Chapter XVI: Book 3: of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a (12)

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say exactly, of course. I do not know the details of this matter. I only know that Himmler, in my presence, made the suggestion to the Führer that Schirach should be brought and tried before the Volksgericht for some reason or other. I do not know the details. I was not interested in them. I said to the Führer that this, in my opinion, would make a very bad impression from the point of view of foreign policy and I know that Himmler received no answer from the Führer; at any rate, he did not give the order. What consequences that would have had I cannot say, but when such a suggestion came from Himmler, the consequences were very serious.

HERR BÖHM: How is it that you were witness to this conversation and how did you react to it?

VON RIBBENTROP: It was purely accidental; I have just stated that I told the Führer as well as Himmler that it would make a very bad impression.

HERR BÖHM: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other questions on behalf of the defendants’ counsel?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, when you began to advise Hitler on matters of foreign policy in 1933, were you familiar with the League of Nations declaration of 1927?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know which declaration you mean.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember the League of Nations declaration of 1927?

VON RIBBENTROP: The League of Nations has made many declarations. Please tell me which one you mean?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It made a rather important one about aggressive war in 1927, didn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know this declaration in detail, but it is clear that the League of Nations, like everyone, was against an aggressive war, and at that time Germany was a member of the League of Nations.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Germany was a member, and the preamble of the declaration was:

“Being convinced that a war of aggression would never serve as a
means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence
an international crime...”

Were you familiar with that when you...

VON RIBBENTROP: Not in detail, no.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was rather an important matter to be familiar with if you were going to advise Hitler, who was then Chancellor, on foreign policy, wasn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: This declaration was certainly important, and corresponded exactly with my attitude at that time. But subsequent events have proved that the League of Nations was not in a position to save Germany from chaos.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold that as your own view?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you continue to hold the expression of opinion I have quoted to you from the preamble as your own view?

VON RIBBENTROP: That was as such my fundamental attitude, but on the other hand I was of the opinion that Germany should be given help in some way.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So I gathered. Now, apart from that, if you were not familiar in detail with that resolution, were you familiar in detail with the Kellogg-Briand Pact?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was familiar with it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you agree with the view expressed in the preamble and in the pact that there should be a renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want you to tell us how you carried that out. Let’s take the first example. Are you telling this Tribunal that as far as you know, no pressure or threats were made to Herr Von Schuschnigg?

VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean in the discussions with Hitler at the Obersalzberg?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, on the 12th of February.

VON RIBBENTROP: At this discussion...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, answer the question first, and then you can give your explanation. Are you saying that no pressure or threats were put to Herr Von Schuschnigg on the 12th of February? Answer that “yes” or “no”, and we will go into the explanation later.

VON RIBBENTROP: Not exactly, no. I believe that the dominating personality of the Führer and the arguments that he presented made such an impression on Schuschnigg that he finally agreed to Hitler’s proposals.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, let’s just look into that.

VON RIBBENTROP: May I continue? I personally had a conversation at that time with Herr Schuschnigg after his first talk with Adolf Hitler, in which his reaction to the first conference became very clear to me. This reaction was one of being deeply impressed by Hitler’s personality and by the arguments which Hitler submitted to him. Schuschnigg told me in this conversation, which was extremely cordial, that he too—and I believe these were his words—regarded it as a historical mission to bring the two peoples closer together.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Who were present at the Berghof—I don’t say in the room, but in the building or about? Were there present Hitler, yourself, the Defendant Von Papen, the Defendant Keitel, General Sperrle, and General Von Reichenau?

VON RIBBENTROP: I think that is correct, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the morning of the 12th, I think that Hitler and Von Schuschnigg were together for about 2 hours before lunch in the morning, isn’t that so?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the time exactly. Anyway, they had a long conversation, that is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, after lunch, Von Schuschnigg was allowed to have a short conversation with his own Foreign Minister, Guido Schmidt, isn’t that so?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know exactly, but it is possible.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, Von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt were called before you and the Defendant Von Papen, isn’t that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember that. I do not think so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember that? Just think again.

VON RIBBENTROP: Do you mean—then I believe I did not understand the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then I will put it again. After a conversation that Schuschnigg had with Guido Schmidt, he and Schmidt came before you and the Defendant Von Papen and they had a conversation with you, which I will put to you in a moment. Now, isn’t it right that you and Von Papen saw Von Schuschnigg and Guido Schmidt?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not believe so. I do not believe that is true.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember exhibiting to Von Schuschnigg a typewritten draft containing the demands made on Von Schuschnigg? Now, just think.

VON RIBBENTROP: That is absolutely possible. Hitler had dictated a memorandum, and it is possible that I gave it to Schuschnigg. I am not sure of the details now.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the subject of that memorandum?

