Chapter XVIII: Book 1: , Mr. President (6)

“3. Q: ‘If yes, was it customary in such areas for submarines to
attack merchantmen without warning, with the exception of her
own and those of her Allies?’

“A: ‘Yes, with the exception of hospital ships and other vessels
under “safe conduct” voyages for humanitarian purposes.’

“4. Q: ‘Were you under orders to do so?’

“A: ‘The Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 ordered
unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan.’

“5. Q: ‘Was it customary for the submarines to attack Japanese
merchantmen without warning—outside of announced operation or
similar areas since the outbreak of the war?’

“A: ‘The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside
the limits of my command during the war; therefore I make no
reply thereto.’

“6. Q: ‘Were you under orders to do so?’

“A: ‘The reply to this interrogatory involves matters outside
the limits of my command during the war; therefore I make no
reply thereto.’

“7. Q: ‘If the practice of attacking without warning did not
exist since the outbreak of the war, did it exist from a later
date on? From what date on?’

“A: ‘The practice existed from 7 December 1941 in the declared
zone of operations.’

“8. Q: ‘Did this practice correspond to issued orders?’

“A: ‘Yes.’

“9. Q: ‘Did it become known to the U.S. naval authorities that
Japanese merchantmen were under orders to report any sighted
U.S. submarine to the Japanese Armed Forces by radio? If yes,
when did it become known?’

“A: ‘During the course of the war, it became known to the U.S.
naval authorities that Japanese merchantmen in fact reported by
radio to Japanese Armed Forces any information regarding
sighting of U.S. submarines.’

“10. Q: ‘Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order to
attack without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order did
not exist already before? If yes, when?’

“A: ‘The order existed from 7 December 1941.’

“11. Q: ‘Did it become known to the U.S. naval authorities that
the Japanese merchantmen were under orders to attack any U.S.
submarine in any way suitable according to the situation; for
instance, by ramming, gunfire, or by depth charges? If yes, when
did it become known?’

“A: ‘Japanese merchantmen were usually armed and always attacked
by any available means when feasible.’

“12. Q: ‘Did the U.S. submarines thereupon receive the order of
attacking without warning Japanese merchantmen, if this order
did not already exist before. If yes, when?’

“A: ‘The order existed from 7 December 1941.’

“13. Q: ‘Were, by order or on general principles, the U.S.
submarines prohibited from carrying out rescue measures toward
passengers and crews of ships sunk without warning in those
cases where by doing so the safety of their own boat was
endangered?’

“A: ‘On general principles, the U.S. submarines did not rescue
enemy survivors if undue additional hazard to the submarine
resulted or the submarine would thereby be prevented from
accomplishing its further mission. U.S. submarines were limited
in rescue measures by small passenger-carrying facilities
combined with the known desperate and suicidal character of the
enemy. Therefore, it was unsafe to pick up many survivors.
Frequently survivors were given rubber boats and/or provisions.
Almost invariably survivors did not come aboard the submarine
voluntarily, and it was necessary to take them prisoner by
force.’

“14. Q: ‘If such an order or principle did not exist, did the
U.S. submarine actually carry out rescue measures in the
above-mentioned cases?’

“A: ‘In numerous cases enemy survivors were rescued by U.S.
submarines.’

“15. Q: ‘In answering the above question, does the expression
“merchantmen” mean any other kind of ships than those which were
not warships?’

“A: ‘No. By “merchantmen” I mean all types of ships which were
not combatant ships. Used in this sense, it includes fishing
boats, et cetera.’

“16. Q: ‘If yes, what kind of ships?’

“A: ‘The last answer covers this question.’

“17. Q: ‘Has any order of the U.S. naval authorities mentioned
in the above questionnaire concerning the tactics of U.S.
submarines toward Japanese merchantmen been based on the grounds
of reprisal? If yes, what orders?’

“A: ‘The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered on 7
December 1941 resulted from the recognition of Japanese tactics
revealed on that date. No further orders to U.S. submarines
concerning tactics toward Japanese merchantmen throughout the
war were based on reprisal, although specific instances of
Japanese submarines committing atrocities toward U.S. merchant
marine survivors became known and would have justified such a
course.’

“18. Q: ‘Has this order or have these orders of the Japanese
Government been announced as reprisals?’

“A: ‘The question is not clear. Therefore I make no reply
thereto.’

“19. Q: ‘On the basis of what Japanese tactics was reprisal
considered justified?’

“A: ‘The unrestricted submarine and air warfare ordered by the
Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941 was justified by
the Japanese attacks on that date on U.S. bases and on both
armed and unarmed ships and nationals without warning or
declaration of war.’

“The above record of testimony has been examined by me on this
date and is in all respects accurate and
true.”—signed—“Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy.”

This document bears the number Dönitz-100.

As my next document I submit an expert opinion given by the former naval judge, Jäckel, on the jurisdiction of the naval courts for the protection of the native population against encroachments by marines. This document has been admitted by the Tribunal and is available in translation and therefore I do not need to read it.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give us the number?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Dönitz-49, Mr. President.

