Chapter V: The Anglo-German Alliance Negotiations, 1898-1901

The international position of Great Britain at the end of the nineteenth century was uncomfortable. The major Powers were all busy in the colonial world more or less in opposition to her interests; _Weltpolitik_ was the order of the day; the navies of all states were growing rapidly and by combining might be able to threaten her maritime supremacy. On the Continent, the German Emperor’s courtship of an apparently complaisant France, cordial relations between Russia and Germany, an agreement in 1897 between Russia and Austria-Hungary over Balkan affairs, and a growing amity between France and Italy and between France and Spain gave evidence of a developing _rapprochement_ between the two systems of alliance. Trouble in West Africa with France in 1897 and early in 1898 made Anglo-French relations acute. Fashoda was on the way; so was the Boer War. British markets in China were being menaced by Russia, and the British feared that the Russian, French, and German governments might co-operate on Chinese affairs to their injury. Public opinion demanded that the government defend British interests more actively.[161] These were the more important of the difficulties confronting the island empire.

To dispel these dangers, two policies were advocated by members of the Unionist cabinet. Lord Salisbury, prime minister and foreign secretary, did not believe that a Continental alliance against Great Britain would be made.[162] He clung to the traditional position of “splendid isolation,” of making special agreements with the various Powers over specific issues. As he realized the inadequacy of this policy if Great Britain attempted to expand her influence too largely in China, South Africa, and elsewhere, he only half-heartedly supported a vigorous program of aggression.[163] In January, 1898, he proposed to the Russian government a general agreement over China and Turkey.[164] On March 8 he asked the United States government to co-operate in maintaining the open door in China.[165] However, he was old, in poor health, and inclined to permit Mr. Chamberlain, the colonial secretary, to force his hand. In fact, the last five years of his administration have been called the “Chamberlain period,” so great was the latter’s influence.[166]

This “stormy petrel” from Birmingham favored an entirely new policy.[167] Determined to maintain and extend British interests in the whole world, he sought to form a corporation for directing world-affairs by close co-operation with the United States and Germany. He was supported more or less fully by the Prince of Wales (who in 1901 became King Edward VII), in the cabinet by Mr. Balfour (who in 1902 succeeded Lord Salisbury as prime minister), and by the Duke of Devonshire;[168] while his influence with the masses and with the business elements seemed to assure him of popular approval.

Various difficulties had in recent years arisen between Great Britain and Germany. But Mr. Chamberlain thought that in view of the German Emperor’s offers of alliance to the British government at various times during the 1890’s, one as late as January, 1898,[169] the German government would eagerly accept a proposal to that effect. When Lord Salisbury’s policy toward Russia failed and trouble with Russia[170] and with France[171] threatened, in March and April, 1898, the British Colonial Minister declared to Count Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador, that Great Britain would have to relinquish her isolation. Under threat of coming to terms with Russia or France if his overture were refused, he made an unofficial offer of defensive alliance to Germany.[172]

Mr. Chamberlain’s proposal was coolly received. Count Bülow, the German secretary of state for foreign affairs, and his inspirer and guide, Herr von Holstein, privy councilor (_vortragender Rat_) in the foreign office, who with occasional interference from the Emperor were the directors of the German foreign policy, not only were mistrustful of British intentions, but also saw no reason for dissatisfaction with the current international position and prospects of their state.[173] Besides, this overture so increased the power of their situation that they were able to lay down a policy of the “free hand” to be followed during the next few years. A telegram from Emperor William II to Count Bülow on April 10, 1898, together with the latter’s marginal notes, best expressed this policy. After stating that Germany had less need of a British alliance since Great Britain had turned her attention from the Continent to the colonial world, the Emperor wrote:

If the English need of support direct itself in the future toward European affairs also, we could consider it more closely than now. Nevertheless, it is also of great significance for the present to keep the official attitude in England favorable and hopeful toward us [Bülow’s comment, “Yes”]. . . . . Through an England friendly to us we hold another card in our hand toward Russia. [Bülow’s comment, “Very true, we must remain independent between them, be the tongue to the wagon, not the pendulum restlessly swinging about.”] And we thereby have prospects of gaining colonial and commercial advantages from England. [Bülow’s comment, “Also the reverse. The calmer relations we have with Russia, the more will England treat us with respect, not to say take great care with respect to us.”]

The Emperor proposed that Count Hatzfeldt be instructed not to refuse the overture abruptly, but rather to express pleasure at the prospect of a profitable co-operation leading toward an alliance. To the Emperor’s remark that the pro-German sentiment of the British cabinet would not long remain concealed from Russia, Count Bülow wrote, “It does not matter, if only the English cannot prove to the Russians and _vice versa_ with the evidence in hand that we have played falsely.”[174] In accordance with the Emperor’s suggestion, Mr. Chamberlain’s offer was for the time refused.[175]

The German leaders had found the policy by which they hoped to carry out their program of _Weltpolitik_, already so resoundingly proclaimed in their speeches and acts.[176] “I am the balance of power,” declared the Emperor in 1901;[177] and by utilizing the advantages of that position, he and his advisers hoped to gain colonial concessions from the Powers, to construct the Bagdad Railway, and to build the German battle fleet. It was a policy of finesse and at times of intrigue, one nicely suited to Count Bülow’s ingratiating nature, but one full of pitfalls. Success depended upon whether Anglo-Russian and Anglo-French hostility was temporary or relatively permanent, upon whether Mr. Chamberlain was in earnest in declaring that Great Britain must abandon her policy of isolation,[178] upon whether German diplomacy would be competent to force concessions from those Powers without driving them together. Guided by Emperor William II, Count Bülow, and Herr von Holstein, the policy of the “free hand” seemed almost foredoomed to failure.

