Chapter III: Front Matter (3)
DR. SEIDL: The next witness admitted by the Tribunal for the Defendant Hess is the witness Karl Strölin. In order to save time I have also prepared an affidavit for this witness, and I ask the Tribunal to inform me whether we will follow the same procedure with this witness as with the witness Bohle, or whether the Prosecution agree that only the affidavit should be presented.
THE PRESIDENT: Have they seen the affidavit?
DR. SEIDL: I gave the affidavit to the Prosecution this morning.
SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have got an English translation of the affidavit. There are one or two questions the Prosecution want to put to the witness, so I suggest that the most convenient course would be if Dr. Seidl did as he did with the last witness, to read the affidavit, and then after the affidavit is read, the few questions that the Prosecution desire to be put can be put to him.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, very well.
COL. POKROVSKY: I must report to you, Mr. President, that as far as this document is concerned, the Defense Counsel has violated the procedure you have established; the Soviet Prosecution received this affidavit only a very short time ago—about 1 or 2 hours ago—and it was not received by us in Russian but in English. Therefore, I had the opportunity of familiarizing myself with it only very slightly, and I ask to have the presentation of this document postponed until such time when the order of the Tribunal is complied with, in other words, not until we have received our document in Russian.
THE PRESIDENT: But, Colonel Pokrovsky, in the interest of the time of the Tribunal, wouldn’t it be better to get on with it now? Sir David has apparently seen the affidavit and read it in English, and if he is satisfied upon that, wouldn’t it be better to go on with it now rather than to postpone it?
You see, Dr. Seidl has actually been allowed this witness, so that it is only a question of time, doing it by way of an affidavit when he can call him, and he can then ask him questions.
COL. POKROVSKY: I must repeat that I have familiarized myself with this document very slightly. As far as I can understand, it is of no particular interest to the Soviet Delegation; it is of greater interest to the British Delegation...
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, you see the witness was allowed to Dr. Seidl. Therefore, Dr. Seidl could have put him on the witness box and could have asked him questions, and the only reason for doing it by way of an affidavit is to get the matter more clearly and more quickly. So if we were to order that this affidavit was not to be used, we should then have Dr. Seidl asking the witness questions, and probably, I am afraid, taking up rather longer than it would to read the affidavit, and you would not object to that.
COL. POKROVSKY: Perhaps the Tribunal would find it advisable to have Dr. Seidl ask the witness those questions which have already been answered in the affidavit? It seems to me that that would give us an opportunity to reconcile this contradiction, especially since there are only a few questions, and the first three, as far as I can understand, are mostly of a historical nature and connected with the organization of the Institute in Stuttgart in 1917.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Pokrovsky, I have not read the affidavit yet so I am afraid I am not in a position to present the question which you wish me to present.
COL. POKROVSKY: All right, I withdraw my objection.
THE PRESIDENT: Call your witness then now.
[_The witness Strölin took the stand._]
What is your name?
KARL STRÖLIN (Witness): Karl Strölin.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: “I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.”
[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.
DR. SEIDL: Witness, you were last Lord Mayor of the City of Stuttgart; is that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: In this capacity were you also Honorary President of the German Auslands-Institut?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
DR. SEIDL: You signed a sworn affidavit this morning which I shall now read to you.
“1. The German Auslands-Institut was founded in Stuttgart in the
year 1917. The fact that Stuttgart was chosen as the seat of
this institute is connected with the fact that the Swabian
district has always furnished a particularly high percentage of
emigrants. That is precisely why there arose in Stuttgart the
need to create an institution for the purpose of preserving the
national ties between the old and the new homeland. The German
Auslands-Institut was to serve this purpose. It had the
following aims:
“(a) Scientific research on Germanism in the world.
“(b) Maintaining cultural connections with the emigrants.
“(c) Informing the people at home about Germanism abroad and
about foreign countries.
“For scientific research the German Auslands-Institut had a
library of more than one hundred thousand volumes on folklore
and an archive for newspaper files concerning Germanism abroad.
For this purpose nearly all newspapers which were published
abroad in the German language and a large number of newspapers
in foreign languages were subscribed to and their contents
evaluated. An extensive collection of pictures was in one filing
room. As the Germans abroad became increasingly interested in
the homeland, genealogical research took on ever greater
proportions.
“In addition to its activities of collecting and registering,
the German Auslands-Institut also had advisory and
representative functions. The question of emigration was also a
subject for consultation for a long time. This required that the
German Auslands-Institut be informed regarding the living
conditions and the possibility of finding employment in the
individual areas favored by emigrants. The records of the German
Auslands-Institut were placed at the disposal of the various
offices and organizations upon request. The representative
activities of the German Auslands-Institut consisted mainly in
organizing exhibitions. The center of this activity was the
Museum of Germandom Abroad, in Stuttgart.
“The scientific work of the German Auslands-Institut found
expression particularly in the books, magazines, and calendars
about the homeland which it published. The connections with the
Germans abroad were maintained by sending out such publications.
The guiding thought of the German Auslands-Institut in its
relations with the Germans abroad was that these Germans abroad
were to be the connecting links between nations in order to
strengthen mutual understanding and the desire for co-operation.
