Chapter M: HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any (15)

VON BUTTLAR-BRANDENFELS: I can testify that Field Marshal Keitel, as superior, was always very well-disposed toward the officers of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. For instance, the relations between himself and Colonel Moench, who was closely connected with him in his military capacity of Chief of the Organization Division, were almost that of father and son; and he deeply lamented his death in action on the Eastern Front.

I can also say that I myself, along with Lieutenant Colonel Ziehrvogel, the A-1 man on my staff, on the basis of factual disagreement with the staff of the Reichsführer SS, was in 1944 accused in a letter to Field Marshal Keitel of sabotaging the co-operation between OKW and Reichsführer SS and the conduct of the war. In his reply, which I saw myself, Field Marshal Keitel defended us in every way, and said that he would take entire responsibility for everything done by his subordinate officers.

DR. NELTE: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Is there any cross-examination?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I do not propose to cross-examine. That, of course, will not be taken that the Prosecution is accepting the truth of this evidence at all. But the whole question of atrocities in the East has been so thoroughly covered by evidence and by document, My Lord, I think it would be wrong and repetitious if I cross-examined.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Mr. Roberts.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, there was one other point. Dr. Laternser, in the interests of saving time, produced an affidavit of this witness dated the 20th of May 1946.

My Lord, of course, we are most anxious to assist Dr. Laternser in any effort on his part to save time, and we do not put any objection to this affidavit. But I am not quite certain as to what the affidavit is, and as to whether it has been put in as an exhibit—in which case it should be given a number—or whether it should go to the commission.

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think it necessary for it to be given an exhibit number. It was put to the witness, and he says the evidence was correct. That enables Dr. Laternser to refer to it hereafter.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes, My Lord. Then I propose the Prosecution should get copies. Could that be conveniently arranged?

THE PRESIDENT: Of course.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, Mr. Dodd is pointing out that we have not seen this affidavit; we do not know what it contains. But we will get a copy, and if we have any further application to make, we can make it.

THE PRESIDENT: When an affidavit is used in this way and put to a witness who is in the witness box, of course the affidavit ought to be supplied to the Prosecution in order that they may see what is in it, and so be able to cross-examine if they wish to do so.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes.

THE PRESIDENT: That has not been done in this case. The best course would be for the affidavit to be supplied to the Prosecution, and they may, if they wish, apply to examine on it before the commission.

Do you think it is necessary? Perhaps you could see the affidavit soon and decide whether it is necessary to keep the witness here.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I respectfully agree.

THE PRESIDENT: And we shall hold the witness in Nuremberg?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, we accept the invitation to examine the affidavit over the week end, and then, if necessary, we could make an application on Monday.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes; that is quite all right. Then, the witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

Yes, Dr. Jahrreiss, will you call the next witness?

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes, if it is the Tribunal’s wish. With the permission of the Tribunal, I wish to call Major Büchs as my next witness. Major Büchs.

[_The witness Büchs took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

HERBERT BÜCHS (Witness): Herbert Büchs.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold nothing and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, what position did you have in the last years of the war?

BÜCHS: From November 1943 I was a General Staff officer of the Air Force serving with the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff; and in that capacity I was second adjutant to General Jodl.

DR. JAHRREISS: And were you in this position until the end of the war?

BÜCHS: I remained in this position until the end, until our arrest on 23 May 1945.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, during this time in which you were in the Führer’s headquarters, were you in the various compounds of these headquarters?

BÜCHS: Yes. I was in the headquarters in East Prussia, and in addition to that I was in the headquarters in Berlin, and in 1944 also in Berchtesgaden.

DR. JAHRREISS: It has been said that there was a Party clique at the Führer’s headquarters. Do you know anything about that?

BÜCHS: If I am to understand by that a circle of people, I would name Fegelein, Bormann, and Burgdorf.

DR. JAHRREISS: You would say that that was a clique?

BÜCHS: These were three gentlemen who were in very close personal and official contact, and who made that impression on outsiders.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was this very close official and personal relationship between themselves or with others?

BÜCHS: They not only had very close relations among themselves, but I also observed that these three gentlemen had very strong influence on Adolf Hitler himself.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, would you ascertain the names of the three again? They did not come to us quite clearly.

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes.

[_Turning to the witness._] Major, will you please pronounce slowly the names of these three gentlemen you just mentioned?

BÜCHS: There is Fegelein, Himmler’s liaison officer to Adolf Hitler; then Bormann, the head of the Party Chancellery and the representative of the Party; and General Burgdorf, who had a dual position as Chief of the Army Personnel Office and at the same time Chief Adjutant of the Armed Forces with the Führer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did General Jodl have official relations with each of these three gentlemen?

BÜCHS: If I may start with Fegelein: Fegelein as liaison officer to Himmler was, as far as the Führer was concerned, the man to whom he turned in all questions of material and personal equipment of the Waffen-SS divisions whenever these questions arose during the situation discussions in connection with putting these divisions into operation. In this connection, points which fell within Fegelein’s sphere were frequently raised during situation reports. But the official connection between Jodl and Fegelein was otherwise very distant.

