Chapter XXI: Book 3: of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a (17)

GEN. RUDENKO: On Page 5 of the document, your appreciation of Hitler, you state, “After the victory over Poland and in the West, under an influence which I mainly ascribe to Himmler, Hitler’s plans were extended, that is, in the direction of establishing German hegemony in Europe.” Do you remember the passage of the document you wrote yourself, Defendant Ribbentrop?

VON RIBBENTROP: May I see this document? I do not know it.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I would like to ask counsel for Defendant Ribbentrop to submit this document to his client.

DR. HORN: Mr. President, we are dealing here with...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute.

Dr. Horn, the Tribunal is inclined to think that this document is quite irrelevant. It is apparently a document prepared by the Defendant Ribbentrop, upon the personality of the Führer. I do not know when it was prepared, but it seems to us to be irrelevant.

DR. HORN: Yes, Mr. President, I too am of the opinion that it is irrelevant. I included this document only in case the defendant did not have an opportunity to speak in greater detail of his relation to Hitler. Since he has had that opportunity I should like to withdraw the document.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, the Tribunal consider the document quite irrelevant.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, this document was presented by the defense counsel in the Document Book. It was written by the Defendant Ribbentrop in the course of this Trial. All the prosecutors considered it admissible since this document, this appreciation, presented by the Defendant Ribbentrop would justify us in asking a large number of questions. But if the Tribunal considers that it really is quite irrelevant to the case, I shall, of course, refrain from quoting it.

THE PRESIDENT: We have not yet had an opportunity of ruling on the admissibility of these documents. It is the first time we have seen them this morning. We all consider this document irrelevant.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President.

[_Turning to the defendant._] I should like to put a few questions with regard to German aggression against Yugoslavia. I should like you to acquaint yourself with Document 1195-PS. This document is entitled “Preliminary Directives for the Partition of Yugoslavia.” I invite your attention to Paragraph 4 of the first section of the document. It states: “The Führer has, in connection with the partition of Yugoslavia...” Have you found the place?

VON RIBBENTROP: Can you tell me, please, on what page it is?

GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4: “In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions...”

VON RIBBENTROP: I must have the wrong document.

GEN. RUDENKO; Document 1195-PS.

VON RIBBENTROP: Ah, yes. The beginning.

GEN. RUDENKO: I begin again:

“In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions:

“The transfer of territories occupied by the Italians is being
prepared for by a letter of the Führer to the Duce and will be
carried out by detailed directive of the Foreign Office.”

Have you found the place?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not see the place.

GEN. RUDENKO: Page 1, Paragraph 4, beginning with the words: “The Führer...” Do you have it?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have already read this paragraph into the record.

VON RIBBENTROP: It begins: “In connection with the partition of Yugoslavia, the Führer has issued the following instructions.” That is how the document begins. May I ask—now what passage are you quoting?

GEN. RUDENKO: It ends with the following words: “...will be carried out according to a detailed directive of the Foreign Office.” And then reference is made to a teletype from the Quartermaster General of the OKH.

VON RIBBENTROP: There must be some mistake. It is not mentioned here.

GEN. RUDENKO: Probably you did not find it in the document.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, it is 12:45 now. Perhaps this would be a good time to adjourn.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

GEN. RUDENKO: Defendant Ribbentrop, have you acquainted yourself with the contents of the document?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.

GEN. RUDENKO: Have you acquainted yourself with the entire document or with Paragraph 4 only?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have read Paragraph 1 of which you spoke previously.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you find the passage referring to the plenary powers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the partition of the territory of Yugoslavia?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, it says in my document that the surrender of the territory occupied by the Italians is to be prepared by a letter from the Führer to the Duce and put into effect on further instructions from the Foreign Office.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is correct. That is precisely the passage which I had in view, that is, Section 2 of this document, which is headed “The Delimitation of the Frontiers.” It is stated there—Section 2, Page 2 of the Document—it is stated:

“As far as the delimitation of the frontiers was not in the
foregoing Section I, this is done in agreement with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs....”

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I see that.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have only one question to ask in this connection. May I assume that this document defines the part played by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the partition of Yugoslav territory? Is this correct?

VON RIBBENTROP: That appears from the fact that the Foreign Office was to take part in fixing the other frontiers, in addition to those defined here, the main lines of which were probably, already, fairly clear. That is correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: This is quite evident. I should like to put two more questions to you concerning Yugoslavia.

On 4 June 1941—this no longer refers to the previous document—a conference was held in the German Legation, presided over by the German Minister in Zagreb, Siegfried Kasche, at which it was decided forcibly to evacuate the Slovenes to Croatia and Serbia and the Serbs from Croatia into Serbia. This decision results from a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Number 389, dated 31 May 1941. Do you know about these measures?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I do not know them, but perhaps I may read through them.

GEN. RUDENKO: Please do.

VON RIBBENTROP: I recollect that resettlement was undertaken there but I do not know the details.