They were to be the envoys of friendship between their old and
their new homeland.
“As President of the German Auslands-Institut, I particularly
emphasized this thought in the speech which I made at Madison
Square Garden in New York City in October 1936 on the occasion
of German Day. Moreover the German Auslands-Institut had no
agencies or representatives abroad acting as liaison for these
corresponding members. Direct or individual care for Germans
abroad was not the task of the German Auslands-Institut. The
welfare of German nationals abroad was taken care of by the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP. Relations with the
Volksdeutsche were maintained by the Volksbund für das
Deutschtum im Ausland (League For Germans Abroad).
“2. The German Auslands-Institut never engaged in any activities
which could be termed Fifth Column activities. No one has ever
made a request of this nature to me or to the Institut.
“3. Rudolf Hess, the Deputy of the Führer, did not exert any
influence on the activities of the Institute. He issued no
directives or instructions which could have induced the
Institute to undertake any activity along the lines of Fifth
Column work.”
Witness, are these statements correct?
STRÖLIN: These statements are correct.
DR. SEIDL: I have at the moment no further questions to direct to the witness.
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the defendants’ counsel wish to ask any questions of this witness?
DR. OTTO FREIHERR VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, with the permission of the Tribunal I should like to ask you a few questions.
First, from when to when were you Lord Mayor of Stuttgart?
STRÖLIN: From 1933 until the end of the war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And how long have you known the Defendant Von Neurath? What was his position at that time and what was his reputation?
STRÖLIN: I have known Herr Von Neurath since the first World War. At that time, at the end of the first World War, he was Chief of the Cabinet of the King of Württemberg, and his reputation was excellent. In my capacity as Lord Mayor I met Herr Von Neurath frequently. In 1938 Von Neurath became an honorary citizen of the city of Stuttgart.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you enter in still closer relations with him later when he returned from Czechoslovakia?
STRÖLIN: When he returned from Czechoslovakia Herr Von Neurath retired to his estate of Leinfelden in the vicinity of Stuttgart, and here I had closer and more active connection with him.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What do you know about his ancestry, his family, his education, his personality, in general?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath comes from an old Swabian family. His father was Lord Chamberlain of the King of Württemberg. His grandfather and his great-grandfather were ministers. Von Neurath was very much respected as a high-minded character, a distinguished personality, always ready to help, extraordinarily humane, very conscientious, straightforward and frank.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During his activity as Foreign Minister and possibly later, did you have an opportunity to discuss politics with him and particularly his views on foreign policy?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath repeatedly discussed these matters with me, but of course, only in general terms. As Reich Foreign Minister he was convinced that Germany would succeed in getting by peaceful means the place in the world which she deserved. He rejected any other way. He strove to build up and strengthen relations of mutual confidence with other European powers, particularly with England. He was convinced that it was precisely in this field that he had done everything possible.
Later, I had occasion to examine with him Henderson’s book _Two Years with Hitler_, which particularly emphasized how extremely popular Von Neurath had been in London at that time. I recall that we also discussed the sentence written by Henderson, that he acknowledged Von Neurath’s honest devotion to peace and to peaceful and friendly relations with England. Von Neurath was also greatly concerned with the cultivation of better relations with the United States. I recall that he discussed the subject with me after my trip to America and said that I had done well to emphasize in my various speeches Germany’s desire for friendship with the United States. I also remember how severely Von Neurath criticized the tone of Hitler’s speech made in the beginning of 1939 in reply to Roosevelt’s message. He said at that time that the international tension had been increased by that speech. Then Von Neurath spoke of the Munich Agreement, in which he had been an active participant. Later he very frequently spoke of the tragedy that was implicit in the fact that, despite all efforts, the relation between England and Germany had not remained one of continuing confidence. He pointed out how tragic it was for Europe and for the world. All my conversations with Von Neurath convinced me that he desired an understanding and a peaceful settlement, and that he would never have pursued a policy that might lead to war.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What were the reasons for his appointment as an honorary citizen of Stuttgart? This happened after he resigned his office as Reich Foreign Minister, did it not?
STRÖLIN: He was appointed in 1938, on the occasion of his 65th birthday on 2 February 1938. This appointment was to express to Von Neurath the gratitude and appreciation not only of the people of Stuttgart but of all Swabia for his manifest love of peace and the calm and prudence with which he had conducted foreign affairs. It was also a token of respect for his honest and incorruptible character.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Witness, the British Prosecution assert that Herr Von Neurath repeatedly assured foreign governments or their representatives that Germany had no military or aggressive intentions toward these states, but that these assurances were, in fact, given for the sake of appearances, in order to lull these states into a false sense of security, because even then Von Neurath knew and approved of the fact that Hitler actually had aggressive intentions toward these states.
From your knowledge of his personality do you consider Von Neurath capable of such infamy?
STRÖLIN: No, I do not consider him capable of such action.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did Herr Von Neurath inform you, at the time, of his resignation from his position as Foreign Minister?