Then, Mr. President, some weeks back I made application to admit extracts from the records of a war crimes court at Oslo. These had been used by the Prosecution on the occasion of the cross-examination of Grossadmiral Dönitz. At that time they were not numbered. From these records I selected some extracts which prove that torpedo boat Number 345, whose crew were shot by reason of the Commando Order, was a boat which was charged with sabotage acts. Due to this fact the High Command of the Navy and also Admiral Dönitz were not informed about the treatment meted out to these prisoners, and this question was settled directly by means of discussions between Gauleiter Terboven and the Führer’s headquarters. I ask that the High Tribunal admit this document as evidence, since this document was used by the Prosecution. It would receive the Number Dönitz-107.

COLONEL H. J. PHILLIMORE (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): My Lord, I do not know if the Tribunal has before it the answer which the Prosecution have put into this application.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we have just looked at it now.

COL. PHILLIMORE: Broadly speaking, it comes to this, that we are quite prepared to put in the whole proceedings, but we should object to extracts being put in; that is, amongst the affidavits and the evidence of some of the witnesses, material to support the points for which counsel for Defendant Dönitz contends. There is, on the other hand, a body of evidence the other way on all those points. That is why, My Lord...

THE PRESIDENT: Would it not save translation if you put in the passages in the document upon which you rely?

COL. PHILLIMORE: If that would be more convenient, My Lord, we can do that.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know how long the document is. It may be very long indeed.

COL. PHILLIMORE: The whole proceedings are very long. The trial lasted for 4 days.

THE PRESIDENT: Then it would be appropriate that you should pick out the parts on which you rely and Dr. Kranzbühler can put in...

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, it is put in the answer that the document against this defendant, which was proved in the defendant’s case, was an affidavit by the Judge Advocate, who set out the effect of the evidence accepted by the court.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal follows that, but it thinks that it is desirable that you should put in the passages upon which you as well as the defense counsel rely.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: May I submit this document, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: What is the number again, please?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Number Dönitz-107, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: And it contains extracts from these proceedings, does it?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, extracts.

THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution will put in their extracts and we will consider them both.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, then I have another question dealing with the documents of the case which we have just dealt with, the case of Katyn.

The witness, Professor Markov, mentioned the expert opinion given by the Italian expert, Professor Palmieri, which is in the German _White Book_. I should also like to submit this opinion as evidence, for the reason that there is no mention of insects being found on the corpses as Professor Markov asserted, but rather, “larvae.” To me the difference appears to be that insects fly about during the summer whereas larvae conceal themselves during the winter months, Mr. President, may I submit this document?

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, I should like to make just one factual remark. In Professor Palmieri’s report it was indicated that the “larvae” were discovered in the throats of the corpses. I cannot imagine that “insects” were ever found in the throat of a corpse. That is why I do not think that the presentation of the document by defendant’s counsel serves a purpose.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, you are specifying a particular document referred to in the _White Book_, is that right?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: And you mean the whole of the document?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: That document is about one page, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Then you may put it in, subject to its being translated.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Very well, Mr. President.

MR. COUNSELLOR SMIRNOV: Mr. President, we are talking about a document which is an account on the dissection of a corpse performed by Professor Palmieri. It is no report but merely an account of an autopsy carried out by Professor Palmieri himself.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it referred to in the conclusions or not?

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: It is put in the general record to the same extent as the record of Professor Markov. It is the findings on the autopsy which Professor Palmieri performed.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Mr. President, I have still another document in the case of Katyn, which I received from Polish sources just a few days ago. This is a document which was written in English and appeared in London in 1946. The title is, _Report on the Massacre of Polish Officers in the Katyn Wood_. In this document Polish sources are used, and I should like to offer this document to the Tribunal as evidence.

However, before I present certain lines of evidence, I would like to ask that the High Tribunal examine this document, for there may be doubts whether it can be used as evidence.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kranzbühler, this document is printed for private circulation only. It has no printer’s name on it, and it is entirely anonymous.

FLOTTENRICHTER KRANZBÜHLER: Yes, Mr. President, these were the doubts which I entertained. I submitted this document as I assumed that in view of the importance of this case, the Tribunal would nevertheless want to take official notice of the contents.

THE PRESIDENT: No, the Tribunal thinks it would be improper to look at a document of this nature.

GEN. RUDENKO: Mr. President, I should just like to make one remark, as in fact the Tribunal has already indicated its decision. The statement of the defendant’s counsel that this document was received from the Polish Delegation astounds me to say the least. I should like to know from what Polish Delegation he received this document, because the Polish Delegation represented here could not possibly produce such a Fascist propaganda document as this.

THE PRESIDENT: I think General Rudenko misunderstood what Dr. Kranzbühler said.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, four interrogatories were granted to me on behalf of the Defendant Funk. When I presented my case, I could not yet submit these affidavits because they had not been translated. In the meantime, I have received these translations; and they have been submitted to the Tribunal. I ask to be permitted to present them briefly to the Tribunal at this point.

One of them, in Document Book Walter Funk, Supplement Number 2, will be numbered Exhibit Number Funk-16. This is the very comprehensive interrogation of the witness Landfried who held the position of state secretary in the Ministry of the Defendant Funk. This witness—I do not believe I need to read this record in detail—in answer to the first question, deals with the economic policy of the Defendant Funk in the occupied countries. He describes it in exactly the same way as it was presented by Funk. In answer to the second question, he deals similarly with the directions given by the Defendant Funk to the military commanders and to the Reich Commissioners of the occupied countries.