GEN. RUDENKO: It goes without saying that it must be very difficult for you to remember all the details at the present time. But you do remember that such deportations did actually take place and precisely in accordance with the directives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. It states here that the Führer had approved a resettlement program, but I do not know the details. At any rate, we undoubtedly had something to do with it, for this meeting definitely took place in the Foreign Office; that is certain. Unfortunately I cannot add any details since I am not informed.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand you. There is one more question in this connection. This was a compulsory resettlement of the population?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know; I cannot say. No.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know? All right. And now the last question in connection with Yugoslavia: After Germany’s attack on Yugoslavia about 200 employees of the Yugoslav Foreign Office attempted to leave for Switzerland. They were arrested; and then, in spite of protests addressed to your Ministry, they were forcibly taken to Belgrade whence many of them were sent to concentration camps and there died. Why did you not take the measures which you were obliged to take after such a glaring breach of diplomatic immunity?

VON RIBBENTROP: I must say that at the moment I cannot recollect it at all; but, as far as I know, instructions have always followed the principle that diplomats must be treated as diplomats and sent back to their own countries. If it did not happen in this case, I do not know why it was not done. However you yourself say that they were sent to Belgrade. That, at any rate, is certainly in accordance with my instructions. Why or whether they were later interned in Belgrade, I must say I do not know. I do not think we had anything to do with that.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know that they were interned in concentration camps?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. Now for a further series of questions. Who, beside Hitler, signed the decree regarding the Sudetenland of 21 November 1938? Can you remember?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know to which order you are referring. May I look through it? I see that I am one of those who signed it. This is the law regarding the reincorporation of the Sudetenland into the Reich.

GEN. RUDENKO: You remember that you actually signed this decree?

VON RIBBENTROP: No doubt. If it says so here, then it must certainly have been so. At the moment, of course, I do not remember it exactly.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is evident. Who, beside Hitler, signed the decree regarding the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, of 16 March 1939, which by its very nature destroyed any remaining vestige of the sovereignty of the Czechoslovakian Republic?

VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that I was one of those who signed that one, too. At least so I assume. Yes, I see that I signed it; here it is.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, surely all these documents speak for themselves. The defendant has not challenged his signature upon these documents.

GEN. RUDENKO: I understand, Mr. President. I only want to remind the defendant. Since he appears to forget I simply present the documents to him.

[_Turning to the defendant._] You also signed the decree of 12 October 1939 regarding the occupation of the Polish territories. Do you remember that?

VON RIBBENTROP: 12 October ’39? No, I do not remember it. I signed a great many things during those years but I cannot remember them in detail.

GEN. RUDENKO: This is the decree dated 12 October.

THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, if he does not dispute his signature, why should you waste time in putting these documents to him? His signature is on the document. He does not dispute it. This is a mere waste of time.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Mr. President. Then I have only one more question in this connection.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Your signature also appears on the decree of 18 May 1940, regarding the annexation by Germany of the Belgian territories, Eupen and Malmédy.

I put these questions so that I may conclude with the following question. Am I right in stating that each time the Hitler Government was attempting to lend the appearance of legality to their territorial annexation by a decree, this decree invariably bore the signature of the Reich Minister Ribbentrop?

VON RIBBENTROP: I believe not. If any territorial changes were undertaken, it was the Führer who ordered them; and, as is probably evident from these documents, the various ministers who were in any way concerned then countersigned the Führer’s order or the laws decreed by the Führer, and, of course, I probably countersigned most of these orders myself.

GEN. RUDENKO: That is clear. Now, I should like you to acquaint yourself with the document already submitted in evidence to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-120 (Document Number USSR-120). It is your agreement with Himmler for the organization of intelligence work. It is an extensive document and I should like you to acquaint yourself with Subparagraph 6 of this document.

VON RIBBENTROP: I beg your pardon. This is a different document. This concerns the intelligence service. You spoke of slave labor, but this concerns the intelligence service.

GEN. RUDENKO: This has been incorrectly translated to you. I was not speaking about slave labor; I was speaking about intelligence work. Please refer to Subparagraph 6 of this document. It is an extensive document and the time of the Tribunal should not be taken up unduly. It is stated here, and I quote:

“The Ministry of Foreign Affairs gives every possible assistance
to the Secret intelligence service. The Minister of Foreign
Affairs, as far as this is compatible with the requirements of
foreign policy, will install certain members of the intelligence
service in the diplomatic missions.”

I want to omit one long paragraph and will read the final paragraph:

“The responsible member of the intelligence service must keep
the head of the mission informed on all important aspects of
secret intelligence service activities in the country in
question.”

