Chapter M: HERZOG: The Prosecution, Mr. President, does not wish to read any (16)

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, it is my respectful submission—again in the interests of saving time—to mention that these matters are all very irrelevant. We know that an attempt was made on Hitler’s life, and that Jodl addressed his staff. It is my submission that the circumstances are not relevant at all.

DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President...

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal hope you’ll do it briefly.

DR. JAHRREISS: Yes; thank you.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, will you please be very brief and quote the personal circumstances?

SCHRAMM: The General appeared on the scene with white bandages around his head. We were all most surprised that he should have recovered so quickly from the attempt considering that he had been standing right next to the explosion. I must say that, at that time, we were deeply impressed by the concentrated energy with which he reappeared before his staff and by his moral attitude to such an attempt.

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do other defendants’ counsel want to ask any questions?

[_There was no response._]

Does the Prosecution want to?

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I have no questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. JAHRREISS: I have no further questions. May I now call the next witness, General Winter?

[_The witness Winter took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please.

AUGUST WINTER (Witness): August Winter.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you sit down.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you take part in the beginning of the Russian campaign?

WINTER: Yes, I took part as the first general staff officer of Field Marshal Von Rundstedt’s army group.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, may I point out to you that I want you to allow a small pause after my question and to speak in general more slowly than you have just been doing.

WINTER: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Can you tell me—since you had a very responsible position—what was officially said to be Hitler’s reason, at that time, for the German attack on the Soviet Union?

WINTER: The official reason, given to me at the time by my commander and my chief, was that an attack from Soviet Russia was to be expected shortly, and that this was therefore a preventive measure.

DR. JAHRREISS: And then you experienced the first battles on the frontier, did you not?

WINTER: Yes, in this staff.

DR. JAHRREISS: That was toward the south?

WINTER: It was in the Ukraine, Army Group South.

DR. JAHRREISS: Even after those first battles, you had a certain amount of experiences and certain impressions of the opponent, did you not?

WINTER: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: Were they, General, such impressions as to confirm the official reason given, that of a preventive war?

WINTER: It was the uniform impression of the command of the army group—including the commander, the chief, and the operations department under my command—that the reason given for the campaign was the true one. Our own impression at the time was that we had hit on active preparations for an offensive campaign.

DR. JAHRREISS: But did you have the facts on which to base this impression?

WINTER: We had a number of facts which confirmed that impression, according to our ideas. I may state them briefly. First of all, there was the strength of the troops we encountered which, although I cannot give you figures now, was greater than the figures mentioned in our marching orders. Then there was the extraordinary deployment of troops, so near and like a front, which struck us, with unusual large proportions of armored troops far exceeding anything we had expected, and the deployment of a comparatively strong group opposite the Hungarian border which we could not explain to ourselves as a defensive force. One point is particularly significant; the fact that during the first week we found that captured enemy staffs were equipped with maps which covered a large area of German or ex-Austrian territory which, again, did not seem in keeping with purely defensive considerations. In addition we observed a number of smaller things, not very important in themselves.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, just now you spoke of evidence which, in your opinion, was particularly significant—namely, the finding of these maps which you described a few minutes ago. Why is that particularly significant—more significant than the other things you have mentioned?

WINTER: It is particularly noticeable that the units on the Russian Front were equipped with maps covering much more than the area which would normally be included in a defensive reconnaissance area—even allowing for the fact that at the beginning of a campaign such reconnaissance might go beyond the enemy’s frontier.

DR. JAHRREISS: There has been mentioned in this courtroom the fact that after marching into the Ukraine, our troops found themselves faced with exceptional circumstances and difficulties in certain Ukrainian cities. Have you any idea of what I mean?

WINTER: Yes, that is obvious. We encountered an enormous number of these difficulties when we approached the Dnieper. I imagine that you are referring to the matter of remote-controlled explosions, or delayed-action explosions, which were carried out, as it seemed, on a very large scale in our fighting zone in the Kiev-Kharkov-Poltava area. They caused us a great deal of trouble, and they forced us to adopt extensive countermeasures at the time.

DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know whether that applies to Odessa?

WINTER: I heard that things were blown up in Odessa, but I cannot give you details.

DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know the details about Kharkov?

WINTER: I know about Kharkov indeed, because something happened there which caused us to adopt certain security measures. In the battles along the west border of Kharkov which were rather long and serious, a divisional staff with all its main material—I cannot remember its number—was destroyed by a delayed-action explosion of this kind. This caused orders to be issued for the carrying out of special security searches in all buildings which had to be used for accommodation of staffs and other authorities from that time on.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did you, Witness, actually handle a Russian map, or see one, which indicated plans for such blowing-up operations?

WINTER: No, I cannot remember seeing such a map.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another point. You said a few moments ago that Field Marshal Von Rundstedt was your commanding officer. Who was your chief?

WINTER: Infantry General Von Sodenstern.

DR. JAHRREISS: Now, another subject. If I remember correctly, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt retired at that time or was dismissed; is that right?

WINTER: When the attack on Rostock failed in November 1941 and permission to withdraw his leading units had been refused by the OKH, Field Marshal Von Rundstedt sent a report to the OKH, to the army to which we were subordinated, in which he said that if the necessary confidence was not felt in his leadership, he must ask the Führer to nominate a new commander for that army group. I have a painfully accurate recollection of this incident, because I myself drafted the telegram and the Field Marshal made that addition with his own hand.