In 1898 the Emperor was thirty-nine years of age, but experience had taught him very little caution, moderation, or political understanding. He remained the spoiled sovereign of a spoiled country; each had risen to power so rapidly as to be unable to take this position for granted and not to demand explicit recognition of it, and as to be inclined consequently to abuse its power. The Emperor’s belief in and practice of his divine right to rule were not tempered by any consistent application to his task. While not devoid of political intuition, he lacked most of the qualities of a statesman. He was brilliant, but erratic and impulsive. In spite of his seeming wide knowledge, he was mentally lazy and devoid of profundity. Of a highly nervous temperament, he was guided chiefly by his emotions. He appeared rigid, severe, and forbidding on state occasions, but he loved to relax, to be jocose and sociable. He could be cordial and wonderfully amiable and charming, like his mother, and again, when his temper was aroused, he could be ruthless and crushing. He spoke often and dramatically, and traveled as much and as widely as he could. He frequently antagonized and angered people unintentionally by his imperious obtuseness. Then he would feel aggrieved and abused, for he expected all the understanding to come from the other side. One could not take him at his word; one had to interpret his meaning from his acts and intentions as well. At times his words would leave exactly the opposite meaning from that which he intended. He once remarked to Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador, that “the noodles seem to have had a lucid interval,” when upon further conversation it developed he had intended thereby to express his great satisfaction with the communication from the British government.[179] He loved to set countries at odds by his intrigues and gossip. His jealousy of Great Britain, her empire, and her fleet was a cardinal reason both for his being constantly attracted to England and for his desiring to become her colonial and naval rival. Nevertheless, after twelve years of personal contact with the Emperor, Sir Frank Lascelles came to the following sane conclusion about him:

In spite of his habit of twirling his moustache and rattling his sabre (I trust that this sentence may be taken in its metaphorical and not in its literal sense, for, as a matter of fact, I have never either seen him twirl his moustache or heard him rattle his sword), which he may think a befitting attitude for the ruler of a mighty Empire, he is really animated by the most pacific sentiments, and . . . . his great ambition now is that his name should be handed down to posterity as that of the German Emperor who kept the peace. It would seem that this is the estimate which the Emperor has formed of his own character, as in a recent conversation with Prince Radolin[180] he said he was at a loss to understand how, with his well-known peaceful intentions, he had come to be looked upon as a disturbing element—an instance, perhaps, of that “inconscience” which M. Herbette[181] considered a characteristic of the German nation, and concluded with the almost pathetic sentence, “Ich bin doch kein böser Mensch” [I am really not a bad person].[182]

The Emperor’s deficiences were in part made up by Count Bülow, who had been chosen secretary of state for foreign affairs in 1897 to execute the program of _Weltpolitik_. Born in 1849 of an old North German family, he had had diplomatic service at St. Petersburg, Vienna, Athens, Paris, Bucharest, and Rome where he had been ambassador since 1894. He came to his task at a crucial time in the history of Germany’s foreign relations, but he lacked the farsightedness, decision, and firmness of character necessary to deal with the problems adequately. Although he learned with time, recognized his mistakes, and tried to readjust the German foreign policy, he was then unable to do so. While his cosmopolitan culture and knowledge enabled him to understand other nations better than most Germans did, he seemed incapable of using this understanding practically. Under him the German policy appeared to demand something for nothing, anywhere or everywhere, merely because Germany was so strong a Power. In 1907 Lord Sanderson, British permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, a sane, sympathetic witness, stigmatized the German method of handling foreign affairs as follows:

The Germans are very tight bargainers, they have earned the nickname of “_les Juifs de la diplomatie_.” The German Foreign Office hold to a traditional view of negotiation that one of the most effective methods of gaining your point is to show how intensely disagreeable you can make yourself if you do not. They are surprised that the recollection of these methods should rankle, and speaking generally the North Germans combine intense susceptibility as regards themselves with a singular inability to appreciate the susceptibilities of others.[183]

Under Count Bülow, German foreign policy lacked direction and stability. It aroused the mistrust of the other Powers, who could not comprehend what Germany wanted. The Count was abler at extricating himself from difficulties than at avoiding them. A confirmed optimist at all times, he was suave and reassuring; the French Ambassador complained that he “was a fluent speaker but when one came to recall and note down what he had said very little came out of it.” Sir Frank Lascelles called him a perfect master at expressing vague generalities.[184] Count Bülow no doubt had a difficult time keeping the Emperor within bounds and undoing the latter’s mischief, but he was by no means an able statesman himself, and he relied for advice upon a person whom many considered a psychopath.

Since Prince Bismarck’s dismissal in 1890, Herr von Holstein had been a dominant influence in the German foreign office as the preserver of the Bismarckian tradition. Strangely secretive, he avoided all publicity and all responsible offices, yet he lusted after power behind the scenes. He was irascible, morbidly suspicious, both timorous and bold, by nature unfit to handle foreign affairs. He could not make up his mind to act. He could not understand the other government’s viewpoint. He knew few of the foreign representatives in Berlin personally, and rarely consulted with any of them. He relied for information chiefly upon the dispatches and upon newspapers, thus lacking the intimate contact with reality which might have balanced his recluse judgment. His mobile mind could make two plus two equal three, five, or seven and a half, but seldom four. His training under Prince Bismarck had taught him that master’s use of threats and force but not his caution and comprehensive sagacity. His adroit and intricate analysis of diplomatic situations and policies made him a power in the foreign office. The Emperor urged his dismissal, but Count Bülow clung to him, consulted him on all matters, and generally followed his advice.[185]

During the next year the German plan worked. On the one hand, with troubles coming to a head in China, the Sudan, and South Africa, the British government was grudgingly compelled to play the German game by agreeing to a division of the Samoan Islands and a prospective partition of the Portuguese colonies and by acknowledging the utility of similar accords.[186] On the other hand, an indirect bid for a _rapprochement_ by M. Delcassé in December, 1898,[187] and a proposal from the Russian government in 1899 for an agreement over Asia Minor[188] signified equal success, although the German government refused both offers. Then when the Boer War began late in 1899, Great Britain, surprised by the universal outburst of hatred against her on the Continent and apprehensive of German, French, and Russian intervention in favor of the Boers, had urgent need of Germany’s friendship. Hence the pressing invitation to the Emperor William II and his foreign secretary in the autumn of 1899 to visit England.[189]

As Count Bülow cared nothing about the fate of the Boers, the visit took place (November 21-24). He and the Emperor were received enthusiastically by government, court, and people. The British ministers showed anger at France and Russia and a desire for co-operation with Germany.[190] Mr. Chamberlain, who boldly asserted that the two countries “must sooner or later come to a general understanding because we need each other,” repeated his wish for a grouping of Germany, the United States, and Great Britain.