You did sign such an agreement? Is that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: We are therefore forced to the conclusion that the foreign organization of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs was actually engaged in espionage work?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, you cannot really say that, for the following reasons:

I mentioned once before this morning in the course of the examination that there were differences of opinion between Himmler and myself in regard to the intelligence service abroad. Thanks to the efforts of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner, that agreement was eventually signed. We planned to co-operate, and I do not deny that we intended to work intelligence service personnel into the Foreign Office organization. This, however, was not put into practice. The agreement could not become effective because it was concluded so late that the end of the war intervened. I think the date of the conclusion of this agreement, which is lacking in this copy, must have been 1944 or even 1945. Thus, there was no actual co-operation. Such co-operation was, however, planned; and I was particularly interested in it. There had been all sorts of differences and I wanted to end them and put matters on a more uniform basis. That was the reason. In any case, I think that is part of the procedure which all countries had to employ abroad. I do not think it is anything unusual.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am not asking you your opinion. I was only interested in this document; it is true that you did sign such an agreement. You replied in the affirmative. I am not asking you further questions about this document.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I replied in the affirmative—yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: I wanted to know this only. I have another document from this series. Do you remember a letter of the Defendant Kaltenbrunner in which he asked for one million Tomans for bribery in Iran?

VON RIBBENTROP: One million...? What is that? I did not hear it; please repeat it. I did not hear the word very well...

GEN. RUDENKO: One million Tomans. Tomans are Iranian currency. I should like you to acquaint yourself with this document; it is a short one.

VON RIBBENTROP: May I see it, please?

GEN. RUDENKO: Of course.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. I recollect the matter, and I think certain funds were placed at their disposal.

GEN. RUDENKO: The money was placed at Kaltenbrunner’s disposal?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know the details, but I believe I did give instructions to the Foreign Office at the time that financial support should be given in this matter. That is correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: It was precisely that point which interested me. The document speaks for itself.

I now proceed to the following series of questions.

You have testified that in August or September 1940 in the Schloss Fuschl, you met the Defendant Keitel to discuss a memorandum on the possibility of an attack by Germany on the Soviet Union. Consequently, nearly one year prior to that attack on the Soviet Union, you were already informed of the plans for this attack, were you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. The Defendant Keitel was with me at the time at Fuschl, and on that occasion he told me that the Führer had certain misgivings regarding Russia and could not leave the possibility of an armed conflict out of his calculations. He said that, for his part, he had prepared a memorandum which he proposed to discuss with the Führer. He had doubts as to the wisdom of any conflict of that kind in the East, and he asked me at the time if I would also use my influence with the Führer in that direction. I agreed to do so. But an attack or plans for an attack were not discussed; I might say that all this was a discussion more from a General Staff point of view. He made no mention to me of anything more concrete.

GEN. RUDENKO: I do not want to detain the attention of the Tribunal on this question, because it has already been sufficiently investigated. But I want to ask you in this connection the following question: You replied to Keitel during this conversation that you would express your opinion regarding the war with the U.S.S.R. to Hitler. Did you have a conversation with Hitler on that subject?

VON RIBBENTROP: I discussed the subject several times with Hitler, and on this occasion I spoke of the danger of preventive wars to him. Hitler told me of his misgivings, which I have already mentioned here.

GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, you have testified in that sense. Tell me, did you know that the so-called “Green File” of the Defendant Göring, containing directives for the plunder and exploitation of the temporarily occupied territories of the Soviet Union was prepared a long time prior to the attack on the Soviet Union? Did you know this?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. I heard the term “Green File” here for the first time.

GEN. RUDENKO: All right—you did not know the name. And when did you learn about the contents? The contents of this file?

VON RIBBENTROP: Neither the file nor the name.

GEN. RUDENKO: You did not know. All right. You knew that already before the war directives were drafted for the extermination of the peaceful Soviet population?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that either.

GEN. RUDENKO: And when did you know about that?

VON RIBBENTROP: I heard nothing at all about such plans.

GEN. RUDENKO: And the directives?

VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding the preparation of such plans...

GEN. RUDENKO: And regarding the directives concerning jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region? You evidently did know about that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Regarding what? I did not understand that.

GEN. RUDENKO: Regarding jurisdiction in the Barbarossa region. It is a supplement to Plan Barbarossa.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must say that I have never occupied myself personally with that subject. It might be possible that some department in my office did have a hand in it somewhere; but as far as I remember I, myself, was never concerned with the subject of jurisdiction; for after the outbreak of the conflict with the Soviet Union the Foreign Office had nothing more to do with these territories.

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you to take cognizance of a telegram which you addressed on 10 July 1941, at 1451 hours, to the German Ambassador in Tokio. We are submitting this document, Number 2896-PS, to the Tribunal as Exhibit Number USSR-446. You must remember this telegram.

VON RIBBENTROP: To whom is it addressed? It does not say here.

GEN. RUDENKO: To the German Ambassador in Tokio. Do you remember?

VON RIBBENTROP: Oh, Tokio, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: You apparently remember it. I must ask you to pay attention to the words on Page 4 at the end of this document. They are underlined in pencil for the sake of convenience. Have you found the passage? I shall read only that part into the record.

VON RIBBENTROP: Which part are you referring to? The last page?

GEN. RUDENKO: It is on Page 4. It is underlined.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have found it now.

