Chapter VI: Book 3: of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a (2)

VON STEENGRACHT: In the first years after 1933 he is said still to have been; but during the course of years he shut himself off more and more from expert objections and suggestions. From the time that I became State Secretary, I saw him only twice on official occasions. I can thus speak only on the success or lack of success of our work. In the course of my activities, covering almost 2 years, I can now recall almost no case in which he agreed to one of our suggestions. On the contrary, it was always to be feared that by some suggestion of a personal nature he would be led to take violent action in an opposite direction. The basic trait of his character was probably lack of confidence, and this bore unprecedented fruit. Thus, experts and decent people who tried to influence Hitler to their way of thinking were engaged, in my opinion, in an altogether vain task. On the other hand, irresponsible creatures who incited him to take violent measures, or who voiced their suspicions, unfortunately found him extremely accessible. These men were then termed strong, whereas the behavior of anyone who was even halfway normal was condemned as weak or defeatist; through a reasonable opinion voiced only once, the influence of that man could be forever destroyed.

DR. HORN: What conclusions did Hitler draw from contradictory viewpoints in respect to the contradicting persons?

VON STEENGRACHT: I cannot answer that question in general terms. I have already shown it in my previous answers. First of all the reaction depended very much, in my opinion, on the mood of the Dictator at the time. It was also a matter of importance as to who contradicted and how much strength or weakness he had already shown or seemed to have shown. But what the atmosphere was can perhaps be demonstrated by the following case, shortly after the death of President Roosevelt, as told by Ribbentrop’s liaison agent with Hitler, a man named Hewel. He said:

“Today I almost met my doom. Goebbels came from the Führer, and
reported on Germany’s prospects, as far as the Führer saw them
affected by Roosevelt’s death, and he drew up a very hopeful
picture of the future. I, Hewel, was of the opinion that such a
view was not justified and remarked as much cautiously to
Goebbels. Goebbels fell into a rage, called me a spirit who
demoralized everyone, who trampled on the happy moods and hopes
of every decent person. I was forced,” Hewel reports, “to make a
special trip to see Goebbels and to ask him to keep the matter
to himself. For if he had informed the Führer of my attitude,
Hitler would have merely pressed a button, and called
Rattenhuber, the Chief of his Security Service, and had me taken
away and shot.”

DR. HORN: How do you explain the fact that so many people remained in Hitler’s circle, although they could not agree with him on basic matters?

VON STEENGRACHT: It is true that many people remained in their positions although at heart they disapproved of Hitler’s methods of government and, indeed, were inimical to those methods. There are various reasons for this.

First, it must be said that the NSDAP had come into power according to the rules of parliamentary procedure as being the strongest Party in the Reichstag. The officials employed had no reason at all to retire from service on account of the change of government. In consequence of the change to dictatorial government and the completely different concept of the State which the change of government involved, the individual suddenly found that he was no longer allowed to take a position of his own concerning this regime. The notorious reign of terror began. Everywhere, in the ministries and chancelleries, in private dwellings, and in restaurants there hovered spies who, out of fanaticism or for pay, were willing to report everything they heard.

Nevertheless, many would deliberately have risked the gravest consequences, if their withdrawal could have in any way improved anything. But it became obvious that such persons merely sacrificed themselves and especially their families unavailingly, because cases of the kind were painstakingly withheld from publicity and therefore had no effect. Worst of all was the fact that the appointment vacated was filled by an especially radical man. Many people realized this and remained at their posts in order to prevent the development that I have just described. The great number of atrocities committed or ordered by Hitler or Himmler have led many foreigners to the conclusion that the German people as a whole shared the guilt for these crimes, or at least had knowledge of them. This is not the case. The majority of people even in high government positions did not learn details of these matters—or the extent to which they were carried on—until the war was over. Perhaps the key to this is found in the speech which Himmler delivered in Posen on 3 October 1943 to his Gruppenführer, and which I learned of for the first time here. This speech directed that his special assignments—that means the actions against the Jews and the concentration camps—were to be kept just as secret as had been the events of 30 June 1934, of which the German people have only now learned the authentic story.

Guilt for all these occurrences rests only on a relatively small group, to be appraised at a few thousand people. It was these who carried out this unparalleled terror against the German people. But those who thought differently and who remained are chiefly to be thanked for the fact that, for example, the Geneva Convention was not renounced, that tens or even hundreds of thousands of English or American airmen and prisoners were not shot, that the unfortunate prisoners, those seriously wounded, were returned during the war to their families in their home countries; Greece in her dire need received food; exchange was stabilized as far as possible, as in Belgium and France, and militarily pointless destruction ordered in foreign countries and in the home country could be in part prevented or at least lessened; indeed that the principles of human justice, in some places at least, remained alive. These circles were discouraged in their attitude earlier by the fact that no foreign power had used the conditions in Germany as a reason for breaking off diplomatic relations, but that almost all, until the outbreak of war negotiated with National Socialism, concluded treaties and even had their diplomatic representatives at the National Socialist Party Days at Nuremberg. It was particularly noted that National Socialist Germany, outwardly at any rate, received much more consideration, understanding, and respect from foreign countries than ever had the Weimar Republic despite all its fidelity to treaties or its integrity.

