Chapter XIII: The Moroccan Crisis, June 6-July 8, 1905

The downfall of M. Delcassé was merely an incident in Germany’s drive toward a conference. Prince Bülow, believing that the Minister’s resignation ended the acute phase of the crisis,[724] immediately dispatched a circular note to the signatory Powers[725] informing them of Germany’s acceptance of the Sultan’s invitation to a conference and asking them also to accept. In this note he argued as follows: Since Article XVII of the Convention of Madrid[726] guaranteed to every Power the same treatment as the most favored nation, the Moroccan reforms had to receive the approval of all the signatory Powers. If the proposal for a conference were refused, the legal status of Morocco would remain unchanged, for the opposition of one Power alone would suffice to block the execution of any reforms proposed. But aside from these legal arguments, the conference was the best means of introducing reforms without endangering the existing political and commercial interests of the signatory Powers by concession of special rights to individual states. Moreover, since the Convention of Madrid was a compact between the Powers, France would have to obtain their sanction for a special position in Morocco. While the details of the French program of Moroccan reforms were unknown, it was evident that France sought, in violation of Article XVII, to control the land as she did Tunis. Thus, to oppose the French action was merely to defend the existing legal status of Morocco.[727]

The attitude of the Powers toward this exposé was not at all satisfactory to the German government. The Russian, Austrian, Italian, Portuguese, and Danish governments evaded a reply, leaving the initiative to the French and the British.[728] German relations with Spain over the matter were complicated by reports that while M. Villa- Urrutia, the Spanish foreign minister, had been in Paris during King Alfonso’s visit, he had openly aligned himself with M. Delcassé’s policy. After the French Minister’s downfall, the German government notified the Spanish government on June 11 that, if M. Villa-Urrutia remained in office, Germany would recall her Ambassador for an indefinite leave of absence.[729] While waiting for the Minister to be overthrown, the German government did not press Spain on the question of the conference.

The British attitude was even more adverse. When Count Metternich handed the German note to Lord Lansdowne, the latter interpreted it as meaning that “the Conference, if it were to meet, would be expected to deal not only with the introduction of reforms, but with the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Morocco, and the preservation of the open door.”[730] The Ambassador’s affirmative reply enhanced Lord Lansdowne’s suspicion that Germany was endeavoring to break the Anglo-French understanding. While questioning strongly the propriety of a conference, the Foreign Secretary gave no definite answer. This note, however, and the passing of M. Delcassé caused the British government to recede on June 8 from its original refusal of the Sultan’s invitation and to postpone its decision until it could consult with France.[731] But on June 7, Herr von Flotow reported from Paris a rumor that Great Britain had offered to France “an offensive and defensive alliance aimed at Germany” which the latter was still considering.[732] Hence, it was manifest to the German government that Great Britain was in complete opposition to its policy.

President Roosevelt also gave a disappointing reply. On May 25 and 30 Prince Bülow had told the President that “the decision in the question of a conference depended to a great extent upon him.” He maintained that if the conference were refused as a result of Great Britain’s pressure upon France, Germany would be forced to choose between a war with France and perhaps Great Britain and an agreement with the former which would serve as a prelude to a strong Continental _bloc_. Declaring that he was averse to making the choice, the Chancellor asked Mr. Roosevelt to favor the conference to the signatory Powers.[733] But the President replied on June 8 that he could hardly participate in a conference without exposing himself to the sharpest attacks, since American opinion was opposed to interfering in the Moroccan affair and inclined to approve reform by one Power.[734]

The attitude of M. Rouvier was equally unsatisfactory to the German government. The Premier expressed to the German representative through M. Betzold the hope that the fall of M. Delcassé would enable the two countries to reach a direct understanding, and promised to show the “greatest conciliation” toward Germany.[735] When the German note of June 6 arrived, he immediately denied to the Powers the accusations made therein.[736] He also instructed M. Saint-René Taillandier to suspend action at Fez so as to avoid complications.[737] He endeavored to find some way by which Germany could be satisfied, France’s position in Morocco be preserved and her agreements with the other Powers be upheld, and the humiliating conference be avoided. On June 7 he protested to Herr von Flotow that France could hardly accept the conference, which French public opinion rejected so completely, and remarked that Great Britain, Spain, and Italy would probably refuse it.[738] Herr von Flotow replied that Germany would not desert the Sultan. Two days later the Premier offered through an intermediary to make a general agreement with Germany not only over the Moroccan question but also over others, such as those of the Bagdad Railway and far eastern affairs.[739] In a conversation with the German Ambassador on June 10, M. Rouvier persisted, in spite of threats, in his repugnance to the conference. Why go there, he asked Prince Radolin, if Germany refused the reforms in Morocco which France considered necessary? In the course of his defense of France’s previous Moroccan policy, he said: “If an understanding concerning the extension of permissible reforms could previously occur with Germany, participation in the conference might be possible.” He was so discouraged that he thought seriously of resigning, for, he declared to the Prince, he could not defend before the French Chamber the German demands as then formulated.[740]

At home Prince Bülow’s policy was encountering disapproval from the Emperor William II, then in a pacific mood. Toward the end of May the Emperor had rebuked the German Navy League for criticizing the naval program as inadequate.[741] On June 3 he had started the movement which culminated in the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War and was co- operating with President Roosevelt in that work—an act which Prince Bülow would have prevented had he been aware of his master’s intentions.[742] Even though the Emperor knew nothing of the French offers,[743] he was entirely willing after the fall of M. Delcassé to gratify M. Rouvier’s wish for an understanding.[744] At the wedding of the German Crown Prince on June 6 he assured the French representative that there would be no war over Morocco.[745]

The beginning of Russo-Japanese negotiations for peace had no effect upon the German policy, for Russia’s force was broken both by defeat and by the rapidly developing revolution.[746] But the attitude of France was so uncompromising and that of the other Powers so unfavorable that Prince Bülow doubted whether he would succeed in launching the conference.[747] He endeavored to do so by a show of boldness coupled with real concessions to France.