DR. JAHRREISS: And how about Bormann?

BÜCHS: In dealing with Bormann as Deputy of the Party, General Jodl always strictly defined his own sphere of military tasks. He always rejected complaints or unjustifiable accusations or possible attacks against the Armed Forces. I witnessed this especially while the war was fought on German soil and there was often friction with the Gauleiter who had been appointed Reich Defense Commissars. For instance, I saw that General Jodl on receiving complaints or letters from Bormann simply returned the originals with rather abrupt marginal notes of his views. If that had no effect, he did not hesitate to express his views to the Führer in every possible way in order to obtain his decision as to the dispute in question.

DR. JAHRREISS: And the third of these gentlemen, Burgdorf?

BÜCHS: To my recollection Generaloberst Jodl had very little official contact with General Burgdorf, although it was Burgdorf who discussed the important questions of the appointment of the commanders and higher officers with the Führer. It was in just such a case that I saw General Burgdorf first of all discuss these matters with the Führer alone, so that General Jodl had comparatively little influence in that direction.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now I should like to hear from you, Witness, what personal relations existed between Generaloberst Jodl and each of these three gentlemen.

BÜCHS: Jodl disliked Fegelein, because—I believe—he discerned the defects of his character at a very early stage. I have known him on several occasions to call Fegelein to account and reprimand him.

As for Bormann, I should say General Jodl had no connection with him at all. I also have never noticed any personal or informal relations between them. What I have said about Fegelein also applies to his relations with General Burgdorf, whom General Jodl probably also disliked personally.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now I turn to a different point. Witness, do you know anything about the fact that in the last phase of the war the possibility of exposing a certain category of captured enemy airmen to the popular rage was under consideration? Did you hear about that?

BÜCHS: Yes. I recall that in the spring of 1944, at Berchtesgaden, the Führer vehemently demanded that Allied fliers who made emergency landings in Germany no longer be protected by the Armed Forces against the enraged populace. This demand was based on reports alleging that a Kreisleiter of the Party and an officer of the Air Force had protected an Allied airman. At that time the Führer made this demand in a very sharp and pointed manner. He demanded that the Armed Forces issue the appropriate orders to put a stop to this once and for all.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did Hitler also make this demand of General Jodl?

BÜCHS: This demand was made at a situation conference attended by these gentlemen and Jodl himself; but I do not think that General Jodl had any direct connection with the handling of the whole question, as it was not directly connected with military matters.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did the General make no comment at all on the matter?

BÜCHS: General Jodl, like all the other gentlemen, rejected this demand and, on his part, did everything he could to try to dissuade the Führer from this demand. He began immediately by adopting a critical attitude, which expressed itself later in details he gave of four cases of violation of international law on the part of Allied airmen.

DR. JAHRREISS: I really do not need to ask you about this, for we have documentary proof of it. If Hitler was so enraged and demanded a decree with the urgency you have described, was it possible to pursue a delaying action?

BÜCHS: In a case of this kind, in which the Führer in the heat of his rage made such demands, it was impossible for the gentlemen to whom the demand was put to oppose him at the moment, let alone flatly refuse to carry out the order. There was nothing else for them to do—General Jodl used these tactics frequently—but to try by obtaining data, arguments pro and con, and asking for comments and opinions from all the offices concerned—to collect the material and at a quiet opportune moment approach the Führer on the matter again and try to dissuade him from his extravagant demand. Outwardly, this resulted in a lengthy correspondence, in which the files of the various departments involved were sent back and forth, all with the intent of delaying the matter to the utmost and, if possible, shelving it completely. My impression, as far as the treatment of the terror-fliers was concerned, was that in this case we really succeeded even though the Führer’s attention was repeatedly called to this question through new reports and statements and he demanded that a decree be put into execution.

DR. JAHRREISS: Then was no such order issued?

BÜCHS: I know of no such order.

DR. JAHRREISS: Can you cite an incident which shows clearly that no such decree was issued?

BÜCHS: On one occasion in August 1944 I personally was called to account by the Führer rather sharply. After an air raid on Munich, Fegelein had described low-level attacks to Hitler rather crudely and reported the incident where a plane was shot down by antiaircraft artillery, and two Allied airmen had made an emergency parachute landing. When they were captured and brought off by a Wachtmeister of the antiaircraft artillery, he himself said that he had called this man to account, and had asked him why he had not shot the two fliers. The man replied, “because I had no orders to do so.” At that moment I interpolated on my own account that no such order existed. And then the Führer reproached me in the most violent manner because the leading men of the Armed Forces had not issued a decree like that. Then, of course, he again demanded that the order be carried out.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was it carried out then?

BÜCHS: No, for that was the period after 20 July, and the time of the campaign in the West when there were more urgent questions in the foreground. And because of all of these questions that of the treatment of terror-fliers was again put aside.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know about an incident in Berlin—I believe in March 1945—which is supposed to have taken place in the Reich Chancellery, where the Führer again complained that in spite of his demand this decree had not been issued?