Then the war came, and with it special duties for civil servants, officers, and every individual German. Should, and if so when and how could these people who still felt themselves to be the servants of the nation, leave their posts under these circumstances? Would they, above all, by taking such a step be useful to their country and to humanity? Would they have frightened Hitler or even warned him?

DR. HORN: Did you make peace suggestions of a foreign political nature to Von Ribbentrop after the French campaign?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I had at that time, to be sure, no official position. But I nevertheless felt the need, and I believe it was a heartfelt wish of many, if not all, Germans, to see peaceful conditions again in the world as soon as possible. On the day of the capitulation of the King of the Belgians, I suggested:

Firstly, the creation of a United States of Europe on a democratic basis. This would have meant independence of Holland, Belgium, Poland, and so on.

Secondly, if this could not be brought about with Hitler, at any rate to have as few encroachments on the autonomy of the countries as possible.

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop speak to Hitler on this matter?

VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. But at that time Hitler considered such plans as premature.

DR. HORN: Did you speak to Von Ribbentrop again in the winter of 1942-43 on the same subject?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Ribbentrop at that time also worked out very concrete proposals. They provided for the sovereignty and independence of all conquered countries, including Poland, and in addition, a far-reaching economic collaboration.

DR. HORN: How did Hitler react then to these proposals?

VON STEENGRACHT: Hitler turned down these proposals giving as reason the fact that the time was not suitable, the military situation not favorable enough, that this would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.

DR. HORN: Now to another question. Before the outbreak of the Russian campaign, did Von Ribbentrop mention to Hitler Bismarck’s statement about the danger of preventive wars?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop told me several times that he was very concerned about the pact with Russia. In regard to preventive war, he had stated to Hitler: “The good God does not let anyone look at His cards.” I know too that Ribbentrop made efforts to bring our experts on Russia to Hitler in order to explain to him the situation there and to advise him against a war. Hitler did not permit these people to see him, so far as I know. Only Ambassador Count Schulenburg was granted a short audience. He, who considered such a war ill-advised and emphatically rejected the idea, could not, however, advance his views on Russia and the reasons against a war; for Hitler, having delivered a speech of his own on this subject, after about 20 minutes dismissed him abruptly without letting him speak a word.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the order of the Tribunal was that witnesses might refresh their memory by notes, but this witness appears to the Tribunal to have read practically every word he has said. That is not refreshing your memory with notes. That is making a speech which you have written out beforehand, and if that sort of thing goes on the Tribunal will have to consider whether it is necessary to alter its rule and adhere to the ordinary rule, which is that no witness is allowed to refer to any notes at all except those made at the time.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, to be sure, I discussed the questions with the witness; but his notes, if they have been made, were made by the witness independently and without my knowledge of the exact contents. I shall now ask the witness to answer my questions without making use of any means which I do not know. I do not—that I want to emphasize once again—know these answers.

Witness, is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop tried to use his influence with Hitler to stop the damaging tendencies against the Church and the Jews?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. I know that Ribbentrop spoke frequently with Hitler on this theme. I was absolutely in despair about the policy toward the Church and the Jews, and for this reason had occasion to speak to him about it often, as I have said. But he explained to me again and again when he returned from Hitler: “Hitler cannot be spoken to on this point. Hitler says that these problems have to be solved before he dies.”

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop and the Foreign Office have any knowledge of the military planning?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop frequently told me that he was completely in the dark in military affairs. So far as the Foreign Office was concerned, it had no ideas whatever of strategic planning.

DR. HORN: What were the relations between Ribbentrop, Himmler, Goebbels, and Bormann?

VON STEENGRACHT: The relations between Ribbentrop and the aforenamed gentlemen were as bad as can be imagined. There was a perpetual fight between them. In my opinion Ribbentrop would have been Himmler’s first victim if anything had happened to Hitler. A constant struggle and feud, I should like to state, went on between these men with an exceptionally sharp exchange of letters.

DR. HORN: What was the relationship in general between the highest Party and Reich offices?

VON STEENGRACHT: The relationship in the individual departments naturally varied according to the character and the origin of the department chiefs. But one can say that the relationship was bad throughout, and, especially, that reciprocal information, so urgently necessary for state business, practically never developed. It was almost more difficult for one minister to discuss a question with another minister by telephone than to have had the Angel Gabriel himself come from heaven and speak with one of us. Even on the most important and essential matters, a factual discussion could not take place. There was, in other words, practically no connection between these departments. Moreover, they were very different, both in their character and in their ideas.

DR. HORN: Is anything known to you about objections on the part of the Vatican, above all regarding the Polish clergy?

VON STEENGRACHT: I heard about that later, and there must have been two protests concerning the Catholic Polish clergy. These two notes were submitted by the Nuncio to the State Secretary of that time. The then State Secretary turned these over to Ribbentrop according to regulation, and Ribbentrop in his turn presented them to Hitler. Since the Vatican had not recognized the Government General, and accordingly the Nuncio was not competent for these regions, Hitler declared when these notes were presented to him:

“They are just one blunt lie. Give these notes back to the
Nuncio through the State Secretary in a sharp form, and tell him
that you will never again accept such a matter.”