GEN. RUDENKO: I am going to read this passage into the record.

“I request you to use every means in your power to influence
Matsuoka, in the way I have indicated, so that Japan will
declare war on Russia as soon as possible; for the sooner this
happens, the better it will be. It must still be our natural aim
to shake hands with Japan on the Trans-Siberian railway before
the winter. With the collapse of Russia the position of the
countries participating in the Three Power Pact will be so
strong that the collapse of England or the complete annihilation
of the British Isles will be only a question of time.”

Have you found this passage?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have the passage; yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: What is it? Is it one of your efforts to localize the war?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not understand that last question?

GEN. RUDENKO: I say, is this one of your efforts to localize the war?

VON RIBBENTROP: The war against Russia had started, and I tried at the time—the Führer held the same view—to get Japan into the war against Russia in order to end the war with Russia as soon as possible. That was the meaning of that telegram.

GEN. RUDENKO: This was not only the policy of the Führer; it was also your policy as the then Minister for Foreign Affairs?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, yes.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have a few more questions to ask. You state that you never heard a thing about the cruelties perpetrated in the concentration camps?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: During the war you, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, studied the foreign press and the foreign newspapers. Did you know what the foreign press was saying?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is true only up to a certain point. I had so much to read and so much work to do every day that, on principle, I received only the foreign political news selected for me from the foreign press. Thus, during the whole of the war I never had any news from abroad about the concentration camps, until one day your armies, that is, the Soviet Russian armies, captured the camp at Maidanek in Poland.

On that occasion news came from our embassies and I asked for press news, _et cetera_, to be submitted to me. How I took these news releases to the Führer and what resulted from that has already been discussed here. Before that I knew nothing about any atrocities or any measures taken in the concentration camps.

GEN. RUDENKO: Did you know about the notes of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Molotov, concerning the atrocities committed by the German fascists in the temporarily occupied territories of the Soviet Union, the deportation into slavery of the people of the Soviet, the pillaging?

VON RIBBENTROP: I think that note reached me somehow through diplomatic channels. I am not quite sure how; it may have come through news agencies. However, I do remember that at the time—I believe there were even several notes—at any rate I remember one of these notes which I submitted to the Führer. But since the beginning of the Russo-German war we could not carry out any action in these territories, and we had no influence there. Therefore, I am not informed about details.

GEN. RUDENKO: I was primarily interested in one fundamental fact, namely, that you were aware of the notes from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union. Tell me, please, do you know that millions of citizens were driven into slavery to Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that.

GEN. RUDENKO: You do not know! And that those citizens were used as slaves in Germany—you were not aware of that?

VON RIBBENTROP: No. According to what I heard, all these foreign workers are supposed to have been well treated in Germany. I think it is possible, of course, that other things might have happened, too; but on the whole, I believe that a good deal was done to treat these workers well. I know that on occasion departments of the Foreign Office co-operated in these matters with a view to preventing those possible things. Generally speaking, however, we had no influence in that sphere, as we were excluded from Eastern questions.

GEN. RUDENKO: Why were you informed that foreign laborers were treated well and why were you not informed that they were being treated as slaves?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think that this is correct. We in the Foreign Office—in the case of the French, for instance, and quite a number of other foreign workers—co-operated in getting musicians, _et cetera_, from France for them. We advised on questions concerning their welfare. And I know that the German Labor Front did everything in its power, at least with regard to the sector which we could view to some extent, to treat the workers well, to preserve their willingness to work, and to make their leisure pleasant. I know, at least, that those of its efforts in which we co-operated were on these lines.

GEN. RUDENKO: Well, I now present a penultimate group of questions in connection with the activities of the “Ribbentrop Battalion.” I must now request you to read the testimony of SS Obersturmbannführer Norman Paul Förster. This document is submitted as Exhibit Number USSR-445 (Document Number USSR-445). Please pay particular attention to Page 3 of Förster’s testimony. This passage is underlined. It is stated there:

“When in that same month, August 1941, I reported to the address
given to me in Berlin, I learned that I had been transferred to
Special Command SS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A member
of the Foreign Ministry, Baron von Kunsberg, was at the head of
the SS Special Command... In this command there were about 80 to
100 men altogether and 300 or 400 men were added later. The
special command was later rechristened the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs Battalion ‘z.b.V.’ (for special employment).

“I was received by Baron von Kunsberg in a building belonging to
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the Sonderkommando was
quartered. He explained to me that the Sonderkommando was
created on instructions from the Reich Minister of Foreign
Affairs Von Ribbentrop. According to Von Ribbentrop’s
instructions, our Sonderkommando was to move forward with the
front-line troops in occupied territory in order to protect the
cultural treasures—museums, archives, scientific institutions,
art galleries, and so forth—from ruin and destruction by the
German soldiers, to confiscate them and transport them to
Germany.”

