Chapter I: France and Morocco, 1898-1904

I. THE DECADENT MOROCCO

Morocco was one of the last of the “backward” countries to be taken under control by a European state. It was a historic land with a long record of wars against the Christians; but, like many another, it had never adapted itself to the course of European civilization, and by the end of the nineteenth century had consequently become consigned by statesmen interested in colonial conquest to the category of “dying states.” Hence it was qualified for acquisition, division, or control.

The execution of this work was beset with unusually grave difficulties. Several centuries of more or less regular diplomatic and commercial relations with European Powers had assured Morocco international recognition as a sovereign and independent land. Moreover, the rival interests of the Powers there were so firmly established and so conflicting that they seemed irreconcilable. Down to 1900 these Powers had jealously blocked each other from a special position, and, in case of necessity, as in 1880, had settled common problems concerning Morocco by means of an international conference.[1] And while this disunion obtained, that country of eight million fanatical and warlike souls able to play one potential enemy against the other was secure.

At the opening of the twentieth century Morocco was one of the least- known lands of the world. Insecurity of life, absence of roads and means of transportation and communication of any but the most primitive sort, undeveloped harbors poor by nature, and a governmental policy designed to prevent any Power from gaining a foothold in the land by the acquisition of property, mining or other concessions had excluded the “Christian dogs” and maintained Mohammedan purity.[2]

Nevertheless, the country was reputed by Europeans to be rich in natural resources, the “pearl of North Africa.”[3] The plains and valleys, if irrigated and cultivated by modern methods, would, it was held, produce vast supplies of foodstuffs and would become one of the granaries of Europe. Other regions were declared to be admirably suited for grazing; while the mountains, those bulwarks against the encroachments of the desert, were envisaged as teeming with minerals. Popular imagination glorified Morocco into another Promised Land.[4]

However that might be, Europeans were doing very little business there. Official French statistics reckoned the total amount of foreign trade with Morocco in 1903 as 109,495,888 francs. Of this small sum France and Algeria enjoyed 31 per cent; Great Britain, 41.6 per cent; Germany, 9 per cent; Spain, 8.4 per cent; and the other Powers insignificant amounts.[5] The contrast between economic fact and economic possibility acted as a spur to the groups desirous of political acquisition; but the smallness of these economic interests and their substantial equality for a number of the Powers made it difficult to determine which had the dominant claim to develop Morocco.

A conflict of strategic interests added to this complication. Morocco’s geographic situation on the Straits of Gibraltar and on the route to South Africa, her proximity to the French and Spanish possessions in North Africa and to Spain, made the Sherifian Empire a land coveted by all Powers with Western Mediterranean interests, in particular Great Britain, Germany, France, Spain, and Italy. Since each state suspected that any rival would abuse its advantages if it gained ascendancy, disagreement over the future of Morocco persisted. However, in an era which was coming to be more and more dominated by the urge for colonial control, this problem would not long remain unsolved. At the close of the century a favorable turn in international affairs and an accentuation of the chronic state of anarchy in the land itself brought the question to the fore.

The period of strong rule in Morocco under Sultan Mulai-el-Hassan (1873-94) and the grand vizier, Ba-Ahmed, came to an end with the death of the latter in May, 1900, when the young, inexperienced, and incompetent sultan, Abd-el-Aziz, assumed authority in person. By his preference for foreign goods and society he soon not only exhausted his treasury but also estranged his subjects. He acquired a fantastic collection in which figured cameras, coaches, bicycles, dolls, pianos by the dozen, and animals for a menagerie. He amused himself lavishly with his European friends. He listened to the advice of his two intimates, Kaid Sir Harry Maclean, a former English soldier from Gibraltar who had been in Moroccan service for almost two decades, and Mr. W. B. Harris, correspondent in Morocco of the _London Times_; and by promulgating a program of fiscal reform sought to replenish his resources and reorganize his country in time to prevent the intervention of the Powers, particularly of France, and the consequent loss of his independence. But, while his intentions were good, his actions proved disastrous for himself and his land.[6] Scandalized by the tales of his antics with the Christians and outraged by the new taxes that violated the Koran, the natives revolted in 1900.[7] The rebellions in the north and northeast constituted a double menace since they might lead to attacks on the French and Spanish possessions and bring on an intervention of those two Powers.[8] The Sultan had no money, therefore no army; and without an army he could collect no taxes. The rumor spread that he had actually turned Christian and sold the land to the English. The political and religious ties with his people were everywhere breaking.[9] By 1903 his precarious authority was confined to a few towns; and his capital, Fez, was itself threatened by the rebels.[10]