VON RIBBENTROP: That I do not know; and in order to explain my ignorance about the entire conference I would like to state that at this time I was not at all informed about the Austrian problem because Hitler had handled these matters personally and I had become Foreign Minister only a few days before.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you hand someone a memorandum, at an occasion which you have described to him as a historic meeting, presumably you can give the Tribunal at any rate an outline of what the memorandum contained. What were the points in the memorandum?

VON RIBBENTROP: Curiously enough, I really do not remember that in detail. This meeting was one between the Führer and Schuschnigg, and everything that was done and agreed upon there was either dictated by the Führer himself or was suggested to the Führer by someone else. I did not know the details. I only knew that it was primarily a question of bringing about better relations between Germany and Austria. Since many National Socialists had been arrested in Austria the relations between the two countries had been greatly troubled.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if I remind you, perhaps, it will bring it back. Were not they the three points for the reorganization of the Austrian Cabinet, including:

The appointment of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart to the Ministry of Security in the Interior; second, a general political amnesty of Nazis convicted of crimes; and thirdly, a declaration of equal rights for Austrian National Socialists and the taking of them into the Fatherland Front?

Are these the points that you were putting to Von Schuschnigg?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not remember exactly now but that may be about correct. At that time that corresponded with the vague notion and knowledge I had about Austrian affairs.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did you tell Von Schuschnigg that Hitler had informed you that these demands which you were offering were the final demands of the Führer and that Hitler was not prepared to discuss them?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that, but it is possible that I told Von Schuschnigg something to that effect but at the moment I do not remember.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say, “You must accept the whole of these demands?”

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not think so, I did not say that. I exerted no pressure whatsoever on Schuschnigg, for I still remember that this conversation which lasted about an hour to an hour and a half was confined to generalities and to personal matters and that I gained from this conversation a very favorable impression of Schuschnigg’s personality, which fact I even mentioned to my staff later on. I put no pressure on Schuschnigg.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told us that before, and I am suggesting to you that at this conversation you were trying to get Schuschnigg to sign the document containing these terms which you agree that you may have had. I want you to remember the answer and remind you of that.

Don’t you remember Herr Von Schuschnigg turning to the Defendant Von Papen and saying, “Now, you told me that I would not be confronted with any demands if I came to Berchtesgaden,” and Herr Von Papen apologizing and saying, “That is so. I did not know you were going to be confronted with these demands.”

Don’t you remember that?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that. That cannot be quite right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We will just see. Do you remember Von Schuschnigg being called back to speak to Hitler again and Guido Schmidt remaining with you to make some alterations in the document which you were putting?

VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite possible that changes were made; it is conceivable, I do not remember the details, though.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But did you hear that in this second conversation with Hitler, Hitler telling Schuschnigg that he must comply with these demands within 3 days?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I am hearing that for the first time today. I did not know that. I was not present at the second conversation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just be a little careful before you say you have heard that for the first time today, because in a moment I will show you some documents. Are you sure you did not hear that Hitler told Schuschnigg that he must comply within 3 days, or Hitler would order the march into Austria?

VON RIBBENTROP: I consider that to be out of the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If he had said that, you will agree that that would be the heaviest military and political pressure? There could be no other heavier pressure than suggesting a march into Austria, could there?

VON RIBBENTROP: In view of the tense situation that existed between the two countries at that time, that, of course, would have been a pressure. But one thing must be taken for granted; and that is, that under no circumstances would it have been possible in the long run to find any solution between the two countries if there were no closer contact, and from the beginning—I should like to state this here—it was always my view that the two countries should form some sort of close alliance, and I visualized a customs and currency union...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You’ve given that view about three times. Let us come back to this interview which I am putting back to you, that took place on the 12th of February. Don’t you know that Schuschnigg said: “I am only the Bundeskanzler. I have to refer to President Miklas, and I can sign this protocol only subject to reference to President Miklas.”

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that any more in detail.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Hitler opening the door and calling Keitel?

VON RIBBENTROP: No; I only learned here that this is supposed to have happened. I have no knowledge whatsoever about that. I heard about it here for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know it is true, don’t you?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know. I heard about it here for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember Keitel’s going in to speak to Hitler?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have already said that I did not hear about that. I do not know, I cannot say.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you know that Von Schuschnigg signed this document on the condition that within 3 days these demands would be fulfilled, otherwise Germany would march into Austria?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think it would be convenient if the witness had the German Document Book in front of him. I tried to get most of the pages agreeing.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, perhaps this would be a good time to break off.

[_A recess was taken._]

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, will you look first at the Defendant Jodl’s diary, the entry of the 13th of February, it is the Ribbentrop Document Book, Page 9, Exhibit Number USA-72, Document Number 1780-PS. The entry is as follows:

“In the afternoon General K.”—that is Keitel—“asks Admiral
C.”—that is Admiral Canaris—“and myself to come to his
apartment. He tells us that the Führer’s order is to the effect
that military pressure by shamming military action should be
kept up until the 15th. Proposals for these deceptive maneuvers
are drafted and submitted to the Führer by telephone for
approval.”

