foreign ministers at Abazzia on April 9, 1904, attested to this fact. See Wedel to Bülow, April 14, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 50 ff., No. 6401; memo. by Bülow, May 9, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 613 ff., No. 5775; Bülow to Monts, June 9, 1903, _ibid._, 616 ff., No. 5776; and following documents in _ibid._, chap. cxxii, Anhang.]

[Footnote 433: Monts to Bülow, April 30, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 64, No. 6412; memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _ibid._, 37 ff., No. 6388.]

[Footnote 434: Chelius to Schlieffen, Dec. 1, 1903, _ibid._, XVIII, 705 ff., No. 5827; Richthofen to Schlieffen, Dec. 11, 1903, _ibid._, 707 f., No. 5826; Schlieffen to Richthofen, Dec. 14, 1903, _ibid._, 708, No. 5829.]

[Footnote 435: Memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 37 ff., No. 6388; Monts to F. O., March 7, 1904, _ibid._, 41, No. 6390.]

[Footnote 436: Bülow to William II, March 11, 1904, _ibid._, 46, No. 6397; Monts to F. O., March 26, 1904, _ibid._, 47 f., No. 6399; _Quest. dipl. et col._, April 1, 1904, XVII, 524 f.]

[Footnote 437: Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 53 f., No. 6403. Giovanni Giolitti, who was then Italian premier, has written as follows about this visit: “In Delcassé I noticed particularly his finesse and ability, as well as the insistence with which he attempted to loosen or weaken our bonds with Germany, without however putting forward anything at all in the nature of a definite proposal” (_Memoirs of My Life_ [London, 1923], p. 183). On March 5, 1904, Sir Francis Bertie, British ambassador in Rome, wrote to Lansdowne as follows: “M. Ba[rrère] does all he can to create friction between Italy and Austria to alienate Italy from her partner in the Triplice” (_B.D._, V, 74). In contrast the British Ambassador in Vienna was in April, 1904, reassuring his Italian colleague about Austrian intentions in the Balkans now that Russia was in a far eastern war (Plunkett to Lansdowne, April 7, 1904, _ibid._, V, 80, No. 41).]

[Footnote 438: Memo. by Holstein, March 3, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 37 ff., No. 6388; Bülow to Monts, March 6, 1904, _ibid._, 39 ff., No. 6389, and following documents.]

[Footnote 439: Monts to F. O., March 17, 1904, _ibid._, 45, No. 6396; Bülow to Monts, March 26, 1904, _ibid._, 46 f., No. 6398; Monts to Bülow, April 2, 1904, _ibid._, 48 f., No. 6400; Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, _ibid._, 52 f., No. 6402; Monts to Bülow, April 16, 1904, _ibid._, 53 f., No. 6403.]

[Footnote 440: Monts to Bülow, April 25, 1904, _ibid._, 54 ff., No. 6404; Monts to F. O., April 26, 1904, _ibid._, 57 f., No. 6405; _Quest. dipl. et col._, XVII, 688 ff.]

[Footnote 441: Monts to Bülow, April 28, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 60 ff., No. 6410.]

[Footnote 442: Monts to Bülow, April 29, 1904, _ibid._, 63 f., No. 6411.]

[Footnote 443: Bülow’s minutes to a dispatch from Monts, May 21, 1904, _ibid._, 78, No. 6419.]

[Footnote 444: Holstein advised informing the Italian government that the Triple Alliance “practically speaking has had its day,” while Monts confined his relations with Tittoni to written communications. See Richthofen to Monts, April 28, 1904, _ibid._, 59 f., No. 6409; Bülow to Monts, May 7, 1904, _ibid._, 67 ff., No. 6414; memo. by Holstein, May 12, 1904, _ibid._, 71 f., No. 6416; memo. by Bülow, May 12, 1904, _ibid._, 73 f., No. 6417.]

[Footnote 445: Quoted in _ibid._, p. 75 nn.; Tommaso Tittoni, _Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy. A Selection from the Speeches Delivered in the Italian Parliament by Tommaso Tittoni_ (New York, 1915), pp. 12 f., quoting a speech by Tittoni on May 14, 1904.]

[Footnote 446: Memo. by Bülow, May 12, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 73 f., No. 6417 and Anlage; Monts to Bülow, May 12, 1904, _ibid._, 74 ff., No. 6418; and the following documents. At a personal meeting on Sept. 27, 1904, Premier Giolitti affirmed to Bülow Italy’s loyalty to her alliance and promised to show more reserve toward France (memo. by Bülow, Sept. 28, 1904, _ibid._, 81 ff., No. 6422).]