STRÖLIN: By chance, I was with Von Neurath in the Foreign Ministry on 4 February 1938 at the very moment when his resignation was accepted. He described how this resignation came about. He said that until the end of the year 1937 he had been convinced that Hitler was completely in sympathy with the foreign policy which he was pursuing and that Hitler as well as himself had not wanted to chance an armed conflict, but at the end of 1937 Hitler had altogether unexpectedly changed his attitude; he had suddenly struck a different note, and it was impossible to decide whether it was to be taken seriously. Von Neurath went on to say that in a personal conversation with Hitler he had attempted to persuade him to give up this altered view, but that he had the impression that he had lost his influence over Hitler, and this prompted him to submit his resignation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: After, or rather simultaneously with his discharge from the foreign ministry, Von Neurath was appointed President of the Secret Cabinet Council. Do you know anything about this appointment—how and why he received it and what he did in this capacity?
STRÖLIN: He received this appointment as President of the Secret Cabinet Council at the same time that his resignation was accepted, but this Cabinet never convened; this was also true of the Reich Cabinet. The Secret Cabinet was to be convened by Hitler personally, and Hitler had simply not done this. Von Neurath believed later that he had been appointed to this post as president only in order to conceal from foreign countries that the former Foreign Minister no longer had any influence on the policy of the Reich.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, I do not see how this witness can know whether the Secret Cabinet Council was ever called. In any event we have already heard it from Göring, and presumably we shall hear it again from the Defendant Von Neurath, in which case it is grossly cumulative. I do not think we should waste the time of the Tribunal with it.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you occasionally speak to Von Neurath regarding his attitude and relations toward the Nazi Party?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath’s attitude toward the Party was critical and disapproving; at first he disapproved and waited to see what would develop. His relations with the Party were bad. The Party was of the opinion that Von Neurath was not a National Socialist.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you ever discuss with him the policy of the Nazis toward the Christian churches, that is, the Catholic and the Protestant Church?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath was a faithful Christian and disapproved of the policy of the Party toward the Christian churches. He particularly supported Bishop Bohr’s efforts to maintain freedom of religion. He repeatedly used his influence to see to it that seminaries which had been requisitioned were released. Following a discussion with Von Neurath I visited Minister for Churches Kerrl personally and discussed with him the question of the policy toward the Church. I discovered that Minister for Churches Kerrl was making every effort to represent and carry out the ideas of positive Christianity. However, he did not succeed because his work was continually sabotaged, particularly by Himmler and Bormann.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Later, when Herr Von Neurath retired to his estate of Leinfelden, did you discuss his activities as Reich Protector with him?
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath said that he took the post as Reich Protector in Bohemia and Moravia most unwillingly, and that he had refused it twice, but finally decided that he must make this sacrifice. He believed that it was precisely there that he could act as an intermediary and bring about reconciliation. He had personal difficulties with Himmler and Frank; he told me of his efforts to gain better treatment for the Czechs, and of the protests which he made to Hitler in vain. Once, when I visited Von Neurath in Prague, I was invited to visit President Hacha, who told me emphatically how pleased he was that Von Neurath had been sent to Bohemia and Moravia, for he enjoyed fullest confidence and performed in every respect a conciliatory function. Von Neurath told me that he was recalled and replaced because in his treatment of the Czechs he was too mild for the Führer, who preferred a particularly trustworthy SS-leader in that position.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Who was to be appointed to that post?
STRÖLIN: That was Heydrich.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was that Herr Von Neurath’s reason for resigning?
STRÖLIN: Evidently.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, Von Neurath was also an Honorary Gruppenführer of the SS. Did he tell you how he attained this—let us say—honor?
STRÖLIN: He told me that he was appointed honorary leader of the SS without having been consulted. When he asked the reason, Hitler told him that Mussolini was soon to pay a visit and that he, Hitler, wanted everyone in his attendance to wear a uniform. Since Von Neurath had no uniform he appointed him an honorary leader of the SS. Von Neurath said he did not intend to become one of Himmler’s subordinates. Thereupon Hitler told him that that was not necessary; it was merely a question of wearing a uniform.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Herr Von Neurath’s attitude toward war?
STRÖLIN: On the first day of the war I saw Von Neurath to the railroad station. He was depressed and rather dismayed. He called the war a terrible disaster, a gamble with the existence of the nation. He said that all his work from 1932 to 1938 had thereby been destroyed. I understood that during the war he saw the Führer occasionally, and on each such occasion he used the opportunity to ask Hitler to consider the idea of peace. That he, Neurath...
THE PRESIDENT: How can the witness say this? He was not present at these meetings; how can the witness tell us what the Defendant Von Neurath said to the Führer?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: As you will understand, that is what the defendant told him. That was told the witness by the defendant directly.
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath told me so repeatedly. He told me...
THE PRESIDENT: It will be all extremely cumulative.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I do not believe so. The witness himself needs only to corroborate this to the Prosecution.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, the Tribunal imagines that the Defendant Von Neurath will give this evidence himself, and the Tribunal does not wish to hear evidence from witnesses that was told to them.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Very well, I shall dispense with any further questions along those lines. I should like to ask only one more question.
