Chapter XXII (2)

I had a long interview with Sir James Graham this morning, and told him that Lord Aberdeen's last letter to the Queen and him[26] made us very uneasy. It was evident that Lord Aberdeen was, against his better judgment, consenting to a course of policy which he inwardly condemned, that his desire to maintain unanimity at the Cabinet led to concessions which by degrees altered the whole character of the policy, while he held out no hope of being able permanently to secure agreement. I described the Queen's position as a very painful one. Here were decisions taken by the Cabinet, perhaps even acted upon, involving the most momentous consequences, without her previous concurrence or even the means for her to judge of the propriety or impropriety of course to be adopted, with evidence that the Minister, in whose judgment the Queen placed her chief reliance, disapproved of it. The position was morally and constitutionally a wrong one. The Queen ought to have the whole policy in spirit and ultimate tendency developed before her to give her deliberate sanction to it, knowing what it involved her in abroad and at home. She might now be involved in war, of which the consequences could not be calculated, chiefly by the desire of Lord Aberdeen to keep his Cabinet together; this might then break down, and the Queen would be left without an efficient Government, and a war on her hands. Lord Aberdeen renounced one of his chief sources of strength in the Cabinet, by not making it apparent that he requires the sanction of the Crown to the course proposed by the Cabinet, and has to justify his advice by argument before it can be adopted, and that it does not suffice to come to a decision at the table of the Cabinet. Sir James Graham perfectly coincided with this view and offered to go up to Town immediately. The Queen wrote the letter to Lord Aberdeen ... which Sir James takes up with him. He shall arrive at Windsor on Friday (14th), and Lord Aberdeen is to have an Audience on Saturday. Sir James will tell him that the Queen wants his deliberate opinion on what course is best to be followed, and that the course once adopted should be steadily and uninterruptedly pursued.

ALBERT.

[Footnote 26:

_The Earl of Aberdeen to Sir James Graham._
[_Submitted to the Queen._]

ARGYLL HOUSE, _8th October 1853._

MY DEAR GRAHAM,--... When we met, Clarendon made a sort of
_resume_ of what had taken place before we all separated, but
ended with no specific proposal. After a few interlocutory
remarks from different quarters, Palmerston proposed his plan.
Lord John faintly supported it in general terms, but did not
seem much in earnest about it. I said that it appeared to
involve the necessity of a declaration of war against Russia,
and the calling together Parliament forthwith. Gladstone
strongly argued against the proposal. Clarendon then read
an outline of his proposed instructions, which were a great
abatement from Palmerston's plan. We came at last to a sort
of compromise; our great difficulty being now to deal with the
question of entering the Black Sea. I consented to this being
done, provided it was strictly in defence of some point of
attack on Turkish territory. I have no fear that this will
take place; and as long as we abstain from entering the Black
Sea, Peace may be possible between us and Russia. We have thus
assumed a strictly defensive position, which for the
moment may be sufficient, and will enable us to carry on
negotiations; but this cannot last long. Under the character
of defensive war, we should inevitably become extensively
engaged. Should the Turks be at all worsted, which is
probable, of course we must increase our assistance. We
should have a French army, and perhaps English money--all for
defence.

The aspect of the Cabinet was, on the whole, very good.
Gladstone, active and energetic for Peace; Argyll, Herbert,
C. Wood, and Granville, all in the same sense. Newcastle,
not quite so much so, but good; Lansdowne, not so warlike
as formerly; Lord John warlike enough, but subdued in
tone; Palmerston urged his views perseveringly, but not
disagreeably. The Chancellor said little, but was cordially
peaceful. Molesworth was not present, there having been some
mistake in sending the notice.

On the whole, therefore, yesterday passed off well enough;
but we shall see what to-day will bring us. Not a syllable was
said in the Cabinet on any other subject. Lord John seemed
in good humour; he came to see me a few minutes before the
Cabinet. I told you that I had spoken to Gladstone very
fully; but I did not press any decision respecting _domestic_
matters, as it would at this moment be quite unseasonable.
Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten altogether. Yours,
etc., etc.,

ABERDEEN.]

[Pageheading: LORD STRATFORD'S INSTRUCTIONS]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

BALMORAL, _11th October 1853._

The Queen has received Lord Clarendon's letter. She had written to Lord Aberdeen that she felt it her duty to pause before giving her consent to the measures decided on in the Cabinet, until she should have received an explanation on the views which dictated that decision, and of the ulterior steps involved in it; and Sir James Graham is gone up to Town, verbally to explain more fully the Queen's feelings. She has now received and read the Despatches, which have in the meantime been sent off to their points of destination without having received her sanction!

The draft to Vienna the Queen thinks very ably argued, and justly to define the present position of the question at issue.[27]

The instructions to Lord Stratford,[28] on the other hand, appear to her very vague, and entrusting him with enormous powers and a latitude of discretion which is hardly to be called safe. As matters have now been arranged, it appears to the Queen, moreover, that we have taken on ourselves in conjunction with France all the risks of a European war, without having bound Turkey to any conditions with respect to provoking it. The hundred and twenty fanatical Turks constituting the Divan at Constantinople are left sole judges of the line of policy to be pursued, and made cognisant at the same time of the fact that England and France have bound themselves to defend the Turkish Territory! This is entrusting them with a power which Parliament has been jealous to confide even to the hands of the British Crown. It may be a question whether England ought to go to war for the defence of so-called Turkish Independence; but there can be none that if she does so, she ought to be the sole judge of what constitutes a breach of that independence, and have the fullest power to prevent by negotiation the breaking out of the war.

The Queen would wish copies of the enclosed papers to be sent for her use as soon as convenient.