Under Question 4, the witness deals with the question of the plundering of the occupied territories. He confirms the fact that the Defendant Funk always opposed such plundering, that he fought the black markets, that he opposed devaluation of the currency, that he tried to maintain currency in the occupied territory on the original level.

In reply to Question 5, the witness describes in detail how the Defendant Funk tried to prevent financial overburdening of the occupied countries, especially to lower the costs of occupation as far as possible.

Then in the other questions, in Part 2, particularly in reply to Question 11, the witness discusses the activities of the Defendant Funk in the Ministry of Economics, with regard to German preparations in the event of a war.

Then, in reply to Question 12, the witness examines the position of the Plenipotentiary General for Economy and he concludes that in practice it was the position of a figurehead only. However, I do not wish to read these detailed statements and take up too much of the time of the Tribunal, for in the main these are only repetitions of statements that have already been made.

In the last two questions, Numbers 14 and 15, the witness Landfried, who, as I have already said, was for years the defendant’s deputy, describes the defendant’s attitude toward the policy of terror and his fundamental attitude in regard to the use of foreign workers and similar matters. I ask that the Tribunal take judicial notice of this very detailed testimony and that these brief statements will suffice.

The next interrogatory comes from the witness Emil Puhl. This is the same witness who was interrogated in this courtroom about other questions, namely the question of gold teeth, _et cetera_. This is the interrogatory and the answers of the witness Emil Puhl, Document Book Funk, Supplement Number 3, Exhibit Funk-17.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, has this interrogatory been granted?

DR. SAUTER: Yes, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: He gave his evidence. We do not generally allow interrogatories to witnesses who have given their evidence.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the matter was like this: As far back as December I had applied for this interrogatory and repeatedly asked for it, but it did not arrive. And only after 2 days of cross-examining, was this witness Emil Puhl suddenly questioned by the Prosecution on entirely different subjects, that is the matter of gold deposits made by the SS, rather of gold teeth. This interrogation by the Prosecution did not refer to the interrogatory, which I believe was granted by you in February.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Sauter, what I mean is this: Supposing the Tribunal is asked to grant an interrogatory and it grants the interrogatory, and then the witness is subsequently called to give evidence. When he is called to give evidence, he ought to be questioned upon all the matters which are relevant to the Trial. The Tribunal does not want to have to read his evidence in one place and then his interrogatory in some other place.

Is there any objection, Mr. Dodd, to accepting it in this case?

MR. DODD: No, I have no objection, Mr. President. That is the situation. It was granted before Puhl was called. He was called here for cross-examination and I do not recall offhand whether or not counsel inquired concerning these matters that are contained therein. We have no objections. It may be some annoyance to the Tribunal, which we regret.

DR. SAUTER: Mr. President, the witness Puhl, during his examination in the French camp, also had the questions of the cross-examination submitted to him which the Prosecution asked for and they were answered by him. Thus he was interrogated not only about the points which I raised, but also about the questions put in the cross-examination by the Prosecution. Therefore, I take the liberty of submitting this document, which is an interrogatory of Emil Puhl, Document Book Number 3, Supplement Number 3, and to which is assigned Exhibit Number Funk-17.

This witness Puhl, who was the vice president of the Reichsbank, in this interrogatory deals solely with matters entirely different from the subjects dealt with here in his examination, namely, the preparations which the Reichsbank President, Dr. Funk, made in the event of war; that is Question Number 1, concerning the handling of the clearing debts, and Question Number 2, about the higher valuation of the Danish currency...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal thinks you need not read the interrogatory but the Tribunal will allow it to go in in this case.

DR. SAUTER: Thank you, Mr. President. I wanted only to sketch the contents of this testimony briefly.

Then I submit additional testimony, given by a witness, which has been granted by the Tribunal. It is the testimony given by the witness Heinz Kallus, to be found in Document Book Walter Funk, Supplement 4, and is assigned Exhibit Number Funk-18. I also submit this testimony to the General Secretary and I should like to ask, in order to save time, that the Tribunal take judicial notice of its contents.

As my fourth and last document there is an affidavit subscribed by Mr. Messersmith, a supplement to a previous statement which has already been submitted to the Tribunal. This is very brief, in fact it is but one sentence and it may be found in the Document Book Walter Funk, Supplement Number 5, with Exhibit Number Funk-19. I also submit this document. And now I have arrived at the conclusion of my report, Mr. President. Thank you very much.

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I should like to submit to the Tribunal the testimony of the witness Dr. Beil. Up to now I had received this testimony only in English. I have fetched it again from the Translation Division so that I could submit it as Exhibit Number Rosenberg-50. In this connection I have another request. This interrogatory contains important questions dealing with the attitude adopted by the East Ministry in the matter of allocation of labor and it is of such importance that I ask the permission of the Tribunal to have it read. Since I am not entirely conversant with the English language, I should like to ask to have an interpreter read this interrogatory.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, has this document been offered in evidence before: It was granted by the Tribunal, was it not, this interrogatory?

DR. THOMA: Yes, it has already been granted by the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it necessary to read it? Can you not submit it in evidence and the Tribunal will consider it?

DR. THOMA: I leave that, of course, to the Tribunal to decide. I wanted to point out only that this is very important and decisive testimony in regard to the question of manpower allocation in the East Ministry. However, I shall leave that to the judgment of the Tribunal.

THE PRESIDENT: Can you not summarize it?