You were suggesting on Friday that the Defendant Jodl had got hold of some rumors or gossip that were going around the Berghof. That rumor or gossip was a definite order from his superior officer, General Keitel, wasn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: I know absolutely nothing about any military measures, therefore I cannot pass judgment on the value of this entry. The Führer did not inform me about any military measures regarding Austria.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal you were there, that you were taking part, handling the document, and that Hitler never said a word to you about what he was arranging with the Defendant Keitel, who was also there?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the next entry for the 14th of February:

“At 2:40 o’clock the agreement of the Führer arrives. Canaris
went to Munich to the Counterintelligence Office (Abwehrstelle
VII) and initiated the different measures. The effect was quick
and strong. In Austria the impression is created that Germany is
undertaking serious military preparation.”

Are you telling this Tribunal that you know nothing about either these military measures or the effect on Austria?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about the military measures, but I consider it quite possible that the Führer, in order to put more stress on his wishes, caused something to be done in this field...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, just a moment!

VON RIBBENTROP: ...and that may have contributed in the end to the solution of the problem.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I quite agree. That is just why I am putting it to you that it did contribute. But surely you as Foreign Minister of the Reich, with all the channels available to a foreign minister, knew something about the effect in Austria, which General Jodl was remarking, that “the effect was quick and strong.”—the impression was “created that Germany is undertaking serious military preparations.” Are you telling the Tribunal, on your oath, that you knew nothing about the effect in Austria?

VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to point out again that I did not know anything about military measures and, if I had known, I would not have the slightest reason not to say here that it was not so. It is a fact, however, that in the days before and after the conversations between the Führer and Schuschnigg, I was so busy taking over the Foreign Office that I treated the Austrian problem, at that time, merely as a secondary matter in foreign policy. I did not play a leading role in the handling of the Austrian problem...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We know you said that before, that you were engaged in the Foreign Office, and my question was perfectly clear—my question was: Are you telling this Tribunal that you did not know anything about the effect in Austria—you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich? Now answer the question. Did you or did you not know of the effect in Austria?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not know anything about that effect, and I did not observe it in detail either.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, that is your story and you want that to be taken as a criterion, a touchstone of whether or not you are telling the truth; that you, as Foreign Minister of the Reich, say that you knew nothing about the effect in Austria of the measures taken by Keitel on the Führer’s orders? Is that your final answer?

VON RIBBENTROP: To that I can tell you again quite precisely, I learned from the Führer when I went to London a little later, and that is absolutely the first thing I remember about the entire Austrian affair, that matters in Austria were working out more or less as agreed upon in the conversations in Berchtesgaden. I did not make any particular observations in detail at that time, so far as I remember. It is possible that this or that detail slipped my memory in the meantime, for many years have passed since then.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the next two entries in Jodl’s diary:

“15 February. In the evening, an official announcement about the
positive results of the conference at Obersalzberg was issued.”

“16 February. Changes in the Austrian Government and the general
political amnesty.”

Do you remember my putting to you what Herr Von Schuschnigg signed, and the condition was made that the matters would come into effect within 3 days; within 3 days there was a conference about the effects and the changes were announced in Austria in accordance with the note that you had put to Schuschnigg. You can see that that is clear, isn’t it—3 days—you still say...

VON RIBBENTROP: Of these 3 days, as I have told you already, I know nothing; but it was a matter of course that this meeting would have some results in the way of appeasing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You call it “appeasing”? Is that your considered view to the Tribunal, that assuming that the Defendant Jodl is telling the truth or assuming that the Defendant Keitel said that to him, as General Jodl was saying, that these military preparations should be put in hand, isn’t that the most severe political and military pressure that could be put on the chancellor of another state?

VON RIBBENTROP: If one considers the problem from a higher viewpoint, no; I have a different opinion. Here was a problem which might possibly have led to war, to a European war; and I believe, and I also said that later to Lord Halifax in London, that it was better to solve this problem than to allow it to become a permanent sore spot on the body of Europe.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t want to put words in your mouth. Do you mean by the last answer, that it was better that political and military pressure should be put on Schuschnigg, so long as the problem was solved? Is that your view?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not get that question. May I ask you to repeat it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My question was: Is it your view that it was better that political and military pressure should be put on Herr Von Schuschnigg if by that means the problem was solved?