Here I omit a few lines and then:

“On the evening of 5 August 1941, in the presence of Nietsch,
Paulsen, Krallat, Remerssen, Lieben, and others, Von Kunsberg
informed us of Von Ribbentrop’s verbal order according to which
all scientific institutions, libraries, palaces, _et cetera_, in
Russia were to be thoroughly ‘combed out’ and everything of
definite value was to be carried off.”

Did you find that passage in the document?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes. Shall I answer?

GEN. RUDENKO: I should like you first of all to reply to my question, reading as follows: You know that such a battalion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs existed, and that in accordance with your directives, it was especially concerned—as is stated in this document—with the preservation of cultural treasures? Please reply to this question.

VON RIBBENTROP: It is quite incorrect as it appears in this document. I cannot acknowledge it in any way and I must object to it. The following is correct:

This Herr Von Kunsberg is a man who was appointed, with a few assistants, long before the Russian campaign with the idea even at that time of confiscating in France documents, important documents, which might be found there and which might be of importance or value to us. Any order which—at the same time, I may say, he had orders to see to it that there should be no unnecessary destruction of art treasures, _et cetera_. In no circumstances did he receive from me orders to transport these things to Germany or to steal any of them. I do not know how this statement came to be made; but in this form it is certainly not correct.

GEN. RUDENKO: You have protested against a great many of the documents here. That does not mean that they are incorrect. I am not going to quote from this testimony any further. I shall now refer to a document; it is a letter from the Defendant Göring addressed to the Defendant Rosenberg. It has already been submitted to the Tribunal under Document Number 1985-PS. I shall here quote Paragraph 2 of the document. It has already been submitted, so I shall read this letter addressed by Göring to Rosenberg into the record. He writes:

“After all the fuss and bother I very much welcomed the fact
that an office was finally set up to collect these things,
although I must point out that still other offices refer here to
authority received from the Führer, especially the Reich
Minister of Foreign Affairs, who sent a circular to all the
organizations several months ago, stating amongst other things,
that he had been given authority in the occupied territories for
the preservation of cultural treasures.”

We can assume that the Defendant Göring is better acquainted with the circumstances anent the preservation of art treasures. Don’t you remember those things at all?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know how this letter from Reich Marshal Göring came to be written. I do not know, but if there is any mention in it of authorities or anything of that kind, that could only refer to the fact that these art treasures were secured in these territories. I have already stated here that during the war neither I myself nor the Foreign Office confiscated or claimed any art treasures whatsoever, whether for my personal use or for our use. It is possible that these art treasures were temporarily placed in safekeeping. Certainly none of them passed into our possession. Therefore it might be a misunderstanding in this letter because I remember clearly that at that time we were dealing with the safekeeping of art treasures. In France, for instance, at that time robberies were beginning to be committed in private houses and art galleries, _et cetera_; and I still remember asking the Wehrmacht to provide guards to keep a watch on these art treasures, _et cetera_. At any rate we in the Foreign Office never saw any of these works of art ourselves.

GEN. RUDENKO: I think we had better not go too deeply into details. I should like to ask another question in this connection. Don’t you think that the term “safekeeping of art treasures in the occupied territories” actually concealed the looting of art treasures?

VON RIBBENTROP: We certainly never intended that; and I have never given any order to that effect. I should like to state that here, emphatically. Perhaps I may add that when I heard that Kunsberg had suddenly assembled such a large staff, I immediately ordered the dissolution of his entire battalion—it was not a battalion; that is badly expressed—at any rate, its immediate dissolution; and I think I even remember dismissing him from the Foreign Office, because he did not do what I wanted. I think he was removed from his office.

GEN. RUDENKO: Very well. I am closing my interrogation. You were Minister of Foreign Affairs of the fascist Germans from 4 February 1938. Your appointment to this post coincided with the initial period, when Hitler had launched on a series of acts involving a foreign policy which in the end led to the World War. The question arises: Why did Hitler appoint you his Minister of Foreign Affairs just before embarking on a wide program of aggression? Don’t you consider that he thought you were the most suitable man for the purpose, a man with whom he could never have any differences of opinion?

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot tell you anything about Adolf Hitler’s thoughts. He did not tell me about them. He knew that I was his faithful assistant, that I shared his view that we must have a strong Germany, and that I had to get these things done through diplomatic and peaceful channels. I cannot say more. What ideas he may have had, I do not know.

GEN. RUDENKO: Here is my last question. How can you explain the fact that even now, when the entire panorama of the bloody crimes of the Hitler regime has been unfolded before your eyes, when you fully realize the complete crash of that Hitlerite policy which has brought you to the dock—how can we explain that you are still defending this regime; and, furthermore, that you are still praising Hitler and that you are still declaring that the leading criminal clique consisted of a group of idealists? How can you explain that?

THE PRESIDENT: That seems to be a number of questions in one, and I do not think it is a proper question to put to the witness.

GEN. RUDENKO: I thought that this was only one question which summarizes everything.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Will you answer please, Defendant Ribbentrop?

THE PRESIDENT: I told you, General Rudenko, that the Tribunal does not think it a proper question to put.

