Chapter XI: The Visit to Tangier

Upon the refusal of an alliance by Russia, the German government, in the early part of 1905, regarded its international situation and loss of prestige with concern. The continued defeats of Russia by Japan in the Far East, culminating in that at Mukden, February 23 to March 10, and the outbreak of revolution in Russia had for the time neutralized the effectiveness of the Dual Alliance. But the Anglo-German animosity persisted. On February 2 at Eastleigh, Mr. Arthur Lee, first civil lord of the British admiralty, frankly explained the redistribution of the fleet as follows:[561]

The balance and center of naval power in Europe had been shifted during the last few years. They [Great Britain] had not so much to keep their eyes upon France and the Mediterranean as they had to look with more anxiety, though not fear, towards the North Sea. It was for that reason that the Fleets had been distributed to enable them to deal with any danger in that direction. . . . . If war should unhappily be declared, under existing conditions the British Navy would get its blow in first, before the other side had time even to read in the papers that war had been declared.

The German Emperor regarded those assertions as an “open threat of war” by that “vengeance-breathing corsair.”[562] An Anglo-German press war ensued. Count Bülow declared to Admiral Tirpitz that he would agree to any sum for the German naval law for 1906.[563]

The state of the Triple Alliance also worried the German foreign office; Austria-Hungary was in internal turmoil, Italy more unreliable than ever. Irredentist troubles, which had flamed up again in the previous November,[564] and Balkan rivalries had so antagonized those two allies that during 1904 the main military force of Italy had been transferred from the French to the Austrian frontier. During the winter, reports of a Franco-Italian agreement nullifying the Triple Alliance and of the activity of Ambassador Barrère in attempting to foment difficulty between Austria and Italy came to the German government.[565] But when, toward the end of February, 1905, Count Bülow mentioned these rumors to the Italian Ambassador, King Victor Emmanuel and his government both formally denied that Italy had made any agreement “that is in contradiction with the Triple Alliance or that may diminish the value of our obligations toward our allies,” and asserted that M. Prinetti’s declarations to France did not “vary, modify, or attenuate the bearing or obligations that result from it [the Triple Alliance] for us.”[566]

Although the Chancellor did not believe these asseverations, he continued to hold to Italy. As he wrote to the Emperor on March 5 and 9:

For times of peace and for all international combinations it is to our interest to maintain the façade of the Triple Alliance as intact as possible, if only because the Italians, so long as they remain in it, will meet with mistrust from hostile sides. In case of complications, however, we need have no illusions concerning active Italian co- operation. Still, it is an advantage if Italy remains neutral instead of siding with France. . . . . The general international situation is so tense that we must endeavor to sacrifice as few tricks as possible.

Therein was expressed the German policy toward Italy until the latter’s final entry into the World War. Upon reading this confession, the Emperor, who already feared that King Edward VII was trying to establish a Franco-Russo-British alliance, summed up the international position of his country as follows: “The Triple Alliance loosened by the antagonism of Austria and Italy, Russia unchanged or indifferent toward us, England hostile, France revengeful.” As to Italy, he wrote severely to the Chancellor: “Your Excellency is easily satisfied. My grandfather and I looked upon the co-operation of the Italian army as a matter of course. In case of a French attack on us that must be adhered to.”[567]

The diminution in Germany’s prestige was felt most acutely in her relationship to France, whose Foreign Minister showed by the dispatch of the French mission to Fez in January that he intended to establish French control over Morocco without consulting Germany. Hence, after the failure of the move toward Russia, the German government began, in December, to turn its attention to the Moroccan question. Conveniently disregarding its unsettled grievances against the Sultan, it responded to certain overtures for a _rapprochement_ from that monarch by quietly and unofficially encouraging him to resist the French demands.[568]