[Footnote 27: In this despatch Lord Clarendon, after referring
to the interpretation which Count Nesselrode had put upon the
Vienna Note, and the Russian rejection of it as amended by
the Porte, told Lord Westmorland that it would be useless and
dishonourable to recommend it in its unaltered form, that the
Czar was contending for privileges for Christian subjects
of the Porte not hitherto enjoyed by them, and that a war
embarked upon in such a cause would be without parallel in
history.]

[Footnote 28: Authority had been given to Lord Stratford to
employ the British Fleet in the manner he might deem most fit
for defending Turkish territory from aggression, and he was
instructed that if the Russian Fleet left Sebastopol, the
British Fleet was to pass through the Bosphorus.]

[Pageheading: RESENTMENT OF THE CZAR]

[Pageheading: LORD JOHN AND THE PREMIERSHIP]

_Memorandum by the Prince Albert._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _16th October 1853._

We saw Lord Aberdeen yesterday. He went with us through the whole of the proceedings of the last six weeks with respect to the Eastern Question. Regretted Count Nesselrode's Note,[29] which Baron Brunnow owned nobody would regret more than the Count himself, acknowledged the weakness of Austria, felt sure of Lord Stratford's insincerity towards him and the Government,... as he had to Lord Aberdeen's certain knowledge called "the conduct of the Government infamous" and declared "he would let the world know that his name was Canning." He acknowledged the disadvantage of the course adopted by the Cabinet, which left the Turks at liberty to do as they pleased; he had to concede this to the Cabinet, which would otherwise have been broken up by Lord John and Lord Palmerston. Had he known what the Queen's opinion was, he might have been more firm, feeling himself supported by the Crown, but he had imagined from her letters that there was more animosity against Russia and leaning to war in her mind.

[Footnote 29: In this despatch to Baron Meyendorff, the
Austrian Foreign Minister, the Count had disclosed the fact
that the Russian interpretation of the Vienna Note differed
from that of the other Powers.]

Yet, under all the adverse circumstances Lord Aberdeen saw still reason for hope that a peaceable settlement could be obtained. The French were ready to do anything we pleased, go to war, remain at peace, etc., etc.; in fact, Louis Napoleon had experienced the great advantage for his position of the Alliance with England.... Lord Stratford was thoroughly frightened, and had made a proposal himself, which accordingly he would support _con amore_. The Emperor of Russia had failed in his attempt to form a Northern League against the Western Powers.... The Emperor complained bitterly of the conduct of the Powers, who had disgraced him before the world by making him accept a Note, and sanctioning its alteration by Turkey; "now they should do what they pleased and settle matters with Turkey first, and bring him only what was settled and fixed, he was wearied of the whole business, and anxious to get rid of it for ever."

What Lord Aberdeen now proposed was to follow the Emperor's advice and agree with Turkey upon a Note, leaving out all that she had objected to in the Vienna Note as Lord Stratford recommended, and taking as much as possible Redschid Pasha's own words to found the proposal of it upon the declaration made by the Emperor at Olmuetz to the Powers, that he sought for _no new_ right, privilege, or advantage, but solely for the confirmation of the legal _status quo_, but accompanying this with a declaration, that if Turkey created needless difficulties and tried to evade a peaceful settlement the Powers would withdraw their support and leave her to fight her own battle. We went over the Documents which are not yet settled, even between Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon, and will require the greatest caution in their wording. It is evident that the Turks have every inducement not to let this opportunity slip in going to war with Russia, as they will probably never find so advantageous a one again, as the whole of Christendom has declared them in the right, and they would fight with England and France actively on their side!

At home, Lord Aberdeen said matters do not stand much better. Lord John has convinced himself that, under present circumstances it would not do for him to ask Lord Aberdeen to retire from the Prime Ministership and let him step in in his place; perhaps he has found out also that the Peelites will not serve under him; his own Whig colleagues would very much regret if not object to such a change, and that Lord Palmerston could not well submit to the arrangement. So he told Lord Aberdeen that he had given up that idea; it was clear, however, that he was now looking for an opportunity to break up the Government on some popular ground, which it was impossible to hope that he should not find. He now had asked for the immediate summoning of Parliament, called for by the state of the Oriental Question. This would create the greatest alarm in the country, and embarrassment to the Government, and was therefore resisted. Lord Aberdeen told Lord John quite plainly he knew what the proposal meant--he meant to break up the Government. "I hope not," was Lord John's laughing reply.

The Queen taxed Lord Aberdeen with imprudence in talking to Lord John of his own readiness to leave office, which he acknowledged, but called _very natural_ in a man of seventy. Lord John was dissatisfied with his position;... upon Lord Aberdeen telling him that he had the most powerful and honourable position of any man in England as leader of the House of Commons, he answered, "Oh, _there_ I am quite happy!"

I asked how under such circumstances that all-important measure of Parliamentary Reform, upon which the future stability and well-being of the Country so much depended, was to be matured and brought forward? Lord Aberdeen replied that Lord John had it all ready and prepared in his pocket, and told Lord Aberdeen so, adding, however, that under present circumstances there was no use in bringing it forward, to which Lord Aberdeen added: "You mean unless you sit in the chair which I now occupy?" Lord John laughed.

We discussed the probable consequences of Lord John's retirement. Lord Aberdeen thought that Lord Palmerston, Lord Lansdowne, and even Lord Clarendon would secede with him, but this by no means implied that the whole party would; Lord Palmerston would not coalesce with Lord John, but try for the lead himself; Lord Clarendon quite agreed with Lord Aberdeen, and had been very angry with Lord John, but was personally under great obligations to him, and Sir James Graham had (as he said) been very much struck with the change of tone in Lord Clarendon at the last meeting of the Cabinet. Most of the Liberals seemed very much pleased with their situation. Sir James Graham had, of his own accord, told Lord Aberdeen that, in the event of Lord John's secession, he himself could not well sit in the House of Commons under so much younger a man as Mr Gladstone as Leader. He knew that there would be objections to his assuming the lead himself, but he would be quite ready to go to the House of Lords to support Lord Aberdeen.

ALBERT.

+++++++++++++

[Pageheading: THE CZAR'S LETTER]

_The Emperor of Russia to Queen Victoria._[30]

18
TSARSKO, _ce_ -- _Octobre_ 1853.
30

MADAME,--Votre Majeste connait, je l'espere, les sentiments d'affection sincere qui m'attachent a Sa personne, depuis que j'ai eu l'honneur de L'approcher. Il m'a semble qu'Elle daignait aussi m'accorder quelque bienveillance. A la veille d'evenements, peut-etre fort graves, qu'Elle daigne donc excuser si je m'adresse droit a Elle, pour essayer de prevenir des calamites, que nos deux pays ont un egal interet a eviter. J'ose le faire avec d'autant plus de confiance, que longtemps encore avant que les affaires d'Orient eussent pris la facheuse tournure qu'elles ont acquise depuis, je m'etais adresse directement a votre Majeste, par l'entremise de Sir Hamilton Seymour, pour appeler votre attention, Madame, sur des eventualites, alors encore incertaines, mais deja fort probables a mes yeux, et que je desirais eclaircir, _avant tout_, avec le Cabinet Anglais, pour ecarter autant qu'il m'etait possible, toute divergence d'opinion entre nous. La correspondance d'alors, qu'Elle daigne de la faire relire atteignit son but, car elle mettait le Gouvernement Anglais au fait de mes plus intimes pensees sur ces graves eventualites, tandis que, je devais au moins le penser ainsi, j'obtiens en reponse un egal expose des vues du Gouvernement de votre Majeste.

Surs ainsi de ce que nous desirions de part et d'autre, par quelle fatalite devons-nous donc, Madame, en venir a une mesintelligence aussi prononcee, sur des objets qui paraissaient convenus d'avance, _ou ma parole est engagee vis-a-vis de votre Majeste_, comme je crois _celle du Gouvernement Anglais engagee de meme vis-a-vis de moi_.

C'est a la justice, au c[oe]ur de votre Majeste que j'en appelle, c'est a Sa bonne foi et a Sa sagesse que je m'en mets qu'Elle daigne de decider entre nous.

Devons nous rester, comme je le souhaite ardemment, dans une bonne intelligence egalement profitable a nos deux Etats, ou juge-t-Elle, que le pavillon Anglais doive flotter pres du croissant, pour combattre la croix de Saint Andre!!!

Telle que soit la determination de votre Majeste, qu'Elle veuille etre persuadee de l'inalterable et sincere attachement avec lesquels je ne cesserais d'etre, de votre Majeste, le tout devoue frere et ami,

NICOLAS.

Je prie votre Majeste de vouloir bien faire mes amities a Monseigneur le Prince Albert.

[Footnote 30: Greville calls the writing of this letter an
unusual step; but in sending it to Lord Aberdeen and Lord
Clarendon, the Queen observed that its despatch was an
important and advantageous fact, as it both committed the Czar
personally, and enabled her to state certain truths to him,
as well as to explain privately the views which guided her own
and her Ministers' conduct.]

[Pageheading: LORD STRATFORD'S PROPOSAL]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Aberdeen._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _5th November 1853._

Although the Queen will have the pleasure of seeing Lord Aberdeen this evening, she wishes to make some observations on the subject of Lord Stratford's last private letters communicated to her yesterday by Lord Clarendon.[31] They exhibit clearly on his part a _desire_ for war, and to drag us into it. When he speaks of the sword which will not only have to be drawn, but the scabbard thrown away, and says, the war to be successful must be a "_very comprehensive one_" on the part of England and France, the intention is unmistakable, and it becomes a serious question whether we are justified in allowing Lord Stratford any longer to remain in a situation which gives him the means of frustrating all our efforts for peace. The question becomes still graver when it is considered that General Baraguay d'Hilliers seems from Lord Cowley's account of his conversation with him equally anxious for extreme measures.

The Queen must express her surprise that Lord Stratford should have coolly sent on so preposterous a proposal as Redschid Pasha's note asking for a Treaty of Alliance, the amalgamation of our Fleets with the Turkish one, and the sending of our surplus ships to the "_White_" Sea (!) without any hesitation or remark on his part. As the note ends, however, by saying that the Porte desires _que les points ci-dessus emenes (sic) soient apprecies par les Cours d'Angleterre et de France, et que ces Cours veuillent bien declarer leur intention d'agir en consequence_, this appears to the Queen to afford an admirable opportunity for stating plainly and strongly to the Turkish Government that we have _no intention_ of being used by them for their own purposes. This time such a declaration might be _handed in_ to the Turkish Government, so that there can be no mistake about the matter for the future.

The Queen encloses the letter and note, and wishes Lord Aberdeen to show her letter to Lord Clarendon.

[Footnote 31: Lord Stratford had written that Redschid Pasha
was unable to make head against his warlike colleagues, and
that unless some proposal of a decidedly satisfactory kind
should come from Vienna very soon, there would be no chance
of avoiding hostilities. Lord Stratford added that he had
obtained a promise that no act of hostility should take place
on the Turkish side before the expiration of fifteen days, and
concluded with the words: "I fear that war is the decree of
Fate, and our wisest part will be to do what we can to bring
it to a thoroughly good conclusion."]

