Chapter M: HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any (14)

JODL: This decree originated in much the same manner as the Commando Order. One of the Führer’s civilian adjutants advised me that Terboven wished to speak to the Führer. He had had trouble with the Wehrmacht in Norway because of the evacuation of the civilian population from northern Norway. The civilian adjutant said he wanted to advise me first before he established connections with Terboven by telephone. Thereupon I at once had inquiries made through my staff of the commander in Norway-Finland. I was told that the Wehrmacht—the commander of the Wehrmacht in Norway had rejected Terboven’s proposals and did not consider them possible on such a large scale. In the meantime Terboven had spoken with the Führer. I then remonstrated with the Führer and told him that, in the first place, the decree and Terboven’s intention were not practicable on such a scale, and secondly, that there was no necessity for it on such a large scale. I said that it would be better to leave it to the discretion of Generaloberst Rendulic to decide what he wanted or had to destroy for military reasons. The Führer however, incited by Terboven, insisted on the decree’s being issued on the grounds of these arguments which I had to set down. But it was certainly not carried out to this extent. This is also shown by the report of the Norwegian Government, and it can also be seen from personal discussions between me and my brother.

DR. EXNER: Now let us turn to something else. When there were drafts and proposals to be submitted to the Führer, you often voiced objections and presented arguments. It seems remarkable that when matters contrary to international law were contemplated you raised no objections on the grounds of international law or on moral grounds, but you mostly voiced objections of a practical nature or from considerations of opportunity. Can you tell us briefly why you acted in this manner?

JODL: I already told you that when I gave my reasons for the formulation of the proposal not to renounce the Geneva Convention.

DR. EXNER: Namely?

JODL: This form had to be chosen to meet with any success with the Führer.

DR. EXNER: Yes, that is sufficient. Now, you said yesterday...

MR. ROBERTS: Your Lordship, I object to this merely in the interest of time, because it is exactly the same evidence which was given yesterday; and, in my submission, it is pure repetition.

DR. EXNER: This discussion at Reichenhall was mentioned today. Please tell us briefly how it came about that you made such statements in Reichenhall or how such directives as you described today were decided upon in Reichenhall?

JODL: I have already testified about the conversation with the Führer.

DR. EXNER: Yes, it was only a question of provisions...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the defendant has just told us that he has given evidence about this already.

DR. EXNER: Yes, about the conversation which preceded it, but you did not testify about the actual conversation at Reichenhall.

JODL: No, I have not yet spoken of the actual conversation at Reichenhall.

DR. EXNER: Please be brief.

JODL: In regard to this conversation at Reichenhall—that is, the orientation of the three officers of my staff—Warlimont’s description is somewhat different from mine. He is confusing here the earlier events with the later ones, which is not surprising, because from 20 July until the time he was arrested, he was ill at home with severe concussion of the brain and complete loss of memory. Up to the time he was captured he was no longer fit for service. That my description is the right one may be readily seen from the notes in the War Diary of the Naval Operations Staff. It is stated there that these divisions would be transferred to the East only to prevent Russia from taking the Romanian oil fields.

DR. EXNER: I should like to correct one point which, it seems to me, was presented erroneously by the Russian prosecutor. He said that Göring and Keitel did not consider the war against Russia to be a preventive war. On Page 5956 of the record (Volume IX, Page 344) it states that Göring, too, considered the war to be a preventive one and that he only differed in opinion from the Führer insofar as he would have chosen a different period of time for this preventive war. Keitel was, in general, of the same opinion.

Furthermore, the Russian prosecutor submitted a document, Number 683-PS. I do not know what exhibit number he gave. I cannot quite see how this document is to be connected with Jodl; and I have the idea that may be a matter of signature, for the document is signed “Joel,” who is not at all identical with the Defendant Jodl. I just wanted to draw attention to this point. Perhaps there is simply a mistake in the names.

Further, the Prosecution said that the defendant made a remark about partisans being hanged upside down, and so on.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, you have simply made a statement, which you are not entitled to do, about this document. If you want to prove it by evidence you should ask the witness about it. You have told us that this document has nothing to do with Jodl, and that the signature on it is somebody else’s. Why didn’t you ask the witness?

I am told just now that it has already been proved that it isn’t Jodl’s document.

DR. EXNER: The translations this morning were bad; I do not remember having heard that. I do not know whether it is permissible for me now in this connection to read something from a questionnaire? It is only one question and an answer in connection with this remark about the hanging of prisoners, and so on. Is that permissible?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, if it arises out of the cross-examination.

DR. EXNER: Yes; the Russian prosecutor brought up the question of whether the defendant made this remark during the discussions about the prisoners, in connection with the guerrilla directive—that members of guerrilla bands could also be quartered during combat.

There it says:

“Question: Is it true or not...?”

Oh yes, I must say that is my Document Number Jodl-60, Exhibit Number AJ-7. Page 189 of Volume III of my document book. It is an interrogatory of General Buhle, which was made in America.

