Chapter XIII: Book 1: , Mr. President (1)
THE PRESIDENT: Oh! I see. Very well. Well, that concludes the case of Fritzsche?
DR. FRITZ: Yes, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn now.
[_A recess was taken._]
DR. BERGOLD: May it please the Tribunal, first of all I want to say that I can also dispense with the witness Dr. Klöpfer, since he worked in close contact with Bormann only after 1942, since he cannot testify on most of the documents on which the Prosecution based its case, and since he only directed the constitutional law department in the Party Chancellery.
Mr. President, I want to begin my case by making a very brief basic statement. The Defendant Bormann is absent; his associates, generally speaking, are not at my disposal either. For that reason, I can only attempt, on the basis of the documents presented by the Prosecution, to submit some little evidence to prove that the defendant did not play the large, legendary part which is now, after the collapse, attributed to him. As a lawyer it has always been much against my will to build something out of nothing; and I beg the High Tribunal to take this into consideration when weighing my evidence, which must, therefore, be extremely small in quantity. It is not negligence on my part that I present so little, but it is the inability to find anything positive from the available documents without the assistance of the defendant.
First of all, then, I come to the question of whether the case against Bormann can be tried at all. I have offered evidence to show that it is most likely that the Defendant Bormann died on 1 May 1945, during an attempted escape from the Reich Chancellery. As my first witness who could testify on this, I named the witness Else Krüger, and my application for her was granted by the Tribunal. In my application of 26 June, I stated that I would waive the examining of this witness if the High Tribunal would permit me to submit instead an affidavit containing her testimony. I have not yet received an answer to this application; but I presume, since I heard from Dr. Kempner that the Prosecution will agree to this, that the High Tribunal also will not raise any objection.
THE PRESIDENT: I thought the application was withdrawn with reference to the witness Krüger.
DR. BERGOLD: I stated that I would dispense with the witness provided that I could submit her affidavit. There appears to be a misunderstanding. The Prosecution informed me that it has no objection.
MR. DODD: We have said we had no objection, Mr. President, to the use of the affidavit since he was waiving the calling of the witness.
DR. BERGOLD: I submit the affidavit as Document Number Bormann-12.
Then, I named three other witnesses who could testify that Bormann had died. First, the witness Kempka, who for many years was Hitler’s chauffeur and who was present when the attempted escape from the Reich Chancellery failed. This witness is not here. According to information which I have, he was interned at the camp at Freising in December 1945 in the hands of the American authorities; but unfortunately he has not yet been produced.
I also named the witness Rattenhuber, who was also present when Bormann died and who, according to the information which I have, is said to be in the hands of the U.S.S.R.
The woman witness, Christians, who had been, granted me, could not be located. She was interned in the camp at Oberursel; from there she was given leave of which she took advantage to vanish. Apart from the affidavit of the witness Krüger, therefore, I have no proof for my statement that Bormann is dead. I regret very much indeed that I am not in a position to present clear evidence on this point and that the members of the Prosecution were not able to give me more support, for in this way the formation of legends will be considerably strengthened. Indeed, a sort of false Demetrius, false Martin Bormann, have already made their appearance and are sending me letters which are signed Martin Bormann but which cannot possibly have been written by him. I believe that a service would have been rendered to the German nation, to the Allies, and to the world generally if I had been in a position to furnish this proof for which I had asked.
I come now to my documents.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the Tribunal would like to hear this affidavit of Krüger read.
DR. BERGOLD: The text is as follows:
“Fräulein Else Krüger, born 9 February 1915, at Hamburg-Altona;
secretary, at present residing at Hamburg (39), Hansenweg 1...
From approximately the end of 1942 was one of several
secretaries of the Defendant Martin Bormann; there were,
roughly, 30 to 40 secretaries. I can no longer give accurate
figures and names. I occupied this position until the end and
after Hitler’s death.
“On 1 May 1945 I saw and talked to Bormann in the bunker of the
Reich Chancellery for the last time; but I was then no longer
working for him, since at that time he was writing his own
orders and wireless messages by hand. All I had to do in those
days in the bunker of the Reich Chancellery was to prepare
myself mentally for my death. The last words he spoke to me,
when he met me accidentally in the bunker, were, ‘Well, then,
farewell. There is not much sense in it now, but I will try to
get through. Very probably I shall not succeed.’ These
approximately, were his last words, I can no longer recollect
them literally.
“Later in the course of the evening when I thought that the
Russians had come very close to the shelter of the Reich
Chancellery I, together with a group of about 20 people, mostly
soldiers, fled from the shelter through subterranean passages,
then through an exit in one of the walls of the Chancellery,
across the Wilhelmsplatz into the entrance of the underground
station Kaiserhof. From there we fled through more subterranean
passages to the Friedrichstrasse, and then through a number of
streets, debris of houses, and so on; I can no longer remember
the exact details on account of the confusion and excitement of
those days. Eventually, in the course of the following morning,
we reached another shelter; I no longer recollect where it was;
it might have been the shelter at Humboldthain.”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, does not the affidavit deal with the Defendant Bormann at all?
