Chapter M: HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any (18)

SEYSS-INQUART: Certainly this accusation is, so to speak, correct in part. With the prohibition of the political parties, most of the organizations of the free professions became impossible, since right down to the chessplayers’ club everything in the Netherlands was organized on a political basis. In the interests of the occupational forces I had to create new supervisory bodies. Maybe it was due to lack of imagination that these organizations were, in part at least, very similar to their prototypes in the Reich. But I used these organizations only for purposes of supervision, and never asked them to co-operate politically. Not only did I refrain from making the exercise of a profession dependent on co-operation, but I did not even insist upon compulsory collection of membership fees.

I admit that we made two mistakes from two errors of judgment: First of all, we had the mistaken impression that the order we imposed as occupational authorities was necessarily the right one—at least the better one; and secondly, that in an occupied country, an independent political will can develop. It was there that our policy failed.

DR. STEINBAUER: What institution did you then set up?

SEYSS-INQUART: I created a cultural association (Kulturkammer), a medical association (Ärztekammer), a chemists’ association (Apothekerkammer), and a board of agriculture (Landstand). Then there was a workers’ front, but that was a voluntary organization. Members could leave it without any disadvantage to themselves whenever they wished.

DR. STEINBAUER: Then another charge is brought against you, that of “Germanization.” What do you say to that?

SEYSS-INQUART: First of all, I must get something quite clear. In English, you say Germany, and in Russian you say Germanski. Both mean German (Deutsch). And when we spoke of Germanization then, we did not mean “making them into Germans”; We meant a political and cultural union of the so-called Germanic peoples, with reciprocal equal rights. That we did intervene in this way, I stated in a speech, Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-103:

“Why do the Germans interfere with everything in the Netherlands?”

Then I went on to say that in this total warfare there would be moments of tension...

THE PRESIDENT: What page is that on?

DR. STEINBAUER: It is still Exhibit USA-708, which has not been translated. But the entire book has been presented.

THE PRESIDENT: Has it got a PS number?

DR. STEINBAUER: Its document number is 3430-PS. It has been made Exhibit USA-708. It is a book entitled _Vier Jahre in den Niederlanden_, and it contains a collection of speeches made by the witness, several of which have been submitted by the Prosecution. The witness is now replying to them.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you.

SEYSS-INQUART: There are moments of tension when there is no longer any dividing line between what is important to the military war effort and something which is private and a matter for civilians.

I was quite aware of the fact that all public activities might be used for or against the occupational forces and that I had, therefore, to exercise control over them.

DR. STEINBAUER: Were there any attempts on the part of the NSDAP in the Reich to influence your administration for the interests of the Party?

SEYSS-INQUART: The Auslands-Organisation in the Netherlands made an alteration in its set-up which permitted it to support the policy of the Dutch National Socialist Party in every respect. It had, however, no particular influence of its own.

DR. STEINBAUER: That is the important thing. Now, let us turn to the administration proper. Who were the competent authorities in the Netherlands?

SEYSS-INQUART: In the civilian sector there was the Reich Commissioner; on a similar footing was the military commander and the Armed Forces, and the Police had a sector of its own. The military commander had special rights to intervene, and from July 1944 a part of the executive powers was transferred to him.

The Police were merely placed at my disposal, but came under the Higher SS and Police Leader, who was suggested by Himmler and appointed by the Führer. I was never asked about this beforehand. The Police reserved the right to investigate. That is to say, if I gave them an order they would investigate to see whether the order was in line with the instructions which Himmler had given directly to the Higher SS and Police Leader.

Then there were the Plenipotentiary General for Allocation of Labor and the Armament Minister, who carried out the orders for the Four Year Plan.

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes; and as another Reich organization, there was Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab too—and Speer, to complete the picture?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, Speer was the Minister for Armaments. Then there were other smaller and separate assignments of a special nature.

DR. STEINBAUER: So that you were really nothing but a kind of executive organ for the superior Reich offices?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, I was not an ordinary official. I bore the responsibility for the Reich in the civilian sector. Perhaps during the first few months departments in Berlin went straight ahead and ignored me, but I then concentrated the administration in such a way in my own hands that nothing occurred in the civilian sector to which I had not previously given my consent. The Führer acknowledged this quite plainly on one occasion, and I should like to remark that you must not draw any conclusions from this with regard to other occupied territories. I am completely convinced that in the Eastern Territories and in the Government General the same centralization did not exist.

DR. STEINBAUER: What possibilities did you have, then, of setting up an administration?

SEYSS-INQUART: The initiative for, and the extent of, the demands made by the Reich came, of course, from the competent central offices in the Reich. I investigated the demands with my colleagues in consultation with the Dutch offices. We would then make counterproposals which seemed to us reasonable for the Dutch. And if the Reich still demanded more, then we made efforts not to exceed what could be expected. Until 1943 all demands were fulfilled by the Dutch authorities themselves. I gave my officials no authority to make such demands until after this period. Then the demands became so large, that I no longer expected the Dutch authorities to supply them.

DR. STEINBAUER: I come back to the question of the Police for a moment, which, as you said, stood directly under Himmler...

SEYSS-INQUART: You asked what possibilities I had?

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes.

