Chapter XXX: Book 2: , Keitel-13). The latter affidavit has also been signed by the (1)

Codefendant Jodl. I refer to these affidavits and make them the contents of my argument without reading from them.

Finally I would like to direct the attention of the Tribunal toward other circumstances which may well impair the probative value of the documents which the Prosecution has submitted and you have accepted—for example, when documents do not bear any signatures, and it is impossible to decide whether it is a question of copies of documents which have actually been issued. As an example I will refer to Document 081-PS, which was submitted by the Prosecution for Keitel’s Indictment during the question of the treatment of prisoners of war. As far as its contents are concerned it is a fabulous document. Keitel does not remember ever having seen this report or ever having knowledge of the details contained in it. From all appearances one must consider this document as the draft of a report which was not issued, for:

a) it bears neither a signature nor an initial as is usual in copies,

b) if this letter had been sent out, it would have a blank journal number; and

c) the letter was not found at the addressee’s. In such cases mere knowledge of the addressee—in this case the Defendant Keitel—and the consequent deduction of his guilt in omitting to take measures to change conditions cannot be considered as proved.

I come to the Indictment against Field Marshal Keitel. I shall shorten the reading of Pages 19 to 21. The reading of the general Indictment and the special Indictment in the trial briefs can be omitted here since, with the exception of the Jewish problem and the persecution of the Church, there is no part of the Indictment which the Prosecution has not raised against the Defendant Keitel.

I should wish merely to point out that the original general Indictment holds Keitel responsible only for the period after 1938 and secondly, that at the beginning of the Indictment, Keitel is described as Chief of Army Command. According to the evidence submitted by the Prosecution, Keitel was also held responsible for the period after 1933, although the American, British, and French Prosecutions seem to have dropped the allegation that Keitel was Chief of Army Command. The Indictment of Field Marshal Keitel is split, therefore, between the periods 1933 to 1938—that is, 4 February 1938—and from 4 February 1938 until the end.

I shall now continue on Page 21, the last paragraph.

Herewith the defendant is not only indicted as a member of the conspiracy but is also accused of personally participating in all the crimes in the Indictment. The space which the Prosecution has devoted to the defendant in its statements corresponds with the comprehensive Indictments. The name of no other defendant has been mentioned so often by the Prosecution as that of the Defendant Keitel. Again and again we hear the words “Keitel’s order,” “Keitel’s decree,” and just as often “order of the OKW,” “directives of the OKW,” along with Keitel’s name as “Chief, OKW” after 4 February 1938.

From this is derived the very substance of the Indictment, namely, the position the Defendant Keitel occupied after 4 February 1938. But from it is also derived the scope of the justification. Here it is not a question of examining to what extent the defendant participated in the individual facts of the case, which in the long run arose from the so-called “Keitel orders” or “OKW instructions”; but what matters is the position he occupied—whether he took part and what part he took in the planning and execution of those orders and instructions, and finally and most important of all, whether his part in it was causal and culpable in the sense of the law which is to be applied here.

It seems to be of importance to stress from the outset several points of view which are important for the treatment of the case and for its judgment.

THE PRESIDENT: Would that be a convenient time to break off?

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

DR. NELTE: The defendant has declared that he admits the objective, that is, the factual contents of the general Indictment to have been proved (that is to say, not every individual point), taking into consideration the law of procedure governing this Trial. It would therefore be senseless, despite the possibility of refuting various documents or individual facts, to attempt to shake the Indictment as a whole. Therefore, I shall confine myself mainly to the questions concerning the subjective facts and the conspiracy, and I will treat only these individual points which require treatment because of their special importance concerning the personal participation of the Defendant Keitel.

The disproportion between the import of past events and the defendant’s fate as an individual is so great that the Defendant Keitel, even if not impelled by conscience, must have known after reflection that such a course on my part would lay him open to the suspicion that he was fighting here for his life. But the defendant has already made it quite clear in his argument that he is not fighting to save his head, but fighting to save face.

The defendant belongs to those men who came into the public eye through Adolf Hitler’s death. From 1938 onward he was in his closest circle and was his almost constant companion. It is clear to him what that means for this Trial. It has often been alleged by the Prosecution that by referring to the dead the defendants desired to unload their own responsibility upon them. If it is the purpose of this Trial to obtain the most faithful picture possible of events and connections, it is not fair to start out by discrediting any mention of those who are dead, and who—as the Prosecution also know—are the major culprits. This is especially true of the Defendant Keitel, whose position, influence, and actions cannot possibly be judged correctly without throwing light upon the person of Adolf Hitler and upon his relationship with Keitel.

As can already be seen from Mr. Justice Jackson’s opening statement, we are dealing here with an indictment against the National Socialist system. Actually, the Indictment is a global indictment against this system, split up into 21 individual indictments. The individual defendants are, to a certain extent, mere symbolic figures of the spheres of authority of the State which was ruled by this system: namely, Party, Government, and Armed Forces. If I understand Mr. Justice Jackson correctly, he goes even further in saying:

“Above all personal forces are nameless and impersonal fores;
their conflict with each other makes up much of humanity’s
history.... What are the real forces which are battling here in
front of you?”