BÜCHS: I recall that in March 1945 the Führer again expressed himself very heatedly on this problem to General Koller, who was then Chief of the General Staff of the Air Force. I myself was not present at the beginning of this conversation. I was called in, however, and heard the Führer say something to the effect that on the basis of the attitude taken by the Armed Forces, and especially by the Air Force, it had been impossible for him to counteract the terror of the Allied fliers over Germany by means of a corresponding counterterror...

DR. JAHRREISS: Just a moment, Witness. You said that you had not been present at the entire discussion.

Mr. President, we have an interrogatory which we want to submit to the Tribunal. It is in our document book, Volume II, Page 178, and is the testimony of General of the Air Force, Koller. This testimony under Number 5, which is on Page 180 of the document book, contains all the details worth preserving of this extremely important conference in Berlin. Only part of this conversation took place in the Führer’s room. Another part took place in the anterooms—as, for instance, that with Kaltenbrunner—while the conversation with Göring was carried on by telephone. In order to save time and to avoid splitting up the matter, I should like to have the Tribunal’s permission to present it as a whole, even though the witness heard only a part.

With regard to Jodl, the last sentence says, as a whole—I believe, Mr. President, we can save time if I may present it now.

First of all, I must read the first question put to General Koller, which is to be found on Page 179. Here the witness was asked:

“How long have you been Chief of the General Staff of the Air
Force?” The answer is on the next page and is:

“From 1 September 1943 to 3 September 1944 I was Chief of the
Air Force Operations Staff; from 23 November 1944, Chief of the
General Staff of the Air Force.”

Question 5—and that is the question which concerns us—is on Page 179:

“Do you recall that about March 1945, in the bunker of the Reich
Chancellery, the Führer censured you and the Air Force because
such an order was not given?”

Answer, Page 180:

“Yes, I remember exactly. A notice taken from the Allied press
reporter survey between the beginning and the middle of March
1945 was laid before the Führer by Bormann during the situation
discussion. In brief it read somewhat to this effect:

“‘An American combat air crew, shot down over Germany a short
time previously, was overtaken by advancing American troops.
They had declared that they were ill-treated by enraged members
of the population, threatened with death, and probably would
have been killed if German soldiers had not released them and
taken them under their protection.’

“Bormann further pointed out to the Führer in a few words that
this confirmed that soldiers in such cases intervene against the
population.

“b) Hitler turned angrily to me and said excitedly:

“‘I have already issued one order that bomber crews which bail
out are not to be protected against the population. These people
only murder German women and children. It is unheard of that
German soldiers should take measures to protect them against our
own population, which is acting on motives of justifiable hate.
Why are my orders not carried out?’

“Surprised by this attack I replied something like this:

“‘I know nothing about any such order; and it would in any case
be a practical impossibility.’

“Hitler turned to me and said very loudly and sharply:

“‘The reason why my orders are not carried out is only the
cowardice of the Air Force, because the gentlemen of the Air
Force are cowards, and are afraid that something might happen to
them too. The whole thing is nothing more than a cowardly pact
between the Air Force and the British and American airmen.’

“Hitler then turned also to Kaltenbrunner, who happened to be
present in the background, and went on, addressing him but
sometimes not looking at him:

“‘I hereby order that all bomber crews who bailed out in the
last few months, as well as all bomber crews bailing out in
future, are to be turned over immediately by the Air Force to
the SD, and are to be liquidated by the SD. Anyone failing to
carry out my orders, or taking action against the population, is
liable to the death penalty and is to be shot.’

“Hitler then further expressed in general terms his indignation
and his views on the matter. The assembled officers gave the
impression of general surprise and disapproval.

“c) After the situation discussion with the Führer I requested
an interview with Kaltenbrunner in the side passageway.
Essential points:

“Koller: ‘It is impossible to carry out those orders. The Air
Force will have nothing more to do with them, nor I myself in
any way whatsoever—and I can say as much for the Reich Marshal.
It is entirely out of the question that the Air Force will agree
to this in any way, shape, or form.’

“Kaltenbrunner: ‘The Führer has completely mistaken ideas. The
duties of the SD are also constantly misunderstood. Those things
are no concern of the SD. Moreover, no German soldier does what
the Führer demands. That is not in the German soldier’s line. He
does not kill prisoners. If individual fanatical Party followers
of Herr Bormann try to do so, the German soldier intervenes. The
Führer has a completely false idea of the views held by our
soldiers. Moreover, I myself will do nothing in the matter
either. I have no intention of doing anything. We must just take
care that we get out of it again, otherwise we will be the first
to get shot. We must gain time. I am again leaving Berlin at
once for a fairly long time anyway.’

“Koller: ‘Then we are agreed on the main point. Your leaving
Berlin is favorable. But we must have another way out as far as
the Führer is concerned, for it is possible that he may again
refer to his order tomorrow. Later on if it becomes extreme, we
will have to see how we can put a stop to the business, or what
is going to happen to us?’

“The following was decided at my suggestion:

“No order along the lines decreed by the Führer will be issued
by the Air Force or the SD.

“Surrenders to the SD—none.