Then it says:

“Question: ‘According to a stenographic transcript, you also
took part in a report on the military situation on the evening
of 1 December 1942, which resulted in a lengthy discussion
between the Führer and Jodl as to combating partisans in the
East. Is that correct?’

“Answer: ‘I took part in this discussion, but I no longer
remember the exact date.’”

THE PRESIDENT: What page did you say, Dr. Exner?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is the third page of the third book—or the third document in the third book.

DR. EXNER: It is Page 189. I have just read Question 4. Now I come to Question 5:

“Question: ‘Is it or is it not correct that on this occasion
Jodl asked the Führer to return the directive which had been
drawn up in his office relative to the combating of partisans?’

“Answer: ‘That is correct.’

“Question 6: ‘Is it or is it not correct that in this draft the
burning of villages was expressly prohibited?’

“Question 7: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer wanted
to have this prohibition rescinded?’

“Answer: ‘Since I never had the draft of the directive in my
hands, I do not know for certain if the burning of villages was
expressly prohibited. However this is to be assumed, because I
remember that the Führer protested against individual provisions
of the directive and demanded the burning down of villages.’

“Question 8: ‘Is it or is it not correct that the Führer also
had misgivings about the draft because he did not want any
restrictions to be placed on soldiers who were directly engaged
in combating the partisans?’”

According to the minutes Jodl stated in reply:

“This is out of the question here. During the fighting they can
do whatever they like, they can hang them, hang them upside down
or quarter them; it says nothing about that. The only limitation
applies to reprisals after the fighting in those areas in which
the partisans were active....

“Answer: ‘It is correct that the Führer had fundamental
misgivings about these restrictions. Jodl’s remark is correct as
far as its contents are concerned. I can no longer recall his
exact words.’

“Question 9: ‘Is it or is it not correct that following this
remark all those present’—Führer, Keitel, Kranke, and you
yourself—‘including the Führer, laughed and the Führer
abandoned his standpoint?’

“Answer: ‘It is probable that all of us laughed on account of
Jodl’s remark. Whether after this the Führer really abandoned
his standpoint I do not know for certain. However, it seems
probable to me.’

“Question 10: ‘Then how were the expressions “hang, hang upside
down, quartered,” interpreted?’

“Answer: ‘The expressions, “hang,” “hang upside down,”
“quartered,” could in this connection only be interpreted as an
ironical remark and be understood to mean that in accordance
with the directive no further restrictions were to be placed on
the soldiers in combat.’

“Question 11: ‘Could you perhaps say something about Jodl’s
fundamental attitude towards the obligation of the Wehrmacht to
observe the provisions of international law in wartime?’

“Answer: ‘I do not know Jodl’s fundamental attitude. I only know
that Keitel, who was Jodl’s and my own immediate superior,
always endeavored to observe the provisions of international
law...’

“Question 12: ‘Did you ever have the experience yourself that
Jodl influenced the Führer to issue an order which violated
international law?’

“Answer: ‘No.’”

THE PRESIDENT: None of that last part arises out of the cross-examination.

DR. EXNER: Did you have anything to do with prisoners of war?

JODL: I had nothing at all to do with prisoners of war. It was the general Armed Forces Department which dealt with them.

DR. EXNER: Now, one last question.

It is alleged by the Prosecution, and during yesterday’s examination it was reaffirmed, that there was or had been a conspiracy between political and military leaders for the waging of aggressive wars and that you were a member of that conspiracy. Can you say anything else about that before we finish?

JODL: There was no conspiracy...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner, the Tribunal does not think that that really arises out of the cross-examination. Anyhow, he said it already; he said that he was not a member of a conspiracy. There is no use repeating his evidence.

DR. EXNER: It was again said yesterday that there was a very close connection with the Party and the members of the Party and, of course, that is connected with the conspiracy. That is why I should have thought the question permissible.

THE PRESIDENT: He said already that he was not a member of the conspiracy.

DR. EXNER: In that case, I have no further questions.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I merely wish to join in the objection which Dr. Nelte has raised to the written statement of Lieutenant General Von Österreich. I refer to the reasons which he has given. That is all.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Defendant Jodl, you spoke—I think it was the day before yesterday—about the number of SS divisions at the end of the war. Do you remember that?

JODL: Yes.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): I think you said there were 35 at the end of the war. Is that right, 35 about?

JODL: If I remember rightly, I said between 35 and 38.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Right. Now, what I want to be clear about is this. You were referring only to Waffen-SS divisions, were you not? Only the Waffen-SS?

JODL: Yes, only the Waffen-SS. It is true they were...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Were they completely co-ordinated into the Army and under the command of the Army?

JODL: For tactical operations they came under the Wehrmacht commanders, but not for disciplinary matters. As regards the latter their superior was, and remained, Himmler, even when they were fighting.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Was discipline the only thing that brought them under Himmler’s jurisdiction?