DR. THOMA: Mr. President, I have received only an English translation, and I do not wish to attempt to do anything with it. But I believe there are only 2 pages—the interpreter will read that in no time at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Let the interpreter read it then.

INTERPRETER: Exhibit Number Rosenberg-50:

“Copy. Completed interrogatory of Ministerialrat Dr. Beil, on
behalf of Rosenberg.

“The witness, having been duly sworn, states:

“Q: ‘Were you the permanent official (Sachbearbeiter) in the
East Ministry (Ost Ministerium) in charge of the questions of
labor and social policy?’

“A: ‘Yes, I was one of 10 permanent officials; we originally
started with 52, but as the East Front receded the staff was
finally reduced to 10. I was in charge of the administration
side of the labor and social policy. The head of the department
was Landesbauernführer Peukert.’

“Q: ‘Was the East Ministry in favor of voluntary recruiting of
workers in the East?’

“A: ‘Yes, of voluntary recruiting only, my instructions being
that it should only be carried out on this basis.’

“Q: ‘Are any results known?’

“A: ‘Yes, but the results were not as great as anticipated, only
some 300,000 to 400,000 volunteered and most of these were from
the Ukraine, Lithuania, and Estonia.’

“Q: ‘Were there any negotiations about decreasing the quotas
ordered by the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor
(GBA)?’

“A: ‘Yes, negotiations for decreasing the quotas took place but
broke down owing to Sauckel demanding something like a million
workers to be transferred to the interior.’

“Q: ‘Who was responsible for the care and control of the East
Workers (Ostarbeiter) in the Reich?’

“A: ‘The German Labor Front (Arbeitsfront) and the Reich Food
Estate (Reichsnährstand) were responsible for the care of the
East Workers, the former for workers in munitions and heavy
industry and the latter for agricultural workers.’

“Q: ‘What was the point of view of the Department ASO...’”

DR. THOMA: ASO, if I may interrupt, is the Labor, Social, and Political Department of the East Ministry.

INTERPRETER: [_continuing._]

“Q: ‘What was the point of view of the Department ASO concerning
the treatment of the East Workers in the Reich?’

“A: ‘The view of my Department ASO was that the voluntary
recruiting of workers on a free movement basis, thus taking them
out of the barbed-wire-enclosed factories, would be the best
method of treatment; we also advocated the removal of the arm
badges, worn originally on the arm and later over the left
breast, which carried the word “East” so as to distinguish them
from workers from the West, who never at any time wore badges.
The wording being later changed to “Greater Russia,” “White
Russia,” and “Ukraine,” the people from the Baltic States did
not wear the arm badge. Certain Russians, small groups of
Cossacks, Tartars, and one or two others were not compelled to
wear the arm band, as they were anti-Bolshevistic and
pro-German; and a certain proportion of these were eventually
called up into the German Army. Some 7,000 youths of Ruthenia
were called up by ASO and these were apprenticed at Junkers
Works.’

“Q: ‘Is the Central Office (Zentralstelle) for the eastern
people (Ostvölker) at the East Ministry known to you? How was
this organized?’

“A: ‘Yes, it was considered to be a consulate for the East;
members of the staff were partly Germans and partly local
employees from the East, who were considered suitable for such
employment. Some of the foreign employees were placed at the
disposal of the country offices to look after the interests of
their fellow countrymen working in the countries. At the Central
Office were instituted offices for each of the eastern states,
each office being controlled by a German, some of whom had
originally come from these states. There was also a welfare
branch which was run by persons from these eastern states, to
look after the comfort, _et cetera_, of their individual
countrymen; there was also a religious branch which was run by
clergy from these countries, but this branch was not very
successful as there was an insufficiency of priests.’

“Q: ‘Now, with the help of the DAF, were the complaints followed
up?’

“A: ‘The interests of foreign workers were always looked after;
missions were sent to the various concentrations of East Workers
to find out how they were progressing and what kind of treatment
they were receiving. These missions dealt with complaints
submitted to them on their visits, but the Central Office had to
deal also with written complaints received through the post.’

“Q: ‘Is a printed circular to the authorities in the country
known to you, that ordered a just treatment? Details? What was
the story about the families who were evacuated by the Army
Group Center and about the children 10-14 years old?’

“A: ‘Yes, there was a circular issued, dealing with this
question, and it gave details at great length for the just
treatment of the East Workers. This circular was issued at the
request of the Ministry of the East, through Sauckel. A second
circular was issued by Rosenberg dealing with the just treatment
of workers from the East only. I have no knowledge of this
story, as this was dealt with entirely by the Army Group
Center.’

“Q: ‘Does the witness know the pamphlet issued by the East
Ministry to the managers of enterprises concerning the nations
of eastern Europe and the attitude towards them?’”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, that affidavit does not seem to be short at all. It all seems to be cumulative. Every word of it is what we have heard before and heard not only once, but over and over again.

INTERPRETER: Dr. Thoma has just said that the last sentence is coming up.

DR. THOMA: There are two more short sentences.

INTERPRETER:

“A: ‘There were two pamphlets issued; one issued by Sauckel, and
the other issued in conjunction with DAF and Sauckel and the
Ministry for the East.’

“Q: ‘Has he one handy?’

“A: ‘I have not got a copy of this pamphlet.’

“(Signed) Beil.”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Thoma, the Tribunal rely on counsel, you know; and when you tell us that this is an important affidavit, we rely on what you tell us. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the reading of the affidavit was an absolute waste of the Tribunal’s time.