SEYSS-INQUART: I had two possibilities: with the Queen of the Netherlands and the Government gone to England, I could have nominated a new Dutch Government, as in Norway, or conducted the administration of the country myself. I decided on the second solution.

DR. STEINBAUER: How did you organize the existing Dutch police force?

SEYSS-INQUART: Whereas the German Police were not in any way dependent on me, the Dutch police were under my orders; but it was a matter of course that I should transfer the supervision of the Dutch police to the Higher SS and Police Leader as well—that is, in the capacity as my Commissioner General for Security. The Dutch police were divided into three or four different branches. I think that we can safely say we were acting in the interests of the occupational power when we co-ordinated them as regards organization.

DR. STEINBAUER: What was the Home Guard (Landwacht)?

SEYSS-INQUART: The Home Guard was a protection squad organized by the Dutch National Socialists. In 1943 there were serious cases of terror attacks on National Socialists—some very cruel murders. There was the danger of the counterterror of which we had heard in Denmark and, in fact, several unfortunate incidents did happen. Consequently I had this Home Guard organized with orders to act as a regular disciplined auxiliary police force, and to control street traffic at night, and guard railways, _et cetera_. The result was that these acts of terror ceased almost entirely, and until the middle of 1944 no further difficulties arose.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, we now come to an exceptionally important chapter.

SEYSS-INQUART: May I just for a moment refer to Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-101? This document has been held against me by the Prosecution...

THE PRESIDENT: Is 101 the right designation?

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the speeches which the defendant is quoting have been sent down by me to be mimeographed. Although they are actually already before the Tribunal, the translation department did not quite catch up, as they wanted to translate all the affidavits too. So they are not here yet in the translation, but I hope to have them by tomorrow morning.

THE PRESIDENT: Hasn’t it got a PS number, or any other designation?

DR. STEINBAUER: It is a book, Exhibit USA-708. The Prosecution have only quoted individual passages from it.

THE PRESIDENT: I see.

SEYSS-INQUART: The Prosecution have quoted Page 167.

On 1 August 1943 I made a speech announcing special measures which would bring difficulties and restrictions upon the Dutch, and the Prosecution believe that the shootings which took place later are connected with it. That is an error. The restrictions I spoke of in that speech concerned only an order forbidding Dutch people to stay in places outside their own provinces, so that bands of terrorists from the northwest could not get to the east. As this happened just during the vacation time, it really was a restriction for the Dutch.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now I come to the next question. Did you change and possibly misuse the existing organization of the lower courts?

SEYSS-INQUART: I took over the organization of the Dutch courts entirely. The administration of justice in the Netherlands was of a commendably high standard. Only on two occasions did I supplement it. The Dutch judges showed little understanding of the economic situation. For instance, on one occasion a group of black market butchers, who had killed large numbers of cattle and brought them to the black market, were fined 200 guilders; so I installed special economic judges, Dutchmen, who had more understanding of these economic necessities. But the legal situation remained as it was. Of course, we also introduced our German courts, as every occupational power does.

DR. STEINBAUER: So that we had Dutch courts, German courts for Germans staying in the Netherlands, and the police courts?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but also for the Dutch who violated the interests of the German occupational forces.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now, it is alleged in the proceedings that through these courts there were 4,000 executions, which have to be accounted for.

SEYSS-INQUART: That is completely false. If I take into account all the death sentences which were pronounced and actually carried out by the German courts, the police courts, and the military courts; and if I add to them the cases where Dutchmen lost their lives in clashes with the executive powers; then, according to a statement of the Higher SS and Police Leader, up to the middle of 1944 there were less than 800 cases in 4 years—that is to say, less than were caused by a bombing attack on the town of Nijmegen. The shootings came afterwards.

DR. STEINBAUER: You also exercised the rights to reprieve, for which you had a special reprieve department?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes.

DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection I wish to refer to Document Seyss-Inquart-75, Page 190 in the document book. This is the affidavit of Rudolf Fritsch, who was a judge at the Prussian Supreme Court and reprieve expert for the Reich Commissioner. I should like to quote two paragraphs from this document, and I refer to the second paragraph on Page 3:

“In exercising his right to reprieve, the Reich Commissioner
proceeded from the standpoint that this was one of the most
sacred rights of the head of a state, and that it was especially
calculated to create a friendly, confidential atmosphere between
the Germans and the Dutch. Therefore, in the beginning it was he
himself who made the decision in every case, on the basis of
case reports which were submitted to him together with a
suggestion for a reprieve from the reprieve department. After
about 2 to 3 months he delegated the exercise of the right to
reprieve within his own organization to the chief of the
Department for Reprieves. The latter was competent except in the
following cases: 1) the cancellation of proceedings; 2) decision
in case of death sentences; 3) decision in fundamental
questions; 4) decision in isolated cases without precedent...

“No sentence of death was carried out without there being an
official examination of the question of a reprieve, even when a
formal appeal for a reprieve was not submitted.”

