Chapter XVI: Book 4: , Page 28 of the English book, and just look at Captain (7)

[_Turning to the witness._] Herr Von Weizsäcker, you have read this article. May I ask you to tell me whether you recall having read this article at the time of its appearance?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do recall that such an article did appear at that time.

DR. SIEMERS: Then may I ask you further what your attitude was at the time when you heard about this article?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I considered it a perverted fantasy.

DR. SIEMERS: Then you condemned this article?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Naturally.

DR. SIEMERS: Even though at the time you did not know yet that it was a German U-Boat?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: The question of whether it was a German U-boat or not could in no wise influence my opinion of the article.

DR. SIEMERS: Then you considered this article objectionable, even if it had not been a German U-boat?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Of course.

DR. SIEMERS: Now the Prosecution asserts that Admiral Raeder had instigated this article and is reproaching him very gravely on moral grounds for this very reason, and the reproach is all the graver since, as we have seen, Raeder at this time—unlike yourself—knew that it was a German U-boat which had sunk the _Athenia_. Do you consider such an action possible on Raeder’s part? That he could have instigated this article?

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute, Dr. Siemers, you can only ask the witness what he knew and what he did. You cannot ask him to speculate about what Raeder has done.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon, Mr. President. I believed that, according to this morning’s affidavit, it would be possible to voice an opinion; but I shall, of course, retract my question.

THE PRESIDENT: What affidavit are you talking about?

DR. SIEMERS: The affidavit in which I suggested the expunging of any expression of opinion, Dietmann’s affidavit.

THE PRESIDENT: That is a perfectly different matter.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you at that time hear that Raeder had instigated this article?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: No, I did not hear that; I would never have believed it either. I consider it entirely out of the question that he could have instigated an article of that sort or that he could have written it himself.

DR. SIEMERS: To your knowledge, could this article be traced exclusively to the Propaganda Ministry?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer this question in the negative; not to Raeder and not to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, are you in a position to judge whether grave points were involved in the historically-known violations committed by the Navy against the Treaty of Versailles?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only answer that question indirectly. The details are unknown to me. But I can scarcely consider it possible that grave or important violations could have occurred, for it is precisely in naval matters that the observance of contract agreements is particularly easy to control. Ships cannot be built without being seen. I must therefore assume that these infringements were of an insignificant nature.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in your opinion, did the Defendant Raeder prepare a war of aggression or do you know of any case from which Raeder’s attitude...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, that is the very charge against the Defendant Raeder which the Tribunal has got to decide.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in February 1939, when you traveled by train from Hamburg to Berlin with Admiral Raeder, did you converse with him? And what was the occasion and what did you discuss?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. It is quite true that I met Admiral Raeder on the train from Hamburg to Berlin, after the launching of a ship at Hamburg. On this occasion the Admiral told me that he had just made a report to Hitler in which he said he had made it quite clear that the size of the Navy would preclude any war against England for years to come. I presume that this is the reply to the question which you wished to receive from me.

DR. SIEMERS: That was in February 1939?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was the launching of the _Bismarck_.

DR. SIEMERS: Then it is known to the Tribunal, for the launching of the _Bismarck_ is entered in the records.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: It must have been in the spring—in February or March.

DR. SIEMERS: Did Raeder’s declaration at that time have a calming influence on you?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I heard Raeder’s declaration on the subject with very great pleasure because there could be no other...

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we do not care whether it had a calming influence on him or not.

DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, and to the best of your knowledge, did Raeder—either as a politician or as a naval expert—exercise any influence over Hitler?

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, the witness can tell us what Raeder said, but he really cannot tell us in what capacity he was speaking, whether as a politician or an admiral. If you want to know whether he had his uniform on...

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have any conversations with Raeder or with any other high-ranking personages?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: About what?

DR. SIEMERS: About Raeder’s influence on Hitler.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was a well-known fact that political arguments expressed by soldiers scarcely influenced Hitler at all, although military arguments of a technical nature certainly did carry weight with him, and in this sense Raeder may have exercised some influence over Hitler.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, in the winter of 1938 to 1939, the usual large diplomatic dinner party took place in Berlin and you, as far as I know, were present at this dinner. On this occasion Raeder spoke to Sir Nevile Henderson about the probable return of Germany’s colonies...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, why do you not ask him instead of telling him. You are telling him what happened.

DR. SIEMERS: No.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, you are.

DR. SIEMERS: I beg your pardon; this was a conversation between Raeder and Sir Nevile Henderson, not between Herr Von Weizsäcker and Henderson.