[_Turning to the witness._] Did not Von Neurath, with you and other people, make an effort to put an end to the war and to the Hitler regime, or at least consider the possibility of doing so?
Now these are facts that the witness knows from his own observation.
STRÖLIN: Von Neurath discussed this question with me on several occasions after his return from Prague. He tried particularly to bring about a meeting of the Reich Cabinet, as did the other ministers, but he did not succeed, since Hitler disapproved of this Reich Cabinet as a “defeatists’ club.” As a preliminary step for ending the war Von Neurath tried to bring about a change of ministers and the appointment of a Reich Chancellor, which was also widely demanded. This also failed. During the year 1943 Neurath became more and more convinced...
THE PRESIDENT: This is the same thing over again—nothing about what Von Neurath did but all about what Von Neurath said to this witness.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I beg your pardon; these are only preliminary remarks to clarify what is to follow.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought you said you had one last question?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, we come to that now. The question shows the attempts he made to carry out his intentions.
STRÖLIN: When Von Neurath failed in his attempts at reform, that is, when he saw that it had miscarried and that Hitler’s attitude was negative and intransigent, Von Neurath came to the conviction, at the beginning of 1944, that the saving of Germany from complete destruction must not be wrecked because of Hitler. He considered the question of how to speak to Hitler once more and persuade him to end the war. He thought of Field Marshal Rommel and asked me to discuss the matters with him. Rommel was at that time very popular in Germany and abroad, and Von Neurath believed that due to the position he held, Rommel was the right person to replace Hitler, if necessary. In the beginning of March 1944, I went to Field Marshal Rommel and discussed the matter with him. Rommel was just as critical of the situation. I knew him from the first World War, so that I could speak to him frankly. He was also of the opinion that if the war could not be won on a military basis, unnecessary bloodshed and senseless destruction...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, we really do not want all this conversation between this witness and Rommel. We do not want it. We will not hear the conversation between this witness and Rommel.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Nor do I want the witness to discuss this matter.
THE PRESIDENT: Why don’t you stop him then? Why don’t you stop him?
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I did not want to hear it from the defendant himself, but from the person who was employed by the defendant to take these steps. That in my opinion has more weight than if the defendant makes the statement himself. That is why I asked the witness about it. But it is almost finished now.
THE PRESIDENT: When we come to the defendant then we will not hear him on these subjects.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: No, that is not intended—moreover, as far as I know, the matter will be finished with just a few words. Please, Witness.
STRÖLIN: Upon Von Neurath’s instigation, Rommel wrote a letter to Hitler saying that because of the military situation he believed that it would not be possible to continue the war, and that he, Rommel, suggested to Hitler that he start political negotiations. Consequently, as he told me, after his accident Rommel fell from favor for this reason, and thus Von Neurath’s attempt to end the war with Rommel’s aid also failed.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And then came 20 July and soon afterwards the end.
I have no more questions, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.
[_A recess was taken._]
THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the other defendants’ counsel want to ask questions of this witness?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: May the witness be handed GB-262 (Document Number 3258-PS). My Lord, that is the same document of which an extract has already been handed up to the Tribunal while I was cross-examining the last witness.
Witness, I want to be quite clear as to what you say about the Deutsches Auslands-Institut. Do you say that that institute had no connection with either Hess or the Auslands-Organisation?
STRÖLIN: The Deutsches Auslands-Institut had no connection with Hess. The connection with the Auslands-Organisation was due to the fact that the Auslands-Organisation had its meetings at Stuttgart.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: So that the fact that the Auslands-Organisation and the Deutsches Auslands-Institut both had their meetings at Stuttgart, that is the only connection between the two organizations; is that so?
STRÖLIN: The Auslands-Organisation, to my knowledge, did not consult the German Auslands-Institut on practical matters, for it had its own collection of material. The Auslands-Organisation was, as far as I know, created in the year ’32, and...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, I do not want to stop you, but if you can answer my question “yes” or “no” it will save us all a great deal of time. I will repeat my question in case you are not quite clear about it. Do you say that the fact that both those organizations held their meeting in Stuttgart is the only connection between the two? Now you can answer that “yes” or “no.”
STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that with “yes” or “no.” I must say that the connecting link was the fact that Stuttgart was the city of foreign Germans and so to speak the representative of Germans abroad, because of its past history.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you read English?
STRÖLIN: A little.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 461 of the book that you have? At the bottom of Page 461 you will see reproduced a copy of an article from the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ of 21 September 1933.
The Tribunal will find the extract on Page 4 of the translation.
That article describes the annual meeting of your institution, after its reorganization in 1933 when the Nazi Party came to power. I want to read just four short extracts from that article 2 and ask you for your comments.
“The chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, Lord Mayor,
Dr. Strölin, opened the celebration.”
That is yourself presumably; is that so?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Among those present, he greeted in
particular, Minister President and Minister of Religion in
Württemberg, Mergenthaler, as the representative of the
supervisory authorities; General Haushofer of Munich as
representative of Rudolf Hess, who has been entrusted by the
Führer with the supreme direction of all matters concerning
Germans in foreign countries....”
