Chapter VI: Part 6

This will be handed you by the Marquis, who brings us very important intelligence. The General communicates the substance of it in a private letter to you, and proposes a measure which all deem essential. For God’s sake, my dear sir, engage Congress to adopt it, and come to a speedy decision. We have not a moment to lose. Were we to improve every instant of the interval, we should have too little time for what we have to do. The expected succor may arrive in the beginning of June, in all probability it will not be later than the middle. In the last case we have not a month to make our preparations in, and in this short period we must collect men, form magazines, and do a thousand things of as much difficulty as importance. The propriety of the measure proposed is so obvious, that an hour ought to decide it, and if any new members are to come, they ought to set out instantly with all expedition for head quarters. Allow me, my dear sir, to give you a hint. The General will often be glad to consult the Committee on particular points, but it will be inexpedient that he should be obliged to do it oftener than he thinks proper, or any peculiar case may require. Their powers should be formed accordingly. It is the essence of many military operations, that they should be trusted to as few as possible.

The Marquis has a title to all the love of all America; but you know he has a thousand little whims to satisfy; one of these he _will have_ me to write to some friend in Congress about. He is desirous of having the Captain of the frigate in which he came complimented; and gives several pretty instances of his punctuality and disinterestedness. He wishes Congress to pass some resolutions of thanks, and to recommend him to their Minister in France, to be recommended to the French Court. The first of these is practicable. The last I think might have an officious appearance. The _essential_ services the Marquis has rendered America in France, give him a claim for all that can be done with propriety; but Congress must not commit themselves.

Again, my dear sir, I must entreat you to use the spur on the present occasion. The fate of America is perhaps suspended on the issue; if we are found unprepared, it must disgrace us in the eyes of all Europe, besides defeating the good intentions of our allies, and losing the happiest opportunity we ever have had to save ourselves. Adieu, my dear Sir.

Believe me to be, with the truest respect and affection,

Your most obed’t servant,
A. Hamilton.

Hon. James Duane, Philadelphia.
Honored by Marquis De Lafayette.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

June 7, 1780.

Dear Baron:

I am commanded by the General to inform you, that the enemy are out in considerable force; and, by the last advice, were advancing this way. We are going to meet them. The General is just set out for Chatham, and will be happy to meet you there.

Yours, respectfully,
A. Hamilton, A. D. C.

HAMILTON TO WASHINGTON.

June 8, 1780.

Sir:

I have seen the enemy. Those in view I calculate at about three thousand: there may be, and probably enough are, others out of sight. They have sent all their horse to the other side, except about fifty or sixty. Their baggage, it is agreed on all hands, has also been sent across, and their wounded. It is not ascertained that any of their infantry have passed to the other side. There are four or five hundred on the opposite point; but it is uncertain whether they are those who went from this side, or those who were on Staten Island. I rather suppose the former.

Different conjectures may be made. The present movement may be calculated to draw us down and betray us into an action. They may have desisted from their intention of passing till night, for fear of our falling upon their rear. I believe this is the case: for as they have but few boats, it would certainly be a delicate manœuvre to cross in our face. We are taking measures to watch their motions to-night, as closely as possible. An incessant but _very light_ skirmishing. Very few boats, not more than enough to carry three or four hundred men at a time. It is likely more will come down this evening.

I have the honor to be,
Your Excellency’s most obedient servant,
Alex. Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO CHEVALIER DE TERNAY.

Au Cap Henry, le 13 Juin, 1780.

Monsieur le Chevalier:

Je suis envoyé par le Général Washington au Cap Henry pour y attendre votre escadre et vous remettre ainsi qu’à Monsieur le Comte de Rochambau, les dépêches de Monsieur le Marquis de La Fayette--ces dépêches, Monsieur le Chevalier, contiennent le plan d’opérations que le Général Washington a l’honneur de vous proposer, la situation des ennemies et la nôtre relativement aux forces respectives des deux parties, aux points occupés, aux moyens de subsistance et cetéra; tous les changements qui pouvraient survenir sur ces objets doivent m’être communiqués, afin qu’à votre arrivée vous puissiez avoir sous les yeux le plus de données possibles. Les mêmes détails vous attendent à Rhode Island, et si vous ne devez les reçevoir qu’après être arrivé, il est presque indifférent, Monsieur le Chevalier, que votre escadre atterisse à Rhode Island ou au Cap Henry; mais il y a des circonstances qui, si elles vous étaient connues, tendraient peut être à vous déterminer plutôt pour l’un de ces points que pour l’autre, ou même pour un troisième point que vos instructions n’ont pu prévoir. C’est pour vous rendre compte de ces circonstances que je saisis l’occasion du fier Rodrique; heureux si, dans une conjoncture où les moments sont d’une si grande importance, cette lettre peut anticiper de quelques jours vos dispositions.

1º. Par le plan proposé à vous, Monsieur le Chevalier, et à Monsieur le Comte de Rochambau, les efforts combinés de l’armée Française et Americaine doivent se porter sur New-York, et vous êtes instamment prié de vous rendre immédiatement à Sandy Hook.

