Chapter VII: Letter 6

_Difficulties of the conquest of Mexico. The acquisition of
California._

NOVEMBER 2, 1846.

SIR: The conquest of Mexico is talked of as a thing settled, and
yet, how few have examined the nature of the undertaking and the
difficulties to be encountered and overcome! To form some idea
of these, we must take into consideration the number of the
inhabitants and the extent of the country to be conquered. It is
true, the warlike character and resources of such a country, may
not be in proportion, as is the case with the Chinese, from
unwillingness to keep pace with other nations in the arts of
peace and war. The Mexicans are not in this condition; they
either have adopted or may adopt all the improvements in war, at
least, of modern European nations. Their military strength ought
to bear some proportion to their numbers and resources. If the
Indian population is destitute of patriotism, their religious
feelings and the influence of the priesthood, over them, ought,
in some measure, to supply the deficiency. Let us now consider,
what we may expect to encounter in the invasion of Mexico.

The population is estimated at eight millions; of these, five
millions are contained in a comparatively small space, of which
the capital is the centre. Four fifths of this number are Indian
peasantry; the others, either of the pure Spanish race or mixed
with the Indian. The whole Mexican territory is said to be a
million and a half of square miles—the whole of the portion
containing the five millions does not exceed three hundred
thousand square miles. The two roads, as already mentioned, are
from Saltillo and from Vera Cruz. Let us see what States and
population General Taylor would have to pass through, and then
we may form some idea of the kind of resistance he may meet, if
any defence at all be attempted:

_States._ _Chief
Cities._
Zacatecas, 272,000 Zacatecas, 40,000
Guanawhato, 500,000 Guanawhato, 60,000
San Louis, 250,000 San Louis, 25,000
Queretaro, 200,000 Queretaro, 30,000
Guadelahara, 800,000 Guadelahara, 90,000
Mexico, 1,500,000 Mexico, 200,000
──────
3,522,000

All the above States must be traversed or passed through—they
must be occupied in such a manner as to keep open the line of
march of the army. We must not think that our marches will be
similar to an insurrectionary movement among themselves. A
Mexican General, at the head of a column, approaches the city
of Mexico, or Guadelahara, a _pronunciamento_ takes places
among the soldiers and citizens, and they invite the insurgent
army to enter as friends and countrymen. If we look for such
_pronunciamentos_ in favor of an American invading army,
especially of heretics, we will be disappointed. There was
nothing of this at Monterey, and the further we penetrate to
the interior, the less there will be, of this kind of
fraternization.

But did not Cortez take the city of Mexico with only nine
hundred men? Not exactly; Cortez had, as his allies, two hundred
thousand Indian warriors, twenty thousand of whom were
Tlascalans, the bravest of that region. The taking the city
occupied seventy days, after a terrific slaughter. He divided
his army into four divisions, of fifty thousand each, entering
the city at different points, and leveling the houses in the
way, until the different armies met in the great square. Even if
the Mexican armies should avoid pitched battles, they can
fortify strong natural positions, and being well provided with
artillery, and having good engineers, it would be strange if
they did not avail themselves of these advantages. We must
expect hard fighting in the mountain passes which abound and
also in taking towns entirely constructed of brick or stone, and
incombustible. General Whitlock attempted to take the city of
Buenos Ayres, which had little to no defence, except the
barricades across the streets and the flat roofs of the houses;
his army was twelve thousand strong, and was repulsed with great
loss. The Texan mode of burrowing through the houses had not
then been invented. I do not say, that General Taylor would not
be able to reach Mexico, but it would be very hard fighting.

Let us now consider what it is to be overcome on the Vera Cruz
line of march.

_States._ _Chief
Cities._
Mexico, 1,500,000 Mexico, 200,000
[!]Michuacan, 450,000 Valladolid, 25,000
[!]Wahaca, 600,000 Wahaca, 40,000
Puebla, 900,000 Puebla, 60,000
Vera Cruz, 200,000 Vera Cruz, 15,000
Chiapa, 100,000 Chiapa, 3,000
Tobasco, 75,000 Tobasco, 5,000
──────
4,347,000

! I have endeavored to accommodate the spelling to the
pronunciation.