DR. HORN: Were these notes then dealt with by the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: Sharp and precise instructions were then issued that in all cases in which representatives of countries brought up matters which were not within their authority, whether in conversations, or notes, _note verbale_, memoranda, or other documents, these were not to be accepted, and verbal protests were to be turned down sharply.

DR. HORN: Is it known to you that Von Ribbentrop prevented the shooting of about 10,000 prisoners of war after the terrible air attack on Dresden?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I know the following: Von Ribbentrop’s liaison man with Hitler called me up one day in great excitement. He informed me that on a suggestion by Goebbels, the Führer intended, as reprisal for the holocaust of Dresden, to have English and American prisoners of war—I believe mostly airmen—shot. I went immediately to Ribbentrop and informed him of this. Ribbentrop became very excited; he turned pale as death; he was in fact almost stunned and thought it was impossible; picked up the phone and called up this liaison man in person in order to verify this report. The liaison man corroborated it. Then Ribbentrop got up immediately and went to Hitler, came back, I think after half an hour, and told me that he had succeeded in having Hitler withdraw this order. That is all I know about this matter.

DR. HORN: Do you know anything about the convocation of an anti-Jewish congress?

VON STEENGRACHT: Regarding the convocation of an anti-Jewish congress I know something; I believe our liaison man with Hitler informed us that, on a suggestion of Bormann, Hitler had ordered the calling of an anti-Jewish congress through the Rosenberg office. Ribbentrop did not want to believe this; but nevertheless had to accept this too as true, once he had spoken with our liaison man. Then, since on the basis of this decision we could do nothing more officially to prevent the thing, we nevertheless worked our way into it, and we made efforts by a policy of hesitation, delay, and obstruction to render the convocation impossible. And although the order was given in the spring of 1944 and the war did not end until April 1945, this congress never actually took place.

DR. HORN: Could you observe whether Von Ribbentrop often adopted a stern manner with his staff, for reasons of state, although he sometimes thought entirely differently?

VON STEENGRACHT: This would be passing a judgment. But I believe that I must affirm this: Thinking that he was being loyal to Hitler, Ribbentrop—it seems to me—in those cases when he went to Hitler with a preconceived opinion and returned with a totally different view, tried afterwards to explain to us Hitler’s view. This he always did with special vehemence. I would assume then that this was contrary to his own most personal original ideas.

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop during the course of the war ask that Rome and Florence be spared?

VON STEENGRACHT: So far as I know, yes. He did speak with Hitler on these subjects.

DR. HORN: Are you acquainted with an article by Goebbels in the _Reich_, or perhaps the _Völkischer Beobachter_, dealing with lynch justice?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. Once by chance I came to Ribbentrop when he was reading a paper and was again very excited. He asked me if I had read the article yet, this shocking article by Goebbels. It was an article on lynch justice.

DR. HORN: Did Von Ribbentrop lodge a protest with Goebbels about this article?

VON STEENGRACHT: As far as I know, he charged our press chief who had the liaison with Goebbels to lodge a protest against this article. But to his surprise he was forced to see that this protest was useless since the article had not only been inspired but, I believe, ordered by Hitler, and thus there was nothing more to be done.

DR. HORN: What attitude did the Foreign Office take in view of the trend of this article?

VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office repudiated the article vehemently, because it comprised an offense against international law and thus made us depart from international law in another field. Moreover, it appealed to the lower instincts of man, and both in internal and external policy did great damage.

Besides, such an article, that has been read by several hundred thousands or by millions, does irreparable damage anyway. We therefore insisted that under no circumstances should such things appear in the press again. I must regretfully state, however, that we had a very difficult stand in this matter, especially since low-flying enemy craft often shot peasants in the fields and pedestrians in the streets, that is to say, purely civilian people, with their murder weapons. And our arguments that in our field we wanted to observe international law under all circumstances, were not taken into account at all either by most German officers, or above all by Hitler personally. On the contrary, in this case too we were regarded again only as formal jurists. But later we did try, as much as we could, with the help of military offices, to prevent the carrying out of this order.

DR. HORN: Do you know of a Battalion Günsberg?

VON STEENGRACHT: I do not know of a Battalion Günsberg. I know, of course, of a former Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg in the Foreign Office. This Legation Counsellor Von Günsberg received, as far as I recall—I did not at that time do any work at all connected with these matters—received from Ribbentrop the assignment of following, with a few people from the Foreign Office and a few drivers, the fighting troops, and seeing to it that, firstly, the foreign missions, for instance in Brussels and Paris, and so forth, that stood under the protection of the protective powers, should not be entered by our troops. And at the same time Günsberg was charged with protecting the files in the Foreign ministries that were of foreign political interest.

After the conclusion of the French campaign, Günsberg, as far as I recall, was no longer in the active service of the Foreign Office, but was listed with the Secret Field Police, from which he had received a uniform, because as a civilian he could not enter these countries.

DR. HORN: How and when did Günsberg’s job end?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ribbentrop lost interest after these events in Günsberg and the original assignment. Then, after the beginning of the Russian campaign, Günsberg, so far as I remember, reported again for duty and said that he intended to do the same thing in the East, and Ribbentrop told him:

“Yes, that is very good. You may go with a few people to the
army groups and see whether anything of interest for us is
happening there and also see to it that when we approach Moscow
the foreign embassies _et cetera_ are not entered, and that the
documents are preserved.”