“In case the Führer should refer to his order again, then, first
of all, prevent further action through explanations of the
following kind: All members of air crews previously captured,
not in the hands of the Air Force but dispersed under the
control of the Replacement Army Commander (BdE). Time of capture
not known to a central office. Therefore a lengthy and difficult
process to determine the number of air personnel captured during
the last few months.

“Also, preparations must be made in detail for getting them out
without attracting attention. The newly captured crews go
automatically to interrogation centers. These are in process of
transfer owing to operations. Communications are bad.

“Detailed discussions and agreements with the SD necessary. In
order to preserve the appearance of discussion, the I-c officer
of the High Command of the Air Force (I-c of OKL) should go to a
delegate of Kaltenbrunner who, however, would first have to be
appointed.

“d) After the situation discussion with the Führer, I spoke to
Field Marshal Keitel at the entrance of the air-raid shelter,
and said:

“‘The Führer’s order is insane.’—Keitel affirmed, ‘It certainly
is’—‘The Air Force must keep its escutcheon clean. The order
cannot be carried out. I am convinced that the Reich Marshal is
entirely of my opinion. To issue such an order—and
verbally—and moreover with such threats of punishment. He must
sign an order of this kind with his own name. It may or may not
be carried out—but not by the Air Force. Nor by the SD, either;
I have spoken to Kaltenbrunner.’

“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘He will not sign such orders then, and
everything is always placed on the shoulders of the OKW. But
I’ll be damned if I issue such an order.’

“Koller: ‘The Air Force cannot join in this in any
circumstances. We will not assume such a responsibility.’

“Field Marshal Keitel: ‘You are right; neither can I. I must
think over what I can do about it, and how I can do it.’

“The conversation was interrupted because Keitel was called to
the telephone. Keitel was very indignant and annoyed about the
Führer’s order.

“e) After refreshments in a side room of the air-raid shelter, I
had to cross the antechamber of the conference room again to
reach the cloakroom and exit. Hitler happened to come out of the
room to give an order to an orderly, and he called me as I was
passing. The door leading to the conference room was open, and
Ley was sitting at the table. Hitler said to me:

“‘I must come back to my order once more. You must all help me,
for matters cannot go on like this any longer. The Air Force—or
at least defense of the Reich—has failed. What am I to do
against the frightful bombing terror which is murdering German
women and children?’

“Koller: ‘The Air Defense and our crews do what they can and
what is humanly possible. Our neglect of air armament and the
enemy’s present technical and numerical superiority cannot be
eliminated or remedied overnight. When the searchlight units get
stronger, the air situation over Germany will be more in our
favor.’

“Hitler: ‘I cannot wait for that. I can no longer be responsible
to the German people for the continuation of this situation in
the air. If those fliers realize that they will be liquidated as
terrorists, they will think twice about flying here.’

“Koller: ‘That will certainly not improve the situation in the
air. On the contrary, it will make it worse.’

“Hitler: ‘No; the Japanese method is the best.’

“Hitler’s manner was now calm again, in comparison with what it
had been at the situation discussion. He appeared more
approachable. Experience had shown that it was better to talk to
him alone than in the presence of others. I thought it was a
good opportunity to attack the whole problem and stated:

“‘If I may state my point of view, I think that this will not
do. Measures of this kind are in such crass opposition to the
education, feelings, and way of thinking of all soldiers, that
they cannot be carried out. One cannot train soldiers on the
regulations governing warfare and decent conduct, and then order
actions which are repulsive to everyone. You must not forget, my
Führer, that enemy airmen also carry out orders, and do their
duty just as ours do. If they are shot down or make forced
landings, they are defenseless and unarmed prisoners. What would
the world think of us? And the first thing the enemy would do
would be to treat our air crews in the same way. That is
something for which we cannot answer to our men and their
relatives. All their willingness to serve and their discipline
would collapse at one blow.’

“Up to that point the Führer had not interrupted me. After his
first glance at me he looked away again and seemed to be lost in
thought. He had been listening, however, and at that point he
interrupted me and said quietly and earnestly:

“‘So the Air Force is afraid after all. That is all very well.
But I am responsible for the protection of the German people and
have no other means except this.’

“Hitler turned away, and went back into the conference room.

“f) After my arrival at the Air Force headquarters (Kurfürst) I
told Colonel Von Brauchitsch what had happened, and ordered him
to report it to the Reich Marshal as soon as possible. I myself
could not contact the Reich Marshal at the moment. During our
conversation Brauchitsch also expressed disapproval of the
Führer’s order.

“g) An hour or two later the Reich Marshal called me, and began
with the following words, ‘Tell me, has he gone quite mad now?’

“It was quite clear who was meant. I myself reported the
principal happenings and the conversation with Kaltenbrunner to
the Reich Marshal again, and added:

“‘I will not carry out this order or anything connected with it.
I will endeavor to handle the situation so as to gain time now,
in any case, and will do everything in my power to protect any
of us from disastrous consequences. Perhaps after the last
conference the Führer will not refer to his order again. If he
does, however, a very difficult situation will arise, and you
will have to go to the Führer yourself. What the Führer has
ordered must in no case be allowed to happen.’