2º. Suivant les informations qui m’ont été récemment fournies par le Gouverneur de la Virginie, la ville de Charlestown est prise; les ennemis embarquent une partie des troupes qui en ont fait la Conquête; et d’après la certitude où nous sommes que la destination de votre escadre leur est connue, il semble que cet embarquement pourrait bien avoir pour objet de renforcer la garnison de New-York.

3º. La somme de leurs forces navales sur ce continent se borne à trois vaisseaux de ligne, un de 50 canons, deux de 44, et quelques frégates à Charlestown; un vaisseau de 74 et quelques frégates, sortis de New-York depuis trois semaines et dont nous ignorons la destination.

Ainsi, Monsieur le Chevalier, la première de ces considérations vous invite à Sandy Hook; la seconde réclame votre atterrage sur un point d’où vous puissiez être en mesure d’intercepter les Secours destinés pour New-York, et la troisième vous offre un terme de comparaison entre la plus grande force qui puisse escorter ces secours, et celle avec laquelle vous pouvez les attaquer. Il est encore à observer qu’excepté les trois vaisseaux de ligne, tous les autres (à Charlestown) sont dans le port, et que les plus gros n’en peuvent sortir, qu’après avoir été allégés, et avec la concurrence d’une haute marée et d’un vent propice.

Telles sont, Monsieur le Chevalier, les choses dont ma mission a pour objet de vous rendre compte, et comme il est de toute importance que ces informations vous parviennent le plus tôt possible, j’ai cru ne pas devoir négliger la probabilité, qui s’offre de les faire devancer votre arrivée.

En supposant, Monsieur le Chevalier, que le fier Rodrique vous rencontre et que vous jugiez à propos de vous rendre en droiture à Sandy Hook, il est un moyen de faire que les dépâches qui vous attendent à Rhode Island et du Cap Henry vous parviennent aussi promptement qui si vous aviez atterri à l’un de ces deux points: ce serait de dépêcher, vers l’un ou l’autre, l’un de vos plus légers vaisseaux qui recevrait à son bord l’officier chargé de ces dépêches, et vous irait rejoindre vers Sandy Hook, où vraisemblablement il se rendrait aussitôt que votre flotte, ou du moins beaucoup plus tôt que les réponses de Général Washington ou de Monsieur le Marquis de La Fayette, aux lettres qui leur annonceraient votre arrivée.

Si le Cap Henry était le point choisi, j’oserais vous prier, Monsieur le Chevalier, afin d’éviter tous délais, d’ordonner qu’à la vue, du signal que vous savez, le vaisseau y réponde par un signal contraire, je veux dire en avertissant la position des pavillons; qu’il envoie sa chaloupe à terre avec un officier muni des mots de reconnaissance; que cet officier me donne la première partie de ces mots et reçoive de moi la seconde. Par là je crois, Monsieur le Chevalier, que toute possibilité de surprise est sauvée, de part et d’autre, sans qu’il y ait un seul instant de perdre par le Cérémonial de la reconnaissance.

Je suis, &c. &c. &c.
A. Hamilton.

A Monsieur le Chevalier de Ternay.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

Whippany, June 25, 1780.

Dear Baron:

The enemy, the day before yesterday, made a forward movement to Springfield, which they burnt, and retired to Elizabethtown Point. The same evening they crossed over to Staten Island; and there are a great many concurring circumstances which make it probable we shall next hear of them on the North River. As you are at West Point, the General wishes you to remain there until the present appearances come to some result. He has confidence in your judgment, and wishes you to give your advice and assistance to the commanding officer. As you have no command in the post, you can only do this in a private friendly way: but I dare say General Howe will be happy to consult you. You will consider this as a private letter, in which I rather convey you the General’s wishes than his commands.

All the army is in march toward you, and will be at Pompton this evening.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully and affectionately,
Your humble servant,
Alex. Hamilton.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head-Quarters, Ramapo, June 30, 1780.

Agreeably to your request, my dear Baron, I communicated your project to the General. Happily the inactivity of the enemy has given us time to make dispositions which render the calling out of the militia unnecessary; and the whole has been accordingly countermanded.

The General requests that when you have completed the object of your errand in your department, and put things in train, you will rejoin the army.

I wrote you a line from Whippany, of which you made no mention.

I have the honor to be, yours,
A. H.

HAMILTON TO BARON STEUBEN.

Head-Quarters, July 23, 1780.

I have received, my dear Baron, your two letters of the sixteenth and eighteenth. On the formation of the Light Infantry, the General has already written to you. I presume it will be, ultimately, nearly as you have proposed.

Smith set out, some days since, to join you. Bradford, I am told, is undecided about entering into the office. Col. Scammel has promised to bring him to me; and if he accepts, we will forward him. I believe Prescott will be appointed in the Light Infantry. _Entre nous_, ’tis not easy to find good Majors for this corps in the Massachusetts Line; and as it will act a good deal with the French troops, we wish it (for this additional reason) to be well officered. Prescott will answer the purpose: but he is not yet to know that he is in contemplation. We shall not long continue in our present position. The distinctions of departments are an old story, which now do not exist except with respect to South Carolina. You are with a detachment of the main army.