To bring President Roosevelt back into active participation in the affair, Prince Bülow reported to him the rumor of the British offer of alliance to France and pictured the possibility of a war with France and Great Britain “not because we want too much but because we desire nothing.” The Prince added that if this war did occur, a new Triple Alliance between France, Great Britain, and Japan, with which Russia might also be associated, might be formed. To preclude this event he urged the President to advise the Powers in favor of a conference or to prevent British participation in a possible Franco-German war brought on by French aggression in Morocco. By confronting the President with the choice of facing the outbreak of a new war just at the moment when he was endeavoring to stop the Russo-Japanese conflict or of supporting the proposal for a conference, Prince Bülow obtained the desired result. On June 12 Mr. Roosevelt agreed to advise the French government in favor of accepting the Sultan’s invitation and against concluding an Anglo-French alliance.[748]

At the same time the German government endeavored to restrain Great Britain. Herr von Holstein asserted to the British Ambassador that “if any one had told him two years ago that a war between England and Germany was within the bounds of possibility he would have simply laughed, but now things had reached such a point that it could no longer be considered impossible.” Both he and the Chancellor cited the bitterness of the British press toward Germany and the reported British offer of a defensive and offensive alliance to France as proofs. Neither of the two German officials believed that Great Britain would attack Germany, but they argued that the popular fear of such an aggression in their country was more plausible than that of a German invasion in Great Britain. In like manner Sir Frank Lascelles credited Germany with pacific intentions, but maintained that the British fears were more justified than the German. Herr von Holstein assured the Ambassador that “the Moroccan question would not lead to any serious complications,” and Lord Lansdowne denied that Great Britain wanted war or had offered an alliance to France. As neither side believed entirely the pacific asseverations of the other, the tension in Anglo-German relations was only slightly relaxed.[749]

While making these efforts with the United States and Great Britain, Prince Bülow yielded before the French resistance. Although he explained away the Emperor’s conciliatory remarks to the French government with a threat and although he warned M. Rouvier not to assume M. Delcassé’s policy toward Morocco, he repeated his assurances that “the conference can have no positive results which would injure the French future.” It was “merely a question of etiquette and of delay,” he said, so that Germany could hold faith with the Sultan and disengage herself from the position into which M. Delcassé had forced her. Instead of demanding that all consideration of the Moroccan question be left to the conference, the Chancellor offered on June 12 to negotiate over the program for that assembly if France would first accept the Sultan’s invitation. In addition, he instructed Prince Radolin to state not officially, but as his (Radolin’s) personal view, that from the very nature of the affair the conference would have to adopt as fundamental “for the present no prejudice to the independence of Morocco . . . . and . . . . no injury to the prospects of France.” The Ambassador should state that the items to be considered by that body, as logical deductions from those two points were: police and military reforms, to be limited in time and international in character; financial reforms, likewise to be internationally executed; and the economic opening of the land in accordance with the principle of the open door. He should warn M. Rouvier against permitting Algerians to furnish the Moroccan pretender with contraband supplies; for if the Sultan should request German mediation in this affair, Germany would give it even at the risk of grave difficulties.[750]

When the Ambassador carried out these instructions two days later, he found M. Rouvier “angry, discouraged, sick” but still defending France’s Moroccan policy. Nor did the Ambassador’s remarks change his mood.[751] On June 16, in response to the Premier’s request for further information, the Ambassador explained unofficially as further logical deductions from the two fundamental points: first, that the military reforms should be internationally ordered by a division of the mandate among the Powers in such a way that France would receive it for the area along the Algerian frontier; second, that to give an international character to the financial reforms, a state bank should be organized in which the capital and management should be divided as equally as possible among the banks representing the various Powers.[752] The Premier’s apparent relief at these remarks encouraged the German government to believe that a solution was near.[753]

In the meantime, in accordance with Germany’s desires, President Roosevelt intervened in Paris and London. Notwithstanding his conviction that France was in the right, he advised her to avoid a war and help the Emperor “save his face” by accepting the conference. He argued that British support in case of a conflict would be of little value to France, and predicted a French victory at the conference. He promised the French government that if the United States participated, he “would treat both sides with absolute justice, and would, if necessary, take very strong grounds against any attitude of Germany which seemed . . . . unjust and unfair.”[754]

In handling Great Britain the President took another line. He suspected her of wishing to make trouble. For he was receiving no support from her in his mediation between Russia and Japan; he knew that Lord Lansdowne was opposed to the conference; and, so far as he could tell from the British Ambassador at Washington, Great Britain was anxious for France to humiliate Germany by refusing the conference and was willing to face the possibility of war. He thought this sagacious on her part, but not valorous; she would be assured a victory on sea, while France would have to bear the brunt of the battle on land. So he warned Great Britain not to put difficulty in the way of a peaceful settlement between France and Germany, and otherwise ignored her.[755]

Neither Prince Radolin’s conciliatory remarks nor President Roosevelt’s advice won the French Premier to accept the conference. While deeply impressed by reports of German threats against France in other capitals,[756] he inferred from his conversations with Prince Radolin and from an assertion of the German Ambassador in Madrid that if France agreed to the conference the German government would then be ready to commence discussions with a view to an understanding which would make the conference unnecessary.[757] M. Rouvier was also assured of the entire support of the British government. On June 16 Lord Lansdowne, in approving M. Paul Cambon’s returning to Paris to advise the inexperienced Premier,[758] remarked to the Ambassador that he saw nothing to be gained

by admitting the theoretical necessity of a Conference, except perhaps to enable Germany, which had brought about M. Delcassé’s downfall, to secure a further success. Our attitude must of course depend upon that of the French Government, but if they maintained their refusal, so, most certainly, should we.[759]

The French note to Germany of June 21 was therefore so composed by M. Paul Cambon as to accept the conference in principle while at the same time inviting Germany to negotiate further in order to obviate that assembly—the position which M. Rouvier had taken for two weeks. Since Prince Radolin’s explanations on June 14 and 18 had been made in such an unofficial and confidential manner, the Premier did not know whether they represented the German view or not, and did not mention them in the note.[760] Hence that document of June 21 ran as follows:

The Imperial Government will not fail to recognize the inconvenience which would result for it as for us from the acceptance of the Conference without a previous accord, an accord which would not infringe upon those already concluded and which would not harm in any way the interests of which the Imperial Government is solicitous. . . . . The Government of the Republic is deeply impressed by the double consideration that the Conference may be dangerous if it is not preceded by an entente, and useless if it follows one. [Nevertheless, the French government did not refuse the conference.] It desires solely to know what are, in the mind of the Imperial Government, the precise points which will be treated at the Conference and the solutions which it will offer there.

