Chapter XXVIII: Letter XII: Rotterdam, Aug. 15, 1778

FRIEND GORDON,

The French, to perplex the councils of the British court assembled a multitude of regiments from all parts of the kingdom, and marched them down to the sea side, where they formed large encampments opposite to the shores of Great-Britain.—These manœuvres occasioned the calling out and embodying of the militia of England upon the rising of parliament. The militia being joined by the regular forces, camps were formed in different places: but the nation trusted most to the navy.

My last closed with the account of Admiral _Keppel’s_ having sailed. He was deservedly in the highest esteem with his own profession, as well as the public. It was extremely proper therefore that he should be appointed to command that fleet, to which was committed the defence of the island, the protection of the homeward bound trade, and the preservation of the dignity of the British flag in the adjoining seas. On his arrival at Portsmouth toward the end of March, he found matters very different from the opinion that had been generally circulated, and from what he himself had been led to expect. Instead of a strong and well appointed fleet, he discovered to his astonishment, that there were only six sail of the line in any degree of condition for immediate service; even these on his reviewing them, with a seaman’s eye, gave him no peculiar pleasure. The paucity and condition of both men and ships was not more alarming, than the deficiency of all kinds of naval stores was lamentable; but the admiral acted with such prudence and caution, as to prevent that increase of the public alarm, that a display of these circumstances must have occasioned. He urged his private applications to the admiralty, with such assiduity and effect, that a new spirit and unusual degree of vigor were suddenly seen to prevade the naval department: and such industry was used, that beside dispatching the twelve ships for America under Byron, he was enabled to take the seas with a fleet of twenty sail of the line, at the time already mentioned. He had scarcely arrived at his station in the Bay of Biscay, when two French frigates, with two smaller vessels appeared in sight, and were evidently taking a survey of the fleet. War had not been declared nor reprisals ordered: but it was necessary to stop these frigates, as well to obtain intelligence, as to prevent its being conveyed. A general signal for chasing was made; a ship of the line got at length along side of the Licorne of 32 guns; on her firing a gun, the Frechman stood to her and was brought into the fleet. Mean while, the other French frigate, _La Belle Poule_, of twenty-six heavy twelve pounders, beside several others of lighter metal, with a schooner of ten guns in company were closely pursued by the _Arethusa_ frigate of only twenty-eight six pounders, and the Alert cutter, till ought of sight of the fleet. The Arethusa getting up with her chase, captain _Marshall_ requested the French officer, lieutenant _Chedeau de la Clocheterie_ to bring to, and acquainded him with the order for conducting him to the admiral. A compliance being refused, the captain fired a shot across the Belle Poule, which she instantly returned, by pouring her whole broadside into the Arethusa. A desperate engagement ensued with unusual warmth and animosity for above two hours, each side vying with the utmost degree of national emulation to obtain the palm of victory, in this first action and opening of a new war. The Belle Poule had the superiority not only in the weight of metal, but to number of men. The Arethusa was so shattered, that she became almost unmanageable as there was little wind. The captain was obliged to act with the more caution, as he was upon the French coast, and close on shore at midnight. The Belle Poule having her head in with the land, and meeting with no further interruption from the Arethusa, embraced the opportunity of standing into a small bay. During the forepart of this action, the engagement was no less warm between the Alert cutter and French schooner.—Their force was about equal. The contest was well supported for upward of an hour, when the schooner was compelled to strike. Next morning an unexpected movement made by the Licorne, occasioned one of the convoy to fire a shot across her way, as a signal for keeping her course, when to the astonishment of admiral Keppel and the whole fleet, she suddenly poured her whole broad-side, accompanied with a general discharge of musketry, into the America, of 74 guns, at the instant lord Longford, her commander, was standing upon the gunwale, and talking in terms of the utmost politeness to the French captain. The frigate instantly struck her colours, as soon as she had discharged her fire. Only four of the America’s people were wounded. Notwithstanding the provocation, lord Longford had such command of his temper as not to return a single shot.—Another French frigate falling in with the fleet, was detained by the admiral, under the plea of hostility committed by the Licorne; but several French merchantmen wer suffered to pass through the fleet unmolested. The capture of the French frigates afforded the admiral a source of the most critical and alarming information. He was now within sight of Ushant, when he discovered to his astonishment, that the French fleet in Brest road and Brest water, amounted to thirty-two ships of the line, beside ten or twelve frigates, while his own force consisted only of twenty of the former and three of the latter. The odds between the two fleets was so vast, that he could not justify risking an action, which might prove fatal to the kingdom. But it gave him the greatest uneasiness to find himself obliged to turn his back on France. The French no sooner determined to take a decided part with the Americans, than they assiduously applied themselves to the getting of their navy into the utmost forwardness for actual service; and had proceeded with such profound secrecy that the strength of it had not transpired so as to reach the British ministry, who appear to have been wanting in procuring good and early intelligence; which was a matter of so much importance in the estimation of the French, that they used every means for obtaining it. The Brest fleet lay ready for sailing; and was only detained till the destination of admiral Byron’s force could be ascertained at Paris.

[June 27.] On the return of the British fleet to Portsmouth, the admiral’s conduct was branded with the most opprobrious terms, and ascribed to the most disgraceful motives, and his general character treated with the most indecent scurrility in those publications which he considered as under the immediate direction of the ministers. He bore all with wonderful temper; made no complaints; pressed forward the preparations for his return to sea, without noise or parade; and submitted to all the unmerited reproach thrown upon him, without being provoked to a justification, which, by the narration of the fact, must have criminated the first lord of the admiralty. The seasonable arrival of the two first of the British West-India fleets, and of the Levant trade, brought in a supply of seamen at the most critical period in which they could have been wanted. By this mean, and the exertions every where used by the admiralty, Keppel was enabled to put again to sea, on the ninth of July, with 24 ships of the line, and was joined on the way by six more; he had also an addition of one frigate and two fire ships. Mean while the French king made use of the engagement with the Belle Poule and the taking of the other frigates, as the ostensible ground for issuing out orders for a reprisal on British ships, and the ordinance signed the 28th of March, was immediately published. Similar measures were pursued in Great-Britain, when the account of these transactions was received. Thus nothing of war was wanting between the two nations, excepting the formality of the declaration.

The force and destination of admiral Byron being at length made certain to the French ministry, orders were sent to the Brest fleet to proceed to sea. They instantly weighed anchor, and sailed the day preceding the departure of the British fleet from Portsmouth. They amounted to 32 ships of the line, and a cloud of frigates, and were divided into three squadrons, the whole under the command of the count d’Orvilliers, who was assisted in his own particular division, by admiral the count de Guichen. The second was commanded by the count Duchaffault, assisted by monsieur de Rochechovart; and the third by the duke of Chartres, a prince of the blood, seconded by admiral the count de Grasse. The duke was sent on board by the court to animate the fleet, and to intimate the greatness of the objects proposed, and how much reliance was placed on the courage and exertions of the officers and seamen. The British fleet was also thrown into three divisions, the van being commanded by Sir Robert Harland, and the rear by Sir Hugh Palliser. The commander in chief, with the centre division, was assisted by the voluntary services of admiral Campbell, a brave and experienced officer, who from ancient friendship and a long participation of danger and service, condescended to act as first captain in Keppel’s own ship, the Victory. The two fleets came in sight of each other on the 23d, in the afternoon. From the movements of the French admiral, it was inferred that he had no knowledge of the increase of Keppel’s strength; but considered his fleet as being in number the same as when on its station before Brest. He appeared disposed to bring on an immediate action; but when the fleets approached so near as to discover each other’s force, he apparently relinquished that determination, and continued afterward to evade, with great caution and knowledge in his profession, all those endeavours which were used on the other side to bring on an engagement. Through a fresh gale and a change of wind in the night, the French gained the weather gage, by which they had the advantage either of bringing it on, or of totally avoiding it. But two of their line of battle ships fell considerably to the leeward, and were so effectually cut off from the rest of the fleet, that they were never able to rejoin it during the remainder of the cruise. This put the hostile fleets on an equality in point of number, with respect to line of battle ships. The British fleet continued constantly to beat up against the wind in pursuit of the French, who declined coming to a general engagement, as they daily expected a strong reinforcement, and hoped to intercept the commercial fleets, that, while making for the British ports, would have to pass through the track in which their numerous frigates were stationed. Admiral Keppel penetrated their motives, and labored to bring them to action; and as the preserving of a regular line of battle with any hope of it was evidently impracticable, the signal for chasing to windward was kept constantly flying. [July 27.] Some sudden shifts of wind, together with an unexpected and unintentional effect produced by an evolution on the French side, being all improved by the most masterly efforts on the other, brought the two fleet so close that they could not part without an action. But the French endeavored to avade its consequences as much as possible; and by suddenly putting about on the contrary tack, altered the course of the ships in each fleet, so that they could engage only as they passed, instead of lying side to side, and thereby making an effectual impression.

