Chapter X: Letter 9
_Present advantageous position of our army—The necessity for
greater efforts—Our present force insufficient to march from
Vera Cruz to Mexico._
FEBRUARY 13TH, 1847.
SIR: The last intelligence from the seat of war has given much
relief to those who were beginning to feel uneasy about the
situation of our troops. Generals Taylor and Patterson have
taken Victoria or New Santander, and the line is therefore
established from Saltillo to Tampico. The line of the Sierra
Madre has already been described; it is certainly of a very
peculiar character; it now presents only three points of attack,
and that of Saltillo, the only one practicable for wheel
carriages, and consequently, for the advance of an army with its
parks of artillery. It is from this quarter, alone, that General
Taylor need fear the march of Santa Anna; but he will have to
cross at least three hundred miles of arid plains; and it is
said, that the water tanks have been destroyed by his order,
which looks as if he intended to prevent the march of General
Taylor on San Luis, rather than undertake the march to Saltillo.
It appears, that he has a large force at Tula, about
equi-distant from Saltillo and Victoria.
By guarding this line, the valley can be cut off from all
supplies from Mexico; with the exception of a small quantity of
indian corn, and the herds of the ranchos, very little can be
procured in it for the support of an army. Our own safety
requires, that we should take possession of all the principal
towns as soon as possible, and garrison them with a sufficient
force. It will, also, be necessary to establish civil authority,
for the country thus cut off from the central Government. Its
head must necessarily be military, as also the local superior
authorities, although using the machinery of Alcaldes &c., for
the purpose of carrying it on. The political Government, must be
suspended, as the consequence of being cut off from both the
State and federal authorities of Mexico.
It would now seem to be the general impression, that nothing
effectual can be done to bring Mexico to terms without taking
Vera Cruz, and marching to the capital; and this appears to be
the opinion of General Taylor at least, that if the march be
resolved upon, then Vera Cruz, is the proper point to start from
and not from Saltillo. A short time will determine.
We have, thus far, been operating at vast expense, with an army
of fifteen thousand men, about one half regulars, and the other
half, volunteers, on the remote, thinly inhabited, northern
frontier of Mexico; and we talk of marching through a densely
peopled country with numerous defiles! If there be any thing
like the resistance made by us during the revolutionary war,
thirty thousand men, at least, will be required for the march
from Vera Cruz to Mexico. A part of the force under General
Taylor may now be spared, but not so as to weaken and disable
him from repelling a part of the army of Santa Anna, if he
should think proper to detach it, for the purpose of attacking
Saltillo. It would be presumptuous in me to venture an opinion
on military movements; but considering the formidable army now
organized by Santa Anna, and the uncertainty as to the point
which he means to attack, I should think, that it would not be
safe to draw off any very considerable portion of General
Taylor’s force from the defence of the lines they at present
occupy.
It is in our power to seize all her ports, and cut off all the
trade of Mexico; and then, holding the lines we now occupy, it
will be strange, if she persists in refusing to make peace. The
fear of the loss of the interior and northern provinces, and the
interruption in her trade, thus shut up in her shell, may have
that effect, if any thing can. We have for the present, given
stability to her Government by outward pressure. Our only
security is to retain the hold we have; and perhaps, it may be
necessary to attempt something on a still larger scale; but for
this, we are not yet prepared. General Scott may take Vera Cruz,
and then block up the road to Mexico, but I have seen no force
yet, even on paper, sufficient to undertake the march to that
capital. If, by withdrawing a large portion of General Taylor’s
force, the line he now occupies be too much weakened, Santa
Anna, will at once, take advantage of it, and regain the country
on that side of the Rio Grande. In doing this, he will compel
the army which may be landed at Vera Cruz, to return in all
haste to Tampico, or Point Isabel. The crisis is now fast
approaching, when it will become a question of national
prowess—shall we cry, “hold, enough!” or make a mighty effort to
obtain the victory? I wish to see my country do right, and
justice to all nations; at the same time, I should be sorry to
see our flag humbled, under any circumstances, and in a war with
any nation on the Globe! I wish to see that flag wave proudly,
and respected, wherever it may be carried, not tarnished and
humbled, by defeat—insulted, scorned, treated with contempt,
instead of affording a shelter and protection to our citizens,
wherever they may be. But, firmly convinced, as I am, that our
country is in the right, and our enemy in the wrong, I should
feel the mortification ten fold, if we failed to obtain a just
and honorable peace by the only means left us, _after our enemy
has repeatedly spurned the olive branch_.
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Mexican letters written during the progress of the late war between the United States and Mexico, no. 1.Chapter X: Letter 9
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