Chapter XI: Letter 10
_Annexation of Texas—The suspension of diplomatic relations, the
immediate causes of the war._
FEBRUARY, 1847.
SIR: In these letters, I have endeavored to repress all party
feeling, thinking it a duty, in a contest with a foreign nation,
in time of actual war, to take the side of my country, unless so
grossly and palpably in the wrong, as to admit of no
justification or defence. I repeat, that it is my sincere
conviction, that justice is on our side, and this after as full,
and dispassionate an examination of the subject as I am able to
bestow. The contrary, is generally assumed, or taken for
granted, by the party to which I belong; and yet the speech of
Mr. Webster, at Philadelphia, which expresses the same opinion,
is highly applauded. He condemns the administration of Mr. Polk,
(not the cause of the country,) solely on the ground of bringing
on a state of actual hostilities, without the previous
approbation of Congress, while he admits, that Mexico is in the
wrong in the causes which led to it the annexation of Texas. But
the act of the President, is a domestic question between him and
American people. The causes previously existing, and which would
have justified Congress in making war, constitute a different
question from that of expediency, or of the distribution of
powers, under the Constitution. He concedes, that if the
constituted authorities of the Union had thought proper to
resort to this course, there was ample cause to justify it. To
this, I assent, and will endeavor to give the reasons on which
my opinion is founded, according to my view of the subject;
professing, at the same time, a sincere respect for the opinion
of those who may differ from me. I admit that the march from the
Nueces to the Rio Grande, had the effect of _hastening_
hostilities; but, in my opinion, it did do more than hasten, for
the appeal of arms was inevitable on the annexation of Texas,
unless Mexico receded entirely from the ground she had taken; of
which, I did not see the slightest probability, unless compelled
to do so, by the consequences of war, whether begun by her or by
us.
Mexico denounces the war as being aggressive on our part, but in
all the official State Papers of the high functionaries of that
Republic, (I do not refer to subordinate officers or generals,)
in all their manifestos, that aggression is distinctly declared
to _be the annexation of Texas_. It was on this ground, that she
put an end to all diplomatic intercourse, after having
previously announced that she would consider annexation as
equivalent to a declaration of war, on our part. It was on this
ground, that she refused to _resume_ a diplomatic intercourse,
and enter into negotiation for a peaceful adjustment of existing
differences, until satisfaction should first be made for the
alleged wrong. She has not limited her complaints of alleged
aggression to the march of our troops to the Rio Grande; her
complaint is, the being deprived of her province of Texas, which
she will never renounce; and she declares her determination
never to listen to overtures of peace, until that province shall
be evacuated by us. Has she, on any occasion, shown a
willingness to accept any other boundary than the Sabine? I have
seen no intimation of this kind, emanating from her President or
Congress. The contrary is unchangeably persisted in.[4] In fact,
it could not occur while she persists in her right to the whole
of Texas. The annexation is the _casus belli_ on the part of
Mexico—the paramount consideration—every thing else, is but
incidental, or subordinate. The very idea of fixing any other
boundary, would imply a relinquishment of her claim.
Footnote 4:
There is no distinct assertion of boundary in any of her
official papers down to the _war proclamation_ of the 23d of
April, 1846.
Now, that great statesman, Mr. Webster, has proved on various
occasions, and especially in his Philadelphia speech, that
annexation of Texas to the United States was no cause of war,
because Texas was as much an independent State as Mexico. The
act was no more a cause of war on the part of Mexico, than her
annexation to the United States would have been a cause of war
on the part of Texas. If Mr. Webster be correct, and I think
his argument unanswerable, was Mexico justifiable in the
course pursued by her towards us on account of that act? Was
she justifiable in withdrawing her minister, and ordering away
the minister of the United States? These were very high handed
and insulting measures, and attended, necessarily, with the
serious consequence of putting an end to all peaceful modes of
adjusting differences, and leaving the only alternatives of,
submission, or war, on our part. But, under the circumstances
in which Mexico was placed towards us, it was an act of gross
injustice, as well as insult. _She had a treaty obligation to
fulfil, in the payment of several millions, as the indemnity
for wrongs done to American citizens, and demands had been
made upon her for several millions more, which remained
unadjusted._ There was, also, a question of boundary to
settle—all these matters must be settled either peaceably, or
by war—if peaceably, the continuance, or re-establishment of
diplomatic intercourse, was indispensable. Her conduct was
like that of the debtor who cuts the acquaintance of his
creditor, and thinks by that means, to avoid fulfilling his
obligations. Let me ask, what would have been the course
pursued, (if placed in our situation,) by England or France,
or any other high minded Government? I ask any candid man to
say, whether they would have borne it as patiently as we have
done? I would ask whether there was as much forbearance shown
by us with Louis Philippe, on the subject of the French
indemnity, or with England in the Northern boundary, and
Oregon question? That nation assumes an awful responsibility,
which, like Mexico, puts an end to the peaceable ways of
diplomacy, leaving no alternative but horrid war, or base
submission. Mexico should have paid her debt before she put an
end to peaceful intercourse, and she could not do it without
injustice, while there were claims still depending. All
arguments drawn from considerations of forbearance, humanity,
generosity, expediency, are for ourselves—Mexico is entitled
to no part in them. In my estimation, the great _error_ of
Mexico, if so mild a term can be applied, consists in her
having terminated all peaceful modes of settling differences;
for, as there is no common arbiter between independent
nations, their differences in that case, must be settled by
war, or not at all.