The telegram was dispatched in the evening, and Hitler’s answer, relieving him of his post, arrived in the course of the same night.

DR. JAHRREISS: So that his application was granted?

WINTER: The application was granted. But perhaps I may tell you that there were repercussions later with Hitler. A few days afterwards Hitler himself flew to Mariupol in order to obtain information about the actual situation on the spot. On his homeward flight, he visited Field Marshal Von Rundstedt’s Poltava headquarters and had a discussion with him. In the course of this discussion, Hitler—I cannot tell you for certain whether I witnessed this scene myself, or whether the Chief Adjutant Oberst Schmundt told me about it immediately afterwards—I repeat, there was a personal discussion in the course of which Hitler again reproached the Field Marshal for having put that alternative question, and said to him:

“In the future I do not intend to tolerate any such applications
to resign. When I have once made a decision the responsibility
is transferred to me. I myself am not in a position to go to my
superior, for instance, God Almighty, and to say to him, ‘I am
not going on with it, because I don’t want to take the
responsibility.’”

We considered, at the time, that that scene was of basic importance, and I may add that, to judge from the orders later given on that point, our impression was correct.

DR. JAHRREISS: Do you know, Witness, whether Hitler, at some later date, altered his decision not to allow that in the future?

WINTER: No, he certainly did not alter his decision. Because, as I know, there were two occasions, I believe, on which orders to that effect were issued, forbidding resignations on the part of a commander, or an officer in a leading position, on grounds of unwillingness to assume responsibility.

DR. JAHRREISS: I now come to another point. If I am properly informed, you were in the Armed Forces Operations Staff during the later stages of the war, were you not?

WINTER: On 15 November 1944 I was called there to succeed General Warlimont who had fallen ill; and I took over his functions on 15 November 1944. My appointment was dated from 1 December 1944.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, did you regularly attend the situation discussions with the Führer?

WINTER: Yes, I was there on an average of 5 days out of 7 during the week.

DR. JAHRREISS: There has been a great deal of discussion about these situation conferences in this courtroom, and a great many events took place at them which are of importance for this Trial; but up to now, no real picture has yet been presented to us of what those situation discussions really were. Can you explain the procedure of such a situation discussion with reference to its length and the number of people present?

WINTER: The situation discussion was a permanent part of the afternoon’s program, and was attended by a fairly large number of people, while there was a second situation discussion at 2 o’clock in the morning, of no importance to us here. In it, reports were made only by the junior General Staff officers of the OKH for the Eastern Front and of the Operations Staff of the OKW for the Western Front.

MR. ROBERTS: Mr. President, I have a submission again in the interest of time. The Defendant Jodl gave evidence as to these conferences, and no one put one word of cross-examination to suggest that his evidence was not accepted. Therefore, I would like to submit that this is pure repetition on a point which is not disputed.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal do not wish to hear anything of a general or detailed nature about these conferences unless there is something in particular that you want to prove about them.

DR. JAHRREISS: Mr. President, so as to clarify matters, may I ask at this time whether the objection raised by Mr. Roberts means that in this case the rule applies that something which has not been touched upon in cross-examination can be considered proved? I am not sure whether I have made myself understood. The objection from the prosecutor apparently is based on the supposition that something has been heard...

THE PRESIDENT: I don’t think you need lay down any hard and fast rules, but General Jodl gave general evidence about the nature of these “situation conferences,” and he was not cross-examined on it. It doesn’t seem at all necessary to go into the general nature of these conferences with any other witness.

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you.

[_Turning to the witness._] Witness, it is possible in military life for an officer to receive an order with which he does not agree, is it not?

WINTER: Yes.

DR. JAHRREISS: In that case, is it possible for him to put his divergent opinion on record?

WINTER: In the German Army, if I remember rightly, such a possibility existed from the time of Moltke. An order from Hitler which came out in 1938—I think, in winter 1938-39—removed such a possibility once and for all. An order was issued at the time prohibiting even chiefs of general staffs and command authorities from putting their divergent opinions on record.

DR. JAHRREISS: In order to avoid creating difficulties for the interpretation, will you please explain the word “Aktenkundig”?

WINTER: According to that it was not possible to include in the official files or in the war diaries of events kept by command staffs any comments to the effect that the chief was not in agreement with the decision or order of his superior.

DR. JAHRREISS: It was canceled?

WINTER: These possibilities existed previously, but since 1938 they no longer existed as they were done away with.

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, General, I am now going to have a document shown to you, Document D-606, a document which the Prosecution also submitted during cross-examination 3 days ago. I am afraid I do not know the exhibit number. Perhaps it is...

MR. ROBERTS: Well, that’s the Number 3606. It’s Exhibit GB-292, My Lord. I put it in separately in cross-examination, in their book...

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Jahrreiss.

DR. JAHRREISS: Witness, do you know this document?

WINTER: I am acquainted with the document. It has my file reference number on it.

DR. JAHRREISS: Did you write it yourself?

WINTER: No, General Jodl wrote it personally. But I can see a blank space under Figure 11. I do not know whether it is complete. The document consists of a preliminary draft, which is not contained here; but now that I have looked at it, I can see that it is dealt with in the file copy from my quartermaster’s department. The third copy must have been sealed and attached to the same records.