As this situation was nothing unusual in Moroccan annals, the natives were not greatly disturbed. If events had been permitted to take their normal course, a revolution would probably have replaced Abd-el-Aziz by some stronger man, and the country would have returned to its usual condition of semianarchy. The tragedy for Morocco lay in the fact that this disorder gave the opportunity for the interested Powers to intervene. The increasing insecurity of foreigners and the Sultan’s need for loans foreshadowed the end of Moroccan independence. In 1899 Lord Salisbury, British prime minister, had declared that Morocco was decaying and might collapse at any moment.[11] Politicians elsewhere began to turn their attention toward this corner of Africa. Among them the French assumed the lead and solved the problem.

II. FRANCE AND THE MOROCCAN PROBLEM, 1898-1904

By the end of the nineteenth century France’s North African empire was assuming definitive form. In the 1890’s agreements with Great Britain, Germany, and Spain (1900) consolidated France’s possession and left only Morocco, a country almost inclosed on the land side by French territory, as an object whose acquisition was coming to be regarded by Frenchmen as essential to the completion of their ambitions in that region.[12]

To aid in the achievement of this goal a Comité de l’Afrique française had been organized in 1889 to popularize African questions with the French people, to exert pressure upon the government, and to carry on a unified and consistent activity for colonial expansion which the French cabinets could not do. Its membership was relatively small—about seventy in all—but very select. With the Prince d’Arenberg as its president, it numbered in its ranks deputies, senators, military and naval officers, officials in the government (although no cabinet members, of course), members of the Academy, newspaper editors and owners, members of the Institute, members of various geographical societies, colonial societies, chambers of commerce—men such as M. Gabriel Hanotaux, former minister of foreign affairs; M. Jules Siegfried, who resigned temporarily when he became minister of commerce in 1893; M. Paul Révoil, governor-general of Algeria; General Joseph Galliéni, governor-general of Madagascar; M. Eugène Etienne, former undersecretary of state for the colonies and future cabinet member; M. Antoine Guillain, vice-president of the Chamber for a time and former minister of the colonies; M. Paul Deschanel, president of the committee for foreign and colonial affairs in the Chamber. Through common membership and close co-operation the Comité was assured of the active support of the other colonial, geographical, and commercial organizations. The character and position of its members in state affairs gave it an undeniably great influence upon the government as well as upon the nation. This influence was enhanced by the organization of groups favoring colonial acquisition in both the Chamber (1892) and Senate (1898), the former of which under the presidency of M. Etienne boasted in 1902 almost two hundred members.[13]

During the 1890’s the French advocated a policy of _status quo_ with reference to Morocco. They opposed permitting any Power to gain undue influence there or allowing Morocco to reform herself. They were suspicious of any individual or collective intervention by the Powers, and wanted to hold the future completely free. But the defeats of Italy by Abyssinia in 1896 and of Spain by the United States in 1898 dampened the ardor of those two rivals. Then, when British attention was claimed by the Boer War and when the internal disintegration of Morocco increased the possibilities of intervention, the proponents of aggression demanded that France should act.

Late in 1899 the official publication of the Comité declared that the Moroccan question was of paramount importance in French foreign policy.[14] It promoted the campaign for the acquisition of Morocco so successfully that by the end of 1903 almost all parties in France, including even the Socialists under M. Jaurès, had come to consider the French claims to predominance in Morocco as superior to those of any other Power.[15] The popular arguments, based largely upon the proximity of Algeria to Morocco, ranged from the theory of the “natural frontier” to economic and strategic contentions. In Morocco rebellions and religious wars could easily start, it was claimed, spreading thence over the whole of North Africa and endangering France’s possessions. If any other European Power established itself in that land, it could utilize the native resources in troubling France. On the other hand, by virtue of her experience in handling and employing Mohammedans, France was better fitted to perform this work of civilization than anyone else. These were, of course, the stock arguments of all parties advocating the establishment of European control over “backward” areas.