This action could the more easily be taken since the Sultan had already begun to oppose the French by convoking an assembly of Moroccan notables to consider the French proposals for reform. The Sultan selected two men from each town, who were moderate conservatives, more or less amenable to his influence, hostile to French control but not in principle opposed to foreigners or to reforms.[569] Count Bülow, much pleased, advised the Sultan about the middle of February to unite with the rebel, Bou-Amama [_sic_], and to threaten a holy war in case France tried to prevent the meeting of the assembly.[570] Early in February a German warship appeared casually in Moroccan waters. A few days later Herr von Holstein instructed Herr von Kühlmann, first secretary of the German legation in Tangier, to avoid official utterances toward France “until we are more certain about the attitude of the Sultan”; for “according as the Sultan shows himself firm or yielding, German policy will endeavor as much as possible to strengthen his back or will confine itself to defending German economic interests.”[571]

The Moroccan government lived up to the German hopes by convening the assembly of notables on February 22 and by requiring M. Saint-René Taillandier to explain the French program to it. To stiffen the Moroccan resistance against France, Herr von Kühlmann suggested that the German government send a note to the Sultan manifesting its disapproval of the French policy.[572] Before following that suggestion, however, the German government endeavored to interest President Roosevelt in the Moroccan question.

As Mr. Roosevelt and the German government were co-operating so cordially for the preservation of the open door in China, Count Bülow sought to extend this effort to Morocco and to involve the United States against France and Great Britain, or at least to prepare the President for isolated German action on the Moroccan question. On February 25, after calling Mr. Roosevelt’s attention to the Franco-Spanish monopolistic plans, the Chancellor invited him to unite with Germany in advising the Sultan that the calling of the assembly was a correct move toward fortifying his government and inaugurating reforms. This action, argued the Chancellor, would stop the French advance and make possible a peaceful solution of the Moroccan question. Even if the United States did not participate, he continued, France would scarcely risk a Moroccan war with a silent Germany on her frontier.[573]

Although not interested in Morocco, the President agreed to instruct the American representative in Tangier to keep in close touch with his German colleague.[574] The answer satisfied the German government, which now felt assured of Mr. Roosevelt’s moral support in case Germany took action alone. On March 10 the note was sent.

Through this note and the supplementary statements of the German representatives in Morocco the German government informed the Sultan that, although he must reorganize his country, Germany

hopes that the rumors of a prospective change in the existing conditions in Morocco—equal rights and freedom for all nations—are unfounded. Germany would disapprove of such a change. Germany and the United States are favorably inclined toward the maintenance of the present conditions; . . . . the attitude of the other Powers is not definitely known. In England the Government has bound itself to a certain extent in favor of France, even though in the English commercial world a current in favor of the maintenance of the independence of Morocco and in favor of equal rights of the Powers is present.[575]

Germany here showed her strong disapproval of the whole French action and sought to augment Moroccan resistance without committing herself to any definite policy.

Immediately after the dispatch of the note the German government heard that at the opening session of the assembly of notables on February 22 M. Saint-René Taillandier had claimed to have “the assent of other foreign representatives at Tangier” to the French program of reform.[576] Considering this a deliberate misrepresentation for the purpose of overawing the Moroccans, the German government sought further means for blocking French efforts. The Chancellor intimated in the Reichstag on March 15 that Germany intended taking steps to defend her economic interests in Morocco.[577] Five days later the newspapers announced the forthcoming visit of the German Emperor to Tangier.[578]

When Count Bülow saw the strong opposition which this proposed visit aroused in the French and English press, he immediately determined to put it to a political use.[579] He wrote to the Emperor: “Your Majesty’s visit to Tangier will embarrass M. Delcassé, thwart his plans, and be of benefit to our economic interests in Morocco.” For, he wrote a few days later,

apart from the fact that the systematic exclusion of all non-French merchants and promoters from Morocco according to the example in Tunis would signify an important economic loss for Germany, it is also a want of appreciation of our power when M. Delcassé has not considered it worth the effort to negotiate with Germany over his Moroccan plans. M. Delcassé has completely ignored us in this affair.[580]