I am now asking you, Herr Von Weizsäcker, did you have a conversation to this effect with Sir Nevile Henderson or with other British diplomats? And do you know anything about their attitude?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot recall having spoken personally with any British diplomats about the question of the colonies. On the other hand, I do know that between 1934 and 1939 the question of the colonies was repeatedly handled by the British Government either officially, unofficially or semiofficially, and their attitude was expressed in a friendly and conciliatory manner. I believe I can remember reading a report on the visit of two British ministers to Berlin and that on this occasion the question of the colonies was also discussed in a conciliatory manner.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, can you tell us anything about the behavior or the reputation of the Navy during the Norwegian occupation?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: An occupational force always finds it difficult to be popular anywhere. But with this one reservation I should like to state that the Navy, as far as I heard, enjoyed a good, even a very good, reputation in Norway. This was repeatedly confirmed to me during the war by my Norwegian friends.

DR. SIEMERS: You made these Norwegian friendships at the time you were Minister in Oslo? When was that?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was Minister in Oslo from 1931 to 1933.

DR. SIEMERS: Now, one last question. A document, D-843, was submitted yesterday, signed by Breuer who was with the Oslo Legation in March 1940. May I submit this document to you?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Am I to read the entire document?

DR. SIEMERS: I think it would suffice if you were just to glance through it, especially over the middle part of the document.

[_Turning to the President._] Mr. President, it is GB-466 and the document was submitted yesterday.

[_Turning to the witness._] According to this document Breuer stated that the danger of a British landing in Norway was not so great as was assumed by the other side, and he speaks of measures only by which Germany might be provoked. What can you tell us about these statements of Breuer’s? Are these statements correct?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Breuer was not with the Legation—he was the Minister himself—and I take it for granted that he reported correctly on the subject from an objective or rather, if I may say so, subjective point of view. Whether this was really correct from an objective point of view or not, is quite another question. To put it in plain German, whether Breuer was correctly informed of the intentions of the enemy forces is another question.

DR. SIEMERS: Herr Von Weizsäcker, according to the information you subsequently received from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, were Raeder’s misgivings justified or was the picture, as painted by Breuer, correct?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I must confess that my personal opinion tallied with the opinion of Breuer, although both our opinions subsequently proved to be incorrect and the conjectures of the Navy were justified, or—at least—more justified than the opinion voiced by the Minister.

DR. SIEMERS: Thank you very much indeed.

THE PRESIDENT: Do any of the Defense Counsel want to ask any questions of this witness?

DR. ALFRED SEIDL (Counsel for Defendant Hess): Witness, on 23 August 1939, a nonaggression pact was concluded between Germany and the Soviet Union. Were any other agreements concluded on that day by the two governments, outside of this pact of nonaggression?

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the USSR): Mr. President, the witness is called upon to answer certain definite questions which are set forth in the application of counsel for the defendant, Dr. Siemers. I consider that the question which is being put to him at this moment by the defense counsel Seidl has no connection with the examination of the case in hand and should be ruled out.

THE PRESIDENT: You may ask the question, Dr. Seidl, that you were going to ask.

DR. SEIDL: I ask you again, Herr Von Weizsäcker, whether on 23 August 1939, other agreements had been reached between the two governments, which were not contained in the nonaggression pact?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: Where were these agreements contained?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: These agreements were contained in a secret protocol.

DR. SEIDL: Did you yourself read this secret protocol in your capacity of State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.

DR. SEIDL: I have before me a text and Ambassador Gaus harbors no doubt at all that the agreements in question are correctly set out in this text. I shall have it put to you.

THE PRESIDENT: One moment, what document are you putting to him?

DR. SEIDL: The secret addenda to the protocol of 23 August 1939.

THE PRESIDENT: Is that not the document—what is this document that you are presenting to the witness? There is a document which you have already presented to the Tribunal and which has been ruled out. Is that the same document?

DR. SEIDL: It is the document which I submitted to the Tribunal in my documentary evidence and which was refused by the Tribunal, presumably because I refused to divulge the origin and source of this document. But the Tribunal granted me permission to produce a new sworn affidavit by Ambassador Gaus on the subject in question.

THE PRESIDENT: You have not done it? You have not done it?

DR. SEIDL: No, but I should, Your Honor, like to read this text in order to stimulate the memory of the witness, and to ask him whether in connection therewith, as far as he can remember, the secret agreements are correctly reproduced in this document.

GEN. RUDENKO: Your Honors! I would like to protest against these questions for two reasons.

First of all, we are examining the matter of the crimes of the major German war criminals. We are not investigating the foreign policies of other states. Secondly, the document which defense counsel Seidl is attempting to put to the witness has been rejected by the Tribunal, since it is—in substance—a forged document and cannot have any probative value whatsoever.

DR. SEIDL: May I in this connection say the following, Mr. President. This document is an essential component of the nonaggression pact, submitted by the Prosecution in evidence as GB-145. If I now submit the text to the witness...

THE PRESIDENT: The only question is whether it is the document which has been rejected by the Tribunal. Is it the document which has been rejected by the Tribunal?

DR. SEIDL: It was rebutted as documentary evidence _per se_.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, then the answer is “yes.”