The Comité formulated a policy for handling both the internal and the international aspects of the question—a policy which M. Delcassé, minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905, was actually to follow. It was the popular solution, and, for France, the only possible one.[16] As the Fashoda affair had taught the French that the approval of the Powers was necessary for the acquisition of colonial territory, the first requisite was to make agreements with the interested states, among whom the _Bulletin_ included Germany. Moreover, the nature of the problem demanded this approach. For Morocco’s international status, the interests of the Powers there, the military strength of the fanatical population, and the consequent need of having French hands completely free from the danger of complications before attempting to reform Morocco made this preliminary international understanding imperative. The program contained four essential points. The sovereignty of the sultan and the independence and integrity of his land should be assured. Adequate guaranties for the freedom of the straits should be provided. The legitimate interests of the Powers, considered to be chiefly economic, should be satisfied through the acceptance of the principle of full commercial liberty. Lastly, Spain’s territorial claims should be satisfied. By this course the Comité and its followers thought to dispose of the international aspect.

At the same time Morocco itself had to be won. The _Bulletin_ believed that a policy of “pacific penetration” carried on through the agency of the sultan would solve this task. The sultan was the sole source of authority, religious as well as political, that France could properly utilize. By working through him she might further her own interests and might introduce reforms without provoking the natives to war. The sovereignty of the Sultan would not be touched nor the independence and integrity of his land be violated. The “pacific” aspect would prevent the other Powers from taking offence and would satisfy the French people. The “penetrating” aspect would give satisfactory reality. It was a masterful combination, with an air of superficial plausibility so long as one did not attempt to reconcile the phrases “pacific penetration” and “preponderant influence” with those of “sovereignty of the sultan” and “independence and integrity of the land.”[17]

The French minister of foreign affairs from 1898 to 1905 was, as already said, M. Théophile Delcassé. Born in 1852, he was at a very impressionable age when the Franco-Prussian War occurred. He became so ardent a disciple of Gambetta that he could never speak afterward of their friendship without emotion. Journalist, deputy, colonial undersecretary, colonial minister—such was the course of his rise. Uncommunicative by nature, he avoided Parliament as much as possible. He was on intimate terms with M. Waldeck-Rousseau, premier from 1899 to 1901; but with the latter’s successors, MM. Combes and Rouvier, his relations were cool, and he asserted his entire independence in the conduct of his office. In a short and caustic sketch, November, 1900, Sir Edmund Monson, British ambassador at Paris, wrote of him:

Delcassé is an unsatisfactory Minister to us diplomatists in Paris. He is extremely uncommunicative, not to say secretive. Consequently it is very rare that any one of us succeeds in extracting information from him. He has plenty of commonplace conversation, which flows glibly enough, and he will talk eloquently in an academical fashion. But he hardly ever tells one anything in the way of political news, and he has an adroit way of feigning ignorance which took me in at first, until I convinced myself that it was all shamming. He always urges that he is not a diplomatist by profession, but he carries the practice of subterfuge to an extent which I have hardly ever met before in a Minister of Foreign Affairs. On the other hand, he does not tell lies systematically, as X did.[18]

His long tenure in office and the free scope given him by the cabinet and Parliament, both engrossed in internal affairs,[19] enabled him to put his own impress upon French foreign policy and to give it a positive, constructive content. Although a member of radical cabinets that reduced the military and naval budgets and neglected the defenses of the land, he openly disapproved of that policy and advocated rearing a virile, patriotic generation of fighters. He courted and received the support of all parties. He took as the sole objective in his foreign policy the maintenance and development of French interests, and avowed himself an opportunist in his method of diplomacy. He was a _Realpolitiker_ at a moment when the French people seemed to be turning toward internationalism and pacifism. His policy unfolded itself gradually, and, in the absence of adequate documentary material, it has to be explained largely upon the basis of its accomplishments.[20]

The new elements introduced into French policy by this minister were associated almost altogether with the Moroccan question. He seems from the start to have coveted that country.[21] He thought that since the Dual Alliance was firmly established, France as well as Russia ought to reap some benefits therefrom. But, as Russia was turning her energies more and more to the Far East and was thereby weakening the effectiveness of the Alliance, he desired some means of re-establishing the equilibrium of forces in Europe. Particularly was this necessary since Germany had inaugurated her _Weltpolitik_; for, with German power increasing at so fast a pace, France had to seek new friends for the protection of herself, her colonies, her interests, and for the realization of her ambitions toward Morocco before it was too late.[22] This triple aim of better defense, of increased prestige, and of colonial acquisition in Northwest Africa he saw could be realized by the settlement of the international aspect of the Moroccan question. Italy and Spain as Mediterranean neighbors and Great Britain as a formidable colonial rival should be won to the French plan by agreements which at the same time should create friendships between them and fortify and aggrandize the French position in Europe. Moreover, M. Delcassé hoped to reconcile Russia with Great Britain, above all to prevent them from actual conflict. And, depending upon circumstances, he was apparently willing to treat with Germany. A colonial acquisition and a rearrangement in international relations were to be achieved together, and the Moroccan problem came to signify both.[23]

The basis of the Franco-Moroccan relations was laid by the treaty of 1845 regulating the boundary between Algeria and her western neighbor.[24] However, the frontier remained in part indefinite; border raids recurred; the possession of the oases, Touat, Gourara, and Tidikelt, discovered after the treaty was made, remained unsettled.[25] The consequence was chronic trouble, which France tried to eliminate by occupying these oases late in 1899 and in 1900 and by beginning to construct railroads toward them.