I dare say all you are doing will be found right. I shall join my _beau-pere_ to save you from the cord. The arrangement for your department was unfortunately sent to Congress soon after you went from here; with the most pressing instances to determine upon it without delay. We have heard nothing of it since. We have repeated our _prayers_ and _exhortations_. If we get no answer in three or four days, we must determine for ourselves.

Major Francis is returned from Philadelphia; but I have not seen him since the arrival of your letters. I will move the inquiry you wish, when I see him. Can you do any thing for him in your department?

A severe stroke upon us, is, that our arms, expected from France, are not arrived. I do not know how we shall be able to arm our recruits.

Graves sailed from the Hook the nineteenth. We had been playing off and on two days.

Adieu, my dear Baron, and believe me always, with the most respectful attachment,

Your humble servant,
A. H.

BAUMAN TO HAMILTON.

West Point, August 13, 1780.

Dear Sir:

I cannot help laying before you a few of my thoughts, which lately have engrossed my whole attention, on the review of our changeable government at West Point. However, I hope you will make no other use of them but such as may be of advantage; and whatever may be improper, or improperly stated, impute to my inability only: and there you will please to let it rest, and take in good part what I shall say, as it proceeds from a zeal of affection to you, and from a regard to the cause I am engaged in. On this consideration you will excuse me, if any where I should seem to exceed those bounds which custom has prescribed to subalterns, when they treat of any thing, or adopt modes, to their superiors.

A continual change of commanding officers, or commandants, is, in my humble opinion, injurious to this post, and hurtful to the military duty, so absolutely requisite to be performed, and preserved in a garrison. As there is no nation at war which pursues the like mode excepting us; I am therefore induced, not only from this consideration, but from weighty experience during my station at this post, to offer an opinion of its impropriety, and bad consequences. The visible ill it creates; the damage to innumerable things; the irregularity it continually causes; and lastly, the total loss of the many thousands which have been, and daily are, expended on this national fabric, which inevitably must fall to pieces, unless an officer is fixed to this post (and who ought to be a competent judge of fortifications, and a military man), are matters which, I think, demand consideration.

A Town-Major, and a good Barrack-Master, are as necessary here, as the necessaries of life are. The former to regulate the duty and to keep up discipline in this jurisdiction: the latter to take care of the buildings, which must otherwise be destroyed. The next thing which falls to our attention, is the public provision, which has been, and daily is, exposed here to be lost, to be stolen, and to be damaged, for want of sufficient shelter and proper repositories. The troops have suffered, and still suffer, from these and other causes. They have been cheated in weights, in measure, and in their scanty allowance of fatigue rum; which I can attest, by being appointed, after my having represented the matter to General M’Dougall, to inspect into some of those abuses. Notwithstanding the many thousands of boards which came here, there are not sufficient for barracks, bunks, etc. For as fast as one thing is built up, another is torn down again. There is not, in all this garrison, a proper guard-house for the conveniency of soldiers, nor for the security of the criminals. No powder magazine, nor a store for the reception and reserve of the implements of war. In short, the whole appears, at present, under the care of ungovernable and undisciplined militia, like a wild Tartar’s camp, instead of that shining fortification all America thinks not only an insurmountable barrier against the incursion of its enemy, but likewise an easy defence in case of an unforeseen disaster of its army.

However, to return to my subject. The importance of those heads already mentioned, and their connection with those preceding, will, I hope, obtain your pardon for the digression into which they have led me; and to your discretion I shall leave what I state.

In a letter I wrote to General Knox some time last winter, among many things I had to say concerning the ordnance and myself, I made this remark, to wit: “That relieving of an officer from a garrison, is not like a relief in the field: for an officer who knows himself to be relieved, will leave many things undone for the next to do; which I have seen, heard, and experienced. Beside, after once every thing is to rights, the men then ought to desist from labor, and exercise the guns. But new commanding officers have chiefly new systems of defence, which add labor to labor, and nothing will be formed systematically.”

I have already stated these and more things minutely to the general officers here, who all agreed in their validity and propriety. But they, being all liable to immediate removal, there cannot be any thing formed into a permanent and regular system. Moreover, I have been informed, that owing to the mismanagement of their predecessors, they were obliged, after they had taken the command, to hunt for materials in order to build their own systems; and to issue orders upon orders, to acquaint themselves with those persons who have, as it were, in keeping, the several branches which flow into this department.

And let me once more, in confidence, assure you, that I suffer incessant pain from the sad state this garrison is in. To rectify defects, my dear sir, when roused to arms, can never be attainable. Therefore let me beg you to assist in adopting some plan which may be soldierly, for the good of the service: which, however, can be done in no other manner, but such as I have hinted to you. For let General Arnold have all the sagacity imaginable, it will take him some time to get himself well acquainted with the position and defence of this post; especially as there is not one single Continental officer left here who can in any way assist him. Every thing seems new here; and the very engineer is transferred from hence, on whom he, in some measure, could have depended for information, with regard to the weakest and strongest parts of this fortress. And I have not yet told you the one hundredth part of what I have to say upon some of these subjects; but I shall finish with prognosticating, that should ever capriciousness hold sway here, it may prove fatal to this post.

