Chapter XVII: Book 3: of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a (13)

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can see how very anxious the Slovaks seemed to be for independence and what action Hitler and yourself were taking to secure it; if you try to find it, it will probably be at Page 67; it is at the end of a paragraph beginning, “Now he has permitted Minister Tiso to come here...”

And just below the middle of that paragraph, Hitler is reported as saying that he would not tolerate that internal instability and he had for that reason permitted Tiso to come in order to hear his decision. It was not a question of days but of hours. He stated at that time that, if Slovakia wished to make herself independent, he would support this endeavor and even guarantee it; he would stand by his words so long as Slovakia would make it clear that she wished for independence. If she hesitated or did not wish to dissolve the connection with Prague, he would leave the destiny of Slovakia to the mercy of the events for which he was no longer responsible.

Then in the next paragraph he asks you if you had anything to say and you are reported as saying (Document Number 2802-PS, Exhibit USA-117):

“The Reich Foreign Minister also emphasized for his part the
view that in this case a decision was a question of hours and
not of days. He showed Hitler a message he had just received
which reported Hungarian troop movements on the Slovak frontier.
The Führer read this report and mentioned it to Tiso and
expressed his hope that Slovakia would soon come to a clear
decision.”

Are you denying, Witness, that Hitler and you were putting the strongest possible pressure you could on the Slovaks to dissolve connections with Prague and so leave the Czechs standing alone to meet your pressure on Hacha which was coming in a couple of days?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not correct. Very strong pressure was not used. There is no doubt that on the part of Hungary—and my remark refers to the possibility of warlike developments with the Hungarians—but wishes for independence had for a long time been conveyed to us again and again by the Slovaks. It is possible that, at the time, as the document shows, Tiso was hesitating, because after all it was an important step. But in view of the wish of the Führer, which must have been obvious by then, to solve the question of Bohemia and Moravia in one way or another, it was in the interest of the Führer to do his part to bring about the independence of Slovakia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: One point. This is my last question before I come to the interview with President Hacha. Don’t you remember that 2 days before Herr Bürckel—that is in my recollection—Herr Bürckel and another Austrian National Socialist, the Defendant Seyss-Inquart and a number of German officers, at about 10 in the evening of Saturday, the 11th of March, went into a Cabinet meeting at Bratislava and told the _soi-disant_ Slovak Government that they should proclaim the independence of Slovakia? Don’t you know that? It was reported by our consul.

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall it in detail, but I believe that something of the kind took place but I do not know exactly what it was. I believe that it was directed by the Führer. I had, I believe, less to do with that. I no longer recall that exactly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will deal very shortly...

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, it is a quarter to 1 now. We had better adjourn until 2.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, you were present at the interview between President Hacha and Hitler on 15 March 1939, were you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler’s saying at that interview that he had given the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia, and that at 6 o’clock in the morning the German Army would invade Czechoslovakia from all sides?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the exact words, but I know that Hitler told Hacha that he would occupy the countries of Bohemia and Moravia.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember his saying what I put to you, that he had given the order for German troops to march into Czechoslovakia?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is what I just said.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember the Defendant Göring, as he told the Tribunal, telling President Hacha that he would order the German Air Forces to bomb Prague?

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot say anything about that in detail, because at that discussion I was not...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking you for a detailed statement; I am asking you if you remember what I should suppose was a rather remarkable statement, that the Defendant Göring said to President Hacha that he would order the German Air Force to bomb Prague if Czech resistance was not called off. Do you remember that?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not know that; I was not present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there during the whole interview, were you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not. If the British Prosecutor will give me a chance I shall explain how it was.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question at the moment. You say you do not remember that. At any rate, if the Defendant Göring said that he said it, would you accept that it happened?

VON RIBBENTROP: If Göring says so, then it must, of course, be true. I have merely stated that I was not present during that conference between President Hacha and the then Reich Marshal Göring.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that within 2 days the Czech Army would not exist any more?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall that in detail, no; it was a very long conference.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember Hitler saying that at 6 o’clock the troops would march in? He was almost ashamed to say that there was one German division to each Czech battalion.

VON RIBBENTROP: It is possible that something like that was said. However, I do not remember the details.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If these things were said, will you agree with me that the most intolerable pressure was put on President Hacha?

VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly Hitler used very clear language. However, to that I must add that President Hacha, on his part, had come to Berlin in order to find a solution, together with Hitler. He was surprised that troops were to march into Czechoslovakia. That I know, and I remember it exactly. But he agreed to it eventually and then contacted his government and his chief of staff, so that there would be no hostile reception for the German troops. He then concluded with Hitler, with the Czech Foreign Minister and me, the agreement which I had drafted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you agree with me that that agreement was obtained through a threat of aggressive action by the German Army and Air Force?

VON RIBBENTROP: It is certain, since the Führer told President Hacha that the German Army would march in, that naturally, this instrument was written under that impression. That is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think you could answer one of my question directly? I will ask it again. Will you agree with me that that document was obtained by the most intolerable pressure and threat of aggression? That is a simple question. Do you agree?

VON RIBBENTROP: In that way, no.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What further pressure could you put on the head of a country except to threaten him that your army would march in, in overwhelming strength, and your Air Force would bomb his capital?

VON RIBBENTROP: War, for instance.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What is that but war? Do you not consider it war that the Army would march in with a proportion of a division over a battalion, and that the Air Force would bomb Prague?

VON RIBBENTROP: President Hacha had told the Führer that he would place the fate of his country in the Führer’s hands, and the Führer had...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to answer my question. My question is a perfectly simple one, and I want your answer to it. You have told us that that agreement was obtained after these threats were made.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not say that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, that is what you said a moment ago.

VON RIBBENTROP: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put to you that that agreement was obtained by threat of war. Is that not so?

VON RIBBENTROP: I believe that this threat is incomparably lighter than the threats under which Germany stood for years through the Versailles Treaty and its sanctions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, leaving whatever it is comparatively, will you now answer my question? Do you agree that that agreement was obtained by threat of war?

VON RIBBENTROP: It was obtained under a pressure, that is under the pressure of the march into Prague; there is no doubt about that. However, the decisive point of the whole matter was that the Führer explained to President Hacha the reasons why he had to do this, and eventually Hacha agreed fully, after he had consulted his government and his general staff and heard their opinion. However, it is absolutely correct that the Führer was resolved to solve this question under any circumstances. The reason was, that the Führer was of the opinion that in the remainder of Czechoslovakia there was a conspiracy against the German Reich; Reich Marshal Göring had already stated that Russian commissions were said to have been at Czech airdromes. Consequently the Führer acted as he did because he believed that it was necessary in the highest interest and for the protection of the German Reich. I might draw a comparison: For instance, President Roosevelt declared an interest in the Western Hemisphere; England has extended her interest over the entire globe. I think, that the interest which the Führer showed in the remainder of Czechoslovakia was, as such, not unreasonable for a great power; about the methods one may think as one pleases. At any rate one thing is certain, and that is that these countries were occupied without a single drop of blood being shed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They were occupied without a single drop of blood being shed because you had threatened to march in overwhelming strength and to bomb Prague if they didn’t agree, isn’t that so?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, not because we had threatened with superiority, but because we had agreed beforehand that the Germans could march in unimpeded.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it to you again, that the agreement was obtained, however, by your threatening to march in and threatening to bomb Prague, was it not?

VON RIBBENTROP: I have already told you once that it was not so, but that the Führer had talked to President Hacha about it and told him that he would march in. The conversation between President Hacha and Göring is not known to me. President Hacha signed the agreement after he had consulted his government and his general staff in Prague by telephone. There is no doubt that the personality of the Führer, his reasoning, and finally the announced entry of the German troops induced President Hacha to sign the agreement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you remember—would you mind standing up, General, for a second? [_A Czechoslovakian Army officer arose._] Don’t you remember that General Ecer asked you some questions once, this general from Czechoslovakia?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, certainly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Did you say to him that you thought that this action on the 15th of March was contrary to the declaration of Hitler given to Chamberlain but, in fact, that Hitler saw in the occupation a vital necessity for Germany?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is correct. I was wrong in the first point; I will admit that openly; I remembered it afterward. In the Munich Agreement between Hitler and Chamberlain nothing like that is contained. It was not intended as a violation of that agreement. In the second place, I think I stated that Hitler believed he had to act that way in the interest of his country.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you to tell us one or two general things about your views with regard to Great Britain. Is it correct that when you went to London as Ambassador of the Reich you thought there was very little chance of an agreement, in fact that it was a hundred-to-one chance of getting an understanding with Great Britain?

VON RIBBENTROP: When I asked the Führer to send me to London personally...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Here is a simple question I am asking you: Is it right that when you went to London as Ambassador you thought there was very little chance of an understanding with England, in fact, that the chance was a hundred-to-one?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, the chances were not good.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These, as you know, are your own words...

VON RIBBENTROP: I would like to add something.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: First answer my question. These are your own words, aren’t they, that the chance was a hundred-to-one? Do you remember saying that?

VON RIBBENTROP: A hundred-to-one? I do not remember that, but I want to add something. I told Hitler that the chance was very small; and I also told him that I would try everything to bring about an Anglo-German understanding in spite of the odds.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England did you believe that war was inevitable? When you left England, when you ceased being ambassador, did you believe that war was unavoidable?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not of the opinion that it was inevitable, but that, considering the developments which were taking place in England, a possibility of war existed, of that I was convinced.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to be careful about this. Did you say that you didn’t think war was unavoidable when you left England?

VON RIBBENTROP: I can neither say that it was unavoidable nor that it was avoidable; at any rate, it was clear to me that with the development of the policy towards Germany which was taking place in England, an armed conflict might lie in the realm of possibility.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, look at page 211-E of the document book; English book, 170.

VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 211?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now will you look at the second paragraph? It reads like this:

“He, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister), had been more than
skeptical even on his arrival in London and had considered the
chances for an understanding as a hundred-to-one. The
warmongers’ clique in England had won the upper hand. When he
(the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable.” (Document Number
1834-PS)

Is that what you said to Ambassador Oshima?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether I said exactly that; at any rate, that is diplomatic language, Mr. Prosecutor, and it is quite possible that we at that time, as a result of the situation, in consultation with the Japanese ambassador, considered it opportune to express it that way. At any rate, that is not the important point; the important thing is that as I remember, when I left England a certainty and inevitability of war did not exist. Whether in later years I said this or that has no bearing on what I said when I left London. I do not think that there is the least bit of evidence for that. Perhaps I tried to draw him into the war against England and therefore used forceful language.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: As you said “no,” just look at Document Number TC-75, Exhibit GB-28, and at your conclusions that are to be drawn. You will see it at the end under Number 5, “Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us...” It is about the end of the third page:

“5) Therefore, conclusions to be drawn by us:

“1) Outwardly further understanding with England while
protecting the interest of our friends;

“2) Formation, under great secrecy but with all persistence, of
a coalition against England, that is, in practice a tightening
of our friendship with Italy and Japan, also the winning over of
all nations whose interests conform with ours, directly or
indirectly; close and confidential co-operation of the diplomats
of the three great powers towards this purpose.”

And the last sentence:

“Every day on which—no matter what tactical interludes of
rapprochement towards us are attempted—our political
considerations are not guided fundamentally by the thought of
England as our most dangerous adversary, would be a gain for our
enemies.”

Why did you tell the Tribunal a minute ago that you had not advised the Führer that there should be outward friendly relations and in actuality a coalition against her?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know what kind of a document that is at all. May I see it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by yourself on the 2d of January 1938. It is your own report to the Führer.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is quite correct as such; that is the conclusive statement: Only thus can we, some day, come to an agreement or to a conflict with England. The situation at that time was clearly this, that England was resisting the German wishes for a revision which the Führer had declared vital and that only through a strong diplomatic coalition did it seem possible to induce England, by diplomatic and not by bellicose means.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You probably told him what was untrue?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know, and I also do not know whether the details have been recorded accurately. It is a long record; I do not know where it comes from.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is your own record of the meeting, from captured German documents.

VON RIBBENTROP: That is quite possible, but many things are said in diplomacy every word of which is not weighed carefully. At any rate, the truth is that when I left London there was no certainty that the war was inevitable, but there is no doubt that I was skeptical when I left London and did not know in what direction things would be drifting, particularly on account of the very strong pro-war party in England.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, will you speak a little bit more slowly?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, Sir.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when you left England, was it not your view that the German policy should be pretended friendliness toward England and actual formation of a coalition against her?

VON RIBBENTROP: Put this way, that is not correct. It was clear to me, when I became Foreign Minister, that the realization of the German desires in Europe was difficult and that it was principally England who opposed them. I had tried for years, by order of the Führer, to achieve these things by means of a friendly understanding with England.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you now to answer my question: Did you advise the Führer that the proper policy was pretended friendliness with England and in actuality the formation of a coalition against her? Did you or did you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, that is not the right way of putting it to agree to these German aspirations. That without doubt, was the situation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to know, Witness, why you told the Tribunal 5 minutes ago that you had not advised Hitler in the sense in which I put to you?