The German leaders responded as in the previous year that more intimate relations between the two countries should be prepared for by special agreements. The British Colonial Minister, readily accepting this program, suggested two subjects for negotiation, the Bagdad Railway and Morocco; whereupon it was agreed that he should take up the latter question with the German Ambassador in the very near future.[191]

The visit to Windsor was apparently a complete success. Both governments were highly pleased with the results. The only discord in the harmony was the expression of mutual antagonism on the part of the English and German press. To counteract this opposition, Mr. Chamberlain, at Count Bülow’s suggestion,[192] openly advocated his project in a speech at Leicester on November 30 as follows:

The same sentiments which bring us into closer sympathy with the United States of America may also be evoked to bring us into closer sympathy and alliance with the Empire of Germany. . . . . If the union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new triple alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the future of the world.[193]

The Colonial Secretary’s act had the very reverse effect of that intended, for the German people rejected with vituperation the idea of allying with the oppressors of the Boers. The German Foreign Minister, ambitious for the chancellorship when the aged Prince Hohenlohe should retire, and inclined to follow the dictates of public opinion, felt compelled to take cognizance of this feeling. Speaking before the Reichstag on December 11, he made a cool rejoinder to Mr. Chamberlain’s proposal. In a chauvinistic declaration of Germany’s need for colonies and a navy, he proclaimed: “As for England we are gladly willing to live with her in peace and harmony on a basis of complete reciprocity. But since our international position is at present a favorable one, we must utilize it in order to safeguard ourselves for the future.”[194]

Mr. Chamberlain was indignant at this reply, even though the German government made special efforts to explain it away.[195] Hence, as the two presses were at each other’s throats and the governments were wrangling over minor troubles arising out of the Boer War, he dropped the idea of an alliance, presumably also that of a Moroccan accord, at least until the close of the war.[196]

In 1900, with the French advance on Touat, the Moroccan question became acute. In April the German government for the first time weighed carefully its ambitions with reference to Morocco and the means for realizing them.[197] Count Bülow held that Germany had maritime interests of her own in that land, and was no longer concerned merely for the sake of Italy, as she had been ten years before. He coveted particularly the southern area on the Atlantic Coast. A British seizure of Moroccan territory without consideration for German interests, he stated, “would within Germany greatly weaken and discredit the Government and in its foreign relations make any future co-operation with England impossible and force us to seek connection with Russia and France at almost any price”; while an Anglo-French settlement of the question to the exclusion or detriment of Germany “would have incalculable results for the further course of German internal and external policy.” In either case German foreign policy would be forced to take another direction whether the government wished it or not; and relations with Great Britain would become more strained than ever before. In fact, the German government “could not possibly accept either eventuality.”[198]

In these words lies the key to the understanding of Germany’s precipitation of the Moroccan crisis in 1905.

To obviate those dangers, the German government preferred an agreement with Great Britain. In May, 1900, it proposed to Mr. Chamberlain that they negotiate a Moroccan accord. But the Colonial Minister, while acknowledging that the only peaceful way to solve the Moroccan problem was by an agreement between Great Britain and Germany, had become more wary and requested the German government to make an official proposal which he could submit to the cabinet. He felt sure, he said, that it would be favorably received, and promised to support it, provided his well-known desires were given due consideration.[199]

Fearing a rejection, the German government deemed it inadvisable to follow Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion. Nor did Count Bülow warn the British government that Germany must participate in any Moroccan settlement, since he believed it possible to prevent the Moroccan affair from becoming serious until the opportunity for an Anglo-German agreement arose.[200] He held that an Anglo-French understanding about Morocco was impossible because of the conflict of French and British interests over the possession of the south shore of the straits. To avert a crisis, he issued a discreet warning to M. Delcassé in May, 1900, not to go beyond treaty limits in the action against Touat;[201] he incited the Russian Foreign Minister, who, he thought, would be opposed to any Anglo-French agreement or to a European disturbance over Morocco, to restrain the French Minister;[202] and he instructed the German representative at Tangier to retard the collapse of the Sherifian Empire.[203] Thereafter the Moroccan question remained in abeyance for a time.[204]

In November, 1900, Lord Salisbury resigned the secretaryship of foreign affairs to Lord Lansdowne. Lord Lansdowne had had a varied life. Of high aristocratic and wealthy family, he had entered politics as a matter of course and had served as governor-general of Canada, viceroy of India, and secretary of state for war. He fitted admirably into his new position as foreign secretary, for he possessed patience, tact, and the ability to inspire confidence, and he assumed responsibility with decision and courage. While he entered office with very few preconceptions, he wrote to Sir Frank Lascelles, he did believe that “we should use every effort to maintain and, if we can, to strengthen the good relations which at present exist between the Queen’s Government and that of the Emperor” of Germany.[205] In his foreign policy he sided with the new school, already represented by Mr. Balfour and Mr. Chamberlain. When King Edward VII gave royal support to this group after his accession to the throne in January, 1901, the Victorian policy of “splendid isolation” definitely terminated. However, the old Marquess of Salisbury remained premier until 1902; and the foreign policy eventually adopted was a compromise between the old and the new.

The international position of Great Britain remained bad. If anything, it had grown worse since 1899; for the Boer War lingered on, and France and Russia were endangering important British interests, the one by her active policy with reference to Morocco, the other by her use of the Boxer Rebellion to extend her power in China and by her activity in Persia and Afghanistan.

In the autumn of 1900, the British government had negotiated an accord with Germany over China to hold Russia in check.[206] In January of the next year Mr. Chamberlain, after repeating his assertion that Great Britain must ally either with Germany and the Triple Alliance or with France and Russia, proposed to Baron Eckardstein, first secretary of the German embassy in London, that as an introduction to the project for an alliance the two governments agree over Morocco. The subject could be taken up with Lord Lansdowne, he said, as soon as Lord Salisbury, still in feeble health, left for the south.[207] Before any negotiations were begun, however, far eastern affairs, as more pressing and vital, brought to the fore the question of alliance.[208]

Early in 1901, reports were spread of a Russo-Chinese agreement which would give Russia practically a protectorate in Southern Manchuria. The problem which thereupon confronted the British government was illuminatingly summed up by Mr. Bertie, undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, as follows (March 11, 1901):

Germany has assured Japan that there is no secret understanding between Germany and Russia respecting the Far East, and that, in the event of a crisis, Germany will observe a benevolent neutrality, the effect of which would be to keep the French fleet in check.