This statement raises a problem which, Gentlemen of the Tribunal, cannot be left unmentioned at this Trial, a problem which M. de Menthon also pointed out: The importance and influence of those forces which shape fate. Fate and guilt are not two poles which exclude each other from their respective spheres; they are areas which overlap so that there are spheres of life and spheres of activity in which the interplay of these two forces make the world move. One can only hint briefly here as to what forces are at work which shape fate, that is to say, what forces cannot be considered as originating in the conscious will of the individual defendants: The sense of national unity, historic events, opinions which are rooted in tradition and environment. Therefore, I will have to go into this background insofar as it is relevant to the Defendant Keitel as a person and as a type of one of the groups under the Indictment, because thus only will you be given the possibility of obtaining a correct picture of the share which the Defendant Keitel had in what has happened.

I also want to state that everything I am about to say is said with the full agreement of the Defendant Keitel; and insofar as aspects and facts are stated which might exonerate the Defendant Keitel, they should be taken as a contribution toward the clarification of what has happened, and as an answer to the question of how things could have reached that point. He does not wish to have his position or the part which he played in this drama minimized, but he is anxious at the same time to avoid giving a distorted picture of his character. The defendant has already stated on the witness stand that he was grateful for the opportunity this Trial afforded him to give an account to the world public and the German people of what he did and why he did it. He wishes to help in ascertaining the historical truth of what happened.

I consider it my obligation to express this opinion of the Defendant Keitel because this attitude, based on such reasons, made it considerably easier for me to conduct his defense. It was, and is, clear to the Defendant Keitel that if one considers the horrible consequences and monstrous deeds which—without here raising the question of guilt—undoubtedly were committed by German people, and which can indisputably be traced back to orders and directives with which Keitel came into contact in some form, then one will experience a feeling of guilt, without considering whether this is guilt in the legal sense or the tragic feeling of being linked by fate with the causes and thereby also the consequences.

The Prosecution has maintained that:

“At one time all the defendants had banded together with the
Nazi Party for a plan which they well knew could be realized
only by the outbreak of a war in Europe.”

With regard to the Defendant Keitel, it is said that from 1933 on he took active part in this conspiracy.

To prove its thesis the Prosecution stated:

(a) that the National Socialist program in itself, according to its wording and meaning, could be realized only by using force;

(b) that the Defendant Keitel recognized, or should have recognized this;

(c) that recognizing this he, together with the others, especially the co-defendants, planned and prepared aggressive wars.

As regards these statements, I would like to call the Tribunal’s attention, first of all, to the principal part of Mr. Justice Jackson’s bill of Indictment, in which he deals with the program of the Party. He mentions there a number of points of the program, about which he says:

“Naturally, these were all aims which were legally
unimpeachable.”

At a different point he says:

“I do not criticize this policy; I wish it were generally
recognized. Naturally, this acknowledging criticism is subject
to the one limitation: As long as these aims would be achieved
without an aggressive war.”

According to that, the Prosecution itself do not assume that the wording and meaning of the Party program were such that normal persons would recognize that these Party political aims could be realized by use of force only. I do not wish to repeat what in this connection was said by the individual defendants at their hearings in court. Especially convincing appeared to me what Dr. Schacht stated on this subject. He concludes his critical examination of the important points of the Party program with these words:

“These are essentially the contents of the National Socialist
Party Program, and I cannot find that anything criminal lies
therein.”

I quote this statement especially because it shows how this program and its recognizable objectives affected a person who may be characterized as intelligent, realistic, free from emotional impulses in politics, and possessing economic penetration and judgment. If that person did not recognize that the Party aims were to be realized by use of force, how was the soldier Keitel to come to such a realization?

Keitel was a professional officer. As such he could not be a member of the Party. Officers were prohibited from any political and Party political activity. The Armed Forces command was intent on keeping the influence of Party politics away from the Armed Forces. This was true both for the time before 1933 and afterward. Hitler himself confirmed this principle because he clearly recognized that the time was not yet ripe for giving the corps of officers, let alone the senior officers, a political character. According to the tradition and conception of their profession, those senior officers had a “national attitude,” as one used to say, and they welcomed the national points of the program which were placed in the foreground by Hitler; they were glad about the co-operation of the Armed Forces and without hesitation placed themselves behind the Government led by Hitler when it proclaimed the fight against the Treaty of Versailles, especially against its military political clauses. An agreement going beyond these aims, or possibly a union with a political object in view, did not exist. The generals, among them also Keitel, thought no differently from millions of Germans who were not Party members or who were opponents, but who regarded the national aims as being a matter of course.

Now, one cannot fail to see that it is somewhat different if millions of Germans, who had no influence, supported that part of the program relating to the national aims, or if the senior officers, who led the Armed Forces, support it. Furthermore, it cannot be overlooked that the realization of these national aims carried with it the danger of a war. But the state of things seems to me to be such that the generals saw the danger of war not so much in the fact that Hitler wanted to realize these national aims by an aggressive war, but rather in the fact that the realization of these aims would entail sanctions by the former enemy powers. The idea of a realization by aggressive, warlike means was far from the generals’ minds for the absolutely compelling reason of military impotency. I shall later deal more in detail with this problem, which is closely connected with the rearmament. Here it is only important that the circles to which Keitel belonged—and I should like to add, between 1933 and 1938—

(1) had no contact with the Party program;

(2) had no relationship with Party circles;

(3) sympathized with a part of the Party program because it corresponded to their national attitude;

(4) did not think of realizing these national points by an aggressive war, because it would have been hopeless from the military point of view.