Then I come to Page 5, the last paragraph:

“Since co-operation with authorities in the Dutch courts proved
that they could be trusted, the Reich Commissioner gradually
delegated in the main the right of reprieve to the Dutch
Minister of Justice. From the huge amount of mail which came in
... I repeatedly learned of police actions staged by the Gestapo
whereby regular jurisdiction was eliminated.... In such cases I
would collect material and use it to take action in order to
bring the persons involved before regular courts for judgment.
And I was actually successful with such action. This was proof
to me that the Reich Commissioner opposed the wild police
methods of the Gestapo and was an adherent of regular legal
procedure.”

I think that with this we can close this subject of justice and now come to the question of finance.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, but the Führer’s order excluding courts is also very important.

DR. STEINBAUER: Well, if you wish to add something else.

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, it is decisive.

After the strike at Amsterdam, I proposed summary court-martial procedure. That is not an invention of recent times; it is summary court procedure for special emergencies, such as you can find in the legislation of every country. The summary courts martial were subject to special precautionary provisions. First of all, a proper judge had to be there; secondly, the defense was allowed a counsel, who could be Dutch; thirdly, evidence had to be given in the proper manner, and if the question of guilt was not clearly determined, then the case had to be transferred to the ordinary courts. This summary court-martial procedure was only in force for 2 weeks at the time of the general strike in May 1943. The number of people shot later on cannot be traced back to these summary courts martial. Also they had been provided for the special emergency of the Netherlands again becoming a theatre of war.

In the meantime, however, a decree came from the Führer which had already been made public in an order from the High Command of the Armed Forces. I refer to 1155-PS—no, I beg your pardon, that is wrong—it is Document 835-PS.

On 30 July 1944 the Führer ordered that all non-German civilians in occupied territories who were guilty of sabotage or terror actions were to be handed over to the Security Police. The Higher SS Leader and I both objected to this order, as we clearly realized what damaging effects it would have, especially in the Netherlands. Through such an order the Dutch would only be driven into illegal organizations.

During a period of 4 to 6 weeks the Higher SS and Police Leader never carried out the order. But he then received a severe reprimand from Himmler, and from that time on he was obliged to deal with the Dutch who had been arrested for sabotage or illegal activities, and had to judge them according to his own jurisdiction, shooting them when necessary. One can account in this way for the shootings on a larger scale, but I do not believe that there were as many as 4,000. As often as I could, I urged the Security Police to be most careful in carrying out this order, but I never received any reports on the individual cases. I had the impression that there were perhaps 600 to 700.

DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, then this was a police affair, which was directly...

SEYSS-INQUART: At all events it no longer came under my authority or influence. But if, at that time, I gave the Security Police orders to check up on an illegal movement somewhere, I nevertheless had to realize that some Dutchman or other, who was discovered to be the leader of such a movement, would be shot by the Police without the courts or myself being able to investigate the case. But then I could not desist from safeguarding the security of the occupational authorities, because the Führer decree had been issued.

DR. STEINBAUER: I now come to the chapter of finance. A document has been presented here where a certain Mr. Trip announces his resignation. Who was this gentleman?

SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Trip was the President of the Bank of the Netherlands—that is to say, the bank of issue—and he was also the General Secretary for Finance. I think he can readily be considered one of the world’s leading banking experts. He is an outstanding personality and one of the men described today as a Dutch patriot.

DR. STEINBAUER: He was also General Secretary for Finance, was he not?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. Until March 1941 he was the General Secretary for Finance. In my first speech to the general secretaries I said that I would not ask any general secretary to do anything that was contrary to his conscience. If he thought that there was something he felt he could not do, then he could resign without any harm to himself. I said that all I asked was that he carry out my orders loyally as long as he remained in office. Mr. Trip was in office until March 1941, and then he resigned because there was something he refused to carry out. He did this without the slightest disadvantage to himself.

DR. STEINBAUER: Who was his successor?

SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to say that what Mr. Trip carried out until March 1941 is, in my opinion, justifiable in every respect. Otherwise he most certainly would not have done it.

His successor was Mr. Rost van Tonningen. Rost van Tonningen was a League of Nations Commissioner in Austria who there had had tasks similar to those I gave him in the Netherlands.

DR. STEINBAUER: What about the costs of occupation?

SEYSS-INQUART: As far as the civilian administration was concerned, Mr. Trip and I agreed that I receive 3 million guilders a month. Then there was another 20 million in fines in addition to that. During the first 3 years I saved 60 million guilders, which remained in the Netherlands as a special bequest.

As far as the cost of the military occupation was concerned, I had no authority to check that. The Armed Forces put in their demands to the Minister of Finance, and I then received orders to place the money at their disposal. During 1941, the Reich exacted indirect occupation costs. It took the point of view that not only the expenses which were incurred directly in the Netherlands should be paid for, but that the cost of preparations in the Reich should be borne too. Fifty million marks per month were demanded—partly in gold. Later this contribution was designated as voluntary assistance for the East...

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean marks, or do you mean guilders?

SEYSS-INQUART: Marks, 50 million marks. Later on this contribution was called voluntary assistance for the East, for political reasons, but of course it was not so. Later on, the Reich demanded that this sum be increased to 100 millions, but I refused.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. Trip retired as General Secretary for Finance because the foreign currency embargo, which still existed at the time between Germany and the Netherlands, was lifted?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, that is correct. I received a request by my administration for the purpose of intensifying economic exchanges between the Reich and the Netherlands—to lift the foreign currency embargo so that, without having recourse to banks of issue, guilders could be exchanged for marks, and vice versa. The fundamental possibility of such exchanges had already been determined under Mr. Trip, but it was subject to the control of the bank of issue, that is to say, of the Netherlands Bank as well. Mr. Trip raised objections and I passed the matter on to Berlin. Berlin decided that it was to be carried out and Mr. Trip resigned. I appointed Mr. Rost van Tonningen, President of the Bank of the Netherlands, and I published the decree.