DR. BERGOLD: Oh yes, I am now coming to that:
“After some time the SS-Gruppenführer Rattenhuber appeared there
quite suddenly. He had been severely wounded in the leg and was
put on a camp bed. Other people asked him where he had come
from; and he said, in my presence, that he, together with
Bormann and others, had fled by car through the
Friedrichstrasse. Presumably everybody was dead; there had been
masses of bodies. I gathered from his statement that he believed
Bormann was dead. This also appeared probable to me because,
according to reports I heard from some soldiers whom I did not
know, all people who had left the shelter after us had been
taken under strong Russian fire and hundreds of dead were said
to have been left behind on the Weidendammer Bridge.”
I omit one unimportant sentence.
“I remember reading afterwards in a British paper that Hitler’s
driver for many years, Kempka, made a statement somewhere that
Bormann, with whom apparently he fled, was dead.”
That is all I am able to submit, Mr. President; the real witnesses have unfortunately not been found.
I now come to the documents. In order to shorten my evidence, may I refer to the document book which I have submitted. All these documents contain orders of Bormann which were collected and have appeared in a body of laws called _Orders of the Deputy of the Führer_. I request that the Tribunal take judicial notice of these official orders. I shall bring up the legal argument arising from these documents in my final speech.
I merely want to refer now briefly to Order Number 23/36; it is the order under the figure 8.
THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean PS?
DR. BERGOLD: No, it is order Number 8 in my document book, Mr. President. I particularly want to draw the Tribunal’s attention to it without quoting from it.
I now turn to the document book submitted by the Prosecution, and I should like to read a short passage from 098-PS, on Page 4, the second paragraph at the top.
THE PRESIDENT: Did you say 098-PS?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, Document 098-PS, Bormann’s letter dated 22 February 1940 and addressed to Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg.
THE PRESIDENT: Page 4?
DR. BERGOLD: Page 4. It is the letter in which Bormann rails against the Christian religion. Nevertheless, he writes as follows, Page 4:
“With regard to religious instruction in schools it seems to me
that the existing conditions need not be changed. No National
Socialist teacher, according to the clear-cut directives of the
Deputy of the Führer, must be accused in any way, if he is
prepared to teach the Christian religion in the schools.”
I omit one sentence.
“In the circular of the Deputy of the Führer Number 3/39, of 4
January 1939, it is expressly stated that teachers of religion
are not by any means to make their own choice of Biblical
material for religious instruction but are obliged to give
instruction on all the Biblical subjects. They are to abstain
from all reinterpreting, analyzing, or paraphrasing of this
directive; attempts of this sort have been made several times by
certain church groups.”
This is a reference to the so-called German Christians.
I then quote from Document 113-PS, document book of the Prosecution. It is Directive Number 104/38, I quote:
“The neutrality of the Party with respect to the Church, which
has been emphasized from the beginning, demands that any
possible friction be avoided. Clergymen, as political leaders or
as leaders or section leaders in the Party and its affiliated
organizations, do not possess the required freedom of decision
in this dual obligation, as has been shown by experience;
moreover, there is the danger that owing to their church office
they will make use of the Movement for their purposes in the
church struggle. The Deputy of the Führer has therefore ordered:
“1. Clergymen holding positions in the Party are to be
immediately relieved of their Party functions.”
I then quote from Document 099-PS, in which Bormann, in a letter of 19 January 1940, addressed to the Reich Minister of Finance, criticizes the low contributions of the Church toward the war. I quote from the second paragraph:
“The assessment of so low a contribution has surprised me. I
gather from numerous reports that the political communities have
to raise so high a war contribution that the carrying out of
their own tasks, which are often very important, as for instance
their work in public welfare, is in jeopardy.”
I omit one sentence.
“I understand that the assessment of so low a contribution is
partly explained by the fact that only the churches of the old
Reich which are entitled to raise taxes are called upon to make
their contribution to the war, whereas the sections of the
Protestant and Catholic Church, which are entitled to demand
church dues in Austria and the Sudetenland, are exempted...”
I omit the rest of the sentence.
“This differentiation in the treatment of individual sections of
the churches and church organizations is, in my opinion, quite
unjustified.”
I then quote from Document 117-PS, a letter from Bormann to Rosenberg, dated 28 January 1939. I quote from the second paragraph:
“The Party has repeatedly in recent years had to explain its
attitude on the plan for a State Church or for some other
measure establishing closer connection between the State and the
Church. The Party has always emphatically rejected such plans
for two reasons. First, a connection between the State and the
Church, as the organization of a religious community which does
not in all fields aim at the practical application of National
Socialist principles, would not fulfill the ideological demands
of National Socialism. Second, purely practical and political
considerations speak against such a formal union.”
I then refer to Document L-22, which deals with a conference in the Führer’s headquarters on 16 July 1941, at which Hitler, Rosenberg, Lammers, Keitel, Göring, and Bormann were present.
THE PRESIDENT: Could you tell us in what part of the book this is and what is the number?
DR. BERGOLD: L-22. It is approximately in the middle of the book. Bormann acted as secretary of the conference and wrote the minutes. The Prosecution stated that Bormann’s incidental remarks showed that he had participated in the discussion, at that conference, of plans for the incorporation of Russian territory into the Reich. I shall therefore have to read this incidental remark which he made.
THE PRESIDENT: This is L-221, not L-22.
DR. BERGOLD: The first incidental remark is in the 14th paragraph and reads as follows:
“Incidentally, does an educated class still exist in the
Ukraine, or are the Ukrainians of a higher class to be found
only as emigrants outside Russia?”