JODL: He was also looked upon as their commander for all practical purposes. That is seen from the fact that the condition of the divisions, their equipment, and their losses were frequently or almost exclusively reported to the Führer by Himmler himself.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When had they been co-ordinated into the Army? When? What year?

JODL: They were co-ordinated into the Wehrmacht at the beginning of the war, at the moment when the Polish campaign began.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, only one other question, about Russia; I want to see if I understood your point of view clearly. You feared an invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right?

JODL: I expected, at a certain moment, either political blackmail on the strength of the large troop concentration or an attack.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, please, Defendant, I asked you if you did not fear an attack by Russia. You did at one time, did you not?

JODL: Yes, I was afraid of that.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): All right. When was that? When?

JODL: It began through...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): When did you fear it? When did you first fear that attack?

JODL: I had that fear for the first time during the summer of 1940; it arose from the first talks with the Führer at the Berghof on 29 July.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Then from the military point of view, from that moment on, it was necessary for you to attack first, was it not?

JODL: After the political clarification, only then; up to then it had only been a conjecture.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): How could you afford to wait for the political clarifying work if you were afraid of an immediate attack?

JODL: For that reason we increased our defensive measures to begin with, until the spring of 1941. Up to then we only took measures for defense. It was not until February 1941 we began concentrating troops for an attack.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Now, then, just one other question. I am not at all clear on this. During that attack did you then advise that Germany attack first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack? What was your advice? You saw this danger; what did you do about it?

JODL: That problem, too, like most of the others, was the subject of a written statement I made to the Führer in which I drew his attention to the tremendous military effects of such a decision. One knew of course how the campaign would begin, but no human being could imagine how it would end...

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): We have heard all that. I did not want to go into that. What I wanted to get at is this: You were afraid that Russia was going to attack. If that was true, why didn’t you advise Germany to attack at once? You were afraid Russia would attack, and yet you say you advised against moving into Russia. I do not understand.

JODL: That is not the case. I did not advise against marching into Russia; I merely said that if there were no other possibility and if there was really no political way of avoiding the danger, then I, too, could only see the possibility of a preventive attack.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): That is all. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: The defendant can return to the dock.

[_The defendant left the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Exner?

DR. EXNER: I have four witnesses to bring before the Tribunal, but I should like to begin by making a request. In consideration of my lame leg may I leave it to my colleague Jahrreis to question these four witnesses?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, certainly, Dr. Exner.

Dr. Exner, the Tribunal wishes me to say that we allow another counsel to examine the witnesses as an exception to our general rule that only one counsel may appear in court and in the presentation of the case on behalf of the defendant. We will make this exception in your favor.

PROFESSOR DR. HERMANN JAHRREISS (Counsel for Defendant Jodl): In that case, with the permission of the Tribunal, I will call the first witness, General Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.

[_The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your name, please?

GENERAL HORST FREIHERR VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS (Witness): Horst Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat the oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you in the Wehrmacht Operations Staff during the war?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: During what period?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was a member of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff from 1 January 1942 until 15 November 1944.

DR. JAHRREISS: What was your position on the staff?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I was first General Staff officer of the Army, and in my capacity as department chief I was in charge of the Operations Department of the Army.

DR. JAHRREISS: I am going to have a document shown you, Document Number 823-PS, Exhibit Number RF-359. It is in document book Jodl, second volume, Page 158. Will you please be good enough to have a look at it.

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Do you want me to read the whole document?

DR. JAHRREISS: I want you to glance through it. Who is the author of the document?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is written by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Department QU, Administration Group.

DR. JAHRREISS: By whom is it signed?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is signed by me.

DR. JAHRREISS: By you. To what extent is that document connected with the Defendant Jodl?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The document has nothing at all to do with the Defendant Jodl.

DR. JAHRREISS: Then please will you look at the signatures at the upper right-hand corner on the first page; there is an initial which can be read as a “J.”

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: That must be a mistake. The initial is exactly the same as the one which appears below in the signature to the written note, and this initial is that of the Chief of the Quartermaster Department, Colonel Polleck.

DR. JAHRREISS: Colonel Polleck?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: If you will look at Page 2, you will see two signatures at the bottom. The first must be that of the expert. I cannot recognize it for certain. I take it for the signature of the Senior Administrative Counsellor Niehments.

DR. JAHRREISS: You mean the initial behind which there are the Numbers 4 or 9 for the date?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean the top one.

DR. JAHRREISS: The top one?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The top one. The bottom initial is the signature, the initials of Colonel Polleck. When the document had been submitted to the Chief of the OKW it was returned to me. Then I initialed it again at the top, and marked it for the Quartermaster Department, that is the “QU” underlined at the top. Then it was again initialed by the “QU” chief, and after that it is marked “Administrative Group” and initialed again by the man who dealt with it. In addition I should like to point out that all this relates to prisoners of war, and that was a field of work with which Jodl actually had nothing to do. In the quartermaster and organizational branches of the Armed Forces Operations Staff we had several fields of work which, although they came from his staff...