I wish to say that the President of the Reichsbank, Herr Funk, was against this procedure, and I can quote in explanation that at that time the effects could not be foreseen as turning out as catastrophic as they did later on. At that time the Netherlands were completely cut off, and the Reich had reached the height of its power. It was to be expected that the mark would become the leading currency in Europe, and that thereby the guilder would have been given the same importance. In February 1941, for instance, imports from the Reich into the Netherlands were greater than the exports from the Netherlands into the Reich. Reich Minister Funk always held the view that these were real debts, so that in the event of a different outcome of the war such debts which amounted to some 4½ billion would have had to be paid back to the Netherlands.

DR. STEINBAUER: If I understood you correctly, it was your General Secretary for Finance, Dr. Fischböck, who suggested this matter contrary to the wishes of Trip.

SEYSS-INQUART: I do not know whether the suggestion came from Fischböck alone. I presume that he must have talked it over with other people; but it was he who put the matter to me.

DR. STEINBAUER: You have also been accused of imposing collective penalties in the form of fines, which is contrary to international law.

SEYSS-INQUART: Collective fines are prohibited under international law only in case of individual offenses. The large collective fine of 18 million guilders was imposed in connection with the general strike in Amsterdam, Arnhem, and Hilversum, in which the entire population took part. Later, I had collective fines paid back whenever it was discovered that definite individuals were responsible for the offense.

DR. STEINBAUER: Can you give us any example?

SEYSS-INQUART: I think witness Schwebel will be able to tell you that. It was in towns in the south of Holland where it happened.

DR. STEINBAUER: You are also accused by the Prosecution of responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in Michelsgestel. What have you to say to that?

SEYSS-INQUART: I can take full and absolute responsibility for what happened in the hostage camp in St. Michelsgestel. It was not a hostage camp in the actual sense of the word: I took Dutchmen into custody only when they had shown themselves to be active in resistance movements. The camp at St. Michelsgestel was not a prison. I visited it. The inmates of the camp played golf. They were given leave, in the case of urgent family affairs or business matters. Not a single one of them was ever shot. I think the majority of the present Dutch Ministers were at St. Michelsgestel. It was a sort of protective custody to temporarily hinder them from continuing their anti-German activities.

DR. STEINBAUER: In addition to this you are said to have prohibited the reading of pastoral letters, and to have put Catholic priests and Lutheran ministers in concentration camps?

SEYSS-INQUART: It is true that I prohibited one pastoral letter, which may happen in times of occupation—because it publicly opposed the measures of the occupational power and incited people to disobedience. That was an isolated case, and it never happened again—for the good reason, too, that there were no more provocations of such a kind in the pastoral letters. In fact, I even intervened and canceled the prohibition issued by the Police, whenever it was a matter only of a criticism toward the measures taken by the occupational powers, and there was no incitement to resistance.

I myself never sent priests to concentration camps. On the contrary, at the beginning of 1943 after having made repeated urgent requests, I finally received a list from the Security Police with the names of the priests who were shut up in concentration camps. There were 45 or 50 of them altogether. Three or four were mentioned as having died in the concentration camp. On the grounds of the facts of their case, I sought out about a third of them and demanded their release; for the second third I demanded investigation within the coming 6 months; and it was only as far as the last third was concerned that it was impossible for me to intervene without violating my own responsibility towards the Reich.

Dutch hostages were also taken for purposes of reprisal. When the Netherlands came into the war, the Germans in the Dutch East Indies were put into prison and allegedly mistreated. The Reich demanded the arrest of 3,000 Dutchmen. The Security Police arrested 800 and took them to Buchenwald. When I heard that the mortality was high, I made such urgent appeals that the hostages were finally returned. They were then accommodated in such a way that one could no longer talk of a prison. They were given leave, and when necessary I released them. In the end, I had less than 100.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, you are said to have prohibited prayers in church, and especially prayers for the Queen.

SEYSS-INQUART: That is incorrect. The prayers in Dutch churches were obvious demonstrations. Prayers were made—as was quite natural—for the Queen of the Netherlands, and for her happiness and prosperity, and the fulfillment of her wishes. At the same time there were prayers for the Reich Commissioner, for his enlightenment. I was severely reproached for tolerating these demonstrations. But I found nothing wrong with these prayers, and did not prohibit them. Perhaps, in some isolated cases a subordinate authority would put in his say, but this was always suppressed.

DR. STEINBAUER: That would not have been so bad; but it is said that you were particularly cruel and had a large number of people shot without legal proceedings. What have you to say to that?

SEYSS-INQUART: As far as I can remember, there was only one real case of hostages being shot—that is, people were shot without there being any causal connection with a crime. This occurred in August 1942, and the case has already been brought up here. It was handled strictly according to the so-called Hostage Law, which has been quoted here. It was in connection with an attack on an army transport, and 50 or 25 hostages were to be shot. It was, I think, the Higher SS and Police Leader who made the demand through the Military Commander upon request of the High Command of the Army.