[Footnote 447: The Emperor tarried so long that Bülow finally advised him to come home; otherwise he would make himself ridiculous. See Monts to F. O., April 17, 1904, _ibid._, 117, No. 6440; Bülow to William II, April 17, 1904, _ibid._, 117 f., No. 6441.]

[Footnote 448: The Emperor made similar speeches at Karlsruhe, April 28, and at St. Johann-Saar-brücken, May 14 (Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1904_, pp. 76, 92). At Karlsruhe he declared: “I hope that peace will not be disturbed and that the events which we see occurring will have the effect of . . . . making our eyes clear, of steeling our courage, and of uniting us if it should become necessary to interfere in the _Weltpolitik_.”]

[Footnote 449: Memo. by Lichnowsky, April 13, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 203, No. 6516.]

[Footnote 450: Dr. Genthe of the _Kölnische Zeitung_ had recently been murdered by some of the Moroccans; a native employee of a German firm had been illegally imprisoned; and certain indemnities from the Moroccan government had to be collected. See Mentzingen to Bülow, April 5 (received April 11), 1904, _ibid._, 202, No. 6515; memo. by Lichnowsky, April 13, 1904, _ibid._, 202 f., No. 6516; memo. by Bruning, April 23, 1904, _ibid._, 203 ff., No. 6517, and Richthofen’s minutes thereto.]

[Footnote 451: Memo. by Lichnowsky, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, XIX, 174 f., No. 6031; Schlieffen to Bülow, April 20, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 175 ff., No. 6032.]

[Footnote 452: On May 21, Mühlberg, of the German foreign office, telegraphed to Mentzingen, German minister at Tangier, that since “a forceful action could be easily misunderstood and lead to erroneous conclusions about the German policy,” the ship would not be sent (_ibid._, 206, No. 6502).]

[Footnote 453: Memo. by Holstein, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, 123 f., No. 6443; Bülow to Richthofen, April 19, 1904, _ibid._, 124, No. 6444. All three men approved of the idea.]

[Footnote 454: Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 329 f.]

[Footnote 455: Richthofen to Lascelles, May 4, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 127 f., No. 6446. Whether or not the communication was sent in this form is not known. See Rücker-Jenisch to F. O., May 18, 1904, _ibid._, 128 f., No. 6447; Villiers to Lascelles, May 24, 1904, _ibid._, 129 ff., No. 6448; Lascelles to Lansdowne, May 18, 1904, _B.D._, III, 1, No. 1; Lansdowne to Lascelles, May 4, 1904, _ibid._, 18, No. 16, and following documents.]

[Footnote 456: Memoir handed to Richthofen to Lascelles, May 28, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 132 f., No. 6449; Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, _ibid._, 147 f., No. 6454.]

[Footnote 457: Memo. by Holstein, June 5, 1904, _ibid._, 144 f., No. 6461; William II to Bülow, June 6, 1904, _ibid._, 147 f., No. 6463.]

[Footnote 458: Dispatches from Metternich to F. O., June 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 1904 (_ibid._, 138 ff., Nos. 6455, 6458, 6460, 6464, 6466). Cf. Mallet to Spring Rice, early summer, 1904 (Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 414). Mallet stated that the British government did not want to weaken the advance toward France by a settlement with Germany, especially since the Anglo-French accord had not been definitely ratified.]

[Footnote 459: _G.P._, XX, 148 ff., Nos. 6464-80; _B.D._, III, 21 ff., Nos. 19-23.]

[Footnote 460: Memo. by Bülow, June 26, 29, 1904, _G.P._, XIX, 186 ff., Nos. 6038, 6040; memo. by Richthofen (undated though probably written about July 4, 1904), _ibid._, 194 ff., No. 6042; Richthofen to Metternich, June 20, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 163, No. 6478; Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 292 ff. See also MacDonald to Lansdowne, June 23, 1904, _B.D._, IV, 1, No. 1; Lansdowne to MacDonald, June 24, 1904, _ibid._, 2, No. 2.]

[Footnote 461: In 1896 the Emperor had shown a decided interest in Morocco (_G.P._, XI, No. 2820). In the next years, however, his attitude had changed. The motive force behind the German policy toward Morocco was Bülow.]

[Footnote 462: The Emperor thought of buying Fernando Po, but said nothing of this to the King. On this incident and the Emperor’s attitude toward Morocco see his minutes to Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, XVII, 362, No. 5206; William II to Bülow, March 16, 1904; _ibid._, 363, No. 5208; Radowitz to Richthofen, March 23, 1904, _ibid._, 364, No. 5209; Radolin to Bülow, March 30, 1904, _ibid._, 365, No. 5210. On Oct. 20, 1903, Radolin had reported from Paris a conversation with the Spanish Ambassador in which the latter, after admitting that France and Spain were well on the way toward an accord over Morocco, remarked to him, “I suppose that you have nothing to object to our entente.” Radolin replied, “We have only commercial interests in those parts, which, however, are of very great importance and which we must safeguard” (Radolin to Bülow, Oct. 20, 1903, _ibid._, 361 f., No. 5206).]