Did you say that?
STRÖLIN: I cannot remember having said that. Haushofer was for me the representative of the VDA, and I cannot conceive how he could have been the deputy of Hess at this occasion. However, it is probably true.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you think the Tribunal is safe in taking it that the _Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt_ on the day after that celebration would accurately report what you said in your opening address?
You need not look at the rest of it for the moment. It is not likely that that article is untrue or incorrect, is it?
STRÖLIN: No, the article is probably correct, but I did not remember—now looking back—that Haushofer was at that time the deputy of Hess, for Rudolf Hess had no connection with the Deutsches Auslands-Institut as such.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It appears that you are saying there, and you are saying it in a speech, that Haushofer is representing Hess, and that Hess has been charged by the Führer with the supreme command of all matters concerning Germans in foreign countries. Do you understand what you are saying there?
STRÖLIN: Yes, it may have been put that way at that time, but in practice, it never happened that I received a directive of any kind from Rudolf Hess.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Your institution could correctly be said to concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign countries, could it not?
STRÖLIN: I did not understand the question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Did your institution, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut, concern itself in matters concerning Germans in foreign countries?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I shall leave that. Will you look down the page and omit the next...
STRÖLIN: I would like to add to this point. It was the first time that I made a speech for the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the speech was, of course drafted with the approval of the personalities who were to be welcomed there. I cannot longer remember that Haushofer was present in that capacity on that occasion and can merely repeat my statement that as the honorary president of the Institute I know nothing of Rudolf Hess having given directives to the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You may have known nothing about it, but you were the new chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut at that time, were you not?
STRÖLIN: No, I was not the chairman. The chairman of the Institute was a special leader. In my capacity as Lord Mayor it was merely one of my many extra duties to act as president of the Institute. It is quite impossible for me to remember which personalities I greeted at the time, and how I did it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Please confine yourself to answering the particular question I put to you: Were you or were you not the chairman of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut on 20 September 1933?
STRÖLIN: Yes, I was appointed to that position at that time.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You had just been appointed because you were a good Nazi and the Nazi Party had come to power and was reorganizing this institution.
STRÖLIN: I was appointed to this post because I was Lord Mayor of Stuttgart and because later the city of Stuttgart was called the “City of Germans Abroad” since, because of its history and tradition it had always had very close connection with Germans abroad.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, now, we will go on. Will you miss out the next short paragraph and look at the paragraph which starts off, “Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing Dr. Goebbels, stated the local Party leadership...”
STRÖLIN: What page is that on?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: It is on the same page.
STRÖLIN: Page 461?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I beg your pardon, it is on Page 462. And it is the third paragraph in the center of the page.
STRÖLIN: Yes, I found the place.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: “Deputy Gauleiter Schmidt, representing
Dr. Goebbels, stated, ‘The local Party leadership (Gauleitung)
is prepared to co-operate through thick and thin with the new
officers of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut.’”
Hess, you know, was in charge of the Party leadership, wasn’t he—the Gauleiter? We will go on:
“National Socialism will demand the blood unity of all Germans
as its historic right.”
Will you look now at Page 463—we will leave that—Will you look now...
STRÖLIN: May I say something in connection with this?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: If you please, yes.
STRÖLIN: The Deputy Gauleiter, Schmidt, was here purely in his capacity as a deputy of the Gauleiter, but he was not the Deputy of Rudolf Hess.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No. But the point I am putting—I will make it quite clear—is that the Gauleitung which came under Hess was going to co-operate with your institution through thick and thin. You appreciate that?
STRÖLIN: That is obvious.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Would you look at Page 463, and on the second paragraph:
“In his address the new director of the DAI, Dr. Csaki, stated:
‘We followed with deep distress the inner disunity of the German
people. Now since all that has been overcome, since we see that
all the German Folk (Volksdeutsche) organizations are standing
in one line, we are filled with a feeling of pride for our
German mother-country, a feeling of happiness: Germany is
united.’
“‘The feeling of adherence to the German people gives us a happy
consciousness. In the course of centuries this or that position
has been lost. We must prevent any from being lost. It gives us
a feeling of pride and self-confidence that we are bridges for
the German Lebensraum.’”
Was that in fact what the purpose of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was?
STRÖLIN: Dr. Csaki said in this quotation that the Germans abroad were bridges to the German Lebensraum. This German Lebensraum also applied, for instance, to the Germans in Hungary and Romania and to that extent it is true when he says the Germans are “bridges” to this Lebensraum, that is, the space in which Germans live. This has also always been the attitude of the Deutsches Auslands-Institut; to build bridges to the Lebensraum in which these Germans live.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well. Now, have you ever read a book by Dr. Emil Ehrlich, or seen it, entitled: _Die Auslands-Organisation der NSDAP_? You need not look at that. Have you ever read that book? A title of that kind?
STRÖLIN: I do not think so.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that Dr. Emil Ehrlich was the personal adviser to Bohle?