My intervention consisted in reducing this figure to 5 and in looking over the list which had been submitted to me by other departments, and which has been read out here in court. I, too, noticed something peculiar about it. The Higher SS and Police Leader had expressly emphasized that the list had been drawn up strictly in keeping with the directives, saying that the attack could be traced back to rightist circles of resistance, not to those on the Left, so that no workers could be shot. I only exercised my influence insofar as I caused the Higher SS and Police Leader to cross off the list the names of fathers with several children.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, what do you know, in detail, about the people who were shot when the camp at Vught was evacuated?

SEYSS-INQUART: When the British and Canadians were advancing through Belgium toward the south of Holland, I had so much to do to keep order in my province that I could not pay any special attention to the camp at Vught, which was under police direction. The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me generally that the most seriously charged political prisoners, numbering about 200, would be transferred to the Reich, that the less seriously charged political prisoners would be set free, and that ordinary criminals would be placed under the command of a Dutch police officer and handed over to the Canadians. It was only here that I heard some people had been shot, and the only way I can explain it is that at the last minute the Reich forbade these people to be transported into the Reich and gave orders for them to be shot. I do not believe there were 600 of them, because from what the witness Kollpuss said there seem to have been some 130 to 150. But even that is enough.

DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the shooting of hostages after the attack on the SS and Police Leader Rauter?

SEYSS-INQUART: The attack on the Higher SS and Police Leader came from the resistance movement, and was carried out with British weapons.

DR. STEINBAUER: What do you know about the Putten case?

SEYSS-INQUART: Excuse me, I have not finished my previous statement.

DR. STEINBAUER: Oh, you want to give a more exact...

SEYSS-INQUART: Himmler, at that time, gave orders for 500 hostages to be shot. Rauter’s deputy Dr. Schöngarth refused, and informed me that there were a number of Dutchmen in the prisons who were to be shot, in accordance with the Führer’s order, because they had been convicted of other acts of sabotage. He had hesitated, he said, since the number was somewhat larger, but now he could not hesitate any longer. He did not give me the actual figure. In this situation I could not, in my opinion, prevent him from carrying out the order, because we had to suppress the resistance movement by all means. The movement had been organized and supplied with arms by the Dutch Government in London, and it presented a serious danger to the German occupational forces.

Two hundred and thirty Dutchmen were supposed to be shot—amongst them 80 in Apeldoorn alone—and this seemed to me a lot. But Dr. Schöngarth told me that in the north of Apeldoorn there was a center of the illegal resistance movement.

DR. STEINBAUER: I want to ask you, last of all, what do you know about the Putten case?

SEYSS-INQUART: In Putten there was an attack on German officers. Three were murdered. The whole thing took place within the Armed Forces, the SS, and the Police; and I knew that measures of reprisal were planned. I myself, at that time, was concerned with the construction of defenses. The Higher SS and Police Leader informed me that he had received the order to burn the village of Putten, and to transfer the male population to a concentration camp in the Reich. However, he had reduced the figure to 40 percent, and later on he reported to me that there was a high mortality rate in German concentration camps. Both he and I applied to the military commander to have these men returned. The military commander agreed. Whether this order could still be carried out I do not know.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, perhaps at this point we could have a short recess?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, I should like to come back to the question of the embargo on foreign currencies.

The Defendant Reich Marshal Göring has just informed me, during the recess, that in this conflict, Fischböck, Trip, and Wohlthat on the one hand, and on the other Funk, who was against it, and he himself, Göring, as head of the Four Year Plan, made a decision to lift the embargo on foreign currencies. And he writes me here, “I bear the responsibility.” So it was a decision which was taken by Göring.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, it is not, of course, a regular way in which to inform the Tribunal about anything, to tell them what one of the defendants may have said to you during an adjournment.

DR. STEINBAUER: He wrote it.

THE PRESIDENT: I am afraid that doesn’t make it any better. You may ask the witness any question about it.

DR. STEINBAUER: As regards the question of shooting without a court sentence, I should like to refer to a very important document. Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-77, Page 199. This is Document F-224 D, a report made by Kriminalkommissar Mund. He says the following on Page 3:

“In my opinion it is very likely that General Christiansen
demanded the maximum number of victims to be executed.
Christiansen spoke of numerous measures of reprisal to Rauter,
who was an impulsive and tactless man, and he on his part
applied pressure to the Commander of the Security Police (Dr.
Schöngarth)...”

He reports further on Page 5:

“It was often a question of prisoners who had already been
sentenced to death by the Higher SS and Police Leader.

“Reprisals for punishable acts were a matter for the Police.
After August 1944, and in accordance with an order of the
Führer’s, these measures of reprisal were interpreted in such a
way that a number of Dutchmen were shot for acts of sabotage and
attempts at murder although they had been arrested for entirely
different reasons.”

SEYSS-INQUART: May I explain that briefly?

DR. STEINBAUER: Please do.