Thus they could arrive at the entente which both governments wished.[761]

The Premier acquainted the British and American governments with the contents of the note and of the German threats, and asked them to recommend this solution to Germany. He emphasized to Mr. Roosevelt especially the menace of a German attack. Declaring that the President could avert that danger, he urged him to exert influence with the Emperor in favor of peace. Mr. Roosevelt immediately agreed to do so in energetic terms.[762]

The German reaction was hostile. As the Chancellor realized that the crisis had arisen in Franco-German relations, he endeavored by a mixture of enticements and threats to bring the impressionable and pacific M. Rouvier to accept the German terms.[763] Refusing the French request, Prince Bülow warned the Premier on June 21, 22, and 23 against resuming M. Delcassé’s policy and against permitting the Algerians to aid the Moroccan pretender. While promising the French government “seriously and loyally” to work for a result satisfactory to all parties and especially for an understanding with France at the conference, the Chancellor declared to the French Ambassador: “The situation is serious. With a little good will and decision we may emerge from it.” But “one should not play with fire”; “it is a dangerous game which might lead further than you and I wish.” Threatening to make a defensive alliance with the Sultan if French policy forced him to, he refused the overture for negotiation and advised a quick acceptance of the conference.[764]

The German policy was not as successful as the Chancellor had expected. By June 21 Italy had, in spite of German pressure, accepted the conference only conditionally.[765] The British government, loyally following the lead of France, fully approved the French note (June 23).[766] In Spain, although a ministerial crisis on June 20 had eliminated M. Villa-Urrutia as Germany had demanded, the new Liberal government refused Germany’s request for support; it declared on June 25 that it would remain loyal to the Franco-Spanish accord.[767] Furthermore, it was apparent that M. Rouvier would not accept the German demands in their existing form.[768] The Premier was staunchly supported by the French press, which was quickly coming to credit Germany with the intention not of making friends with France but of teaching her a lesson and of setting limits to her foreign policy.[769] More discouraging still, on June 24 Baron Sternburg telegraphed the following statement from President Roosevelt:

The French Government informs me unofficially . . . . that it has ceased its opposition to a conference. . . . . It seems as a matter of course that a program of the conference would be needed in advance in accordance with the usual custom in such cases. I suggest that that be arranged between France and Germany. . . . . Let me congratulate the Emperor warmly on his diplomatic triumph of the first magnitude.[770]

The German government retreated. Replying to the French government on June 24,[771] it asserted the right of the other Powers to participate in the work of Moroccan reform. It refused to negotiate a program for the conference beforehand, but admitted “that France has a very legitimate interest in maintaining order in the territory bordering on the frontier.” In the verbal explanations made upon the delivery of the note, the Chancellor, denying that the conference was intended to procure for Germany a “miserable satisfaction for her _amour-propre_” or to humiliate France, declared that international reform should be attempted in Morocco first. Then if this work broke down, he said, “the future is free,” and “in that future, which is perhaps not so distant, we shall again be able to become opportunists.” He was profoundly surprised, he said, that the French note took no cognizance of the overtures made by the German Ambassador. He urged the acceptance of the conference so that the two countries might escape from this “perilous and dangerous situation” into “a path which leads to appeasement, conciliation, and peace.”

The Chancellor also instructed Prince Radolin to inform M. Rouvier that if France accepted the conference, Germany would then be willing to work out an agreement with her on the bases mentioned previously (June 14 and 18) for a prospective program to be submitted to the Sultan.[772] If the Ambassador thought that M. Rouvier would refuse to accept the conference before the program was agreed upon, the Chancellor would permit him to propose that the French and German representatives work out a program with the Sultan in Fez. If M. Rouvier refused the conference altogether, Prince Radolin should warn him that Germany would aid the Sultan against any French aggressions. The Ambassador was to tell M. Rouvier that the Moroccan government had made offers to Germany which would insure her a leading position in that land, but that Germany would refuse them as long as the possibility of an accord with France remained.[773]

By June 27 the advantage again shifted to the German side. In Paris the more anti-British and pro-German element, led by M. Dupuy, owner of _Petit Parisien_ and an intimate friend of M. Rouvier, was gaining greater influence. M. Dupuy informed the German Ambassador on June 26 that M. Rouvier, whom he represented as a rather well-meaning simpleton, now regretted having dispatched the French note and that he now sought some phrase by which the German and French views could be harmonized and the conference accepted. In fact, M. Dupuy stated that he expected the French government to make the acceptance in a day or so. Both he and M. Betzold said that the Premier still mistrusted Great Britain.[774]

Even more valuable for the German government was Mr. Roosevelt’s change in attitude. When the German government explained to Mr. Roosevelt that France had not agreed to the conference except under conditions which Germany had persistently refused,[775] the President immediately advised France on June 26 to accept unconditionally. He stated that the question of a program was a minor one, that the important thing was for the conference to meet. In answer, the French Ambassador protested that in view of the German Emperor’s erratic temperament France could not go to the conference

without previously having drawn up a program, or at least without an understanding, indicating that which we might have reason to expect and guaranteeing in particular that solemn international undertakings, which have for a long time been public property, should not be brought into question.[776]

Thereupon Mr. Roosevelt proposed the following compromise: “Let France and Germany go into the conference without any programme or agreement; but to discuss all questions in regard to Morocco; save of course where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power.”[777]

In reporting to Baron Sternburg what he had done, the President said that if France and Germany agreed upon this or any other compromise, he himself would accept the invitation to the conference and would advise Great Britain to do likewise. On June 27 he offered to telegraph his greetings to the Emperor William II. He also expressed to the British Ambassador his strong hope that Great Britain would drop her objections to the conference.[778]

The President’s intervention was beneficial to both the French and the German governments; it brought them into a frame of mind which permitted a compromise. The German government was elated over his action; for even though it diminished any hope of breaking the French accords over Morocco, it did seem to assure a peaceful issue of the crisis by the acceptance of the conference. Hence Prince Bülow telegraphed to Washington on June 27 that “if after the acceptance of the conference by France we negotiate with the French and differences arise, I shall be ready at all times to support before His Majesty the Emperor that decision which President Roosevelt recommends as practical and fair.”[779]