Alarmed by this activity, the Sultan asked Queen Victoria in the autumn of 1900 to obtain assurances from France which would tranquilize his fears. Realizing that this would be impossible, the British government refused, and Sir Edmund Monson, the British ambassador at Paris, merely mentioned the Sultan’s anxieties to the French Foreign Minister (October 17).[26] The Italian, Spanish, and German governments also showed some concern over this action at Touat.[27] M. Delcassé replied to them all with the statement which he had made in the French Senate on April 3, that in Africa France would honor all treaties signed by her, that she would respect the frontiers of neighboring states, and that she had no intention of changing the _status quo_ in the Mediterranean. She was merely occupying territory manifestly belonging to her.[28]

The number of attacks of the Moroccans upon Algeria increased. After several particularly bold raids had occurred early in 1901, the French government sent a sharply worded note to the Sultan which he interpreted as threatening action against his ancestral home, Tafilelt.[29] He appealed to the British government for protection,[30] and in June and July sent an embassy headed by the minister of war, el-Menebhi, to London and Berlin to obtain aid against France and to negotiate a loan.[31] As the question of an alliance was then engrossing the attentions of both the British and the German governments, neither felt inclined to give the Moroccans anything but innocuous advice, and this mission was a failure.[32]

The dispatch of that embassy just at the time when Anglo-German relations were so cordial alarmed the French Foreign Minister.[33] Through M. Révoil, governor-general of Algeria, he warned the Moroccan government against signing any political or commercial agreement without French approval, and exacted a promise from a Moroccan embassy then in Paris concerning the execution of any accord which might be signed.[34] Among the Powers, M. Delcassé had little to fear from Spain, with whom he was on intimate terms, or from Italy, with whom in the previous December he had made an agreement about Morocco.[35] He assured the British government that France had no intention of raising “serious questions in Morocco.” The Marquess of Lansdowne, British foreign secretary, responded with a frank account of his conversations with the Moroccan embassy.[36] It was Germany of whose reactions M. Delcassé was most uncertain. In June, through his friend M. Leon y Castillo, the Spanish ambassador, he suggested to Prince Radolin, the German ambassador in Paris, that if the German government, as the victor in 1870, would take the initiative, he would like to discuss various matters with a view to arriving at an entente.[37] The German response to the Spanish Ambassador was that before Germany could enter into an arrangement with France whereby the hostility of a third Power might be incurred the two countries must make a mutual guaranty of each other’s territorial integrity. Since France would thereby have to guarantee the German possession of Alsace-Lorraine, the proposed negotiation was crushed.[38] None the less, in a conversation with Prince Radolin on June 23, 1901, M. Delcassé made and received an important statement about Morocco. When the Ambassador mentioned the discussion in the French newspapers of a French protectorate over that land, the Foreign Minister replied:

“If by that word protectorate one means that France, mistress of Algeria and Tunis, has and must conserve toward Morocco an unique situation [_une situation absolument à part_], it seems to me that it is self- evident [_il me semble que c’est l’évidence même_].” “Nothing is more just, every one takes account of that situation [_tout le mond se rend compte de cette situation_],” answered Prince Radolin.[39]

Much or little could be read into either remark; but together with the general diplomatic situation they enabled M. Delcassé in the Senate on July 5 to declare that

if France, mistress of Algeria and through Algeria neighbor of Morocco along an immense frontier, is forced to follow what occurs there with a singular interest,—our vigilance does not aim at other than the tranquillity, prosperity, and integrity of the Sherifian empire. . . . .[40]

The presence of an embassy in Paris simultaneously with the one in London and Berlin[41] gave the French Minister an opportunity for taking the first steps toward “pacific penetration.” The mission came to Paris to seek an agreement with the French government upon a definite boundary line between Algeria and Morocco which would assure Moroccan isolation. M. Delcassé, however, aimed, by leaving the frontier line indefinite, to utilize this geographic proximity as a means of creating a community of interests with the Sultan and his people and of familiarizing them with things European.