STRÖLIN: I believe he was Bohle’s adjutant at one time.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 305 of the book that you have in front of you—My Lord, this passage appears on Page 5 of the document the Tribunal has—and that is a reproduction of Dr. Emil Ehrlich’s book. Would you look at the second paragraph on Page 305, half way down that paragraph, starting:
“On 27 August 1936 the Führer designated Stuttgart as the ‘City
of Germans Abroad,’ and the Gauleiter of the
Auslands-Organisation of the NSDAP assumed protection of this
beautiful city, which also houses within its walls the German
Auslands-Institut, which works in hearty co-operation with the
Auslands-Organisation.”
Would I be right in saying that throughout the whole history, from 1933 onwards, the Deutsches Auslands-Institut was working in the heartiest co-operation with the Auslands-Organisation?
STRÖLIN: This is not correct, inasmuch as there was no practical or scientific co-operation between the Deutsches Auslands-Institut and the Auslands-Organisation. The hearty co-operation, as I have already mentioned, referred to the fact that the Ausland Germans had their meetings in Stuttgart. That was the hearty co-operation between them. There was no co-operation in practical matters since it was not necessary.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at Page 127 of this book? I want you to tell me, looking at the last paragraph, whether that is an accurate report, “All persons who in the future...” this is, I beg your pardon, a confidential report on the special schooling work conducted by the DAI for the foreign organizations. You did in fact, did you not, assist the foreign organizations in training their Landesgruppenleiter and other leaders abroad?
STRÖLIN: May I ask who signed this article or report?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No, I cannot tell you who signed that report. I asked you a question. Did the Deutsches Auslands-Institut assist in training leaders for the Auslands-Organisation abroad?
STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, just turn over to Page 128, second paragraph, which I read to you quite shortly:
“The Auslands-Institut plays a part in determining the
curriculum for the training camps (Schulungslager) as well as
serving as an intermediary between the party authorities who run
these camps and the Germans from abroad who attend them.”
You still say that that report is...
STRÖLIN: May I ask the date of this report?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I told you it is a report...
STRÖLIN: I had no knowledge of this report.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Very well, I just want to ask you one or two very short questions on the evidence that you have given about the Defendant Von Neurath. You have told us that he was a man of peace, with an excellent, kind character. Do you know that on the 5th of November 1937 he attended a meeting at which Hitler addressed the leaders of his Armed Forces? Did you ever hear of that meeting, on the 5th of November 1937?
STRÖLIN: No, I did not hear of this meeting, at least not until I was imprisoned.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well then, perhaps I could tell you quite shortly what took place. Hitler said at the meeting, among other things, that the only way out of the German difficulties was to secure greater living space, and he said that that problem could be solved only by force. And, having said that, he then went on to say that he had decided to attack Austria and Czechoslovakia. You never heard of that meeting?
STRÖLIN: No, I have not heard anything of that meeting, and concluded only later that...
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: But...
STRÖLIN: May I finish my sentence?
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I only wanted to know...
STRÖLIN: I said just that Von Neurath indicated to me that he had serious differences of opinion with Hitler. That was toward the end of 1937. It was only later that I realized that he must have meant the conference with Hitler and the attitude which he took on 5 November; however, it was only when I was in prison that I heard through the newspapers that such a conference actually took place.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I shall come to all that in a moment. I just want you to get a picture of what happened at this meeting, and I quote four lines from the minutes of that meeting:
“Hitler believed that very probably England and presumably
France had already secretly abandoned Czechoslovakia and were
satisfied that this question would one day be cleared up by
Germany.”
And Hitler then went on to say that the embodiment of Czechoslovakia and Austria would constitute a conquest of food for 5 or 6 million people, and that he visualized the compulsory immigration of 2 million people from Czechoslovakia.
Now, that is what took place at that conference. Do you know that some 4 months later—on 12 March 1938—Von Neurath was giving an assurance to M. Masaryk, and among other things he assured him, on behalf of Herr Hitler, that Germany still considered herself bound by the German-Czechoslovak Arbitration Convention of 1925? Do you know that he said that?
STRÖLIN: I do not recall it.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Can you understand, now that I have told you that that is a fact, can you understand anybody who had been at that conference and had heard what Hitler had said on 5 November giving an assurance to Czechoslovakia 4 months later in terms of that kind? Can you understand any honest man doing that?
STRÖLIN: I cannot judge the situation prevailing at that time. I do not know from whom Von Neurath might have received an order.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am not asking you to judge at that time. I am asking you now what your opinion is of a man who can do that sort of thing. I want you to tell the Tribunal.
STRÖLIN: I cannot answer that because I do not have a comprehensive picture of that situation.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I must under any circumstances object to this type of suggestive question. It is not permissible to put such a question to the witness without giving him the complete picture of how this assurance was given. The fact is, and it is correct, that in the speech of 5 November 1937, Hitler for the first time developed plans which were no longer in accord with the peace policy of Herr Von Neurath, and Von Neurath took the opportunity—I believe in December or early in January—to discuss this thoroughly with Hitler and point out to him the impossibility of the policy which he apparently wanted to embark upon and to persuade him not to carry it out. When from Hitler’s reply he was forced to the conclusion that Hitler would nevertheless insist on this policy which would lead to aggression in the future he submitted his resignation. On 4 February 1938 Herr Von Neurath was permitted to resign. He no longer participated in active politics.