This success, however, was offset by a report from Baron Eckardstein on June 27 that M. Delcassé had received an offer of an offensive and defensive alliance from Great Britain, but that M. Rouvier had refused to consider it. Within the past ten days, the Baron continued, the British government had informed the French Premier “that he could rely upon its diplomatic support under all circumstances, but that if he wished to make an alliance with England, the English fleet would also uphold the French policy in case of necessity.”[780] After frankly repeating those statements to Lord Lansdowne on the following day, Count Metternich added that “at no moment had the German Government desired to fasten a quarrel upon France,” as the British seemed to think. Lord Lansdowne replied that “the language attributed to some of the German representatives had certainly suggested the idea that it was desired to do so.” He then made this important statement:

. . . . British diplomatic support was assured to the French by the Anglo-French accord. . . . . As a natural result questions which concerned that agreement would have been discussed between the two Governments and proper ways and means conferred upon to maintain intact the individual points of the accord. The question of an alliance with France has never been discussed by the British cabinet nor has an English alliance ever been offered to France. . . . . However, he would not conceal his belief that in the event that Germany “lightheartedly” made war upon France, which he considered entirely improbable, it was not to be foreseen how far British public opinion would force the Government to support France.[781]

To this alarming information was added the report from Paris that the British were exerting all possible pressure to prevent France from accepting the conference.[782] Furthermore, when Prince Radolin carried out his instructions, June 27, M. Rouvier continued to refuse the conference without a previous understanding. To that end he offered two proposals. One, a suggestion which he took from a German newspaper, was that the French and German representatives at Fez work out a program in co-operation with the Sultan prior to French acceptance of the conference. The other was that in providing for the international regulation of the police and financial reforms France should be assured the right to execute the police reforms along the Algerian frontier while nothing definite should be stated about the organization of the police in the rest of Morocco. This agreement, M. Rouvier added, could become valid as soon as France officially accepted the conference. He also desired the recall of the three ministers from Fez so as to prevent complications.[783]

As already seen, the Chancellor was willing to accept the first proposal, although, fearing that upon further delay the Sultan might throw over the project of a conference and undermine the entire German policy, he preferred some other solution. Since he mistrusted the Sultan, he refused to recall Count Tattenbach from Fez until the conference actually met. He also held to his formula of “first acceptance, then negotiations”; but to counteract the British pressure he retreated further by agreeing on June 28 for the Premier to declare publicly that

the French Government has dropped its objections to the conference after becoming convinced from the declarations of Your Highness [Prince Radolin] that Germany would pursue no goals at the conference which would stand in opposition to the just interests of France.

He refused, however, to permit M. Rouvier to make public anything further about the German concessions of June 14 and 18.[784] On the same day he declared to M. Bihourd that once the conference met, Germany would be freed from her obligations to the Sultan and could follow her own interests. Let international reforms first be tried in Morocco, he said; if they failed, Germany would have to consult only her own interests, among which Morocco occupied “an infinitely small place.” If France, in conformity with the views of the British government, refused the conference, there would obtain a condition of _la paix armée_. If she accepted, there would be “neither victor nor vanquished.”[785]

Learning that the German government regarded Prince Radolin’s assertions of June 14 and 18 as official and despairing of any other solution, M. Rouvier was more inclined to accept the conference. He justified this course to the British chargé d’affaires on June 28 as follows:

He [M. Rouvier] considered that under the conditions a conference was perhaps the best way of arriving at a satisfactory solution. The Emperor had made it a point of personal honour: France would go into it with the support of England, Spain, and possibly Italy, whereas Germany would be alone; Germany was prepared to admit the preponderance of French interests on the Algerian frontier. It was absolutely necessary to arrive at some solution as the present situation was excessively dangerous. So long as the Conference was not accepted, Germany considered that she was entitled to a free hand in Morocco, and she was very very [_sic_] active. She would ask for all sorts of concessions, ports, cables, etc., and were the Sultan to accede to such demands the situation both for France and England would become far more critical. Monsieur Rouvier hinted that once the present difficulties had been more or less tided over at the Conference, it would be possible to see that Germany did not get too much in Morocco.[786]

Before approving the proposal for a conference, however, M. Rouvier intended to include in the agreement with Germany some mention of France’s accords with Great Britain and Spain over Morocco.[787]

While M. Rouvier delayed, the German government grew apprehensive. Prince Radolin heard on June 29 that M. Paul Cambon, Sir Francis Bertie, and the British government were making every effort to prevent the French acceptance, arguing that Germany was endeavoring to nullify the Anglo-French agreement. On the next day M. Dupuy informed the Ambassador that the British “were sitting powerfully on M. Rouvier’s back” to obstruct it and that Sir Francis Bertie was pressing the French Premier to make a defensive and offensive alliance with Great Britain. When M. Cambon reached Paris on June 30, M. Dupuy thought that there was grave danger of M. Rouvier’s being overthrown.[788]

In this situation the German government denied on June 30 to the French government that it meant to question the Anglo-French accord. On the next day it was prepared to give way still further, but M. Rouvier accepted the conference.[789] The Premier proposed that he and the German Ambassador make an exchange of notes and sign a declaration incorporating the concessions which the German government had made to France.[790] M. Rouvier then submitted the bases of the agreement to Lord Lansdowne, who approved them.[791] After much bickering over the formulation of the agreement, during which a liberal repetition of German threats mixed with enticements was made, accord was finally reached on July 8.[792]

By that agreement Germany promised to pursue no goal at the conference which would compromise the “legitimate interests” of France in Morocco or

that would be contrary to the rights of France resulting from treaties or arrangements and harmonizing with the following principles: sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; integrity of his empire; economic liberty without any inequality; utility of police and financial reforms the introduction of which will be regulated for a short period by way of an international accord; recognition of the situation created for France with reference to Morocco by the contiguity, over a long stretch, of Algeria and the Sherifian empire, by the particular relations which result therefrom between the two neighboring countries, as well as by the special interest which results therefrom for France for order to obtain in the Sherifian empire.