SEYSS-INQUART: For example, leading members of the resistance movement were arrested, and on examination by the Higher SS and Police Leader it was decided that they should be shot according to the Führer’s orders. The Higher SS and Police Leader had called upon his court officer for this examination. When later on an attempt to blow up a bridge was made, instead of shooting hostages these men were taken and shot. That was the exact opposite of the shooting of hostages—or at least, it was supposed to be.

DR. STEINBAUER: Now, I come to Chapter IV-B, “Concentration Camps and Prisons.” My first question: Who was competent in these matters?

SEYSS-INQUART: For concentration camps and for police detention prisons, the Police were competent. For court detention prisons, and court authorities, I myself was competent—that is, the court prisons were under my charge.

DR. STEINBAUER: Were there concentration camps in the Netherlands, too?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, especially the big concentration camp of Putten near Hertogenbosch. Then also a police transit camp near Amersfoort, and a Jewish assembly camp in Westerborg. I have already spoken of St. Michelsgestel; that was a protective custody camp. And then there might be mentioned the camp at Ommen, which was neither a police nor a concentration camp, but abuses occurred there.

DR. STEINBAUER: What can you tell me about the Hertogenbosch Camp?

SEYSS-INQUART: Hertogenbosch was originally meant as a Jewish assembly camp, at the time when we intended to keep the Jews in the Netherlands. But Reichsführer Himmler gave orders for it to be turned into a concentration camp. After some reflection I was satisfied with this idea. In consideration of the fact that I could not prevent Dutchmen from being put into concentration camps, I preferred them to be in concentration camps in the Netherlands, where I might still be able to exert a certain influence.

DR. STEINBAUER: But there are supposed to have been excesses in these concentration camps, too—for example, especially in the Vught Camp, which you mentioned.

SEYSS-INQUART: That is quite true. There were excesses in prisons, as well as in concentration camps. In wartime I consider this almost unavoidable, because subordinates get unlimited power over others and it cannot adequately be controlled. Whenever I heard of any excesses, I took steps—the first time toward the end of 1940, or 1941, when the president of my German court reported to me that a prisoner had been brought up with injuries from blows on the head. I had the case investigated, and the prison warden received disciplinary punishment and was sent back to the Reich.

In the Vught Concentration Camp, soon after its opening, there was a high mortality rate. Immediately I had an investigation started, using the services of Dutch medical personnel. Every day—and later on every week—I had the mortality figures reported to me, until they sank to what was approximately a normal level. Of course, I do not know whether the director of the camp reported the normal death cases only, or whether he included the cases of shooting—I could not say.

In this camp there were excesses due to drinking parties and reveling; brawls and fights were also heard now and then. The head of the camp was removed and sent to the Reich. I noted that the Higher SS and Police Leader had apparently himself tried to maintain order, although he was not in charge of the camps; they were under Gruppenführer Pohl.

There was one very serious case which, in Document Number F-224 D, is described under the title, “Women in Cell.” The head of the camp, allegedly for disciplinary reasons, had a large number of women crowded into a cell overnight, whereby three or four women were smothered to death. When we heard of that, we demanded court action. The Central Administration in Berlin refused, and we turned to Reichsführer SS Himmler and did not give in. The head of the camp was put on trial and received at least 4 years—I believe even a sentence of 8 years. That is indicated, moreover, in the French report.

DR. STEINBAUER: What about the Amersfoort Camp?

SEYSS-INQUART: That was a police transit camp—that is, for police prisoners who were to be turned over to the courts, or who were to be sent to the Reich; or persons who refused labor service who were being sent to the Reich. In general, they were not to be there more than 6 or 8 weeks. There were Dutch guards in this camp—not Dutch Police, but a voluntary SS guard company, I believe.

Excesses did occur here. General Secretary Van Damm called my attention to the fact that a Dutchman was supposed to have been beaten to death there. I urged the Higher SS and Police Leader to bring this case to light. He did this through his court officer, and sent the documents to me. According to the documents, severe mistreatment occurred, but no one was killed, and the persons responsible were punished.

I repeatedly called the attention of the Higher SS and Police Leader to the fact that concentration camps and prisons in wartime actually favored the perpetration of brutal excesses. If, here or there, not a severe case but certain mistreatment was reported to me, I always called his attention to it. He then reported to me either that the case had not occurred, or that he had taken steps, and so forth.

In particular, I always had the food ration statistics of the concentration camps and prisons reported to me. The food rations were satisfactory. I believe that the Dutch in the concentration camps and prisons, at the end of 1944 and in 1945, received more than the Dutch in the western Netherlands. Of course, I do not want to give too much importance to this fact, because the Dutch did suffer from hunger.

DR. STEINBAUER: Then there was the Westerborg Camp.

SEYSS-INQUART: The Dutch Government had already set up Westerborg as a completely free camp for Jews who had fled from Germany. This was enlarged into an assembly camp for Jews. In the camp itself there were Jewish guards to maintain order. Dutch Police guarded the camp on the outside. There was only a detail of the Security Police for supervision in the camp. In all the files I found no report about excesses in the camp itself. Every Sunday clergymen went to the camp, at least one clergyman for the catholic Jews, and one for the so-called Christians. They, too, never reported anything.

DR. STEINBAUER: We will speak about their removal later on.