But he did not consider himself any longer as belonging to the Foreign Office and apparently received orders from other offices. Then, as I later heard, he had a large number of men under him and had many automobiles which he could not have received from the Foreign Office any more than he could have received a military uniform from the Foreign Office so he was apparently working for other offices.

DR. HORN: He no longer belonged to the Foreign Office at any rate not in a military capacity?

VON STEENGRACHT: No. And, in addition, when Ribbentrop heard that he had undertaken such a large job, he charged me personally to call immediately on the SS and say that he, Ribbentrop, did not want to have Günsberg any longer, and at that time I told Obergruppenführer Wolff that I should like to point out that we wanted nothing more to do with Günsberg. See to it that you keep him with the Waffen-SS along with all his subordinates. That is all I know about the matter of Günsberg.

DR. HORN: Would Your Lordship like to interrupt the examination or should I continue to put further questions?

THE PRESIDENT: Unless you are going to conclude almost immediately, we had better adjourn. Will you be some time longer with this witness?

DR. HORN: I have a number of further questions.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 27 March 1946 at 1000 hours._]

NINETY-SECOND DAY
Wednesday, 27 March 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. HORN: Witness, you knew Count Ciano. Where and when did you meet him?

VON STEENGRACHT: I knew Count Ciano but not in a political sense, only personally. I cannot remember exactly when I met him; probably it was on the occasion of a state visit. I was working at the time in the Protocol Department in the Foreign Office.

DR. HORN: What experiences did you have with Count Ciano?

VON STEENGRACHT: Since I did not work with him politically, I had no political experience with him.

DR. HORN: Now, another matter. Is it correct that Herr Von Ribbentrop gave orders that under all circumstances the French franc should be sustained against inflation?

VON STEENGRACHT: Such measures can apply only to a time when I was not yet State Secretary. But I know that the basic attitude towards France and all occupied territories was that under all circumstances their currency was to be preserved as far as possible, or rather should be preserved by all means. That is why we often sent gold to Greece in order to attempt to maintain the value of the currency there to some extent.

DR. HORN: What was accomplished in Greece by sending this gold there?

VON STEENGRACHT: By sending gold to Greece we lowered the rate of exchange of foreign currencies. Thus the Greek merchants who had hoarded food to a large extent, became frightened and threw the food on the market, and in this way it was made available to the Greek population again.

DR. HORN: Is it correct that Von Ribbentrop gave strictest orders not to undertake any confiscation in occupied territories but to deal directly only with their governments?

VON STEENGRACHT: If you put the question like that, it is basically correct, but I say, as I said yesterday, that in principle we had no functions at all in the occupied territories, therefore no power to confiscate, nor was such power within the jurisdiction of other agencies; but it is correct that we negotiated only with the foreign governments and that Von Ribbentrop had most strictly forbidden us to support any direct measures concerning an occupied country which were carried out by other departments.

DR. HORN: For the time being I have no further questions to put to this witness.

DR. EGON KUBUSCHOK (Counsel for Defendant Von Papen): Witness, are you well acquainted with Von Papen as a result of the period during which you were working in the Foreign Office and particularly during the time you were active as State Secretary in the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: I had known Herr Von Papen for several years before 1933, but privately. Then I lost track of him for some time and re-established contact with him when I became State Secretary in the German Foreign Office. Then I was continually associated with him in an official and unofficial capacity.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did you, particularly in the last period of your activities as State Secretary, continually receive the reports which Von Papen, as Ambassador in Ankara, sent to Berlin?

VON STEENGRACHT: Unless Herr Von Papen sent reports directly to Von Ribbentrop—which may have been possible; I do not know—I received them weekly through official channels.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Do you remember that after two previous refusals Von Papen took over the post of Ambassador in Ankara, in April 1939, on the day that Italy occupied Albania, whereby an acute danger of war arose in the Southeast?

VON STEENGRACHT: At that time I was not State Secretary and also had no political position, so that I am not acquainted with the events of that period. But today I have the impression that he took over that position after the Italians had occupied Albania. And he himself told me later that at that time there was danger that the Italians would advance further into the Balkans, possibly causing a conflict with Turkey, as a result of which world peace would have been endangered. For that reason he had decided at the time to accept the post. Exactly on which day that was, I cannot say.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: What can you say in general about Herr Von Papen’s efforts toward peace?

VON STEENGRACHT: I am under the impression that Herr Von Papen always strove to preserve peace by every means. He certainly considered that it would be a great disaster for Germany and the world if war were to break out.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were the efforts which Von Papen made during the war towards establishing peace aimed at foregoing any annexations regardless of the military outcome and completely re-establishing the sovereignty of occupied territories, in short, to achieve, by means of reasonable renunciation, a bearable status for all European states?

VON STEENGRACHT: In principle it was quite clear that Von Papen always worked for the re-establishment of peace under conditions which would have re-established full sovereignty for all countries, and so that no encroachment nor damage, material or otherwise would be inflicted on any foreign countries.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Was that Von Papen’s attitude even at the time of the greatest German military successes?