The Japanese Government ask whether His Majesty’s Government have been consulted by Germany, and whether they believe the assurances given to Japan; and they further ask: “How far may Japan rely upon the support of Great Britain in case Japan finds it necessary to approach Russia?”

It is assumed by the Japanese Minister that “approach” in the context means “resist,” which is war.

Unless Japan can make sure of neither Germany nor France taking an active part on the side of Russia, she will not fight Russia over the Manchurian Agreement. If the possession of Corea by Russia were at issue, Japan would fight, with or without support, and independently of whether France or Germany would remain neutral.

If Germany and England, in answer to the Japanese Government’s inquiries, deprecated war, and said that if unfortunately war broke out between Japan and Russia, it would be the object of England and Germany to restrict as much as possible the theatre of it, and they would consequently remain neutral, so long as no third Power attempted to take a part in it, then I think that such an assurance might be sufficient to satisfy Japan that France would not be allowed to join with Russia, and that Japan might fight Russia single-handed. . . . .

If France were allowed to side with Russia, and they crushed Japan, the result might be a renewal of the triple understanding—viz., Russia, France, and Germany. Those three Powers would become supreme in China, and we should go to the wall.

If Russia alone, or in combination with France, defeated Japan, and we came to the rescue to prevent the obliteration of Japan, we should incur the lasting enmity of Russia and France, and a defeated, and probably ungrateful, Japan would not be of much use to us as against Russian encroachments.

It has been suggested that if Japan defeated Russia there would be grave danger to European interests in the Far East.

A great military and naval Power, with unbounded natural resources and an immense population such as Russia, is not likely to accept defeat permanently. She would reorganize for a further trial of strength, but such a trial might be a long way off, and it would be greatly retarded by Japan being allowed to take as the spoils of war the Liaotung Peninsula. Its possession by Japan would be a guarantee that there would be no reconciliation between Russia and Japan. This would be an advantage to England and Europe. The yellow danger would be kept in check by Russia and the Russian danger by Japan.

If we do nothing to encourage Japan to look upon us as a friend and possible ally against Russia and France, we may drive her to a policy of despair, in which she may come to some sort of terms with Russia. I do not say that it is probable, but it is possible, and our interests would greatly suffer if she did.[209]

Therein lies the deciding reason why the British government tried to secure the support of Germany; why it made the alliance with Japan when this attempt came to naught; and why it subsequently established the entente with France. An agreement with Germany, supplemented by one with Japan, would have solved Great Britain’s difficulty of defending her colonial interests by assuring the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. Failing this, an alliance with Japan and a policy of reconciliation and entente with the other Powers furnished the best solution. But in any case either alliance or close friendship with a European Power was essential.

At the time the prospect of obtaining German aid looked favorable. The German Emperor had rushed impetuously to the bedside of the dying Queen Victoria late in January, 1901, and had remained for her funeral. In his talk with the British officials he had denounced Russia for her aggressions in China, had informed them that Great Britain needed an alliance, and, in a dinner speech at Marlborough House on February 5, had declared: “We ought to form an Anglo-German alliance, you to keep the seas while we would be responsible for the land.”[210]

Late in January the British government tried to obtain German aid against the Russian aggressions in Manchuria by calling into action the Anglo-German agreement of the previous year; but the German government refused to permit an interpretation of that accord which would embroil it with its eastern neighbor.[211] Instead, it tried to persuade the British government to connive at embroiling Russia and Japan in war without binding themselves.[212] It assured Japan of the localization of that conflict by remarking that Germany would remain neutral and would thereby hold France neutral. In March, Lord Lansdowne, following up this assertion, asked Baron Eckardstein if Germany would undertake to hold France neutral in case of war (March 16). In violation of strict orders from Herr von Holstein “not to breathe a word of alliance” to the British government,[213] Baron Eckardstein replied that “if there were a defensive alliance between Germany and Great Britain covering all eventualities,” Germany would be able to do so.[214] Two days later Lord Lansdowne declared to the Baron that “England now stands at a turning point and must decide upon her future policy”; and in accordance with the Baron’s strong hint, a defensive alliance was tentatively set forth for consideration. By its terms each Power should preserve neutrality in case of an attack upon the other by either France or Russia but should come to its aid in case of an attack by those two Powers combined.[215]

Baron Eckardstein reported the proposal as coming from the British Minister, and his government looked upon it as a British offer. Lord Lansdowne made the Baron responsible for the initiative. With the existing evidence, the contradiction cannot be cleared up; yet as each government was under the impression that the other had taken the first step and was therefore more eager for the alliance than was really the case, the negotiations endured longer than they might otherwise have done.[216]

In the next two and a half months the course of the negotiations was checkered. On March 22, Baron Eckardstein unofficially brought up the subject with Lord Lansdowne. During their discussion they agreed that it would be best for the _casus foederis_ to arise when one of the Powers was attacked by two or more Powers, and that the accord should be ratified by the two parliaments. The British Secretary declared that the Premier approved “in principle of a strictly defined defensive alliance.”[217] On March 29 they again touched on the matter; but owing to Lord Lansdowne’s inability to consult his chief, who was ill, and owing to a flare-up between the two governments over a minor matter connected with the Chinese customs, Baron Eckardstein postponed the negotiations.[218] On April 9 he was ready to resume the discussion; and for the first time he mentioned to the British Minister the indispensable stipulation of his government, that Austria-Hungary and Italy must also be included in the alliance.[219]

From the start the attitude of the German government toward these proposals was mistrustful. Since the British government had been disinclined to execute the Anglo-German accord of 1898 for a future division of the Portuguese Colonies, the German government was reluctant to consider even Mr. Chamberlain’s suggestion for an accord over Morocco, at least until events permitted its immediate execution.[220] Count Bülow and Herr von Holstein refused to believe that the British government would make an alliance so long as Lord Salisbury remained in authority. Moreover, they feared that if the negotiations failed and became known to France and Russia, owing to British perfidy or to Parliament’s rejecting the treaty—and either outcome seemed likely to them—Germany would be the one to suffer from the wrath of those two Powers while Great Britain, protected by the sea, would enjoy greater international security than before.