DR. SEIDL: But it seems to me that there is a difference as to whether this document may be put to the witness during the hearing of his testimony. I should like to answer this question in the affirmative since the Prosecution when cross-examining can put the document in their possession to the witness, and on the basis of his testimony we should then see which is the correct text or whether these two texts harmonize at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Where does the document which you are presenting come from?

DR. SEIDL: I received this document a few weeks ago from a man on the Allied side who appeared absolutely reliable. I received it only on condition that I would not divulge its origin, a condition which seemed to me perfectly reasonable.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you say that you received it a few moments ago?

DR. SEIDL: Weeks ago.

THE PRESIDENT: It is the same document that you say just now that you presented to the Tribunal and the Tribunal rejected?

DR. SEIDL: Yes, but the Tribunal also decided that I might submit another sworn affidavit from Ambassador Gaus on this subject, and this decision only makes sense...

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I know, but you have not done so. We do not know what affidavit Dr. Gaus has made.

DR. SEIDL: Ambassador Gaus’ sworn affidavit, the new one, is already in my possession, but it has not yet been translated.

MR. DODD: Mr. President, I certainly join General Rudenko in objecting to the use of this document. We now know that it comes from some anonymous source. We do not know the source at all, and anyway it is not established that this witness does not remember himself what this purported agreement amounted to. I do not know why he can not ask him, if that is what he wants to do.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Seidl, you may ask the witness what his recollection is of the treaty without putting the document to him. Ask him what he remembers of the treaty, or the protocol.

DR. SEIDL: Witness, please describe the contents of the agreement insofar as you can remember them.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: It is about a very incisive, a very far-reaching secret addendum to the nonaggression pact concluded at that time. The scope of this document was very extensive since it concerned the partition of the spheres of influence and drew a demarcation line between areas which, under given conditions, belonged to the sphere of Soviet Russia and those which would fall in the German sphere of interest. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and, as far as I can remember, certain areas of Romania were to be included in the sphere of the Soviet Union. Anything west of this area fell into the German sphere of interest. It is true that this secret agreement did not maintain its original form. Later on, either in September or October of the same year, a certain change, an amendment was made. As far as I can recall the essential difference in the two documents consisted in the fact that Lithuania, or—at least—the greater part of Lithuania, fell into the sphere of interest of the Soviet Union, while in the Polish territory the line of demarcation between the two spheres of interest was moved very considerably westwards.

I believe that I have herewith given you the gist of the secret agreement and of the subsequent addendum.

DR. SEIDL: Is it true that in case of a subsequent territorial reorganization, a line of demarcation was agreed upon in the territory of the Polish State?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I cannot tell you exactly whether the expression “line of demarcation” was contained in this protocol or whether “line of separation of spheres of interest” was the actual term.

DR. SEIDL: But a line was drawn.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Precisely the line which I have just mentioned, and I believe I can recall that this line, once the agreement became effective, was adhered to as a general rule with possible slight fluctuations.

DR. SEIDL: Can you recall—this is my last question—if this secret addendum of 23 August 1939 also contained an agreement on the future destiny of Poland?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: This secret agreement included a complete redirection of Poland’s destiny. It may very well have been that explicitly or implicitly such a redirection had been provided for in the agreement. I would not, however, like to commit myself as to the exact wording.

DR. SEIDL: Mr. President, I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, did you see the original of the secret treaty?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I saw a photostat of the original, possibly the original as well. In any case I had the photostatic copy in my possession, I had a photostatic copy locked up in my personal safe.

THE PRESIDENT: Would you recognize a copy of it if it was shown to you?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Oh, yes, I definitely think so. The original signatures were attached and they could be recognized immediately.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal has been considering whether it ought to put to the witness the document in the possession of Dr. Seidl, but in view of the fact that the contents of the original have been stated by the witness and by other witnesses and that it does not appear what is the origin of the document which is in Dr. Seidl’s possession, the Tribunal has decided not to put the document to the witness. The Tribunal will now adjourn.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 22 May 1946 at 1000 hours._]

ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIXTH DAY
Wednesday, 22 May 1946

_Morning Session_

[_The witness Von Weizsäcker resumed the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Siemers, I think yesterday we got to the stage whether any of the other defendants’ counsel wished to ask any questions.