“The Reich Marshal expressed strong disapproval of Hitler’s
attitude and agreed with me in every point. He ordered me to act
as I had suggested, to inform him immediately when necessary,
and ended the interview with these words, ‘This is all insane
and cannot be done.’

“h) Measures against Allied airmen on the basis of the
above-mentioned Führer’s order were taken neither by the Air
Force nor by the SD. This order did not become known, in my
opinion, to the Replacement Army Command (BdE), or its offices,
as the Replacement Army Command was not present at the Führer’s
meeting, and the order was not transmitted by the Armed Forces
High Command (OKW).

“Hitler made no further reference to his order, either to the
Reich Marshal or to myself or my representative or, I think, to
Kaltenbrunner. To be sure, I never spoke to the latter again
about this matter.

“I cannot judge whether Hitler deliberately let the matter drop
or whether he forgot about it under the pressure of events.

“i) I know that about two or three weeks later an OKW directive
was issued—I think a teletype—in which, as I recall, mention
was made of the correspondent’s report that occasioned it. It
disclosed the fact that the Führer had expressed his displeasure
that German soldiers had taken action against their own people.

“No mention was made of the main point of Hitler’s order. If I
remember correctly, the directive was signed by Keitel, and must
be regarded as an attempt to cover himself as far as the Führer
was concerned.

“In my opinion, General Jodl had nothing to do with the affair
at all.”

Witness, as far as you were present at this meeting, is the picture presented by General Koller correct?

BÜCHS: I remember personally something like the following formulation by the Führer, “This results from the fact that in the Air Force war is based on a mutual life insurance policy of, ‘Don’t hurt me; I won’t hurt you.’” That was the sentence which impressed me most strongly, which emphasizes what was said...

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. Then I need not ask you any further questions on this point.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Jahrreiss, we will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, I assume that you can still recollect how the offices of the Führer’s headquarters were furnished.

BÜCHS: Yes, I can still remember.

DR. JAHRREISS: In the offices occupied by the Führer, the Field Marshal, the General, and yourself, were there maps on the wall?

BÜCHS: Yes, and also in East Prussia—particularly the headquarters—the Führer had a topographic map of Germany, as well as a political map of Europe, and there were similar maps in the various other rooms.

DR. JAHRREISS: Were maps of Germany hanging there, too?

BÜCHS: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: And the neighboring territories on which concentration camps and penal institutions were indicated with a red or blue ring?

BÜCHS: No. Neither in the headquarters in East Prussia nor in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, nor at the Berghof in Berchtesgaden, have I ever seen such a map.

DR. JAHRREISS: At 1230 hours on 11 May 1946, the Munich radio station broadcast a letter from a painter asserting that he had seen maps in the Führer’s headquarters which could only be intended to show the location of concentration camps. Is that possible?

BÜCHS: That is quite out of the question.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was there any more detailed statement about...?

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think we need go into the broadcast from Munich. We have no evidence of a broadcast from Munich.

DR. JAHRREISS: I am afraid I was misunderstood. I did not ask him whether he heard it, but I wanted to illustrate how the public had come to believe that there were such maps. Thank you, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: What I was pointing out was that it ought not be referred to, as it is not in evidence. The fact which you alleged, that there was a broadcast, ought not to be referred to.

DR. STAHMER: Major Büchs, during the time you spent as commanding officer attached to Führer headquarters, were you regularly present at the daily discussions of the situation?

BÜCHS: Yes, I participated in the daily military situation discussions.

DR. STAHMER: Do you still remember whether you attended the situation discussion of 27 January 1945, at which the fate of the 10,000 air force officers imprisoned in the Sagan Camp was discussed?

BÜCHS: I can remember something like this: Fegelein must have raised the question of evacuating that camp on the approach of the Russian troops. These captured officers were asked whether they wished to remain in the camp and be handed over to the Russian Army, or whether they wanted to be taken away in the course of the evacuation of Silesia. As far as I remember, they definitely decided on the latter alternative—that is to say, to be taken away; and I believe that the only question still to be decided was how their transport was to be arranged.

DR. STAHMER: Can you still remember the suggestions that were made regarding that transport, and who made them?

BÜCHS: No. I believe, at that time, the Führer only said in general terms that these imprisoned officers could not receive better treatment than our own people. It was just at the time of the evacuation of Silesia, and our traffic situation did not permit the transport of even our own people by means of railway trains or in large columns, and the population had to tramp along the roads even in winter. And I think I remember that, at the time, the Führer said, “If these officers wish to be taken along on a transport, they will have to march just like the German civilian population.”