The French Minister succeeded partially in incorporating this plan in an agreement with the Moroccan embassy in July, 1901, supplementing that of 1845. Drawn “to consolidate the bonds of amity existing between them [France and Morocco] and to develop their reciprocal good relations,” the treaty provided that the boundary should remain uncertain, but that France and Morocco should each have the right to set up a line of posts for purposes of defense and customs collection in the desert region on soil which unquestionably belonged to them. The tribes living in the territory between those two lines should be permitted to choose which authority they preferred to reside under. Moroccans and Algerians could enter that territory freely for commercial or other purposes. Moroccan tribes who owned pastures in Algeria could continue to use them, and vice versa. For the preservation of amicable relations between the two countries each government agreed to appoint two commissioners annually to settle future border disputes.[42]

To Ben Sliman, the leader of the embassy to Paris, M. Delcassé offered French friendship and aid, but added a veiled threat of the trouble which France would make for Morocco if his offers were not accepted. While the French Minister showed a nice regard for Moroccan sensitiveness toward innovations, he voiced the expectation that when the land should decide to “enter into new ways” it would give France the preference for furnishing it with the needed resources. In an important dispatch of July 27, 1901, M. Delcassé instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier, the French representative at Tangier, concerning his future conduct. The French Minister was to assure the Sultan of French respect for the integrity of his land and for his own sovereignty, to affirm France’s desire to give him friendly aid, and to point out the benefit which the Sultan, as ruler, might derive therefrom. He was to warn the latter against foreign innovations which might imperil the security of Algeria.[43] Lastly he was to support all enterprises, commercial, industrial, and philanthropic, calculated to increase French influence in the land.[44]

Thus the French government could note with satisfaction that whereas the Moroccan mission to London and Berlin had accomplished nothing, the one to Paris had enabled France to feel out the Powers on this question, to proclaim publicly her special interests, and to begin the actual execution of her program. M. Delcassé was now started upon a conscious policy of establishing French predominance in the Sherifian Empire.

When the French and Moroccan commissioners appointed to execute the agreement of 1901 set to work, they found that its terms were impracticable. The assassination of two French captains by Moroccans in January, 1902, also showed that if order were ever to obtain along the frontier, French power would have to strengthen the Sultan’s efforts.[45] The commissioners therefore negotiated in April and May, 1902, two further treaties, the content of which was much more in harmony with the French objective of loosening the boundary instead of tightening it, of providing a complete program of military, economic, and political co-operation between the two governments as follows: In case of need the two states should concert in pacifying and policing the frontier from Teniet-Sassi to Figuig, but no guard or customs posts should be established between those two points. In lieu of these customs duties, France agreed to pay Morocco a lump sum annually. In the other frontier area the two governments should establish markets and customs posts at specified points in order to develop commerce between Algeria and Morocco.[46]

It became impossible to carry out the commercial clauses of the treaty because of anarchy on the Moroccan side of the border. But the Sultan made immediate use of the military articles by requesting permission of the French government to send Moroccan troops and munitions to the frontier by way of Algeria, and by asking it in July to furnish military instructors for these troops. M. Delcassé readily agreed.[47]

Notwithstanding these requests, the Sultan was dissatisfied with the course of affairs, and in September, 1902, sent Kaid Maclean to Europe to seek aid in stemming the tide of the French advance. Carrying personal letters from the Sultan to King Edward and to the German Emperor, the Kaid went first to London. He proposed to the King and to Lord Lansdowne that the integrity of Morocco be guaranteed by Great Britain, or, failing that, by Great Britain and Germany, for a period of seven years, and that, if at the end of this period Morocco had not thoroughly reformed her government and developed her natural resources, the guaranty should lapse. He proposed also that a Moorish loan be made in England, France, and Germany, and that all railway concessions be divided between those three countries. The British government approved the method of handling the project for a loan and for railroad construction; but, as it was already in conversation with the French government over the future of Morocco and was disinclined to tie its hands, it refused to consider the other measure. Thus the mission was a failure.[48]

In 1903 the Sultan was in dire straits. While the whole country was more or less in rebellion, the main center of danger lay in the northeast near Taza where the pretender to the throne, Bu-Hamara, “Father of the She-Ass,” had acquired a large following late in 1902. He was in a position to attack the French along the border or the Sultan in Fez, and did so. His defeat of the Sherifian army endangered Fez itself. Even in his capital the Sultan angered his subjects by summarily executing the murderers of a British missionary. In this plight, he turned to the obliging French for further aid. He received permission for his troops and the loyal border tribes to seek refuge in Algeria. After M. Delcassé had officially intervened in his behalf, he was able to obtain a loan of 7,500,000 francs from the French banking-house of Gautsch. By the time the Anglo-French agreement of April 8, 1904, was made, the Sultan seemed to be falling in line with the French policy of “pacific penetration.”[49]

[Footnote 1: This was the Conference of Madrid.]