Immediately after the attacks on Dresden, when Hitler had raised the question of leaving the Geneva Convention, this preliminary draft was drawn up at my headquarters under the responsibility of General Jodl, and the order stated that all angles should be worked on which would prevent the Führer from coming to such a decision—that is, of leaving the Geneva Convention. This document was carefully worked out from the point of view of international law and from the point of view of the psychological effect on the enemy troops, as well as on our own at home. I myself did it. The following day, my chief, General Jodl, received me. He had this document, the contents of which I have not checked now, and he told me that he was completely in agreement with this negative treatment, but that he had felt obliged to work on the draft in more detail, and bring it into line with the information he had from the Navy and so formulate it tactically in such a way that would guarantee its success with Hitler under all circumstances—for his idea must not be allowed to be put into practice.

DR. JAHRREISS: Thank you, Mr. President. I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other defendant’s counsel want to ask questions?

DR. LATERNSER: Mr. President, may I ask whether the prohibition regarding interrogation applies to this witness? And I want to point out that this witness is a member of the indicted group of the General Staff and of the OKW.

THE PRESIDENT: I do not know whether he is or not, but it does not matter whether he is or not. You can question him before the Commission. I mean, you can call him yourself before the Commission.

DR. LATERNSER: I merely wanted to clarify the matter by means of this question.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, thanks. Dr. Laternser, if there is any witness who is not residing in Nuremberg, you can have him kept for the purpose of having him examined before the Commission if you want to do so.

MR. ROBERTS: My Lord, I only want to ask one question.

[_Turning to the witness._] You have told us that Germany attacked the Soviet Union in breach of their Nonaggression Pact, because Germany feared an attack from the Soviet Union.

WINTER: May I be more precise by saying that we, as General Staff officers in the high command of an army group that was deployed in the Ukraine, were given that reason by our commanding officer. Whether politically...

MR. ROBERTS: Very good. We know now from the evidence in this Court that Hitler decided, in July 1940, to attack the Soviet Union; that on 18 December 1940—446-PS, it is Page 53 of Book 7—that on 18 December Hitler stated that the Armed Forces must be prepared to overthrow Soviet Russia in a single attack of lightning-like speed. We know that the attack was not until 22 June. It does not look as though the leaders of Germany were very much frightened, does it, of Russia, or should we say the Soviet Union, breaking the Nonaggression Pact.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Witness, you had to take retaliation measures in the Ukraine, did you not?

WINTER: We did not undertake any reprisals—as far as the troops were concerned—in the operational zone of the Ukraine; at least, I have no recollection now of any such instances.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): What measures did you take against the resistance of the population?

WINTER: During the entire campaign in which Army Group South was involved, there was no resistance by the population in the operational zone in the Ukraine. Only in rear areas were there fights, at that time, with struggling Russian troop units. A resistance on the part of the population did not occur—as far as I know—until later when the operational zone had already been limited in the rear, and then there was resistance against political Reich commissioners.

THE TRIBUNAL (Mr. Biddle): Very well. You were not there at that time?

WINTER: The command to which I belonged was withdrawn from the front at the end of January, or in the early days of February 1943. The rear area lines were at the Dnieper at that time.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness can retire.

DR. EXNER: Mr. President, in conclusion I have only two interrogatories to submit to the Tribunal; and I want to read a few lines from one of them—something which was forgotten.

To begin with, the interrogatory, Exhibit AJ-8, Document Jodl-61, an interrogatory of Waizenegger, which I herewith submit and beg the Tribunal to take judicial notice of its contents. And then there is Exhibit AJ-6, Document Jodl-59, an interrogatory of Brudermüller, with reference to which I wish to make a similar request. Then, from the last to be submitted, Exhibit AJ-12, Document Jodl-65, General Greiffenberg’s statement, I should like to quote the important parts. It is a question of the attack against Yugoslavia and the question of whether or not, after the Simovic Putsch, Yugoslavia had already taken up a position against us. This is in the third volume of my document book on Page 211. The Simovic Putsch was over, and the question was whether there was an immediate threat from Yugoslavia at the time.

“Question: Is it a fact that Yugoslavia, immediately after the
_coup d’état_ of the army, started to deploy her armies on all
her borders?

“Answer: I know only the front which was opposite the German
Twelfth Army, located at the Bulgarian border. Here the
Yugoslavs had deployed their armies at the border.

“Question: Is it a fact that the Army ‘List,’ of which you were
the commander at the time, had the order, before the _coup
d’état_ in Yugoslavia, to respect strictly the neutrality of
Yugoslavia during the pending attacks on Greece, and that not
even supply trains should be dispatched through Yugoslavian
territory?

“Answer: I can testify that the strictest order had been given
to respect Yugoslavia’s neutrality.

“Question: Did you hear of any violations of this order?

“Answer: No.”

Gentlemen of the Tribunal, a number of interrogatories have not yet come in. Whether we are going to get them or not, I do not know. At any rate, I shall have to reserve to myself the right to submit them later. Apart from that, I have completed my case.

THE PRESIDENT: On Monday the Tribunal will hear the case of the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, will it not?

Very well, the Tribunal may adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 10 June 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIRST DAY
Monday, 10 June 1946

_Morning Session_

THE PRESIDENT: I call on counsel for the Defendant Seyss-Inquart.

DR. STEINBAUER: Your Lordship, High Tribunal, I open the defense case with the last words spoken by Dr. Schuschnigg as he resigned from the Austrian Chancellorship on 11 March 1938: “God protect Austria.”