I am, with due respect, Sir,
Your most humble servant,
S. Bauman,
Major of Artillery.

DE MARBOIS TO HAMILTON.

Philadelphia, 21 Aout, 1780.

Je viens de recevoir mon cher Colonel votre lettre du 17 de ce mois. Vous m’y parlez de mes Frères comme si vous étiez sûr qu’ils sont en effet prisonniers. Avez-vous sur cet article plus de connaissance que je n’en ai, on m’avez-vous déjà écrit à ce sujet quelque lettre qui ne me serait point parvenue. Je vais écrire à M. de Ternay à ce sujet, mais en attendant je vous prie de vouloir bien me communiquer tous les éclaircissements que vous aurez pu vous procurer, et d’être persuadé que rien ne me touche plus que de leur procurer de soulagement s’ils sont en effet entre les mains de l’ennemi.

Si vous avez quelques nouvelles dernières touchant l’embarcation que M. le Général Clinton prépare, je vous prie de vouloir bien m’en instruire, cet article étant de la plus grande importance pour nous. Je vous embrasse de tout mon cœur.

De Marbois.

Col. Hamilton.

WILLIAMS TO HAMILTON.

Hillsborough, August 30, 1780.

Dear Hamilton:

About the twenty-third instant, I wrote my friend Harrison from Salisbury, giving him a very hasty particular account of the defeat of General Gates’s army at Sutton’s, near Campden, the sixteenth instant. We were truly unfortunate, and completely routed. The infamous cowardice of the militia of Virginia and North Carolina, gave the enemy every advantage over our few regular troops, whose firm opposition and gallant behavior have gained them the applause, as well of our successful foes, as of our runaway friends. If I mentioned to Col. Harrison the loss of two howitzers, I was mistaken. We had eight pieces of light artillery, with six ammunition wagons, which, with the greatest part of our baggage, were lost.

Our retreat was the most mortifying that could have happened. Those who escaped the dangers of the field, knew not where to find protection: the wounded found no relief from the inhabitants, who were immediately in arms against us; and many of our fugitive officers and men were disarmed by those faithless villains, who had flattered us with promises of joining us against the enemy. The tories are now assembling in different parts of the country; and there is actually a sort of partisan war waged between them and the whigs of this country.

The greatest part of our baggage was plundered by those who first left the field. The enemy took a part; and much of what escaped them, has been pillaged by the inhabitants on the retreat. The wagon horses have been stolen, and frequently taken from the drivers; and some of those desperate rascals have been daring enough to fire upon parties of our regular troops many miles from the place of action.

General Gates used the utmost expedition in getting from the lost field to this place. As this step is unaccountable to me, you must expect to know the reason another time, and from better authority. An unfortunate General usually loses the confidence of his army; and this is much the case with us at present. However, I suppose every thing necessary will be done, in justification of the steps that have been taken, and then all will be understood. Beside my ignorance, there is another reason for my silence on this subject. The General is extremely mortified at the disappointment his hopes have met with; and I think it ungenerous to oppress dejected spirits by a premature censure.

The legislature of this State is now sitting at this place, and devising means of defending the country. The General has exhibited estimates (he informs me) of the supplies wanting to carry on the campaign, both to the legislature of this State, and to Virginia; and hopes they will be furnished. The officers of North Carolina talk confidently of re-embodying a great number of militia. General Stephens had collected about eight hundred of the Virginia militia at this place since the action. But I am sorry to add, at least half that number have deserted. The Maryland Division, including the Delaware regiment, will, I hope, muster six hundred when all are collected. Part are now here: a party are with General Smallwood at Ellis’s Ferry, Adkin river; and a small party with Major Anderson, who General Smallwood left some time at Charlotte, to receive the fugitives as they arrived. But this is the place of general rendezvous.

From the best accounts I can get, Lord Cornwallis had with him, on the day of battle, the seventy-first, sixty-third, thirty-third, and twenty-third British regiments; a corps of Hessians, Tarlton’s legion, and some new levies, amounting to about three thousand men. Our numbers were very little greater; and our force will not be imagined so great, by those who are informed of our long march in a barren country, with very little other subsistence than a short allowance of fresh beef, green corn, apples, and peaches.

As soon as I recover from a relaxation of spirits, which is all my present complaint, I will write you again, and inform you that we are resolved not to despair, but bear our fortunes like veterans in the South; while you, like heroes in the North, win and wear the laurels of the present campaign. Present my most respectful compliments to the General, whom I love; to all my friends at head quarters and in camp. Not a man among you have been generous enough to write a single sentence to

Your sincere friend and servant,
O. H. Williams.

I mentioned the surprise of General Sumpter’s party, which happened the sixteenth instant, in my last.

HAMILTON TO JAMES DUANE.

Liberty Pole, September 8, 1780.