GEN. RUDENKO: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, do you want to re-examine?

DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to the defendant, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the defendant can return to his seat.

Now, Dr. Horn, I understand that you are going to deal with your documents now, are you not?

DR. HORN: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: I see the time; we might perhaps adjourn for 10 minutes now.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal wish me to announce that the Tribunal will not sit on Good Friday or the Saturday afterwards nor on Easter Monday.

MAJOR J. HARCOURT BARRINGTON (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, I am speaking for all the four prosecutors, to put the Prosecution’s comments on the document books which the Defendant Von Ribbentrop has put in. I am speaking for all the four prosecutors, with one exception, that the French Chief Prosecutor wishes to speak on two particular groups of documents which are of special interest to the French Delegation. I think, if it is convenient to the Tribunal, I might put the whole of the Prosecution’s position before Dr. Horn puts his answer if that is agreeable to him.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you agree, Dr. Horn, that he might put his view first? Is it agreeable to you that Mr. Barrington should put the position first?

DR. HORN: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: There are, in all, nine books in the English version; and the last two have been received only today, so, as they contain perhaps about 350 documents, I regret that I have not been able to agree in the list with Dr. Horn, himself, although I have acquainted him with the comments that the Prosecution proposes to make.

The first two books, comprising Documents 1 to 44, have already been read in open court on the 27th of March by Dr. Horn, and I take it that Your Lordship does not want them gone into again.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: So that leaves simply Books 3 to 9, and I have made out a working note of which I have copies. I do not know whether the members of the Tribunal have them.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Oh, yes; Your Lordship will see that on the left column are the documents which the Prosecution would object to, and in the middle column are those that they would allow, and there are remarks on the right-hand side.

Although this does not show it, I have, for convenience, divided these documents up into nine groups; and so I think I need not go through all the documents in detail unless there is any particular question on any one of them.

Before saying what the groups are, perhaps I might make two general remarks, that the Prosecution takes the position that the _German White Books_, which figure very largely in this list—_White Books_ issued by the government of the Nazi conspirators,—cannot be regarded as evidence of facts, stated therein; and secondly, that there are among these documents a considerable number which are only discussions of subjects in a very vague and tentative stage, and a great many of them, in the Prosecution’s view, are cumulative.

Now, of the first of the nine groups, I have broken them down to Czechoslovakia; and if you will look at the note that I have handed up, that consists of the first few documents down to 45. I beg your Lordship’s pardon. That is wrong. From after 45, there are six PS documents which are already exhibits and there are 46 and 47 and over the page there are 7 more on Czechoslovakia, and the Prosecution’s position on those is that six PS documents are allowed and 46 and 47; but, over the page, 66, 67, and 69 are objected to purely on the ground that they are cumulative—cumulative, I think of Number 68.

THE PRESIDENT: Which volume are they in, 66 and 69?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: In Volume 3, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: As they have already been translated does it make much difference if there are objections that they are cumulative?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, there is not any difference, My Lord, at all, except if they are going to be read into the record.

THE PRESIDENT: They have all been translated?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: They have all been translated.

THE PRESIDENT: And in the other languages, too?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I understand so, My Lord, yes.

THE PRESIDENT: So they need not be read into the record.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: If your Lordship pleases.

THE PRESIDENT: That is the rule, isn’t it, that if they have been translated into the four languages, they need not be read into the record?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: That would apply to all the documents in all these nine books now because they all have been translated.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, it would; but there may be other objections to the documents besides their being cumulative.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: There will be, according to the Prosecution’s submission, a very large number that are cumulative _in toto_.

THE PRESIDENT: There will be a very large number?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, but the point was that, being translated, they are there already.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is the only point the Prosecution has against those. The thing is, My Lord, the Prosecution say they are cumulative. Of course, Dr. Horn might not say so and perhaps he would welcome a ruling as to whether they should be used or not.

THE PRESIDENT: No. What I was suggesting to you was that if the only objection to them was that they were cumulative they may just as well go in, be put in evidence, because they have already been translated—it saves time—as to have them all argued.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes, My Lord, unless Dr. Horn wishes to read any of these documents and refer to them specifically.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, you mean that he might read them all and then...

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I do not know what Your Lordship is going to allow him to do. I understood perhaps he would read some of them.

THE PRESIDENT: Presumably, if he reads many that are cumulative, we shall stop him.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I will pass on to the second group, which are Numbers 48 to 62 inclusive, and those are on the subject of Allied rearmament and alleged warlike intentions before the outbreak of war. Number 54 appears to be missing from my book, and I do not know whether it was intentionally left out.

The Prosecution would object to all those on the ground that they are irrelevant. They are in Book 3, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: 59 is different, isn’t it? 59 is dealing with a speech by Sir Malcolm MacDonald about the colonies.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. That is not exactly rearmament, but of course it is on the same theme in a way, that it is a provocation to war. It is certainly in rather a different category from the others.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: The third group deals with Poland, and that is a very large group because it includes all the negotiations before the outbreak of the war, and the numbers involved in that group are 74 to 214.