Now I would like to speak about Ommen. There is a long report on that.

SEYSS-INQUART: Ommen was intended as a training camp for those Dutch who voluntarily wanted to be employed in the economy in the Eastern Territories. They were given instruction on the country, the people, and their language. The head of the camp borrowed prisoners from a neighboring Dutch prison for the work. Then I received reports that these prisoners were being mistreated. The judges of Amsterdam turned to me. I gave the Dutch judges of Amsterdam permission to personally inspect the camp and speak to the prisoners. That was done, according to Document F-224(d), on 5 March 1943. Thereupon the Amsterdam judges wrote a long letter to the General Secretary for Justice. They complained about the mistreatment of the prisoners, which they had noted, and about the fact that Dutch prisoners were transferred to prisons in the Reich for labor assignment. The complaints were justified, and I ordered that the prisoners be sent back from the Ommen Camp to the Dutch penal institution, and that Dutch prisoners be returned from German prisons to Dutch prisons. This procedure was correct, and therefore I necessarily took due steps to settle the matter.

DR. STEINBAUER: But now I have to ask you a certain question and confront you with a charge. Document RF-931 shows that you removed judges who made such complaints, namely, in Leeuwarden.

SEYSS-INQUART: In my eyes the procedure of the court of Leeuwarden was incorrect. These judges did not consult me, but publicly asserted in a verdict that the Dutch prisoners were being sent to German concentration camps and shot. According to the facts, which lay before me, that was false. I then informed them of the results obtained by the Amsterdam judges. The Leeuwarden judges refused to pass further judgments. I asked them to continue to officiate, but they refused. I then dismissed them as persons who refused to work. Of course, I could have had them tried by a German court with charges of making atrocity propaganda.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did you receive complaints from the Red Cross about conditions in the camps?

SEYSS-INQUART: In the Netherlands we had the arrangement that a representative of the Dutch Red Cross, Mrs. Van Overeem, could visit all concentration camps and prisons, especially for the purpose of verifying whether the food packages were being delivered. Neither Mrs. Van Overeem nor the heads of the Dutch Red Cross ever directed any complaint to me. I should like to say that this circumstance was especially gratifying for me, because the Dutch complained about everything, and if for a change I received no complaints, then that was a certain relief for me.

I should like to remark that about the beginning of 1944, according to the reports submitted to me, about 12,000 Dutch persons were in concentration camps or prisons. That is the same as if today, in all of Germany, 120,000 Germans were in prisons or camps. That occasioned my setting up legal commissions which had to visit the camps and the prisons in order to make investigations and determine what prisoners could be released or placed on trial. Naturally, in cases where there were orders for arrest from Berlin, I could do nothing.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, so you say that you waged a constant struggle with the Police on this question?

SEYSS-INQUART: I would not like to call it a struggle.

DR. STEINBAUER: Do you believe that you were successful?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I believe so, on the basis of certain definite facts. I have followed the proceedings here very carefully, and—we have heard most terrible things. The reports from the Netherlands, it seems to me, are not that bad. I do not want to say that I disclaim every excess. However, such reports as those about Breedonck in Belgium, do not exist. The reports show beatings as the most serious charge. There is only a single report here—that is Document F-677, the report of the tax collector Bruder—which attains the level of the usual atrocity reports. But I do not believe that this report should be accepted at its face value, since Bruder does not even say who told him this. And the information itself is not credible. He asserts, for example, that the prisoners who were at work had to prostrate themselves before every SS guard. I do not believe that the camp authorities would have permitted that, because then the prisoners would not have been able to work.

It is hard for me to say, but I do not think that conditions in the Netherlands were quite as bad as all that.

DR. STEINBAUER: I think that I can now conclude this chapter and turn to Point V of the Indictment, which deals with the question of labor commitment. What problems did you have in the Netherlands in the field of labor commitment?

SEYSS-INQUART: In the field of labor commitment we must distinguish between three or perhaps four different phases. When I came to the Netherlands, there were about 500,000 unemployed: registered unemployed, those who might become so due to demobilization of the Dutch land and naval forces, part-time workers, and so forth. It was an urgent problem—not only a social one—for me to reduce the number of unemployed. For, in the first place, such an army of unemployed is without doubt a good source of recruits for illegal activities. In the second place, as the war continued, it was to be expected that the material condition of the unemployed would steadily become worse.

At that time we instituted measures which I must, despite all charges, call voluntary labor recruitment. That lasted until the middle of 1942—that is, about 2 years. During that period, I gave neither the German nor the Dutch labor authorities full power to press any worker to work abroad. Without doubt there was a certain economic pressure, but I believe that always exists in this connection. The recruitment was carried out by the Dutch labor offices, which were subordinate to the Dutch General Secretary for Social Administration. There were German inspectors in the labor offices. There were also private hiring agencies; companies from the Reich sent their own agents over. On the whole, about 530,000 Dutchmen were engaged to work in the Reich. In the period which I call “voluntary,” 240,000 to 250,000 volunteers went to the Reich and about 40,000 to France.