William II was lukewarm about the project. He had persistently opposed interfering in the Moroccan question both for reasons of general policy and for lack of interest in Morocco itself. At the insistence of the Chancellor he agreed to execute the _coup_; but Count Bülow had to employ every means to hold him steady. When the Emperor learned from the papers that the natives and the German and British colonies in Morocco intended to exploit his visit against the French, he wrote to the Chancellor on March 20 as follows: “Telegraph immediately to Tangier that it is _highly_ doubtful whether I shall land and that I shall only travel incog[nito] as a tourist, that is, no audiences, no receptions.”[581] Count Bülow overcame his objections by arguing that otherwise M. Delcassé would spread the rumor that the program of reception for the Emperor had been curtailed after remonstrances had been made in Berlin.[582]

Aside from the communication with President Roosevelt, the German government made no diplomatic preparation for this action.[583] Direct contact with the French government was cut off as early as March 22.[584] Two days later the Chancellor issued general orders to play the sphinx on the subject of Morocco.[585] A Franco-German press war alone revealed the tension of the situation.[586]

With the performance ready to start, the chief actor began to suffer from stage fright. Learning of an attempt at Tangier a day or so before to assassinate Mr. Harris of the _London Times_, the Emperor telegraphed Count Bülow from Lisbon on March 28 as follows: “In Tangier the devil is already loose. Yesterday an Englishman almost murdered. I consider the affair there as very doubtful.”[587] Furthermore, he learned that at Tangier he would have to disembark in an open boat, and that after he was in the town he would have to walk through the narrow streets or be carried in a sedan or ride some unknown Berber horse. The first two ways were decidedly beneath imperial dignity, while the last one, on account of the Emperor’s crippled left arm, might be too dangerous. Not only the anxious sovereign, but members of his company as well, were inclined to advise against the attempt. But Count Tattenbach, former minister at Tangier and at the time minister at Lisbon, whom the Emperor had brought along from Portugal, and Prince Eulenburg clung to the plan and kept up their master’s courage,[588] while from Berlin the Chancellor sent one telegram after the other to effect the visit. To the Emperor he telegraphed that it would be a “historic act,” that the attention of the world was focused on him, that “if the visit . . . . turns out as desired, Delcassé with his anti-German policy will stand there as a disgraced European,” and that the French Foreign Minister would probably then be overthrown by his enemies in France. He agreed with Count Tattenbach that since press and people were discussing the matter so fully the Emperor could not recede without exposing himself to the accusation of cowardice. He likewise sent a telegram of four pages to the Emperor on March 26 with instructions about his speeches at Tangier. It read in part as follows:

Naturally it is not to German interest for the Sultan to be discouraged now at the beginning of the French negotiations and to place himself under a French protectorate. To oppose this . . . . Your Majesty should receive the Sultan’s representative expressly as a representative of a sovereign, and should . . . . express the hope that he [the Sultan] would soon suppress the rebellion of Bou-Amama. . . . . Your Majesty might ask where the rebel Bou-Amama obtains the means for his long resistance. If the representative should reply, “Probably from France,” Your Majesty might answer, “It is difficult to believe the French capable of such baseness.”

. . . . Without saying an unfriendly word about France, Your Majesty should ignore her in Morocco, should not mention at all the French advance against Morocco, and should honor the French chargé d’affaires with . . . . only a silent greeting.

It is improbable that any diplomat will mention France’s Moroccan policy to Your Majesty. If that subject should be brought up, Your Majesty might reply that the French policy is entirely unknown to you. The case is different, however, if the Sultan’s representative at his master’s command . . . . asks Your Majesty’s advice. On the reply will depend whether the Sultan will continue to defend the independence of Morocco or will submit to France. The question whether Your Majesty can risk a war with France for the sake of Morocco cannot be considered at all. But on the other hand it is more than doubtful whether the present civil Government of France . . . . would risk a war with Morocco so long as the least possibility exists that Germany might sooner or later interfere. Therefore we must for the present leave our goal uncertain. We cannot conveniently make an alliance with the Sultan. But if we withdraw our moral support entirely from him and destroy all hope, we shall relinquish important German interests. Therefore I conceive Your Majesty’s reply to the Sultan’s minister somewhat as follows: “It is known that I desire no Morocco territory, but that I value equality of treatment with other nations in trade and commerce with Morocco. Other commercial nations have the same interest. As my view is known, the English colony greeted me joyfully today. It is to the interest of the Sultan as well as of almost all seafaring and commercial peoples that he preserve his independence and therewith freedom to permit them all equal rights in his empire. The main strength of every ruler lies in having his people back of him at decisive moments. In that case no foreign Power will attack him lightly. Therefore the Sultan should make certain that the notables whom he has summoned to Fez for advice are of one mind with him and should direct his policy in accordance therewith.”