VON RIBBENTROP: If by that means, a worse complication, that is to say a war was actually avoided, I consider that was the better way.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just tell me, why did you and your friends keep Schuschnigg in prison for 7 years?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, at any rate, I believe Schuschnigg—I do not know the details—must at that time have done something which was against the State or the interests of the State. But if you say “prison”, I know only from my own recollection that the Führer said and emphasized several times that Schuschnigg should be treated particularly well and decently and that he was not in a prison but lodged in a house and also, I believe, that his wife was with him. I cannot, however, say more on the subject from my own experience and from my own observation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean “prison.” I will substitute for it “Buchenwald” and “Dachau”. He was at both Buchenwald and Dachau. Do you think he was enjoying himself there?

VON RIBBENTROP: I only heard here that Herr Schuschnigg was in a concentration camp; I did not know before.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just make a change, just try to answer my question. Why did you and your friends keep Schuschnigg in prison for 7 years?

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything on that point. I can only say and repeat, that, according to what I heard at that time, he was not in prison but confined in a villa and had all the comforts possible. That is what I heard to that time and I was glad about it because, as I have said already, I liked him.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There is one thing he did not have, Witness, he did not have the opportunity of giving his account as to what had happened at Berchtesgaden or of his side of the Anschluss to anyone for these 7 years, did he? That is quite obvious with all you say, that he was very comfortable at Buchenwald and Dachau, wherever he was, but comfortable or not, he didn’t get the chance of putting his side of the happenings to the world, did he?

VON RIBBENTROP: That I could not judge.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You couldn’t judge? You know perfectly well, don’t you, that Herr Von Schuschnigg was not allowed to publish his account of anything while he was under restraint for these 7 years? Don’t you know that quite well?

VON RIBBENTROP: That may be assumed...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now...

VON RIBBENTROP: It may have been in the interests of the State, however.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is your view of it. We will pass to another subject.

I am going to ask you a few questions now about your share in the dealing with Czechoslovakia. Will you agree with me, that in March of 1938, the Foreign Office, that is, you, through your ambassador in Prague, took over control of the activities of the Sudeten Deutsche Party under Konrad Henlein?

VON RIBBENTROP: I am sorry but that is not correct. May I explain...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Before you explain, I think you might save time if you look at the document book on Page 20 in your book, it is Page 31 in the English book, and listen while I refer you to a letter from your ambassador.

VON RIBBENTROP: Which number, please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 20. It is a letter from your ambassador in Prague to the Foreign Office.

If I may explain to the Tribunal, it is not the defendant’s document book, it is the Prosecution’s book. I will see, hereafter, that it is correct.

[_Turning to the defendant_]: Now, this letter from your ambassador to the Foreign Office...

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I know about that letter. May I...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just let me refer you to Paragraph 1. I refer you also to Paragraph 3, so you need not be worried that I shall miss it.

Paragraph 1:

“The line of German Foreign policy, as transmitted by the German
Legation, is exclusively decisive for the policy and tactics of
the Sudeten German Party. My”—that is, your
ambassador—“directives are to be complied with implicitly.”

Paragraph 2:

“Public speeches and the press will be co-ordinated uniformly
with my approval. The editorial staff of _Zeit_ is to be
improved.”

Paragraph 3:

“Party leadership abandons the former intransigent line which,
in the end, might lead to political complications, and adopts
the line of gradual promotion of Sudeten German interests. The
objectives are to be set in every case with my participation and
to be promoted by parallel diplomatic action.” (Document Number
3060-PS)

Having read that, don’t you agree with me—what I put to you a moment ago—that the activities of the Sudeten German Party were to take place according to the directives?

VON RIBBENTROP: May I state an opinion on that now?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would like the answer to that question first, and I am sure the Tribunal will let you make an explanation. It is perfectly easy to answer that question “yes” or “no”. Isn’t it right that that letter shows that the Sudeten German Party was acting under your directives; isn’t that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Why not?

VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to explain. This letter in itself is a crowning proof of the fact that things were quite to the contrary. Between the Sudeten German Party and many agencies in the Reich, connections had been established; this was quite natural, because there was a very strong movement among the Sudeten Germans which was striving for closer connection with the Reich, especially after Adolf Hitler had come to power. These tendencies were beginning to impair the relations between Germany and Czechoslovakia and this very letter bears proof of the fact that I attempted gradually to put these uncontrolled connections, which existed between the Sudeten Germans and the Reich, in some way under control.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not what I am asking you, Witness. What I put to you, and I put it to you three times, I think, quite clearly: Does this letter show that that Party, the Sudeten German Party, was from that time acting under your directions? Are you still denying that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I deny that emphatically. The case is just the opposite. This letter indicates an attempt to direct the German-Czech relations, which had become very difficult due to the natural desire of the Sudeten Germans to establish closer relations with the German people, into right and sensible channels, which however, shortly after this letter, unfortunately failed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, if you deny what I have put to you, what is meant when your ambassador writes to the Foreign Office and says that the line of German policy, as transmitted by the German Legation, is exclusively decisive for policy and tactics of the Sudeten German Party? What does that mean if it doesn’t mean what you have said—that the Party was acting under your direction? What else can it mean if it doesn’t mean that?