DR. THOMA: I should like to put another request to the Tribunal. I have asked that I be granted an interrogatory for the Reichshauptstellenleiter Dr. Oeppert, of the office of the Delegate of the Führer for the supervision of the entire ideological and mental relation of the NSDAP under Rosenberg’s office. This affidavit has not been granted to me, but I already have it on hand.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the Prosecution seen it?

DR. THOMA: No, Mr. President, I do not think so. I submitted an application to the General Secretary. Whether this request has already been transmitted to the Prosecution, I do not know.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, the only application that we have got, as far as I can see, is an interrogatory to Dr. Köppen in lieu of Dr. Stellbrecht. Is that the one that you are speaking about now?

DR. THOMA: No. Mr. President, I was granted permission to interrogate Dr. Köppen instead of Dr. Stellbrecht, and the interrogatory has already been sent off. This, however, is a new application regarding Dr. Oeppert and has not yet been decided upon.

THE PRESIDENT: You had better submit it to the Prosecution and see whether they have any comment to make on it, and we can take it up tomorrow.

DR. THOMA: Thank you very much, Mr. President.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the case of Papen there are six interrogatories which have not been disposed of. Three of them have been returned in the last few days and are in the stage of being translated. I asked, when I received my last interrogatory, to be allowed to submit all six at one time to the Tribunal.

Then, without my taking any steps to get it, I received an affidavit 3 days ago from a foreign journalist, Rademacher von Unna, from Milan, Italy. This affidavit is being translated at present. I submitted it to the British prosecutor, and he does not object. I ask to be allowed to submit this affidavit later with the remainder of my documents.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly you may submit it. We shall then pass an opinion upon it as to its admissibility.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Thank you, Mr. President.

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendants Frank and Hess): Mr. President, I ask permission to submit the answers to the interrogatories from the witnesses which have not yet been submitted. As Exhibit Frank-19 I submit the answers to the interrogatory given by the witness Dr. Ernst Böpple. Böpple was State Secretary in the Government General, and he has answered 41 questions in all.

As Number Frank-20, I submit the answers to an interrogatory given by the witness Max Meidinger. Meidinger was chief of the chancellery of the Government General. He has answered 43 questions. This interrogatory, as well as the first interrogatory by Böpple, as far as I could make out, has not been translated yet, although I handed these interrogatories in to be translated about 10 days ago. But attached to the interrogatory there is an English translation which was made during the interrogation.

As Number Frank-21 I submit the answers given by the witness Gassner, who answered 49 questions. Gassner was press chief in the Government General.

Number Frank-22 will be the interrogatory deposed by the witness Dr. Stepp, who in the end was president of the Court of Appeals (Oberlandesgericht). He deals mainly with the efforts made by the Defendant Frank in the years 1933 and 1934, in his capacity as Bavarian Minister of Justice, for the dissolution of the concentration camp at Dachau.

I should also like to take this opportunity, Mr. President, of pointing out an error of translation which does not refer to the documents of Frank but to a document which was submitted on behalf of the Defendant Hess. Although it was not used by the Prosecution with regard to the personal responsibility of Rudolf Hess, it is found in the document book, and the document concerned is Exhibit USA-696, Document 062-PS. That is a directive of 13 March 1940, the same directive which was mentioned last Saturday in the case of the Defendant Bormann, on which occasion the President himself read Figure 4 of this directive, which was submitted as an appendix to this directive of 13 March. There is a very serious error in translation, which completely distorts the sense of the directive and which, I must say, can have very dangerous consequences.

Under Figure 4 the words “unschädlich gemacht” (made harmless) were translated as “liquidated.”

THE PRESIDENT: If there is an error in the translation, you had better apply to the General Secretary; and he will have the matter gone into by the Translation Division.

DR. SEIDL: Yes, Mr. President, but the matter does not seem to be as simple as that. The translator obviously had the feeling himself that his translation was not reproducing the sense quite accurately, because in parentheses he added “unschädlich gemacht.” In my opinion this sentence must be translated as follows: “Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested or made harmless.” The sense was obviously that the parachutists...

THE PRESIDENT: I dare say, Dr. Seidl, but we do not have the document before us and we do not all of us understand the German language. Therefore, it had better be referred to the Translation Division. It is no good referring it to us.

DR. SEIDL: Then I shall put a written application to the General Secretary, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Have the Prosecution any objection to these interrogatories which Dr. Seidl has been dealing with? Have the Prosecution had the opportunity of putting cross-interrogatories if they wanted to do so?

COL. PHILLIMORE: My Lord, I am told that we think so, with the possible exception of the last one. Perhaps I could look into it overnight.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

COL. PHILLIMORE: I will look into that point and let the Tribunal know.

My Lord, the Prosecution have a few documents to put in. I have eight, and I think my friend Mr. Dodd has three. I could do it very quickly, but it might be more convenient to do it tomorrow morning.

THE PRESIDENT: We will go into all these documents tomorrow morning. There will be some others on behalf of some of the other defendants. We will also hear the witnesses Kempka and Walkenhorst, I believe it is, whom Dr. Bergold wishes to call.

The Tribunal desires Dr. Bergold to be here tomorrow morning in order to be able to examine these witnesses.