It is a coincidence in history that at a time when the question of the Anschluss is being discussed here with reference to the person of Seyss-Inquart, the four Foreign Ministers are preparing the peace treaties on the basis of the same events. May I, therefore, draw the Tribunal’s attention to my documents on this matter and ask that I be permitted to quote from them at somewhat greater length than I had originally intended?

Now, with the permission of the Tribunal, may I begin with the examination of the defendant as witness in his own defense.

[_The defendant took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name, please?

ARTHUR SEYSS-INQUART (Defendant): Arthur Seyss-Inquart.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The defendant repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, when and where were you born?

SEYSS-INQUART: I was born in 1892 in Iglau, situated in what was up to now a German-speaking enclave in Moravia. Moravia, at that time, was a crown province of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. There and in the German-speaking enclave Olmütz, also in Moravia, I lived until the age of 15, when with my parents I moved into the vicinity of Vienna where I completed my studies at the Gymnasium and the legal faculty of the University of Vienna. In August 1914 I enlisted in the Army.

DR. STEINBAUER: Were you in the Army during the whole of the war?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. I served with the Tyrolean Kaiserjäger and saw fighting in Russia, Romania, and in Italy. On a furlough during the war I passed my final examinations, and in 1917 I received my doctor’s degree. I was wounded once, decorated several times, three times for bravery in the face of the enemy.

DR. STEINBAUER: What impressions of importance for your later life did you retain from the time of your youth?

SEYSS-INQUART: Relevant to my case is, I think, only the experience of the struggle between the nationalities in Moravia, between the Germans and the Czechs. The Germans in those days were in favor of a unified Austrian state, while the Czechs pursued a predominantly nationalistic policy. It is, however, not without significance that a language compromise was agreed upon in Moravia.

DR. STEINBAUER: What lasting impressions did you retain from your service in the war?

SEYSS-INQUART: Apart from the experience of comradeship at the front, I remember especially the discussion toward the end of the war on the Fourteen Points of President Wilson.

DR. STEINBAUER: Their essential content being the people’s right of self-determination?

SEYSS-INQUART: It was clear to us that the realization of those Fourteen Points would mean the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. We Germans regarded it as at least a compensation that in pursuance of this right of self-determination the German Erblande (the domain of the Holy Roman Emperors) would be able to return to the Reich from which they had been separated just 50 years before, in 1866. Yes, these territories had been created by the German Reich and had been part of it for 950 out of the 1,000 years of their existence.

DR. STEINBAUER: What did you do after your return from the war?

SEYSS-INQUART: I devoted myself to my legal profession. In 1921 I set up my own practice, which in time grew into a very successful one.

DR. STEINBAUER: What of your political attitude? Were you a member of any political party?

SEYSS-INQUART: I was not a member of any political party, because I did not want to tie myself to partisan politics. I had good friends in all parties, including the Christian Social and Social Democratic Parties; but the party programs seemed to me rather one-sided, too much designed for individual groups of the community.

DR. STEINBAUER: Were you a member of any political clubs, for instance, the Austro-German Volksbund?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, I was a member of the executive of the Austro-German Volksbund, because the only political idea to which I adhered after 1918 was Austria’s Anschluss with the German Reich. I witnessed 12 November 1918, when the Provisional National Assembly, in fulfillment of the right of self-determination, decided that “Austria is a part of the German Republic.” Furthermore, the Constitutional National Assembly repeated the decision 6 months later. But the Treaty of St. Germain forbade the Anschluss. Thereupon the various districts tried to hold plebiscites; in Salzburg and the Tyrol 98 percent of those entitled to the vote were in favor of the Anschluss. Dr. Schuschnigg describes these events in his book, _Three Times Austria_.

The answer was a serious attempt to divide Austria among its non-German neighbors; but they could not agree on the booty.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, may I at this point submit to the Tribunal and refer briefly to several documents of my document book? The first document, to which I have given the Document Number Seyss-Inquart-1, is on Page 2 of the document book and contains the proclamation of the German-Austrian deputies after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy on 21 October 1918. There the second sentence reads:

“The German-Austrian State claims the territorial jurisdiction
over the entire territory of German settlement areas, especially
in the Sudetenland. The German-Austrian State will fight any
annexation by other nations of territories which are inhabited
by German farmers, workers, and citizens.”

Then, as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-2, I should like to submit—it is on Page 4 of the document book—the resolution which the witness has already mentioned, passed by the Provisional Austrian National Assembly on 12 November 1918, which says:

“German-Austria is a democratic republic. All public authorities
are installed by the people. German-Austria is a part of the
German Republic.”

The leader of the biggest national party of the time, Dr. Karl Renner, explained the reasons for this law on 12 November and said the following, which appears on Page 6 as Document Number Seyss-Inquart-3:

“Our great people is in distress and misery, the people whose
pride it has always been to be called the people of poets and
thinkers, our German people of humanism, our German people which
loves all mankind is deeply bowed in misery. But it is just in
this hour in which it would be so easy and convenient and
perhaps also tempting to settle one’s account separately and
perhaps to snatch advantages from the enemy’s ruse, in this hour
our people in all provinces wish to proclaim: We are one family
and one people living under a common fate.”

Then I come to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-4, which is on Page 18...

THE PRESIDENT: Page 8, is it not?

DR. STEINBAUER: Page 18. I beg your pardon, yes, Page 8.