DR. JAHRREISS: Just a minute, Witness. I do not mind your giving us a lecture, but I should like to get to the point. There are remarks in the margin of this document, do you see them?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Is any one of them written by Jodl?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No, they are initialed with a “K” for Field Marshal Keitel.

DR. JAHRREISS: But the French Prosecution assert that these are comments made by Jodl on the prisoner-of-war question; and if I understood you correctly, you mean to say that this was not possible at all for reasons of competency?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Apart from the fact that there is not a mark on the document made by Jodl, it is unlikely that Jodl had any knowledge of the affair at all, because of the way in which it had to be dealt with.

DR. JAHRREISS: But is it not correct, Witness, that Department “QU” came under Jodl?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Actually, it is correct, but in “QU” Department, just as in “Org.” Department there were several fields of work which the Generaloberst had given up and which were dealt with either directly by the head of the department, or through the deputy chief, with the Chief of the OKW.

DR. JAHRREISS: You say prisoner-of-war questions were among those, is that true?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Among other things also the question of prisoners of war.

DR. JAHRREISS: What other work did this Department “QU” have?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As its main task or in its first department, “QU-1,” Department “QU” looked after nothing but supplies and also supervised the provisioning of the various theaters of war, which came directly under the OKW. The second department was occupied mainly with military administration, and the third department dealt with general questions, such as the prisoner-of-war system—for example, questions concerning international law and so on.

DR. JAHRREISS: Then I have just one more question about these organizational matters. Were all the departments of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the Führer’s headquarters?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: No; for example we had the “Org.” Department, an organizational department, which was not located at headquarters but in the neighborhood of Berlin.

DR. JAHRREISS: If I have understood you correctly, the affairs of Department “QU” by-passed Jodl, so to speak, and were handled with the Chief of OKW?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Not in every case, but in a certain number of cases.

DR. JAHRREISS: At all events the question of prisoners of war?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Certainly, the question of prisoners of war.

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Witness, what position did you have at the beginning of the war?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: At the beginning of the war I was the second General Staff officer in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army.

DR. JAHRREISS: Would you speak a little more slowly. And what were your duties there?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: My department dealt with the filling of positions in the higher command offices for mobilization.

DR. JAHRREISS: Those of the General Staff officers of the OKW too?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, those, too.

DR. JAHRREISS: General, do you know who was meant to be Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff in the event of mobilization from 1 October 1939 on?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, General Von Sodenstern was meant to hold this position for the next mobilization year.

DR. JAHRREISS: Am I to understand that if the war had broken out after 1 October—let us say on 5 or 6—then Jodl would not have been Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff at all?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I am not sure of the date on which the new mobilization year of 1939 to 1940 began. From that time on...

MR. ROBERTS: I submit this testimony is not relevant to any issue in this case at all, and it may be somewhat interesting to know the answers that are submitted have no relevancy at all.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t quite understand what the relevancy of the evidence at the moment is.

DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if the Prosecution are right that the Defendant Jodl belonged to a group of conspirators aiming at world conquest and if, as the Prosecution say, that group of conspirators obtained use of the German state machine to achieve their aims, then it must be a somewhat peculiar state system when conspirators are changed periodically. To that extent I believe the case must be presented to the Tribunal for consideration.

THE PRESIDENT: Has he been given the dates of his exchanges, without any cross-examination? He went to Vienna at a certain date, he came back at another date, and we have no challenge of that.

DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that is a different question. The Defendant Jodl has said that if mobilization was decreed before 1 October he was Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff and had to leave Vienna for Berlin. Now the witness says that this was only up to the new mobilization year and that then the other would have come along if the war had broken out 14 days later. I think...

THE PRESIDENT: Surely that is extraordinarily remote, Dr. Jahrreiss. You show us a matter of surmise about what would have happened if something else would have happened. That does not help us very much.

DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, the testimony of the witness is not a mere conjecture. He only said that the person who held this important position was disposed of in a routine manner according to date. That was the only thing to be shown.

May I continue, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: No, in the interest of time and an expeditious trial, the Tribunal rules you may not go into that.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, if I now ask you about a certain field of activity which you just mentioned, it is because I assume that you have particularly expert knowledge of it. Is it true that you were officially connected with the suppression of partisans?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. The chief authority for combating guerrillas was turned over to my department toward the end of the summer of 1942, and the tactical basis for combating guerrillas was dealt with by my department from that date on.

DR. JAHRREISS: Are you familiar with the pamphlet on the suppression of partisans, issued in May 1944?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, the leaflet was drawn up in my department.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was that the first one, or had there been a previous regulation concerning guerrilla warfare?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. In the autumn of 1942 a short and incomplete directive had been issued on the subject of combating guerrillas. At that time we were still comparatively inexperienced; and since guerrilla fighting had not been anticipated in peacetime, we first had to get further experience.