I am especially mistrustful of this present storm of friendship by Chamberlain and comrades [wrote Herr von Holstein to Count Metternich] because the threatened understanding with Russia and France is such complete fraud. A retreat by England would postpone her struggle for existence for a few years, but would then make it all the more certain, because the opponents [France and Russia] will have been strengthened, while the English will have been weakened in power and prestige. A reasonable agreement with England, that is, one in which a proper consideration is given to the almost certain danger of war to which we should thereby expose ourselves, can in my opinion first be achieved when the appreciation of her constrained position has become more general in England than it is at present.[221]

Count Bülow, chancellor since the previous October, held the same view. In fact, he was even more inclined to preserve the policy of the “free hand.” “Facts, sir, facts,” he wrote in connection with this question of alliance, and above all he wanted facts in the form of colonial acquisitions in Africa.[222] So while sensible of the power of such an alliance, these two would have it only on German terms, an alliance between the British Empire, on the one hand, and the Triple Alliance, on the other; or, as an alternative formulation, an alliance by which Great Britain joined the Triple Alliance.[223] To obviate all possibility of betrayal, they instructed Baron Eckardstein to demand of Lord Lansdowne the acceptance of this basic condition before continuing the negotiations. Not until then, they declared, should the terms of the Triple Alliance be imparted to the British government.[224]

Conversations were resumed in the second half of May. When, on May 23, Count Hatzfeldt made clear to Lord Lansdowne the provision of his government, an _impasse_ was soon reached. The British Foreign Secretary approved the project of alliance in principle, but he had never expected much to come of it. Upon ascertaining the German condition he foresaw a breakdown when the time came to formulate the terms.[225]

Moreover, Lord Salisbury persistently refused to admit that Great Britain needed an alliance. He asserted that it would be a bad bargain to join the Triple Alliance, for the “liability of having to defend the German and the Austrian frontiers against Russia is heavier than that of having to defend the British Isles against France.” He opposed any secret agreement on the grounds that Parliament had the right to decide questions of war and peace; and he continued to favor isolation and dependence on public opinion to determine governmental policy in a crisis. Nor did he believe that German public opinion, so hostile to Great Britain, would accept an Anglo-German defensive alliance.[226] Thus while some of the members of the cabinet discussed the possible terms of an alliance, and Sir Thomas Sanderson, permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, even drew up two trial drafts of a treaty, the opposition of Lord Salisbury together with the German refusal to communicate the terms of the Triple Alliance forced the negotiations to a halt in June.[227]

The German Chancellor readily accepted this turn of affairs. After expressing a desire for a future alliance, he assured the British government that Germany would continue the policy of the “free hand.”[228]

The visit of the Moroccan embassy to London and Berlin in June and July afforded an opportunity to revive the Moroccan question. Lord Lansdowne’s uneasiness about the French actions with reference to Morocco was not allayed by the French Ambassador’s assertion to him on July 3 that France had no intention of raising that problem.[229] But nothing was done.[230]

When el-Menebhi, the leader of that embassy, was dismissed in disgrace on his return home, the British Foreign Secretary expressed the wish to remain in constant touch with the German government on the Moroccan question.[231] Each Power, however, acted separately in defending the Moroccan Minister; and the German government looked on this as another occasion in which Great Britain was trying to employ Germany to defend British interests. The German leaders likewise thought that by refusing to make any separate agreements with Great Britain they would eventually force the latter to accept their terms for an alliance.[232]

As soon as the negotiations with Germany showed no prospect of success, the British government followed up Japan’s offer of an alliance and in August began official conversations on that subject.[233] None the less it continued its efforts to make some kind of agreement with Germany. But on August 23, at Wilhelmshöhe, a meeting between Emperor William II and King Edward VII, which the British leaders hoped would pave the way for an understanding, had no result.[234] In November, Lord Lansdowne regarded the difficulties in the way of an alliance as “at the present moment virtually insuperable,” enumerating some of them as follows:

1. The impossibility of arriving at a definition of the _casus foederis_ which would not be either so rigid as to greatly hamper our freedom of action or so vague as to deprive the alliance of all practical value.

2. The certainty of alienating France and Russia.

3. Complications with the Colonies, which might not at all approve of the idea of hanging on to the skirts of the Triple Alliance.

4. The risk of entangling ourselves in a policy which might be hostile to America. Without knowledge of the German Emperor’s views in regard to the United States, this is to my mind a formidable obstacle.

5. The difficulty of carrying Parliament with us at a moment when the Parliamentary situation is as little satisfactory as it is at present.[235]

But, he wrote, “the argument that, because we have in the past survived in spite of our isolation, we need have no misgivings as to the effect of that isolation in the future,” could be pushed too far. Besides, since negotiations then in progress for an alliance with Japan virtually signified that Great Britain did not wish to remain alone, he proposed that the government seek “a much more limited understanding with Germany as to our policy in regard to certain matters of interest to both Powers”—for instance, they might agree to co-operate for the preservation of the territorial _status quo_ on the shores of the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Black Seas, for the maintenance of the “freedom for the commerce and navigation . . . . in the Persian Gulf, and the prevention of any territorial acquisitions on its shores by other Powers which might interfere with that object.” But only “whenever the occasion for it might arise” should the nature of their co-operation be determined.[236]

The Premier remained vigorously opposed to the project; but Lord Lansdowne urged that the German government probably expected him to reopen the negotiations, and that if he made this offer, that government would be deprived of any grounds for complaining that Great Britain “had treated it inconsiderately or brusquely rejected its overture.” As he also suspected that “the German Gov’t. (or the German Emperor) desire something much more precise and far-reaching . . . . and that they would refuse an overture on the above lines,” he maintained that the proposal could cause no damage.[237]