VON RIBBENTROP: It means exactly what I have said, that the legation should try to induce the leadership of the Sudeten Germans to adopt a sensible program, so that the illegal tendencies which were existent should not lead to difficulties in German-Czech relations. That was at that time the purport of the conversation with the legation in Prague and that is quite clearly expressed by this letter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us see what this sensible program which you were suggesting was. The next day, on the 17th of March, Konrad Henlein writes to you and suggests a personal talk; and if you will turn over to Page 26 of the German document book—Page 33 of the English—you will find the note of the personal talk which you had at the Foreign Office on the 29th of March with Henlein, Karl Hermann Frank, and two other gentlemen whose names are not so well known. (Document Number 2788-PS, Exhibit Number USA-95) I only want you to look at four sentences in that, after the first one: “The Reichsminister started out by emphasizing the necessity to keep the conference, which had been scheduled, strictly a secret.”

And then you refer to the meeting that the Führer had had with Konrad Henlein the afternoon before. I just want you to have that in mind.

Now, if you will look down the page, after the “1” and “2”, there is a paragraph which begins “The Foreign Minister”, and the second sentence is:

“It is essential to propose a maximum program which as its final
aim grants full freedom to the Sudeten Germans. It appears
dangerous to be satisfied prematurely with promises of the
Czechoslovakian Government, which, on the one hand, would give
the impression abroad that a solution has been found and, on the
other hand, would only partially satisfy the Sudeten Germans.”

Then, if you will look one sentence further on, after some uncomplimentary remarks about Beneš, it says:

“The aim of the negotiations to be carried on by the Sudeten
German Party with the Czechoslovakian Government would finally
be to avoid entry into the government”—observe the next
words—“by the extension and gradual specification of the
demands to be made.”

And then you make the position of the Reich Cabinet clear:

“The Reich Cabinet”—the next sentence but one—“itself must
refuse to appear towards the government in Prague or towards
London and Paris as the advocate”—note the next words—“or
peacemaker of the Sudeten German demands.”

The policy which I suggest to you was now to direct the activities of the Sudeten Germans. They were to avoid agreement with the Czechoslovak Government, avoid participation in the Czechoslovak Government, and the Reich Cabinet in its turn would avoid acting as mediator in the matter; in other words, Witness, that you, through your influence on the Sudeten Germans, were taking every step and doing your utmost to see that no agreement could be reached on the difficulties or the minority problem. Isn’t that right? Isn’t that what you were telling them at that interview?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Give your explanation. What would you say these words meant?

VON RIBBENTROP: I summoned Konrad Henlein at that time, and believe it was the only time, or perhaps I saw him once more; unfortunately, only once or twice, in order to enjoin him, too, to work for a peaceful development of the Sudeten German problem. The demands of the Sudeten Germans were already far-reaching at that time. They wanted to return to the Reich. That was more or less tacit or was expressed. It seemed to me a solution which was dangerous and which had to be stopped in some way or another because otherwise it might lead to a war. Henlein finally came to see me then, but I wish to point out in advance that it was the only time, I believe, that I discussed the matter thoroughly with Henlein, and soon afterwards I lost control of the matter. The entire Sudeten German problem, that is, what is contained in this letter and about which there can be no doubt, is:

Firstly, that I wanted to bring the efforts of the Sudeten Germans to a peaceful development so that we could support it diplomatically also, which seemed to me absolutely justified.

And secondly, that in this way we should avoid the sudden development of a situation which, by acts of terror or other wild incidents, would lead to a German-Czech and European crisis.

Those were at that time the reasons why I summoned Henlein.

Now, as to the various sentences which the Prosecutor has read, it is clear that the Sudeten German Party had at that time very far-reaching demands. Naturally, they wanted Adolf Hitler to send an ultimatum to Prague saying “You must do that, and that is final,” and that is what they would have preferred.

We did not want that, of course. We wanted a quiet, peaceful development and solution of these things. Therefore, I discussed with Henlein at that time the way in which the Sudeten German Party was to proceed in order to put through their demands gradually. The demands which I had in mind at that time were demands for a far-reaching cultural autonomy, and possibly autonomy in other fields too.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you were thinking of cultural and social autonomy, why were you telling these gentlemen not to come to an agreement with the Prague Government?