VON STEENGRACHT: I believe that his basic attitude in this respect never changed.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Were his continuous personal efforts to establish peace held against Von Papen by Hitler, and was he considered a disagreeable outsider in that connection?

VON STEENGRACHT: I did not have an opportunity to discuss it with Hitler; I only know that he was quite generally criticized by Hitler and other persons as a man who always followed a weak line.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did Herr Von Papen frankly acknowledge that peace would be impossible as long as Hitler and the Party existed in Germany and the necessary credit for negotiating abroad was lacking?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I think it must have been about April 1943 or May 1943, that I spoke to Von Papen in detail about the whole subject, since, at that time, I had just become State Secretary. At that time he very clearly voiced the opinion to me which you have just sketched. It was quite plain to him that foreign countries would conclude no peace with Hitler and the methods he employed.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Just one last question, Witness: The Indictment accuses the Defendant Von Papen of being an unscrupulous opportunist. You, Witness, know the defendant from the reports and from all the official relations the defendant had with his superior office for a number of years. Did you, on the strength of that knowledge, get the impression that this characterization of Von Papen is correct, or can you say, on the strength of these reports and these official relations, that Von Papen appears to you to be a man who always tells the truth, even when that truth is disagreeable to his quite unpleasant superiors, and even when the voicing of that truth involves personal danger for him?

VON STEENGRACHT: I can say that is absolutely so. I find the best evidence of it is that Herr Von Papen was finally completely eliminated from the position of Vice-Chancellor and resigned from the government, then he became a private citizen and only in the greatest emergency was he called upon. In my opinion, Von Papen made himself available only because he said to himself, “I have still got a certain amount of credit, I am a good Catholic, and accordingly I represent an attitude which is opposed to all inhumanity, _et cetera_. Perhaps I can, through my intervention, exercise some influence in that direction.” I myself never attended a meeting or a conference which took place between Hitler and Von Papen, but, particularly from my liaison officer with Hitler, I often heard that Von Papen, in his smooth way, often told Hitler many things which no one else could have told Hitler and I believe that through his manner he prevented a number of things, at least for a time.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you.

DR. OTTO NELTE (Counsel for Defendant Keitel): Witness, you have stated that Hitler, because of the terrible bombing attack on Dresden, intended to issue an order according to which thousands of prisoners of war were to be killed in reprisal.

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

DR. NELTE: Do I remember your testimony of yesterday correctly, that all you have said about this matter is information from, or based on information from Herr Von Ribbentrop?

VON STEENGRACHT: No.

DR. NELTE: What do you know from your own personal knowledge?

VON STEENGRACHT: From my own personal knowledge I only know that our liaison man with Hitler called me on the telephone and told me that Goebbels had proposed to Hitler that 10,000 or more British and American prisoners of war be shot in reprisal, and that Hitler would agree or had agreed. I immediately reported this to Von Ribbentrop, and he went there at once and told me after half an hour that the order had been withdrawn. About Field Marshal Keitel I know nothing at all in that connection.

DR. NELTE: You do not know, therefore, who was the originator of that order?

VON STEENGRACHT: No.

DR. NELTE: Who suggested it, I mean.

VON STEENGRACHT: The suggestion for that order evidently came from Goebbels according to the information which I received.

DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop, do you mean?

VON STEENGRACHT: Who?

DR. NELTE: Through Herr Von Ribbentrop?

VON STEENGRACHT: No, Von Ribbentrop had nothing to do with that.

DR. NELTE: Then from Herr Hewel?

VON STEENGRACHT: Herr Hewel told me that. He called me up and told me that.

DR. NELTE: And you know nothing about the participation of military men?

VON STEENGRACHT: I know nothing at all about the participation of military men.

DR. NELTE: Thank you very much.

DR. HANS LATERNSER (Counsel for General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces): Witness, I have only one question. Did you, as State Secretary, or did the Foreign Office regularly inform military offices, for instance, the Army High Command or the High Command of the Navy, with reference to pertinent matters of German politics?

VON STEENGRACHT: No, they were not informed.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Does the British Prosecutor wish to cross-examine?

COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): Witness, you told us yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop was against the persecution of the churches, was against the persecution of Jews, and did not know what was going on in the concentration camps. You have told us that he was not a typical Nazi. What are the qualities of a typical Nazi?

VON STEENGRACHT: By a typical National Socialist, I mean a man who fanatically acknowledges and represents all the doctrines of National Socialism.

Herr Von Ribbentrop, as I said, followed Hitler personally, but he really knew uncommonly little of any of the other ideology and never bothered about it. He never spoke at meetings, never participated in large rallies, and therefore, he really knew extremely little about the people and the mood of the people.

COL. PHILLIMORE: By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean someone who was persecuting the churches?

VON STEENGRACHT: I did not understand that question.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I will repeat it. By “a typical Nazi,” do you mean a man who was engaged in persecution of the churches?

VON STEENGRACHT: At any rate, someone who, if Adolf Hitler considered it right, did not state his personal opinion on the matter.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And a man who would take his full share in persecution and extermination of Jews?