The two governments agreed to work out a program for the conference which they would submit to the Sultan for acceptance. The French and German missions were to be recalled from Fez as soon as the conference met. Prince Radolin also stated specifically that the Anglo-French and Franco-Spanish agreements remained untouched by this understanding.[793]

The French, British, and German presses greeted this accord with relief and with the sincere hope that the crisis was past.[794] The Powers also signified their acceptances.[795]

The agreement marked Germany’s first reverse in her Moroccan campaign. She had been compelled to recognize France’s special interest in Morocco and had failed to nullify the French ententes. Germany could have placed herself on the same basis with reference to France that Great Britain occupied, both in regard to European and to colonial affairs. Instead, however, of weakening the Entente Cordiale, instead of making a valuable colonial accord by accepting the French offers, the German government had preferred both to keep its promises to the Sultan and to free itself from those promises by forcing a conference upon an unwilling world. Caught in the toils of its own tangled policy and determined to have a share in Morocco even though the German people were uninterested, it had refused present offers of colonial gain with the hope of bringing about their renewal in the future. Its virtue, not appreciated by any other Power, was greater than its common sense.

Although the German government had receded, it had done so only after embittering the French nation and arousing it to the united defense of its national honor. As Ambassador Jusserand wrote to Mr. Roosevelt on July 11:

I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement arrived at is in substance the one which we had considered and the acceptation of which you did so very much to secure. Letters just received by me from Paris . . . . confirm what I guessed was the case, that is, that there was a point where more yielding would have been impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently in view of possible great events.[796]

Germany’s actions had antagonized M. Rouvier and converted him to the Entente Cordiale. M. Rouvier remarked to the British chargé d’affaires as follows:

His Majesty [the German Emperor] had expected a complete climb-down to follow upon the change of direction of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but as His Excellency [M. Rouvier] said, there was no reason because he parted with Monsieur Delcassé that he should throw himself “dans les bras de l’Empereur et sur son cou.”[797]

M. Cambon informed Lord Lansdowne that

after all that had happened M. Rouvier was more convinced than ever of the necessity of maintaining a close understanding with this country [Great Britain]. It was, in his view, essential that the two Governments should treat one another with the fullest confidence, and that no further steps should be taken without previous discussion between us. While holding this opinion, M. Rouvier thought it desirable to proceed with caution in dealing with the German Government and thought we should avoid parading a desire to run counter to them.

These assertions met with Lord Lansdowne’s entire approval, for they signified the success of the British struggle to maintain the Entente Cordiale and to keep Germany out of Morocco. The Foreign Secretary assured M. Cambon that Great Britain had no intention of withdrawing her support. But he added: “. . . . The apparent sacrifice of M. Delcassé in the face of German pressure had created an unfavourable impression in this country, and I therefore thought there was a good deal to be said for M. Rouvier’s view that it would be as well to avoid any action calculated to bring about fresh complications.”[798] In other words, Lord Lansdowne intimated that British public opinion would not be so willing to support France as it had been before that display of French weakness.

In spite of this remark, signs were not lacking of close intimacy between the two countries. On July 12 _Gaulois_ published the information that at the cabinet meeting on June 6 M. Delcassé had favored an alliance with Great Britain in order to hold Germany in check. Without definitely stating so, the article left the impression that the Foreign Minister had been certain of an alliance.[799] When the French and British fleets exchanged visits in July and August, the press compared the visits to that of the Russian fleet to Toulon in 1893 which had sealed the Franco-Russian alliance.[800]

The German government was thus furthering that process which it called Germany’s encirclement and isolation.

[Footnote 724: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 418 f., No. 6692.]

[Footnote 725: The signatory Powers were as follows: Austria-Hungary, Italy, Spain, Great Britain, France, Russia, United States, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Belgium, and Germany.]

[Footnote 726: Art. XVII read as follows: “Le droit au traitement de la nation la plus favorisée est reconnu par le Maroc à toutes les Puissances representées à la Conférence de Madrid” (Leon Deloncle [ed.], _Statut international du Maroc_ [Paris, 1912], p. 51). The French refused to accept this interpretation of the Convention of Madrid and of Art. XVII. Tardieu replied to the German arguments as follows: “That convention aimed to limit at the demand of Morocco the right of protection of the legations to certain Moroccan subjects which some Powers tended to abuse. It had regulated the exercise of that right, determined the conditions of naturalization for the Moroccans, those for the acquisition of landed property by foreigners, and had established the basis of the agricultural tax. Concerning general policy or stipulations about the tariff, not a word. Article XVII, which Germany invoked as the charter of international equality in Morocco, applied in reality only to the right of protection. . . . . Article XVII is not a promise of the Powers among themselves never to touch the diplomatic or economic terrain. It is a promise by Morocco never to differentiate between them within the limits of 1880 and within those limits alone, that is (following the preamble of the convention) in the exercise of protection” (Tardieu, _La Conf. d’Algés_, p. 39). Lansdowne also challenged the German interpretation. “Any rights which other countries may have to most-favoured-nation treatment in Morocco would not . . . . preclude the possibility of a privileged position being in certain respects accorded to France in her dealings with the Moorish Government. Most-favoured-nation treatment is variously interpreted in different countries. But no Power has, I believe, ever contended that the obligation to give such treatment debars one country from invoking the assistance of another in improving its domestic administration, and it is obvious that such assistance can be most conveniently and effectually given when the Power which affords it is the immediate neighbour of that which receives it, nor was there any desire or intention on the part of France to deprive other Powers of the rights and privileges to which they were justly entitled under Treaty” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 11, 1905, _B.D._, III, 117 f., No. 150; cf. Metternich to F. O., June 6, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 416 f., No. 6690).

The German interpretation was based upon a loose construction of that convention while the French interpretation was based upon a strict construction. Although from a legal standpoint the French view was correct, yet the precedent of an international conference over Moroccan affairs, no matter what they were, favored the German argument. Moreover, the fact remained that France had tried to change the existing status in Morocco without consulting Powers who had as much right to be considered as the three with whom she had come to terms.]

[Footnote 727: Bülow to Flotow, June 5, dispatched June 6, 1905, _G.P._, 413 ff., No. 6687; _L.j., 1901-5_, 230 f., No. 268, annexe.]