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN TO THE CZAR]

_Queen Victoria to the Emperor of Russia._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _ce 14 Novembre 1853._

SIRE ET TRES CHER FRERE,--C'est avec une profonde et sincere satisfaction que je viens de recevoir la lettre que V.M.I. a bien voulu m'ecrire le 18/30 Octobre. Je suis vivement touchee des sentiments affectueux que vous m'y temoignez. V.M. me connait assez pour savoir combien ils sont reciproques.

Je vous remercierai egalement, Sire, de la franchise avec laquelle vous me parlez des complications actuelles; je ne saurais mieux repondre aux loyales intentions de V.M. qu'en lui exprimant a mon tour, et avec toute droiture, mes opinions a ce sujet, car c'est la, j'en suis sure, le meilleur moyen de conserver utilement une amitie bien veritable.

J'ai, mon cher Frere, conformement a votre desir, relu les communications confidentielles que vous avez bien voulu me faire, ce printemps, par l'intermediaire du bon Sir Hamilton Seymour, et les reponses que mon Gouvernement a recu l'ordre d'adresser a V.M.

Bien qu'une difference d'opinion tres notable devint alors evidente entre V.M. et moi relativement a la maniere d'envisager l'etat de la Turquie et l'appreciation de sa vitalite, le Memorandum de V.M. en date du 3/15 Avril vint neanmoins dissiper de la maniere la plus heureuse ces facheuses apprehensions; car il m'annoncait que, si nous n'etions pas d'accord sur _l'etat de sante_ de l'Empire Ottoman, nous l'etions cependant sur la necessite, pour le laisser vivre, de ne point lui faire des demandes humiliantes, pourvu que tout le monde en agit de meme, et que personne n'abusat de sa faiblesse pour obtenir des avantages exclusifs. V.M. dans ce but, daigna meme se declarer prete "a travailler de concert avec l'Angleterre a l'[oe]uvre commune de prolonger l'existence de l'Empire Turque, en evitant toute cause d'alarme au sujet de sa dissolution."

J'avais de plus la conviction qu'il n'existait et ne pouvait exister au fond aucune divergence d'opinion entre nous au sujet des reclamations relatives aux Lieux-Saints, reclamations qui, j'avais droit de le croire, constituaient le seul grief de la Russie contre la Porte.

Je mets, Sire, la confiance la plus entiere dans la parole que V.M. a bien voulu me donner alors, et, que les assurances subsequentes, dues a votre amitie, sont venues confirmer, en me donnant la connaissance de Vos intentions. Personne n'apprecie plus que moi la haute loyaute de V.M., et je voudrais que les convictions que j'ai a cet egard pussent seules resoudre toutes les difficultes. Mais quelle que soit la purete des motifs qui dirigent les actions du Souverain meme le plus eleve par le caractere, V.M. sait que ses qualites personnelles ne sont point suffisantes dans des transactions internationales par lesquelles un Etat se lie envers un autre en de solennels engagements; et les veritables intentions de V.M. ont ete a coup sur meconnues et mal interpretees, a cause de la forme donnee au reclamations adressees a la Porte.

Ayant a c[oe]ur, Sire, d'examiner ce qui avait pu produire ce facheux malentendu, mon attention a ete naturellement attiree par l'article 7 du Traite de Kainardji; et je dois dire a V.M. qu'apres avoir consulte, sur le sens qui pouvait avoir ete attache a cet article, les personnes les plus competentes de ce pays-ci; apres l'avoir relu ensuite moi-meme, avec le plus sincere desir d'impartialite, je suis arrivee a la conviction que cet article n'etait point susceptible de l'extension qu'on y a voulu donner. Tous les amis de V.M. ont, comme moi, la certitude que vous n'auriez point abuse du pouvoir, que vous eut ainsi ete accorde; mais une demande de ce genre, pouvait a peine etre acceptee par un Souverain qui tient a son independance.

Je ne cacherai pas davantage a V.M. l'impression douloureuse qu'a produit sur moi l'occupation des Principautes. Cette occupation a cause, depuis les quatres derniers mois, une perturbation generale en Europe, et pourrait amener des evenements ulterieurs que je deplorerais d'un commun accord avec V.M. Mais, comme les intentions de V.M. envers la Porte sont, je le sais, amicales et desinteressees, j'ai toute confiance que vous trouverez le moyen de les exprimer et mettre a execution de maniere a detourner de plus graves dangers, que tous mes efforts, je vous assure, tendront sans cesse a empecher. L'attention impartiale avec laquelle j'ai suivi les causes qui ont fait echouer jusqu'a present toutes les tentatives de conciliation, me donne la ferme conviction qu'il n'existe pas d'obstacle reel qui ne puisse etre ecarte ou promptement surmonte avec l'assistance de V.M.

Je n'abandonne point l'espoir de cet heureux resultat, meme apres les tristes conflits qui ont fait couler le sang dans les Principautes; car j'ai la foi en Dieu que lorsque de toute part les intentions sont droites et lorsque les interets bien entendus sont communs, le Tout-Puissant ne permettra pas que l'Europe entiere qui contient deja tant d'elements inflammables, soit exposee a une conflagration generale.

Que Dieu veille sur les jours de V.M.; et croyez, Sire, a l'attachement sincere avec lequel je suis, Sire et cher Frere, de votre Majeste Imperiale, la bien bonne S[oe]ur et Amie,

VICTORIA R.

Albert est tres sensible au souvenir de V.M. et me prie de le mettre a vos pieds.