On December 19 the British Foreign Minister recalled to Count Metternich, the new German ambassador at London, the negotiations for an alliance and stated that “while . . . . we certainly did not regard the German proposal with an unfriendly or indifferent eye, I did not think that for the moment we could afford to take it up.” Instead he suggested that the two governments arrive at “an understanding with regard to the policy which they might pursue in reference to particular questions or in particular parts of the world in which they are alike interested.” Count Metternich expressed surprise that the British government had not “jumped at” this “magnificent opportunity” to end its isolation, and replied that he did not expect his government to favor this restricted proposal. “It was a case of the whole or none.”[238]

There the matter rested. Lord Lansdowne and King Edward were both dissatisfied with Count Metternich’s critical tone;[239] but they continued to voice their solicitude, which the German Emperor and Count Bülow reciprocated, that the two governments keep in close touch.[240] However, public opinion in both countries remained bitterly hostile, and when in October, 1901, Mr. Chamberlain spoke disparagingly of the actions of the German army in the war of 1870-71, the protest of the German press was so vehement that the Chancellor, on January 8, 1902, declared in the Reichstag, “let the man go and do not become excited. He bites on granite.”[241] The pleasant visit of the Prince of Wales to Germany a short time later did not offset the discord resulting from this war of words.[242] By March, Count Metternich wrote that he “wouldn’t give two pence for Anglo-German relations”; while the Chancellor admitted that so far as Great Britain was concerned the Emperor was Germany’s “best card.”[243] It was a dismal fiasco for so momentous a negotiation.

The British government thought that by considering an alliance the German leaders had manifested friendly feeling. Lord Lansdowne did not believe that the animosity of Germany toward Great Britain would last forever or that Germany would “let us ‘go under’ before a great European coalition.” “Is it not more likely,” he wrote, April 22, 1902, to Sir Frank Lascelles, “that she will stick to her rôle of the honest broker, taking advantage, if you like, of our difficulties in order to pursue a _politique de pourboire_ at our expense, but without pooling her ironclads with those of France and Russia?” The Ambassador agreed with him; but after talking to the British naval attaché in Berlin he pointed out for the first time that the German navy was definitely aimed at Great Britain.[244] The future for Anglo-German relations was therefore none too bright for the British government, and British public opinion cordially approved when on January 30, 1902, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded.

The German government was not at all alarmed by this failure. Its relations with France and Russia were of the best. As a result of the Anglo-German intimacy in 1901, M. Delcassé had twice endeavored to approach Germany, while in September, during a meeting at Danzig of the Russian and German rulers together with their foreign ministers, the Russian Minister had asserted that “an alliance between Germany and Russia would be the greatest blessing and is a goal to be striven for.” The overtures were disregarded.[245] When the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded in February, 1902, the Russian government urged Germany to enter a Continental combination against those Powers; but Count Bülow, pleased to see obviated the possibility of an Anglo-Russian understanding, bluntly rejected the proposal.[246] Nor did he believe that, since Russia and Great Britain were so decisively at odds, France would dare make an accord with the latter.[247] And Herr von Holstein wrote on December 31, 1901, that “at the present day Germany with her enormous strength on land and sea is a factor which no Power that wishes to perform an important act dare leave in its rear without having previously come to an understanding with her.”[248]

Thus, the German apostles of _Weltpolitik_ guiding the destinies of an acquisitive and chauvinistic nation, refused to co-operate with Great Britain, France, or Russia. Apparently they did not know what they wanted or how they might utilize their favorable situation; for they derived no benefits whatever from any of the opportunities offered. An Anglo-German agreement would have prevented the formation of the Entente Cordiale and would very likely have brought about a settlement of the Moroccan question to Germany’s advantage. By cultivating France and encouraging her to draw closer, Germany might have come to some agreement with that Power through which she could have prevented the later Entente Cordiale from becoming so cordial, and through which she might have shared in the general improvement of relations between the Powers and in the settlement of the Moroccan question. The whole Moroccan crisis and many others to follow might thereby have been avoided. In a world of shifting friendships, of swiftly changing policies, a world demanding resolute and judicious statesmanship, the German Chancellor and Herr von Holstein refused to take risks. Toward the British government they had showed themselves too sensitive, suspicious, and peremptory in their demands.[249] The French and Russian governments they had rebuffed even more brusquely. Deluded by wrong preconceptions of international politics and overprudent in their negotiations, they believed themselves entirely safe in playing their favorite rôle of sphinx and of aligning with no one.[250] Their naval program alarmed Great Britain; their construction of the Bagdad Railway antagonized Russia; their Moroccan policy exasperated France. They played against all three Powers, and still did not expect them to draw together against a common opponent. Instead of alliances or ententes, they reaped animosities. By their refusals and their clumsy diplomacy, they paved the road for the Anglo-French and the Anglo-Russian ententes. And when, a few years later, those Powers came to agreement, the German leaders feared that their country was being encircled and isolated.

[Footnote 161: Memo. by Bertie, March 14, 1898, _B.D._, I, 17 f., No. 24; memo. by Tilley, on relations between Russia and Great Britain, 1892-1904, Jan. 14, 1905, _ibid._, 1 ff., No. 1; O’Conor to Salisbury, March 15, 1898, _ibid._, 20, No. 29; Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24, 1898, _ibid._, 24 f., No. 38; Monson to Salisbury, Feb. 26, 1898, _ibid._, 146, No. 172; Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, _ibid._, 147, No. 173; Monson to Salisbury, May 19, 1898, _ibid._, 154, No. 179; memo. by Bertie, June 30, 1898, _ibid._, 54, No. 72; Erich Brandenburg, _Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege_ (Berlin, 1924), chaps. iv, v; Sir A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (eds.), _The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy, 1783-1919_ (Cambridge, 1923), Vol. III, chaps. iii, iv, _passim_; _G.P._, Vol. XIV, chap. xci. The British were especially concerned over maintaining the open door in China. See Alfred L. P. Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy, 1896-1906_ (New York, 1928), pp. 179, 182 f.]

[Footnote 162: For expressions of this fear see Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 182 f., 225 f., 331 f.]