By the first half of 1942, this reservoir had been used up. The Reich demanded more workers. We then considered introducing compulsory labor service. I recall I did not receive instructions to this effect from Sauckel, but from Bormann as a direct Führer order. Now, labor commitment occurred predominantly, but not exclusively, in the following way. Young and, as far as possible, unmarried Dutchmen were called to the labor office, where they received certificates of conscription for work in the Reich. The Dutch report itself says that only a few refused. Of course, some of those who refused were arrested by the Police and taken to the Reich. The Higher SS and Police Leader reported to me that this totaled 2,600 people of about 250,000 to 260,000 labor conscripts, and of the total engaged 530,000 persons. So this meant only 1 percent, or even 0.5 percent. I believe that the figure resulting from compulsory measures in the Reich was no lower—or higher.

At the beginning of 1943 the Reich demanded a large commitment of workers, and I was advised to draft whole age groups to send to the Reich. I call attention to the fact that all of these workers received free labor contracts in the Reich and were not put into labor camps. I decided to draft three young age groups—I believe 21 to 23 years of age—in order to spare married men. The success was satisfactory in the first group; in the second group it was moderate; and in the third it was quite bad. I realized that I could draft further groups only by sheer force. I refused to do so. But at that time I managed, due to Minister Speer’s understanding, to arrange not to have the workers taken to their work, but that the work be brought to the workers. Big orders arrived in the Netherlands, and the industries charged with filling these orders were declared “blocked” industries. Among them was the Organization Todt.

Dutchmen who were needed in the Netherlands were exempted. Over a million certificates of exemption were issued by the Dutch authorities. It was clear that that was Dutch sabotage, but I did not want to take steps against it. No woman was ever forced to work outside the Netherlands, nor were young people under 18. Reich Minister Lammers has confirmed here that at the beginning of 1944 he transmitted the Führer order to me demanding that 250,000 workers be brought to the Reich. He also confirmed that I refused it. At that time Gauleiter Sauckel came to me and discussed this matter with me. I must state that he understood my arguments surprisingly quickly, and did not insist on carrying out the forced recruitment. By “forced recruitment,” I mean blocking off whole districts and seizing the men.

In the course of 1944 labor recruitment ceased almost completely. Instead of 250,000 I believe 12,000 were sent to the Reich. But something entirely different took place in the fall of 1944. From experience gathered in France and Belgium, the High Command of the Army decided that able-bodied Dutchmen were to be drawn from Holland—that is, the western Netherlands. That was because the Netherlands Government in England had set up an illegal army. I had the organizational charter in my hands. There was a complete General Staff and a complete War Ministry. We estimated that there were about 50,000 illegal troops. If an appeal was made and one more able-bodied Dutchman joined, the illegal forces would have been more numerous than the German troops in Holland. Moreover, they had received very good equipment from England. Full shiploads of the most modern tommy guns were confiscated by us, but I am convinced that the larger part of the weapons was not confiscated.

The High Command of the Army, through the military commanders, ordered the removal of the able-bodied Dutchmen. The measure was entirely carried out by the Armed Forces. A general who was sent for that very purpose was entrusted with the task, with an operational staff of his own. This measure was carried out by the local commandants. My local authorities were informed of the action to be taken, sometimes at the last moment and sometimes not at all. Of course I knew about the measure. In view of these reasons I could not take the responsibility of protesting against it. I only intervened when it was necessary to protect civilian interests, and prevent the workers in the vital industries from being removed also. I entrusted this to the Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort, whom Dr. Goebbels had sent to the Netherlands in the meantime. His task was to issue exemption certificates. He issued 50,000 of them.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you mean Himmler?

SEYSS-INQUART: Goebbels, the Delegate for Total War Effort.

I admit that this measure led to conditions which were unbearable for the Dutch. I am certain that, as for feeding, temporary lodging, and transportation, the population in the bombed German territories did not live under any better conditions. But one could not demand this from the Dutch. Many Dutch people told me, at that time, that they would be willing to agree to this labor commitment—by no means in order to aid the German cause, but only in order to avoid these severe conditions—if they would be drafted in orderly proceedings. I then did that. The Plenipotentiary General for the Total War Effort issued the proclamation which has been submitted to the Court. The people were called to the labor offices, recorded on lists, sent home again to get clothes, and ordered to report to the railroad stations. Not the Police but labor officials took them to the Reich to be put to work under normal conditions. The Dutch report, in its objectivity, recognizes this fact. It speaks of the better transportation facilities for those mobilized for labor. I am responsible for this labor mobilization for the reasons which I have given.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I remark in this connection that my Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-78, Document 1726-PS, Exhibit USA-195, Page 200, excerpt from the Netherlands Government report, confirms the statement of my client fully. I should like to read it briefly because it is important. Page 2:

“...workers who refused—relatively few—were prosecuted by the
Security Service.”

Then, Page 3:

“...apart from that, the measure was not very successful.
Certain German authorities seem to have opposed its execution,
because many former members of the armed forces received
exemption; others went underground....

“The result was that in the last month of 1943, and in the
greater part of 1944, relatively few persons were deported....”

And then, Page 6:

“...until the end of 1944, the method of transportation for
deportees was bearable....

“Anyone who reported for the manpower mobilization in January
1945, enjoyed improved transportation facilities—that is,
almost the whole journey by rail, although only in freight
cars....”

SEYSS-INQUART: Even for our own use we had no other cars at that time.