VON STEENGRACHT: That I would not like to say either. That was limited to a certain circle of people. A large number even of fanatical Nazis knew nothing about these atrocities and repudiated them and would have repudiated them, had they been properly informed of them.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I understand you to say that you knew nothing of them yourself. Is that so?

VON STEENGRACHT: That I knew nothing?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes.

VON STEENGRACHT: In my position as State Secretary and because I read foreign papers, and particularly since I had contact with the opposition, I knew of many things connected with concentration camps. In all these cases, as far as it was in my power, I intervened. But regarding the things which I have heard here now, I knew nothing at all.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to ask you about another matter. You have told us that Ribbentrop had no responsibility in the occupied territories. Your words were that “the Foreign Office lost responsibility at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the frontier.” Is that right?

VON STEENGRACHT: I said that at that moment at which the German bayonet crossed the frontier the Foreign Office lost the sole right to negotiate with foreign governments everywhere. Beyond that, in most countries, the Foreign Office did not have the right to have even a diplomatic observer without authority, particularly in Norway and the Eastern Territories.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You have said the Foreign Office had no right to have an observer there, and that direct relations with occupied territories were withdrawn, is that right?

VON STEENGRACHT: No, I said that in all occupied territories the Foreign Office no longer had the sole right to negotiate with the government, since there was then either a civil administration in those countries or a military government with auxiliary command offices and a military administrative head, and that these offices themselves then approached the foreign governments and their executive organs in the countries occupied at that time. Consequently one can no longer say that the Foreign Office had the sole right to negotiate with the governments. But in some countries, as in the North and the East, we no longer had any of our people at all, and Hitler had issued the order that we withdraw our observers from the other countries, such as Holland, Belgium and so on. However, we did not do so.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You say that in France you had an ambassador reporting direct to Ribbentrop, did you not?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And his duties included advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police by the impounding of politically important documents and securing and seizure of public property; further, of private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of instructions especially given for the matter. Isn’t that right?

VON STEENGRACHT: I already emphasized yesterday that only since 1943 had I anything at all to do with political affairs. If I understood your question correctly, Mr. Prosecutor, you are of the opinion that the Secret State Police and the German executive organs in France were under our jurisdiction. That is incorrect.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You are not answering the question. I asked you if the Minister Abetz had not got those duties.

VON STEENGRACHT: He did not have the assignment of confiscating any French property or carrying out any action against the Jews. No orders of that kind went through my hands during my time, and he could...

COL. PHILLIMORE: [_Handing the document to the witness._] Will you look at Document 3614-PS.

My Lord, that was put in as French Exhibit Number RF-1061 on the 4th of February. It is a letter dated the 3rd of August 1940, signed by Ribbentrop, to the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). It reads:

“The Führer has appointed the former Minister Abetz Ambassador
and after my report has decreed as follows:

“I. Ambassador Abetz has the following tasks in France...”

then it sets out a number of tasks and Number 6 is the one I put to the witness:

“6. Advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police
in connection with the impounding of politically important
documents.

“7. Securing and seizure of public art property; further, of
private and, above all, Jewish artistic property on the basis of
instructions specially given for this case.”

Then the concluding paragraphs:

“II. The Führer has hereby expressly ordered that Ambassador
Abetz is exclusively responsible for the handling of all
political questions in Occupied, and Unoccupied France. Insofar
as his functions touch military interests, Ambassador Abetz will
act only in agreement with the Military Commander in France.

“III. Ambassador Abetz is attached to the Military Commander in
France as his Commissioner. His seat remains Paris as
heretofore. He receives instructions for carrying out his tasks
from me and is responsible exclusively to me on these
matters.”—Signed—“Ribbentrop.”

I want to ask you one or two questions about the Jews. You have told us that you and the Defendant Ribbentrop...

THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Phillimore, the Tribunal would like to know why this witness told them that Ambassador Abetz did not have the task of confiscating property.

[_Turning to the witness._] Why did you say that?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz had no executive powers, and he was expressly forbidden to intervene in French internal affairs. He could, therefore, address himself exclusively to the French Government, and if the French Government did anything by means of their executive power, then that was a transaction on the part of the French Government but never a confiscation carried out by Abetz.

COL. PHILLIMORE: That is not an answer to the question. The question is why, when you were asked whether Abetz had the task of advising the Secret Field Police and the Secret State Police on the impounding of politically important documents, did you not say so?

VON STEENGRACHT: I said that no order went through my hands, since I did not become State Secretary until May 1943. This is an order of 3 August 1940. But here we are concerned only with an official directive addressed to Ambassador Abetz.

COL. PHILLIMORE: At this time you were Ribbentrop’s personal adjutant, weren’t you?

VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, but not political secretary. I was only...

COL. PHILLIMORE: You were adjutant?

VON STEENGRACHT: I was adjutant, that is to say I was concerned with technical matters. At that time I never presented a political report to him. But I should add, if I may, this concerns a directive to Ambassador Abetz and this directive was completely outdated by actual conditions. Because advising the Secret Field Police...

COL. PHILLIMORE: How do you know that, if you were only personal adjutant and not acting in political matters?