VON RIBBENTROP: I could not specify that now. That may have been for tactical considerations. I assume that Konrad Henlein made such a suggestion and that I agreed with it. Naturally I did not know the problem too well in detail and this note must be—I presume that what happened was that Henlein himself merely explained his program—the details are not contained here—and that I agreed to it more or less. Therefore, I assume that at that time it seemed perhaps advisable to Henlein for tactical reasons not to enter into the government and assume responsibilities at that moment, but rather to try first to proceed with the matter in a different way.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was the 29th of March, and you have told the Tribunal a moment ago about your anxiety for peace. You very soon knew that there wasn’t going to be any question of relying on peaceful measures, didn’t you? Can you remember? Just try and apply yourself to it, because you have obviously been applying your mind to this. Can you remember when Hitler disclosed to you that he was making the military preparations for occupying Czechoslovakia that autumn?

VON RIBBENTROP: Adolf Hitler spoke very little to me about military matters. I do not remember such a disclosure, but I know of course that the Führer was determined to solve this problem at a fixed time; and according to the experiences which Germany had had in past years, it was for him a matter of course that to do this he was obliged, I might say, to take some sort of military measures in order to put more pressure on his demands.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me help you about that. Turn on to Page 31 of your document book. It is Page 37 of the English Document Book. (Document Number 2360-PS, Exhibit GB-134)

VON RIBBENTROP: Page 31?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 31 of your document book, yes. It is a quotation from Hitler’s speech in January 1939, but it happens to make clear this point. You see he says—have you got it, Witness?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “On the basis of this unbearable provocation, which was still further emphasized by truly infamous persecution and terrorizing of our Germans there, I have now decided to solve the Sudeten German question in a final and radical manner. On 28 May I gave:

“1. The order for the preparation of military steps against this
State”—that is Czechoslovakia—“to be completed by 2 October.

“2. I ordered the intensive and speedy completion of our line of
fortifications in the West.” (Document Number 2360-PS)

I want to remind you of that, because there was a meeting on the 28th of May, and that is Hitler’s own account of it. Put in another way, he said, “It is my absolute will that Czechoslovakia should disappear from the map.” And then he made clear the other thing about the defensive front in the West.

Now, do you remember that meeting, the 28th of May?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have here, I believe, seen the document about it. I do not recall the meeting.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if—I think Captain Fritz Wiedemann was still adjutant of the Führer at that time; it was before he went abroad—he says you were there, would you deny it?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have seen that, but I believe that is an error by Herr Wiedemann.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you think you weren’t there?

VON RIBBENTROP: I am inclined to believe that it is an error. At any rate I do not remember that meeting. I could not say for sure. Generally I was not drawn into military affairs, but in this case I cannot say for sure. But I knew that it was common talk that the Führer, in the course of the year 1938, became more and more determined to assure the rights, as he put it, of the Sudeten Germans; I knew that he had made certain military preparations for that purpose, but I did not know in what form and to what extent.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just to put your point of view fairly—I don’t want to put anything more into it—you knew that military preparations were being made, but you did not know the details of what we know now as “Fall Grün.”

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know any details; I never heard about them, but I knew that during the last weeks and months of the crisis...

DR. HORN: Mr. President, I object to this question. I believe I may, in order to save time, just point out that the entire Sudeten German policy was sanctioned by the four great powers, England, France, Italy, and Germany, and by the Munich Agreement which determined this policy. Therefore, I do not see that in this respect there can be a violation of International Law.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question is perfectly proper.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, at the time you knew enough to discuss the possible course of the possible war with the foreign personalities. Would you look on to Page 34, that is Page 40 of the English book. These are the notes of a discussion with the Italian Ambassador. I do not know which of your officials it took place with, but I want you to look at where it says in a handwritten note “only for the Reichsminister.”

“Attolico further remarked that we had indeed revealed
unmistakably to the Italians our intentions against the Czechs.
Also, as to the date he had information so far that he might go
on leave for perhaps 2 months, but certainly not later than...”
(Document Number 2800-PS)

If you look at the date you will see it is the 18th of July, and 2 months from the 18th of July would be the 18th of September. Then if you will look, a month later there is a note, I think signed by yourself, on the 27th of August:

“Attolico paid me a visit. He had received another written
instruction from Mussolini, asking that Germany communicate in
time the probable date of action against Czechoslovakia.
Mussolini asked for such notification, as Attolico assured me,
in order: ‘to be able to take in due time the necessary measures
on the French frontier.’

“Note: I replied to Ambassador Attolico, just as on his former
_démarche_, that I could not give him any date, that, however,
in any case Mussolini would be the first one to be informed of
any decision.” (Document Number 2792-PS)

So that it is quite clear, isn’t it, that you knew that the general German preparations for an attack on Czechoslovakia were under way but the date had not been fixed beyond the general directive of Hitler, that it was to be ready by the beginning of October. That was the position in July and August, wasn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: In August, 27 August, there was, of course, already a sort of crisis between Germany and Czechoslovakia about that problem; and it is quite clear that during that time there was some alarm as to the final outcome. And apparently, according to this document, I said to the Italian Ambassador that in case crisis developed into a military action, Mussolini would, of course, be notified in advance.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And Mussolini would be ready to make a demonstration on the French frontier in order to help forward your military plans; is that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is in this document, but I do not know anything about it. Perhaps Attolico said that; if it says so here he must have said it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, just turn over to about the same time, Pages 36 to 38, Pages 41 to 43 of the English book. I do not want to take up time in reading it all, but that is the account of the meeting which you had with the Hungarian Ministers Imredy and Kanya. And I should be very glad if, in the interest of time, you would try to answer the general question.