Dear Sir:

Agreeably to your request, and my promise, I sit down to give you my ideas of the defects of our present system, and the changes necessary to save us from ruin. They may, perhaps, be the reveries of a projector, rather than the sober views of a politician. You will judge of them, and make what use you please of them.

The fundamental defect is a want of power in Congress. It is hardly worth while to show in what this consists, as it seems to be universally acknowledged; or to point out how it has happened, as the only question is how to remedy it. It may, however, be said, that it has originated from three causes; an excess of the spirit of liberty, which has made the particular States show a jealousy of all power not in their own hands; and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety, or necessity; a diffidence, in Congress, of their own powers, by which they have been timid and indecisive in their resolutions: constantly making concessions to the States, till they have scarcely left themselves the shadow of power; a want of sufficient means at their disposal to answer the public exigencies, and of vigor to draw forth those means; which have occasioned them to depend on the States individually, to fulfil their engagements with the army; the consequence of which, has been to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to establish its dependence on each State separately, rather than _on them_, that is, rather than on the whole collectively.

It may be pleaded, that Congress had never any definite powers granted them, and, of course, could exercise none, could do nothing more than recommend. The manner in which Congress was appointed, would warrant, and the public good required, that they should have considered themselves as vested with full power _to preserve the republic from harm_. They have done many of the highest acts of sovereignty, which were always cheerfully submitted to: The declaration of independence; the declaration of war: the levying of an army; creating a navy; emitting money; making alliances with foreign powers; appointing a dictator, etc., etc. All these implications of a complete sovereignty were never disputed, and ought to have been a standard for the whole conduct of administration. Undefined powers are discretionary powers, limited only by the object for which they were given; in the present case, the independence and freedom of America. The Confederation made no difference; for as it has not been generally adopted, it had no operation. But from what I recollect of it, Congress have even descended from the authority which the spirit of that act gives them; while the particular States have no further attended to it, than as it suited their pretensions and convenience. It would take too much time to enter into particular instances, each of which separately might appear inconsiderable; but united, are of serious import. I only mean to remark, not to censure.

But the Confederation itself is defective, and requires to be altered. It is neither fit for war nor peace. The idea of an uncontrollable sovereignty, in each State, over its internal police, will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious. There are instances without number, where Acts, necessary for the general good, and which rise out of the powers given to Congress, must interfere with the internal police of the States; and there are as many instances in which the particular States, by arrangements of internal police, can effectually, though indirectly, counteract the arrangements of Congress. You have already had examples of this, for which I refer you to your own memory.

The Confederation gives the States, individually, too much influence in the affairs of the army. They should have nothing to do with it. The entire formation and disposal of our military forces, ought to belong to Congress. It is an essential cement of the union: and it ought to be the policy of Congress, to destroy all ideas of State attachments in the army, and make it look up wholly to them. For this purpose, all appointments, promotions, and provisions, whatsoever, ought to be made by them. It may be apprehended that this may be dangerous to liberty. But nothing appears more evident to me, than that we run much greater risk of having a weak and disunited federal government, than one which will be able to usurp upon the rights of the people.

Already some of the lines of the army would obey their States in opposition to Congress, notwithstanding the pains we have taken to preserve the unity of the army. If any thing would hinder this, it would be the personal influence of the General; a melancholy and mortifying consideration.

The forms of our State constitutions, must always give them great weight in our affairs, and will make it too difficult to bend them to the pursuit of a common interest; too easy to oppose whatever they do not like: and to form partial combinations subversive of the general one. There is a wide difference between our situation, and that of an empire under one simple form of government, distributed into counties, provinces, or districts, which have no legislatures, but merely magistratical bodies, to execute the laws of a common sovereign. Here the danger is, that the sovereign will have too much power, and oppress the parts of which it is composed. In our case, that of an empire composed of confederated States; each with a government completely organized within itself, having all the means to draw its subjects to a close dependence on itself; the danger is directly the reverse. It is, that the common sovereign will not have power sufficient to unite the different members together, and direct the common forces to the interest and happiness of the whole.

The leagues among the old Grecian republics are a proof of this. They were continually at war with each other; and, for want of union, fell a prey to their neighbors. They frequently held general councils; but their resolutions were no further observed, than as they suited the interests and inclinations of all the parties; and, at length, they sunk entirely into contempt.

The Swiss Cantons are another proof of the doctrine. They have had wars with each other, which would have been fatal to them, had not the different powers, in their neighborhood, been too jealous of one another, and too equally matched, to suffer either to take advantage of their quarrels. That they have remained so long united at all, is to be attributed to their weakness, to their poverty, and to the causes just mentioned. These ties will not exist in America; a little time hence, some of the States will be powerful empires; and we are so remote from other nations, that we shall have all the leisure and opportunity we can wish, to cut each other’s throats.

The Germanic corps might also be cited as an example in favor of the position.

The United Provinces may be thought to be one against it. But the family of the Stadtholders, whose authority is interwoven with the whole Government, has been a strong link of union between them. Their physical necessities, and the habits founded upon them, have contributed to it.

Each province is too inconsiderable, by itself, to undertake any thing. An analysis of their present constitutions, would show that they have many ties which would not exist in ours; and that they are by no means a proper model for us.