Since it is well known that the Moorish delegates at present assembled at Fez are entirely hostile to the Sultan’s conciliation toward France, definite advice would herewith be imparted to the Sultan. If the representative should ask whether Your Majesty would support the Sultan in a war against France, Your Majesty might reply: “In case I promised today to support you, you would attack the French at once. But I desire, if possible, to maintain peace, although I have a very strong army. Therefore I must reserve decision until it really comes to war between France and Morocco. I do not expect this event. France will try to see how far she can advance with threats. But France knows that her situation would be dangerous if she attacked Morocco without having assured herself of Germany’s neutrality.”

Next in importance to the conversation with the Sultan’s representative is Your Majesty’s reply to a probable short English greeting. . . . . There Your Majesty might well stress the common interest in equality for all nations. By emphasizing this principle at that place Your Majesty will make it half impossible for the English Government in later Franco- German discussions about Morocco to place itself on the French side.

Finally, in case Your Majesty has to reply to a question from a non- Moroccan source about what attitude Germany would take in case of a Franco-Moroccan war, Your Majesty might reply somewhat as follows: “Germany has no obligations which would prevent her from being guided in that case by her own interests.” This reply sounds disquieting for our opponents but binds us to nothing.

Thus, Count Bülow instructed the Emperor to encourage the Moroccans in their resistance to France, to make France uneasy by his actions and words, but not to bind Germany to anything definite.

At the same time, to assure his master’s safety, the Chancellor telegraphed to Herr von Kühlmann that German and Spanish secret police should be present in abundance, that the visit should perhaps be shortened, and that “a horse, guaranteed gentle, which should be exercised early in the morning for several hours by some trustworthy rider in order to quiet it, would be best and could obviate all difficulties as well as any curtailment of the program.”[589] Then, to cut off any possibility of retreat, the Chancellor declared on March 29 to the Reichstag that Germany had no aggressive intentions toward Morocco, but that she did aim to defend her economic interests and the open door.

The speech and attitude of a diplomat . . . . must vary according to circumstances [he stated]. The moment suitable . . . . for the preservation of our interests I shall choose as I think best. But in this case the tendency of the German policy has not changed. Whoever seeks a _fait nouveau_ will not find it in the German policy. In the same degree as it is attempted to change the international position of Morocco or to control the open door in the economic development of the land, we must also to a greater degree than before be heedful that our economic interests in Morocco remain safe. For this reason we are entering into relations with the Sultan of Morocco.[590]

When the Emperor’s boat arrived at Tangier early in the morning of March 31, a stiff east wind made landing impossible.[591] Herr von Kühlmann and the captain of one of the French warships stationed in the harbor succeeded only with the greatest difficulty in coming aboard. The Emperor immediately drew the latter into conversation about the weather prospects. It looked as if the “historic act” would not occur. A few hours later, however, the wind died down, and General Scholl, a member of the Emperor’s party, went ashore to make a tour of inspection. He returned with an enthusiastic report of the reception in view from the natives, declared the horse to be trustworthy, and said that if one did not mind getting wet, one could make the landing. So the Emperor intrusted himself to the wind and the waves, the Moroccans, and a Berber horse. The landing was made; the horse, which at first shied at the splendor of the imperial costume, was quieted; and