DR. JAHRREISS: In this connection I am interested particularly in the guerrilla fighting in the East and Southeast, on the subject of which the Prosecution have shown that they have a very definite idea. Is it correct to speak of a “guerrilla war,” as has been done here several times?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It is correct according to the extent and danger which guerrilla fighting assumed, given its limitations in regard to time and space.

DR. JAHRREISS: Does that mean that the characteristics of this fighting went beyond the general conception of the _franc-tireur_ system?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In extent, yes. In the methods, no.

DR. JAHRREISS: What do you mean by “extent”?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I mean by “extent” the dimensions of the area affected by guerrilla fighting.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was it therefore unusual with regard to territory or with regard to people involved?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The guerrilla fighting was certainly unusual both in regard to its territorial extent and the people who took part in it.

DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether there were many Jews in these guerrilla groups in the East and Southeast?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I do not remember that among the hundreds of reports I received on guerrilla fighting, there was never any mention of Jews. If there were Jews in these groups it can only have been to a very limited extent.

DR. JAHRREISS: But it has been asserted here that this anti-guerrilla warfare was carried on for the purpose of exterminating the Jews; is that true?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I never heard anything about that.

DR. JAHRREISS: Or the extermination of the Slavs?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: There again, I never heard so much as a hint of such a thing. Such an interpretation would have been quite contrary to the intentions of the military leaders.

DR. JAHRREISS: Why?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The military command had a very definite interest in seeing a peaceful country and a productive population behind every front; and every measure which aimed at this was always welcomed by the military authorities. Every soldier we had to use in guerrilla fighting was urgently needed at the front.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was the policy in the East carried out as the Wehrmacht command wished for their purposes?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Without any doubt that was not the case, because the Wehrmacht would have been glad to see a different policy in the East for the very sake of its volunteer units. We ourselves, with our own methods, made attempts to reach a bloodless pacification of the country even among the guerrillas. Big propaganda campaigns were undertaken there to induce the guerrillas to stop fighting. In certain cases there were special negotiations with individual groups; and, although they were limited to certain occasions and periods, these were most successful.

DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know General Von Pannewitz?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz was the Commander of the 1st Cossack Division.

DR. JAHRREISS: When, please?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must have been during 1943.

DR. JAHRREISS: Is it correct that this General, as Commander of the 1st Cossack Division, this volunteer division, once complained to the OKW about the difficulties he was having in his division?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. General Von Pannewitz is a friend of mine from my old regiment. He came to see me at headquarters and on that occasion—in the summer of 1943 or maybe during the autumn—talked to me in detail about the state of affairs in recruiting his troops and the difficulties he was experiencing with the morale of his unit, particularly because of the Government’s policy in the East. At that time he complained particularly about the fact that the Government’s policy held up no national aim for his division; and he made other complaints about the difficulties incurred by the members of his division at that time who were partly on the road and had to be settled.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did Jodl take care of the affair?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. After the visit I reported the subject of our conversation to the Generaloberst and asked him to use his influence in the interests of our volunteer units.

DR. JAHRREISS: Influence on whom do you mean?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Influence on the Führer.

DR. JAHRREISS: But you told me that Jodl was not competent for this?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Generaloberst Jodl...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, what is the relevancy of this, about some general who commanded a Cossack Division and that he had difficulties with morale? What has that got to do with this case?

DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, that was a preparatory question. I am now coming to the real question. It is the question of the dividing up of competency and responsibility. I was just about to ask the witness the decisive question.

[_Turning to the witness._] General...

THE PRESIDENT: What relevancy have the preparatory questions got to do with the decisive question? How can a visit of this general have anything to do with it? What is the decisive question?

DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, if I am to give the reason for that, then I will have to tell the witness what I want him to tell me. Then my question will become a leading one.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, that is not an unusual thing in this Court.

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, but I did not want to make that mistake.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, go on, Dr. Jahrreiss. The Tribunal hopes that you won’t take up too much time over these preliminary questions which are leading to decisive ones.

DR. JAHRREISS: I am sorry, but I did not understand.

THE PRESIDENT: I said, the Tribunal hopes that you will not take up too much time with these preparatory questions before the decisive one.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can abbreviate the examination of the witness a great deal because I am in possession of an affidavit by this witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, why are you at the microphone?

DR. LATERNSER: I thought, My Lord, that Dr. Jahrreiss had finished with his interrogation, that he had no more questions to put to the witness.

DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, there is a misunderstanding. The witness has, in fact, already answered my question.

THE PRESIDENT: He has answered it, has he?

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, he has answered it. I merely wanted to enlarge on it a little further but...

THE PRESIDENT: Then you have finished, have you, Dr. Jahrreiss?

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes. I now have no further questions to put to the witness.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, I can shorten the examination considerably because I have an affidavit from the witness which he made on 20 May 1946. If it is my turn, I propose to submit this affidavit to the Tribunal. But so that I may not be reproached for not having ascertained the facts when the witness was available in the courtroom, I will now ask the witness whether the contents of the affidavit of 20 May 1946, are correct.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, are the contents of the affidavit which was given me, dated 20 May 1946, correct?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: They are correct.