[Pageheading: LORD ABERDEEN'S SCRUPLES]

_The Earl of Aberdeen to Queen Victoria._

LONDON, _26th November 1853._

Lord Aberdeen presents his humble duty to your Majesty. The Cabinet met to-day for the consideration of the overtures made by the French Government for the settlement of the Eastern Question.[32] These proposals were in substance adopted; although a considerable change was made in their form, and in some of their details. The step now taken is evidently wise; but Lord Aberdeen can scarcely venture to hope that it will be attended with success. Pacific language is accompanied with insulting and hostile acts; and it remains to be seen what effect will be produced on the Emperor of Russia by the entrance of English and French ships of war into the Black Sea, under the pretext of bringing off Consuls from Varna, and of looking after the grain-ships at the Sulina mouth of the Danube. This information has hitherto been only communicated by telegraph; but it is calculated to lead to serious consequences, of which Lord Stratford must be perfectly well aware.

[Footnote 32: The Emperor had made certain suggestions to Lord
Cowley, which the British Government were willing to adopt;
but the anti-Russian feeling was increasing daily in the
nation, and, as will be seen from the Queen's letter of the
27th of November, Lord Stratford seemed resolved on war.]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Aberdeen._

OSBORNE, _27th November 1853._

The Queen has received Lord Aberdeen's letter of yesterday. She is sorry to find that after all a considerable change was made in the form of the French proposal. She is not aware at present of what that change consists in and is therefore unable to form an opinion as to the effects of its introduction, but she quite concurs in Lord Aberdeen's apprehensions with regard to the effect of Lord Stratford's orders to the Fleet. The perusal of Lord Stratford's Despatches of the 5th inst. has given the Queen the strongest impression that, whilst guarding himself against the possibility of being called to account for acting in opposition to his instructions, he is pushing us deeper and deeper into the War policy which we wish to escape. Wherefore should three poor Turkish steamers go to the Crimea, but to beard the Russian Fleet and tempt it to come out of Sebastopol, which would thus constitute the much desired contingency for our combined Fleets to attack it, and so engage us irretrievably!

The Queen must seriously call upon Lord Aberdeen and the Cabinet to consider whether they are justified in allowing such a state of things to continue!

[Pageheading: THE CZAR TO THE QUEEN]

_The Emperor of Russia to Queen Victoria._

2
S. PETERSBOURG, _le -- Decembre 1853._
14

MADAME,--Je remercie votre Majeste d'avoir eu la bonte de repondre aussi amicalement que franchement a la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de lui ecrire. Je la remercie egalement de la foi qu'elle accorde a ma parole,--je crois le meriter, je l'avoue,--28 annees d'une vie politique, souvent fort penible, ne peuvent donner le droit a personne d'en douter.

Je me permets aussi, contrairement a l'avis de votre Majeste, de penser, qu'en affaires publiques et en relations de pays a pays, rien ne peut etre _plus sacre_ et ne l'est en effet a mes yeux que la parole souveraine, car elle decide en derniere instance de la paix ou de la guerre. Je ne fatiguerais certes pas l'attention de votre Majeste par un examen detaille du sens qu'elle donne a l'article 7 du Traite de Kainardji; j'assurerais seulement, Madame, que depuis 80 ans la Russie et la Porte l'ont compris ainsi que nous le faisons encore. Ce sens-la n'a ete interrompu qu'en derniers temps, a la suite d'instigations que votre Majeste connait aussi bien que moi. Le retablir dans son reception primitive et la justifier par un engagement plus solennel, tel est le but de mes efforts, tel il sera, Madame, quand meme le sang devrait couler encore contre mon v[oe]u le plus ardent; parce que c'est une question vitale pour la Russie, et mes efforts ne lui sont impossibles pour y satisfaire.

Si j'ai du occuper les Principautes, ce que je regrette autant que votre Majeste, c'est encore Madame, parce que les libertes dont ces provinces jouissent, leurs ont ete acquises _au prix du sang Russe, et par moi-meme Madame les annees_ 1828 _et_ 29. Il ne s'agit donc pas de _conquetes_, mais a la veille d'un conflit que l'on rendait de plus en plus probable, il eut ete indigne de moi de les livrer surement a la main des ennemis du Christianisme, dont les persecutions ne sont un secret que pour ceux qui veulent l'ignorer. J'esperais avoir repondu ainsi aux doutes et aux regrets de votre Majeste _avec la plus entiere franchise_. Elle veut bien me dire qu'Elle ne doute pas qu'avec mon aide le retablissement de la paix ne soit encore possible, malgre le sang repandu; j'y reponds de grand c[oe]ur, _Oui_, Madame, si les organes des volontes de votre Majeste _executent fidelement ses ordres et ses intentions bienveillantes. Les miennes n'out pas varie des le debut de cette triste episode. Reculer devant le danger, comme vouloir maintenant autre chose que je n'ai voulu en violant ma parole, serait au-dessous de moi_, et le noble c[oe]ur de votre Majeste doit le comprendre.

J'ajouterais encore que son c[oe]ur saignera en apprenant les horreurs qui se commettent deja par les hordes sauvages, pres desquels flotte le pavillon Anglais!!!

Je la remercie cordialement des v[oe]ux qu'Elle veut bien faire pour moi; tant que ma vie se prolongera ils seront reciproques de ma part. Je suis heureux de le Lui dire, en l'assurant du sincere attachement avec lequel je suis, Madame, de votre Majeste, le tout devoue Frere and Ami,

NICOLAS.

Je me rappelle encore une fois au bon souvenir de Son Altesse Royale le Prince Albert et le remercie egalement de ses paroles obligeantes.

[Pageheading: LORD PALMERSTON AND REFORM]

_The Earl of Aberdeen to Queen Victoria._

LONDON, _6th December 1853._

... As Lord John Russell will have the honour of seeing your Majesty to-morrow, he will be able to explain to your Majesty the present state of the discussions on Reform, and the progress of the Measure.[33] Lord Aberdeen feels it to be his duty to inform your Majesty that on Saturday evening he received a visit from Lord Palmerston, who announced his decided objection to the greater part of the proposed plan.[34] He did this in such positive terms that Lord Aberdeen should imagine he had made up his mind not to give the Measure his support; but Lord John entertains considerable doubt that such is the case.