I am again sustained, by the opinion of Mr. Webster, in respect
of the refusal of Mexico to the re-establishment of diplomatic
relations proposed by us; and again, in her refusal to meet the
more recent overtures for negotiation. The first improper
conduct of Mexico has been greatly aggravated by these acts. It
has been urged, that Mexico was willing to receive a
_commissioner_, to treat in relation to Texas. It is surprising
to me, that any one should not see the folly of this
proposition. It was only saying, “as you have wronged us, in the
annexation of Texas, we will permit you to offer us suitable
reparation, and this must precede all other matters between us.”
The ignorance and presumption of such an idea, is truly Mexican.
[5]If they were sincere in their desire to discuss the subject,
what objection could there be to receiving an ambassador,
clothed with full powers to settle all matters in dispute? What
right had Mexico to require us to _admit_, that annexation was
an aggression on her rights? There was no proposition to discuss
the question of _boundary_, as is frequently asserted, which
would be inconsistent with her pretensions. But even that could
be more fully settled by one having full authority, than by a
mere special commissioner, with limited powers. The whole was
but a diplomatic quibble—a deceitful evasion. In the opinion of
Mr. Webster, Mexico was wrong in putting an end to diplomatic
relations; she was wrong in rejecting our minister under a
frivolous pretext, and she continues in the wrong in rejecting
overtures of peace, after the commencement of hostilities. Here
was a direct advance on our part, superseding the necessity of
mediation, a measure only adopted to save the pride of either
party, in being the _first_ to propose a peace. In all this,
Mexico is in the wrong; and here is the whole question, as
between her and the United States. The degree of forbearance to
be shown, is a question for ourselves alone. The first blow was
struck by Mexico, unless the provocation of our march to the Rio
Grande, _be considered the first blow_. There is nothing left
for us, but to prosecute the war until Mexico shall be willing
to enter into peaceable negotiation. Some appear to think that
she would be most likely to re-establish diplomatic relations,
by our withdrawing our fleets and armies. But this would only be
an experiment, and might fail; and if it should fail, our work
would have to begin again. This was done when Mr. Slidell landed
at Vera Cruz, but without success. Can we place sufficient
confidence in Mexico, even after the most positive and distinct
assurances, and still less without any such assurances? For my
part, I have no confidence either in the good faith of her
present rulers, or in the stability of her Government. What,
then, is to be done? I see no way but to retain the advantages
we already possess, and to prosecute the war on her territory,
as other wars, under like circumstances, would be prosecuted by
other nations. What is there to prevent her from entering into
negotiations at once? Pride—folly—but we were not too proud to
negotiate with England, at the moment when the war was hottest.
At the very moment of signing the treaty of Ghent, the British
Commissioner supposed, and ours also, that the British troops
were in possession of Louisiana, and one of them observed to the
American Commissioner. “You have reason to be satisfied, for you
have now regained New Orleans.” The idea of falling back on the
Rio Grande, in the visionary hope of coaxing Mexico to make
peace, and then in case of her refusal, retaking Monterey and
Tampico, and the valley of the Rio Grande, would be like the
fisherman, who after having one good haul, throws back the best
fish into the sea, for the pleasure of retaking them!
Footnote 5:
Mr. Gallatin makes a strange mistake, when he says, that the
refusal, was to receiving a _resident minister_. The refusal
was on account of his not being a mere Commissioner on the
_single subject of Texas_! What reasonable objection could
there be to a resident minister, after a treaty of peace? And
if no such treaty were made, then the minister clothed with
those powers would take his _departure_, as a matter of
course. Mr. Gallatin speaks very _lightly_ of a _suspension_
of diplomatic intercourse! I regard this, under the
circumstance, as most serious. But there was more than
suspension; Mexico declared _all negotiations_ at an end, and
war was, therefore, the only alternative.
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Mexican letters written during the progress of the late war between the United States and Mexico, no. 1.Chapter XI: Letter 10
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