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, could you not tell us what original page it is? In our document book there are headings “original page” so and so.
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, they are there, but—one moment, please, I shall have to look for it again. The translation which I have received has a different type of division—Page 4.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.
“We have to create a garden of Eden....” The first part of Page 4 is, “We have to create a garden of Eden....”
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, yes, yes, the second paragraph, the third paragraph, no, after each one—it is the third paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: Go on, then.
DR. BERGOLD: Have you got it, Mr. President?
THE PRESIDENT: I shall not know until you tell me how it begins.
DR. BERGOLD: It begins, “Incidentally, does an educated class still exist in the Ukraine...?”
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I have got that, yes. Page 3.
DR. BERGOLD: It is on Page 3.
THE PRESIDENT: I think it is on Page 4. It goes like this: “Is there still anything like an educated class in the Ukraine?”
DR. BERGOLD: According to the document book which has just been submitted to me, it is on Page 3, but it may be Page 4.
THE PRESIDENT: The original is Page 4.
DR. BERGOLD: Then on Page 5, Page 4, no, it is Page 3, Your Lordship. Page 4 has a very similar remark which reads:
“It has frequently become apparent that Rosenberg has a great
deal of liking for the Ukrainians. He wants to enlarge the old
Ukraine considerably.”
And then the last remark on Page 8—Page 5 in the English text, third paragraph from the end, a note for Party member Klöpfer:
“Please ask Dr. Meyer as soon as possible for the data on the
proposed organization and the filling of the positions.”
Then at the end, Page 6 of your original, last paragraph:
“Incidentally, the Führer emphasized that activity of the
churches was out of the question. Papen had already submitted to
him through the Foreign Office a long memorandum stating that
now the right moment for re-establishing the churches had
arrived. But that was definitely out of the question.”
This refers to a statement by Hitler.
Then I come to Document 1520-PS. I want first of all to draw the Tribunal’s attention to the fact that in this record, which Lammers wrote, Bormann is not at all mentioned at the beginning among those present, apparently because his activity as secretary was considered a matter of course.
I should now like to read from Page 2 of your original, from the paragraph beginning, “Then the discussion turned to the question of freedom of religion...” I shall begin on the eighth line of the fourth paragraph:
“Bormann agreed with this attitude absolutely but said that the
only question was whether the Reich Minister for the East, who
after all had a name in Germany, would not through such a law
create too far-reaching obligations which would then have
repercussions in the Reich. The churches themselves were going
to define what was meant by ‘religious freedom,’ and he
predicted that such a law would result in hundreds of new
letters and complaints on the part of the churches within the
Reich.”
I omit one sentence.
“Finally it was agreed that the entire question should not be
settled by me”—that is, Lammers—“in the form of a law but that
the Reich Commissioners should take the existing religious
freedom for granted and should issue the necessary directives.”
Then Document 072-PS, a letter from Bormann to Rosenberg; of that I should like to read the third paragraph:
“The Führer emphasized that in the Balkans the use of your
experts would not be necessary, since there were no art objects
to be confiscated. In Belgrade there was only the collection of
Prince Paul which would be returned to him intact. The remaining
material of the lodges, _et cetera_, would be taken care of by
the representatives of Gruppenführer Heydrich.”
From Document 062-PS I should like to read the introduction, in which the Defendant Hess deals with the orders he had issued for the treatment of airmen. I quote:
“The French civilian population received official instructions
by radio and otherwise on what they were to do at landings of
German aircraft.”
From Document 205-PS I should like to read the opening words of Bormann, the second paragraph.
THE PRESIDENT: What, is the date of 062-PS? [_The interpreter wrongly translated this as 205-PS._]
DR. BERGOLD: 5th of May 1943, circular letter Number 70/43.
THE PRESIDENT: I think I have got it now.
THE INTERPRETER: You have 205, My Lord.
DR. BERGOLD: 5th of May 1943.
THE PRESIDENT: No, but I wanted to know the date of 062-PS. It appears to be 13 March 1940.
DR. BERGOLD: 062-PS? Yes, the date of that is 13 March 1940. That is the one I read before.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal does not understand why you read the document in view of Paragraph 4 of it which is as follows:
“Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested or
liquidated.”
DR. BERGOLD: I shall return to that in my final speech, Mr. President. I can present my arguments now if the Tribunal so desires, but I do not think the argument is wanted now.
THE PRESIDENT: No, no; I thought you might have another paragraph in the document which you wish to refer to.
DR. BERGOLD: No. I referred to the introduction, which was the reason for this document, namely, the statement of the Defendant Hess preceding Bormann’s document.
I come then to Document 205-PS, dated 5 May 1943, circular letter Number 70/43. I shall quote the following sentence:
“I request that along the lines set out in the attached copy the
necessity for a firm but just treatment of the foreign workers
be made clear in a suitable manner to members of the Party and
the population.”
This circular letter itself was issued by the Defendant Sauckel. I now come to Document 025-PS, of 4 September 1942 and I read...
THE PRESIDENT: Which number are you going to now?
DR. BERGOLD: 025-PS, dated 4 September 1942. I shall quote the last sentence of the second paragraph:
“Therefore, and this is also the opinion of the Reich Marshal
and of Reichsleiter Bormann, the problem of domestic workers
must be solved in a way different from that mentioned above.”