Now one could argue that although the generals themselves did not think of waging an aggressive war, they certainly recognized, or should have recognized, that Hitler had the intention, if not now, then in the near future, of waging an aggressive war.

The Prosecution believes it can be presumed that the Defendant Keitel had this knowledge from 1933 on. The argument of the Prosecution that this knowledge is equivalent to knowledge of the National Socialist program has been refuted; the same holds true of the knowledge of the book _Mein Kampf_—assuming he possessed the book. Therefore, the question is only whether Keitel had knowledge of Hitler’s intentions regarding an aggression for other reasons. For the period up to 1938 Keitel could not have obtained knowledge from Hitler himself because Keitel spoke with him late in January 1938 for the first time. The speeches which Hitler made before that time, just as those of the other Party leaders, were unambiguously aimed at preserving peace. Looking back, one might call it propagandistic camouflage of opposite intentions. If that were the case, then this camouflage successfully deceived not only many millions of Germans, but also the foreign countries which were partly critical and partly hostile toward National Socialism.

Keitel believed the protestations of peaceful intentions, and saw their honesty confirmed also by official proposals of disarmament and treaties with England and Poland. He believed them all the more because, as has already been said, an aggressive war appeared to him an impossibility.

The Codefendant Von Neurath too, frequently declared here that all his information and knowledge of Hitler’s policy up to 5 November 1937 justified his firm conviction that Hitler did not want to realize his political aims by force or aggressive wars. It was only by the speech of 5 November 1937 that this conviction of Von Neurath’s was shaken.

In the arguments in Dr. Schacht’s defense to which I referred, those facts were presented which show a contradiction between the former conduct of the victorious powers and the thesis which the Prosecution advances on this question.

Through their official relations and beyond these, the victorious powers showed that, despite their knowledge of all the circumstances of which the defendants are now being accused, they, that is, the victors, did not believe in Hitler’s intentions, or did not recognize these intentions of realizing his aims by aggressive war.

The Prosecution now makes the accusation against the defendant that he knew, or ought to have known, such intentions of Hitler. This is not convincing, and I can leave it to the Tribunal to judge who—if all contingencies are taken into consideration—had better possibilities of obtaining information on Hitler’s true intentions. I believe the Defendant Keitel may claim for himself the same good faith and the same ignorance, unless such knowledge or participation itself results from other circumstances.

Such circumstances during the years 1933 through 1938 may have concerned Keitel’s activity in connection with rearmament and in the Reich Defense Committee. The charge of illegal rearmament includes two facts which have been summed up by the Prosecution:

(1) Secret rearmament by circumventing the Treaty of Versailles;

(2) Rearmament with the purpose of planning wars of aggression.

For a judicial consideration, however, these facts must be kept strictly apart; for they are different with respect to cause and effect, and they must also be legally assessed from different points of view.

The time between 1933 and 1938 is the fateful period, a period of development and conversion. The forces of the hitherto existing order are struggling against the new which have not yet taken definite shape. Everything is in fermentation. The aims remain obscure. They are camouflaged by the adoption of existing nationalistic tendencies. By clever propagandistic utilization of these tendencies, the psychological basis for the aims pursued by the new rulers is being created without being noticed by those whom it concerned. Here lies the problem of the Armed Forces leadership and of the Defendant Keitel during this period with which I am going to deal now.

This problem cannot be solved without taking into consideration Germany’s military position. In judging the then Colonel Keitel another consideration enters the picture: how the special sphere to which he belonged was affected by this situation. Keitel considered the Treaty of Versailles, and especially the military clauses, as a humiliation for Germany. He considered it a duty toward his country to collaborate in putting an end to this situation. He was convinced that the Treaty of Versailles, because of its impossible military and territorial stipulations, would have to be revised some day. Such a revision appeared to him imperative, in the interest of justice as well as of reason, if a lasting world peace was to be preserved. On the basis of this conviction he believed that as a German and a soldier, he was entitled, in the official capacities in which he acted during this period, to interpret the military stipulations of the Versailles Treaty literally, even if this was in contradiction to the spirit of the stipulation. His justification for this was that the stipulations limited the possibilities of development in an unbearable manner, that is, in a manner altogether insufficient for an effective defense. Though he did not participate personally, he did not consider it wrong for Germany, under the given circumstances, to construct submarines in Finland, not for herself, but for the purpose of gathering experience and training specialists; or to maintain construction and designing offices in Amsterdam in order to observe the progress achieved in the field of aeronautics and to make use of it without actually building planes. Symptomatic of the way democratic Germany of that time thought—without consideration of position and party—was Dr. Brüning’s statement which on 15 February 1932 was broadcast over all U.S.A. radio stations on the occasion of the meeting of the disarmament conference. I am going to quote some passages from that speech:

“The inner-political fights in Germany are very bitter in their
outward forms, to be sure; but this must not lead one to
overlook the fact that despite many differences there exist
indisputably many things in common also. On the two decisive
foreign-political questions of today, the questions of
disarmament and reparations, uniform opinions prevail among the
German people. The demand for equal rights and equal security is
shared by the entire German people. Every German Government will
have to uphold these demands. That the fight of the parties as
to the road which our politics must take is perhaps more bitter
in Germany today than in some other countries, is a result of
the deep misery which weighs heavily upon Germany and greatly
burdens the people’s soul.”