The army, by way of Vera Cruz, would have to pass through four
millions, and would meet with greater difficulties on the way
than that from Saltillo. I am supposing that while the invading
army advances from this latter place, the States along the other
road will remain passive; and so of the army taking its march
from Vera Cruz, that the northern States will not take part. But
this will not be the case. It will, therefore, be necessary to
take both roads at once, and advance with two armies
simultaneously, at an enormous expense and loss of life. It is
true, we may find efficient allies in the discords among the
Mexicans themselves, which may prevent them from uniting against
us. The Indians may remain perfectly passive; the men of
property, tired of internal revolutions, and despairing of ever
seeing a settled government in their country, may desire to seek
security and peace under the wings of the American eagle. These
dissensions and jealousies, although of a different kind from
those which favored the conquest by Cortez, may lead to the same
result. If they were a patriotic and united people, the attempt
to conquer them would seem to me hopeless. Yet, when we consider
the force they can bring into the field in defence of their
homes, and as they believe, of their altars, instigated by
hatred towards us, and that sense of degradation, which even the
dullest of the human race must feel at the idea of subjugation
by a foreign enemy, we cannot but expect a powerful resistance.
They ought to be able to arm and embody two hundred thousand men
for defence. This is a very different affair from marching an
army a thousand miles to attack Texas. They would be called out
to defend the very soil on which they exist, and it seems
incredible, that they would not respond to the call.

And should we make ourselves masters of the capital, will this
be the conquest of the whole country? When Cortez took the city,
he, at the same time, overturned the dynasty and Empire of
Montezuma, which had become odious to the surrounding nations.
It was, in fact, those nations which overthrew that empire,
under the guidance and with the aid of the Spaniards, little
thinking, that they were only fighting for a change of masters.
And suppose, that notwithstanding our signal success in taking
the Metropolis, the Mexican Congress retiring to some other city
should still persist in refusing to make peace on our terms, or
on any terms, what are we then to do? We must go on to conquer,
and hold each separate State, or we must retire, without either
conquering the country or conquering a peace. We should bring
back laurels and glory, but foiled and baffled in the objects
for which we made such mighty efforts. And I confess, I should
be sorry to annex such a population, incapable of defending
themselves, incapable of self-government, and who must be our
dependants, or rather bondsmen. The conquests and annexation of
nations on the soil of Italy, gave strength to Rome, but when
she acquired distant provinces as dependencies, and established
colonies, the government became hopelessly corrupt, and the
empire fell by its own weight. It is not so much the annexation
of territory, as of people unfitted for republican government,
that I dread. If it be necessary to govern them as dependencies,
a degree of corruption will be so rapidly introduced into our
Government, that its whole character will be changed, and
republican virtue will hardly be a name among us.

These, after all, are but speculations, and may prove to be
visionary. Our scope of vision into the future is very limited.
The great event of the war, in my estimation, is the taking of
California. As respects Mexico, it was a mere waif or derelict,
liable to be seized by the first comer; and, in fact, we were
only about a week before the British squadron, who were utterly
astonished to see our flag flying at Monterey and San Francisco,
when it was their design to place St. George’s Cross there. It
was merely a question as to who should occupy the country, and
surely, in such an alternative, no American can hesitate to say,
that possession should be taken by us. It was lost to Mexico, at
any rate; and, in the hands of Great Britain, would have been an
endless source of vexation to us, and, perhaps, lead to ultimate
rupture with that country. We have now a sea coast on the
Pacific corresponding to that on the Atlantic. Our republic
stretches from sea to sea, and in time, a land communication
will be established between the two, reducing the distance more
and more every day. The Republic thus fronts Europe on the east,
and Asia on the west, with an ocean boundary, beyond which we
cannot go. Here let our proud progress be stayed! Let us be
content with filling up the vast space, and improving our
condition and the condition of our fellow men. An immense
commerce must spring up in less than half a century, from our
Pacific coast, with the five hundred millions of people, who
inhabit the shores washed by the western and Indian oceans!

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