That refers to the plebiscite on 24 April 1921 in the Tyrol, when 145,302 voted for the Anschluss and 1,805 against it. On 18 May 1921, there were 98,546 votes for the Anschluss in the district of Salzburg, and 877 votes against it.

Your Honors, while submitting the document, I said that I maintain there were three component factors leading to the Anschluss: First, the economic emergency which runs as a recurring theme through the entire history of the period. Second, the disunity among the democratic parties, resulting therefrom. Third, the attitude of the rest of the world, particularly the big powers, toward our small country.

Those thoughts are laid down in my document book, and I should like now with reference to the economic emergency of that time to submit as my next exhibit the speech of Prelate Hauser, President of the Austrian Parliament. The speech, made on 6 September 1919, appears on Page 14 of my document book. As President of the Parliament he suggested the acceptance of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, giving the following reason:

“The National Assembly has no choice. Country and people need
lasting peace which will open the world to them again morally
and economically and which can once again procure work for the
masses of our people at home and abroad....”

Then in the second paragraph he says:

“It also has no other choice because our country depends on the
big powers for its supply of food, coal, and industrial raw
materials as well as in the re-establishment of its credit and
its currency.”

The same point of view was expressed by the two statesmen Seipel and Schober. In Document Number Seyss-Inquart-17, Seipel, regarded as the greatest Austrian statesman, said at that time:

“But we will never believe that the Central European question is
solved as long as the great state which virtually makes up
Central Europe, the German Reich, is not a party to the
solution.”

I shall now continue with the examination of the witness.

I want to ask you, Witness, do you still remember the time and the conditions after 1927?

SEYSS-INQUART: On account of the economic situation which you have just described, the League powers again and again forced Austria to make so-called voluntary declarations renouncing the Anschluss. This had repercussions in Austrian domestic politics. The Austrians, who in 1918 had been resolved to have a democratic parliamentary form of government, turned to radical ideas of an authoritarian character.

DR. STEINBAUER: At that time a new party was formed. Which one was that?

SEYSS-INQUART: Then there occurred the so-called Palace of Justice fire, an uprising of the Marxists, which brought in its wake the creation of the anti-Marxists Home Guard, a militant organization. Thus uniforms were introduced into the political life of Austria. The controversy between the Marxists and the anti-Marxists became ever more marked. The only nonpartisan organization at that time was the German-Austrian Volksbund, and the Anschluss idea was the only political objective which still held all parties together. Around the year 1930—at least then it was first noticeable—the National Socialist German Workers Party made its appearance.

DR. STEINBAUER: What impression did that Party make on you, particularly with reference to the seizure of power in the Reich?

SEYSS-INQUART: I want to say quite openly that amidst Austrian conditions the Party appeared somewhat strange. Uniforms had, of course, already been introduced into politics by the Republican Guard of the Marxists and the Home Guard, but in the NSDAP even the actual political leaders wore uniforms and marched in close formation. And also the kind of political intransigence which they displayed was not in keeping with our customary political thinking.

DR. STEINBAUER: But what then were the reasons for that?

SEYSS-INQUART: Well, let me say that the NSDAP did not recognize any value in any other party and was never prepared to co-operate with any other.

DR. STEINBAUER: Then, what positive successes did you think the Party had gained in the Reich?

SEYSS-INQUART: I think that the influence of the Party in Austria—undoubtedly very great as time went on—was due to its unqualified determination to attain the Anschluss. I am of the opinion that the radicalism is to be attributed, for instance, to the negation of the customs union by the Hague decision, to please the democratic party leaders.

DR. STEINBAUER: In addition, were there not economic reasons which brought success to the NSDAP?

SEYSS-INQUART: What was discussed in the Reich, and what we heard from the Reich...

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, I suppose you are hearing the words spoken by Dr. Steinbauer direct, and you are answering them without any pause, which gives the interpreter no chance.

SEYSS-INQUART: We in Austria observed after 1933 the removal of the discriminations imposed by the Versailles Treaty and above all, the elimination of unemployment in the Reich. In Austria, too, about 10 percent of the population were unemployed at that time. Especially the Austrian workers, therefore, were hoping that the Anschluss would put an end to their unemployment; and Austrian farmers were greatly interested in the Reich Food Estate and in the German market control.

DR. STEINBAUER: If I understand you correctly, then, it was the Anschluss idea which brought you, too, in contact with the Party? I do not want to speak of the Party program, which has been discussed here again and again; but I just want to ask you briefly: When did you join the Party?

SEYSS-INQUART: Officially, I became a member of the Party on 13 May 1938, and my membership number is above 7 million.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did you have any contact with Dr. Dollfuss?

SEYSS-INQUART: I met Dr. Dollfuss in the period after the war. I knew that he wanted to take me into his Ministry in 1933; and a week before 25 July 1934, at his invitation, I had a discussion with him.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did you participate in any way in the murder of Federal Chancellor Dr. Dollfuss on 25 July 1934?

SEYSS-INQUART: No, in no way. Dr. Dollfuss planned to have another discussion with me. He was interested in my view regarding the calming of the very radical situation of that time. I told Dr. Dollfuss already at that time that there were no more nationalists in Austria but only National Socialists, and that the National Socialists were acting only on Hitler’s orders.

DR. STEINBAUER: But, I must remind you, Doctor, that the Prosecution have submitted a photograph which shows the murder of Dollfuss being extolled.