Our own experience should satisfy us. We have felt the difficulty of drawing out the resources of the country, and inducing the States to combine in equal exertions for the common cause.

The ill success of our last attempt is striking. Some have done a great deal; others little, or scarcely any thing. The disputes about boundaries, etc., testify how flattering a prospect we have of future tranquillity, if we do not frame, in time, a confederacy capable of deciding the differences, and compelling the obedience of the respective members.

The Confederation, too, gives the power of the purse too entirely to the State Legislatures. It should provide perpetual funds, in the disposal of Congress, by a land tax, poll tax, or the like. All imposts upon commerce ought to be laid by Congress, and appropriated to their use. For, without certain revenues, a Government can have no power. That power which holds the purse-strings absolutely, must rule. This seems to be a medium which, without making Congress altogether independent, will tend to give reality to its authority.

Another defect in our system, is want of method and energy in the administration. This has partly resulted from the other defect; but in a great degree from prejudice, and the want of a proper executive. Congress have kept the power too much in their own hands, and have meddled too much with details of every sort. Congress is, properly, a deliberative corps; and it forgets itself when it attempts to play the executive. It is impossible such a body, numerous as it is, constantly fluctuating, can ever act with sufficient decision, or with system. Two-thirds of the members, one half the time, cannot know what has gone before them, or what connection the subject in hand has to what has been transacted on former occasions. The members who have been more permanent, will only give information that promotes the side they espouse in the present case; and will as often mislead as enlighten. The variety of business must distract; and the proneness of every assembly to debate, must at all times delay.

Lately, Congress, convinced of these inconveniences, have gone into the measure of appointing Boards. But this is, in my opinion, a bad plan.

A single man, in each department of the administration, would be greatly preferable. It would give us a chance of more knowledge, more activity, more responsibility, and, of course, more zeal and attention. Boards partake of a part of the inconveniences of larger assemblies. Their decisions are slower, their energy less, their responsibility more diffused. They will not have the same abilities and knowledge as an administration by single men. Men of the first pretensions will not so readily engage in them; because they will be less conspicuous, of less importance, have less opportunity of distinguishing themselves. The members of Boards will take less pains to inform themselves and arrive to eminence, because they have fewer motives to do it. All these reasons conspire to give a preference to the plan of vesting the great executive departments of the State in the hands of individuals. As these men will be, of course, at all times under the direction of Congress, we shall blend the advantages of a Monarchy and Republic in our constitution.

A question has been made, whether single men could be found to undertake these offices. I think they could; because there would be then every thing to excite the ambition of candidates. But, in order to this, Congress, by their manner of appointing them, and the line of duty marked out, must show that they are in earnest in making these officers, officers of real trust and importance.

I fear a little vanity has stood in the way of these arrangements, as though they would lessen the importance of Congress, and leave them nothing to do. But they would have precisely the same rights and powers as heretofore, happily disencumbered of the detail. They would have to inspect the conduct of their ministers, deliberate upon their plans, originate others for the public good; only observing this rule: that they ought to consult their ministers, and get all the information and advice they could from them, before they entered into any new measures, or made changes in the old.

A third defect is, the fluctuating constitution of our army. This has been a pregnant source of evil: all our military misfortunes, three-fourths of our civil embarrassments, are to be ascribed to it. The General has so fully enumerated the mischiefs of it, in a letter of the , to Congress, that I could only repeat what he has said, and will therefore refer you to that letter.

The imperfect and unequal provision made for the army, is a fourth defect, which you will find delineated in the same letter. Without a speedy change, the army must dissolve. It is now a mob, rather than an army; without clothing, without pay, without provision, without morals, without discipline. We begin to hate the country for its neglect of us. The country begin to hate us for our oppressions of them. Congress have long been jealous of us. We have now lost all confidence in them, and give the worst construction to all they do. Held together by the slenderest ties, we are ripening for a dissolution.

The present mode of supplying the army, by State purchases, is not one of the least considerable defects of our system. It is too precarious a dependence; because the States will never be sufficiently impressed with our necessities. Each will make its own ease a primary object; the supply of the army a secondary one. The variety of channels through which the business is transacted, will multiply the number of persons employed, and the opportunities of embezzling public money. From the popular spirit on which most of the Governments turn, the State agents will be men of less character and ability: nor will there be so rigid a responsibility among them, as there might easily be among those in the employ of the Continent; of course, not so much diligence, care, or economy. Very little of the money raised in the several States, will go into the Continental treasury, on pretence, that it is all exhausted in providing the quotas of supplies; and the public will be without funds for the other demands of Government. The expense will be ultimately much greater, and the advantages much smaller. We actually feel the insufficiency of this plan; and have reason to dread, under it, a ruinous extremity of want.

These are the principal defects, in the present system, that now occur to me. There are many inferior ones, in the organization of particular departments, and many errors of administration, which might be pointed out; but the task would be troublesome and tedious: and if we had once remedied those I have mentioned, the others would not be attended with much difficulty.