And then I quote from Paragraph 3, starting with the second sentence:
“In connection with this”—namely, the employment in Germany of
women workers from the East—“Reichsleiter Bormann also agrees
that members of the Armed Forces or other agencies who have
brought female domestic workers into the Reich illegally will
have their action subsequently approved; approval of such action
in the future will not be withheld, regardless of the official
recruiting scheme. The determining factor in the recruiting of
Ukrainian female workers is the specific wish of the Führer that
only girls whose conduct and appearance permit a permanent stay
in Germany should be brought into the Reich.”
Then I shall read from Figure 1, almost the last paragraph on Page 3 of your document book:
“Recruiting, especially in the case of domestic servants, must
be on a voluntary basis and must in practice be carried out with
the help of the offices of the Reichsführer SS.”
This concludes my quotations from the document book of the Prosecution, and I should like now to refer only to the Russian Document USSR-172 and to Document Dönitz-91, of which I shall make use in my final speech.
This, then, brings me to the end of the presentation of my evidence.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, may I suggest that if this witness Kempka can be located, counsel might submit an affidavit or an interrogatory to any persons who have knowledge of the alleged death of Defendant Bormann. We certainly would have no objection to it.
DR. BERGOLD: I have no objection either.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Bergold, have you any information as to what this witness Kempka can tell us about the death of Bormann?
DR. BERGOLD: According to the affidavit, which I read to the Tribunal, he is said to have been present when Bormann was killed by a tank explosion. He would, therefore, be an eye witness of Bormann’s death, like the witness Rattenhuber, from whom the witness Krüger obtained her information. If the witnesses Kempka and Rattenhuber were found, I would be satisfied with affidavits and interrogatories.
MR. DODD: Mr. President, I have seen this statement by Kempka some time ago, which is in affidavit form and which has come to our attention. But my recollection is that he does not state positively that he saw him die. But I again suggest we might make further efforts to get an affidavit from him, or an interrogatory, or carefully question him about the circumstances of the death.
THE PRESIDENT: A statement was made to the Tribunal at one time by the Prosecution suggesting that Bormann had escaped from the Chancellery in a tank and then the tank had been stopped or blown up on a bridge and that two of the persons inside the tank had last seen Bormann wounded, or something of that sort.
MR. DODD: Yes, I think that is the best information.
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Dodd, if the Prosecution has any material in the shape of affidavits or anything of that sort, the Tribunal would like to have them placed before them.
MR. DODD: Yes, Sir. I am sure we do not have an affidavit. As I recall, it was last fall when someone sent down here what purported to be a narrative account by Kempka of the last days in Berlin. Now, I will try to look that up and present it to you.
THE PRESIDENT: If you can go into the matter, then possibly they might be located through the investigations which you would make.
MR. DODD: Very well.
THE PRESIDENT: Then interrogatories or affidavits could be obtained.
MR. DODD: Very well, Sir.
THE PRESIDENT: Then that concludes your presentation of evidence on behalf of Bormann?
DR. BERGOLD: That is all I have, Mr. President.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you.
Colonel Pokrovsky, is there anything you wish to say? I beg your pardon.
Dr. Bergold, you have offered in evidence all the exhibits that you want to offer and have given them exhibit numbers, have you?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, in my document book.
THE PRESIDENT: You are intending to offer your document book as evidence?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes.
THE PRESIDENT: It has exhibit numbers on each document, has it?
DR. BERGOLD: Yes, each document has a number.
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
Colonel Pokrovsky, the Tribunal would like to know whether you have arrived at any agreement with Dr. Stahmer on behalf of the Defendant Göring with reference to affidavit evidence or witnesses, with reference to the Katyn matter.
COLONEL Y. V. POKROVSKY (Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): My Lord, we have had three conferences with the Defense Counsel. After the second meeting I told the Tribunal that, in order to shorten the proceedings, the Soviet Prosecution was willing to read into the record only a part of the evidence submitted. About 15 minutes ago I had a meeting with Dr. Exner and Dr. Stahmer, and they told me that their understanding of the Tribunal’s ruling was that the old decision for the summoning of two witnesses was still in force and that only additional documents were now under discussion.
In view of this interpretation of the Tribunal’s ruling, I do not think that we shall be able to come to an agreement with the Defense. As I see it, the decision in this matter must now rest in the hands of the Tribunal.
THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal orders that, unless an agreement is arrived at, the evidence shall not be given entirely by affidavits and that the three witnesses on either side shall be called first thing on Monday morning at 10 o’clock, unless you can arrive at an agreement before that, that the evidence is to be offered in affidavits.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I say something on this subject?