[Footnote 2: See among the numerous works on Morocco: Albert Salmon, _Le Maroc. Son état économique et commercial_ (Paris, 1906); René Pinon, _L’empire de la Méditerranée_ (Paris, 1904), p. 96; Eugène Aubin, _Morocco of To-Day_ (London, 1906), p. 119.]

[Footnote 3: Victor Piquet, _La colonisation française dans l’Afrique du Nord: Algérie, Tunisie, Maroc_ (Paris, 1912), p. 15.]

[Footnote 4: For typical reactions see Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._; M. Aflalo, _The Truth about Morocco. An Indictment of the Policy of the British Foreign Office with Regard to the Anglo-French Agreement_ (London, 1904); _Zwanzig Jahre alldeutscher Arbeit und Kämpfe_ (Leipzig, 1910), pp. 219 ff. For a more scientific discussion see Piquet, pp. 514 ff.]

[Footnote 5: The statistics about Morocco are all unreliable. They vary according to the persons taking them. The Moroccan government took none itself. Those given above are quoted in André Tardieu, _La conference d’Algésiras. Histoire diplomatique de la crise marocaine (15 Janvier-7 Avril, 1906)_ (Paris, 1909), pp. 499 ff.]

[Footnote 6: On the new sultan see Pinon, _L’empire de la Médit._, pp. 150 ff.; Aubin, pp. 137 ff., 178; Walter B. Harris, _Morocco That Was_ (Edinburgh and London, 1921), esp. pp. 65 ff.]

[Footnote 7: See Aubin, pp. 203 ff.; Auguste Lombard, _La banque d’état du Maroc_ (Montpellier, 1911), pp. 14 ff.]

[Footnote 8: On this disorder see Victor Bérard, _L’affaire marocaine_ (Paris, 1906), p. 82; Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, _Documents diplomatiques. Affaires du Maroc, 1901-1905_ (Paris, 1905), Nos. 33 ff., 42 ff., 61 ff., 90, 98 ff. (This _Livre jaune_ is hereafter cited as _L.j., 1901-5_.) See also _Bulletin du comité de l’Afrique française, Supplément_, 1901, pp. 193 ff. (This magazine is hereafter cited as _Bulletin_.)]

[Footnote 9: Aubin, p. 109.]

[Footnote 10: _Ibid._, pp. 320-21.]

[Footnote 11: Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, _Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes_ (im Auftrage des Auswärtigen Amtes herausgegeben von Johannes Lepsius, Albrecht Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Friedrich Thimme; Berlin, 1922-27), XVII, 295 f., No. 5152 (hereafter cited as _G.P._).]

[Footnote 12: See Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._; speech by M. Etienne on June 16, 1903, reprinted in _Bulletin, Supplément_, 1903, p. 179.]

[Footnote 13: _Bulletin_, July, 1902, p. 267.]

[Footnote 14: _Ibid._, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, 429.]

[Footnote 15: See the debates in the Chamber on this subject, Nov., 1903, _Journal officiel de la République française. Débats parlementaires_ (Chambre des Députés, Nov., 1903); Tardieu, pp. 17 ff.]

[Footnote 16: See _Bulletin_, Dec., 1899, pp. 412, 429; Jan., 1900, p. 2; April, 1900, p. 140; June, 1901, p. 182; March, 1902, p. 107; Oct., 1902, pp. 347, 350; Oct., 1903, pp. 301, 305; Jan., 1904, p. 3, etc. Also speech by M. Etienne, June 16, 1903, in _ibid., Supplément_, 1903, p. 179.]

[Footnote 17: See _ibid._, July, 1900, p. 257; Aug., 1901, pp. 259 f.; April, 1903, p. 120; Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._, p. 182.]

[Footnote 18: Lord Newton, _Lord Lansdowne, A Biography_ (London, 1929), p. 209.]

[Footnote 19: Such as the Dreyfus case, the law of the Congregations, the separation of church and state.]