followed by about twenty attendants all on horseback [according to Herr von Schoen’s account], the Emperor entered the town, the narrow streets of which, filled with the joyous, noisy masses, permitted only a slow advance. The flat roofs of the houses were thickly packed with Moorish, Christian, and Jewish women who hailed the Emperor in the most varied tones and scattered flowers. Finally the procession arrived at the Soko, the open place before the garden of the legation, filled with a turbulent sea of human beings who expressed their enthusiasm in deafening cries and wild shooting. The confused din was increased still more by a military band sent by the Sultan which endeavored in vain to drown out the uproar of the people. The restlessness of the horses caused me to ask the French officer, apparently leading a command, whether he could not stop the wild shooting. He replied dejectedly that he had some influence only over the handful of regular troops entrusted to his instruction but not the least over the sportively shooting, half- wild Kabyle.

However, the company reached the legation in safety where the German colony, the diplomatic corps, and the representative of the Sultan were received.

In the speeches which the excited Emperor delivered, he permitted his tongue to become looser than usual. Whereas he had previously been opposed to intervention in the Moroccan affair, he now fixed the German policy with respect to Morocco more tightly than the Chancellor had wished and exposed himself to the criticism of having taken another backward monarch under his wing. In reply to the greeting of the Sultan’s representative, Abd-el-Melik, the Emperor declared that

he . . . . had great interest in the welfare and prosperity of the Moroccan Empire, that he visited the Sultan as an independent ruler, and that he hoped that under the authority of the Sultan a free Morocco would be opened to the peaceful competition of all nations without monopoly or exclusion.

The Sultan’s representative read to the Emperor a message from his master in which the latter stated that

he remembered the friendship which had always existed between his predecessors and Germany and that he was filled with the wish to strengthen and extend those friendly relations in every way. In reply the Emperor William expressed his thanks for this cordial message. He shared the feelings of the Sultan [he said] and agreed with Abd-el- Melik’s assertations concerning the divine power and wisdom which directs the fate of peoples. He wished sincerely for the development and welfare of the Moroccan Empire for the sake of his subjects and for that of the other European nations who traded there, as he hoped, on the basis of full equality.

The Emperor then decorated Abd-el-Melik and his three companions. Later, he said to Abd-el-Melik that

his visit to Tangier aimed to assert that German interests in Morocco would be protected and preserved. Concerning the best means to achieve this, he would enter into direct relations with the Sultan, whom he regarded as an independent ruler. The Emperor closed with the remark that prudence was necessary in the reforms which the Sultan planned and that regard should be paid to the religious feelings of the Moroccan people in order to avoid disturbing public order.[592]

After the speeches were over, the imperial party hurried back on shipboard before some accident should occur or a contrary wind arise. Count Bülow was so relieved upon learning that his master was safe on board that, as he later confided to the Emperor, he had a “nervous fit of tears.”[593] The Emperor himself did not at first realize the great political significance of his act. When he met Prince Louis of Battenberg at Gibraltar on April 1, he expressed the time-honored shibboleth, that “Germany, Great Britain and the United States must make common cause and march shoulder to shoulder.”[594] When he received the reports from the press several days later, he awoke from his illusions.[595] For, although the whole event smacked of a comic opera, it none the less threw down the gauntlet to M. Delcassé and French policy in Morocco[596] and ushered in a long period of crisis in international relations. The echoes which the Emperor’s speeches aroused in Europe reverberated like the distant rumblings of cannon.

[Footnote 561: Reported in the _London Times_, Feb. 4, 1905. When Lee saw how the German press took offense at his words, he published a “correct version” of these passages in a somewhat milder form (_ibid._, Feb. 7, 1905; _Annual Register, 1905_, pp. 21 f.).]

[Footnote 562: Von Tirpitz, _Politische Dokumente_, I, 14.]

[Footnote 563: _Ibid._, pp. 17 ff.]

[Footnote 564: Monts to Bülow, Nov. 19, 1904, _G.P._, XX, 85 ff., No. 6423.]