In connection with this point I also refer to the testimony which the Codefendant Von Neurath gave on 22 June 1946. These words which Brüning spoke prove that there was a demand which was upheld by the entire people irrespective of the difference in parties: The demand for equal rights and equal security. The objection to that is: A demand, even if upheld by the entire people, does not in itself create the right to violate or circumvent established regulations. In principle, one can accept that. However, things were not as simple as that. I do not wish to harp upon a fundamental law applying to all countries and giving every nation the right to create for itself a certain state of defense. But even if one is not prepared to recognize such a fundamental law, one will still perhaps understand the state of emergency which actually exists when a country is so limited in its military potential that it is not only liable to military attack by any neighbor but also condemned to political impotency.

In the course of the hearing of evidence the Tribunal has had occasion to recognize that this was true with regard to the situation in which Germany found herself in the year 1933. I want to call your attention to the following passages of the Field Marshal’s report which was submitted to the Tribunal. The following passages, written by this outstanding soldier, summarize as follows the experience of a patriotic and military life as regards the point discussed here under the title “Rearmament”:

“Nature is inclined to pass over weak people. The law that only
the strong survive is generally recognized...”

I quote further:

“The world does not take seriously the wishes of the weak.
Weakness is too great a temptation for the strong.”

And finally I quote:

“Above all, it seems to me, we must correct the tragic
misunderstanding that a policy directed at security is a war
policy.”

The best witness with regard to this question, which is so important for the Defendant Keitel, is the book by a British Major General, A. C. Temperley, (Publishers Collins, 1938) _The Whispering-Gallery of Europe_, for which the British Foreign Secretary of the second World War, Mr. Anthony Eden, wrote a very friendly, concurring preface.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Nelte, wouldn’t it be possible for you to pass over the reading of these passages which come from the book of Major General Temperley? The Tribunal will take notice of them. There are quite a number of long speeches from the book.

DR. NELTE: I intended to ask the Tribunal whether it would kindly take judicial notice of these passages if I submit them.

They carry particular weight because Temperley reports and judges retrospectively from the year of 1936.

The statements made by Temperley, who witnessed the disarmament conference, the official negotiations and the negotiations behind the scenes, are deeply moving because they reveal the tragic—I must use the word—fateful—and primary conflict: fateful because the thesis presented by the representatives of the different countries—which was derived from the national, given conditions and from traditionally bound conceptions—proved that the difficulties could not be overcome and thus formed the origin of the confusion the last consequences of which we have just experienced. Temperley says:

1) (Page 50) “The French had studied the question of disarmament
much more thoroughly than any other nation, and some of their
best brains of the General Staff and Naval Staff had examined
the problem for months... To characterize their problem roughly,
it was their goal to disarm themselves as little as possible
although they were the strongest power of the world, but at the
same time to keep Germany in a state of disarmament down to the
minutest detail according to the conditions of the peace
treaty...

(Page 71) “In the report which I gave, I spared neither the
French nor us. We had made big mistakes, but at that time I came
to recognize that in reality the French never thought of
disarming at all... M. Paul Boncour certainly was honest and
worked intensively in order to achieve success, but the pressure
of the French General Staff upon the Government was too great...

2) (Page 126) “Mr. Stresemann knew his people best. It was a
race against time. How long could he keep his people in an
atmosphere of cooperative acquiescence without any tangible
success in the form of concessions on the part of the Allies?
Ought the Allied Governments to have given faster and more
willingly what they were ready to give? Would this gesture have
prevented the catastrophe?... Doubtless, history will provide
the answer. I do not know what kind of an answer it is going to
be, but it seems certain to me that the most important period,
when Germany turned away from the road of peace, will be found
to be the period of co-operation between 1929 and 1930... Would
a less hesitating policy as regards the cancellation of the
debts, economic reconstruction, and concessions in the treaties
have prevented Hitlerism and all its consequences? Who knows?...
In his _Review of International Affairs_, 1930, Professor Arnold
Toynbee writes: ‘For the foreign observer who visited Germany at
that time it was a terrible and strange drama to see a whole
nation—one of the greatest and most civilized nations of the
world—engaged in a heroic struggle against fate, half paralyzed
already in titanic battle, driven by the conviction that its
steps had already irresistibly been led on to the path of
destruction.’ (Pages 128 and 129) “The German people had lost
hope... The French had always contended that Germany would
maintain a pretext of modesty as long as the Rhineland was
occupied, and that when the occupation ceased the true color
would show... This has proved to be a good prediction, yet it
was a concurrence of circumstances and the expression of a
people taking its last gasp rather than premeditated planning...