Weren’t you trying in your discussions with Imredy and Kanya to get the Hungarians to be prepared to attack Czechoslovakia, should war eventuate?

VON RIBBENTROP: I am not very familiar with the contents of this document. May I read it first, please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will just read to you...

VON RIBBENTROP: I may perhaps be able to answer it from recollection. I do not know exactly what the document says, but my recollection is, that at that time a crisis was impending. It is quite natural, if an armed conflict about the Sudeten German problem was within the realm of possibility, that Germany should then establish some sort of contact with neighboring states. That is a matter of course, but I believe...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you went a little beyond contacting them, didn’t you? The document says at the end of the sixth paragraph, “Von Ribbentrop repeated that whoever desires revision must exploit the good opportunity and participate.” (Document Number 2796-PS)

That is a bit beyond contacting people. What you are saying to the Hungarians is: “If you want the revision of your boundaries, you have to come into the war with us.” It is quite clear, isn’t it, Witness, that is what you were saying, that is what you were trying to do?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is exactly in line with what I just said. I do not know if that expression was used, but, at any rate, it is clear that at that time, I remember, I told these gentlemen that the possibility of a conflict was present and that in such a case it would be advisable if we reached an agreement regarding our interests. I would like to mention that Hungary, during all the preceding years, considered it one of the hardest conditions of the peace treaty that these territories in the north had been separated from her and naturally she was very much interested in the agreement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were very much interested in offering them revision. Just look at the last two paragraphs. It is headed “The 25th.” It should be Page 38 of your document book. It begins—the very end of this statement:

“Concerning Hungary’s military preparedness for participation in
case of a German-Czech conflict, Von Kanya mentioned several
days ago that his country would need a period of one or two
years in order to develop adequately the armed strength of
Hungary. During today’s conversation, Von Kanya corrected this
remark and said that Hungary’s military situation was much
better; his country would be ready, as far as armaments were
concerned, to take part in the conflict by 1 October of this
year.” (Document Number 2797-PS)

You see that? What I am putting to you, Witness, is this: That your position was perfectly clear. First of all, you get the Sudeten Germans under your control. Then you learned from Hitler that there were military preparations. Then you get the Italians in line. Then you get the Hungarians in line. You are getting everyone ready for aggression against Czechoslovakia. That is what I am putting to you. I want you to be quite clear about it, to be under no misapprehension. Now, look, what...

VON RIBBENTROP: May I answer to that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, if you like.

VON RIBBENTROP: I said once before that the Sudeten German Party was unfortunately not under my control. Moreover, it is and was my view that it was the fundamental right of the Sudeten Germans, according to the law of the sovereign rights of peoples which had been proclaimed in 1919, to decide themselves where they wanted to belong.

When Adolf Hitler came, this pressure to join the Reich became very strong. Adolf Hitler was determined to solve this problem, either by diplomatic means or, if it had to be, by other means. That was obvious, and became more so to me. At any rate, I personally did everything to try to solve the problem diplomatically. On the other hand, however, in order to bring about a situation such as eventually led to Munich, I naturally tried my utmost to surround Germany with friends in order to make our position as strong as possible in the face of such a problem.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You knew perfectly well, did you not, that the Fall Grün and Hitler’s military plans envisaged the conquest of the whole of Czechoslovakia? You knew that, didn’t you?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. As far as the Sudeten-German problem is concerned, the British Government themselves concluded the agreement at Munich by which the entire problem was solved in the way I always strove to achieve it by German diplomacy.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I am not going to argue politics with you on any point. I only remind you of this: That the Fall Grün and Hitler’s plans on this matter had been known to His Majesty’s Government only since the end of the war, when it came into our possession as a captured document. What I asked you was—you say that as the Foreign Minister of the Reich, you did not know of these military plans, that the conquest of the whole Czechoslovakia was envisaged? You say that? You want the Tribunal to believe that?

VON RIBBENTROP: I repeat again that I read about Fall Grün and the conception of Fall Grün here for the first time in the documents. I did not know that term before, nor was I interested. That the Führer envisaged a more far-reaching solution became, of course, clear to me later in the course of the subsequent developments and by the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just a moment. We will get to that in a moment. I just want you to look at the final act of preparation which you were doing, and I am suggesting for this clear aggression; if you will look at Page 45 in the book in front of you, you will see a note from the Foreign Office to the Embassy in Prague.