DR. LATERNSER: Witness, do you know General Heusinger?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes, I know General Heusinger.

DR. LATERNSER: The Prosecution in their case against the General Staff submitted Affidavit Number 20, Document Number 3717-PS, Exhibit Number USA-564; and on Page 2, Figure 4, this general makes the following statement. I quote:

“It has always been my personal view that the treatment of the
civilian population in operational areas and the methods of
guerrilla fighting in the operational zone offered a welcome
opportunity for the supreme political and military leadership to
carry out their aims, that is to say, to bring about the
systematic reduction of Slavs and Jews.”

I want to ask you now, can you explain how General Heusinger could have arrived at that view?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I worked closely with General Heusinger and very often I talked to him about questions concerning anti-guerrilla warfare.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes.

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: He never said anything to me which might express this view and I cannot explain this statement of his, because it is entirely contrary to the basic views of the military leaders in regard to the conduct of anti-guerrilla warfare.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. Why was the general command over anti-guerrilla fighting in the East in 1943, as well as in Italy at the end of 1943 and the beginning of 1944, transferred to Himmler by the Führer’s order?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: The Führer always held the view that anti-guerrilla warfare was predominantly a task for the Police and that police forces were more suited to carrying it out than the partly over-aged security forces of the Army which we could detail for these tasks. Just how far Himmler wanted to obtain a new increase of power in this connection I do not know, nor how far he might have suggested it to the Führer.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the OKW and especially of the Armed Forces Operations Staff to this decree of Hitler’s?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: It must be emphasized first of all in this connection that, so far as operational areas were concerned, there was no change. The operational area remained until the end, in the case of guerrilla warfare too, under the orders of the commanding generals. In the remaining areas the Armed Forces Operations Staff did not altogether disagree with this arrangement, because we hoped that in these zones the Reichsführer SS would be in a position to use some of his reserves, which were, mostly unknown to us; and we should then have some forces released for the front.

DR. LATERNSER: Do you remember, Witness, that the Commander, Southwest made an urgent request to be excepted from this measure, that is, from transferring his authority in anti-guerrilla warfare to Himmler?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These cases were discussed with General Westphal several times over the telephone, and I consider it possible that he might have made such a suggestion at that time.

DR. LATERNSER: You yourself did not discuss it with the Commander, Southwest?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: With the chief?

DR. LATERNSER: With the chief, yes. As you have just said, before the war you were in the Central Department of the General Staff of the Army; and, as I know, the filling of the higher command positions was handled there, too. Now I want to ask you on what principles they based their selection of commanding generals of army groups and armies?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These appointments were made according to ability and length of service, and the peacetime appointments formed the framework for filling positions at the time of mobilization.

DR. LATERNSER: Were these appointments of the higher commanders carried out strictly from a military standpoint?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: These nominations took place entirely on the strength of military considerations; and retired officers, some of whom I am convinced left because of political pressure, were again placed in responsible positions in the event of mobilization. I should like to cite as examples General Von Leeb, General Von Kressenstein, General Von Kleist, Generaloberst Von Hammerstein.

DR. LATERNSER: And these officers you have just mentioned had already retired before the outbreak of the war but were meant to take over higher positions of command in the event of a mobilization?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: Did the Central Department, which had to fill these positions, ever learn that the military leaders had formed a group with the aim of carrying out aggressive wars and of disregarding international law in these wars of aggression?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: In the Central Department we knew nothing of the formation of such a group. Perhaps I may state in this connection that during the years 1937 to 1939 quite a number of General Staff officers came to see Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and me, as personnel administrators of the General Staff officers, and talked to us. The majority of these officers were chiefs of army corps, army, and army group general staffs; and they were, therefore, the confidential and responsible advisers of the commanding generals and commanders. These officers, just like their commanding generals, had fought in the first World War; and the opinion they always expressed to us was only that the German nation should be spared a second war. In spite of every positive attitude to the Führer’s successes, there was a certain anxiety about his policy and particularly about the rapid rearmament of the forces, which made careful work difficult.

After the Munich negotiations confidence increased a great deal and it was the general opinion of the officers that the Führer would continue to be successful in maintaining peace.

DR. LATERNSER: What was the attitude of the higher commanders towards Hitler after the Munich Agreement?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: After the Munich Agreement I concluded from my talks with General Staff officers that there was a general conviction among them that, thanks to his policy, the Führer would continue to preserve peace. I remember that as late as 25 or 26 August I saw the Führer, at headquarters in Zossen, having a conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Von Zielberg and several other officers. At that time these officers were still of the opinion that a war would not occur and that to render the Führer’s political aims feasible it was only necessary to keep the troops firmly under control so that no political catastrophe should be produced by the laying down of arms.

DR. LATERNSER: I think that is enough as far as this question is concerned. Now, regarding the Ardennes Offensive in December 1944, at what time were the preparations for that offensive begun?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: So far as I can remember...