The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 3 July 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND SEVENTIETH DAY
Wednesday, 3 July 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: Has Dr. Bergold asked any of the defendants’ counsel to represent him?

[_There was no response._]

Has the Marshal been able to get in touch with Dr. Bergold?

MARSHAL: No, Sir.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, Dr. Bergold was advised yesterday that his presence would be required in the courtroom today. As far as I have heard—and I have only heard this—the General Secretary also got in touch with him regarding this matter. I am sorry I cannot tell you any more about it. As far as I know, he did not ask anyone to represent him in Court today.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you, Dr. Stahmer.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I shall look into this matter immediately, to see whether he has arrived or whether I can contact him.

THE PRESIDENT: Very good; and Dr. Stahmer, I think the best course would be for the Tribunal to consider the various applications with reference to interrogatories and documents, which I think you and other counsel wish to offer in evidence, and the Tribunal will then examine these witnesses if Dr. Bergold is not here by that time. The Tribunal, of course, expect him to be here if it is possible. Perhaps you will communicate with him, and the Marshal should also communicate with Dr. Bergold.

DR. STAHMER: Yes.

MARSHAL: Yes, Sir.

PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): Mr. President, I have learned that the son of Dr. Bergold returned yesterday unexpectedly and suddenly from a prisoner-of-war camp. Therefore, Dr. Bergold went to his home, a short distance from Nuremberg. I asked his secretary to go to Dr. Bergold’s home and to bring him here and I assume he will be here within approximately half an hour.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, you have some interrogatories, I think, which you want to offer in evidence, have you not?

DR. STAHMER: Yes, Sir. At the end of my presentation I still had some interrogatories which I had been permitted to present but which had not arrived.

First of all, I shall turn to the interrogatory of Kammhuber, who was a general in the Air Force. He submitted an organizational study for 1950, which was completed on 2 May 1938. He was questioned about the purpose and significance of this study and he stated—I will give a short summary—that a part of it, which came under the heading of “long term objective” was a tentative sketch based on theoretical assumptions. Then there was a second part which gave the deadline of 1942, and the interim solution for 1 October 1938. This was a positive proposal for the organization of the Luftwaffe.

This study was compiled by the author on his own initiative. The witness does not know whether it was actually submitted to Göring. He considers it improbable, but he does assume that he did suggest the positive proposal for the organization of the Luftwaffe to Göring.

That is the substance of this interrogatory which will be called Exhibit Number Göring-54.

I have another interrogatory which I should like to submit, which originates from General Kurt Student. This deals with the air attack on Rotterdam in May of 1940. It is an explanation...

THE PRESIDENT: Have you got copies of these affidavits, I mean these interrogatories? We have got this one you are now offering of Student, but we have not got the one of Kammhuber.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I submitted this material to the Translation Division and I asked that the translations should be ready. I shall look into the matter and see what has become of it. At any rate, I did submit the originals to the Translation Division.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; the General Secretary will look into it. And this one of Student, has that been applied for and granted? It is not on my list.

DR. STAHMER: Yes, Mr. President, it has been granted, and the Prosecution has submitted a counterinterrogatory to this one. I believe...

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

DR. STAHMER: If I am not mistaken, this interrogatory of Student’s was granted on 14 February, if I remember rightly.

Student deals with the air attack on Rotterdam in May 1940. He gives the necessary explanation as to how it came about that during capitulation negotiations bombs were still being dropped on Rotterdam. Here, too, I believe, I can refer to this interrogatory. The facts were that capitulation negotiations were in progress when an air attack had been planned and the squadron which was being employed could not be advised in time by wireless. Then the ground troops gave signals, which were misunderstood by one group...

THE PRESIDENT: It appears that it covers the same ground that has already been covered in evidence; does it not?

DR. STAHMER: It has been dealt with in the examination; yes, that is correct, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Then it should not be read under any circumstances now.

DR. STAHMER: Then I shall submit this document...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, offer it in evidence. But I mean, you need not read it in detail.

DR. STAHMER: Very well, Mr. President. This will be Exhibit Number Göring-53.

Then, Mr. President, I have another interrogatory by a general of the Air Force, Koller, which I should like to submit. This will be submitted as Exhibit Number Göring-55.

Mr. President, I ask the permission of the High Tribunal to read these questions, for there is a special significance connected with the testimony given by this witness in relation to the defendant in this proceeding:

“Question 1: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring at any time
issue an order that enemy airmen who had been shot down should
be handed over to the Police, the SD, or that they should be
shot without a trial?

“Answer: As far as I know, no. In any case, I know of no such
order issued by the Reich Marshal.

“Question 2: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring help to
formulate an order on the strength of which the British flying
officers who escaped from Stalag III at Sagan in March 1944 were
shot by the Police or SD?

“Answer: General Korten told me that the Luftwaffe, the Air
Force—meaning the Reich Marshal and he, Korten, himself—had no
part in the issuing of this order.

“Question 3: Did the former Reich Marshal Göring learn of the
fact contained in Question 2 only after the order given by
Hitler had been carried out?

“Answer: General Korten told me that he and the Reich Marshal
did not get to know of it until later.

“Question 4: On what day was this order issued by Hitler?

“Answer: I do not know.

“Question 5: On what day, or on what days, was this order
carried out?

“Answer: I do not know.

“Question 6: Do you know whether the former Reich Marshal Göring
very strongly condemned the shooting of these 50 British Air
Force officers?