[Footnote 728: Alvensleben to F. O., June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 419, No. 6693; Wedel to F. O., June 6, 1905, _ibid._, 417 f., No. 6691; Monts to F. O., June 6, 9, 12, 1905, _ibid._, 415 f., No. 6688; 424 f., No. 6699; 435 ff., No. 6709; de Bunsen to Lansdowne, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 91 f., No. 115; Smith to Lansdowne, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 101, No. 129; Lansdowne to Goschen, June 21, 1905, _ibid._, 100, No. 127; Egerton to Lansdowne, June 9, 10, 13, 1905, _ibid._, 94 f., Nos. 119 ff.; Hardinge to Lansdowne, June 14, 1905, _ibid._, 96, No. 123.]

[Footnote 729: Bülow to Radowitz, June 10, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 425 f., No. 6701.]

[Footnote 730: Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 8, 1905, _B.D._, III, 92 f., No. 117.]

[Footnote 731: Metternich to F. O., June 6 and 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 416 f., No. 6690; 422 ff., No. 6697 f. King Edward also refused to permit the Prince of Wales to attend the wedding of the German Crown Prince on June 6 (Lee, _King Edward VII_, II, 335 f.). Lowther had communicated the British refusal to the Sultan when on June 8 new instructions arrived for him to await further developments. See Lowther to Lansdowne, June 9, 1905, _B.D._, III, 94, No. 118; Lansdowne to Lowther, June 8, 1905, _ibid._, 92, No. 116.]

[Footnote 732: The information came from M. Bunau-Varilla, owner of _Matin_ (_G.P._, XX, 623 f., No. 6853).]

[Footnote 733: Bülow to Sternburg, May 25 and 30, 1905, _ibid._, 385 f., Nos. 6667 f.; Bishop, _The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt_, I, 470 f.]

[Footnote 734: Sternburg to Bülow, June 8, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 421, No. 6696. Durand reported that Roosevelt had said to Sternburg that “so long as the French Government object, the United States Government could not adhere to the proposal for a Conference of the Powers” (Lansdowne to Cambon, June 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 90 f., No. 112).]

[Footnote 735: Radolin to F. O., June 3, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 402 f., No. 6680; Flotow to F. O., June 6 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 404, No. 6682; 425, No. 6700. In these negotiations Rouvier leaned on the advice of Révoil, who in June without holding any office was given a desk in the foreign office (Tardieu, p. 84).]

[Footnote 736: _L.j., 1901-5_, 230, No. 268; 231, No. 269; 233, No. 271.]

[Footnote 737: Rouvier to Saint-René Taillandier, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 230 f., No. 269.]

[Footnote 738: Flotow to F. O., June 7, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 420, No. 6694.]

[Footnote 739: Flotow to F. O., June 9, 1905, _ibid._, 425, No. 6700.]

[Footnote 740: Bülow to Radolin, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 427 f., No. 6702; Radolin to F. O., June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 430 f., No. 6705; Rouvier to Bihourd, June 11, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 232, No. 270. Immediately after that interview Rouvier declared to some of his friends: “They are putting a knife to my throat. I do not know where they wish to drive us” (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, pp. 174 f.).]

[Footnote 741: Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, p. 92.]

[Footnote 742: Goetz, _Briefe Wilhelms II an den Zaren 1894-1914_, pp. 370 ff.; _G.P._, XIX, Nos. 6193, 6196 f., 6311 ff., 6318; _B.D._, Vol. IV, chap. xxiii, Part. V.]

[Footnote 743: The absence of minutes by him to the dispatches during this crisis points to this fact (also see Eckardstein, _Lebenserinnerungen und politische Denkwürdigkeiten_, III, 167). The Emperor first learned of Rouvier’s offer of a general colonial agreement at this time in 1907. His comment was as follows: “If I had known of that, I would have accepted it and the whole stupid conference of Algeciras would have been avoided” (Brandenburg, _Von Bismarck zum Weltkriege_, p. 215).]

[Footnote 744: See the Emperor’s minutes, one of the very few instances in which they are to be found, to the dispatch from Radolin to Bülow, June 11, 1905 (_G.P._, XX, 409, No. 6685).]

[Footnote 745: On this episode see Eckardstein, II, 139 f.; Zedlitz- Trützschler, _Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof_, p. 174; Bülow to Radolin, June 10, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 429 f., No. 6704.]

[Footnote 746: This was General Schlieffen’s opinion. Schlieffen believed that the condition of the Russian army would grow worse instead of better. See Bülow to Schlieffen, June 4, 1905, _ibid._, XIX, 422, No. 6194; Schlieffen to Bülow, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 423 f., No. 6195.]

[Footnote 747: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 7, 1905, _ibid._, 418 f., No. 6692.]

[Footnote 748: Bülow to Sternburg, June 9 and 10, 1905, _ibid._, XX, 421 f. n.; 626 ff., No. 6856; Bishop, I, 476 f.; Sternburg to F. O., June 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 433 f., No. 6707.]

[Footnote 749: Metternich to Bülow, June 9, 1905, _ibid._, 625 f., No. 6855; Bülow to Metternich, June 11, 1905, _ibid._, 628 ff., No. 6857; Metternich to F. O., June 15 and 16, 1905, _ibid._, 441 f., No. 6712; 630 ff., No. 6858; Lascelles to Lansdowne, June 12, 1905, _B.D._, III, 79 ff., Nos. 97 f.; Lansdowne to Lascelles, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 82 f., No. 99. See also Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 335 f.]

[Footnote 750: Bülow to Radolin, June 12, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 431 ff., No. 6706. The accusation that Algerians were helping the pretender was made by a German army officer who in June returned from the Algerian border. Governor Jonnart of Algeria denied it and asserted that the contraband came, not from Algeria but from the Riff. Although Jonnart’s statement was undoubtedly correct, yet the report came in so handily that the German government used it as a weapon of intimidation against France (_ibid._, Nos. 6724, 6746; _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 275 f., 281, 283 f.).]

[Footnote 751: Radolin to F. O., June 14, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 438 f., No. 6710.]

[Footnote 752: Bülow to Radolin, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 439 ff., No. 6711; Radolin to Rouvier, June 16, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 234 ff., No. 272.]