DR. SIEMERS: Yes, indeed; I believe Dr. Von Lüdinghausen wishes to examine the witness.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN (Counsel for Defendant Von Neurath): Witness, I should like to put a few questions to you about the activity of Herr Von Neurath in his capacity as Foreign Minister. You were at that time Director of the Political Department of the Foreign Office. What were the dates?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe from late autumn of 1936, as a deputy, and from the spring of 1937 until the spring of 1938 with full capacity.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But before then you had already had occasion to work with Herr Von Neurath? In the autumn of 1932 were you not together now and then at the Disarmament Conference at Geneva?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What tendencies did Herr Von Neurath follow, and what attitude did Von Neurath adopt at the Disarmament Conference?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: The attitude of Herr Von Neurath was dictated by the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations which provided for disarmament. He followed those lines.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: In that he followed the same policy which his predecessors had followed at the Disarmament Conference?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: It was always the same.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Yes, all the previous governments pursued a policy aimed at peace and unity, or understanding; and Herr Von Neurath continued this policy wholeheartedly, is that not correct?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I never noticed anything to the contrary.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you at that time—that is in 1932—notice in any way that he had National Socialist tendencies or that he was at all in sympathy with the National Socialists?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that there was no common ground between him and National Socialism.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Can you quite briefly summarize Herr Von Neurath’s views with respect to foreign politics? Could he have been at that time in favor of belligerent action, or was he the representative, the acknowledged representative, of a policy of understanding and peace?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should say that Herr Von Neurath pursued a policy of peaceful revision, the same policy that had been carried on by his predecessors. His aim was good neighborliness with all, without binding himself politically in any special direction. I never noticed any bellicose tendencies in his policies.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was there any change in Herr Von Neurath’s views in the year 1936, when you became one of his closest collaborators, or did they always remain the same?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: They were always the same.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: He was especially interested in bringing about an understanding with England, but also with France; is that right?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I had the impression that Herr Von Neurath wanted to bring about an understanding with all sides.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I should like to put a few more questions to you which more or less concern his relations with Hitler.

According to your knowledge of the circumstances, as his collaborator, can it be said that he had the confidence of Adolf Hitler at all times when he was Foreign Minister, and also that Hitler let himself be advised and led by him altogether?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I am in a position to judge, he was the adviser but not the confidant of Hitler.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But there was a certain contact between those gentlemen; is that not right?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I was hardly ever a witness of such contacts.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Did you observe, when Von Neurath and Hitler met, whether they frequently discussed the political situation, what had to be done, and what should be done?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I can only say that we of the Foreign Office regretted that the contact was not closer; all the more so as Hitler was frequently absent from Berlin. We considered the contact too loose.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Then, one cannot speak of close relations or of very close collaboration with Hitler in the case of Von Neurath?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: In my opinion, no.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: And, in your opinion and according to your observation, how did the activity of Von Neurath affect foreign policy? Was he the leading man, or was he not perhaps a retarding element, that is a brake, so to speak, where matters contrary to his convictions were concerned?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I have no actual proof that important foreign political actions of this period were influenced by Von Neurath. But I can well imagine that certain actions in the sphere of foreign politics were prevented...

THE PRESIDENT: Wait a minute. I do not think we can have the witness imagine. We cannot have the witness telling us what he can imagine. I think the question is too vague, and not a proper question to ask.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: During the time when Herr Von Neurath was Foreign Minister, did any authority in the Party also have an influence on the foreign policy which in effect was contrary to the tendencies of Von Neurath or at least was not shared by him?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe there was not only one but many who acted in that way and had connection and influence with Hitler of course. That could not be verified, but it could be concluded from the results.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know why, for what reason, the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan in November 1935 was not signed by Von Neurath but by the then Ambassador Von Ribbentrop in London?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Was not that in 1936?

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: 1936; yes that is right.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I assume for the reason that Hitler always liked to put several persons on to certain work, and he would then select from among them the one he considered best suited to carry the work through.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Was Von Neurath at all in agreement with this Anti-Comintern Pact?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: What was Von Neurath’s policy regarding personnel? Did he try to keep old officials in office, or did he bring in National Socialist officials?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was very anxious to retain the old and familiar Foreign Office staff, in the Foreign Office, as well as in positions abroad.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: But that changed the moment he resigned?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Not immediately, but later on to an increasing extent.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Now, just two more questions. What was the attitude of Herr Von Neurath when he was no longer Foreign Minister and the Sudeten questions became acute, in the autumn of 1938; and what part did he play at the Munich Conference?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I recall a scene in the Reich Chancellery, a day before the Munich Agreement, when Herr Von Neurath very strongly recommended pursuing a policy of appeasement and following the suggestion of Mussolini to hold a four-power conference.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: Do you know that after Von Neurath had left the Foreign Office that office was forbidden to give him any information about foreign politics?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I think I remember that the successor of Herr Von Neurath kept to himself information his predecessor received about foreign political matters.

DR. VON LÜDINGHAUSEN: I have no further questions.

DR. LATERNSER: Herr Von Weizsäcker, you were German Ambassador to the Holy See in Rome from the summer of 1943?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.

DR. LATERNSER: At the same time the commander-in-chief in the Italian theater of war was Field Marshal Kesselring?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes; that is, he was the commander-in-chief in that theater from 25 September 1943. Before that time an Italian general held the post.