On 11 or 12 March, when the invasion of Austria took place, an invasion of which Herr Von Neurath had no inkling until that day, Hitler called him...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Lüdinghausen, will you kindly wait? The question was put about the 5th of March 1938, whether a man who had heard the conference of the 5th of November 1937 could have given the assurance of the 5th of March.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, I can also clarify that statement, if I may. The question put by Minister Mastny was whether any military action against Czechoslovakia was intended immediately or soon after the invasion of Austria, and Herr Von Neurath believed that he could, honestly and as a gentleman, answer this question in the negative.
We have to take into consideration the circumstances under which this statement was made. First, Hitler, in his speech of 5 November 1937, spoke of the years to come. When he marched into Austria on 12 March, that is at a time which from 5 March...
THE PRESIDENT: Just one moment. We do not want to have all this argument. The question was what was this witness’ opinion of a man who had done that. That was all the question that was asked, and that question is put to credit...
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, I beg your pardon; no one can answer that question unless he knows in what connection it was put. Mr. Mastny asked whether the march into Austria would entail any aggressive action against Czechoslovakia and Von Neurath answered that question. No more and no less. He did not want to give an answer regarding the future. The Minister wanted to know whether in connection with the march of the German troops into Austria any military actions against Czechoslovakia were intended. According to the information which my client had, he could in the given situation answer this question in the negative with a clear conscience. This question is admissible only if the witness is informed about what I have just said. The point is not that he declared once and for all Germany will never march into Czechoslovakia, but that he merely answered the Czech Minister Mastny’s question: Is there any danger that in connection with the march into Austria, military measures will also be taken against Czechoslovakia? This question he could answer the way he did. Therefore, the question in the form in which it was put by the British Prosecution is in my opinion not admissible.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks the question properly admissible.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Well, we will not pursue the matter. I ask you just this one further question, so that I make myself quite clear. You said in your evidence, as I wrote it down, that the Defendant Von Neurath was well thought of, dignified and of noble character. Having heard what I have told you, are you still prepared to tell the Court that you think he is well thought of, dignified, and of noble character? Is that your opinion now? I just want to get the value of your evidence; do you see? After what you have been told is that your opinion?
STRÖLIN: It is still my opinion that Herr Von Neurath is a man of distinguished and decent character. I cannot judge under what circumstances he acted at the time and what considerations prompted him to act this way.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: You say that he was in favor of peace and did all he could to avoid a war. Do you call a deceit of that kind doing everything possible to avoid war? Is that what your idea of a peaceful policy is—giving assurance 4 months after you know perfectly well that the German intention is to overrun their country? Is that what you call doing everything to avoid war?
STRÖLIN: I would like to state once more that I do not sufficiently understand the essential points and ramifications of this question to form a proper opinion on it. But obviously things cannot be as simple as they have been pictured here.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Let me turn to another aspect of this matter. We have been told at great length that he disapproved of Hitler’s policy, and that he resigned. Do you know that, having resigned, he was appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia-Moravia in March 1939? Do you know that?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: That was after the remainder of Czechoslovakia had been overrun, occupied.
STRÖLIN: I said previously that Von Neurath told me that he accepted this post very reluctantly; that he had twice refused to accept it but later he believed that he had to make a sacrifice in order to achieve his ends; and, as the State President Hacha told me later, Von Neurath’s personal influence was of great benefit because, as Hacha told me, Von Neurath’s activity undoubtedly had a balancing and conciliatory effect. As I said before, he was recalled because he was too mild.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Now, you have already said it, and we have heard it, and we have remembered it, so it is quite unnecessary for you to say it again. Do try to answer my question shortly. Let me ask you this question. Have you ever thought that the reason for that appointment might have been as a reward for his assistance in the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia that had followed so shortly before?
STRÖLIN: No, I never thought of that. However, if I may mention it, I have read quite a different version in the book by Henderson, that is, that Von Neurath had been put into that post so that his international prestige could be discredited. I wanted to bring in this version in order to point out that there were other possibilities that might come into question.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you remember that you described him as a disciplined, humane, and conscientious man?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Will you look at that poster.
[_The poster was submitted to the witness._]
My Lord, I regret that I have not got a copy of this for the Tribunal. It is a very short matter. It has been introduced in the Czechoslovak report on the German occupation. I will give Your Lordship the number: Document Number USSR-60.
[_Turning to the witness._] Do you see that this is signed by the Defendant Von Neurath, the humane and conscientious man?