“Please inform Deputy Kundt, at Konrad Henlein’s request, to get
into touch with the Slovaks at once and induce them to start
their demands for autonomy tomorrow.” (Document Number 2858-PS)

That was your office’s further act, wasn’t it, in order to make things difficult for the Government in Prague? You were getting your friends to induce—to use your own word—the Slovaks to start an advance for autonomy, is that right? Is that what your office was doing?

VON RIBBENTROP: This is, beyond doubt, a telegram from the Foreign Office. I do no longer recall the details, but according to the contents, Henlein apparently approached us to send a telegram because Henlein was apparently of the opinion, at that time, that he should put the demands for autonomy to the Prague Government. How that came about, I could not say in detail today. I would like to emphasize again that Conrad Henlein’s activity—I say, unfortunately, and I said so before—was far beyond my control. I saw Henlein only once or twice during that entire time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to take you through all the details. You understand what I’m suggesting to you, that your office was now taking one of its last steps, because this was in the middle of the crisis, on the 19th of September, trying to weaken the Czech Government by inducing demands of autonomy from the Slovaks. You said that you were only passing on Henlein’s wishes. If you like to leave it at that, I shall not trouble you further. Besides, you suggested—I come on to what took place in the spring and ask you one or two questions about that. In the spring Hitler was out and you acquiesced in his wishes, without—I was going to say swallowing, but I want to choose my language carefully—to obtain the adherence of Bohemia and Moravia to the Reich and to make Slovakia separate from Bohemia and Moravia. Now, just look on to Page 65 of the book in front of you. That is a telegram in secret code from the Foreign Office, from yourself in fact; to the Embassy in Prague.

“With reference to telephone instructions given by Kordt today,
in case you should get any written communications from President
Hacha, please do not make any written or verbal comments or take
any other action but pass them on here by ciphered telegrams.
Moreover, I must ask you and the other members of the legation
to make a point of not being available during the next few days
if the Czech Government wants to communicate with you.”
(Document Number 2815-PS)

Why were you so anxious that your ambassador should not carry out these ordinary functions and form a channel of communication with the Czech Government?

VON RIBBENTROP: That happened as follows. I remember very well. That had the following reasons: The Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia, Chvalkovsky, on one of these days, it must have been the same day, approached the envoy in Prague, saying that President Hacha wished to speak to the Führer. I had reported that to the Führer, and the Führer had agreed to receive the Czechoslovakian Prime Minister or the Czechoslovakian President. The Führer said, at the same time, that he wished to conduct these negotiations himself and that he did not wish anybody else, even the legation, to interfere in any way. That, according to my recollection, was the reason for this telegram. No one was to undertake anything in Prague; whatever was done would be done by the Führer personally.

I wish to point out that also at that time signs of an impending crisis between Prague and ourselves became apparent. The visit of President Hacha or his desire to see the Führer can be explained as being the result of this situation in general.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like to remind you what you and the Führer were doing on that day. You will find that if you look at Page 66, which is 71 of the English book. You were having a conference, you and the Führer, with Meissner and the Defendant Keitel and Dietrich and Keppler; and you were having the conference with the Slovaks, with M. Tiso. Do you remember that conference?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I remember that conference very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, I will ask you a general question and perhaps without putting the details to you. What Hitler and you were doing at that conference was saying this to the Slovaks: “If you do not declare your independence of Prague, we shall leave you to the tender mercies of Hungary.” Isn’t that in a sentence a fair summary of what Hitler and you were saying at that conference?

VON RIBBENTROP: That is correct to a certain degree. But I would like to add a further statement to that. The situation at the time was as follows, and one has to look at it from a political point of view: The Hungarians were highly dissatisfied and they wanted to regain the territories which they had lost by the peace treaty and today form a part of Czechoslovakia, that is the Slovak part of Czechoslovakia. There were, therefore, constantly great differences between Pressburg (Bratislava) and Budapest and, chiefly, also between Prague and Budapest. The outbreak of an armed conflict could be expected at any time; at least half a dozen times we were given to understand by the Hungarian Government that this could not go on forever; that they must have their revision in one way or the other. The situation was such that for quite some time very strong movements for independence existed among the Slovaks. We were approached on this matter quite frequently, at first by Tuka and later by Tiso. In this conference described here, the situation was that the Führer, who knew for weeks of the endeavors of the Slovaks to become independent, finally received Tiso, later President of the State, and told him that now, of course—I believe he told him during this conversation—that he was not interested in the question for its own sake. But if anything should happen at all, then the Slovaks must proclaim their independence as quickly as possible. There is no doubt that at the time we expected an action by Hungary. It is, however, correct...