DR. STAHMER: May I, Mr. President, in connection with this statement, refer to an error, in the record. During the cross-examination of the Defendant Göring on 20 March 1946, Document 3786-PS, Exhibit USA-787 was presented. In the German record, Page 6249, after a discussion of how they should be transported, there is a statement that the Führer said, “They will have to go even if they march in ‘Dreck’ (mud).” The actual text is, “They will have to go even if they trek (Treck) on foot.” That is quite a different thing. I do not know how the word is translated in the English text; but that, of course, would give it a very different and entirely wrong meaning. As the witness has just said, the Führer said, “They have got to go even if they have to trek”—that is to march in a column, on foot.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes. Now, the Tribunal think that the best way to deal with these questions of translation is to take it up with the General Secretary, and get it submitted to the Translation Division.

DR. STAHMER: I merely wanted to establish the fact.

[_Turning to the witness._] A remark is supposed to have been made in the course of that conference, during the discussion on transport, “Take off their boots and trousers so that they cannot walk in the snow.” Do you remember who made that remark?

BÜCHS: No, I cannot remember; and I think it is quite impossible.

DR. STAHMER: You do not remember any such remark, or by whom it was made?

BÜCHS: It is perfectly possible that Fegelein made such a suggestion in some connection or other; I do not know.

DR. STAHMER: According to the record, Reich Marshal Göring is supposed to have made such a remark.

BÜCHS: I think that is quite out of the question.

In this connection may I just mention that it was extremely difficult to take notes of the proceedings. Four to six people frequently spoke at once during these conferences—and much more rapidly than usual. The stenographers could only take down what they heard. They could neither look up nor make certain who actually made such and such a remark at such and such a moment. There was a table around which there were often some 30 people standing; and that interfered with the work of the stenographers.

DR. STAHMER: I have no further questions.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, at this point of the Trial I feel obliged to make a statement. I wanted to ask this witness some important questions, but I am not in a position to do so because of the decision announced by the Tribunal today. I state that through that decision I...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, you will have full opportunity to put the questions to the witness before the Commission.

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I please complete my statement.

I have explained that as a result of the decision announced today, I am not in a position to put my questions, and that I must submit to that decision. I wish to state, however, that I consider this decision...

THE PRESIDENT: But it is inaccurate to say you are not in a position to put your questions. You are not able to put your questions now to the witness, but it is not true to say that you are not in a position to put your questions without further qualification. You are in a position to put your questions to the witness before the Commission.

DR. LATERNSER: Nevertheless, Mr. President, I feel there is an impediment for the defense, constituted by the fact that the defense of the organizations is thus not in a position to present its evidence directly.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has announced its decision.

DR. LATERNSER: I only regret, Mr. President, that that decision was announced without the Defense having first been notified.

DR. MARTIN LÖFFLER (Counsel for the SA): I should like to add in connection with the statements of my colleague Laternser that I must emphasize them because...

THE PRESIDENT: On what point, Dr. Löffler?

DR. LÖFFLER: On the point that the witnesses called today cannot be questioned by defense counsel for the organizations, as has been the custom until now, and that is, therefore, a disadvantage to the defense because for all practical purposes we lose these witnesses altogether.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, you and Dr. Laternser seem not to have read Article 9 of the Charter, which provides that the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. That is with reference to the organizations. The Tribunal, after very great trouble, have brought to Nuremberg a very large number of witnesses and have set up commissions for the purpose of examining those witnesses, and they are going to hear some witnesses from among those witnesses at a future date in this Court.

The Tribunal have given the matter full consideration, and it doesn’t desire to hear any further arguments from you or from any other of the counsel for the organizations.

DR. LÖFFLER: Mr. President, we appreciate the Tribunal’s grounds, but we feel obliged to point out from the point of view of the defense that these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss of that witness.

I ask permission, therefore, to give you a very brief explanation so that the Tribunal will understand why we lose those witnesses. You, Mr. President, have said that the witnesses can be heard before this Commission. These witnesses cannot be heard before the Commission because the number...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Löffler, the Tribunal, as I have told you, have already considered this matter, and it may be that they will consider it further, but they don’t desire to hear any further argument about it. It is a matter entirely within their discretion, and they have been at very great pains to provide that the applicants who wish to be heard in respect to these organizations shall be fully and thoroughly heard.

The Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.

DR. LÖFFLER: May I give one explanation...

THE PRESIDENT: Did you hear what I said? I said the Tribunal will not hear you further at this stage.

DR. LÖFFLER: Very well.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have only a few questions.

[_Turning to the witness._] Your memory of that conference doesn’t seem to be entirely clear.

BÜCHS: May I ask which conference?

MR. ROBERTS: The conference that you last mentioned, with regard to the evacuation of the prisoners of Sagan.

BÜCHS: I am not aware that it was incorrect in any point.

MR. ROBERTS: Well, but you say that you don’t remember any mention being made of the prisoners having to walk through the snow without their boots on.

BÜCHS: Yes, that is what I said.

MR. ROBERTS: And you know that it is—I can’t find the actual place; I had no idea this exhibit was going to be referred to—but you know that that is in the actual stenographer’s notes, do you not?

BÜCHS: So it was said.

MR. ROBERTS: Yes. And you would agree with me that the stenographer could hardly put that remark down unless it was said?

BÜCHS: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: But you didn’t hear the remark; therefore, you don’t know who said it?

BÜCHS: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: That is all I ask on that.