“Answer: General Korten told me that the Reich Marshal was very
angry about this shooting.

“Question 7: Have you any knowledge as to whether the former
Reich Marshal Göring and his deputy for the Air Force, the Chief
of the General Staff, repeatedly remonstrated with Hitler about
the measures which Hitler had ordered to be taken against the
enemy terror-fliers who had been shot down?

“Answer: According to statements which General Korten made to me
in June of 1944, that is correct. I remember too that some time
afterward it was reported to me that the Reich Marshal had
complained to the Führer about the action taken by Party
organizations and individuals among the population against
so-called terror-fliers, for the reason that some of our own air
crews had come to harm.

“In March of 1945 he flatly turned down the order given by the
Führer that all enemy crews which had been shot down and which
would be shot down in the future should be turned over to the
SD.

“Replying to Questions 1 to 7, I should like to state in
explanation and in supplement: During the period which is
covered by the report I was Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations
Staff. In February 1944 the Führer’s headquarters transferred to
Berchtesgaden the High Command of the Armed Forces, the Reich
Marshal with his personal entourage and the Chief of the General
Staff of the Air Force, General Korten, together with two or
three ordnance officers. I had to stay with the High Command of
the Luftwaffe, that is, with the whole working staff known as
Robinson, in East Prussia, as it was expected that the Führer’s
headquarters would have to be moved back quickly. The whole
signal apparatus and the apparatus for the issuing of orders for
Luftwaffe supplies was to be under the control of Robinson.

“Due to the separation of the High Command of the Luftwaffe on
the one hand and the Commander-in-Chief and Chief of General
Staff on the other hand, a separation which was prolonged from
week to week, we in East Prussia did not have knowledge about
many things which were being handled directly in Berchtesgaden.
Often we received no knowledge at all of important Führer
directives, or if we did, we received the information very late.
It was not until the beginning of June—I believe it was the
week after Whitsun—that I, together with some assistant
officers, was transferred to Berchtesgaden. From February until
that time, I think I had attended only one conference at
Berchtesgaden.

“As to Questions 2 to 6, which deal with Sagan, it was from
General Korten that I learned, and I believe Colonel Christian
informed me almost at the same time, that the airmen who had
escaped from Sagan had been shot by order of the Führer. I
rather think I heard about it first from General Korten, who, if
I remember rightly, told me about it during one of the rather
long telephone conversations which we had every evening. Korten
made it quite clear that he disapproved of this, for the reasons
which I mentioned in reply to Questions 2, 3, and 6. The
conversation must have taken place at the end of March or the
beginning of April. However, I cannot give the exact date.

“In reply to Questions 1 and 7, concerning the terror-fliers, it
was approximately the beginning of June 1944—at first I thought
that it was in July, but I think now that it must have been
June—when General Korten advised me that the Führer intended to
order that terror-fliers be left to the fury of the people.

“We discussed this matter repeatedly and we all agreed in our
opposition. We had always considered the direct attacks by
low-flying enemy aircraft on the civilian population, on women
and children, gatherings of civilians, civilian passenger
trains, hospitals, school children who were out for a walk, our
own crews who were parachuting to earth, and farmers who were
tilling their fields, cruel and contrary to international law,
but we did not consider the decree which the Führer intended to
issue to be the proper way to solve this very difficult problem.
Our reasons for this refusal were articles of war, international
law, it was against fundamental soldierly principles, and it
would lead to many misunderstandings inflicting harm not only to
enemy fliers, but also to our own men and affecting the morale
of our own crews...”

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, is this not really going into argument and not dealing with facts? It really is not necessary for you to read all this witness’ arguments about it. He is not really dealing with facts at all now and it is in detail...

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, these are the facts which he discussed with General Korten, the facts which decided them to reject the Führer’s order. These were the reasons which he and Korten discussed...

THE PRESIDENT: Some of what you have read no doubt is a matter of fact, but what you are now reading is a matter of argument.

DR. STAHMER: No, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, surely you can summarize the rest of this.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, this document is of great importance to the defendant because it deals with just those points with which he is accused and which distress him most and...

THE PRESIDENT: I heard you say it is of great importance and therefore you have been reading it and insofar as it is statement of fact, it seems to me that there is some excuse for reading it in detail. But when you come to matters of argument, it seems to me there is no excuse for reading it, because argument by a particular witness is not really relevant for the Tribunal’s consideration at all. Summarize the argument, if you like. I mean, you have read the factual part. Summarize the rest which—maybe you can tell us, if you like, what the argument is.

DR. STAHMER: Very well, Mr. President. General Korten further stated that all the documents which are relevant to the question of terror-fliers and the shooting of the Royal Air Force officers have been submitted to him and after perusing them he arrived at the conclusion that the contents of these documents is proof of the fact that the High Command of the Armed Forces as well as the Reich Marshal opposed this action and did everything in their power to prevent the measure intended by Hitler from being put into effect. He particularly points out that in one of these letters there is a marginal note to the effect that it was not possible to get a reply from the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, and he concludes from that that the Reich Marshal personally opposed any final decision of this matter.

Then there is a further incident dealt with in:

“Question 8: Did the Führer, for the reason stated under Figure
5, on the occasion of a situation discussion and in the presence
of all who attended it, excitedly accuse the German Luftwaffe of
having made a mutual coward’s agreement with the Allied Air
Forces?