The French began, by firing at a great distance on the headmost of Sir Robert Harland’s division as the ships led up, but not a shot was returned till they were near the enemy. The example was followed, or a similar conduct pursued by the fleet in general, as fast as each ship could close up with the French; and notwithstanding their having been necessarily extended by the chase, they were all soon in battle. As the fleets passed each other very close on the opposite tacks, the cannonade was heavy, and the effect considerable. The action lasted about three hours. As the French in their usual way, directed their fire principally against the rigging, several of the British ships suffered considerably in their masts, yards and sails. The British fire which was principally levelled at the hulls of the enemy, was not deficient in its effect of another kind, the destruction of the seamen. The action being over for the present, admiral Keppel hauled down the signal for battle, till the ships could recover their stations, or get near enough to support each other on the renewal of the action. To call them together for that purpose, he immediately made the signal to form the line of battle a-head, which was considered as commanding the most prompt obedience. Admiral Palliser was at this moment in his proper station; but quitted it and passing Keppel to leeward on the contrary tack, while the latter was advancing to the enemy, never came into the line during the rest of the day. Palliser being totally out of the line, other ships for a-stern, and 5 disabled in their rigging, at a great distance to leeward, the British admiral, about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, could not collect above twelve ships to renew the engagement. The French observing the exposed situation of the British ships which had fallen to leeward to repair their damages, edged away with an evident intention of cutting them off from the rest of the fleet. Adm. Keppel instantly discerned their design and the danger of the ships, and suddenly wore and stood athwart the van of the enemy, in a diagonal line, for their protection. He also dispatched orders to Sir Robert Harland to form his division at a distance astern of the Victory, to cover the rear and keep the enemy in check, till Palliser should, in obedience to the signal, come with his division into his proper station. The protection of the disabled ships being accomplished, and the French continuing to form their line, ranging up to leeward parallel to the centre division, it became the admiral’s immediate object to form his as speedily as possible, in order to bear down upon them and renew the battle. Seeing Palliser still to windward, he sent capt. Windsor of the Fox frigate with express orders to him to bear down into his wake; and to tell him, that he only waited for him and his division to renew the attack. This order not producing the desired effect, the admiral threw out the signal for all ships to come into their stations; and again at seven o’clock, being wearied out with fruitless expectation, he made the signal for each particular ship of Palliser’s division to come into her station in the line; but before they had complied with this signal, night put an end to all further operations.—From a motive of delicacy, no signal was particularly thrown out to the Formidable, Sir Hugh Palliser’s own ship.

The French could have renewed the action during every hour of the afternoon, with apparent advantages, which from the situation of affairs could not possibly have escaped their observation. Their conduct the following night indicated their indisposition to a renewal of it. Three of their best sailing vessels were stationed at proper distances with lights to divert the attention of the British fleet, and to induce a belief that their whole line still kept its position. During this deception the rest of the fleet withdrew in the most silent manner, without lights or other signals than the throwing up of some rockets; and made the best of their way to Brest, where they arrived the next evening. By day-light the French fleet had got at such a distance, that the British admiral concluded, he had not the smallest prospect of coming up with them, and that neither a general nor partial pursuit could answer any beneficial purpose. He therefore left only a proper force to protect the homeward bound trade, and then made the best of his way to Plymouth, as being the nearest port, in order to put the fleet into a proper condition to return in quest of the enemy.

It was observed on the day of action with equal surprise and regret, and by some of the bravest and most experienced British officers, that the French worked and manœuvred their ships, with a degree of seaman-like address and dexterity, which they never before perceived. The event of the day, and the consequent escape of the French fleet were to admiral Keppel intolerably grievous. By his consummate skill, and the most incessant industry, he had gained after four days pursuit of the enemy, one of the fairest opportunities of doing the most signal service to his country, in the most critical exigency, and of raising his own name to the summit of naval renown. He hoped to have made the 27th of July, “a proud day to Great-Britain.” All these mighty advantages and glorious rewards were unaccountably ravished from him, when they appeared within his grasp. In Plymouth, the failure of a complete victory was attributed to Sir Hugh Palliser; whose non-compliance with the admiral’s signals has been ascribed by many to the disabled condition of some of the ships in his division.

The admiral, with wonderful temper, and no less prudence, accommodated his conduct to the necessity of his situation, and made the public security and interest the only objects of his direction. He advanced no charge against Palliser. His public letter was short, general, and barren of information. It stated facts so far as it went, threw no blame upon any body, and commended the bravery of the officers in general, and of Sir Robert Harland and Sir Hugh Palliser in particular. But this approbation is to be applied only to the particular circumstances and immediate time of the action: the subsequent transactions of the afternoon, were in general thrown into the shade; and the causes that prevented a renewal of the engagement left in such obscurity, as has drawn no small share of censure upon Keppel himself.

The French fleet returned to Brest considerably damaged in their hulls, but glorying in an action, wherein they had engaged an equal number of British ships without the loss of a single vessel, as though they had gained a victory. It will be some time before they are fully repaired, through a scarcity of the necessary means.

The Americans have many friends in Holland, who will be ready to assist them when an opportunity offers; but not a-la-mode de Paris. They have not the same inducements with the French to venture on a war with Britain, in favor of the independence of your United States. Dutch policy will keep them from it, that they may enjoy the sweets of a neutrality while others are fighting. They may supply you with a loan; but they will not draw the sword in your behalf. Nothing will bring them to this unless Britain should add to their long catalogue of political errors, that of compelling them to it.