I just ask on one other matter: In April of 1945 did Fegelein attain the status of Hitler’s brother-in-law, when Hitler got married?

BÜCHS: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: And two days afterwards, was Fegelein shot on the orders of his new-found brother-in-law?

BÜCHS: Yes.

MR. ROBERTS: That is all.

DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further question to put to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

DR. JAHRREISS: With the permission of the Tribunal, I now call the witness Professor Dr. Schramm.

[_The witness Schramm took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

PERCY ERNST SCHRAMM (Witness): Percy Ernst Schramm.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, were you working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the war?

SCHRAMM: Yes. From March 1943 onwards, I was working in the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

DR. JAHRREISS: Until the end?

SCHRAMM: Until the end—that is to say, the beginning of May 1945.

DR. JAHRREISS: What functions did you have in the Armed Forces Operations Staff?

SCHRAMM: During my entire time in the Armed Forces Operations Staff I kept the War Diary of that staff.

DR. JAHRREISS: Was there a special reason why you received that task?

SCHRAMM: My appointment to the Armed Forces Operations Staff was due to the fact that my civilian profession is professor of history at the University of Göttingen. At that time an expert was sought whose name would constitute a guarantee for expert work. General Jodl appointed me to the position at the suggestion of the deputy chief.

DR. JAHRREISS: If you were to write a war diary in the way a historian would wish to do, you would require an insight into all the events connected with that staff, would you not?

SCHRAMM: Yes. I did not attend the Führer’s situation discussions or the internal conferences; but I did participate every day in the situation discussions of the Armed Forces Operations Staff, and every important document passed through my office during those two years.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, considering that you had perhaps more insight into the activities of the Armed Forces Operations Staff than anyone else, I should like you to tell us here what you know of the range of General Jodl’s activities.

SCHRAMM: It is impossible to overestimate the range of the General’s activities. As proof of this, I may say that in 1944 alone, according to information which I received from a competent officer, 60,000 teleprint messages went through the teleprint department of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. There was also a large courier correspondence which, of course, was even larger. Then there was internal correspondence between individual departments. The bulk of that correspondence appeared on the General’s desk at some time or other. To look at it from another angle, the General was responsible for four theaters of war: North Finland and Norway; West Holland, Belgium, France; then the Southwest, in the first place Africa and Italy; and then the Southeast.

DR. JAHRREISS: Please speak more slowly.

SCHRAMM: It was the General’s task not only to have up-to-date information based on incoming reports, but also to act as operational adviser to the Führer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as saying that the four theaters you have just mentioned were the so-called OKW main theaters of war?

SCHRAMM: Precisely. The East was under the General Staff of the Army, and the General was concerned only insofar as the main difficulty always lay in co-ordinating the interests of the other theaters of war with those of the Eastern Front.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did I understand you correctly as mentioning 60,000 teleprint messages in a year?

SCHRAMM: Yes, 60,000. I remember the exact figure. And I remember it exactly, because my clerk calculated that 120 volumes of files passed through the War Diary office, and that they were so [_demonstrating_] thick. Therefore, about 12 yards of material passed constantly through my office. That represents 10,000 sheets of paper, if not 100,000.

DR. JAHRREISS: Perhaps you may be able to help us with a question which has been repeatedly touched upon here, but to which no precise answer has ever been given. Do you know anything about an order from Hitler saying that generals must not resign?

SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember that very exactly from an order which appeared in the middle of 1944, repeating with great strictness an order already issued before my time—that must have been during 1940 or 1941. That order was about 1½ typewritten pages in length and most forcefully worded. Its contents are still clear in my mind, because I discussed it afterwards with several of my comrades. The order stated that every commanding officer—and the departments under him correspondingly—was entitled to mention any objections he might have to the measures of the Supreme Command, but that he would then have to obey unconditionally the order once it was given him by higher quarters—that is to say, he would have to do something which meant acting contrary to his intentions. It added that it was impossible for a commander to resign in consequence of this. The reason stated was that the sergeants in the trench could not tell their company commander that they wanted to resign when they were not in agreement with his orders.

I repeat, it was so emphatically worded that we talked about it a great deal. From that time on, the commanders had even less chance of evading an order from the Supreme Command.

DR. JAHRREISS: Professor Schramm, might I ask you to speak just a little more slowly?

This order—the contents of which you have just described to us, and by means of which you have established the date of the final and most stringent formulation—did this order also apply to a man like General Jodl?

SCHRAMM: If it applied to the commanders, it naturally applied all the more to General Jodl.

DR. JAHRREISS: I now turn to another question.

General Jodl has been described as a political general. You are a civilian and a professor; and I assume, therefore, that you possess the detachment required to enable you to make up your mind on the matter and to supply the Tribunal with facts which will permit it to form its decision. Can you give us facts which would of necessity form a basis for judgment for or against?