DR. LATERNSER: Were you frequently called upon by Kesselring to settle differences between the German Army on one hand and the civil authorities on the other?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: There was constant communication between Field Marshal Kesselring and my own office, not only in order to straighten out differences, but above all to prevent differences.

DR. LATERNSER: Did you, through your frequent contacts with Field Marshal Kesselring, gain a personal impression with regard to the attitude of the military...

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Laternser, we are not trying Kesselring. What relevance has this question got?

DR. LATERNSER: This question is relevant because in the cross-examination of Field Marshal Kesselring the Prosecution produced incriminating material to the effect that the military leadership in Italy did not observe the usages of war and the laws of humanity. I distinctly remember that you, Mr. President—and this may be seen on Pages 5803 and 5805 (Volume IX, Pages 234, 235)—said in reply to an objection by Dr. Stahmer that it was material incriminating the General Staff. I should like to ask the witness now present a few questions about this incriminating material.

THE PRESIDENT: If you wish to ask him anything that he knows about accusations which have been made by the Prosecution against Kesselring as a member of the General Staff, then you may do that.

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, Mr. President. I started and that was to be a preparatory question.

Herr Von Weizsäcker, were the objects of art of Italy in the Italian theater of war spared and put in safekeeping?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Wehrmacht, under the leadership of Field Marshal Kesselring, made the greatest efforts to spare and protect edifices, property, and objects of art belonging to the Church. This was a large chapter in the activities of the staff of Field Marshal Kesselring, and success was not wanting.

DR. LATERNSER: Can you give us one or two especially significant examples on this point?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes, there are a lot of examples. I would like to mention that 6 months or a year ago an exhibition of manuscripts, incunabula, and similar things, was held in the Vatican. The German Wehrmacht is to be thanked for having saved a large part, if not the greater part of these objects.

DR. LATERNSER: That is sufficient, Herr Von Weizsäcker. The high military command in Italy is accused of having treated the Italian population with especial harshness and cruelty. Can you tell us anything about the fact that precisely on the part of the high military command in Italy special measures were taken for the feeding of the population at a period when the food problem was difficult?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Does this question refer especially to the food problem?

DR. LATERNSER: Yes, the food problem in Rome.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, my field of observation was only Rome. But there I can say that Field Marshal Kesselring told me one day that half his time was taken up with the question of feeding Rome. And I knew one of the higher military officials—I believe his name was Seifert or something like that—who with great devotion concerned himself with this task and carried it through with success.

DR. LATERNSER: Now my last question, Herr Von Weizsäcker: Through your observations of the activities of the high military leaders in Italy you must have gained a personal impression of these people. Did you get the impression that there was a sincere effort on the part of these military leaders to observe the laws of war and the laws of humanity?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is a matter of course, for otherwise certain results could not have come about. Perhaps it is not known here that in the autumn of 1943 the Holy See published a communiqué, an official communiqué, which especially praised the behavior of the German soldiers in Rome. Besides that, the sparing of the Eternal City could not have been realized if the German Wehrmacht had not behaved as it did.

DR. LATERNSER: And that was a special merit of Field Marshal Kesselring in particular?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I would say that when the history of this time comes to be written first in the list of merit will be Pope Pius XII. Then praise will be accorded, in the second place to the German Wehrmacht under the leadership of Kesselring.

DR. LATERNSER: Thank you very much. I have no further questions.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: It has been asserted once that the Defendant Von Papen, who in the summer of 1934 had been appointed ambassador to Vienna, directed from that office a policy of aggressive expansion taking in the entire southeast up to Turkey; and that he, among other things, had offered neighboring states like Hungary and Poland territory to be gained from the intended partitioning of Czechoslovakia. Did this policy actually exist?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry. I did not quite understand your question.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy, which I just outlined, actually exist?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: My observation dates only from the late summer of 1936, as before that time I was abroad. I did not notice later that Herr Von Papen had carried on a southeastern policy for Vienna, or that he was commissioned to do so. The Foreign Office could not entrust him with such a mission, for he did not come under the Foreign Office.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: And this policy, as just outlined, did that exist at all when you entered the Foreign Office?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Please repeat the question.

DR. KUBUSCHOK: Did this policy of expansion on the part of Germany...

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Which policy?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: The aggressive policy of expansion on the part of Germany to the southeast as far as Turkey, the partitioning of Czechoslovakia, and the cession of parts of Czechoslovakia to Poland and Hungary.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes. In 1939, no doubt?

DR. KUBUSCHOK: 1936—in 1936.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.

THE PRESIDENT: The Prosecution?

MAJOR JONES: Witness, I want to ask you one or two questions about the _Athenia_ matter. You have told the Tribunal that you, yourself, saw the American chargé d’affaires and informed him, about the middle of September, that the _Athenia_ could not have been sunk by a German U-boat. That is so, is it not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not see the American chargé d’affaires in the middle of September, but on the day on which I heard of the sinking, and that must have been, perhaps, 3, 4, or 5 of September.