[Footnote 753: Bülow to Tattenbach, June 19, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 448 ff., No. 6718.]

[Footnote 754: Sternburg to F. O., June 17, 1905, _ibid._, 442 f., No. 6713; Bishop, I, 477 f.]

[Footnote 755: On Roosevelt and Great Britain see Bishop, I, 474 f., 481 ff., 408; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, 37 f., 210 ff.; Sykes, _The Right Honourable Sir Mortimer Durand_, p. 285; Sternburg to F. O., June 12, 17, 25, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 433 f., No. 6707; 442 f., No. 6713; 473 ff., No. 6738; Lansdowne to Durand, June 16, July 12, 1905, _B.D._, IV, 89, No. 85; 91, No. 87; Spring Rice’s correspondence with Roosevelt, June-July, 1905, Gwynn, _The Letters and Friendships of Sir Cecil Spring Rice_, I, 472 ff.]

[Footnote 756: Threats by the German ambassadors in Paris, Rome, and Madrid (_B.D._, III, 97, No. 126).]

[Footnote 757: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 96, No. 124; Nicolson to Lansdowne, June 17, 1905, _ibid._, 97, No. 125.]

[Footnote 758: Barrère, the two Cambons, and Jusserand, all firmly in sympathy with Delcassé’s policy, were holding Rouvier in line. See Egerton to Lansdowne, June 13, 1905, _ibid._, 95, No. 122.]

[Footnote 759: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 16, 1905, _ibid._, 96 f., No. 124. In Rome Egerton was working to hold Italy in line with this policy. See Egerton to Lansdowne, June 10, 1905, _ibid._, 94, No. 120.]

[Footnote 760: Radolin to F. O., June 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 484, No. 6745.]

[Footnote 761: Rouvier to Radolin, June 21, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 235 ff., No. 273; Radolin to F. O., June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 452 f., No. 6720. The note was composed mainly by Paul Cambon. See Radolin to F. O., June 30, 1905, _ibid._, 494, No. 6752.]

[Footnote 762: Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, _B.D._, III, 97 f., No. 126; Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 463 f., No. 6727; Rouvier to Jusserand, June 23 and 25, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I, 478 ff. Dennis relates that while in France in May, 1926, he heard a story to the effect that Roosevelt had written to the German Emperor at this crisis warning him that “it would be a crime against civilization for Germany to declare war against France.” Dennis was unable to find any such letter, and presumes that the one thought to have contained this warning was one from Roosevelt to Sternburg on June 26 [_sic_], 1905 (Dennis, _Adventures in American Diplomacy_, p. 495). The truth seems to be that Roosevelt, who had not been so schooled in diplomacy as to choose his words carefully, spoke to Jusserand as if he would use such language to the Emperor, and then softened down his words greatly when he did write to Sternburg. Cf. Jusserand’s letter to Rouvier on June 25, 1905, with Roosevelt’s letter to Sternburg on the same date, quoted in Bishop, I, 480 f., 483 ff. Rouvier gave Roosevelt credit for his acceptance in principle of the conference. The French Premier also asked Eckardstein to intervene again, but the latter refused since he was in such bad odor with his government (Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.).]

[Footnote 763: “Rouvier . . . . we know does not wish a conflict with us,” . . . . “the Chamber of Deputies wishes above all to avoid war” (quoted from a dispatch from Bülow to William II, June 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 456, No. 6723). “The sooner we make it clear to him [Rouvier] what results the French refusal of the conference and the further support of the pretender must have, the more we diminish the dangers of the situation” (Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 466, No. 6730). That the German government was playing with war but did not intend to start one is also evident from a confidential letter from Holstein to the editor of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, June 28, 1905, which expresses completely the nature of the German policy. “. . . . In brief, I consider the danger of war for Germany at the present moment vanishingly small. It will be still more diminished if a conviction of our firmness prevails. We know now for certain that in the last ministerial council Delcassé declared: ‘Germany will not dare to fight, it is all bluff.’ This doubt about our determination could have led to a conflict if the other ministers had shared Delcassé’s views” (reprinted in _Kölnische Zeitung_, April 2, 1922).]

[Footnote 764: Radolin to F. O., June 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 457 ff., No. 6724; memo. by Bülow, June 23, 1905, _ibid._, 459 ff., No. 6725; Bülow to William II, June 22 and 24, 1905, _ibid._, 455 ff., No. 6723; 464 f., No. 6729; Bülow to Radolin, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 465 f., No. 6730; Bihourd to Rouvier, June 23, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 240 f., No. 277; Lansdowne to Lister, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 105 ff., No. 133; Whitehead to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 108 f., No. 135.]

[Footnote 765: Monts to Bülow, June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 454 f., No. 6722.]

[Footnote 766: Metternich to F. O., June 23, 1905, _ibid._, 463 f., No. 6727; Lee, II, 344; Lansdowne to Bertie, June 21, 1905, _B.D._, III, 97 f., No. 126.]

[Footnote 767: Bülow held out prospects of aiding Spain to acquire Tangier and the surrounding territory in case of a future break-up of Morocco if Spain would uphold the German policy. The insincerity of the statement is proved by a letter from Holstein to Radolin on July 2, 1905. In regard to the Moroccan affair he wrote: “We need have no consideration for the wishes of others, at any rate not for those of Spain who has never caused other than anger or embarrassment for us.” See Bülow to Radowitz, June 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 453 f., No. 6721; Radowitz to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 473, No. 6737; Holstein to Radolin, July 2, 1905, _ibid._, 503, No. 6757.]

[Footnote 768: See Rouvier’s reply to the Prince of Monaco, which the latter immediately handed to the German government (William II to Bülow, June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 464, No. 6728).]

[Footnote 769: Eckardstein, III, 147 ff.; report from Paris, June 18, 1905, _Zur europ. Politik_, II, 60; _Bulletin_, June, 1905, pp. 235 ff. “There appear to me to be indications that the feeling is growing in France that it is necessary to treat the Morocco question in as conciliatory a spirit as possible, but that when further demands are made by Germany they should be met by a firm refusal. . . . . The feeling of resentment against Germany on account of her present action is very strong and the spirit of the ‘revanche’ is reawakening; the French have pulled themselves together wonderfully after their first panic and they now seem prepared to face calmly the contingency of war in the future should the pretensions of Germany continue.