[Footnote 463: Bülow to Radowitz, April 29, 1904, _ibid._, XX, 169 f., No. 6481.]

[Footnote 464: Bülow to Radowitz, May 22, 1904, _ibid._, 173 f., No. 6484; Bülow to Radowitz, May 25, 1904, _ibid._, 174 f., No. 6486.]

[Footnote 465: Bülow to Metternich, May 31, 1904, _ibid._, 176 f., No. 6488; Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, _ibid._, 177 f., No. 6489, and following documents; also Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 1, 1904, _B.D._, III, 53, No. 61.]

[Footnote 466: Radowitz to F. O., June 10, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 180 f., No. 6494; Bülow to Radowitz, June 16, 1904, _ibid._, 181, No. 6496.]

[Footnote 467: Radowitz to F. O., June 17, 1904, _ibid._, 182, No. 6497; Bülow to Radowitz, June 18, 1904, _ibid._, 182 f., No. 6498 and following documents.]

[Footnote 468: Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, _ibid._, 216, No. 6524; memo. by Richthofen, July 16, 1904, _ibid._, 186, No. 6503; Radowitz to F. O., July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 188, No. 6504.]

[Footnote 469: Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 210 ff., No. 6523; Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, _ibid._, 215 ff., No. 6524; memo. by Richthofen, July 29, 1904, _ibid._, 217, No. 6525, and Bülow’s minutes. In the negotiations with Germany over the acceptance of the Khedivial decree, Lansdowne informed Metternich that France had agreed to support Great Britain fully if at some future time the latter should propose “a revision of the international agreements affecting the position of the Powers in Egypt” (Lansdowne to Whitehead, June 19, 1904, _B.D._, III, 22 f., No. 21). This was, of course, the content of one of the secret articles in the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, although naturally Lansdowne did not say so. Whether the German government inferred therefrom that a reciprocal concession had been made by Great Britain to France with respect to Morocco is not evident, but it probably did. Lansdowne also stated to Metternich on June 1 what the area was which should be supervised by Spain, although he spoke only of having emphasized this point verbally to the French government and said nothing of a secret article to that effect. So far as the documents show, the German government does not seem to have recognized the import of this statement, although this negative proof is not conclusive (Metternich to F. O., June 1, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 177 f., No. 6489).]

[Footnote 470: Bülow to Metternich, June 4, 1904, _ibid._, 27 f., No. 6383; Metternich to F. O., June 4, 1904, _ibid._, 29 f., Nos. 6384 f.]

[Footnote 471: Bülow to Radolin, July 21, 1904, _ibid._, 210 f., No. 6523. Radolin also warned that if “English diplomatic support of France does not signify much, we have a free hand, while an Anglo-French resistance could easily force us to retreat” (Radolin to Bülow, July 27, 1904, _ibid._, 216 f., No. 6524).]

[Footnote 472: Mühlberg to Metternich, Aug. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 217 ff., No. 6526.]

[Footnote 473: Metternich to Bülow, Aug. 15, 1904, _ibid._, 219 ff., No. 6527; Lansdowne to Lascelles, Aug. 15, 1904, _B.D._, III, 53 f., No. 62.]

[Footnote 474: Metternich’s dispatch was sent on Aug. 18, although dated Aug. 15. Bülow approved of the new measures on Aug. 17. See Mentzingen to Bülow, Aug. 6, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 222 f., No. 6528; Mühlberg to Bülow, Aug. 16, 1904, _ibid._, 223 f., No. 6529; Bülow to Tschirschky, Aug. 17, 1904, _ibid._, 224 f., No. 6530.]

[Footnote 475: Mentzingen to F. O., Sept. 13, 18, 1904, _ibid._, 226 ff., Nos. 6532 f.]

[Footnote 476: See editor’s note, _ibid._, p. 225; also memo. by Richthofen, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 228, No. 6534.]

[Footnote 477: Memo. by Richthofen, _ibid._, 228 ff., No. 6534.]

[Footnote 478: Richthofen to Radowitz, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 191, No. 6508; memo. by Richthofen for Bülow, Oct. 7, 1904, _ibid._, 228 ff., No. 6534.]

[Footnote 479: Memo. by Kries, Oct. 22, 1904, _ibid._, 231 f., No. 6535.]

[Footnote 480: Kühlmann to Bülow, Nov. 9, 1904, _ibid._, 232 ff., No. 6536.]