I shall now propose the remedies, which appear to me applicable to our circumstances, and necessary to extricate our affairs from their present deplorable situation. The first step must be, to give Congress powers competent to the public exigencies. This may happen in two ways: one, by resuming and exercising the discretionary powers I suppose to have been originally vested in them, for the safety of the States; and resting their conduct on the candor of their countrymen, and the necessity of the conjuncture: the other, by calling immediately a Convention of all the States, with full authority to conclude finally upon a General Confederation; stating to them, beforehand, explicitly, the evils arising from a want of power in Congress, and the impossibility of supporting the contest on its present footing; that the delegates may come, possessed of proper sentiments, as well as proper authority, to give efficacy to the meeting. Their commission should include a right of vesting Congress with the whole, or a proportion, of the unoccupied lands, to be employed for the purpose of raising a revenue: reserving the jurisdiction to the States by whom they are granted.

The first plan, I expect, will be thought too bold an expedient, by the generality of Congress; and, indeed, their practice hitherto, has so riveted the opinion of their want of power, that the success of this experiment may very well be doubted.

I see no objection to the other mode, that has any weight, in competition with the reasons for it. The Convention should assemble the first of November next. The sooner the better. Our disorders are too violent to admit of a common or lingering remedy. The reasons for which I require them to be vested with plenipotentiary authority, are, that the business may suffer no delay in the execution; and may, in reality, come to effect. A Convention may agree upon a Confederation: the States, individually, hardly ever will. We must have one at all events, and a vigorous one, if we mean to succeed in the contest, and be happy hereafter. As I said before, to engage the States to comply with this mode, Congress ought to confess to them, plainly and unanimously, the impracticability of supporting our affairs on the present footing, and without a solid coercive union. I ask, that the Convention should have a power of vesting the whole, or a part, of the unoccupied lands in Congress; because it is necessary that body should have some property, as a fund for the arrangements of finance; and I know of no other kind that can be given them.

The Confederation, in my opinion, should give Congress complete sovereignty; except as to that part of internal police, which relates to the rights of property and life among individuals, and to raising money by internal taxes. It is necessary that every thing belonging to this, should be regulated by the State legislatures. Congress should have complete sovereignty in all that relates to war, peace, trade, finance; and to the management of foreign affairs; the right of declaring war; of raising armies, officering, paying them, directing their motions in every respect; of equipping fleets, and doing the same with them; of building fortifications, arsenals, magazines, etc., etc.; of making peace on such conditions as they think proper; of regulating trade, determining with what countries it shall be carried on; granting indulgencies; laying prohibitions on all the articles of export, or import; imposing duties; granting bounties and premiums for raising, exporting, or importing, and applying to their own use, the product of these duties; only giving credit to the States on whom they are raised, in the general account of revenues and expenses; instituting Admiralty Courts, etc.; of coining money; establishing Banks on such terms, and with such privileges, as they think proper; appropriating funds, and doing whatever else relates to the operations of finance; transacting every thing with foreign nations; making alliances, offensive and defensive; treaties of commerce, etc., etc.

The Confederation should provide certain perpetual revenues, productive, and easy of collection; a land tax, poll tax, or the like; which, together with the duties on trade, and the unlocated lands, would give Congress a substantial existence, and a stable foundation for their schemes of finance. What more supplies were necessary, should be occasionally demanded of the States, in the present mode of quotas.

The second step I would recommend, is, that Congress should instantly appoint the following great officers of State. A Secretary for Foreign Affairs, a President of War, a President of Marine, a Financier, a President of Trade. Instead of this last, a Board of Trade may be preferable, as the regulations of trade are slow and gradual; and require prudence and experience more than other qualities; for which Boards are very well adapted.

Congress should choose for these offices, men of the first abilities, property, and character, in the Continent; and such as have had the best opportunities of being acquainted with the several branches. General Schuyler, whom you mentioned, would make an excellent President of War; General M’Dougall a very good President of Marine. Mr. Robert Morris would have many things in his favor for the department of finance. He could, by his own personal influence, give great weight to the measures he should adopt. I dare say men, equally capable, may be found for the other departments.

I know not if it would not be a good plan to let the Financier be President of the Board of Trade; but he should only have a casting voice in determining questions there. There is a connection between trade and finance, which ought to make the director of one acquainted with the other; but the Financier should not direct the affairs of trade, because, for the sake of acquiring reputation by increasing the revenues, he might adopt measures that would depress trade. In what relates to finance, he should be alone.

These officers should have nearly the same powers and functions as those in France analogous to them: and each should be Chief in his department; with subordinate Boards, composed of assistants, clerks, etc., to execute his orders.

In my opinion, a plan of this kind would be of inconceivable utility to our affairs: its benefits would be very speedily felt. It would give new life and energy to the operations of Government. Business would be conducted with dispatch, method, and system. A million of abuses, now existing, would be corrected; and judicious plans would be formed and executed for the public good.