MAJOR JONES: Were you already assuring the American representatives as early as that that a U-boat could not have been responsible?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: That is correct.

MAJOR JONES: And did you recommend, or rather, did the German Foreign Office recommend that the Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy should receive the American naval attaché and tell him the same thing, namely, that a U-boat could not have sunk the _Athenia_?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: That I do not know. I only dealt with the chargé d’affaires.

MAJOR JONES: I would like you to look at a new document, Document. Number D-804, which will be Exhibit GB-477, which is an extract from the SKL on the _Athenia_ case. You will see that that is a report from Neubauer to the naval attaché and it reads as follows:

“The Foreign Office has had a report of the meeting between the
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy and the American naval
attaché, on 13 September 1939, passed on to it by telephone. It
is worded as follows:

“‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the
Commander-in-Chief of...’”

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I am sorry; I have not found the place as yet.

MAJOR JONES: Perhaps you would like to follow the English copy, Witness, if you would like.

I read the second paragraph:

“‘On the 16th of September, at about 1300 hours, the
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy received the American naval
attaché on the advice of the Reich Foreign Minister and told him
more or less the following: He had intended for some days
already—as he knew—to write him that he should visit him in
order to tell him his opinion about the sinking of the
_Athenia_, in view of the continued agitation about it. However,
he had waited for the return of those of the submarines that had
been employed in waging war against merchant ships at the time
in question and which might possibly be concerned, in order to
receive reports about their activity personally. He repeated
most emphatically that the sinking of the _Athenia_ was not
caused by a German submarine. The ship nearest to the place of
the incident was at the time actually situated about 170 sea
miles away from the place of the sinking. Besides this, the
instructions as to how the commanders were to wage war against
merchant shipping, had after all been published. Up to date, in
no case had these instructions been even slightly disregarded.
On the contrary, an American captain reported a short time
before about the particularly courteous and chivalrous behavior
of the submarine commanders.’”

Well, now, it is clear from that, is it not, that the German Foreign Office was most anxious to cover up this matter of the _Athenia_ as best it could; was it not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: No; there was nothing to be covered up.

MAJOR JONES: When you discovered at the end of September that in fact it was the _U-30_ that had sunk the _Athenia_, there was then a good deal to be covered, was there not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that I stated already yesterday that I had heard nothing to that effect.

MAJOR JONES: Are you saying that you did not know at the end of September, on the return of the _U-30_, that the _U-30_ had in fact sunk the _Athenia_?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not remember that in any way at all.

MAJOR JONES: When did you first discover that the _U-30_ had sunk the _Athenia_?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: As far as I remember, not at all during the war.

MAJOR JONES: But I understood you to say yesterday that you thought that the publication in the _Völkischer Beobachter_, accusing Mr. Winston Churchill of sinking the _Athenia_, was a piece of perverse imagination; is that right?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Completely.

MAJOR JONES: Are you really saying to the Tribunal that—though you were in a responsible job—are you saying to the Tribunal that you did not discover the true facts about the _Athenia_ until the end of the war, when you were directly concerned in the Foreign Office with this matter?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I told you already yesterday what I know about this. It seems, does it not, that it was realized later by the Navy that the sinking of the _Athenia_ was due to the action of a German submarine, but I cannot at all remember that I or the Foreign Office were informed of this fact.

MAJOR JONES: At any rate, the Defendant Raeder took no steps to correct the information that had been passed to the American diplomatic representatives, did he?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not recall at all that Admiral Raeder advised me or the Foreign Office of the fact.

MAJOR JONES: Now, with regard to the Defendant Von Neurath.

If it please the Tribunal, I am not proposing to question the witness as to the earlier diplomatic history, as this Tribunal has indicated that it is desirable to reserve the matter for the defendants as they go into the witness box later.

[_Turning to the witness._] But I want to ask you a general question. What was the earliest date at which responsible officials of the Foreign Office, like yourself, first realized that Hitler intended to wage aggressive war?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: That the foreign policy of Hitler’s Government was a dangerous one I realized clearly for the first time in May 1933; the fact that an aggressive war was planned, perhaps, in the summer of 1938, or at least that the course pursued in foreign policy might very easily lead to war.

MAJOR JONES: Already in April 1938, the foreign political situation was so tense that you sent a special memorandum to all German diplomatic representatives dealing with the situation—the critical situation of Germany.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: That may be. May I be permitted to read the document?

MAJOR JONES: I want you to look at Document Number 3572-PS, which is a memorandum of the 25th of April 1938, signed by yourself, and a copy of which was sent to all the German diplomatic representatives. It will be Exhibit GB-478. That document reads:

“Since the work in the field of preparation for the mobilization
has made further progress within Germany in the Armed Forces and
in all civil administrations including the Foreign Office, it is
necessary now that in the case of government offices abroad
corresponding measures also be taken in their area of
jurisdiction without delay.”