[Footnote 565: Monts to Bülow, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 88 f. No. 6424; report of Military Attaché Chelius to Schlieffen, Dec. 18, 1904, _ibid._, 89 ff., No. 6424 Anlage; Metternich to Bülow, Jan. 12, 1905, _ibid._, 93, No. 6425. The relation of Italy to France and Germany was well shown in the following incident. Shortly after Loubet’s visit to Rome, an Italian officer was caught delivering to the French important documents dealing with the Italian plan of mobilization. At about the same time the Italian chief of staff gave to the German government photographs of the French border fortifications (_ibid._, Nos. 6423-24, 6426).]

[Footnote 566: Bülow to Monts, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 93 f., No. 6426; Monts to F. O., Feb. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 94 f., No. 6427; Bülow to William II, March 5, 1905, _ibid._, 95, No. 6428 and Anlage.]

[Footnote 567: Bülow to William II, March 5 and 9, 1905, _ibid._, 95 ff., Nos. 6428 f., and the Emperor’s minutes.]

[Footnote 568: The German representatives in Morocco unofficially assured the Sultan early in February that Germany had a political interest in the Moroccan question, that Germany as well as several other Powers had not yet taken the question in its existing form into consideration, that Germany would not actively support Morocco, but that, with a silent Germany on her frontier, France would not attack the latter (see _ibid._, Nos. 6538-40, 6544-47, 6550, 6553).]

[Footnote 569: Kühlmann to Bülow, Jan. 29, 1905, _ibid._, 248, No. 6552.]

[Footnote 570: Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 11, 1905, _ibid._, 251 ff., No. 6554.]

[Footnote 571: Bülow to Kühlmann, Feb. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 255, No. 6556. The dispatch was written by Holstein.]

[Footnote 572: Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, _ibid._, 255 f., No. 6557.]

[Footnote 573: Bülow to Kühlmann, Jan. 16, 1905, _ibid._, 245, No. 6547; Bülow to Sternburg, Feb. 25, 1905, _ibid._, 256 ff., No. 6558.]

[Footnote 574: Sternburg to F. O., March 9, 1905, _ibid._, 258 f., No. 6559; Dennett, _Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War_, pp. 83 f.]

[Footnote 575: Only a summary of the note is given in _G.P._, XX, 260 n. The quotations are taken from this summary and from a telegram from Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, _ibid._, 260 f., No. 6561.]

[Footnote 576: Report from Vassel, German vice-consul at Fez, Feb. 23, 1905. According to a second report from him, March 7, the French Minister had claimed to have “the approval of his proposals by the foreigners” (_ibid._, pp. 255 f. n.; Auswärtiger Amt, _Aktenstücke über Marokko, 1905_ [Berlin, 1905], No. 3). The latest communication received by the German government from Vassel, before the dispatch of the note of March 10, was of Feb. 17. See Kühlmann to Bülow, Feb. 21, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 255, No. 6557; Bülow to Kühlmann, March 10, 1905, _ibid._, 260, No. 6561.]

[Footnote 577: The Chancellor declared as follows: “I understand entirely the attention which is given here to the events in and about Morocco. I regard it as a duty of the German Government to see that . . . . our economic interests in Morocco are not injured. But the present moment is unsuitable for further explanations” (Bülow, _Reden_, II, 186 f.). As a matter of fact, German economic interests ran a very poor third behind those of France and Great Britain (_Zeitschrift für Kolonialpolitik_, Dec., 1904, pp. 885 ff.).]

[Footnote 578: The information was given out to the _London Standard_, _London Times_, and the _Kölnische Zeitung_, at Tangier on March 19. The origin of the visit is obscure. Theodor Wolff relates that Kühlmann and Hornung, correspondent in Tangier of the _Kölnische Zeitung_, were responsible for proposing in February that the Emperor include Tangier in his itinerary (Wolff, _Das Vorspiel_, p. 156). The plan for the Emperor’s voyage in the Mediterranean submitted to the Chancellor on March 13 included a stay of four hours in Tangier (editor’s note, _G.P._, XX, 263). Probably Bülow aimed to use this visit politically from the start, just as he had intended using the dispatch of a warship to Tangier in the previous year. But only after he saw the effect of the announcement upon public opinion did he realize the full political significance of the visit (cf. _ibid._, pp. 262 ff.). Crozier’s story of the origin of this voyage is unsubstantiated by any evidence (_Revue de France_, April 1, 1921, pp. 279 f.).]