SEYSS-INQUART: That is the so-called Annual Commemoration in the year 1938. During that celebration nobody thought of Dollfuss; it was a Commemoration by the Party in honor of the seven SS men who had been hanged in connection with the Putsch attempt at that time. None of us referred to that death as murder.

DR. STEINBAUER: Well, Dr. Schuschnigg succeeded Dollfuss as Federal Chancellor, and I want to ask you: What conclusions were drawn by the NSDAP from this event, as far as you could gather?

SEYSS-INQUART: The NSDAP itself was completely broken up and disorganized, and a small circle of men was formed at that time; I also found my way to those men, and we drew the following conclusions from the events of 25 July:

First, that they represented a considerable danger. I recall the meeting of statesmen in Stresa and their resolutions against Germany. And even though we were never worried about Italy, one had nevertheless to realize that in this very troubled atmosphere anything could easily lead to war. We all agreed that the main task of German policy must be to avoid war.

DR. STEINBAUER: We are now in the year...

SEYSS-INQUART: I should like to add that, with regard to domestic policy, the events on 25 July were the worst that could possibly have happened to the prospect of the Anschluss. We reflected on what might be done and came to the conclusion that the Party in the Reich should cease its interference in the Austrian National Socialist Party, the existence of which anticipated the Anschluss; but in return, the National Socialists in Austria should once more receive permission to be active, and especially, there should be elections to ascertain the proportional strength of the parties.

DR. STEINBAUER: What I am interested in is the question whether you had any connections with authorities in the Reich at that time, that is, in 1936?

SEYSS-INQUART: I had no connections with authorities in the Reich.

DR. STEINBAUER: Thank you. Did you...

SEYSS-INQUART: Only, as Reich Marshal Göring has already testified, when I became a State Councillor, did I, for the first time, meet a leading German politician.

DR. STEINBAUER: When was that?

SEYSS-INQUART: That was in June or July 1937.

DR. STEINBAUER: What was your attitude toward the NSDAP in Austria at that time, when you were State Councillor?

SEYSS-INQUART: When the agreement of 11 July 1936 was reached—without my having taken any part in it—Dr. Schuschnigg, through Minister Klees asked me for my political co-operation. At that time I had particularly close connections with Zernatto, the General Secretary of the Fatherland Front. At the suggestion of Zernatto and his friends I became an Austrian State Councillor and Dr. Schuschnigg gave me the task, in writing, of examining the conditions under which the national opposition could be enlisted to collaborate politically. In order to fulfill that task I did, of course, have to contact the National Socialists, because the national opposition consisted only of National Socialists.

DR. STEINBAUER: Who was the head of the NSDAP in Austria?

SEYSS-INQUART: The Party in Austria had reorganized illegally; Captain Leopold was the head.

DR. STEINBAUER: Were you on friendly terms with him?

SEYSS-INQUART: I could not come to an agreement with Captain Leopold; he did not understand my policy, but thought that on the basis of the agreement of 11 July Dr. Schuschnigg had to allow the NSDAP again in its earlier form. I think I talked to Leopold only twice, or at most three times, throughout that time. He demanded that I be subordinate to him; that I refused.

DR. STEINBAUER: May I in this connection draw attention to the following documents without reading from them?

Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-44, on Page 103 of the document book, an excerpt from the Document Number 3471-PS, Exhibit Number USA-583, already submitted to the Court.

Exhibit Seyss-Inquart-45, on Page 105, Document Number 3473-PS, Exhibit Number USA-581.

And Document Number Seyss-Inquart-97, on Page 109, in which Zernatto expressly states that Seyss-Inquart did not fall in with Leopold’s aims and efforts.

My client has been accused by the Prosecution of having played a double game. As counterevidence, I applied for permission to hear the former Gauleiter Siegfried Uiberreither. He was interrogated here, and I want to quote from the interrogatory, which is Document Number Seyss-Inquart-59, from the counterquestions put by the Prosecution on Page 140:

“Question: ‘Was not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart, before the time
when the Nazi Party was legalized, that is, before it was
declared legal in February 1938, was he not in constant contact
with the illegal Nazi Party of Austria?’

“Answer: ‘No. I personally did not know Seyss-Inquart until his
visit to Graz. In Nazi circles he was considered a non-Party
member. I think—I do not know with certainty—that he joined
the NSDAP only when it was legalized. For this reason, he
personally encountered a strong opposition in illegal Nazi
circles.’”

On Page 6 of the same document it says:

“Question: ‘Did not the Defendant Seyss-Inquart play a double
game: On one side his legal position in Schuschnigg’s Cabinet
and on the other side his co-operation with the formerly illegal
Nazi Party, whose activity was then legalized to a certain
extent through the efforts of the defendant at Berchtesgaden in
February 1938?’

“Answer: ‘I do not know to what extent he was in touch with the
illegal Nazi circles before 12 February. I do not know about it,
because I was not in Vienna. But from 18 February his contact
with the Nazi Party was not duplicity but his duty. Schuschnigg
himself had discussions with Leopold, the leader of the Nazis at
that time—before Klausner it was Leopold.’”

[_Turning to the defendant._] This brings us to 1938. At the beginning of that year you were State Councillor in the Austrian Government. What did you think of the political situation at that time?