[Footnote 20: On Delcassé see Christian Schefer, _D’une guerre à l’autre. Essai sur la politique extérieure de la Troisième République (1871-1914)_ (Paris, 1920), pp. 221 f.; Georges Reynald, _La diplomatie française. L’œuvre de Delcassé_ (Paris, 1915); René Millet, _Notre politique extérieure de 1898 à 1905_ (Paris, 1905), p. 2; Robert Dell, _My Second Country_ (New York, 1920), p. 176; René Pinon, _France et Allemagne, 1870-1913_ (Paris, 1913), pp. 116 ff.; Delcassé’s speeches; Monson to Lansdowne, Nov. 15, 1904, _British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914_ (ed. by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley; London, 1927——), III, 14 f., No. 11 (hereafter cited as _B.D._).]

[Footnote 21: See his speeches, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, April 3, 1900, pp. 299 f.; Chambre, Jan. 21, 1902, quoted in _Bulletin, Supplément_, 1902, pp. 46 f.; Chambre, March 11, 1903, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, p. 1356; especially his speech on Nov. 10, 1904, in the Chambre, _ibid._, pp. 2381, 2386; Sénat, Dec. 7, 1904, pp. 1048 ff.; Reynald, p. 11.]

[Footnote 22: André Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort à la Conférence d’Algésiras_ (Paris, 1909), pp. 117 f. Mévil’s book contains the official apology for Delcassé’s work.]

[Footnote 23: See Mévil, pp. 120 f., and Delcassé’s speeches. On Dec. 7, 1904, in the Senate and on Nov. 10, in the Chamber, he spoke as follows: “The problem, in effect, was this: to establish the preponderance of France in Morocco, thereby to augment her power in the Mediterranean, not by alienating but rather by conciliating the Powers whose position in the Mediterranean brings them to our attention. . . . . In considering the positions occupied not only by England, but by Italy and by Spain in the Mediterranean, it is evident that if diplomacy succeeds in resolving this problem [of Morocco] it will have at one blow fortified and aggrandized the situation of France in Europe by the friendships which it will have procured and by the _rapprochements_ of interests of which it will have been the creator.”

He further declared that this had been his conscious policy during his six years of residency at the Quai d’Orsay (see _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, Dec. 7, 1904, pp. 1048 ff.; Chambre, Nov. 10, 1904, p. 386).]

[Footnote 24: See Augustin Bernard, _Les confins algéro-marocaine_ (Paris, 1911). Treaty given in De Clercq, _Recueil des traités de la France_, pp. 271 ff.]

[Footnote 25: See various articles in the _Bulletin_; also Pinon, _Empire de la Médit._; Bérard, _L’affaire marocaine_; speech of Waldeck- Rousseau in the Chamber, July 2, 1900, _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, pp. 1739 f.]

[Footnote 26: Exactly what the Sultan requested is not known. Count Bülow, the German foreign minister, heard in June, 1900, from an Italian source that the Grand Vizier of Morocco just before his death had proposed to Salisbury, the British premier, that the Powers guarantee a new boundary to be made between Algeria and Morocco, but that the British Minister had refused to consider the matter. See Bülow to Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 318, No. 5167. On the Sultan’s proposal of October see Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 12, 17, 1900, _B.D._, II, 259, Nos. 312 f.]

[Footnote 27: We have positive evidence that the Spanish and German governments did so; and as Italy was then in negotiation with France over the question of Morocco (see below), it is safe to say that her government did also. See Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 299 ff., No. 5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 5157.]

[Footnote 28: See _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, April 3, 1900, p. 299. He also said in private that France had no intention of attacking Morocco. Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 301 f., No. 5157; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 17, 1900, _B.D._, II, 259, No. 313.]

[Footnote 29: See Bérard, p. 68; Aubin, p. 178; _Bulletin_, Aug., 1901, p. 279; _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 1, 3, 4, 6. For the note see Révoil to Delcassé, March 23, 1901, Révoil to Si Mohamméd Torres and Ben Sliman, March 18, _ibid._, No. 2 and annexe.]

[Footnote 30: So the British Minister at Tangier stated to his German colleague (Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 326 f., No. 5173).]

[Footnote 31: Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 13, 20, 1900, _ibid._, 326 f., No. 5173; 328, No. 5174.]