[Footnote 579: Editor’s note, _G.P._, XX, 263 f.; Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 262, No. 6563; 264 f., No. 6565.]

[Footnote 580: Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 263, No. 6563; Bülow to William II, March 26, 1905, _ibid._, 274 f., No. 6576. It was reported in the German foreign office soon after the Anglo-French accord was made that Delcassé had said to some intimate friends: “Je viens de rouler Radolin; il ne me reste plus qu’à rouler l’empereur d’Allemagne” (Guibert et Ferrette, _Le conflit franco-allemand en 1905_ [Paris, 1905], p. 83, quoted in Stuart, _French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo_, p. 136 n.). On Feb. 21, 1907, Lord Sanderson, permanent undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, 1894-1906, wrote as follows: “M. Delcassé . . . . ignored Germany entirely when he commenced operations in Morocco. The action of France and her demands on the Sultan were undoubtedly much exaggerated and misrepresented. But in addition there is no doubt that M. Delcassé was steadily pursuing a series of manœuvres for the purpose of isolating Germany and weakening her alliances. The German Gov[ernmen]t and the German nation are extremely sensitive about being ignored or neglected in the discussion of important questions, and it is not surprising that on this occasion they should have been much exasperated, and determined on inflicting on France a severe humiliation. That they also wished to separate us from France, to prevent the Agreement from developing into an alliance, and to obtain any share they could in the eventual development of Morocco is no doubt also true. The methods adopted were characteristic of German policy, and as on some other occasions they failed” (memo. by Lord Sanderson, Feb. 21, 1907, _B.D._, IV, 421). Whether the German government knew the exact terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement is a question. Tardieu says that it did know them (_La conf. d’Algés_, p. 156). Hammann has written, “One may assume that it learned the main content” (_Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges_, p. 200). It also suspected that the Moroccan accords contained stipulations for the exclusion of Germany from any participation in the territorial division of Morocco (_ibid._, p. 201). See also the dispatch from Stumm to Bülow, Feb. 20, 1906, _G.P._, XXI, 191, No. 7024, and the Emperor’s minute thereto: “And the rascals [the Spanish government] will not even admit what sort of a pact they have made with the devil [France].” See also Veit Valentin, _Deutschlands Aussenpolitik von Bismarcks Abgang bis zum Ende des Weltkrieges_ (Berlin, 1921), p. 54; report from Madrid, Dec. 10, 1904, _Zur europ. Politik_, I, 126 f. However, the German government did know the terms of the Franco-Spanish agreement of Sept. 1, 1905, so Ojeda of the Spanish foreign office admitted to Cartwright of the British embassy (Cartwright to Grey, Jan. 22, 1906, _B.D._, III, 233, No. 252). The probability is therefore that it also learned in good time the terms of the other secret accords. Failure to mention that knowledge or even denials of being informed in the documents is not conclusive proof that the secret articles were not known to the German foreign office.]

[Footnote 581: William II to Bülow, undated, _G.P._, XX, 263, No. 6564. The editors of _G.P._ presume the date of this communication to have been March 21; but Bülow’s reply to it was dated March 20. See Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _ibid._, 264, No. 6565. The Emperor had dined at the French embassy on March 17 and had said nothing about his proposed visit. Furthermore, just before leaving on his trip he made at Bremen one of his half-militaristic, half-pacific speeches which did not indicate what was to follow (Schulthess, _Europäischer Geschichtskalender 1905_, pp. 67 f.; Ludwig, _Wilhelm der Zweite_, p. 275; Mévil, _De la Paix de Francfort, etc._, pp. 193 ff.).]

[Footnote 582: Bülow to William II, March 20, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 264 f., No. 6565.]