[Footnote 163: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 221 ff., No. 3793; dispatches from Hatzfeldt recounting conversations with Salisbury, May 12, 15, 1898, _ibid._, 230 ff., and notes; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 15, 1898, _ibid._, 233 ff., No. 3797. The best exposition of Salisbury’s views is given in a memorandum by him, May 29, 1901, _B.D._, II, 68 f., No. 86. See also J. A. Spender, _The Public Life_ (New York, 1925), I, 79; Salisbury to Lansdowne, April 21, 1897, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne, A Biography_, pp. 145 f. On Aug. 30, 1899, Salisbury wrote to Lansdowne that the British army would not be needed for a Continental war “in a blue moon” (_ibid._, p. 157).]

[Footnote 164: Salisbury to O’Conor, Jan. 17, 25, 1898, _B.D._, I, 5, No. 5; 8, No. 9; and others in _ibid._, chap. i.]

[Footnote 165: Dennis, pp. 170 f.]

[Footnote 166: Salisbury was prime minister from 1895 to 1902.]

[Footnote 167: On Chamberlain see Spender, I, 79.]

[Footnote 168: Hatzfeldt, German ambassador to London, also thought that the Liberal leaders, Lord Rosebery and Sir William Harcourt, approved of Chamberlain’s plan. Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 7, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 209 ff., No. 3788. See also Gwynn, I, 188, 191.]

[Footnote 169: Lieut. Col. Grierson, British military attaché at Berlin, reported to the British Ambassador a conversation with the Emperor on Jan. 15, 1898, as follows: “He [the Emperor] said that for eight years he had striven to be friendly with Great Britain to gain her alliance, and to work hand in hand with her, but had failed” (Grierson to Lascelles, Jan. 19, 1898, _B.D._, I, 42, No. 62). The Emperor said the same to Lascelles on Feb. 1. See Lascelles to Salisbury, Feb. 1, 1898, _ibid._, 43 f., No. 63; memo. by Tilley on the relations between Germany and Great Britain (1892-1904), Jan. 5, 1905, _ibid._, Appendix, 322 ff.; Brandenburg, chaps. i-iv.]

[Footnote 170: Russia had just occupied Port Arthur. In speaking to the Russian Ambassador about that act on March 24, Balfour declared that the British government regarded it with “grave objection,” as a “menace” to the friendship of the two countries. See Salisbury to O’Conor, March 24, 1898, _B.D._, I, 24 f., No. 38.]

[Footnote 171: Monson to Salisbury, March 6, 1898, _ibid._, 147, No. 173. Salisbury tried to obtain the support of the United States on Chinese affairs (Dennis, p. 170).]

[Footnote 172: It was on March 24 that Hatzfeldt reported that Alfred Rothschild had arranged a meeting between him and Chamberlain and Balfour. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 24, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 193 f., No. 3779. For reports of the conversations between Hatzfeldt and Balfour and Chamberlain see the following dispatches: Hatzfeldt to F. O., March 25, 29, April 1, 1898, _ibid._, 195 ff., Nos. 3781, 3782, 3784; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _ibid._, 221 ff., No. 3793. The editors of the _British Documents_ could find “practically no evidence” concerning this proposal in the archives of the British foreign office, and have stated that Chamberlain apparently treated the affair as private (_B.D._, Vol. I, Foreword). See also the dispatch from Lascelles to Balfour, Aug. 23, 1898, _ibid._, 101, No. 122. That Chamberlain was uncertain about the sort of agreement he wished was evident from the different formulations of the proposal which he made. As to the American aspect of his plan, Chamberlain was influenced by Ambassador John Hay, who supported the idea of an Anglo-American alliance. On May 13, 1898, at Birmingham the British Minister spoke publicly in favor of that alliance (Dennis, pp. 117 f., 122). Nothing of course came of the matter. The great affinity for the United States on the part of the British government was shown in July, 1898, by its indirect warning to Germany not to interfere in the Spanish-American War (Gwynn, I, 251, 253). On the Anglo-German negotiations for an alliance see Friedrich Meinecke, _Geschichte des deutsch-englischen Bündnisproblems, 1890-1901_ (München and Berlin, 1927); Eugen Fischer, _Holsteins Grosses Nein_ (Berlin, 1925).]

[Footnote 173: Holstein thought that the possibility for this alliance would first enter “when (1) Russia threatens us; (2) England acts less haughty than today.” See Holstein’s minute to a dispatch from Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _G.P._, XIV, 223, No. 3793. On the German reaction see also the dispatch from Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 1898, _ibid._, 204 ff., No. 3785, and the following documents.]

[Footnote 174: William II to F. O., April 10, 1898, _ibid._, 217 f., No. 3790.]

[Footnote 175: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, April 3, 24, 1898, _ibid._, 207, No. 3785; 218 ff., No. 3792.]

[Footnote 176: In January, 1896, the Emperor had sent the famous telegram to President Krueger of the Transvaal which was regarded by the British as showing a desire to take the Boers under Germany’s wing. On Dec. 6, 1897, Bülow in his first speech before the Reichstag as secretary of state for foreign affairs declared: “The days are past when the German left to one neighbor the earth, to another the sea, and reserved for himself the air. . . . . We do not wish to place anyone in the shadow, but we demand also our place in the sun” (Bülow, _Reden_, I, 7 f.). In 1898 the first important navy bill was passed by the Reichstag. On September 23, 1898, the Emperor declared, “Our future lies on the sea” (G. P. Gooch, _History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919_ [New York, 1923], pp. 225 ff.). These were merely a few examples of Germany’s changed interests.]

[Footnote 177: William II to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1901, _G.P._, XVII, 28, No. 4987.]

[Footnote 178: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, April 26, 1898, _ibid._, 224, No. 3793.]

[Footnote 179: The occasion for this remark was the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance early in 1902 (Lascelles to Lansdowne, Feb. 8, 1902, Newton, p. 247).]

[Footnote 180: German ambassador at Paris at the time.]

[Footnote 181: Formerly French ambassador at Berlin.]

[Footnote 182: Extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906, May 24, 1907,” _B.D._, III, 437 f.]

[Footnote 183: Memo. by Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _ibid._, p. 429.]

[Footnote 184: Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 108 f., No. 135; extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906,” _ibid._, p. 435.]