And then there follows a series of instructions as to the actions that are to be taken on the commencement of the period of crisis, or of actual mobilization, and there is an insistence in the last paragraph but one:

“I request the heads of offices, without waiting for further
instructions, to start considering now the measures to be taken
in their sphere of activity in the case of an emergency. In the
interest of absolute secrecy it must be observed strictly that
the number of people informed remains as restricted as
possible.”

That suggests, does it not, that as early as April 1938 you were conscious of the imminent approach of actual mobilization; is that so?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: May I ask, is this document really dated the year 1938, or is it 1939? I cannot quite distinguish the date.

MAJOR JONES: It is dated the 25th of April 1938.

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Well, that may be.

MAJOR JONES: Now, you yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy, were you not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I did not quite understand your question.

MAJOR JONES: You yourself were opposed to Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy, were you not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I personally, completely.

MAJOR JONES: Did you endeavor to persuade the Defendant Von Neurath also to oppose Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Herr Von Neurath was not Foreign Minister at that time.

MAJOR JONES: But he continued to be a very important functionary of the Nazi State, did he not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe that his influence in that period was even smaller than before; but I kept in touch with him, and I think I agreed with his opinion and he with mine.

MAJOR JONES: And yet he continued to serve the Nazi State, in particular, in a territory which was acquired as a result of this policy of aggression; is that not so?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I should be grateful if this question would be put to Herr Von Neurath rather than to me.

MAJOR JONES: If you please. Now, you were in Italy and in Rome, were you not, in March of 1944?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.

MAJOR JONES: You have given me some evidence as to the behavior of the German forces in Italy. Were you in Rome at the time of the massacres in the Hadrian Cave? You remember the incident, Witness, do you not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: Yes.

MAJOR JONES: When 325 Italians were murdered and 57 Jews were thrown in as a bit of makeweight. You were there when that happened, were you not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe it was 320 prisoners who were murdered in this cave which you just mentioned.

MAJOR JONES: Yes. Were you consulted about that matter?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: No.

MAJOR JONES: That was an action by German forces, was it not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I believe by the German Police, and not by the German Armed Forces.

MAJOR JONES: And you know, Witness, that there were many murders of that kind carried out by the SS during the period of German activity in Italy, do you not?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: I do not know about many murders having taken place, but I believe that the German Police were quite capable of such things.

MAJOR JONES: You know that they left a record of terror and brutality wherever they left their mark upon Italy; is that not so?

VON WEIZSÄCKER: The German Police, yes.

MAJOR JONES: I have no further questions.

THE PRESIDENT: Do you want to re-examine?

DR. SIEMERS: I have no more questions, Your Honor.

THE PRESIDENT: Then the witness can retire.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, may I now call the witness Vice Admiral Schulte-Mönting.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, go ahead.

[_The witness Schulte-Mönting took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: Will you state your full name?

ERICH SCHULTE-MÖNTING (Witness): Erich Schulte-Mönting.

THE PRESIDENT: Will you repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, please tell us briefly what positions you held from 1925 to 1945, particularly in what positions you served immediately under Admiral Raeder.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: From 1925 to 1928 I was naval adjutant to Reichspräsident Hindenburg and, as such, simultaneously second adjutant to the Chief of the Naval Command Staff. Consequently my first collaboration with Raeder dates back to 1928.

From 1929 until 1933 I had several front commands. From 1933 to 1937 I was first adjutant to Raeder. From 1937 to 1939 I had several front commands. From 1939 to 1943 I was Admiral Raeder’s Chief of Staff; and up to 1944 I remained Admiral Dönitz’ Chief of Staff. In January 1944 I was naval commander in southern France until the invasion; subsequently commanding general in North Trondheim. After the collapse I was employed for some months with the British Navy in winding up activities. Then in the autumn I was interned in a camp for generals in England.

DR. SIEMERS: Please tell me, if you can remember, in which month of 1939 you started to work with Raeder.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: The first of January 1939.

DR. SIEMERS: Can you tell us briefly anything about Raeder’s prestige as a navy expert, especially abroad? I mean only with regard to technical naval questions.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I believe that through the many years of service I had with Raeder, and the many conversations I had with foreigners, I have been able to form some idea. After all, Raeder was head of the Navy for 15 years. He was known, or rather had a name, as a naval officer and as Chief of Staff of the last Commander-in-Chief of the German Imperial Navy, Admiral Hipper, the opponent of the famous British Admiral Beatty in the Skagerrak battle. He was known...

THE PRESIDENT: Witness, will you kindly observe that light. When the yellow light goes on, you are talking too fast. When the red light goes on, you must stop.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: He was known through his literary activity at the time of the “Tirpitz Era,” when he edited the _Nautikus_, and later, after the first World War, through his two works on cruiser warfare in the last World War, for which he received an honorary doctor’s degree and which, I should say, gained him a reputation among experts.