Lord Aberdeen thinks it by no means improbable that Lord Palmerston may also desire to separate himself from the Government, in consequence of their pacific policy, and in order to take the lead of the War Party and the Anti-Reformers in the House of Commons, who are essentially the same. Such a combination would undoubtedly be formidable; but Lord Aberdeen trusts that it would not prove dangerous. At all events, it would tend greatly to the improvement of Lord John's Foreign Policy.

[Footnote 33: On the 19th of November Lord John had written to
the Queen outlining the Reform proposals of the Committee of
the Cabinet. The Queen subsequently wrote to make additional
suggestions, _e.g._, for finding a means of bringing into the
House official persons or men without local connections, and
for dealing with Ministerial re-elections.]

[Footnote 34: Lord Palmerston wrote to Lord Lansdowne, giving
an account of the affair:--

"CARLTON GARDENS, _8th December 1853._

"MY DEAR LANSDOWNE,--I have had two conversations with
Aberdeen on the subject of John Russell's proposed Reform
Bill, and I have said that there are three points in it to
which I cannot agree.

"These points are--the extent of disfranchisement, the
extent of enfranchisement, and the addition of the Municipal
Franchise in Boroughs to the L10 Householder Franchise....

"We should by such an arrangement increase the number of
bribeable Electors, and overpower intelligence and property by
ignorance and poverty.

"I have told Aberdeen that I am persuaded that the Measure as
proposed by John Russell and Graham will not pass through the
two Houses of Parliament without material modifications, and
that I do not choose to be a party to a contest between the
two Houses or to an Appeal to the Country for a Measure of
which I decidedly disapprove; and that I cannot enter into a
career which would lead me to such a position, that, in
short, I do not choose to be dragged through the dirt by John
Russell. I reminded Aberdeen that on accepting his offer of
Office, I had expressed apprehension both to him and to you,
that I might find myself differing from my Colleagues on the
question of Parliamentary Reform.

"I have thought a good deal on this matter. I should be very
sorry to give up my present Office at this moment: I have
taken a great interest in it, and I have matters in hand which
I should much wish to bring to a conclusion. Moreover, I
think that the presence in the Cabinet of a person holding the
opinions which I entertain as to the principles on which our
Foreign Affairs ought to be conducted, is useful in modifying
the contrary system of Policy, which, as I think, injuriously
to the interests and dignity of the Country, there is a
disposition in other quarters to pursue; but notwithstanding
all this. I cannot consent to stand forward as one of the
Authors and Supporters of John Russell's sweeping alterations.
Yours sincerely,

PALMERSTON."]

[Pageheading: LORD PALMERSTON'S POSITION]

_The Prince Albert to the Earl of Aberdeen._

OSBORNE, _9th December 1853._

MY DEAR LORD ABERDEEN,--The Queen has consulted with Lord John Russell upon the Reform plan, and on the question of Lord Palmerston's position with regard to it; and he will doubtless give you an account of what passed. She wishes me, however, to tell you likewise what strikes her with respect to Lord Palmerston. It appears to the Queen clear that the Reform Bill will have no chance of success unless prepared and introduced in Parliament by a _united_ Cabinet; that, if Lord Palmerston has made up his mind to oppose it and to leave the Government, there will be no use in trying to keep him in it, and that there will be danger in allowing him to attend the discussions of the Cabinet, preparing all the time his line of attack; that if a successor to him would after all have to be found at the Home Office, it will be unfair not to give that important member of the Government full opportunity to take his share in the preparation and deliberation on the measure to which his consent would be asked. Under these circumstances it becomes of the highest importance to ascertain--

1. What the amount of objection is that Lord Palmerston entertains to the Measure;

2. What the object of the declaration was, which he seems to have made to you.

This should be obtained _in writing_, so as to make all future misrepresentation impossible, and on this alone a decision can well be taken, and, in the Queen's opinion, even the Cabinet could alone deliberate.

Should Lord Palmerston have stated his objections with the view of having the Measure modified it will be right to consider how far that can safely be done, and for the Queen, also, to balance the probable value of the modification with the risk of allowing Lord Palmerston to put himself at the head of the Opposition Party, entailing as it does the possibility of his forcing himself back upon her as leader of that Party.

Should he on the other hand consider his declaration as a "notice to quit," the ground upon which he does so should be clearly put on record, and no attempt should be made to damage the character of the Measure in the vain hope of propitiating him. Ever yours truly,

ALBERT.

[Pageheading: LORD PALMERSTON RESIGNS]

_Memorandum by the Prince Albert._

OSBORNE, _16th December 1853._

Lord Aberdeen arrived yesterday and returned to-day to meet the Cabinet to-morrow. Lord Palmerston has sent in his resignation in a short note to Lord Aberdeen, a further correspondence with Lord John and Lord Lansdowne, Lord Aberdeen put into my hands, and I have copied the two most important letters which follow here.

Lord John is reported as very angry, calling Lord Palmerston's conduct "treacherous," a term Lord Aberdeen hardly understands, as against him he has been perfectly consistent with regard to the Reform Measure, from the beginning, and had frequently denied the necessity of Reform.... Lord Aberdeen had advised Lord John to show boldness and energy, and to undertake the Home Office at once himself; this would have a great effect under the difficulties of the circumstances, would show that he was in earnest and determined to carry his Reform Measure. Lord John seemed hit by the idea, but asked for time to consider; after seeing _Lady_ John, however, he declined.

Lord Aberdeen's fears are still mainly as to the Eastern Question, Lord John pressing for war measures. Lord Aberdeen had followed my advice, and had a long explanation on the subject, in which they both agreed that their policy should be one of Peace, and he thought matters settled when Lord John now asks for contingent engagements to make war on Russia if her forces cross the Danube (which Lord Aberdeen thinks quite uncalled for), and to convoy the Turkish expeditions in the Black Sea, even if directed against Russian territory, etc., etc. The Cabinet is certain not to agree to either of these propositions.

When Lord Aberdeen announced the intended rupture with Lord Palmerston to Lord John, he drily said: "Well, it would be very awkward for you if Palmerston quarrels one day with you about Reform, and I the next about Turkey!"

There can be no doubt that Lord Palmerston will at once try to put himself at the head of the late Protectionist party, and, with the present indifference of the Country upon Reform, the fate of the Bill is by no means certain. On the question of Peace or War, Lord Aberdeen is quite certain that the House of Commons will adopt no war resolutions.

Much will depend, however, on the line taken by Lord Lansdowne, who has great influence in the House of Lords, and whose secession would spread great alarm over the Country as to the real tendency of the Measure (which the Duke of Newcastle describes as in fact a great increase of power to the land[35]). We agree that the Queen should write to him to prevent any hasty step.

The Queen sanctioned the offer of the Home Office to Sir George Grey, and of a seat in the Cabinet to Mr Cardwell (the President of the Board of Trade).

ALBERT.

[Footnote 35: _I.e._, the landed interest.]

[Pageheading: LORD LANSDOWNE AND REFORM]

_Queen Victoria to the Marquis of Lansdowne._

OSBORNE, _16th December 1853._

The Queen has been made very anxious by the Resignation of Lord Palmerston, but still more so by hearing that Lord Lansdowne has not been able to reconcile himself to the Measure of Reform as now proposed in the Cabinet, which has caused Lord Palmerston's withdrawal. Lord Lansdowne is aware of the paramount importance which the Queen attaches to a safe settlement of that question, and to the maintenance of her present Government; and she would press upon Lord Lansdowne not to commit himself to a final determination before she shall have an opportunity of seeing him. The Queen will go to Windsor on Thursday, and hold a Council on Friday, at which it may perhaps be convenient to Lord Lansdowne to attend, and it will give the Queen the greatest pleasure to find that Lord John Russell has succeeded in removing Lord Lansdowne's objections.

[Pageheading: LORD STRATFORD'S DESPATCH]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

OSBORNE, _17th December 1853._

The Queen returns the enclosed Draft and Despatch to Lord Clarendon.

She has never been so much perplexed respecting any decision she has had to make, as in the present instance. She has read Lord Stratford's Despatch (358) over several times, and she is struck, every time more, with the consummate ability with which it is written and argued; but also with the difficulty in which it places the person reading it to extract distinctly what the Porte will be prepared to concede.

The concluding passage of the Draft involves the most important consequences. As the Queen understands it, it promises war with Russia in a given contingency, but the contingency is: Russia rejecting terms which are "in their spirit and character such as Your Excellency sets forth in your Despatch." The Queen finds it impossible to make such tremendous consequences dependent upon such vague expressions. The more so, as "the spirit and character" alluded to, appears to her to be, as if purposely, obscure.

When Lord Stratford says, that the Turks would be satisfied "with a renewal in clear and comprehensive terms of the formal Declarations and Treaties already existing in favour of the Porte"--the Queen cannot understand what is meant--as all the former Treaties between Russia and Turkey have certainly not been in favour of the Porte. Nor is it clear to the Queen whether "the clear and unquestionable deliverance from Russian interference applied to spiritual matters" is compatible with the former treaties.

Whilst the Queen, therefore, perfectly agrees in the principle that, should Russia "for its own unjustifiable objects, show herself regardless of the best interests of Europe" by rejecting every fair term, the time will have arrived "for adopting measures of more active coercion against her"--she cannot sanction such a Declaration except on terms which are so clear in themselves as to exclude all misinterpretation.

[Pageheading: SINOPE]

_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._

(Undated.)

The Queen has received Lord Clarendon's letter of the 19th, and enclosures. She approves the Draft to Vienna, and asks to have a copy of it, together with the Despatch from Lord Westmorland to which it refers.

She also approves of the Draft to Lord Cowley, with certain exceptions, viz., on the second page our accordance with the views of the French Government "upon the utterly unjustifiable course that Russia has pursued," etc., is stated. If, as the Queen must read it, this refers to the affair at Sinope,[36] it is a dangerous assertion, as we have yet no authentic account of the circumstances of the case, which would make it possible to judge what degree of justification there might have been. The sentence should, at any rate, be qualified by some expression such as "as far as we know," or "should present accounts prove correct," etc.

The word "utterly" might under any circumstances be left out, as a state of War is in itself a justification of a battle.

On page four the words "by sea" will have to be added to make the statement precise and correct.

The concluding sentence, the Queen must consider as tantamount to a declaration of war, which, under the guarded conditions however attached to it, she feels she cannot refuse to sanction. It would, in the Queen's opinion, be necessary, however, distinctly and fully to acquaint the Russian Government with the step now agreed upon.

Lord Palmerston's mode of proceeding always had that advantage, that it threatened steps which it was hoped would not become necessary, whilst those hitherto taken, started on the principle of not needlessly offending Russia by threats, obliging us at the same time to take the very steps which we refused to threaten.

The Queen has to make one more and a most _serious_ observation. The Fleet has orders now to prevent a recurrence of such disasters as that of Sinope. This cannot mean that it should protect the Turkish Fleet in acts of aggression upon the Russian territory, such as an attack on Sebastopol, of which the papers speak. This point will have to be made quite clear, both to Lord Stratford and the Turks.