[Footnote 32: See Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13 ff., No. 19 and annexe; Hatzfeldt to foreign office, June 19, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 332 f., No. 5177 and note; Holstein to Eckardstein, July 8, 1901, _ibid._, 333, No. 5178; memorandum by Mentzingen concerning the conversations between Richthofen and the Moroccan Ambassador, _ibid._, 334 ff., No. 5179, undated though handed in to the foreign office on July 19, 1901; Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, 1901, _ibid._, 336 f., No. 5180; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, _ibid._, 338 f., No. 5182.]

[Footnote 33: On the cordiality of their relations see below. Late in 1899 Joseph Chamberlain, the British colonial secretary, had made a speech at Leicester advocating an Anglo-German-American alliance; an accord over China had been made between them in 1900, and the Emperor had in January, 1901, hurried to the bedside of the dying Queen Victoria.]

[Footnote 34: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 20, No. 21. What the promise was is not related. Also editor’s note, _G.P._, XVII, 332 f., No. 5177; Eckardstein to F. O., July 29, 1901, _ibid._, 338 f., No. 5182; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, XVIII, 781 f., No. 5872.]

[Footnote 35: See below.]

[Footnote 36: Lansdowne to Monson, July 3, 1901, _B.D._, II, 261, No. 318; Cambon to Delcassé, July 4, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13 ff., No. 19.]

[Footnote 37: On these conversations see Radolin to Bülow, June 5, 1901, _G.P._, XVIII, 772 ff., No. 5868; June 15, _ibid._, 775 ff., No. 5869; _ibid._, 777 f., No. 5870. Leon y Castillo declared that Delcassé had said to him that “he wished for nothing better than to converse with the German Ambassador on different points, that he would be very desirous of arriving at an entente with him” (_ibid._, 775 ff., No. 5869). At the same time leading articles appeared in _Temps_ and _Figaro_, papers in close touch with the foreign office, to the effect that Germany had the opportunity in the Moroccan affair to prove her good will toward France (Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, 781, No. 5872).]

[Footnote 38: Bülow to Radolin, June 19, 1901, _ibid._, 778 ff., No. 5871; Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, July 5, 1901, _ibid._, 781 f., No. 5872; Mühlberg to Mentzingen, July 19, 1901, _ibid._, XVII, 336 f., No. 5180.]

[Footnote 39: Delcassé to Noailles, June 23, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 13, No. 18. No account of the conversation is given in _G.P._]

[Footnote 40: _Journal officiel, Debats parlem._, Sénat, July 5, 1901, p. 1207.]

[Footnote 41: The British government might have prevented the sending of that mission. See Richthofen to Hatzfeldt, April 20, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 328, No. 5174. The German Minister at Tangier reported that the Sultan had asked Mr. Nicolson, British minister there, whether he should also send a mission to Paris and St. Petersburg.]

[Footnote 42: On these negotiations see Révoil to Delcassé, April 27, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 5, No. 5; Delcassé to Martiniére, July 20, 1901, _ibid._, 15 ff., No. 20 and annexe; Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _ibid._, 18 ff., No. 21; Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, Sept. 19, 1901, _ibid._, 22, No. 22.]

[Footnote 43: Such, for instance, as the recent tax reforms.]

[Footnote 44: Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, July 27, 1901, _L.j., 1901-5_, 18 ff., No. 21.]

[Footnote 45: Révoil to Delcassé, Feb. 22, 1902, _ibid._, 31, No. 25.]

[Footnote 46: Révoil to Delcassé, Jan. 18, April 26, May 17, 1902, _ibid._, 26 ff., No. 24; 33 ff., Nos. 27 f.; Graham H. Stuart, _French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo (1898-1914)_ (New York, 1921), p. 144.]

[Footnote 47: See especially Saint-René Taillandier to Delcassé, July 22, Aug. 6, 1902, _L.j., 1901-5_, 44 ff., Nos. 29 f.]

[Footnote 48: See memo. for Maclean, Oct. 24, 1902, by Lansdowne, _B.D._, II, 272 f., No. 328; Sir Sidney Lee, _King Edward VII. A Biography_ (London, 1925, 1927), II, 220 f. Apparently Maclean did not go to Berlin at all, although he threatened to do so if the British government refused his proposal. See Lee, II, 220 f.]

[Footnote 49: For instances of this co-operation see _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 33, 39, 44-46, 57, 60, 68, 70-72, 77-79, 81-84, 86, 89, 91-107, 110-11, 119-26, 132; for Delcassé’s part in assuring the loan see Delcassé to Saint-René Taillandier, Jan. 5, 1903, _ibid._, 53 ff., No. 39. The Sultan obtained similar loans in Spain and in England.]