Another step of immediate necessity, is, to recruit the army for the war, or at least for three years. This must be done by a mode similar to that which is practised in Sweden. There the inhabitants are thrown into classes of sixteen; and when the sovereign wants men, each of these classes must furnish one. They raise a fixed sum of money; and if one of the class is willing to become a soldier, he receives the money and offers himself a volunteer. If none is found to do this, a draught is made; and he on whom the lot falls, receives the money, and is obliged to serve.

The minds of the people are prepared for a thing of this kind. The heavy bounties they have been obliged to pay for men to serve a few months, must have disgusted them with this mode, and made them desirous of another, that will, once for all, answer the public purposes, and obviate a repetition of the demand. It ought, by all means, to be attempted; and Congress should frame a general plan, and press the execution upon the States.

When the Confederation comes to be framed, it ought to provide for this by a fundamental law; and hereafter there would be no doubt of the success.

But we cannot now wait for this. We want to replace the men whose times of service will expire the first of January: for then, without this, we shall have no army remaining; and the enemy may do what they please. The General, in his letter already quoted, has assigned the most substantial reasons for paying immediate attention to this point.

Congress should endeavor, both upon their credit in Europe, and by every possible exertion in this country, to provide clothing for their officers; and should abolish the whole system of State supplies. The making good the depreciation of the currency, and all other compensations to the army, should be immediately taken up by Congress, and not left to the States. If they would have the accounts of depreciation liquidated, and governmental certificates given for what is due, in specie, or an equivalent to specie, it would give satisfaction; appointing periodical settlements for future depreciation.

The placing the officers upon half-pay during life, would be a great stroke of policy; and would give Congress a stronger tie upon them than any thing else they can do. No man, that reflects a moment, but will prefer a permanent provision of this kind to any temporary compensation. Nor is it opposed to economy: the difference between this, and between what has already been done, will be insignificant. The benefit of it to the widows should be confined to those whose husbands die during the war. As to the survivors, not more than one half, on the usual calculation of men’s lives, will exceed the seven years for which the half-pay is already established. Beside this, whatever may be the visionary speculations of some men at this time, we shall find it indispensable, after the war, to keep on foot a considerable body of troops: and all the officers, retained for this purpose, must be deducted out of the half-pay list. If any one will take the pains to calculate the expense of these principles, I am persuaded he will find the addition of expense, from the establishment proposed, by no means a national object.

The advantages of securing the attachment of the army to Congress, and binding them to the service by substantial ties, are immense. We should then have discipline; an army in reality, as well as in name. Congress would then have a solid basis of authority and consequence: for, to me, it is an axiom, that in our constitution, an army is essential to the American Union.

The providing of supplies, is the pivot of every thing else (though a well-constituted army would, not in a small degree, conduce to this, by giving consistency and weight to Government). There are four ways, all of which must be united: A foreign loan; heavy pecuniary taxes; a tax in kind; a Bank founded on public and private credit.

As to a foreign loan, I dare say Congress are doing every thing in their power to obtain it. The most effectual way will be to tell France, that, without it, we must make terms with Great Britain. This must be done with plainness and firmness; but with respect, and without petulance; not as a menace, but as a candid declaration of our circumstances.

We need not fear to be deserted by France. Her interest and honor are too deeply involved in our fate; and she can make no possible compromise. She can assist us, if she is convinced it is absolutely necessary; either by lending us, herself, or by becoming our surety, or by influencing Spain. It has been to me astonishing, how any man could have doubted, at any period of our affairs, of the necessity of a foreign loan. It was self-evident, that we had not a fund of wealth in this country capable of affording revenues equal to the expenses. We must then create artificial revenues, or borrow. The first was done; but it ought to have been foreseen that the expedient could not last, and we should have provided in time for its failure.

Here was an error of Congress. I have good reason to believe, that measures were not taken, in earnest, early enough to procure a loan abroad. I give you my honor, that from our first outset, I thought as I do now, and wished for a foreign loan; not only because I foresaw it would be essential, but because I considered it as a tie upon the nation from which it was derived, and as a mean to prop our cause in Europe.

Concerning the necessity of heavy pecuniary taxes, I need say nothing; as it is a point in which every body is agreed. Nor is there any danger, that the product of any taxes, raised in this way, will overburthen the people, or exceed the wants of the public. Indeed, if all the paper in circulation were drawn annually into the treasury, it would neither do one nor the other.

As to a tax in kind, the necessity of it results from this principle: that the money in circulation is not a sufficient representative of the productions of the country; and, consequently, no revenues, raised from it as a medium, can be a competent representative of that part of the products of the country which it is bound to contribute to the support of the public. The public, therefore, to obtain its due, or satisfy its just demands, and its wants, must call for a part of those products themselves. This is done in all those countries which are not commercial: in Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, etc., and is peculiarly necessary in our case.

Congress, in calling for specific supplies, seem to have had this in view; but their intention has not been answered. The States, in general, have undertaken to furnish supplies by purchase; a mode, as I have observed, attended with every inconvenience, and subverting the principle on which the supplies were demanded; the insufficiency of our circulating medium as a representative for the labor and commodities of the country. It is therefore necessary that Congress should be more explicit; should form the outlines of a plan for a tax in kind, and recommend it to the States as a measure of absolute necessity.