I think it would perhaps be convenient to break that group down into two phases. The first one would be the questions of the minorities and Danzig and the Corridor and the incidents connected with them, and the second phase—slightly overlapping in time, but roughly it follows after the other one—would be the diplomatic events involving countries other than Poland, that is to say, very approximately from the 15th of March 1939 onwards. The first phase of that group would be Numbers 74 to 181, and the second phase 182 to 214.

Now, in regard to the first phase, there are two points. The Prosecution says that these are, with very few exceptions, irrelevant because they treat of incidents and the problems arising out of these minority questions, and the Prosecution says those are irrelevant for two reasons. One of the documents among them consists of an exchange of notes between the German and Polish governments on the 28th of April 1939. That is TC-72, Number 14, in Book 5. And that exchange of notes consists of a confirmation that both parties unconditionally renounce the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg Pact. That had been done previously on the 26th of January 1934, as appears in another document here. It is on Page 2 of my note, TC-21.

THE PRESIDENT: What was the date of TC-72?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: TC-72, Number 14, was the 28th of April 1939.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: And on the footing that the two countries unconditionally renounced, the use of force on the basis of the Kellogg Pact, added to the fact that the Defendant Ribbentrop has himself said that during 1938 Germany was on very good terms with Poland. And also there was a declaration made by Germany and Poland on the 5th of November 1937 about minorities—that is Number 123 in this list of documents; it occurs at the top of Page 4 in the note. In view of these things, the Prosecution says that the accounts of these and reports of these incidents and minority problems are irrelevant and very old history.

I think perhaps I might...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): You have them all cumulative or irrelevant starting with 76. You mean the cumulative?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, I am afraid to say, Your Honor, this was originally got out purely as a working note, and that is rather an error. It should be irrelevant on account of TC-21.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: My Lord, I was going to say that perhaps I might anticipate an objection that Dr. Horn has been good enough to tell me that he will make to this, that yesterday he contended that certain incidents before Munich had been condoned by the Munich Agreement, and that the argument I have just put up is on the same lines as that which the Tribunal turned down yesterday.

But, of course, there is this difference, that the Munich Agreement was negotiated in ignorance of the Fall Grün and that, from the point of view of condoning previous incidents, it is not on the same footing as an agreement negotiated in full knowledge of the circumstances.

So, My Lord, taking Group 3, Poland and the first phase of it, the Prosecution would suggest—looking at the middle column on Page 2—allowing Number 75, which is the Polish Treaty of 1919, and TC-21, which I have already mentioned, which reaffirmed the Kellogg Pact, and Number 123 and TC-72, Number 14 and 16, which I have already mentioned. The remainder, perhaps, might all be said to be irrelevant; but it would be reasonable, perhaps, to allow Numbers 117, 149, 150, 153, 154, 159, 160, 163, and TC-72, Number 18. These were largely discussions between ambassadors and heads of state, which may have rather more importance than the other documents in this particular group.

As a matter of fact, My Lord, I think they are all in anyhow, those that I have just mentioned.

That goes up to 182. Starting now at 182, and the first five, 182 to 186...

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to 155 which is the calling out of Polish reserves, 155 to 158?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, My Lord, the objection to that was simply based on the fact that...

THE PRESIDENT: I think they are all mentioned in the conversation which is 159, and that is probably the reason.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Yes. I am obliged, Your Lordship. I think that it is so, but I do not think the objection to them could be very strong.

THE PRESIDENT: No.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 182 to 186, My Lord, they are reports by the German chargés d’affaires in various capitals, and the Prosecution say that those would not be proper evidence.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Why not?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are just accounts of the German chargés d’affaires’ observations and conclusions of fact, for the most part by them, transmitted to their Foreign Office.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Do you mean they are irrelevant on the ground of hearsay?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I beg your pardon.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Because they are hearsay they should not be admitted; is that what you mean?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, of course, partly hearsay. They are also vague, and again, they are transmitted with an object in view. At least that has been the submission of the Prosecution, that they are transmitted to color the picture from the German point of view.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Would you admit these if they were made by chargés d’affaires of other states?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: If they were made by chargés d’affaires of other states?

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they would be admissible if they were put in as government reports by Allied nations under the Charter; but they are not really admissible if they are German documents.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry; I do not know what you mean.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Article 21 of the Charter...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I am sorry. Perhaps I do not make myself clear. I do not quite understand why these are different from any other official reports made by chargés d’affaires of any country. Is it because they are German reports?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Because they are German reports.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Oh, I see. In other words, you think German reports should be excluded.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think under the Charter they should be excluded, except, of course, if they are used by the Prosecution as admissions against the German Government itself.

THE PRESIDENT: We are going to hear you in a moment, Dr. Horn. Anyhow, Mr. Barrington, your objection to 182 to 214 is that it is self-serving evidence and therefore not admissible; is that it?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is right, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any other objection to them?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, they are, as I said, conclusions of fact drawn by an observer in a foreign country. They tend to get rather vague.