[Footnote 185: Emil Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_ (Berlin, 1926); G. P. Gooch, “Baron von Holstein,” _Cambridge Historical Journal_, Vol. I; Johannes Haller, _Die Ära Bülow; eine historisch-politische Studie_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1922); Otto Hammann, _Bilder aus der letzten Kaiserzeit_ (Berlin, 1922); extract from “General Report on Germany for 1906,” _op. cit._, III, 434 ff.; Wilhelm Spickernagel, _Fürst Bülow_ (Hamburg, 1921); André Tardieu, _Le Prince de Bülow_ (Paris, 1909).]

[Footnote 186: _G.P._, Vol. XIV, chaps. xcii, xcvi; _B.D._, Vol. I, chaps. ii, iii.]

[Footnote 187: Memo. by Huhn, Dec. 5, 1898, _G.P._, XIII, 247 ff., No. 3558. See above.]

[Footnote 188: Memo. by Bülow, April 18, 1899, _ibid._, XIV, 540 f., No. 4017, and the following documents. According to a memorandum by Bülow on May 5, 1899, Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador, attempted “in every way” to convince him that Germany “should hold in all questions to Russia and France and take position against England.” “England is strong only because Germany and France do not co-operate,” said the Ambassador (_ibid._, 546 ff., No. 4020).]

[Footnote 189: Hatzfeldt to F. O., Sept. 30, 1899, _ibid._, XV, 397, No. 4386; Bülow to F. O., Sept. 25, 1899, _ibid._, 396 f., No. 4385; Monson to Salisbury, Aug. 14, 1899, _B.D._, I, 213, No. 259; Monson to Salisbury, Oct. 1, 1899, _ibid._, 233, No. 285; and other documents in _ibid._, chap. vii.; Dennis, pp. 125 ff.]

[Footnote 190: Salisbury was absent on account of the death of his wife, but the officials in the British foreign office assured Hatzfeldt that the premier was not at all prejudiced against Germany, as the latter supposed. See Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 423, No. 4401; cf. Gwynn, I, 351.]

[Footnote 191: On this visit see Lee, _King Edward VII_, I, 747; Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, Vol. II, chaps. iv, v; memo. by Bülow, Nov. 24, 1899, _G.P._, XV, 413 f., No. 4398; Eckardstein to Hatzfeldt, Nov. 30, 1899, _ibid._, 421 f., No. 4400; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, Dec. 2, 1899, _ibid._, 422 ff., No. 4401.]

[Footnote 192: Eckardstein, II, 107.]

[Footnote 193: _Annual Register_ (1899), p. 227. Salisbury agreed to this act, but warned Chamberlain that Germany would very probably disappoint him (Spring Rice to Miss Lascelles, April 17, 1902, Gwynn, I, 351).]

[Footnote 194: Bülow, I, 88 ff.]

[Footnote 195: Eckardstein, II, 126 ff., 133 ff.]

[Footnote 196: _Ibid._, p. 125.]

[Footnote 197: On several previous occasions Morocco had been the topic of conversation between British and German officials. In January, 1897, not to go back any farther, Lord Salisbury had sounded the German government on that question, but the latter had not been interested (_G.P._, XVII, No. 4979 n.). But when the subject was brought up in a conversation between the Premier and Hatzfeldt in February and again in June, 1899, the German policy, now launched on its career of _Weltpolitik_, was different. Salisbury stated that in case of the break-up of the Sherifian Empire, “Great Britain could not with indifference see the Atlantic seaboard pass under any other dominion.” Hatzfeldt replied that in his personal opinion his government would approve a British acquisition of territory in that land only in case Germany received her share; and he added that it would be very desirable to exchange views and ideas on the subject whenever action should become pressing. Salisbury, however, expressed the wish for the _status quo_ to be indefinitely maintained, and refused to enter into details. See Hatzfeldt to Bülow, Feb. 8, 1899, _ibid._, 295 f., No. 5152; Salisbury to Lascelles, June 7, 1899, _B.D._, II, 256 f., No. 307.

A short time before the visit to Windsor in Nov., 1899, Chamberlain suggested to Eckardstein that the two governments make a secret agreement over Morocco by which the Mediterranean coast should be left free for Great Britain while Germany should receive far-reaching concessions on the Atlantic seaboard. See Hatzfeldt to F. O., _G.P._, XVII, 297, No. 5153. Eckardstein also states that in Jan., 1901, Chamberlain and Devonshire both told him that in 1899 Salisbury had approved the idea of a solution of the Moroccan problem with Germany (Eckardstein, II, 359).]

[Footnote 198: These remarks by Bülow were chiefly contained in his minutes to the dispatches from Hatzfeldt. See Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _G.P._, XVII, 299 ff., No. 5156; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 1, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff., No. 5159; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 29, 1900, _ibid._, 313 f., No. 5165; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1, 1900, _ibid._, 314 ff., No. 5166.]

[Footnote 199: Bülow’s plan was also to associate Italy later in the Moroccan settlement. See Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 14, 1900, _ibid._, 302 f., No. 5158; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff., No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, 1900, _ibid._, 308 f., Nos. 5160 f.; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162.]

[Footnote 200: Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, May 21, 1900, _ibid._, 303 ff., No. 5159; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 23, 1900, _ibid._, 308, No. 5160; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 27, 1900, _ibid._, 309 ff., No. 5162; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, May 28, 1900, _ibid._, 311 f., No. 5163; Hatzfeldt to F. O., May 29, 1900, _ibid._, 312 f., No. 5164; Hatzfeldt to Hohenlohe, June 1, 1900, _ibid._, 314 ff., No. 5166.]

[Footnote 201: Bülow to Münster, April 27, 1900, _ibid._, 299 f., No. 5156; Münster to Hohenlohe, May 9, 1900, _ibid._, 301 f., No. 5157.]

[Footnote 202: Bülow to Tschirschky, June 5, 1900, _ibid._, 318 ff., No. 5167; Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 13, 1900, _ibid._, 321 ff., No. 5168.]

[Footnote 203: Derenthall to Mentzingen, Aug. 2, 1900, _ibid._, 324, No. 5170.]

[Footnote 204: Bülow to Hatzfeldt, June 30, 1900, _ibid._, 323 ff., No. 5169 and note.]

[Footnote 205: Newton, pp. 196 f.]

[Footnote 206: _G.P._, Vol. XVI, chap. cv; _B.D._, Vol. II, chap. ix,