SCHRAMM: If the question aims at establishing whether or not the General was a Party general, then I deny it most emphatically. It was utterly immaterial to the General whether the members of his staff were Party members or not. Although I was on that staff for 2 years, I personally could not tell you which of the officers were Party members. That was completely unimportant. As to whether the General tried to exercise political influence, I must again draw your attention to the tremendous amount of work for which he was responsible. He would not have had time for it; and with regard to my documents I can only tell you that I do not remember any papers from which such a conclusion might be drawn. What the General committed to paper—and these papers, as I have seen myself, run into thousands—was always strictly confined to military matters, and in no way encroached upon the sphere of politics. To be more exact, I do not remember in the course of those 2 years ever having seen in my files any document of a political nature inspired by the Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff or written by himself.

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; but perhaps he was fond of the limelight and had great ambitions; and perhaps, and outside of the files...

SCHRAMM: I can answer that question with a definite “no,” because I know from his associates, and from conversations with him, that all diplomatic procedure was repugnant to him and that he disliked it because it had nothing to do with soldiers. I did not notice any ambition, because if the General was ambitious he certainly had chosen the least suitable position for such a purpose, since he thus exposed himself to criticism from those below him—from people who did not know the underlying reasons. From that time on he was criticized a good deal, and he did not receive from higher quarters the recognition he deserved. I always thought it peculiar, and even grotesque, that the General, at the time of Adolf Hitler’s, death, had scarcely more German war decorations than I had myself, as a mere major in the reserve. I did not see whether he had foreign decorations. I never saw him wearing a foreign order. At any rate, there were no indications of ambition or of political aspirations.

DR. JAHRREISS: During this Trial there has been frequent mention of a speech made by the General during the winter of 1943-44 addressed to the Gauleiter. I do not know whether you know anything about that speech.

SCHRAMM: Yes, I remember it exactly.

DR. JAHRREISS: What do you remember exactly?

SCHRAMM: First of all, let me tell you that the reason why I remember it exactly is because I received the material on which the speech was based. After it was no longer needed, it was given to me for my War Diary. It was like this:

That was a speech for which material was collected in the various departments. For this purpose an enormous map was needed, which was difficult to prepare because it was larger than the offices in which we were working. The speech was made at this annual meeting in Munich on 8 or 9 November. The particular reason for the General making a speech outside the usual military circle was the following: Italy’s dropping out of the war in September 1943 had led to a break in the Southern Front extending from Marseilles to Athens, a distance of 4,000 km. We had succeeded in filling the gap again, but a good deal of uneasiness was felt by all those who understood the situation.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I object to long reasons being given for the speech being made. The speech is in evidence and, in my submission, the reasons for the speech are entirely immaterial.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal upholds the objection.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, please go on telling us about the attack.

SCHRAMM: This was the one reason...

THE PRESIDENT: No, no, I said that the Tribunal upheld Mr. Roberts’ objection as to what the witness must say. That’s a mistranslation.

DR. JAHRREISS: It was a misunderstanding. I am sorry. It was wrongly translated.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, I want to show you a document which was submitted to the Tribunal by the Prosecution 2 days ago, Document 1808-PS. Perhaps you will just look through the whole of the document first.

[_The document was submitted to the witness._]

THE PRESIDENT: Is it among the Jodl documents?

DR. JAHRREISS: No, it is a document which the Prosecution submitted in the course of the cross-examination 2 days ago.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, that document was handed up separately by me during the cross-examination, and I am afraid it is not in the book. It is one of those documents which received a new GB number, and was handed up loose towards the end of the cross-examination, Document 1808-PS.

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you. May I go on?

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, does your signature appear at the foot of the second last page, on the right?

SCHRAMM: Yes. This is a file which I started after the attempt of 20 July 1944, in order to have a permanent record of what was being done in the Armed Forces Operations Staff. I want to add in this connection that the Armed Forces Operations Staff was in no way involved in that conspiracy. This copy presumably comes from the war archives. The signature and the corrections are partly mine, and partly those of my clerk.

DR. JAHRREISS: I want to draw your attention to Number 5 in this file of documents.

SCHRAMM: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: It is dated 25 July. Do you have it?

SCHRAMM: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did you draw it up?

SCHRAMM: Yes, I drew it up myself.

DR. JAHRREISS: Please, will you tell us what the basis for this work of yours was?

SCHRAMM: The officers of the staff were called to our mess hall at short notice. We were told that the General wanted to address his staff. As not all the officers were able to attend, I was ordered to take notes, so that the other officers could be informed of what the General had said. I remember clearly that I jotted down a few key words, still standing, so this is not a shorthand record. I cannot write shorthand. There was no time to find a stenographer.

DR. JAHRREISS: Well, did you base this on your notes?

SCHRAMM: Yes. Afterwards, probably on the following day, I reconstructed the General’s speech as far as possible from my notes. I am not certain, of course, if all the details are quite accurate, because the notes which I had taken standing up were much too sketchy for that. And, of course, I am particularly doubtful about the accuracy of the actual words spoken. I now see that there are 4½ pages. The speech was, of course, very much longer than that. It is therefore a compressed account.

DR. JAHRREISS: A compressed account only...

SCHRAMM: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now, I should like to know more about the circumstances in which the General made that speech, the actual words of which we do not possess. That was...