The Queen would also wish to have copies of the Draft, when corrected, of Lord Cowley's Despatch.

[Footnote 36: On the 30th of November the Russian Fleet from
Sevastopol attacked the Turkish squadron in the harbour of
Sinope, a naval station in the Black Sea, and destroyed it.
The feeling in the country against Russia was greatly inflamed
by the incident, which was referred to as the "massacre of
Sinope."]

[Pageheading: PUBLIC FEELING]

_Memorandum by the Prince Albert._

WINDSOR CASTLE, _25th December 1853._

Lord Aberdeen had an Audience of the Queen yesterday afternoon. He reported that some of his colleagues, Sir C. Wood, the Duke of Newcastle, and Mr Gladstone, had been very anxious that Lord Palmerston should be readmitted into the Cabinet; they had had interviews with him in which he had expressed his hope to be allowed to reconsider his step. Lady Palmerston had been most urgent upon this point with her husband. All the people best conversant with the House of Commons stated that the Government had no chance of going on with Lord Palmerston in opposition, and with the present temper of the public, which was quite mad about the Oriental Question and the disaster at Sinope. Even Sir W. Molesworth shared this opinion.

Lord Palmerston had written a letter to Lord Aberdeen, in which he begs to have his resignation considered as not having taken place, as it arose entirely from a misapprehension on his part, his having believed that none of the details of the Reform Measure were yet open for consideration, he had quite agreed in the principle of the Measure! Lord Aberdeen saw Lord John and Sir J. Graham, who convinced themselves that under the circumstances nothing else remained to be done. Lord Aberdeen having asked Lord John whether he should tell the Queen that it was a political _necessity_, he answered: "Yes, owing to the shabbiness of your colleagues," to which Lord Aberdeen rejoined: "Not shabbiness; _cowardice_ is the word."

Lord Aberdeen owns that the step must damage the Government, although it ought to damage Lord Palmerston still more. Lord John's expression was: "Yes, it would ruin anybody but Palmerston."

Lord Aberdeen thinks, however, that he can make no further difficulties about Reform, and he, Lord John, and Graham were determined to make no material alterations in the Bill. Graham is suspicious lest the wish to get Palmerston in again, on the part of a section of the Cabinet, was an intrigue to get the Measure emasculated. Lord Aberdeen does not believe this....

Lord Aberdeen describes Lord John's feeling as very good and cordial towards him. He, Lord John, had even made him a long speech to show his gratitude for Lord Aberdeen's kindness to him.

ALBERT.

[Pageheading: PALMERSTON RESUMES OFFICE]

_The Earl of Aberdeen to Queen Victoria._

LONDON, _26th December 1853._

Lord Aberdeen, with his most humble duty to your Majesty, has the honour of enclosing copies of Lord Palmerston's letter to him,[37] and of his answer. Lord Aberdeen was not without some apprehension of receiving a rejoinder; but instead of which, a note arrived this morning, merely asking if a Cabinet was likely to be summoned in the course of the week, as he was going into the country; in fact, a note just as if nothing whatever has taken place!

[Footnote 37: Lord Palmerston wrote: "I find ... that I was
mistaken in inferring from your letter that the details of
the intended Reform Bill had been finally settled by the
Government, and that no objection to any part of those details
would be listened to." He went on to say that, under the
circumstances, he could not decline to comply with the wish
of many members of the Government that he should withdraw his
resignation.]

_Printed by Hazell, Watson & Viney, Ld. London and Aylesbury. Paper supplied by John Dickinson & Co., Ld., London._

* * * *

Transcriber's Note:

[ae] and [oe] are used for the diphthongs/ligatures in (mostly) French words. (e.g. c[oe]ur, heart; s[oe]ur, sister; ch[oe]ur; choir).

The original pageheadings have been retained, and moved to appropriate positions, at the beginning of letters and text to which they refer, so as not to interrupt the flow of the text. Thus, a long letter may be prefaced by two, or even three pageheadings. Likewise, footnotes have been moved to the end of the appropriate letter, or the appropriate paragraph, in the case of longer pieces of text.

Mr or Mr.

Most instances of this form of address, in the book, are 'Mr', without the period. There are a few spelt as 'Mr.', with the period. These have been left as they appeared in the original book.

Russian Dates.

The difference between the Russian Calendar and the Calendar used in Western Europe was 12 days...22nd March 1848, in Great Britain and Western Europe, was 3rd April in Russia; 8th April 1853, in Great Britain and Western Europe, was 20th April in Russia, etc.

ERRATA (and sic):

Obvious punctuation errors have been repaired.

Pages 124/5: 'Wellingon' corrected to 'Wellington' [Footnote 6: The Duke of Wellington wrote to Croker, 19th of December 1846...]

Page 146: '1843' corrected to '1848'. CLAREMONT, _11th January 1848._

Page 173: 'sacrified' corrected to 'sacrificed' ... interests (those of the smaller Sovereigns) are not sacrificed....

Page 186, Footnote 33: 'De Tallenay' corrected to 'de Tallenay'

Page 187: Innspruck (sic: alternative spelling)

Page 332: happness corrected to happiness.

Page 341: 'you' corrected to 'your' (Ever your devoted Niece....)

Page 388: 'Excehquer' corrected to 'Exchequer' (The Chancellor of the Excehquer)

Page 389: 'you' corrected to 'your' (ever your truly devoted Niece,)

Page 403: 'decidedy' corrected to 'decidedly' (and that they were decidedly acting together.)

Page 443: 'an at' corrected to at an (... should be at an end.)

Page 458: 'Queston' corrected to 'Question' (the Oriental Question.)

Page 471: 'opnion' corrected to 'opinion' (... shared this opinion.)