THE PRESIDENT: How can that have any relevance after about 5 years of war?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, for my next question I should like to ask the witness who of the commanding generals were informed of this offensive and when. It is important to ascertain what co-operation there was among the group. I beg you to allow me to put this question. It is the last but one. The one I just mentioned is the last.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well, go on.

DR. LATERNSER: When were the preparations for the Ardennes Offensive begun?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: As far as I can remember, the first preparations were begun in about September 1944.

DR. LATERNSER: When were the commanding generals informed of these intentions and were commanding generals who did not take part in the offensive informed before it began?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: To the last question I can answer, “no.” The first question I cannot answer as far as the date is concerned: but I do know that in the zone which was proposed for the offensive there had already been troop movements ordered by the supreme command before the Commander, West, who was responsible, was informed and that he therefore made frequent inquiries of us asking for an explanation of these movements.

DR. LATERNSER: The Commander, West, who later on had to direct the offensive, was not previously informed about the movements and transfer of divisions for the offensive, all of which took place in his very territory?

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: Yes. Later on, of course, he was informed.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 8 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTIETH DAY
Saturday, 8 June 1946

_Morning Session_

[_The witness Von Buttlar-Brandenfels resumed the stand._]

MARSHAL: May it please the Tribunal, the report is made that the Defendants Hess and Raeder are absent.

THE PRESIDENT: With reference to the applications for witnesses and documents that were made the other day in Court, I will take them in the order in which they were dealt with in Court.

The first application is the application of Kaltenbrunner, and the three witnesses which he asks for are allowed: Tiefenbacher, Kandruth, and Strupp.

The application of the Defendant Schirach is rejected.

The applications of the Defendants Hess and Frank for General Donovan are rejected.

The applications of the Defendants Speer and Keitel are granted, and the application of the Defendant Jodl for an affidavit I think was granted yesterday.

The application for the Defendant Göring for two witnesses, Stuckart and Burmath is granted, but on the condition that three witnesses only may be called upon the subject concerned.

With reference to the application of the Defendant Hess, the Tribunal order as follows:

The affidavit of the former Ambassador Gaus of the 17th of May 1946 is rejected on the ground that it is not in accordance with the permission given on May 14, 1946, but purports to incorporate not merely the substance but also the form of the secret treaties, and the form embraced in the affidavit is not identified as being correct either by a person who made the copies or by one who compared them with the originals. Such copies cannot be received in evidence, and the Tribunal have twice ruled to this effect. The matter of importance to the issues before the Tribunal is not the form of the treaties, but their contents, and evidence of their contents is already before the Tribunal by the testimony of three witnesses. The admission of this affidavit would add nothing to the proof before the Tribunal. The same is true of the proposal to call Gaus as a witness, who would only support evidence as to the contents of the treaties which has not been contradicted. The motion of the 23d of May 1946 to reconsider the Tribunal’s former decision and the motion of the 24th of May 1946 to call Gaus as a witness are accordingly denied.

There is one other matter with which the Tribunal propose to deal, and it is this: In the future, counsel for the organizations which the Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to declare to be criminal will not be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other than the defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine those witnesses, they must call them before the commissions which are now sitting for the taking of evidence oh the questions with which the organizations are concerned.

That is all.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: I should like to voice a further request for the case of Von Papen. I already submitted a written request on 6 June. This was discussed with the Prosecution, and the General Secretary has instructed me to bring this matter to the attention of the Court.

Prince Erbach-Schönberg has filled out an interrogatory. His answers, however, are partially incomplete and sometimes misleading, and it is therefore necessary to supplement them. I suggest that Prince Erbach, who is in Gmunden in the American-occupied zone of Austria, be brought here and interrogated—outside of this Court but in the presence of the Prosecution—to supplement this interrogatory.

My associate received a letter some days ago from Count Pfeil, who is living in Bad Ischl, which is also in the American-occupied zone of Austria, not far from Gmunden, the residence of Prince Erbach. In this letter he has made detailed statements about the contacts which the Defendant Von Papen had with the circle of conspirators involved in the attempted assassination of 20 July. Since this question was raised by the witness Gisevius, the Defense feel themselves bound to discuss it in the presentation of evidence, although they attach no great importance to it. This evidence can probably be produced by means of an affidavit.

I ask that Count Pfeil be brought here with Prince Erbach at the same time so that he can depose an affidavit in the presence of the Prosecution. It is absolutely essential to bring both of these witnesses here, because the case of Von Papen is imminent, and we could not take care of these matters by correspondence.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Kubuschok, will you draw our attention to the particular points in which you say that the interrogatory of Prince Erbach-Schönberg is incomplete or misleading?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In connection with one of the preceding questions of this interrogatory, Prince Erbach answered that the Defendant Von Papen had desired to achieve his assignment by peaceful means rather than by the use of force. The witness answered a later question as to whether the Defendant Von Papen acted in accordance with these political principles as follows:

“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant
Von Papen acted in accordance with these principles—that is,
the establishment of relations by peaceful means rather than by
the use of force.”