3) (Page 151) “I was present at the session and was profoundly
moved in the face of the attitude of the French delegation and
that of the Little Entente. They believed that they now had
Germany financially by the throat and that her utter ruin was
only a question of weeks. Our Foreign Office recognized the
situation. Yet after a discussion with Henderson I ask myself
whether he really did recognize the abyss which was gaping
before us...”

Perhaps one certain passage might be of interest, on Page 38, under (4):

“I also name the general staffs, because there is no greater
illusion than that they, taken as a whole, are in favor of war.
I know the general staffs of many countries very well, and have
never known any general staff which would have glorified war or
would have wished for war. They knew too much about it. If they
advocated strength, it was because they believed in the idea
that armed strength can prevent war.

“In opposition to the bloodthirsty pacifists who reject modern
weapons, but who immediately clamor for their presence on the
battlefield when one must resist attackers... This leads to the
conclusion that armaments are not the main reason for wars. The
history of the years 1926 to 1931 is not that of a race for
rearmament, but that of a slowly developing deterioration of the
international situation because of the economic and political
chaos, which made disarmament impossible and rearmament
unavoidable...

(Page 222) “The Germans actually repeated their successful
tactics in circumventing treaties, the very tactics they had
used in Napoleon’s time. And yet, one wonders what other
honor-loving nation in the same circumstances would not also
have done its utmost to circumvent a treaty which had been
forced upon it at the point of the bayonet...

(Page 232) “The following 6 months brought Germany’s return,
Hoover’s failure and that of the French plans, and the complete
change in the atmosphere through Hitler’s seizure of power.
However dreadful this was for the peace of the world—the other
powers, above all France, have only themselves to blame for
it... We should have exerted more pressure upon the French and
made greater efforts to keep a moderate government in office in
Germany.

(Page 256) “...they felt they were still being treated as
outlaws...”

I would like to ask that these opinions of the British general which, as I already said, had the approval of the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, be taken into consideration. In this connection I want to refer also to the statements by the following statesmen: Paul Boncour, Henderson, Briand, and Cecil; these statements were submitted by Dr. Schacht’s defense (Schacht Document Book Number 3, Exhibit Schacht-12) on the same subject matter and were accepted by the Tribunal; I also want to refer to the book by Viscount Rothermere: _Warnings and Predictions_ (Page 100).

In examining and deciding whether the Defendant Keitel knowingly violated the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles in the meaning of the Indictment, the Tribunal will have to consider the facts which have been presented. Individual charges against him on this point have not been made.

It is unquestionable that from 1933 on rearmament took place in the Reich. The Defendant Keitel has admitted that, and he stated that in the official positions he held up to 30 September 1934 and from 1 October 1935 on he participated in this rearmament in accordance with the functions incumbent on him. Like everything the Germans do, the rearmament too was well thought-out and organized. The Prosecution collected data for that; especially Document Number 2353-PS and the transcripts of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee.

During the hearing of evidence the total picture of this period from 1935 to 1938 was not clearly defined. The Prosecution arranged its presentation of evidence retrospectively and drew a conclusion from the results of the war as to the motive for the rearmament, but at the same time it deduced from the fact, which cannot be denied and has not been denied, that this rearmament could not have been planned and carried out by any one man, that it constituted a joint plot for the purpose of aggressive war.

Now, where is the decisive criterion: in military armament or in other preparations for war from which the conclusion may be drawn that these measures have an aggressive character, that is to say, that they aim at an aggressive war? In principle, from armament itself nothing can be deduced as to the alleged intentions; armament may, in fact it must, look just the same if carried out for security and defense as it would if applied to aggressive war. Therefore, if the intention of rearmament for the purpose of a plot is to be determined, distinction must be made between:

(a) Armament and preventive measures which must be taken in case a mobilization should become necessary for defense at any time;

(b) Rearmament and enacting of measures which exceed, in quantity or quality, the volume under (a) to such an extent that the intention of the political leadership to begin a war will be recognized by those concerned, in which case the political question of whether an aggressive, defensive, or preventive war is intended may be disregarded. Therefore, in the end, the decisive question will be whether in connection with these measures the intention of planning for an aggressive war was expressed or had become otherwise noticeable, or whether the measures, because of their nature and volume, demand the conclusive deduction that an aggressive war was being prepared.

In retrospect, the events are presented as the logical chain of a development according to plan. In reality, not only Hitler’s far-reaching intentions and his planning were subject to an actual course of events in which, objectively viewed, a certain causality seems to be inherent, but the knowledge and approving support of co-operating circles were equally subject to this. There can be no dispute over the statement that the economic capacity of a country, which in its totality must be regarded as armament for the case of war, will eventually get to a point which must be considered of decisive importance in solving the question of when the rearmament, that is, the status of the entire industry essential for war, exceeds the capacity of armament for defense.

While considering this, it must be taken into account, especially for the Defendant Keitel as a soldier, that until he took over the office of Chief of OKW on 4 February he had not held an important position.

Now, what part did the Defendant Keitel play at that time,

(a) In the field of rearmament with regard to material and personnel;

(b) in the field of administrative and—as charged by the Prosecution—military-political rearmament as dealt with under the heading of the Reich Defense Council?

I shall now skip Pages 43 to 46, since they contain the historical development of the organizational principles, and I beg the Tribunal, if it can make use of this information, to consider it in reaching a verdict. I shall continue on Page 47.

When on 1 October 1935 the Defendant Keitel became the Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces in the Reich Ministry of Von Blomberg, there was a Military Economy Branch headed by Colonel Thomas. He was appointed by Von Blomberg as an expert adviser for the organization.

This Military Economy Branch, later called the Military Economy Staff, as a ministerial service post had to represent the Reich Minister of War with the competent and authoritative economy posts, later also with the Plenipotentiary General for Economy (GB), nominated in 1935. The Minister of War, Von Blomberg, generally communicated directly with Thomas at the time when Field Marshal Keitel was Chief of the Armed Forces Department.

To clarify the part Keitel had in the organizational development of rearmament in this period, I would explain the following:

I. The position at the start in 1933 (for the period 1933-38) was as follows: Lack of any kind of basis for production as a consequence of the destruction of the armament industry following the Treaty of Versailles.

Consequence: no capacity for production, no motor vehicles, no mechanical equipment, no offices for construction, no experience.

Thus, the first stage for rearmament: the restoration of a basis for production, and equipment and reconversion of factories.

II. Basic initial factors to procure armaments:

(a) Branches of the Armed Forces, in Issuing orders to firms through their ordnance offices as purchasing agents, were handicapped by budget means and their incorporation in the budget year.

Consequence: Subsidizing of firms for lack of long term orders and through the impossibility of calculation.

(b) War Economy Office in the OKW as the central organizer and representative of the producer firms through War Economy (later Armament) Inspectorates as intermediary offices in the military area, to serve the branches of the Armed Forces as executive. Duties of the organization, which was run by a military staff:

(1) To gain information about and recommend firms to the military branches.

(2) To adjust the orders of the military branches to the capacity.

(3) To provide for the allotment of raw materials, machinery, and manpower.

(4) To further the extension and capacity of industrial plants.

(5) To protect the plants from bad investments, air raids, espionage, et cetera.

(c) The Plenipotentiary for Economy, GBW, as from the autumn of 1935 was the declared organizer of the entire German economy for its mobilization in case of war and its prospective leader during a war.

His duties in peacetime were preparatory only:

1. Statistical co-ordination of the individual industrial and economic branches, including the armament authorities connected with the OKW, and the War Economy office under Thomas.

2. Provision and storing of raw materials obtainable by importation only.

3. Procurement of foreign currencies for importation.

4. Financing of domestic rearmament.

5. Planning of reconversion of the entire economy to war needs, and extension of the special armament industry.

6. Duties as mentioned already under II (b), (3), and (4), together with the War Economy office in the OKW.

In addition to this, but planned to take effect only in case of mobilization, there was collaboration with the following subordinate ministries: a) Ministry of Economics, b) Ministry of Food, c) Ministry of Labor, d) Ministry of Finance, for foreign exchange and purchase of raw materials, e) Ministry of Forestry.

This necessitated, from December 1935 onward, the participation of a GBW deputy for purposes of information in the Belch Defense Commission.

After Dr. Schacht’s retirement from the Reich Ministry of Economics, the GBW became only fiction, because the full powers had been transferred to the Four Year Plan, that is to say, Göring. Only when the powers of the ministry of armament and munitions were extended in August 1943, when it became known as the Ministry for Armament and War Production, was there a revival of the originally planned position of the GBW entailing full powers in time of war, but he remained subordinate as regards organization to the Four Year Plan, with the Führer as the general authority in reality at the top, owing to the failure of the Four Year Plan.

III. In collaboration of the GBW with the War Economy Office in the OKW the “Mobilization Plan for Rearmament” had been set up, with General Thomas presiding. This “Mobilization Plan for Rearmament” acted on behalf of the Armed Forces and the GBW who supplied particulars of the industrial plants to be assigned from general production for reconversion to armament production in time of war. It was to attend to:

(a) labor requirements, (b) raw material requirements, and (c) industrial equipment (special machinery for weapons, et cetera).

The prerequisite of modern warfare is not so much the exploitation and organization of the manpower of a country into military formations, but it is essentially a problem of industrial capacity and of its appropriate utilization for the production of all necessary raw materials. This process must of necessity precede any rearmament, and requires expenditure of money and, even more, of time.

When Germany proclaimed her equal rights as regards defense—that is, military sovereignty—she did not possess the necessary resources for a material rearmament, as they had been taken away in the execution and recognition of the disarmament plan. It has been confirmed here during the Trial by various sources that first 10, then 7 to 8 years were allowed and anticipated for providing material equipment in the form of hitherto prohibited modern weapons and supplies, especially including munitions, for the peacetime Armed Forces which had been announced to the world with the proclamation of liberty for national defense in 1935. This becomes comprehensible if one considers that even the U.S.A. with its unlimited means, which were not impaired by the effects of war, required 4 to 5 years for the necessary conversion and rearmament in this war. Thus we see that rearmament, if it is intended to exceed the limits of defensive armament, can only be achieved gradually in the case of nations, which—like Germany in 1934—had no armaments.

First stage: Procuring of essentials with regard to industries and raw
materials for the production of war supplies.

Second stage: Placing of orders with the armament industry for the first
equipment of the peacetime strength of the Armed Forces and
execution of these orders within the framework of the means
provided by the annual budgets.

Third stage: Procurement of the munition and weapon supplies to be stored
for the equipment of a mobile Armed Forces which would be
developed, in the case of war, from the permanent peacetime
strength in accordance with the manpower capacity of a
nation. Those supplies would include the necessary
replacements during the war.

If one considers that in 1934 Germany had no modern weapons, no submarines, and no military aircraft at her disposal, it can well be believed that any reasonable soldier had to assume under the given circumstances there could be no thought of a war, let alone a war of aggression.

Accordingly, the tasks which the Defendant Keitel assumed in his official capacity of Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Department must be considered as purely preparatory and organizational. Keitel, of course, bears the responsibility for General Thomas, Chief of the Defense Economy Staff. The technical details and the extent of his activity can be seen from Document 2353-PS, which is correct in essence despite the fact that Thomas, in the declaration prefixed to this historical document, now wants it to look as if he had presented his original notes in an exaggerated way and given them a more favorable turn to please Hitler and avoid arrest. This does not correspond to the facts. What Thomas wrote proves, according to the Defendant Keitel’s opinion, that a “war armament” with mobilization of the industrial capacity and its conversion to war economy did not begin until early in October 1939. It further proves that the statements of the defendants who were examined here, as far as they were connected with this rearmament, and especially those of Dr. Schacht until 1937, are in complete agreement on the following point: At this period wars of aggression were not avowedly desired, and that in the light of the state of actual armament they must have appeared impossible.

But rearmament in manpower also shows the same picture during this period. The evidence has demonstrated that up to the spring of 1938 only 27 peacetime divisions were scantily equipped and that 10 or 12 reserve divisions were in preparation; at that time the Wehrmacht had no other supplies or armaments at its disposal. If despite this fact, and operating without general mobilization, it succeeded by the autumn of 1938 in preparing an army of almost 40 divisions for the aggression against Czechoslovakia, at a time when it had the poorest protection on its western border, one can see what the maximum war potential was in those days.

Under such circumstances, and with knowledge of the armament situation and war potentials of neighboring countries which were mutually united by alliances and assistance pacts, none of the generals of the old school could ever think of bringing about a war. The fact that already one year later, in 1939, the state of German armaments was substantially improved, must primarily be attributed to the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Finally it must be pointed out that during this period there was no strategic plan for any aggression whatsoever. General Jodl has declared on the witness stand that when in 1935 he came to the Armed Forces Department, no plan nor anything similar was in existence, except what was provided for in case of internal unrest. The occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland zone was not planned, but was improvised by Hitler. The _Initial Assembly and Combat Directives_ of June 1937 is a general instruction for possible military conflicts.

For the sake of completeness I must also call attention to Document EC-194. This is an order issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Von Blomberg, on the subject of aerial reconnaissance and the observation of submarine movements during the occupation of the Rhine. Keitel signed and forwarded this order. It is the only existent document of that period.

The Reichswehr had a permanent force of 100,000 men, as had been laid down by the Treaty of Versailles. It is indisputable that in view of the size of the Reich, its unprotected borders and the way East Prussia was cut off, this figure was absolutely inadequate for creating a feeling of internal security and the possibility of defense in the face of an attack from the outside world—an elementary right for any country and nation. This state of inadequacy, which had been created by the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, was the subject of reflection even before 1933 with a view to improving it without actually making use of soldiers for the purpose. An examination was made and it was found that in case of mobilization a series of tasks could be taken over by the civil ministries. Here tasks of a purely defensive nature were concerned, which cannot be considered aggressive. They were tasks of national defense, and principally the following: I have enumerated them in my manuscript and, without reading them, I would like the High Tribunal to take judicial notice of these points. As it is quite clear these are matters for defense only.

(1) Protection of the frontiers by reinforcement of the customs
service;

(2) Postal security by Reichspost agencies (repeater offices);

(3) Railroad protection by Reichsbahn personnel;

(4) Laying of cables instead of overhead telegraph lines;

(5) Construction of railroad viaducts and elimination of level
crossings on main traffic roads;

(6) Construction of frontier fortifications in the East,
Oder-Warthe line, Pomeranian line, Oder line (terrain
expropriation);

(7) Improvement of maritime traffic with East Prussia and of
rail transit through the Corridor;

(8) Fortifications in East Prussia;

(9) Reinforcement of frontier protection in East Prussia;

(10) Preparation by the Reichsbahn of mobile loading ramps;

(11) Reinforcement of the coastal customs service;

(12) Development by the Reichspost of the radio network
(amplified transmitters and receivers);

(13) Manning of permanent army signal stations with Reichspost
personnel;

(14) Relieving the Reichswehr from the charge of detaching
soldiers for duties which can be carried out by civilian
personnel;

(15) Protection of frontier crossings by the local authorities
(Landräte);

(16) Co-ordination of motor vehicles, et cetera.

The advisory body for these tasks and their execution was, up to 1933, the Committee of Experts. It consisted of experts coming from the different civil ministries, who after being accepted by the Minister of the Interior—Severing, up to the end of 1933—met for conferences at the Reich Defense Ministry. The Reichswehr Minister charged the then Colonel Keitel to direct these meetings. At these meetings the experts received and discussed the desires of the Reich Defense Ministry as regards the afore-mentioned tasks, which the individual ministers could take over in case of a mobilization.

During Minister Severing’s time this co-operation worked without friction with the idea of satisfying as far as possible the wishes of the Reichswehr Minister, and it continued in the same way after 30 January 1933. The scope and content of the tasks remained the same. When, on 4 April 1933, a Reich Defense Council was established by a resolution of Hitler’s new Reich Government, the committee was retained and only its name was changed: The Committee of Experts became the Reich Defense Committee. However, it did not change its field of action and was not given any new jurisdiction. It only grew in size as it went on developing, especially after the introduction of compulsory military service. Now, as before, the Reich Defense Committee was a body which had to give advice about those tasks of national defense concerning the civilian sector which had to be prepared and also partly taken over by the civil ministries. For this Count of the Indictment it must be made quite clear that after 4 April 1933 Keitel’s position did not change either, and especially that he was not a member of the Reich Defense Council.

The Reich Defense Council, which has taken up a lot of space in the statements of the Prosecution, may be considered as virtually nonexistent in the light of the evidence produced—later on I will come back to the time after 1938. In any case the Prosecution could not prove that there was any session of the Reich Defense Council during this period. The minutes submitted dealt without exception with the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee, and the members of this committee reported to their competent ministries, who in turn had an opportunity, within the framework of the cabinet, to translate into concrete form the suggestions and proposals discussed in the Reich Defense Committee. Thus there were never any sessions of the Reich Defense Council whose existence was merely formal, so that witnesses could rightly say that the Reich Defense Council existed only on paper.

Keitel, up to 30 September 1933, as colonel and section chief in the Reich Defense Ministry, and later from October 1935 as major general and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Department in the Reich War Ministry, was a member of the Reich Defense Committee. Therefore, from 30 September 1933 to 30 September 1935 he was not in the War Ministry, and thus had no function connected with this Count of the Indictment. Neither did he during this time participate in sessions of the Reich Defense Committee, the minutes of which have been presented by the Prosecution as having special probative value. The session of 22 May 1933, described as the second session of the working Committee of Experts, was the last session in which Keitel participated before being transferred to serve with the troops. The first session after his transfer to the Reich War Ministry was held on 6 September 1935. It is put down as the 11th session of the Reich Defense Committee. Although in the examination of Keitel’s responsibility one has to exclude the work done by the Reich Defense Committee during the two years between sessions 3 and 10, I will nevertheless make it the subject of my statements, as it is from these very minutes that one can see what the Reich Defense Committee was doing.

Only the knowledge of these minutes makes it clear why an institution, which in this or some other form exists in every country and which serves the purpose of national defense as deemed legitimate by every country, has now been presented as an important factor in submitting evidence on plans and preparations for aggression.

The minutes of the sessions of the Reich Defense Committee in 1933, 1934, and 1935 reveal the character of the work as that of preparations for the event of war. But it is likewise evident that it is a question of preparations intended to bring about a more perfect degree of readiness in national defense in case of mobilization. If the “political situation” is twice mentioned, these allusions indicate the fear of military sanctions from neighboring states. (Reference is made to the case of Abyssinia, which led to sanctions against Italy.) Everything is rooted in the thought of overcoming that state of military impotency which made it impossible to safeguard the open frontiers of the Reich.

The recurring idea of obligation to secrecy can only be attributed to fear arising from the situation at the time lest the revelation of measures, however defensive, might produce preventive measures on the part of the victorious powers.

That these suspicions were well-founded is shown by the intransigent attitude of certain states after the complete disarmament of Germany, and this question is important for Keitel’s attitude, for he affirms that the conclusion drawn from the obligation to secrecy, namely, that secrecy is a proof of bad conscience, and bad conscience is a proof of knowledge of illegality, is erroneous.

The Reich Defense Committee never passed resolutions; it was an advisory body on matters of national defense insofar as the civilian sector was concerned with mobilization. At no time did it ever indulge in deliberations concerning rearmament as regards manpower or material, or concerning plans of aggression. The Prosecution has tried in one instance to show that the Reich Defense Committee was involved in plans for aggression.

I do not wish to read the next few sentences. Here we deal with the well-known event of freeing the River Rhine for traffic, a question which was designated as the technical liberation of the Rhine River. This came up in Göring’s testimony.

They pointed out Document Number EC-405, the minutes of the Committee for Reich Defense, session of 26 June 1934, in which there is mention of “participation in preparing mobilization.” In these minutes under (c) can be found: “Preparation for the liberation of the Rhine.” From this the prosecuting authorities have drawn the conclusion that already on 26 June 1934 the Reich Defense Committee was contemplating the “liberation of the Rhine.” The witness Reich Marshal Göring has stated during his hearing that, given the unequivocal wording of the German text, it is a question here of the technical freeing of the river Rhine, but not of any strategic or political matter. I am mentioning this manifest error by the prosecuting authorities, which can only have occurred through a gross mistake in translation, because it has led to an erroneous conception of the prosecution as to the competence of the Reich Defense Committee, and because it is the only case which has come up in connection with this complex.