“There is I think no doubt that Monsieur Rouvier could at present command a very large majority in the Chamber on any question of Foreign policy, and his efforts to preserve peace by conciliation so far as conciliation can go without loss of dignity, will only enhance his position in the eyes of his countrymen, and assure him their unanimous support in the event of such a policy being rendered impossible” (Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 107 f., No. 134).]

[Footnote 770: Sternburg to F. O., June 24, 1905, _ibid._, 466 f., No. 6731; Bishop, I, 482.]

[Footnote 771: The note was dated June 24, but was handed by Bülow to Bihourd on June 25 and by Radolin to Rouvier on June 27, 1905. See Radolin to Rouvier, June 24, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 242 ff., No. 278; Bihourd to Rouvier, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 244 f., No. 279; Bülow to Radolin, June 25 and 26, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 470 f., No. 6734; 472, No. 6736; Bülow to William II, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 476 ff., No. 6740.]

[Footnote 772: However, the Sultan and the other Powers should not be precluded thereby from proposing other matters for the consideration of that body.]

[Footnote 773: Bülow to Radolin, June 25, dispatched June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 470 f., No. 6734.]

[Footnote 774: Radolin to F. O., June 25 and 26, 1905, _ibid._, 472, No. 6735; 479, No. 6741; Radolin to Bülow, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 483 f., No. 6743.]

[Footnote 775: Bülow to William II, June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 467 ff., No. 6732; Sternburg to F. O., June 25, 1905, _ibid._, 473 ff., No. 6738; Bülow to Sternburg, June 26, 1905, _ibid._, 475 f., No. 6739; Bishop, I, 483 f.]

[Footnote 776: Bishop, I, 485 f.]

[Footnote 777: Sternburg to F. O., June 26, 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 479 ff., No. 6742 f.; Bishop, I, 485.]

[Footnote 778: Sternburg to F. O., June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 480 f., No. 6743.]

[Footnote 779: Bülow to Sternburg, June 27, 1905, _ibid._, 481, No. 6744. Sternburg inadvertently changed the wording of that promise to read as follows: “The Emperor has requested me [Sternburg] to tell you that if during the coming conference differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be most fair and most practical” (Sternburg to Roosevelt, June 28, 1905, quoted in Bishop, I, 487). The latter promise bound the German government more tightly than did the former, and was to cause it embarrassment later.]

[Footnote 780: Metternich to F. O., June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 634 f., No. 6859.]

[Footnote 781: Metternich to F. O., June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 636, No. 6860; Lansdowne to Whitehead, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 103, No. 132_a_.]

[Footnote 782: Radolin to F. O., June 26, dispatched June 27, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 479, No. 6741.]

[Footnote 783: Radolin to F. O., June 27, dispatched June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 485 f., No. 6746.]

[Footnote 784: Bülow to Radolin, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 487 f., No. 6748; Bülow to William II, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 488 ff., No. 6749.]

[Footnote 785: Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 495 ff., No. 6753 and Appendix; Holstein to Radolin, June 28, 1905, _ibid._, 490 ff., No. 6750.]

[Footnote 786: Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 107 f., No. 134.]

[Footnote 787: Lansdowne entirely approved of this suggestion, remarking that “it [the Anglo-French declaration] might be usefully cited for the purpose of showing that the policy of both France and Great Britain had been in favour of maintaining the independence and integrity of Morocco and preserving commercial equality” (Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 110 f., No. 137). The rancor back of Lansdowne’s statement is apparent.]

[Footnote 788: Radolin to F. O., June 29 and 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 492 ff., Nos. 6751 f.; Lee, II, 344.]

[Footnote 789: Bülow to Radolin, July 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 495 ff., No. 6753 and Anlage; Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249, No. 285.]

[Footnote 790: Radolin to Bülow, July 1, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 499, No. 6754; 501 f., No. 6756; Radolin to F. O., July 1, 1905, _ibid._, 499 f., No. 6755.]

[Footnote 791: Lansdowne to Bertie, July 1, 1905, _B.D._, III, 110 f., No. 137.]

[Footnote 792: On those negotiations see _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6754 ff.; Rouvier to Bihourd, July 9, 1905, _L.j., 1901-5_, 249, No. 285.]

[Footnote 793: _L.j., 1901-5_, Nos. 287 f.; _G.P._, XX, Nos. 6767 f.; _B.D._, III, 115 f., No. 147.]

[Footnote 794: See Rouvier’s speech in the Chamber on July 10, 1905 (_Journal officiel. Debats parlem._ [Chambre, July 10, 1905], pp. 2825 f.). Lansdowne’s speech of acceptance in the House of Lords, July 11, 1905, 4 Hansard, Vol. CIXL, col. 241. Richthofen to Radolin, July 9, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 516 f., No. 6769. The German government prohibited Jaurès from coming to Berlin to speak before a socialist congress on July 9, but as the prohibition was based on internal reasons, it had little effect upon Franco-German relations (Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 104 f.; _L’année politique, 1905_, p. 388).]

[Footnote 795: The French and British governments were particularly anxious for Russia and the United States to attend. See Lansdowne to Lister, July 6, 1905, _B.D._, III, 114, No. 143; see also _ibid._, Nos. 149 ff., 154, 159 f., 164.]

[Footnote 796: Quoted in Bishop, I, 488.]

[Footnote 797: Lister to Lansdowne, June 28, 1905, _B.D._, III, 108, No. 134.]

[Footnote 798: Lansdowne to Bertie, July 12, 1905, _ibid._, 118 f., No. 152. On June 28 Lowther reported a conversation with Tattenbach in which the latter gave him to understand that “what he [Tattenbach] desired the Conference should do, would be to bring about an amendment of the Anglo- French Convention of April 8th, 1904.” King Edward’s minute to this dispatch was, “In plain English—Germany ousts France fr[om] Morocco and puts herself in her place!” See Lowther to Lansdowne, D. June 28, 1905, R. July 10, 1905, _ibid._, 101 f., No. 191.]

[Footnote 799: Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 217 f.]

[Footnote 800: Lee, II, 344 f.]