[Footnote 583: The unexpectedness of this action was shown by the remarks made on March 21 by Bernstorff, first secretary of the embassy in London, to a reporter of the _Daily Chronicle_. He asserted that Germany had only economic interests in Morocco over which it ought not to be difficult for France and Germany to agree (Bülow to Metternich, March 22, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 268 f., and note, No. 6569).]

[Footnote 584: Bülow to Radolin, March 22, 1905, _ibid._, 267 f., No. 6568; Flotow to F. O., March 23, 1905, _ibid._, 269, No. 6570; Flotow to F. O., March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 278, No. 6578; Bülow to Flotow, March 28, 1905, _ibid._, 278, No. 6579; Mévil, pp. 197 f.]

[Footnote 585: Memo. by Bülow, March 24, 1905, _G.P._, 271, No. 6573.]

[Footnote 586: Mévil, p. 205; _G.P._, XX, 262 f., n. 266 n., Nos. 6570, 6584, 6590; _Quest. dipl. et. col._, XIX, 442 ff.; Schulthess, _1905_, pp. 78 f.]

[Footnote 587: William II to Bülow, March 28, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 279, No. 6580.]

[Footnote 588: Tattenbach to F. O., March 29, 1905, _ibid._, 283, No. 6585; Freiherr von Schoen, _Erlebtes. Beiträge zur politischen Geschichte der neuesten Zeit_ (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1921), pp. 19 ff.]

[Footnote 589: See his telegrams from March 26 to March 30, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 272 ff., Nos. 6574 ff.]

[Footnote 590: Bülow, II, 209 f.]

[Footnote 591: For a description of the visit see Schoen, pp. 19 ff.; Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 285 ff., Nos. 6588 ff.; Tardieu, pp. 69 f.]

[Footnote 592: The foregoing is the official version of the speeches published in the German press (see _Allgemeine Zeitung_ [Munich], April 4, 1905). There were various versions of the speeches since the Emperor spoke extemporaneously. Schoen on March 31 sent to the foreign office a report of William II’s assertions as follows: When Count de Chérisey attempted to greet the Emperor in the name of Delcassé in such a way as to imply a French predominance in Morocco, William II replied sharply that his visit “signified that Germany demanded free trade there and full equality with other nations.” When the Count admitted this, the Emperor remarked that “he would treat directly with the Sultan as a peer, as a free ruler of an independent land, that he would know how to assert his just claims and expected that these also be respected by France.” Those words crushed the Count. To the Sultan’s representative the Emperor spoke as follows: “He regarded the Sultan as the ruler of a free and independent Empire, subject to no foreign suzerainty. He expected for German trade and commerce the same advantages as for all other commercial nations. He would always negotiate with the Sultan directly. Reforms which the Sultan planned to introduce ought always to be executed within the limits of the customs and views of his people and without violation of the precepts of the Koran, in honest administration and strengthening of peace and order that would make the best impression outside. European customs and usages would not be taken over without further consideration. Let the Sultan therein listen carefully to the counsel of the great ones of his land” (Schoen to F. O., March 31, 1905, _G.P._, XX, 286 f., No. 6589. It was also stated in the press, although not in the official version of the speeches, that the Emperor replied to the greetings from the German colony at Tangier that that colony “could rely on the support of the German Government to prevent any obstacle in that free country [Morocco] from hindering the success of its efforts in favor of the national commerce” (Quoted in _Quest. dipl. et col._, XIX, 504). Schoen made no mention of this assertion. Cf. Schoen, pp. 20 f.; Mévil, pp. 210 ff.; _B.D._, III, 62 f., Nos. 71 f.; 64, No. 74; Prince Louis of Battenberg’s report of a conversation with the Emperor, April 1, 1905, Newton, _Lord Lansdowne_, pp. 333 f.]

[Footnote 593: William II to Bülow, Aug. 11, 1905, _G.P._, XIX, 497, No. 6237.]

[Footnote 594: Memo. by Prince Louis of Battenberg, April 1, 1905, Newton, p. 333.]

[Footnote 595: Schoen, p. 22.]

[Footnote 596: Mévil, p. 210.]