Chapter IX: Letter 8

_Slight hopes of peace—State of the war—The situation of General
Taylor._

JANUARY, 1847.

SIR: When Santa Anna declares, that there can be no negotiations
for peace until the _national_ territory shall have been
evacuated by the troops of the United States, he means by the
_national_ territory, from the Rio Grande to the Sabine, as well
as those portions of Mexico, which we now hold by invasion. Not
a single official declaration on the part of the Mexican
Government can be produced, in which any other boundary than the
Sabine is even supposed. In the last proclamation of Almonte,
this is the only boundary acknowledged by him. As long as this
is maintained by Mexico, peace is impossible. The Rio Grande was
the boundary of the Province of Texas, under the Spanish
Government, and as such, was claimed, both by France and the
United States, as part of Louisiana, under the treaty of
Ildefonso, when ceded by Spain. It is the boundary claimed by
Texas after her separation from Tamaulipas and Coawilla, with
which Texas had, for a time, been united, to form a State of the
Mexican confederacy; and on separating from that confederacy,
she returned to the ancient limits. It is this ancient Texas we
claim, and not the Texas arranged in connection with Tamaulipas
and Coawilla. But Santa Anna and Almonte now acknowledge no
boundary but the Sabine, notwithstanding their treaty with
Texas, expressly establishing the Rio Grande.

Persons not reflecting on our present position, as respects our
enemy, exclaim, “let us make peace—let us put an end to this
unfortunate war”. This supposes, that it is _in our power_ at
any moment, to make peace, when, from the very declarations of
Mexico, she is unwilling to treat with us, unless we first
acknowledge ourselves vanquished, and agree to retire, yielding
every thing we have been contending for! ONE may make war, but
it takes TWO or more, to make peace. We may, indeed, fall back
on the Rio Grande, and then to the Sabine, thus exposing
ourselves to the contempt and derision of the world; and there
are well meaning people, who propose this course. But, judging
from a knowledge of human nature, it is not difficult to
perceive, that the great majority of the people of the United
States will never consent to such a degrading submission, even
if it were prudent, as a mere matter of interest, which it is
plainly not, however it may be recommended by abstract
considerations of moral or religious duty, or rather of sickly
sentimentality.

Let us consider what are the steps to be taken to bring about
negotiations for peace. The olive branch ought to be continually
held out to the enemy; and our agents should not be prevented by
pride or offended dignity, from renewing at every moment, the
offer to treat. It would be magnanimous on our part, and also
continue us in the right. Suppose the proposition come from
Mexico, what will it be, and how made? It is not probable that
commissioners will be sent direct to Washington, or invited from
us, to Mexico. A communication may be addressed to our
Government declaring a willingness to treat, in all probability,
clogged with conditions of the withdrawal of our naval and
military forces, and proposing an armistice pending
negotiations. To the latter, we cannot accede, without giving
decided advantage to the enemy. The evacuation of the country we
now hold would not be listened to for a moment; it would at once
be yielding all the advantages we have gained at so much cost,
as the _means of coercing Mexico to treat of peace_. The attempt
at negotiation may thus fail at various stages, and it may fail
entirely; at all events, there will be unavoidable delay. There
is nothing before us, at present, but as a vigorous prosecution
of the war, _and at the same time, preparations on a much larger
scale than we have hitherto made_.

What is the state of the war at this moment? We have made
wonderful progress, if not towards conquest, at least, towards
bringing the enemy to terms. But we are obliged to keep up three
very extensive lines, without speaking of California and New
Mexico. The first, is along the Rio Grande, from Presidio to
Matamoras, of seven hundred miles; the next, that from Comargo
to Monterey; and the third, from Tampico to the same place, a
distance of nearly six hundred. It is absolutely necessary to
keep up the two first, in order to furnish supplies for our
troops in all their operations; although, since the occupation
of Tampico, a portion of these may be obtained from that
quarter. But, between the mountains and the river, there is an
enemy’s country, which, although thinly inhabited, is capable of
interrupting our communications by their rancheros, aided by
Mexican troops, and led by Mexican officers, even if they cannot
bring a sufficient force at any point, to meet ours in the
field. We hear of large bodies of irregular cavalry, which may
prove formidable in case the war be prolonged. This kind of
force, thus far, appears to have been much overrated, but it may
take lessons from us, and improve. Their horses, although small,
may be better trained, and their riders, equal to any in the
world, may be provided with better arms—the sabre, and pistol,
and carbine, instead of the lance and lasso.

It was supposed that there were but two passes through the
mountains to the table land; but a third, that of Tula, near
Victoria, is now spoken of. This river, appears to penetrate the
great barrier between Tampico and Monterey, and takes its rise
in the table land, between San Luis, and Zacatecas. It is
possible, that the army of Santa Anna may, by this route, keep
open a communication with the valley of the Rio Grande, and even
send large reinforcements of cavalry and infantry through this
pass, so as to threaten our lines on the Rio Grande and Tampico.
According to the last accounts, our troops were marching towards
Victoria. I should think it all important to take possession of
that pass, and close it completely.

There are still paragraphs in the papers, speaking of the
intended march from Monterey, or Tampico, to San Luis. I think
this highly improbable. It will be unsafe for us to move until
we are completely masters of the whole country between the river
and the mountains, and of all the passes to the table land. It
would not do to leave this country in our rear, with all our
military depots, but weakly guarded. Of one thing I will speak
with confidence; that we shall need all the troops we have on
the present scene of operations, and all we shall be able to
send for some time. The descent on Vera Cruz, which is said to
be in preparation, under the immediate direction of the
commander in chief, General Scott, will require, at least,
twenty thousand men, and if any considerable proportion be
withdrawn from General Taylor, it will leave him in a very
perilous situation. What is to prevent Santa Anna from making
his head quarters at Victoria? It is said, that cannon cannot be
transported by the Tula pass. This may, or may not be. Things
deemed impossible have been accomplished by men of bold and
enterprising spirit, as he is said to be. Napoleon crossed the
Alps in spite of impossibilities, and appeared suddenly in the
plains of Lombardy; and I should think the difficulties a
hundred times greater than would be encountered by the Mexican
Napoleon. I confess, I entertain serious apprehensions for our
troops, although of the best materials, and admirably commanded.

Santa Anna has, at this moment, a great advantage; he is posted
at San Luis with an army of twenty-five or thirty thousand men.
Thus concentrated at one point, he will be enabled to strike,
with his whole force, or the greater part of it, at Tampico,
Saltillo, or Victoria, while our forces, are necessarily divided
into comparatively small bodies. He can act with perfect
secrecy, in a friendly country, and with a perfect knowledge of
all our movements, while we are ignorant of his. If he should
attack us with his whole force at any one point, he may roll
back the tide of war, and drive us beyond the Rio Grande. Under
present circumstances, instead of weakening our lines, prudence
requires that we should strengthen them.

Looking to the hazzards of war, and the _dangers_ following on
conquests, the idea has suggested itself, of inviting the States
of the lower Rio Grande to establish a separate confederacy,
under our protection; and if Mexico persists in refusing to
treat, then, to enter into a treaty of peace, alliance, and
limits with this new confederacy, thus indemnifying ourselves
for Mexican spoliations, by taking California and New Mexico,
with the right of way to Mazatlan, and leaving Mexico to repent
of her folly at leisure.

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