STRÖLIN: Yes, I see that the Czech universities were closed for a period of 3 years, and that nine culprits were shot. This announcement, however, does not say, as far as I can see, exactly why this was done. Consequently I cannot pass judgment on the announcement, because I do not know what Von Neurath proclaimed in it. The announcement does not tell me anything, if I do not know the reason why the announcement was issued. That universities were closed and nine culprits shot must have been for convincing reasons.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Mr. President, may I add the following? I would like to say this in order to save time. This question of Czechoslovakia and of this poster, with which I am also familiar, will, of course, be dealt with, in connection with Von Neurath’s case, and at that stage of the proceedings. I will then have the opportunity to bring the proof that this poster did not originate with the Defendant Von Neurath. This witness was not in Prague and can relate only things which he did not know of his own experience, but which Herr Von Neurath told him. Therefore, I believe that this question is not appropriate and is taking up time unnecessarily, for I would have to raise objections and describe the actual situation. We should not put questions to the witness which, though put in good faith, are positively incorrect, that is, questions which are based on inaccurately reported facts which actually occurred in a different manner. I shall prove that at the time when this poster was drafted and put up, Herr Von Neurath was not in Prague and was not informed of what was going on during his absence.
Therefore I believe that we should not deal with this question today, since, as I have said, the witness cannot know anything about it from his own observation.
THE PRESIDENT: It will be open to you to show that this poster was put up when Von Neurath was not at Prague, and that he gave no authority for it. That would clear him with reference to this poster; but what is being put to this witness is: Assuming that this poster was put up by Von Neurath, is it right to describe him as a humane man? That is all the cross-examination means.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But, the witness knows nothing of this poster. He cannot answer the question correctly if he does not know the ramifications, if he does not know that this poster actually did not originate with Herr Von Neurath.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness was examined at great length by you to show he was a humane man and had a very good character. Under such circumstances it is up to the Prosecution to put to the witness circumstances which would indicate that he was not of that humane character. That is all that is being done.
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that case the most this witness could say would be “I do not know,” or “if it is true, one cannot call it humane.” Any one of us can say that. The witness does not need to say it.
THE PRESIDENT: The witness can say, “If this is correct it is inconsistent with what I knew of Von Neurath.”
DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He cannot and he will not say that either, for the simple reason that he does not know the circumstances under which this poster was published. Frankly I cannot see the purpose of this question, for if the question is put in that way, every decent individual will say that it is inhumane; but this would not alter the fact that the witness would be judging facts which do not exist and which are not true.
THE PRESIDENT: Colonel Griffith-Jones, don’t you think this is really taking up unnecessary time, if this witness doesn’t know anything about it? I quite see that it is the proper purpose of cross-examination to discredit the witness.
LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am much obliged to the Tribunal. The point of that cross-examination was, perhaps I might be allowed to say, this: This defendant has produced a witness to give evidence on his oath before this Tribunal. If that evidence is unchallenged, then it goes down on the record, and there is nothing to stop this Tribunal from regarding this witness as a man who is in a position to give reliable evidence of that kind. This cross-examination is rather to show that this witness, whether he is saying it truthfully or untruthfully, is certainly inaccurate. The evidence he has given as to the good character of this defendant does not bear investigation—that is quite clear—and the Tribunal is not saying we are not entitled to cross-examine as to character. However, I do not think I need occupy the time of the Tribunal with that.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
COL. AMEN: Witness, when were you last in New York City?
STRÖLIN: I was in New York in 1936.
COL. AMEN: At that time you made a speech at Madison Square Garden; is that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: That was a rally in the Garden?
STRÖLIN: It was for “German Day,” on 6 October 1936.
COL. AMEN: A “German Day” rally, correct?
STRÖLIN: It was the annual meeting of the Germans which took place on 6 October.
COL. AMEN: And a great percentage of the German-American Bund, is that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: In fact, that whole rally was held under the auspices of the German-American Bund, was it not?
STRÖLIN: The fact is, a festival committee had been commissioned by all German clubs—I believe there are all in all two thousand of them in New York—and these 2,000 German clubs had united in one festival committee which organized the “German Day.” I did not know the composition of this committee in detail.
COL. AMEN: And it was at the solicitation of the German-American Bund that you made your speech, was it not?
STRÖLIN: No, it was at the solicitation of the festival committee of the German clubs of New York.
COL. AMEN: Yes, and on that committee were numerous members of the German-American Bund; is that true? “Yes” or “no.”
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And as a matter of fact, there were many of the members of your organization at that time who were active members of the German-American Bund; is that correct?
STRÖLIN: Yes.
COL. AMEN: And you personally had had several conferences with them, both here in Germany and in New York City, correct?
STRÖLIN: No, that is not correct.
COL. AMEN: Well, what is correct?
STRÖLIN: It is correct that I was invited, but there were no further conferences.
COL. AMEN: But you do not dispute that many of the members of your organization were at that time members of the German-American Bund?
STRÖLIN: I am not informed on that point.
THE PRESIDENT [_To the witness_]: I have just taken down that you have said that was so.
COL. AMEN: Precisely.
STRÖLIN: Please repeat the question.
COL. AMEN: Did you not just tell me a few moments ago, in response to a previous question, that many members of your organization were members of the German-American Bund at the time of your speech at the rally in Madison Square Garden?
STRÖLIN: When you speak of an “organization,” do you mean members of the German Auslands-Institut?
COL. AMEN: “Your organization” is the way I put it.
STRÖLIN: I had no organization; I had an institute.
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Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, Volume 10Chapter III: Front Matter (3)
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