SEYSS-INQUART: In many conversations with Dr. Schuschnigg but most of all in continual discussions with Zernatto, I suggested, in line with the conclusions I had drawn from the events of 25 July 1934, that the Reich, and particularly Hitler, be asked to refrain from any interference in Austrian politics through the medium of the Austrian National Socialist Party. I proposed that instead the Austrian National Socialists should receive permission to resume activities. That did not mean at all that I would give up the Anschluss, but I was completely convinced that a lawful and responsible policy of the Austrian National Socialists in Austria would in the course of time win for them the support of a clear majority of the Austrian nation—I mean of the Germans in Austria; and that the demonstration of such a clear majority would no longer be challenged by the powers of the League of Nations. One had to attempt to make Adolf Hitler agree to such a policy by enlisting the support of the autonomous and independent state of Austria for the Führer’s policy and the demand for equal rights of the German people. It was in the interests of these ideas that I talked to Field Marshal Göring and Herr Hess. I reported the outcome of these conversations to Dr. Schuschnigg and to Zernatto and I recommended the formation of a coalition government by taking National Socialist ministers into the cabinet, on condition that Adolf Hitler offer adequate guarantees. My suggestions made no headway with either of the two parties, but were not directly turned down. Meanwhile, the Austrian National Socialists continued to be active illegally; the police intervened and made arrests; three Austrian concentration camps were set up; in short, the events of that time foreshadowed today’s denazification system.

DR. STEINBAUER: Were you at the Obersalzberg on 12 February 1938?

SEYSS-INQUART: No. But I want to describe how that meeting came about. First of all, a renewed Party radicalism set in. At the beginning of 1938, legitimist tendencies were being promoted in Austria, the laws regarding the return of the Hapsburg property were discussed in the State Council. For the moment my own position, therefore, became untenable; I retired and informed Zernatto and State Secretary Keppler who had been officially nominated by the Reich Government to conduct the political affairs relating to Austria. I felt that in view of my task it was my duty to inform Keppler also. I myself accepted an invitation from the Reich Sports Leader Tschammer-Osten and went to Garmisch-Partenkirchen. There, without previous appointment, I met Herr Von Papen. Each of us poured out his troubles to the other, and came to the conclusion that both parties, that is to say, Hitler as well as the Austrian Government—that is, Dr. Schuschnigg—should be made aware of the fact that a clear decision on the lines of my proposal was necessary. At that time, participation of the National Socialists in the government was certainly discussed. Perhaps the Ministry of the Interior was also a subject of discussion, but my name was definitely not mentioned though it was the obvious one. I received no report on the discussions which Herr Von Papen had with Hitler, but I informed Zernatto of my conversation with Herr Von Papen. Zernatto at that time met me half-way on some questions, in particular with regard to the expansion of those sections dealing with national policy which were concerned with the National Socialists; and for this purpose he also placed means at my disposal. It was on 10 February, I think, when I heard through the group of my colleagues that Hitler had invited Dr. Schuschnigg to Berchtesgaden. Among the members of my circle were Dr. Reiner, Dr. Jury, Dr. Kaltenbrunner, Langot, and several others.

DR. STEINBAUER: Were you informed of the outcome of the discussions at the Obersalzberg?

SEYSS-INQUART: I was informed of the outcome of this conference only by Zernatto. On the evening of the 11th, before Dr. Schuschnigg left for Berchtesgaden, I had a detailed discussion with him and Zernatto. We agreed to a large extent regarding the appointment of National Socialists—for instance, Jury, Reinthaller, and Fischböck—to certain public functions but not to ministerial positions. I did not broach the subject of a ministerial post, because I did not know how Adolf Hitler reacted to the suggestion which I made to Herr Von Papen. On 13 February Zernatto asked me to see him, and he then told me of the results and contents of the Berchtesgaden conference, which were known to him.

DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection, I want to refer to Document Number Seyss-Inquart-48, Page 111, in which Zernatto states, “I had the definite impression that he”—Seyss-Inquart—“did not until then know anything about the result of the discussion and the contents of the agreement”—of 12 February.

Witness, on the basis of that agreement, you became Minister of the Interior and Police, did you not?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes, on 17 February.

DR. STEINBAUER: On 17 February 1938, with the assignment of establishing connections between Austria and the Reich, or rather of improving them. Did you also have a discussion with Hitler himself?

SEYSS-INQUART: Yes. The agreement at Berchtesgaden on 12 February contained a definite stipulation to the effect that I was to be liaison man between the Austrian Government and the Austrian National Socialists on one side, and the German Reich on the other. The contents of the protocol appeared to me unsatisfactory and even dangerous. There was no doubt at all that my appointment to the Ministry of the Interior and Security served as a notification, if not a signal, for the Austrian National Socialists that they might expect an early realization of their political objectives. In addition they received permission to profess their beliefs; they could wear the swastika and salute with the raised hand. What was not permitted, however, was their organization; that means, my National Socialist friends in Austria had no possibility of getting in touch with the National Socialists in a legal way. This agreement opened the gates without providing for a regular procedure thereafter. Hence, I myself resolved to see Adolf Hitler in order to make sure whether my plan had his approval. I went with Dr. Schuschnigg’s assent and with an Austrian diplomatic passport.

DR. STEINBAUER: And when did you talk then to Hitler?

SEYSS-INQUART: I mentioned an incorrect date just now; it was on 16 February that I became Minister and I went to Berlin on the 17th. I talked with Adolf Hitler alone for more than 2 hours.