This last statement contradicts the first half of the answer. Moreover, this latter phrasing scarcely corresponds to the facts.

THE PRESIDENT: Are you saying that that answer is incomplete or contradictory?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: There is a contradiction. “Rather than by force” contradicts the first half of his reply, that he acted according to these principles. These questions...

THE PRESIDENT: The answer that I have got is:

“As long as I was there I had the impression that the Defendant
Von Papen acted according to this policy of establishing
relations through peaceful means rather than force.”

There is nothing contradictory in that, in English.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German text it says, “rather than with force.” The word “rather” disturbs me, and is a contradiction. It does not mean the same thing—namely, that he wanted to bring about connections in a peaceful manner only and not by force.

THE PRESIDENT: It means the same thing. It means that he wanted to establish the relations by peaceful means rather than with forceful means. “Not by force” he means.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: This version might lead to the assumption that the Defendant Von Papen may even have considered non-peaceful means. We want to prove, in accordance with the foregoing answer, that he rejected all means other than peaceful means from the beginning, and never introduced them into his discussions. However, if the High Tribunal interpret the interrogatory in the manner which has just been stated, then I have no further reason to supplement it.

THE PRESIDENT: It couldn’t mean anything else in English. I don’t know what it could mean in German.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: In the German version it is translated, “I would prefer peaceful means to force; as a last resort, other than peaceful means might have to be considered.” That would be the interpretation placed on the German translation.

We want to establish clearly the fact that none other than peaceful methods were ever considered.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: To save any trouble, I should like to assure the Tribunal that the Prosecution accepted the answer in the sense which Your Lordship has just put. We shouldn’t suggest for a moment that Prince Erbach would make any other answer than in the sense the Tribunal have accepted it.

THE PRESIDENT: Perhaps a way of meeting the difficulty would be if you would agree to read the words in the sense “and not by force.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Lordship pleases.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Then, of course, I quite agree. And I should like to have the Tribunal’s decision as to whether Count Pfeil is to be brought here to depose an affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: You mean the other witness?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The second witness, Count Pfeil, who wrote the letter which we wish to submit to the High Tribunal in the form of an affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: We will consider that when we have heard Sir David.

Are there any other inconsistencies or contradictions which you wish to draw our attention to in the Prince’s interrogatory?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Has the letter of Count Pfeil been translated?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: No, it has not as yet been translated. But it is simply a letter, the identity of which we cannot prove, and that is why we wanted the affidavit in the proper form.

THE PRESIDENT: Would the letter itself be sufficient if the Prosecution were prepared to admit the letter?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Yes, it would suffice, for we could certainly prove nothing more with the affidavit than what is contained in the letter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have no objection to admitting the letter, My Lord.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well. Thank you, Sir David.

Then the interrogatories of Prince Erbach-Schönberg will be amended in the way that we have indicated, and the letter of Count Friedrich Karl von Pfeil will be admitted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wonder if Your Lordship will allow me to mention one point that arose on Tuesday.

Your Lordship may remember that the Defendant Jodl said that he had not been permitted by the Prosecution to mention a document. My Lord, a misunderstanding arose in this way. Your Lordship may remember that at an early stage in dealing with witnesses and applications, I objected to general evidence of shackling because I said that the Prosecution had not made the evidence as to shackling by the Germans a part of their case, and therefore it did not seem to me an issue that need be pursued. I put that forward, and Mr. Roberts, who was dealing with the later stages, adopted the same line.

Apparently that was understood as including an objection to the Wehrmacht order which the Defendant Jodl mentioned, and which he wanted to use as an answer to a broadcast of the British War Office. This, I think, is a further remark which could be made. I certainly didn’t wish to object to the Defendant Jodl clarifying a Wehrmacht order that was part of the preparations for the Commando Order, and I said so at the time.

I should not like the Tribunal to think that I was making any reflection on the learned professors who are conducting the Defendant Jodl’s case, or putting forward that they had made a basic accusation against me. I thought, therefore, the Tribunal would allow me just a moment to explain that it was a misunderstanding, and that neither of us feels that we have been injured in any way by the other by what has been said.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there anything further that needs to be done with reference to the admission or introduction of this?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Not at all, because I waived any objection to it, and the Defendant Jodl was permitted, in giving his evidence, to make a full explanation concerning it. I only wanted it understood how the misunderstanding had arisen, and that I did not feel that Professor Exner or Professor Jahrreiss had made any baseless charges against me in so doing.

THE PRESIDENT: All right.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you very much.

DR. NELTE: I should like to put one question to the witness.

Witness, the charge has been made against the Defendant Field Marshal Keitel that—and I quote—“rather than back up his subordinate officers and protect them, he threatened them; yes, he threatened to turn them over to the Gestapo.”

Can you give us facts about this charge which prove that this was not the case?