“Answer: During the first half of March 1945, Bormann showed the
Führer a note taken from a correspondent’s report in the Allied
press. The gist of this note was: The crew of an American
fighter plane, which shortly before had been shot down over
Germany, had been picked up by advancing American troops. The
crew had testified that the enraged civilians had mishandled
them, had threatened them with death, and in all probability
they would have been lynched if it had not been for the German
soldiers who had liberated them and protected them. Bormann
pointed out to Hitler in a few words that this confirmed the
fact that German soldiers, in instances such as this, were going
against their own countrymen; and he concluded his remarks
somewhat as follows: ‘My Führer, that is the way your orders are
being carried out.’ Thereupon in the presence of all who
attended the situation discussion the Führer made some very
excited statements and among other things the Führer said to me,
‘If my orders are not being carried out it is due to the
cowardice of the Luftwaffe because the men in the Luftwaffe are
cowards and they are afraid that something might happen to them,
too, some day. The whole business is nothing but a cowards’
agreement between the German Luftwaffe and the English and
American airmen.’ I reported this to the Reich Marshal.

“Whether Hitler made the same remark to the Reich Marshal
personally, that I am not able to say; but I consider it quite
probable, because when making reproaches of this kind,
especially if they applied to the Luftwaffe, he often repeated
himself and used the same expressions.

“Question 9: On what day did this discussion take place?

“Answer: I cannot give the date.”

Now we come to:

“Question 10: Did the Führer repeatedly order the former Reich
Marshal to divulge the name of the officer of the Luftwaffe who,
in May of 1944, protected an Allied airman who had been shot
down in Munich from being lynched by the population? But despite
repeated inquiries on the part of the Führer, the Reich Marshal
gave no instructions to find out the name of this officer and to
make it known to the Führer?”

I can summarize the answer. He says he cannot state this from his own experience; it had only been reported to him that an officer of the Luftwaffe and an Ortsgruppenleiter had interfered on behalf of this American crew; that the Ortsgruppenleiter, who was known, was shot on Hitler’s order; that Hitler then demanded to have the name of the Luftwaffe officer given to him and that he had not been told the name. He said further that if the Reich Marshal had actually wanted to find out the name of this Luftwaffe officer, he could easily have done so.

“Question 11: At the end of the war did the Luftwaffe ever
receive orders to destroy Dachau Concentration Camp with bombs
at the approach of the enemy? In particular, was an order to
that effect given by the Gauleiter in Munich under the code word
‘Wolke’? Could a Gauleiter give such instructions to the
Luftwaffe?”

Here again I can summarize the answer. The witness says,

“I do not recall any order to that effect,” and especially he does not know whether the Gauleiter in Munich gave such an order. The Gauleiter was not competent to give an order of this kind and he does not believe that a senior officer of the Luftwaffe would have been willing to carry out such an order.

“Question 12: What do you know about the attitude of the Reich
Marshal and his Luftwaffe to enemy airmen who had been shot
down?

“Answer: Notwithstanding occasional expressions of displeasure,
the attitude of the Reich Marshal was always correct and
chivalrous, which was in line with the Air Force tradition which
he learned in the first World War and to which he frequently
referred.

“Of course, in his anxiety about the great difficulties of air
defense and pressed by the Führer, perhaps on occasion he used
harsh words. These words, however, were soon forgotten and I do
not know of a single case where the Reich Marshal followed up
these spontaneous utterances by incorrect or harsh measures or
orders against members of foreign air forces. The conduct of the
entire Luftwaffe was always correct and humane. To fight in a
chivalrous manner was a matter of honor with the German airmen.
To quote only a few examples of many: Although the enemy crews
shot at German airmen who were parachuting to earth, and these
practices were bitterly resented by our airmen and some...”

THE PRESIDENT: Well, Dr. Stahmer. Again, what you are now reading is all comment; it is not statement of facts, it is comment and argument.

DR. STAHMER: Now Mr. President, he is coming to an example in which he reports about those things.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let us come to it.

DR. STAHMER: Yes. The sea rescue services of the Luftwaffe from the Bay of Heligoland through the English Channel as far as Brest, in the Bay of Biscay, in the Atlantic, and in the Mediterranean, was put into use for the enemy in the same way as for the Germans. The rescue service fliers and the rescue service boats made untiring efforts and showed exemplary self-sacrifice in going to the rescue of friend and foe in distress. Even when...

THE PRESIDENT: But, Dr. Stahmer, these were not particular instances. These were not particular facts. They are just general statements which are really comments and argument about the chivalry of the German Air Force; that is all.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, by this he is trying to prove the chivalry of the German Air Force.

THE PRESIDENT: But he does not prove it by making a general statement.

DR. STAHMER: No. Later on he comes—he will go on to say how many they have rescued, how many of those were enemies and how many were their own people. I believe these facts, Mr. President, are important when judging the attitude of the Luftwaffe.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, as I said just now, if you will get down to the facts, if you have got the numbers, well then, no doubt that will be a matter of fact.

DR. STAHMER: Of the thousands who were rescued from the sea by the German Luftwaffe Rescue Service the great majority belonged to the enemy—members of enemy air crews, crews of enemy ships. Without being able to give exact figures at the moment, I would estimate—according to my memory I would say that the proportion of enemy rescued was from 70 to 80 percent. And he continues: