Chapter X: Book 3: of the document book for the Defendant Hess there are also a (6)

DR. HORN: Then Von Ribbentrop did not hand the memorandum which we mentioned previously to Sir Nevile Henderson. Did you have the impression that Ribbentrop did not submit the text of the ultimatum to Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson because he did not wish to or because he was not allowed to do so?

SCHMIDT: It is difficult for me to give a clear-cut answer to this question as I was not present at the preliminary discussions which Hitler doubtless had with the Foreign Minister regarding that point before the conference with the British Ambassador. I, therefore, have to rely on the impressions I got during the conference with the British Ambassador; and from these I can draw my conclusions as to the instructions Hitler may have given the Foreign Minister for this conference. In this connection I can say the following:

When Henderson requested that the document containing the German proposals be submitted to him, the Foreign Minister said: “No, I cannot give you the document.” These are the words he used. This of course was a somewhat unusual procedure because normally Sir Nevile Henderson had the right to expect that a document which had just been read out would be handed to him. I myself was rather surprised at the Foreign Minister’s answer and looked up because I thought I had misunderstood. I looked at the Foreign Minister and heard him say for the second time: “I cannot give you the document.” But I saw that this matter caused him some discomfort and that he must have been aware of the rather difficult position in which he found himself by this answer, because an uneasy smile played on his lips when he said in a quiet voice to Sir Nevile Henderson these words, “I cannot give you the document.” Then I looked at Sir Nevile Henderson as I of course expected him to ask me to translate the document, but this request was not forthcoming. I looked at Henderson rather invitingly, since I wanted to translate the document, knowing how extraordinarily important a quick and complete transmission of its contents to the British Government was. If I had been asked to translate I would have done so quite slowly, almost at dictation speed, in order to enable the British Ambassador in this roundabout way to take down not merely the general outline of the German proposal, but all its details and transmit them to his Government. But Sir Nevile Henderson did not react even to my glance so that the discussion soon came to an end and events took their course.

DR. HORN: Did you, on the morning of 3 September 1939, receive the British ultimatum to the German Government?

SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.

DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this ultimatum?

SCHMIDT: On the morning of the 3rd, at about 2 or 3 o’clock, the British Embassy telephoned the Reich Chancellery, where I was still present with the Foreign Minister in order to be available for possible conferences, to give the information that the British Ambassador had received instructions from his government, according to which, at exactly 9 o’clock, he was to make an important announcement on behalf of the British Government to the Foreign Minister. He therefore asked to be received by Herr Von Ribbentrop at that time. He was given the reply that Ribbentrop himself would not be available but that a member of the Foreign Office, namely I, would be authorized to receive the British Government’s announcement from the British Ambassador on his behalf. Thus it happened that at 9 o’clock in the morning I received the British Ambassador in Ribbentrop’s office. When I asked him to be seated Henderson refused and while still standing he read to me the well-known ultimatum of the British Government to the German Government, according to which, unless certain conditions were fulfilled by Germany, the British Government would consider themselves at war with Germany at 11 o’clock that morning.

After we had exchanged a few words of farewell, I took the document to the Reich Chancellery.

DR. HORN: To whom did you submit this document there?

SCHMIDT: In the Reich Chancellery I gave it to Hitler, that is to say, I found Hitler in his office in conference with the Foreign Minister and I translated the document into German for him. When I had completed my translation, there was at first silence.

DR. HORN: Was Hitler alone in the room?

SCHMIDT: No, as I said before, he was in his office with the Foreign Minister. And when I had completed my translation, both gentlemen were absolutely silent for about a minute. I could clearly see that this development did not suit them at all. For a while Hitler sat in his chair deep in thought and stared somewhat worriedly into space. Then he broke the silence with a rather abrupt question to the Foreign Minister, saying, “What shall we do now?” Thereupon they began to discuss the next diplomatic steps to be taken, whether this or that ambassador should be called, _et cetera_. I, of course, left the room since I had nothing more to do. When I entered the anteroom, I found assembled there—or rather I had already seen on my way in—some Cabinet members and higher officials, to whose questioning looks—they knew I had seen the British Ambassador—I had said only that there would be no second Munich. When I came out again, I saw by their anxious faces that my remark had been correctly interpreted. When I then told them that I had just handed a British ultimatum to Hitler, a heavy silence fell on the room. The faces suddenly grew rather serious. I still remember that Göring, for instance, who was standing in front of me, turned round to me and said, “If we lose this war, then God help us.” Goebbels was standing in a corner by himself and had a very serious, not to say depressed, expression. This depressing atmosphere prevailed over all those present, and it naturally lives in my memory as something most remarkable for the frame of mind prevailing in the anteroom of the Reich Chancellery on the first day of the war.

DR. HORN: So you did not have the impression, then, that these men expected a declaration of war?

SCHMIDT: No, I did not have that impression.

DR. HORN: Witness, were you in a position to observe how Ribbentrop reacted to the news of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor?

SCHMIDT: I had no direct opportunity, but in the Foreign Office it was generally known that the news of Pearl Harbor took the Foreign Minister, as indeed the whole Foreign Office, completely by surprise. This impression was confirmed by what a member of the Press Department told me. The Press Department had a listening station for radio news and the official on duty had instructions to inform the Foreign Minister personally of important news at once. When the first news of Pearl Harbor was received by the listening station of the Press Department, the official on duty considered it of sufficient importance to report it to his chief, that is to say, the head of the Press Department, who in turn was to pass it on to the Foreign Minister. He was, however—so I was told—rather harshly rebuffed by the Foreign Minister who said it must be an invention of the press or a canard, and he did not wish our Press Department to disturb him with such stories. After that, a second and third message about Pearl Harbor was received, I think a Reuters report had also been received by the listening station; and the head of the Press Department then again plucked up courage and, in spite of the order not to disturb the Foreign Minister, he once more gave him this news.

THE PRESIDENT: This evidence seems to be utterly uninteresting and irrelevant to the Tribunal.

DR. HORN: Von Ribbentrop is accused also of having prepared aggressive war against the United States of America.

THE PRESIDENT: What you were telling was the reactions of the press. What have we got to do with the reactions of the press?

DR. HORN: The witness described Von Ribbentrop’s reaction to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Von Ribbentrop did not know that the Japanese were about to attack Pearl Harbor or that they were about to attack America at all. Neither was there such an agreement between Japan and Germany. It is therefore not correct that Ribbentrop prepared an aggressive war against the United States of America. That is...

THE PRESIDENT: You were talking about the press. I am not saying that you ought not to ask him whether the Foreign Minister knew nothing about the attack upon Pearl Harbor. That was not what I said. What I said was that the Tribunal was not interested and thought it was irrelevant for you to go into the reactions of the press.

DR. HORN: Witness, you were present at the negotiations regarding the Naval Agreement with England. Can you tell us how those negotiations proceeded, and whether Von Ribbentrop was sincere, and what aims he pursued?

SCHMIDT: These negotiations, at which I was also present as interpreter, went perfectly smoothly after some difficulties had been overcome. The aims which the Foreign Minister...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, as I understand it, this is the Naval Agreement of 1935. In my recollection—I am just trying to check it—that was one of the matters which we discussed on the application for witnesses, and the Tribunal ruled against going into the negotiations antecedent to the conclusion of that treaty. It came up on application for witnesses. One or two witnesses who were going to give the negotiations were asked for and, I think, to deal with this exact point which Dr. Horn put in his last question, namely, the state of mind of the Defendant Ribbentrop. I found one or two—there is Lord Monsell, for example, who was on the list of witnesses—who were denied by the Court, and a number of German ones were denied on the same point. My Lord, it is in the Tribunal’s statement of the 26th of February; and Your Lordship will see, on Page 2, I think, certainly the witness Monsell, who happens to be the one most familiar to myself; but I am sure there were other witnesses, too. I know that we discussed this point quite fully on the application for witnesses.

THE PRESIDENT: Who were the others, Sir David?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have a list of witnesses who were refused. There is Admiral Schuster...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, he is one.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: ...who was relevant on this question as to who initiated the treaty. And then there is Sir Robert Craigie, Number 24. There is Lord Monsell...

THE PRESIDENT: He was refused.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: These are on the same points, Number 25.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, My Lord, I think these are the three.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, what do you say to this? Those three witnesses—Schuster, Craigie, and Monsell—who as alleged by you were to give evidence on this 1935 treaty, were all refused. As to the witness you are now examining, no such reference was contained regarding him in the application. He was asked for only as an interpreter in the Foreign Office.

DR. HORN: I was under the impression that these other three witnesses had been refused because they were cumulative and I was not going to question the witness on the Naval Agreement but I merely want to ask him about the attitude shown by Ribbentrop when the agreement was concluded and afterwards in order to prove to the Tribunal that Von Ribbentrop was not, in any case at that time, deliberately working towards an aggressive war, nor was he participating in a conspiracy to initiate a war of aggression, at least not at that time. And I wish to prove further that this agreement was not “eyewash” as the afore-mentioned British Ambassador, Sir Nevile Henderson, put it.

THE PRESIDENT: Your application with reference to Ambassador Craigie was this: The witness can give evidence that in 1935 Ribbentrop approached England with a proposal that the Naval Treaty should be signed and Ribbentrop’s initiative brought about an agreement by France to this treaty which involved the Treaty of Versailles. Thus the treaty has come into effect.

Is it not in connection with that, that you were going to ask this witness questions?

DR. HORN: No.

THE PRESIDENT: If you have nothing about the Naval treaty of 1935, then you can go on.

DR. HORN: Witness, in 1944, you were present at a conference between Horthy and Hitler at Klessheim, in which Von Ribbentrop also took part and during which the solution of the Jewish question in Hungary was discussed. What did Von Ribbentrop say to you about this question?

SCHMIDT: During this conference there had been a certain difficulty, when Hitler insisted that Horthy should proceed more energetically in the Jewish question, and Horthy answered with some heat, “But what am I supposed to do? Shall I perhaps beat the Jews to death?”—Whereupon there was rather a lull, and the Foreign Minister then turned to Horthy and said, “Yes, there are only two possibilities—either that, or to intern the Jews.” Afterwards he said to me—and this was rather exceptional—that Hitler’s demands in this connection might have gone a bit too far.

DR. HORN: On 25 August 1939, you took part in a conference between Hitler, Henderson, and Ribbentrop, at which Ribbentrop and Hitler once more expressed their wish to come to an agreement with Poland, using Britain as intermediary. Is it correct that Ribbentrop then sent you with a draft note on this conference to Henderson at the Embassy to ask him to back this proposal as far as possible and to try to put it through? Is that correct?

SCHMIDT: Yes, that is so.

DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal a copy of this telegram from Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Halifax? (Document Number TC-72, Number 69.)

[_Turning to the witness._] Is it correct, Witness, that on 28 August 1939, Herr Von Ribbentrop in a further discussion with Sir Nevile Henderson again stressed that an agreement between Germany and Britain after a settlement of the Polish question was Chamberlain’s greatest wish, as the British Prime Minister had stated to Ribbentrop and that Von Ribbentrop then repeated this to Henderson? Is that true?

SCHMIDT: Yes, that is true.

DR. HORN: May I submit to the Tribunal the memorandum in question as an exhibit?

THE PRESIDENT: You offer a copy of that in evidence, do you?

DR. HORN: I request the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the document.

THE PRESIDENT: What number?

DR. HORN: The one number has already been submitted by the Prosecution. It bears the Document Number TC-72 and another number, and the second number has also been submitted by the Prosecution. I submit it again to the Tribunal because I have referred to it just now. (Document Number TC-72, Number 75).

Witness, one last question: In your extensive experience as an interpreter, you had much opportunity to observe Hitler in contact with foreigners. What impression, according to your observations, did Hitler make on foreign statesmen?

SCHMIDT: Naturally, it is not quite so easy to answer this question, as one cannot look into the hearts and minds of other people. But as an observer one can naturally draw certain conclusions from the attitude...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Horn, the Tribunal does not think really that this is a matter which is relevant, the effect that Hitler’s demeanor had on foreign statesmen. It does not influence us in the least.

DR. HORN: Then I withdraw my question. I have no further questions to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Are there any other defendants’ counsel who wish to ask questions?

DR. OTTO STAHMER (Counsel for Defendant Göring): Witness, were you present at a conversation which, about one year before the outbreak of war, took place between Lord Londonderry and Field Marshal Göring at Karinhall?

SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present at this conversation.

DR. STAHMER: Describe briefly to the Tribunal the substance of this conversation.

SCHMIDT: After so long a time I cannot, of course, remember the details, but I recall merely that the subject of conversation was the Anglo-German rapprochement, or rather the elimination of any points of dispute between Germany and England, and that in addition, of course, quite a number of technical questions regarding aviation and the air force were dealt with. I have always remembered very clearly one particular remark made by Göring in the course of this conversation, when at the end of a discussion which was to prove how desirable it was that Germany and England be friendly and avoid conflicts, he said the following:

“If our two countries should be involved in a war against each
other, then there will naturally be a victor and a vanquished,
but the victor in this bitter conflict will in the moment of
victory have just enough strength left to strike the last blow
at the defeated and will then fall to the ground himself gravely
wounded and for this reason alone our two countries should get
along with each other without conflict and without war.”

DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in the negotiations in Munich in the autumn of 1938?

SCHMIDT: Yes, I did take part in these negotiations.

DR. STAHMER: Was the then Field Marshal Göring also present?

SCHMIDT: During the first part he was not present, but later when the circle of those present became larger he likewise took part.

DR. STAHMER: In what way did he participate in the negotiations?

SCHMIDT: He intervened only in individual questions of lesser importance. However, he did take part in a way which showed that through his intervention he wanted to remove insofar as possible, any difficulties arising from certain technical points which might hamper the progress of the negotiations. In other words, he was anxious that the Munich negotiations should not collapse over such technical points of procedure, which played an important role in the second part of the negotiations.

DR. STAHMER: Were you present at a conversation which took place in the autumn of 1937 between Lord Halifax and the then Field Marshal Göring and followed a conference between Lord Halifax and Hitler at the Berghof?

SCHMIDT: Yes, I was present.

DR. STAHMER: What course did this conversation take? Briefly, please.

SCHMIDT: First I must say that at the Obersalzberg the conversation with Lord Halifax had taken a very unsatisfactory turn. The two partners could in no way come to an understanding, but in the conversation with Göring the atmosphere improved. The same points were dealt with as at Obersalzberg, the subjects which were in the foreground at the time, namely, the Anschluss, the Sudeten question, and finally the questions of the Polish Corridor and Danzig. At Obersalzberg Hitler had treated these matters rather uncompromisingly, and he had demanded more or less that a solution as he conceived it be accepted by England, whereas Göring in his discussions always attached importance to the fact or always stressed that his idea was a peaceful solution, that is to say, a solution through negotiation, and that everything should be done in this direction, and that he also believed that such a solution could be reached for all three questions if the negotiations were properly conducted.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, you were present at numerous political conferences of Hitler’s. Did you notice on such occasions that high military leaders tried to influence him to enlarge German territory in a peaceful way or by war?

SCHMIDT: No, no such efforts on the part of the military came to my notice, because at political negotiations the military representatives were for the most part not present at the beginning when the large problems were dealt with and they were called in only when purely military problems were discussed; and then, of course, they stated their opinion only on purely military questions and did not speak on any political matters.

DR. LATERNSER: Then I have one more question: On the occasion of such discussions, did you find that high military leaders were anxious to exert political influence upon the Reich Government?

SCHMIDT: No, I did not find that, and you could not have found it, since they were hardly ever present.

DR. LATERNSER: I have no further questions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you first of all to tell the Tribunal quite shortly the general background of your views. Do you remember on 28 November making an affidavit at Oberursel; do you remember?

SCHMIDT: I cannot remember the date clearly, but I do remember that I made an affidavit.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at it. [_Handing the document to the witness._] Paragraph 1 sets out your experience, the number of conferences, _et cetera_.

My Lord, I ought to have said that this document is Document Number 3308-PS and will be Exhibit GB-288.

[_Turning to the witness._] Then, in Paragraph 2 you give the basis of your experience. Would you follow it while I read:

“Whatever success and position I have enjoyed in the Foreign
Office I owe to the fact that I made it my business at all times
to possess thorough familiarity with the subject matter under
discussion, and I endeavored to achieve intimate knowledge of
the mentality of Hitler and the other leaders. Throughout the
Hitler Regime I constantly endeavored to keep myself apprised as
to what was going on in the Foreign Office and in related
organizations, and I enjoyed such a position that it was
possible to have ready access to key officials and to key
personnel in their offices.”

And then, if you will look at the third paragraph, which gives your impression from that basis of the objectives of the foreign policy:

“The general objectives of the Nazi leadership were apparent
from the start, namely, the domination of the European
Continent, to be achieved, first, by the incorporation of all
German-speaking groups in the Reich, and secondly, by
territorial expansion under the slogan of ‘Lebensraum.’ The
execution of these basic objectives, however, seemed to be
characterized by improvisation. Each succeeding step apparently
was carried out as each new situation arose, but all consistent
with the ultimate objectives mentioned above.”

Is that right, Herr Schmidt? Does that express your views?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, before I go on to deal with particular matters, I want you to develop your impressions a little further. You have told us that you acted under or with every foreign minister since Herr Stresemann. Did you notice a considerable difference between the style of living of the Nazi ministers and those who had preceded them?

SCHMIDT: As far as the style of living is concerned, there were certain differences, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us take the Defendant Ribbentrop. Before the Defendant Ribbentrop went into politics, had he one house in Berlin-Dahlem? I think Lenze-Allee 19. Was that his possession?

SCHMIDT: Yes, that is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, when he was Foreign Minister, had he six houses? Let me remind you and take them one by one. You can tell me if I am right. There was a house in Sonnenburg, somewhere near Berlin, with an estate of 750 hectares, and a private golf course. That was one, was it not?

SCHMIDT: I knew that there was a house at Sonnenburg, but I did not know how large it was.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then there was one at Tanneck bei Düren, near Aachen, a house that he used for horse breeding?

SCHMIDT: I did not know about that house.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then there was one near Kitzbühl that he used for chamois hunting?

SCHMIDT: That is not known to me in detail.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not in detail, but its existence was known?

SCHMIDT: I consider that it is not at all improbable that the house existed, but I have not heard any details about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, of course, there was the Schloss Fuschl; that is in Austria, is it not?

SCHMIDT: Near Salzburg, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Near Salzburg, yes. That was taken over as a state residence. I will ask you about the circumstances a little later.

Then there was a Slovakian hunting estate called “Pustepole,” was there not?

SCHMIDT: The name is familiar to me, and I know that Herr Von Ribbentrop sometimes went hunting there, but I know nothing regarding the proprietorship.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then he also used a hunting lodge, near Podersan, that had been that of Count Czernin, near Podersan, in Bohemia, in the Sudetenland?

SCHMIDT: There was a hunting house or something similar, I do not know the name, where receptions took place, as for instance, that given for Count Ciano. But I think it had a different name.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the one—where Ciano visited. That is the one I was indicating to you. I think I am right that it previously belonged to Count Czernin.

Tell me, was the salary fixed for Reich Ministers?

SCHMIDT: I did not understand the question.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me put it quite clearly. Was a salary—that is, a fixed annual remuneration—appointed for Reich Ministers?

SCHMIDT: Yes, that is quite right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How much was that?

SCHMIDT: That I cannot say.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was kept secret?

SCHMIDT: That is not the reason that I cannot give you any information. I was not at all interested in how large a salary the Reich Foreign Minister received.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You do not know?

SCHMIDT: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you say that you do not know, that is good enough for me. I think, perhaps, you can answer this question. Had any previous Reich Foreign Minister been able to run six country houses and estates of various sizes on his salary, anyone that you had worked with?

SCHMIDT: Whether he could have done it I cannot say, but he did not do it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He did not. We will leave it there for a moment.

Now, I want you to apply your mind to May 1939. That is about four months before the war, when the Polish question was just coming up. I mean, it was getting to be quite a serious question. Do you remember what I think they call in the German Foreign Office a _conduite de langage_ that was issued by Ribbentrop about that time and put out by Baron Von Weizsäcker?

SCHMIDT: No, I do not know that, or at any rate I should say that I cannot remember it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me try to remind you, to see if this draws it to your recollection:

“The Polish problem will be solved by Hitler in 48 hours; the
Western Powers will be unable to give any assistance to Poland;
the British Empire is doomed within the next 10 years; France
will bleed to death if she tries to intervene.”

Do you remember a _conduite de langage_ to that effect issued by the Foreign Minister?

SCHMIDT: I cannot remember a _conduite de langage_ of that kind. It appears to me rather to resemble a _conduite de langage_ for propaganda purposes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that Von Ribbentrop issued instructions that no official of the Foreign Office was to issue any different views?

SCHMIDT: That is right, that one was to adhere to those _conduites de langage_.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember what he told Baron Von Weizsäcker to say would happen to anyone who expressed different views?

SCHMIDT: No, I do not recollect that, but I can imagine that severe penalties would have been threatened to such a person. But I do not remember the actual case.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you not remember that he said they would be shot by him personally?

SCHMIDT: That such a statement may have been made by him on some occasion when he was angry, I consider perfectly possible, but I do not believe that it was meant seriously.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I thought you might remember—I just suggest it to you—was the distress and difficulty that Baron Von Weizsäcker had in deciding how he was to say it to the official conference at the Foreign Office. Do you not remember that?

SCHMIDT: At that time I had not yet been admitted to the morning conferences. I was not present at that time so I cannot tell you anything about it, but I can imagine that the State Secretary may have had quite some trouble in translating that statement into official language.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I want to deal quite shortly with the points that have been put to you about August 1939. I only want to get the facts quite clear.

Do you remember that you were with Hitler at the time that he was expecting the reactions of the Western Powers to the Soviet treaty?

SCHMIDT: No, I was attached to the delegation in Moscow and therefore not with Hitler.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So did you come back with the Defendant Ribbentrop on the 24th?

SCHMIDT: Yes, but I remained in Berlin and did not go to Berchtesgaden.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. Well, now you remember that Hitler saw Sir Nevile Henderson at 1:30 on the 25th and gave him what has been called a _note verbale_? Do you remember that?

SCHMIDT: I think that I was not present at that conference, because just at that time I was in Moscow. It must be possible to establish the date. I was not present at a conference between Hitler and the British Ambassador which took place on the Obersalzberg during the time of our Moscow journey. I think that is the conference to which you are referring.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is the day after the defendant came back from Moscow?

SCHMIDT: No, I remained in Berlin. I was not up there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I just want to remind you of the day. If you were not present, I will pass from it; but were you present when Signor Attolico, the Italian Ambassador, produced a communication from Mussolini?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You were there?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the day I am asking you about. Do you remember that a communication came from Signor Attolico that afternoon that the Italian Army and Air Force were not in a condition to go to war?

SCHMIDT: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want you to try to help me because it is rather important as to the time. Was that not about 3 o’clock in the afternoon?

SCHMIDT: That could be so; but with the many conferences which took place at the time, the question of hours and dates is naturally a bit confused.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember the news that the Anglo-Polish Treaty would be signed that evening coming through about 4 o’clock?

SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember about 4 o’clock M. Coulondre, the French Ambassador, having an interview with Hitler?

SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, were you aware that on that day the orders for an attack on Poland the next morning were countermanded?

SCHMIDT: I remember that military orders had been withdrawn, but just what orders these were I naturally never learned.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would not ask you about that, Herr Schmidt, but you knew that orders had been countermanded. I wondered if you could help me on this point: Was not the countermanding of the orders at 6:15—1815 hours—after the interview with the French Ambassador, M. Coulondre, was not that the time when they were countermanded?

SCHMIDT: I cannot recall whether that was the time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And equally could you help the Tribunal on this point: Were they not issued about 2 o’clock—1400 hours—after the interview with Sir Nevile Henderson? Do you know that?

SCHMIDT: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see. You cannot help us on that point.

Well, now. I am not going to take time about the interview on the night of the 30-31 August between Sir Nevile Henderson and the Defendant Ribbentrop, except to ask you this: You have told us that the Defendant Ribbentrop was very excited; when he read these terms over, did he raise his voice at times, shouting?

SCHMIDT: No.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: How did he show his nervousness, then?

SCHMIDT: It manifested itself during some incidents which I mentioned before, which had occurred during the conversation; previously during those incidents the nervousness became apparent, but not during the reading of the document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I see, but you remember and were very much astounded at the time at the refusal to hand over the vital document to the British Ambassador?

SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want to see if you can help us with one or two other incidents. It has been suggested by a witness that we heard yesterday that the Defendant Ribbentrop knew very little about concentration camps. I want to make it clear that was suggested. I think perhaps you can help us on one or two inhabitants of concentration camps that he knew about. Do you remember a man called Martin Luther? Not the religious gentleman but a contemporary?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember that the Defendant Ribbentrop brought him into his office, the Bureau Ribbentrop, in 1936?

SCHMIDT: I am not sure about the year, but I do know that he got his job through the Bureau.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. I think it was not received with great joy by the older members of the German Foreign Office.

SCHMIDT: No, certainly not.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: There had been some trouble about a small matter of 4,000 Reichsmark that Mr. Luther had had to deal with in the past?

SCHMIDT: Yes. We learned about that afterwards.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He was taken into the Foreign Office and received rapid promotion to counsellor, that is to say minister, and Under Secretary of State, did he not?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then, do you remember that in 1943 he had a quarrel with the Defendant Ribbentrop?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And he sent to Himmler—I think he did it through Lieutenant Büttner—suggesting that Ribbentrop’s state of mind was not such that he ought to continue as Foreign Secretary, and suggesting that Werner Best, I believe it was, should be appointed. Do you remember that?

SCHMIDT: Yes, I remember that; but I did not know that he suggested Werner Best as successor.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, he suggested that Ribbentrop should go. I think he was quite blunt about it. I believe he suggested that his mental powers were no longer up to it.

SCHMIDT: I did not see the report. I only heard rumors about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In consequence of that, of course, after an interview with Ribbentrop, Ribbentrop had Luther put in a concentration camp, did he not?

SCHMIDT: I do not know whether that happened on Ribbentrop’s initiative, or whether it came from some other source, but it was said among us in the office that Luther had landed in a concentration camp.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Well, the sequence of events was that Luther had this disagreement with Ribbentrop and shortly afterwards he appeared in a concentration camp. And not only did he go into a concentration camp, but is it not correct that even the SS asked that he should come out of the concentration camp, and Ribbentrop would not agree to it?

SCHMIDT: That I cannot say, because the whole matter was, of course, treated rather confidentially in the office by Herr Von Ribbentrop and the members of the old Foreign Office, of whom I was one, did not have his confidence to such an extent that they were informed of all such details. In other words, I heard about the whole Luther affair only by way of rumor, through special channels—actually through prohibited channels—so that I cannot therefore give you any authentic information but I can repeat only what I have heard unofficially.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sure you desire to be absolutely frank with the Tribunal, and the point I am putting to you is that everyone in the Foreign Office knew that Luther had landed in a concentration camp and, quite clearly, the Defendant Ribbentrop knew that he had landed in a concentration camp. That is right, is it not?

SCHMIDT: Yes, certainly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, let us just take one other incident relating to this if I may comment as to his extraordinary innocence about concentration camps.

You remember two unfortunate people called Herr and Frau Von Remitz, to whom the Schloss Fuschl used to belong? I think the name is either Remitz or Raenitz. Do you remember?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, the Schloss Fuschl—would you tell me how it is pronounced?

SCHMIDT: Well, regarding these matters I am so little...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I want you to tell me how it is pronounced.

SCHMIDT: Fuschl.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.

The Schloss Fuschl used to belong to the people that I have just mentioned. Frau Von Remitz was a sister of August Thyssen, was she not?

SCHMIDT: I cannot say anything about that, since all these questions refer to the private household of Herr Von Ribbentrop and I had nothing to do with that. My connections with him were purely official and limited at that to routine matters and the important political interpretation affairs in the Foreign Office. I only heard about the other matters, and naturally not in such a way that I could make any authentic statements about them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will ask you only one question. After the Schloss had become the property, or at any rate had come to the use of the Foreign Minister, did not Herr Von Remitz spend several years in a concentration camp, where he ultimately died? You knew that, did you not?

SCHMIDT: I knew it as a rumor; I was told that it had happened in that way.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And did he not hear of other stories stronger than these, that came out of concentration camps?

SCHMIDT: I do not believe that any authentic reports were made there regarding conditions because naturally, particularly in front of the Foreign Office, it was treated as taboo by these people who were responsible for concentration camps, since we were in any case regarded as not quite reliable and as not belonging to them. Such matters were of course diligently covered up and concealed from us. Therefore, any concrete details never became known to us at all.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But you knew, did you not, even in the Foreign Office, that there were a large number of concentration camps in which a vast number of people were shut up?

SCHMIDT: We knew that, but our source of information was mostly the foreign press, which we read, of course; and the foreign radio reports which appeared on our table, translated, every morning.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: So that if you knew it from the foreign press and the foreign radio, whoever else in that dock did not know about concentration camps, the Defendant Ribbentrop, as foreign Minister, did know. Is that not right?

SCHMIDT: I would like to put it this way: Of course, he had access to that foreign news material. Just how he evaluated it, whether he considered it true or completely false, or exaggerated, naturally I cannot say. Of course he also received the reports as such, but as reports from abroad and, during the war, as reports from hostile countries.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Doctor, I will not pursue that further at the moment. I want you just to tell me this: You have given us your account of the interview between Hitler and the Defendant Ribbentrop and Horthy when the question of the Jews was discussed, on the 17th of April 1943. I just wanted on record that your account is based on the fact that you actually made the minutes; the minutes are signed by you.

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to pass to another point. From 1943 to 1945 were you still going to Hitler’s headquarters for occasional interpreting and attending of meetings and the like?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: For example—I do not know if you can remember it, but I am sure you will try—on the 27th of February 1944, do you remember a visit of Marshal Antonescu?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Were you present at that?

SCHMIDT: I remember I was always present during all the visits of Antonescu, since the discussion could not take place any other way. Regarding the date I cannot tell you anything exact at the moment.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It was actually the 27th of February. I wanted to try and fix it by an incident which might remind you of it, that Antonescu was there. Now, do you remember on that occasion that the Defendant Dönitz was present?

SCHMIDT: It is possible, but I have no exact recollection. It is quite possible that he was present during the military discussions.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Exhibit, My Lord, is GB-207, and it is dealt with on Page 2705 of the shorthand notes (Volume V, Page 249). The document was originally Number D-648.

[_Turning to the witness._] I want you to tell the Tribunal about the general governmental setup. There has been considerable evidence given before the Tribunal that the Reichsregierung, as such, did not meet after the beginning of the war. Several people have told us that. Instead of a cabinet meeting, was it not a fact that the Government of Germany was carried on by these constant meetings at Hitler’s headquarters?

SCHMIDT: I consider it possible, but naturally I have no exact knowledge, since I never took part in such internal conferences. I went to headquarters only whenever I had to accompany a foreigner there.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You came only when there was a foreign visitor, but you know that these meetings were continuously taking place and that the Defendant Göring, the Defendant Speer, the Defendant Keitel, the Defendant Jodl, the Defendant Dönitz were constantly attending these meetings.

SCHMIDT: I do not know, of course, whether you can describe that conference as a meeting.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I did not mean to play with words with you at all. I used the word only to describe what was happening. If you prefer to call it a conference, I am willing to do that.

SCHMIDT: I admit that on occasions conferences with Hitler took place or could have taken place, while these people you have just named were present at the headquarters.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you agree with me, do you not, that as far as one can find any organism or organization through which the government of the Reich was being carried on, it was this succession of meetings or conferences at Hitler’s headquarters; is that not so?

SCHMIDT: Well, I do not know whether you can regard that as governmental activity, because if I drew a parallel with the conferences at which I was present with these foreign gentlemen, then you will find that the person who spoke and who pushed through decisions was Hitler alone. If it was the same at those conferences, then you could call it a government discussion; but it was only a one-man government. The others were there only as an audience or to be questioned regarding individual points. That is how I imagine it, but I was not present.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I quite appreciate your point, but these were the occasions at which each service and each department and each organization—like the SS through the Reichsführer SS, Himmler—put its point of view and put the facts before Hitler on which decisions were come to, were they not? And that is what happened for the last 2 years of the war.

SCHMIDT: One could have drawn that conclusion from the presence of those people, yes, but as I say it could of course have been that there was only a sort of taking of orders at headquarters. Both possibilities exist, but which is applicable I cannot say.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: At any rate, I think you will agree with this, will you not, Herr Schmidt, that there was no other place at which the government of Germany took place except that?

SCHMIDT: Yes. That is right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you be good enough to look at your affidavit? I will just read the rest of it. It is quite short, but I want it to be on the record. Paragraph 4:

“The attempted Putsch in Austria and the murder of Dollfuss on
25 July 1934 seriously disturbed the career personnel of the
Foreign Office, because these events discredited Germany in the
eyes of the world. It was common knowledge that the Putsch had
been engineered by the Party, and the fact that the attempted
Putsch followed so closely on the heels of the blood purge
within Germany could not help but suggest the similarity of Nazi
methods both in foreign and domestic policy. This concern over
the repercussions of the attempted Putsch was soon heightened by
a recognition of the fact that these episodes were of influence
in leading to the Franco-Soviet Consultative Pact of 5 December
1934, a defensive arrangement which was not heeded as a warning
by the Nazis.

“5. The announcement in March of the establishment of a German
Air Force and of the reintroduction of conscription was followed
on 2 May 1935 by the conclusion of a mutual-assistance pact
between France and the Soviet Union. The career personnel of the
Foreign Office regarded this as a further very serious warning
as to the potential consequences of German foreign policy, but
the Nazi leaders only stiffened their attitude towards the
Western Powers, declaring that they were not going to be
intimidated. At this time, the career officials at least
expressed their reservations to the Foreign Minister, Neurath. I
do not know whether or not Neurath in turn related these
expressions of concern to Hitler.

“6. The re-entry of the German military forces into the
Rhineland was preceded by Nazi diplomatic preparation in
February. A German communiqué of 21 February 1936 reaffirmed
that the French-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance was
incompatible with the Locarno Treaties and the Covenant of the
League. On the same day Hitler argued in an interview that no
real grounds existed for conflict between Germany and France.
Considered against the background statements in _Mein Kampf_,
offensive to France, the circumstances were such as to suggest
that the stage was being set for justifying some future act. I
do not know how far in advance the march into the Rhineland was
decided upon. I personally knew about it and discussed it
approximately 2 or 3 weeks before it occurred. Considerable fear
had been expressed, particularly in military circles, concerning
the risks of this undertaking. Similar fears were felt by many
in the Foreign Office. It was common knowledge in the Foreign
Office, however, that Neurath was the only person in government
circles, consulted by Hitler, who felt confident that the
Rhineland could be remilitarized without armed opposition from
Britain and France. Neurath’s position throughout this period
was one which would induce Hitler to have more faith in Neurath
than in the general run of ‘old school’ diplomats whom Hitler
tended to hold in disrespect.”

Then there is a paragraph about the sanctions in Italy which I do not think is a relevant matter before the Tribunal; and then, in Paragraph 8, I will go on:

“Plans for annexation of Austria were a part of the Nazi program
from the beginning. Italian opposition after the murder of
Dollfuss temporarily forced a more careful approach to this
problem, but the application of sanctions against Italy by the
League, plus the rapid increase of German military strength,
made safer the resumption of the Austrian program. When Göring
visited Rome early in 1937 he declared that a union of Austria
and Germany was inevitable and could be expected sooner or
later. Mussolini, hearing these words in German, remained
silent, and protested only mildly when I translated them into
French. The consummation of the Anschluss was essentially a
Party matter, in which Von Papen’s role was to preserve smooth
diplomatic relations on the surface while the Party used more
devious ways of preparing conditions for the expected move. The
speech delivered by Papen on 18 Feb. 1938, following the
Berchtesgaden meeting, interpreted the Berchtesgaden agreement
as the first step towards the establishment of a Central
European Commonwealth under the leadership of Germany. This was
generally recognized in the Foreign Office as a clear prophecy
of a Greater Germany which would embrace Austria.”

The final paragraph says these matters are true and that you have made this affidavit voluntarily and without compulsion. That is right, is it not, Herr Schmidt?

Now, just one more point and then I have finished with you. It is correct, is it not, that in his period as Foreign Minister the Defendant Ribbentrop brought a number of people who had rank in the SS, or, in the old days in the SA into the Foreign Office and made them part of the staff?

SCHMIDT: Yes. Principally they were members of his so-called Bureau—that is to say, his former organization. They were taken into the Office, not all, but some of them.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: Does any other prosecutor want to cross-examine? Dr. Horn, do you want to re-examine?

DR. HORN: I have no further questions to put to this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.

DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): Mr. President, I have just one question to ask the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Keep the witness.

DR. LÖFFLER: May I have your permission to put one question to the witness?

THE PRESIDENT: Would you say whom you are appearing for?

DR. LÖFFLER: Dr. Löffler, Defense Counsel for the SA.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, you were, as a rule, personally present during the visit of highly placed foreign statesmen. Were you also present during the visit of statesmen during the Olympic Games of 1936?

SCHMIDT: Yes.

DR. LÖFFLER: Did any one of the foreign statesmen express the wish to inspect the German institutions and the establishments set up by the National Socialists—in particular in the social sphere—before or after 1936?

SCHMIDT: Whether any such wishes were expressed during the Olympic Games I cannot remember at the moment; but that such wishes were expressed and that they were fulfilled becomes clear from a number of facts—for instance, from Lloyd George’s visit to the Obersalzberg and, later on, his inspection of social institutions in Germany; from the visit of a number of interested foreign persons who, in my opinion, took a very lively interest in the social institutions in Germany.

DR. LÖFFLER: You were present personally during these inspections. Do you remember an inspection during which you were present?

SCHMIDT: Mostly I was not present at these inspections. I only recollect that, for instance, the Labor Front had an organization which was called “Joy and Work” and that was an international organization which held a great annual congress at Hamburg, during which I often acted as interpreter.

DR. LÖFFLER: Do you know anything about the impressions made by these institutions on foreign statesmen?

SCHMIDT: The social institutions, as far as I know, always made quite a favorable impression.

DR. LÖFFLER: Do you remember the visit of the Prince of Wales to Germany?

SCHMIDT: Yes. I acted as interpreter there.

THE PRESIDENT: What has this got to do with the charges in the Indictment? Dr. Löffler, your duty was to ask any question you have got at the same time as the other defense counsels. I asked you whether you had any questions to ask. You said “no,” or you indicated that you had not. You now get up and say you have one question to ask and you have asked about—I don’t know how many you are going to ask, but they are all, in the opinion of the Tribunal, I think, irrelevant.

DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, the questions which I am putting are caused by the cross-examination by Sir David. Sir David has mentioned the SA, and I want to put a corresponding counterquestion to the witness, and apart from that...

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David had not asked any question as to the social conditions of Germany, and he did not ask any questions about the Olympic Games of 1936. In any event, you are not the right person to re-examine.