VON STEENGRACHT: Ambassador Abetz was ambassador until May 1945. Therefore from 1943 to 1945 I continuously corresponded with him, and during that time Ambassador Abetz continually fought against the measures which were carried out by the Secret State Police anyway. It was a bitter struggle and he was personally threatened in all possible matters. One can talk about advice, but whether people heeded him—he had no power—that is quite another question.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Does it come to this, that your answer about occupied territories applies only after 1943?

VON STEENGRACHT: From my own experience I can speak only about the period after 1943.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Now, I want to turn to the question of Jews. You have told us that you and Ribbentrop, by adopting a policy of delay, prevented the holding of the Anti-Jewish Congress in 1944; is that correct?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And that you were against the policy of persecution of the Jews.

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And so was the Defendant Ribbentrop?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I want you to look at Document 3319-PS. [_Handing the document to the witness._]

My Lord, that is a new document. It will be Exhibit GB-287.

[_Turning to witness._] Now you have got a photostat there. Will you look at Page 4 of the German—that’s the first page of the English. That is a letter dated the 28th of April on the subject of anti-Jewish action in foreign countries. It is marked at the bottom of Page 4.

VON STEENGRACHT: I have not found it.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Will you look at Page 4, marked in a black square at the bottom of the page. You see a letter dated the 28th of April 1944, Subject: Anti-Jewish action in foreign countries, and it is addressed to practically every German legation and mission abroad.

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Turn to Page 10. You will see that it purports to be signed by you; is that correct?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You remember the letter? I will read you the first paragraph to refresh your memory. “The Reich Foreign Minister...”

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: “...has ordered the creation of Information
Department XIV (Anti-Jewish Action Abroad) under the leadership
of Envoy I. K. Schleier, whose task it is to deepen and
strengthen the anti-Jewish information service abroad by the
incorporation of all experts of the departments and working
units of the Foreign Office who have an interest and take part
in the anti-Jewish information service abroad, in close
co-operation with all offices outside the Foreign Office which
are engaged in anti-Jewish work and with the German missions in
Europe.”

Then you set out the co-workers, number of departments of the Foreign Office, and then one permanent representative of the Reich Security Main Office—that’s Himmler’s office, isn’t it?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And one representative of the office of Reichsleiter Rosenberg. That department just up above “Inland II,” that is the Foreign Office which had liaison with the SS, isn’t it?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: At that time the chief was a man called Wagner and the assistant chief, Von Thadden?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Do you still say that you were against the policy of persecution of the Jews?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, I maintain that now as before. I also say, as I have already said during earlier interrogations, that even the holding of an anti-Jewish congress in its effect would not have been directed against the Jews because what was happening in Germany was all taking place under the seal of secrecy and no one was informed in any way. The Jews disappeared. But if there had been an international congress, one would have been forced in the first place to bring up the question: where are these Jews anyway? What is actually happening to these Jews?

COL. PHILLIMORE: Is the point this, that you wanted to put off an anti-Jewish congress because that would be known to the world, but you were quite prepared to set up an organization in the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: Gentlemen, we must separate two completely different problems here. The one problem is this: There were offices in Germany which conducted and carried out anti-Jewish measures. These organizations also reached abroad and there, without the knowledge and without the participation of the Foreign Office, did away with the people in foreign countries. Consequently, an improvement and a policy guided to some extent into normal channels could exist only if some German department had really assumed responsibility for these things at that time. For we did not hear of these matters; we always heard the complaints which we received from foreign mission heads about events which took place. But we had no means of control. If I applied to the inner German offices...

COL. PHILLIMORE: Was this set up to control the anti-Jewish policy, this department?

VON STEENGRACHT: Apparently we are discussing two different matters here today. The anti-Jewish congress had been ordered. The fact that Rosenberg’s office was holding an anti-Jewish congress...

THE PRESIDENT: You are not answering the question. The question was: Was this organization, referred to in this letter, set up to control the organization of anti-Jewish work abroad? That is the question. Can you not answer that by “yes” or “no”?

VON STEENGRACHT: The Foreign Office could not exercise general control since all anti-Jewish questions were principally dealt with in Rosenberg’s office.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Well then, what was the purpose of this organization of the Foreign Office?

VON STEENGRACHT: By Hitler’s order we had to contact all German departments and archives in order to collect all the material there, and we attached importance...

COL. PHILLIMORE: And this was ordered by Ribbentrop, wasn’t it?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: As set out in your letter?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes. And we thought it important that we get an idea in this way of what was actually happening to the Jews, _et cetera_, and therefore we drew in people from all offices.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I will show you in a minute what was actually happening and out of your own files, but I just want to put this to you:

The point of your putting off the anti-Jewish congress was simply because you did not want the world to know. You had not the slightest objection to setting up an anti-Jewish organization in Germany.

Now, will you look at Page 32 of the German text.

My Lord, that is on Page 23 of the English text.

You will see there a letter from Rosenberg’s office to the Foreign Office, signed by Bräutigam, Page 32 of the German text. It is marked at the bottom of Page 32.

Bräutigam was your liaison officer with Rosenberg, wasn’t he, Witness? Was Bräutigam your liaison officer in Rosenberg’s office?

VON STEENGRACHT: No. Bräutigam was, I think, in the Foreign Office in 1941.