It was pointed out here by the Prosecution that I saluted Adolf Hitler with the raised-hand greeting. That was permissible under the agreement. But I would ask the Prosecution to admit that during every one of my interrogations I stated that I had emphasized to Adolf Hitler at once that I was an Austrian Minister and as such responsible to Austria. I made some shorthand notes on this discussion on the back of a letter, and a few weeks later I dictated those notes to my secretary. I now want to relate the contents of my talk with Hitler on the basis of those notes. My statements...

DR. STEINBAUER: Witness, will you kindly be as brief as possible; can you do it in headings, perhaps?

SEYSS-INQUART: But this is the most important point with regard to my whole responsibility.

“A condition of Federal Chancellor Dr. Schuschnigg is that I
adhere to an autonomous and independent Austria, that I support
the Constitution, that is, further development, including the
Anschluss, must be based on this. The formation of public
opinion in Austria must proceed independently and in accordance
with present constitutional possibilities; I must be an active
guarantor for Dr. Schuschnigg of the revolutionary way, in the
meaning of these statements (Yes), no Trojan horse. The Party
and Movement must not adopt a militant attitude against
prevailing cultural conceptions. (Yes). No totalitarianism of
the Party and Movement; that is, National Socialist ideology to
be realized with due appreciation and regard for conditions in
Austria; not to be imposed on others by force. The Party as such
is not simply to disappear, but to exist as an organization of
individuals; no illegal activity, no efforts inimical to the
State, everything to be done in a legal fashion, anyone failing
to do this, to be locked up.”

In the main, Adolf Hitler agreed, and he told me:

“It is not a question of the 25 points. One cannot proclaim a
dogma; one must arrive from the pan-German and the national
German conception to a National Socialist one.”

That was the gist of my conference with Adolf Hitler on 17 February, from 12 to 2:10 o’clock.

DR. STEINBAUER: Did you...

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I understood the witness to say that he made his notes on the meeting with Hitler and later dictated them to his secretary. It is not clear to me whether he was reading from those notes. Furthermore, we have never seen such notes and I think it should be made clear on the record.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Steinbauer, has the defendant got the notes?

DR. STEINBAUER: The original was taken from him when he was arrested.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, you heard the question I asked; have you got the notes?

SEYSS-INQUART: The original of these notes was among my files in Vienna. I made an application to have these files of mine, which were found, searched for the notes. I handed a copy of the notes to the Prosecution during one of my first interrogations; it is in the files of the Prosecution. I have only copies here; I do not have the original.

THE PRESIDENT: The copy would be just as good for the purposes.

SEYSS-INQUART: I have placed a copy at the disposal of the Defense.

DR. STEINBAUER: But I gave it back to you.

SEYSS-INQUART: Then you can submit this one.

DR. STEINBAUER: Yes, would you hand it over?

[_The document was submitted to the Tribunal._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you give it an exhibit number, Dr. Steinbauer?

DR. STEINBAUER: Number Seyss-Inquart-61, otherwise it would be confused with the others.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I am confused about this; I still do not understand, and I am sure that my colleagues do not. We have never received any copy of any notes that this defendant has claimed he made soon after, or at the time of, his conference with Hitler. We have no such copy in our files. And I would like to have understood myself whether or not he is now claiming that this copy which is offered to the Tribunal is a copy of this original that he claims he gave to us.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that what you say, Defendant, that the document which you have just handed to your counsel is a copy of the document which you say you produced during your interrogations, which was from the shorthand notes you made at that time?

SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. President, the original notes I made on the afternoon of 17 February. A few weeks later I dictated these notes, which I made in shorthand, to my secretary, who took them down on a typewriter. I had several copies, one of which I presented to the Prosecution during one of my interrogations last summer. I have now given a second copy to my defense counsel. These are copies made from the original notes a few weeks after the conference. The original was in my secret flies in Vienna.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

MR. DODD: I wonder if we could learn just who it was to whom this defendant gave these notes? Mr. President, I would like to have some search made for them, and some effort made to find them.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you know who was the interrogating counsel?

SEYSS-INQUART: Mr. Dodd himself.

MR. DODD: We do not have it.

SEYSS-INQUART: I think I am right in saying that it was handed over.

DR. STEINBAUER: Mr. President, the main points of the contents coincide with the voluntary statement, which the defendant...

MR. DODD: I think this is important enough at this point, Mr. President, to clear up. I have the interrogation that I first conducted on this defendant, and it clearly shows that he referred to the notes; but he clearly said at the time that he did not have them, that he left them in a black leather case with other documents in Mondorf, and he asked me if I would make an effort to get them; and I said that I would, and we never have been able to find them, and that is the transcript of the interrogation.

SEYSS-INQUART: May I say that I received them. The black leather case was brought to me here in Court and the notes were in it. I submitted the copy at one of the subsequent interrogations.

[_There was a short pause._]

THE PRESIDENT: Go on, Dr. Steinbauer.

DR. STEINBAUER: May I say that Document Number Seyss-Inquart-49, Page 113, is substantially of the same content. The defendant, the present witness, informed Schuschnigg of the substance of that talk; that is evident from Document Number 3271-PS, Exhibit Number Seyss-Inquart-65, on Page 158.

Witness, I want to ask you now whether Hitler approved of your proposals?

SEYSS-INQUART: He clearly said “yes” to a number of things, but on other points he expressed doubts as to whether the Austrian Government would agree; the principal impression was, however, that this policy seemed feasible.

DR. STEINBAUER: In this connection it has also been alleged that as Minister of the Interior and Police you brought executive power under the control of the Nazis.