Chapter VI: Letter 5: Capitulation of Monterey—Ideas of conquests in Mexico

OCTOBER 26, 1846

SIR: When I wrote my last letter I had not seen the capitulation
of Monterey, at least the official report. It appears, that the
terms were conditional, and allow no more time than is
absolutely requisite for Gen. Taylor to make his arrangements
for ulterior movements. The city was taken by a forced march,
with only a part of the troops. The attempt to cast censure, by
indirection, on this meritorious officer, betrays a jealousy of
his growing popularity. The capture of Monterey is of immense
importance, as well on account of its being one of the keys of
Mexico, as on account of the vast amount of public property, in
arms and munitions captured, which Mexico is in no condition to
replace. That city was a stronghold under the Spaniards before
the Mexican revolution, and contained a great quantity of
cannon, transported with immense difficulty and expense, from
the city of Mexico. It was in fact, the metropolis of the
provinces of the Rio Grande; and if a new confederacy should be
formed by those States, it would be the seat of the federal
Government. In a few weeks, the sickly season will be over; the
surviving sick will be again fit for duty, the commissariat will
be enabled to complete its supplies, and transportation for the
army, considerable reinforcements will reach the seat of war,
and then we may expect an onward movement.

General Taylor having now gained a safe footing, must go to work
to consolidate his occupation, or if you will, his conquest of
the country between the Rio Grande, the mountains, and the Gulf.
This extensive tract of country, as large as Italy, and
resembling it in scenery, climate, and soil, is now cut off by
our arms and by its natural boundary, from the rest of Mexico.
It ought to be completely occupied, by fortifying the principal
points on the Rio Grande, the mountain passes of the Sierra
Madre, and also by the occupation of the chief towns of New
Leon, Coawilla, and Tamaulipas. Tampico, of course, must be
taken by a combined land and naval attack. It has a shallow sea
coast from Tampico to the mouth of the Rio Grande, of four
hundred miles, whilst it stretches east and west, between the
mountains and the river, nearly double that distance. Here is an
extent of surface equal to that from the Potomac to the Savannah
and east of the Appalachian chain. It is capable of containing
four millions of souls, and in the hands of Americans, would be
rapidly filled up by them and European emigrants. The climate is
said to be delightful, and much more temperate than might be
expected from its latitude. I have rated its population at five
hundred thousand; this estimate may be too high; but it is
possible, that the common estimate may be too low. The following
is that given by a recent pamphlet, including Chewawa:

New Leon, 100,000 Monterey, 15,000
Tamaulipas, 150,000 Tampico, 6,000
Coawilla, 125,000 Monclova, 3,000
Chewawa, 112,000 Chewawa, 30,000
──────
487,000

This population, it is true, is scattered over a very large
space, and more occupied in pastoral, than in agricultural
pursuits, with little trade or manufactures. Their flocks of
sheep and horned cattle, are immense, while they raise vast
numbers of horses and mules. Being shut out from all
communication with the Southern provinces, they can be conquered
by our arms, and made to stay conquered, by the American
emigrants who will immediately pour into every habitable
district. A small, well appointed regular army of five thousand
men, with an equal number of volunteers, replacing each other at
intervals, will be sufficient for the purpose.

The occupation of this important country, should be complete
before attempting any thing further. By grasping at too much, we
may fail to realize any thing. If our object be _conquest_, it
will be one of the greatest (even thus circumscribed) ever
effected by the same numerical force. After consolidating this
splendid acquisition, instead of marching on the city of Mexico,
I would take the course to Durango, and thence to Mazatlan, on
the Pacific, thus cutting off one half of the mine district, and
giving us a direct communication with that ocean, of such
immense importance to us in a commercial as well as political
point of view. If, however, the object be merely to _conquer a
peace_ with Mexico, the fear of losing at least one half of the
territory of the Republic, and the hope of regaining possession
of it, would be an inducement to treat, which nothing but the
most brutish stupidity can resist. I fear she will persist in
the same arrogant folly which induced her to declare, _that she_
_would be satisfied with no boundary short of the Sabine_. She
will not consent to receive back her territory by treaty, to the
Rio Grand—her wounded pride must be appeased by regaining it by
arms—and she will not consent under any circumstances, to yield
up California and Santa Fee! We shall be compelled, if she
persists in the determination, to hold to the line of the Sierra
Madre, and make our boundary from Tampico to Mazatlan. There is
no doubt that the administration would now gladly treat for the
boundary of the Rio Grand and a portion of Upper California. But
if Mexico persists in her obstinacy, we cannot retreat with
safety or honor; we may possibly be compelled to adopt the
tropic of Cancer, as the line from ocean to ocean, and thus add
to our confederacy a region as extensive as Europe.

But will England and France look with indifference on this vast
acquisition of territory? And suppose they shall be displeased,
what can they allege against us? The necessity of the conquest
will have been forced upon us by the refusal of Mexico to treat.
It is probable, that to the boundary of the Rio Grand, and to
the acquisition of a portion of California, with the barren
mountains and plains of New Mexico, they may be, comparatively,
indifferent. Not so with respect to the wholesale acquisition
just mentioned. But what can they say—what can they do? They
must address themselves to Mexico, and compel her to negotiate
with us, which she still persists in refusing, except on terms
which she knows it is impossible for us to concede. In the
meantime, let us not follow the example of our proud and
arrogant enemy, and refuse all friendly mediation which may lead
to an amicable adjustment on reasonable terms.

If, for the next three months, there should be no treaty of
peace with Mexico, I shall begin to fear we have entered upon an
experiment which may be attended with momentous consequences. It
will be a new and fearful career of conquest. I cannot agree
with those who propose a retreat; and I know that the American
people will never consent to it! Yet, I am well aware of the
danger to our confederacy, from such a conquest as that of all
Mexico. We must follow the war wherever it may lead; and if it
lead to victory it must end in conquest or a magnanimous peace,
when Mexico shall be at our feet.

------------------------------------------------------------------------