COL. PHILLIMORE: And in 1942.

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes, but in 1941, since he had previously been working on Eastern problems in the Foreign Office, he had been transferred and was now in the Rosenberg office.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. And you will see there he is referring to a conference with Obersturmbannführer Eichmann, that is, the chief of the Jewish section of the Gestapo, and a Dr. Wetzel, and he sends you a copy of an agreement made at Tighina in Romania on the 30th of August 1941 with the request for acknowledgment.

VON STEENGRACHT: Mr. Prosecutor, there could be an error here. This letter is dated 11 March 1942. I became State Secretary in May 1943. I therefore know nothing about this matter. I should like to remark...

COL. PHILLIMORE: You just listen and wait until you are asked a question. We shall get on faster if you just listen to the letter:

“I point out especially Number 7 of the agreements... I have
already taken a position in my letter of 5 March 1942.”

Now, that enclosed an agreement made between the German and Romanian General Staffs, and, if you will look at Paragraph 7, on Page 38 of the German, Page 27 of the English, this was the agreement they made:

“Deportation of Jews from Transnistria. Deportation of Jews
across the Bug is not possible at present. They must, therefore,
be collected in concentration camps and set to work until a
deportation to the east is possible after the end of
operations.”

And then there’s a note on the file on the next page of the German, still on Page 27 of the English:

“According to information from Director General Lecca, today
110,000 Jews are being evacuated from Bukovina and Bessarabia
into two forests in the Bug River Area. As far as he could
learn, this action is based upon an order issued by Marshal
Antonescu. Purpose of the action is the liquidation of these
Jews.”

Now, do you doubt that that agreement, enclosed with that letter sent to the Foreign Office, would have reached the Defendant Ribbentrop?

VON STEENGRACHT: Well. I see this document and this agreement for the first time today. Nothing of this entire affair...

COL. PHILLIMORE: Yes. Would you answer the question? Do you doubt that that letter and that agreement enclosed with it would have been shown to the Defendant Ribbentrop?

VON STEENGRACHT: At that time there was an Under Secretary of State Luther in the Foreign Office who acted quite independently; and I fought a bitter battle against him although I was not called upon to do it, because he wanted to introduce National Socialist methods. Whether he submitted this matter to Ribbentrop or not I cannot decide.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Very well. We come to a time when you were the State Secretary. Would you look at Page 31 of the German text, Page 20 of the English.

THE PRESIDENT: What do the words that follow the passage you have just read mean on Page 27: “Bucharest, 17 October 1941 (Signature illegible)”—and below—“To be discussed with Vice Minister President Antonescu. Confidential, Bucharest, 16 October 1943”?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is badly typed. “Bucharest, 17 October 1943” and then follows the next letter. The previous part is a note on the file.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is a note on the German Legation file on Bucharest.

THE PRESIDENT: Go on.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I have not troubled the Tribunal with the following letters. They deal with the earlier date on the expulsion of Jews from firms owned by citizens of the German Reich.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now would you look at Page 31 of the German, Page 20 of the English. You will see there a document sent to...

THE PRESIDENT: When you started that document you didn’t give the date in full. The year there appears to be 1944, doesn’t it?

COL. PHILLIMORE: It is not. In 1942, I think, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: It should be April 29, 1942? Is the date at the head of the document?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, the letter I read was dated March ’42 and marked with a foreign office stamp “Received 13th of March 1942...”

THE PRESIDENT: I am speaking of the whole document, Page 1 of the document.

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is a file, one of those rather inconvenient documents, a file, and it starts with the earliest date at the bottom and then works up to 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, then the part you read first...

COL. PHILLIMORE: That was 1944.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. What page are you going to now?

COL. PHILLIMORE: I was going to Page 20 now, My Lord.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, this is a communication from Von Thadden who was, as you have told us, assistant in the Department Inland II, to the German Legation in Bucharest. It is dated 12 October 1943, and it is stamped as received on 18 October. And he encloses a letter signed by Müller in the Reichssicherheitshauptamt, to all German police authorities abroad. You will see that it goes to the commander of the Security Police in Prague, The Hague, Paris, Brussels, Metz, Strasbourg, Luxembourg, Kraków, Kiev, Smolensk, and so on. October ’43. That is after you had become Secretary of State, isn’t it?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: You were appointed in April?

VON STEENGRACHT: Yes.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Turning to the substance of the letter, the subject is the treatment of Jews with foreign citizenship in the sphere of German power:

“In agreement with the Foreign Office, all Jews who remain in
the sphere of German power after the end of the so-called
home-bringing action and who have the citizenship of the
following countries may now be included in the evacuation
measures: Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden,
Finland, Hungary, Romania, Turkey.

“Since the evacuation of these Jews to the East cannot yet take
place at the present time, for reasons of foreign policy, a
temporary stay is provided in Concentration Camp Buchenwald for
male Jews over 14 years of age and in the Concentration Camp
Ravensbrück for Jewesses and children.

“The necessary measures are to be carried out on the following
dates:

“a) for Jews with Italian citizenship, immediately;

“b) for Jews with Turkish citizenship, on 20 October 1943;

“c) for Jews with citizenship of other countries mentioned
above, on 10 October 1943.