A number of counsel who are interested in the Katyn case had a conference this morning; among them were Professor Exner and Dr. Stahmer. We agreed to ask the Tribunal to allow two witnesses to be examined here in person by the Defense. These witnesses would be Colonel Ahrens and First Lieutenant Von Eichborn. We also agreed to dispense with the hearing of the third witness but decided to request that an affidavit of this witness, and in addition two other affidavits, be submitted. I believe this to be a suggestion which both satisfies us and saves the most time: Two witnesses would be heard and three affidavits submitted.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal sees no objection to there being two witnesses called and one affidavit. But their order was that three witnesses on either side—that the evidence should be limited to three witnesses on either side; and they, therefore, are not prepared to allow further affidavits to be given. The evidence must be confined to the evidence of three persons on either side. They may give their evidence either by oral evidence or by affidavit.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, as far as I was informed, the original decision stated that three witnesses were allowed but did not mention affidavits. That was the reason why Dr. Stahmer and Professor Exner assumed that, regardless of the witnesses, certain individual points could be proved by means of affidavits. I think that the hearing of two witnesses and three affidavits would be quicker than the examination of three witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid Dr. Stahmer and Dr. Exner drew a wrong inference from the order of the Tribunal. The Tribunal intended and intends that the evidence should be limited to the evidence of three witnesses on either side, and whether they give their evidence orally or by affidavit does not matter. We left it to the Soviet Prosecution and to defendant’s counsel to see whether they could agree that it should be given by affidavit in order to save time. But that was not intended to extend the number of witnesses who might give evidence.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in that case, I should be grateful if Dr. Stahmer and Professor Exner would be heard. I myself have not been in Nuremberg recently; I was therefore not present when these details were discussed and it is difficult for me—I see that Dr. Stahmer is now—perhaps Dr. Stahmer himself could speak about it.
DR. STAHMER: I have just heard Dr. Siemers’ report, at least a part of it. I mentioned already during the last discussion, Mr. President, that Professor Exner and I had understood the decision to mean that besides the three witnesses we were also allowed to submit affidavits. Indeed, the original decision granted us five witnesses, though it made the reservation that only three of them could give evidence here in Court. We assumed, therefore, that we could submit affidavits of those witnesses out of the five who had been originally granted us but who would not give evidence in Court. The original decision granted us five witnesses, and then a later decision of the Tribunal...
THE PRESIDENT: Listen, that is not the recollection of the Tribunal; and if you say so, you must produce written evidence that that was the decision. The Tribunal’s recollection is not that five witnesses were allowed.
DR. STAHMER: Yes, yes, yes. I shall submit written evidence of these decisions to the Tribunal. I cannot remember offhand when they were made, but originally five witnesses were granted; then I named another witness, who was also granted, and it was only afterwards that the decision to allow only three witnesses to give evidence in Court was announced.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, when the order was made limiting it to three out of five, there was no reference in that order to affidavits, as far as I know.
DR. STAHMER: No, affidavits were not mentioned then.
THE PRESIDENT: What I am telling you is that the Tribunal in making that order of limitation intended to limit the whole of the evidence to three witnesses on either side, because the matter is only a subsidiary allegation of fact; and the Tribunal thinks that at this stage of the proceedings such an allegation of fact ought not to be investigated by a great number of witnesses, and three witnesses are quite sufficient on either side.
Therefore the Tribunal does not desire to hear and did not intend that it should have to hear any evidence except the evidence of three witnesses, either orally or by affidavit.
The Tribunal will now adjourn.
[_The Tribunal adjourned until Monday 1 July at 1000 hours._]
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH DAY
Monday, 1 July 1946
_Morning Session_
THE PRESIDENT: I have an announcement to make.
The Tribunal orders that any of the evidence taken on commission which the Defense Counsel or the Prosecution wish to use shall be offered in evidence by them. This evidence will then become a part of the record, subject to any objections.
Counsel for the organizations should begin to make up their document books as soon as possible and put in their requests for translations.
That is all.
Dr. Stahmer.
DR. STAHMER: With reference to the events at Katyn, the Indictment contains only the remark: “In September 1941, 11,000 Polish officers, prisoners of war, were killed in the Katyn woods near Smolensk.” The Russian Prosecution only submitted the details at the session of 14 February 1946. Document USSR-54 was then submitted to the Tribunal. This document is an official report by the Extraordinary State Commission, which was officially authorized to investigate the Katyn case. This commission, after questioning the witnesses...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, the Tribunal are aware of the document and they only want you to call your evidence; that is all.
DR. STAHMER: I wanted only to add, Mr. President, that according to this document, there are two accusations: One, that the period of the shooting of the Polish prisoners of war was the autumn of 1941; and the second assertion is, that the killing was carried out by some German military authority, camouflaged under the name of “Staff of Engineer Battalion 537.”
THE PRESIDENT: That is all in the document, is it not? I have just told you we know the document. We only want you to call your evidence.
DR. STAHMER: Then, as my first witness for the Defense, I shall call Colonel Friedrich Ahrens to the witness stand.
DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I have a request to make before the evidence is heard in the Katyn case. The Tribunal decided that three witnesses should be heard, and it hinted that in the interests of equality, the Prosecution could also produce only three witnesses, either by means of direct examination or by means of an affidavit. In the interests of that same principled equality, I should be grateful if the Soviet Delegation, in the same way as the Defense, would state the names of their witnesses before the hearing of the evidence. The Defense submitted the names of their witnesses weeks ago. Unfortunately, up to now, I note that in the interests of equality and with regard to the treatment of the Defense and the Prosecution, the Soviet Delegation has so far not given the names of the witnesses.
THE PRESIDENT: General Rudenko, were you going to give me the names of the witnesses?
GEN. RUDENKO: Yes, Mr. President. Today we notified the General Secretary of the Tribunal that the Soviet Prosecution intends to call three witnesses to the stand: Professor Prosorovski, who is the Chief of the Medico-Legal Experts Commission; the Bulgarian subject, Professor of Legal Medicine at Sofia University Markov, who at the same time was a member of the so-called International Commission created by the Germans; and Professor Bazilevsky, who was the deputy mayor of Smolensk during the time of the German occupation.
[_The witness Ahrens took the stand._]
THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?
FRIEDRICH AHRENS (Witness): Friedrich Ahrens.
THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.
[_The witness repeated the oath._]
THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.
DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you, as a professional officer in the German Armed Forces, participate in the second World War?
AHRENS: Yes, of course; as a professional officer I participated in the second World War.
DR. STAHMER: What rank did you hold finally?
AHRENS: At the end as colonel.
DR. STAHMER: Were you stationed in the eastern theater of war?
AHRENS: Yes.
DR. STAHMER: In what capacity?
AHRENS: I was the commanding officer of a signal regiment of an army group.
DR. STAHMER: What were the tasks of your regiment?
AHRENS: The signal regiment of an army group had the task of setting up and maintaining communications between the army group and the neighboring units and subordinate units, as well as preparing the necessary lines of communication for new operations.
DR. STAHMER: Did your regiment have any special tasks apart from that?
AHRENS: No, with the exception of the duty of defending themselves, of taking all measures to hinder a sudden attack and of holding themselves in readiness to defend themselves with the forces at their disposal, so as to prevent the capture of the regimental battle headquarters.
This was particularly important for an army group signal regiment and its battle headquarters because we had to keep a lot of highly secret material in our staff.
DR. STAHMER: Your regiment was the Signal Regiment 537. Was there also an Engineer Battalion 537, the same number?
AHRENS: During the time when I was in the Army Group Center I heard of no unit with the same number, nor do I believe that there was such a unit.
DR. STAHMER: And to whom were you subordinated?
AHRENS: I was directly subordinated to the staff of the Army Group Center, and that was the case during the entire period when I was with the army group. My superior was General Oberhäuser.
With regard to defense, the signal staff of the regiment with its first battalion, which was in close touch with the regimental staff, was at times subordinated to the commander of Smolensk; all orders which I received from that last-named command came via General Oberhäuser, who either approved or refused to allow the regiment to be employed for a particular purpose.
In other words, I received my orders exclusively from General Oberhäuser.
DR. STAHMER: Where was your staff accommodated?
AHRENS: I prepared a sketch of the position of the staff headquarters west of Smolensk.
DR. STAHMER: I am having the sketch shown to you. Please tell us whether that is your sketch.
AHRENS: That sketch was drawn by me from memory.
DR. STAHMER: I am now going to have a second sketch shown to you. Will you please have a look at that one also, and will you tell me whether it presents a correct picture of the situation?
AHRENS: May I briefly explain this sketch to you? At the right-hand margin, that large red spot is the town of Smolensk. West of Smolensk, and on either side of the road to Vitebsk, the staff of the army group was situated together with the Air Force corps, that is south of Krasnibor. On my sketch I have marked the actual area occupied by the Army Group Center.
That part of my sketch which has a dark line around it was very densely occupied by troops who came directly under the army group; there was hardly a house empty in that area.
The regimental staff of my regiment was in the so-called little Katyn wood. That is the white spot which is indicated on the sketch; it measures about 1 square kilometer of the large forest and is a part of the entire forest around Katyn. On the southern edge of this small wood there lay the so-called Dnieper Castle, which was the regimental staff headquarters.
Two and a half kilometers to the east of the staff headquarters of the regiment there was the first company of the regiment, which was the operating company, which did teleprinting and telephone work for the army group. About 3 kilometers west of the regimental staff headquarters there was the wireless company. There were no buildings within the radius of about 1 kilometer of the regimental staff headquarters.
This house was a large two-story building with about 14 to 15 rooms, several bath installations, a cinema, a rifle range, garages, Sauna (steam baths) and so on, and was most suitable for accommodating the regimental staff. Our regiment permanently retained this battle headquarters.
DR. STAHMER: Were there also any other high-ranking staff headquarters nearby?
AHRENS: As higher staff headquarters there was the army group, which I have already mentioned, then a corps staff from the Air Force, and several battalion staffs. Then there was the delegate of the railway for the army group, who was at Gnesdovo in a special train.
DR. STAHMER: It has been stated in this Trial that certain events which have taken place in your neighborhood had been most secret and most suspicious. Will you please, therefore, answer the following questions with particular care?
How many Germans were there in the staff personnel, and what positions did they fill?
AHRENS: I had 3 officers on my staff to begin with, and then 2, and approximately 18 to 20 noncommissioned officers and men; that is to say, as few as I could have in my regimental staff, and every man in the staff was fully occupied.
DR. STAHMER: Did you have Russian personnel in your staff?
AHRENS: Yes, we had four auxiliary volunteers and some female personnel living in the immediate vicinity of the regimental staff quarters. The auxiliary volunteers remained permanently with the regimental staff, whereas the female personnel changed from time to time. Some of these women also came from Smolensk and they lived in a separate building near the regimental staff.
DR. STAHMER: Did this Russian personnel receive special instructions from you about their conduct?
AHRENS: I issued general instructions on conduct for the regimental headquarters, which did not solely apply to the Russian personnel.
I have already mentioned the importance of secrecy with reference to this regimental headquarters, which not only kept the records of the position of the army group, but also that of its neighboring units, and on which the intentions of the army group were clearly recognizable. Therefore, it was my duty to keep this material particularly secret. Consequently, I had the rooms containing this material barred to ordinary access. Only those persons were admitted—generally officers—who had been passed by me, but also a few noncommissioned officers and other ranks who were put under special oath.
DR. STAHMER: To which rooms did this “no admission” order refer?
AHRENS: In the first place, it referred to the telephone expert’s room, it also referred to my own room and partly, although to a smaller degree, to the adjutant’s room. All remaining rooms in the house and on the site were not off limits.
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, how is this evidence about the actual conditions in these staff headquarters relevant to this question?
DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, in the Russian document the allegation is contained that events of a particularly secret nature had taken place in this staff building and that a ban of silence had been imposed on the Russian personnel by Colonel Ahrens, that the rooms had been locked, and that one was only permitted to enter the rooms when accompanied by guards. I have put the questions in this connection in order to clear up the case and to prove that these events have a perfectly natural explanation on account of the tasks entrusted to the regiment and which necessitated quite obviously, a certain amount of secrecy.
For that reason, I have put these questions. May I be permitted...
THE PRESIDENT: Very well.
DR. STAHMER: I have almost finished with these questions.
[_Turning to the witness._] Was the Katyn wood cordoned off, and especially strictly guarded by soldiers?
Mr. President, may I remark with reference to this question that here also it had been alleged that this cordon had only been introduced by the regiment. Previously, there had been free access to the woods, and from this conclusions are drawn which are detrimental to the regiment.
AHRENS: In order to secure antiaircraft cover for the regimental staff headquarters, I stopped any timber from being cut for fuel in the immediate vicinity of the regimental staff headquarters. During this winter the situation was such that the units cut wood wherever they could get it.
On 22 January, there was a fairly heavy air attack on my position during which half a house was torn away. It was quite impossible to find any other accommodation because of the overcrowding of the area, and I therefore took additional precautions to make sure that this already fairly thin wood would be preserved so as to serve as cover. Since, on the other hand, I am against the putting up of prohibition signs, I asked the other troop units by way of verses to leave us our trees as antiaircraft cover. The wood was not closed off at all, particularly as the road had to be kept open for heavy traffic, and I only sent sentries now and then into the wood to see whether our trees were left intact.
DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution...
THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, at a time that is convenient to you, you will, of course, draw our attention to the necessary dates, the date at which this unit took over its headquarters and the date at which it left.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] When did your unit, your regiment, move into this Dnieper Castle?
AHRENS: As far as I know, this house was taken over immediately after the combat troops had left that area in August 1941, and it was confiscated together with the other army group accommodations, and was occupied by advance parties. It was then permanently occupied by the regimental headquarters as long as I was there up to August 1943.
DR. STAHMER: So, if I understand you correctly, it was first of all in August 1941 that an advance party took it over?
AHRENS: Yes, as far as I know.
DR. STAHMER: When did the staff actually arrive?
AHRENS: A few weeks later.
DR. STAHMER: Who was the regimental commander at that time?
AHRENS: My predecessor was Colonel Bedenck.
DR. STAHMER: When did you take over the regiment?
AHRENS: I joined the army group during the second half of November 1941, and after getting thoroughly acquainted with all details I took over the command of the regiment, at the end of November, if I remember rightly, on 30 November.
DR. STAHMER: Was there a proper handing over from Bedenck to you?
AHRENS: A very careful, detailed, and lengthy transfer took place, on account of the very considerable tasks entrusted to this regiment. Added to that, my superior, General Oberhäuser, was an extraordinarily painstaking superior, and he took great pains to convince himself personally whether, by the transfer negotiations and the instructions which I had received, I was fully capable of taking over the responsibilities of the regiment.
DR. STAHMER: The Prosecution further alleges and claims that it was suspicious that shots were often fired in the forest. Is that true, and to what would you attribute that?
AHRENS: I have already mentioned that it was one of the main tasks of the regiment to take all the necessary measures to defend themselves against sudden attack. Considering the small number of men which I had in my regimental staff, I had to organize and take the necessary steps to enable me to obtain replacements in the shortest time possible. This was arranged through wireless communication with the regimental headquarters. I ordered that defensive maneuvers should be carried out and that defense works should be prepared around the regimental headquarters sector and that there should be maneuvers and exercises in these works together with the members of the regimental headquarters. I personally participated in these maneuvers at times and, of course, shots were fired, particularly since we were preparing ourselves for night fighting.
DR. STAHMER: There is supposed to have been a very lively and rather suspicious traffic to and around your staff building. Will you please tell us quite briefly what this traffic signified?
AHRENS: There was an extraordinary lively traffic around staff headquarters which still increased in the spring of 1941 as I was having the house rebuilt. I think I mentioned that it had been destroyed through air attacks. But, of course, the traffic increased also through the maneuvers which were held nearby. The battalions in the front area operating at 300 and 400 kilometers distance had to, and could perform their job only by maintaining personal contact with the regiment and its staff headquarters.
DR. STAHMER: There is supposed to have been considerable truck traffic which has been described as suspicious.
AHRENS: Besides our supplies, which were relatively small, the Kommandos, as I have just mentioned, were brought in by trucks; but so was, of course, all the building material which I required. Apart from that, the traffic was not unusually heavy.
DR. STAHMER: Do you know that about 25 kilometers west of Smolensk there were three Russian prisoner-of-war camps, which had originally been inhabited by Poles and which had been abandoned by the Russians when the German troops approached in July 1941?
AHRENS: At that time I had not yet arrived. But never during the entire period I served in Russia did I see a single Pole; nor did I hear of Poles.
DR. STAHMER: It has been alleged that an order had been issued from Berlin according to which Polish prisoners of war were to be shot. Did you know of such an order?
AHRENS: No. I have never heard of such an order.
DR. STAHMER: Did you possibly receive such an order from any other office?
AHRENS: I told you already that I never heard of such an order and I therefore did not receive it, either.
DR. STAHMER: Were any Poles shot on your instructions, your direct instructions?
AHRENS: No Poles were shot on my instructions. Nobody at all was ever shot upon my order. I have never given such an order in all my life.
DR. STAHMER: Well, you did not arrive until November 1941. Have you heard anything about your predecessor, Colonel Bedenck, having given any similar orders?
AHRENS: I have not heard anything about it. With my regimental staff, with whom I lived closely together for 21 months, I had such close connections, I knew my people so well, and they also knew me, that I am perfectly convinced that this deed was not perpetrated by my predecessor nor by any member of my former regiment. I would undoubtedly have heard rumors of it at the very least.
THE PRESIDENT: This is argument, you know, Dr. Stahmer. This is not evidence; it is argument. He is telling you what he thinks might have been the case.
DR. STAHMER: I asked whether he had heard of it from members of his regiment.
THE PRESIDENT: The answer to that would be “no,” I suppose, that he had not heard—not that he was convinced that he had not done it.
DR. STAHMER: Very well.
[_Turning to the witness._] After your arrival at Katyn, did you notice that there was a grave mound in the woods at Katyn?
AHRENS: Shortly after I arrived—the ground was covered by snow—one of my soldiers pointed out to me that at a certain spot there was some sort of a mound, which one could hardly describe as such, on which there was a birch cross. I have seen that birch cross. In the course of 1942 my soldiers kept telling me that here in our woods shootings were supposed to have taken place, but at first I did not pay any attention to it. However, in the summer of 1942 this topic was referred to in an order of the army group later commanded by General Von Harsdorff. He told me that he had also heard about it.
DR. STAHMER: Did these stories prove true later on?
AHRENS: Yes, they did turn out to be true and I was able to confirm, quite by accident, that there was actually a grave here. During the winter of 1943—I think either January or February—quite accidentally I saw a wolf in this wood and at first I did not believe that it was a wolf; when I followed the tracks with an expert, we saw that there were traces of scratchings on the mound with the cross. I had investigations made as to what kind of bones these were. The doctors told me “human bones.” Thereupon I informed the officer responsible for war graves in the area of this fact, because I believed that it was a soldier’s grave, as there were a number of such graves in our immediate vicinity.
DR. STAHMER: Then, how did the exhumation take place?
AHRENS: I do not know about all the details. Professor Dr. Butz arrived one day on orders from the army group, and informed me that following the rumors in my little wood, he had to make exhumations, and that he had to inform me that these exhumations would take place in my wood.
DR. STAHMER: Did Professor Butz later give you details of the result of his exhumations?
AHRENS: Yes, he did occasionally give me details and I remember that he told me that he had conclusive evidence regarding the date of the shootings. Among other things, he showed me letters, of which I cannot remember much now; but I do remember some sort of a diary which he passed over to me in which there were dates followed by some notes which I could not read because they were written in Polish. In this connection he explained to me that these notes had been made by a Polish officer regarding events of the past months, and that at the end—the diary ended with the spring of 1940—the fear was expressed in these notes that something horrible was going to happen. I am giving only a broad outline of the meaning.
DR. STAHMER: Did he give you any further indication regarding the period he assumed the shooting had taken place?
AHRENS: Professor Butz, on the basis of the proofs which he had found, was convinced that the shootings had taken place in the spring of 1940 and I often heard him express these convictions in my presence, and also later on, when commissions visited the grave and I had to place my house at the disposal of these commissions to accommodate them. I personally did not have anything to do whatsoever with the exhumations or with the commissions. All I had to do was to place the house at their disposal and act as host.
DR. STAHMER: It was alleged that in March 1943 lorries had transported bodies to Katyn from outside and these bodies were buried in the little wood. Do you know anything about that?
AHRENS: No, I know nothing about that.
DR. STAHMER: Would you have had to take notice of it?
AHRENS: I would have had to take notice of it—at least my officers would have reported it to me, because my officers were constantly at the regimental battle headquarters, whereas I, as a regimental commander, was of course, frequently on the way. The officer who in those days was there constantly was First Lieutenant Hodt, whose address I got to know last night from a letter.
DR. STAHMER: Were Russian prisoners of war used for these exhumations?
AHRENS: As far as I remember, yes.
DR. STAHMER: Can you tell us the number?
AHRENS: I cannot say exactly as I did not concern myself any further with these exhumations on account of the dreadful and revolting stench around our house, but I should estimate the number as being about 40 to 50 men.
DR. STAHMER: It has been alleged that they were shot afterward; have you any knowledge of that?
Comments
Log in to leave a comment.
Trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, 14 November 1945-1 October 1946, volume 17Chapter XIII: Book 1: , Mr. President (1)
0%36 min left in chapter