VON RIBBENTROP: Which advice do you mean?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Outwardly an understanding with England and formation under great secrecy of a coalition against her. I put that to you twice and you denied it, I want to know why you did deny it.

VON RIBBENTROP: I said quite clearly that England was resisting the German requests and that therefore, if Germany wanted to realize these aspirations, she could do nothing but find friends and bring England with the help of those friends to the conference table so that England would yield to these aspirations by diplomatic means. That was my task at that time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now I want you to direct your attention to the relations with Poland. I will give you the opportunity of answering a question generally, and I hope in that way we may save time.

Will you agree that up to the Munich Agreement, the speeches of all German statesmen were full of the most profound affection and respect for Poland? Do you agree with that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What was the purpose of what is shown in the Foreign Office memorandum of 26 August 1938? I will give you the page number, Page 107 of your document book. I want you to look at it. I think it is the fourth paragraph, beginning, “This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia...”; and you may take it from me that the method of approach was putting forward the idea that you and Hitler wanted the return of all Germans to the Reich. I put it quite fairly and objectively. That is what preceded it. I want you to look at that paragraph.

VON RIBBENTROP: Which paragraph do you mean? I did not hear.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The fourth, “This method of approach towards Czechoslovakia...” it begins. The fourth on my copy.

VON RIBBENTROP: I have not found it yet. Paragraph 5, yes, I have it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “This method of approach towards
Czechoslovakia is to be recommended also because of our
relationship with Poland. The turning away of Germany from the
boundary question of the southeast and her change-over to those
of the east and northeast must inevitably put the Poles on the
alert. After the liquidation of the Czechoslovakian question, it
will be generally assumed that Poland will be the next in turn;
but the later this assumption becomes a factor in international
politics, the better.” (Document Number TC-76)

Does that correctly set out the endeavors of German foreign policy at that time?

VON RIBBENTROP: Undoubtedly no, for, first of all, I do not know what kind of a document it is. It has apparently been prepared by some official in the Foreign Office where sometimes such theoretical treatises were prepared and may have come to me through the State Secretary. However, I do not remember having read it. Whether it reached me, I cannot tell you at the moment; but it is possible that such thoughts prevailed among some of our officials. That is quite possible.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Now, if you do not agree, would you look at Page 110, on which you will find extracts from Hitler’s Reichstag speech on 26 September 1938. I am sorry. I said Reichstag; I meant Sportpalast.

VON RIBBENTROP: Sportpalast, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At the end of this extract the Führer is quoted as saying with regard to Poland, after a tribute to Marshal Pilsudski:

“We are all convinced that this agreement will bring lasting
pacification. We realize that here are two peoples who must live
together and neither of whom can do away with the other. A
people of 33 millions will always strive for an outlet to the
sea. A way to understanding, then, had to be found. It has been
found, and it will be continually extended further. Certainly,
things were difficult for this area. The nationalities and small
groups frequently quarreled among themselves, but the decisive
fact is that the two Governments and all reasonable and
clear-sighted persons among the two peoples and in the two
countries possess the firm will and determination to improve
their relations. This is a real work of peace, of more value
than all of the idle talk at the League of Nations Palace in
Geneva.” (Document Number TC-73, Number 42)

Do you think that is an honest statement of opinion?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I believe that that was definitely the Führer’s view at the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And so at that time all the questions of the treatment of minorities in Poland were very unimportant; is that so?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, they were not unimportant. They were a latent and even difficult point between Poland and ourselves, and the purpose of that particular kind of statement by the Führer was to overcome it. I am so familiar with the problem of the minorities in Poland because I watched it for personal reasons for many years. From the time I took over the Foreign Ministry, there were again and again the greatest difficulties which, however, were always settled on our part in the most generous way.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate you have agreed with me that the speeches at that time—and you say quite honestly—were full of praise and affection for the Poles; is that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, we were hoping that thereby we could bring the German minority problem, in particular, to a satisfactory and sensible solution. That had been our policy since 1934.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, immediately after Munich you first raised the question of Danzig with M. Lipski, I think, in October, around 21 October.

VON RIBBENTROP: Right, 28 October.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 28 October. And the Poles had replied on the 31st; it may have reached you a day later through M. Lipski, suggesting the making of a bilateral agreement between Germany and Poland, but saying the return of Danzig to the Reich would lead to a conflict. I put it quite generally. I just wanted to remind you of the tenor of the reply. Do you remember?

VON RIBBENTROP: According to my recollection it was not quite like that. The Führer had charged me—it was on 28 October, to be exact—to request Ambassador Lipski to come to Berchtesgaden. His order was given because the Führer in particular, perhaps as a sequel to the speech in the Sportpalast, but that I do not remember, wanted to bring about a clarification of the relations with all his neighbors. He wanted that now particularly with respect to Poland. He instructed me, therefore, to discuss with Ambassador Lipski the question of Danzig and the question of a connection between the Reich and East Prussia.

I asked Ambassador Lipski to come and see me, and stated these wishes in a very friendly atmosphere. Ambassador Lipski was very reserved; he stated that after all Danzig was not a simple problem but that he would discuss the question with his government. I asked him to do so soon and inform me of the outcome. That was the beginning of the negotiations with Poland.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, if you will turn—I do not want to stop you, but I want to get on quickly over this matter—if you will turn to Page 114, you will find the minutes of M. Beck’s conversation with Hitler on 5 January. I just want to draw your attention to the last paragraph, where, after M. Beck had said that the Danzig question was a very difficult problem:

“In answer to this the Chancellor stated that to solve this
problem it would be necessary to try to find something quite
new, some new formula, for which he used the term
‘Körperschaft,’ which on the one hand would safeguard the
interest of the German population and on the other hand the
Polish interest. In addition the Chancellor declared that the
Minister could be quite at ease; there would be no _fait
accompli_ in Danzig and nothing would be done to render
difficult the situation of the Polish Government.” (Document
TC-73, Number 48)

Do you see that, before I ask you the question?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I have read that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just look at the summary of your own conversation with M. Beck on the next day. It is Page 115, at the beginning of the paragraph, the second paragraph. You will see that, after M. Beck had mentioned the Danzig question, you said, “In answer, Herr Von Ribbentrop once more emphasized that Germany was not seeking any violent solution.” (Document TC-73, Number 49). That was almost word for word what Hitler had said the day before; do you see that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, turn back to Page 113. (Document Number C-137, Exhibit GB-33) These are the Defendant Keitel’s orders to—or rather, to put it exactly—the Defendant Keitel’s transmission of the Führer’s order with regard to Danzig. It is dated 24 November. That was some 6 weeks before, and it is supplementary to an order of 21 October, and you see what it says:

“Apart from the three contingencies mentioned in the
instructions of 21 October, preparations are also to be made to
enable the Free State of Danzig to be occupied by German troops
by surprise. (‘4. Occupation of Danzig’).

“The preparations will be made on the following basis. The
condition is a _coup de main_ occupation of Danzig, exploiting a
politically favorable situation, not a war against Poland.”
(Document Number C-137)

Did you know of these instructions?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know that. This is the first time that I have seen that order or whatever it may be. May I add something?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not for the moment. Hitler must have known of the order, mustn’t he? It is an order of the Führer?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, of course, and therefore I assume—that is what I wanted to add—that the British Prosecution are aware that political matters and military matters are in this case two completely different conceptions. There is no doubt that the Führer, in view of the permanent difficulties in Danzig and the Corridor, had given military orders of some kind—just in case—and I can well imagine that it is one of these orders. I see it today for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Supposing that you had known of the orders, Witness, would you still have said on the 5th of January that Germany was not seeking a _fait accompli_ or a violent solution? If you had known of that order would you still have said it?

VON RIBBENTROP: If I had known this order and considering it an order of the General Staff for possible cases, as I am compelled to do, then I would still continue to have the same opinion. I think it is part of the General Staff’s duty to take into consideration all possible eventualities and prepare for them in principle. In the final analysis that has nothing to do with politics.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Nothing to do with politics to have a cut-and-dried plan how the Free State of Danzig is to be occupied by German troops by surprise when you are telling the Poles that you won’t have a _fait accompli_? That is your idea of how matters should be carried on? If it is I will leave it.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I must rather add that I know that the Führer was alarmed for a long time, particularly during 1939, lest a sudden Polish attack take place against Danzig; so that to me, I am not a military man, it appears quite natural to make some preparations for all such problems and possibilities. But, of course, I cannot judge the details of these orders.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when did you learn that Hitler was determined to attack Poland?

VON RIBBENTROP: That Hitler contemplated a military action against Poland, I learned for the first time, as I remember, in August 1939. That, of course, he had made certain military preparations in advance to meet any eventuality becomes clear from this order regarding Danzig. But I definitely did not learn about this order, and I do not recollect now in detail whether I received at that time any military communication. I do remember that I knew virtually nothing about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you tell the Tribunal that you did not know in May that Hitler’s real view was that Danzig was not the subject of the dispute at all, but that his real object was the acquisition of Lebensraum in the East?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I did not know it in that sense. The Führer talked sometimes about living space, that is right, but I did not know that he had the intention to attack Poland.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at Page 117, or it may be 118, of your document. On Page 117 you will find the minutes of the conference on the 23rd day of May 1939 at the new Reich Chancellery.

VON RIBBENTROP: Did you say 117?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: 117. I want you to look at it. It may be on Page 118, and it begins with the following words:

“Danzig is not the subject of the dispute at all; it is a
question of expanding our Lebensraum in the East and of securing
our food supplies and of the settlement of the Baltic problem.
Food supplies can be expected only from thinly populated areas.
Added to the natural fertility, the German, through cultivation,
will enormously increase the surplus. There is no other
possibility for Europe.” (Document Number L-79)

Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never explained that view to you?

VON RIBBENTROP: It may be strange to say so, but I should like to say first that it looks as though I was not present during this conference. That was a military conference, and the Führer used to hold these military conferences quite separately from the political conferences. The Führer did now and then mention that we had to have Lebensraum; but I knew nothing, and he never told me anything at that time, that is in May 1939, of an intention to attack Poland. Yes, I think this was kept back deliberately, as had been done in other cases, because he always wanted his diplomats to stand wholeheartedly for a diplomatic solution and to bring it about.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You mean to say that Hitler was deliberately keeping you in the dark as to his real aims; that Danzig was not the subject of dispute and what he really wanted was Lebensraum; is that your story?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I assume that he did that deliberately because...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, just look at the very short paragraph a little further on where he says:

“There is no question of sparing Poland, and we are left with no
alternative but to attack Poland at the first suitable
opportunity. We cannot expect a repetition of the Czech affair.
There will be fighting. The task is to isolate Poland.”

Do you tell the Tribunal that he never said that to his Foreign Minister?

VON RIBBENTROP: I did not quite understand that question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is a perfectly simple one. Do you tell the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned what I have just read from his speech, that there is to be no question of sparing Poland, that you had to attack Poland at the first opportunity, and your task was to isolate Poland? Are you telling the Tribunal that Hitler never mentioned that to his Foreign Minister, who would have the practical conduct of foreign policy?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, he did not do that at that time; but, according to my recollection, only much later, in the summer of 1939. At that time he did say that he was resolved—and he said literally—to solve the problem one way or another.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you say that you didn’t know in May that Hitler wanted war?

VON RIBBENTROP: That he wanted what?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You didn’t know in May that Hitler wanted war?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I was not convinced of that at all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is quite clear from the document that he did want war, isn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: This document, no doubt, shows the intention of an action against Poland, but I know that Hitler often used strong language to his military men, that is, he spoke as though he had the firm intention of attacking a certain country in some way, but whether he actually would have carried it out later politically is an entirely different question. I know that he repeatedly told me that one had to talk with military men as if war was about to break out here or there on the next day.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want to ask you about another point. You said on Friday that you had never expressed the view that Great Britain would stay out of war and would fail to honor her guarantee to Poland. Do you remember saying that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I would just like you to look at one or two other documents. Do you remember on the 29th of April 1939 receiving the Hungarian Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister at 3:30 in the afternoon?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not remember that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, we have the minutes of your meeting signed by Von Erdmannsdorff, I think. Did you say this to the Hungarian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister:

“The Reich Foreign Minister added that it was his firm
conviction that, no matter what happened in Europe, no French or
English soldier would attack Germany. Our relations with Poland
were gloomy at the moment.”

Did you say that?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not think I ever said that. I consider that impossible.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, if you got a copy...

VON RIBBENTROP: May I perhaps have a look at the document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, certainly, with pleasure. This will become Exhibit GB-289, Document D-737.

VON RIBBENTROP: I cannot, of course, tell you now in detail what I said at that time, but it may be possible that there was an effort at that time to reassure the Hungarians who were probably concerned about the Polish problem; that is absolutely possible. But I hardly believe that I said anything like this. However, it is certain that the Führer knew, and I had told the Führer that England would march to the aid of Poland.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you are a little doubtful would you look at Document Number D-738, which will be Exhibit GB-290. Apparently you saw these gentlemen again 2 days later. Just look at the last sentence of that:

“He (the Reich Foreign Minister) pointed out again that Poland
presented no military problem for us. In case of a military
clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.”

That is quite straight speaking, isn’t it, “The British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch”?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know on just what page that is.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Paragraph 7, and it is the report of the 1st of May, the last sentence of my quotation. It is signed by a gentlemen called Von Erdmannsdorff; it appears above his signature. The words I am asking you about are, “In case of a military clash the British would coldly leave the Poles in the lurch.”

VON RIBBENTROP: Is that on Page 8 or where? On what page, if I may ask?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My heading is Paragraph 7. It begins:

“The Reich Foreign Minister then returned to our attitude
towards the Polish question and pointed out that the Polish
attitude had aroused great bitterness.”

VON RIBBENTROP: It is perfectly conceivable that I said something like that, and if it has been said it was done in order not to alarm the Hungarians and to keep them on our side. It is quite clear that that is nothing but diplomatic talk.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Don’t you think there is any requirement to tell the truth in a political conversation?

VON RIBBENTROP: That was not the point; the point was to bring about a situation which made it possible to solve this and the Polish question in a diplomatic way. If I were to tell the Hungarians today, and this applies to the Italians also, that England would assist Poland and that a great war would result, then this would create a diplomatic situation which would make it impossible to solve the problem at all. There is no doubt that during the entire time I had to use very strong language, just as the Führer had always ordered, for if his own Foreign Minister had hinted at other possibilities, it would naturally have been very difficult, and I venture to say, it would have meant that this would, in any case, have led to war. But we wanted to create a strong German position so that we could solve this problem peacefully. I may add that the Hungarians were somewhat worried with regard to the German policy, and that the Führer had told me from the start to use particularly clear and strong language on these subjects. I used that kind of language also quite frequently to my own diplomats for the same reasons.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You want us to assume that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what it comes to shortly, isn’t it? That is what you want us to understand—that you were telling lies to the Hungarians but you are telling the truth to this Tribunal. That is what you want us to understand isn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not know whether one can talk of lies in this case, Mr. Prosecutor. This is a question of diplomacy; and if we wanted to create a strong position, then of course we could not go beating about the bush. Consider what the impression would have been if the German Foreign Minister had spoken as if at the slightest German step the whole world would attack Germany! The Führer used frequently such strong language and expected me to do the same. I want to emphasize again that often I had to use such language, even to my own Foreign Office, so that there was no misunderstanding. If the Führer was determined on the solution of a problem, no matter what the circumstances, even at the risk of war if it had to be, our only chance to succeed was to adopt a firm stand, for had we failed to do that, war would have been inevitable.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you to have in mind what Count Ciano says that you said to him on, I think the 11th or 12th of August, just before your meeting at, I think it was at Salzburg, with you and Hitler. You remember that according to Count Ciano’s diary he said that he asked you, “What do you want, the Corridor or Danzig?” and that you looked at him and said, “Not any more; we want war.” Do you remember that?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is absolutely untrue. I told Count Ciano at that time, this is on the same line, “the Führer is determined to solve the Polish problem one way or another.” This was what the Führer had instructed me to say. That I am supposed to have said “we want war” is absurd for the simple reason that, it is clear to every diplomat, those things are just not said, not even to the very best and most trusted ally, but most certainly not to Count Ciano.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I should just like you to look at a report of the subsequent conversation that you had with Mussolini and Count Ciano not very long after, on the 10th of March 1940, that is, about 9 months later. If you look at Document Number 2835-PS, which will become Exhibit GB-291, and if you will turn to, I think it is Page 18 or 19...

VON RIBBENTROP: You mean Page 18?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I remind you again, a conversation between you and Mussolini and Ciano on the 10th of March 1940. It begins by saying:

“The Reich Foreign Minister recalled that he actually had stated
in Salzburg to Count Ciano that he did not believe that England
and France would assist Poland without further questions, but
that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of
intervention by the Western Powers. He was glad now about the
course of events, because, first of all, it had always been
clear that the clash would have to come sooner or later and that
it was inevitable.”

And then you go on to say that it would be a good thing to finish the conflict in the lifetime of the Führer.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that was after the outbreak of war; is that it?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. What I am putting to you are these words:

“He was glad now about the course of events, because, first of
all, it had always been clear that the clash would have to come
sooner or later and that it was inevitable.”

And if you will look at where it says “secondly”...