THE PRESIDENT: That might apply to a great deal of the evidence.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Numbers 187 to 192 and TC-77 there is no objection to.

Number 193 and 194 are German Foreign Office memoranda and they are mere discussions, internal to the German Foreign Office. 193 is a memorandum of the State Secretary of the Foreign Office, and it deals with a visit to him of the French Ambassador. And Number 194 is similar, a visit of the British Ambassador. Number 195, that is Sir Nevile Henderson’s White Paper, _Failure of a Mission_, and there are a number of extracts from that; it is a book and there are a number of extracts from that in the document book and it is contended that they are cumulative of evidence which has already been given and that in particular most of them are really provocative. That applies particularly to the first extract.

THE PRESIDENT: What do you mean by provocative?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, Your Lordship will see that in the first extract there are some rather strongly worded opinions.

THE PRESIDENT: Which book are they in?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: They are in Book 6, My Lord. There are some rather strongly worded opinions about the position of Soviet Russia.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go on.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Number 196 and 197 are German memoranda and reports for Foreign Office use, and they cover the same category as 193 and 194. One of them is internal to the Foreign Office and the other from the German chargé d’affaires in Washington.

Numbers 198 to 203 are all right.

Number 204 is objected to as not being evidence; it is a memorandum of the Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office in Berlin, and it merely talks of a report in the _Berliner Börsenzeitung_. It is merely secondhand evidence.

Number 205 and 206 are not objected to.

The next one, TC-72, Number 74, is not objected to.

Number 207 is the same document as the previous one. It is a mere repetition.

Now, Number 208, My Lord, consists of a collection of extracts from the _British Blue Book_, and I am afraid I have not had time to check up which of them are actually in evidence already. But it is clear that the majority of them are obviously relevant, but it is suggested that those in the left-hand column do include unnecessary detail in view of the rest of them.

Number 209, there is no objection.

Number 210 is a conversation between the Defendant Ribbentrop and Sir Nevile Henderson on the 30th of August 1939, and that of course has been the subject of evidence already and is perhaps in any event cumulative for that reason.

Number 211(a) and 211(b) are just repetitions of documents quoted from the _British Blue Book_.

Number 212 is a Polish wireless broadcast, and Number 213 is a German communiqué to the German public, and it is contended that those have no evidential value.

Number 214 is an extract from a book which the Tribunal has already refused to the defendants.

Now, the next page of the note, My Lord, deals with my next group, which is Norway and Denmark.

THE PRESIDENT: Group 4, is it? Group 4, is that right?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: That is Group 4, My Lord, yes.

215(a) and 215(b) deal with the case of Iceland and Greenland. They are not very long documents; they are just considered to be irrelevant. Objection to them could not be very strong.

There is no objection to 216(a) and 216(b), which are already in evidence, I think; and D-629 is also already in evidence.

Number 217 is simply an interview which the Defendant Ribbentrop gave to the press, which the Prosecution says is not proper evidence.

Number 004-PS is already in evidence.

Number 218 and 219, I think, are also in evidence.

Number 220 again is objected to as it is simply an interview with the press.

THE PRESIDENT: Why do you object to those two Ribbentrop communications to the press?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: It is self-created evidence, My Lord. He has presumably given that evidence already. He had not given it at the same time.

THE PRESIDENT: What he said 6 years ago might be relevant.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Well, if Your Lordship thinks so; but the point I was making is simply that it is self-created evidence and created at the time with a view to create an impression. It is propaganda.

THE PRESIDENT: You may say that, yes.

MAJOR BARRINGTON: Then, My Lord, the next group is the Low Countries. That group really began at 218, of course, and it goes on to 240...

THE PRESIDENT: Is this another group? Communiqué of the 5th group?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: This is the fifth group, My Lord, yes. That goes on from 218 to 245, and I shall not deal in detail with that because the French Chief Prosecutor is going to speak about that. And the same with the next group, Number 6, which is the Balkans. The French Chief Prosecutor will deal with that, Documents 246 to 278.

The next group, Number 7, is Russia, that is, Documents 280 to 295, with the exception, I think of 285(a), which seems to have got there by mistake; it appears to refer to the United States.

Number 279—I cannot identify from the English translation what it is at all. Perhaps Your Lordship will be good enough to make an amendment against Numbers 232 and 283; they should be put into the middle column, there being no objection to them. But there is an objection to all the other Russian documents. Your Lordship will see, beginning at the bottom of the group, 291 to 295, they all concern the Anticomintern Pact. Working up the page again from the bottom, 290, 1 to 5, are extracts from the book which the Tribunal has already refused. And, of the documents above that, 280 is Hitler’s speech about Russia in October 1939. And 281 is a repetition of a document we have already had, Number 274, which is the Three Power Pact. That will be dealt with.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean that that is a textual reproduction?

MAJOR BARRINGTON: I think I am right in saying that it is actually a textual reproduction.