VON RIBBENTROP: May I reply to that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes; but what I am suggesting to you is that that shows perfectly clearly that Count Ciano is right, and that you were very glad that the war had come, because you thought this was an appropriate time for it to happen.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, I do not agree. On the contrary, it says here also “that at all times he had reckoned with the possibility of intervention by the Western Powers.” It says so here quite clearly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But it is the second part that I am putting to you. I pass from that point about British intervention. I say, “he was glad now about the course of events,” and if you will look down at the paragraph where it says “secondly,” so that you will have it in mind, the third line says:

“Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general
conscription it was clear that the ratio of war strength would
not develop in the long run in favor of Germany and Italy.”

VON RIBBENTROP: May I ask where it says that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: A few lines further down. The word “secondly” is underlined, isn’t it?

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it is not here. Yes, I have it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “Secondly, at the moment when England introduced general conscription...” It is about 10 lines further on.

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, what does the British Prosecutor try to prove with that; I do not quite understand?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to look at the next sentence before you answer my question.

“This, along with the other things, was decisive for the
Führer’s decision to solve the Polish question, even under the
danger of intervention by the Western Powers. The deciding fact
was, however, that a great power could not take certain things
lying down.”

What I am saying...

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that appears correct to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was your view at the time and the view that you declared afterwards as being your view, that you were determined that you would solve the Polish question even if it meant war? Count Ciano was perfectly right in saying that you wanted war. That is what I am putting to you.

VON RIBBENTROP: No; that is not correct. I told Count Ciano at the time at Berchtesgaden that the Führer was determined to solve the problem one way or another. It was necessary to put it in that way because the Führer was convinced that whatever became known to Rome would go to London and Paris at once. He wanted therefore to have clear language used so that Italy would be on our side diplomatically. If the Führer or myself had said that the Führer was not so determined to solve that problem, then it would have been without doubt passed on immediately. But since the Führer was determined to solve the problem, if necessary by war if it could not be solved any other way, this would have meant war, which explains the clear and firm diplomatic attitude which I had to adopt at that time in Salzburg. But I do not know in what way this is contradictory to what is being said here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to pass on to the last week in August and take that again very shortly, because there is a lot of ground to cover.

You agreed in your evidence that on the 25th of August the Führer called off the attack which was designed for the morning of the 26th. You remember that? I just want you to have the dates in mind.

VON RIBBENTROP: I know that date very well.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were here in court the day Dahlerus gave his evidence, were you not?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, I was here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And let me remind you of the date, that on the evening of the 24th the Defendant Göring asked Herr Dahlerus to go to London the next morning to carry forward a preliminary outline of what the Führer was going to say to Sir Nevile Henderson on the 25th. So you remember that was his evidence? And on the 25th, at 1:30...

VON RIBBENTROP: I do not recall the dates exactly, but I suppose they are correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I know these dates pretty well, and the Tribunal will correct me if I am wrong, but I am giving them as I have looked them up. That was the night of the 24th; Dahlerus left on the morning of the 25th, and then at 1:30 on the 25th—you said about noon, I am not quarreling with you for a matter of minutes—midday on the 25th the Führer saw Sir Nevile Henderson...

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And gave him what is called a _note verbale_, that is, an inquiry in general terms.

VON RIBBENTROP: No, it was given to him in the evening. At noon he had only talked to him and in the evening I had Minister Schmidt take the _note verbale_ to him, I think that is the way it was, with a special message in which I asked him again to impress upon his Government how serious the Führer was about this message or offer. I think that is contained in the _British Blue Book_.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Whenever you gave him the actual note, Herr Hitler told him the general view in the oral conversation which he had with Sir Nevile in the middle of the day?

VON RIBBENTROP: Yes, that is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And the actual calling off of the attack on the morning of the 26th, as you have said, was not done until you had had the message from Signor Mussolini at about 3 o’clock, and the news that the Anglo-Polish formal agreement was going to be signed that evening about 4 o’clock. That is what you have said.

Now, the first point that I am putting to you is this: That at the time that Herr Dahlerus was sent, and the time of this note, when the words were spoken by the Führer to Sir Nevile Henderson, it was the German intention to attack on the morning of the 26th; and what I suggest is that both the message to Herr Dahlerus and the words which were spoken to Sir Nevile Henderson were simply designed in order to trouble the British Government, in the hope that it might have some effect on them withdrawing from their aid to Poland; isn’t that right?

VON RIBBENTROP: Do you want me to answer that?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly; I am asking you.