DR. SIEMERS: The defendant is accused of building up the Navy with the intention of carrying on an aggressive war, and this even after the Treaty of Versailles was already in force.

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. Never in all my conversations which I had with Raeder was the thought—much less the word—of an aggressive war mentioned. I believe that all his actions and his directives contradict this.

DR. SIEMERS: Were there possibly any ideas of a strategic nature under consideration, while the Versailles Treaty was in force, with a view to an aggressive war?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Never.

DR. SIEMERS: What was the basic reason for the maneuvers held by the Navy from the years 1932 until 1939?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: They were held exclusively with a view to the security, protection, and defense of the coastal waters and the coast itself.

DR. SIEMERS: Was a war with England taken as a basis for any of these maneuvers between 1932 and 1939?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, that was never made a basis, and I believe that would have appeared impossible and unreasonable to every naval officer. I remember that even at the beginning of the year 1939 Raeder issued a directive to the front commanders to hold maneuvers, in which he excluded a maneuver directed against England as an impossibility. It was forbidden to carry out that maneuver at all.

DR. SIEMERS: Admiral, it is now confirmed, as you know, that the Navy in the twenties, with the knowledge of the then parliamentary government, violated the Treaty of Versailles. These questions have been discussed a great deal here, therefore, we can be brief.

I should like to ask you generally: Is it possible from these violations, which are known to you, to deduce aggressive intentions?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I consider that is completely out of the question. The violations were so insignificant and were based so exclusively on protection and defense that I think it is impossible to construe them as aggressive intentions.

DR. SIEMERS: Can you give us briefly a few instances or name a few cases where violations took place?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: First of all, they were limited to the installation of coastal batteries, antiaircraft batteries, the procuring of mines and similar things, all of which were exclusively for the purpose of defense or protection.

DR. SIEMERS: Did these violations of the Treaty of Versailles—or, shall we say, the slight deviations—become known to the Inter-Allied Commission in whole or in part, and did that commission partly overlook these things because they were really trifles?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes. I would say it was an open secret.

DR. SIEMERS: May I ask you, Admiral, to pause between question and answer so that the interpreters can keep up. Just pause a moment after my questions before you reply. May I ask you to repeat the answer to my question with regard to the commission?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I would say that it was an open secret. It was just passed by.

DR. SIEMERS: As proof that these violations of the treaty were made with the intention of waging aggressive war the Prosecution has several times presented the book by Post Captain Schüssler entitled _The Navy’s Fight against Versailles_. It is Document C-156. I will have this document submitted to you in the original. In order to save time and not to burden the Tribunal again with details—I do not want to go into details—I shall just ask you: What do you know about this book, and what caused it to be written at all? When was it written and what is your general opinion about it?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I know this book. It came about as a result of the attacks of the National Socialist regime in the years 1934 and 1935, which blamed the preceding government and the Navy for not having done enough in the past to arm the nation and for not even having exhausted the possibilities of the Treaty of Versailles. Consequently, the idea arose at that time of publishing a sort of justification. This brochure is to be considered in that light; a sort of justification for, I might say, sins of omission.

This booklet was later never actually published, or rather it was withdrawn from circulation because it was, I might say, a rather poor attempt, for, after all, it contains no challenging points which might be classified as rearmament.

DR. SIEMERS: Was this booklet distributed within the Navy later on?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No. As I said, it was withdrawn from the circles which had already had it and it was also severely criticized.

DR. SIEMERS: Was the book withdrawn on Raeder’s orders?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe so, yes.

DR. SIEMERS: Through this book and another document, by Assmann, a charge has been brought concerning the known endeavors made with a construction firm in Holland. And it was also said yesterday that, by order of Admiral Raeder, U-boats were built for Germany in Finland and in Spain. Is that correct?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: That is not correct. The U-boats which were designed by the Dutch firm, and which were built abroad, were not built for the German Navy, but for foreign countries.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you know for whom they were built? Who received the boat which was built in Finland?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: I believe Turkey received one, and one went to Finland.

DR. SIEMERS: Then the ships were constructed for foreign orders and for a foreign country?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: What advantages at all did the Navy have from their collaboration in the construction?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: We were only interested in keeping alive the experiences gained in U-boat warfare during the last World War. Consequently the Navy was interested in seeing that constructors of U-boats continued along those lines.

DR. SIEMERS: In your opinion, was that prohibited according to the Treaty of Versailles?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: No, I know of no paragraph which prohibits our activity in foreign countries along those lines.

DR. SIEMERS: In the beginning of February 1933 Admiral Raeder made his first naval report to Hitler. Do you know what Hitler, on that occasion, gave Raeder as the basis for rebuilding the Navy?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I remember it exactly, because it was the first report which the then Chief of the Naval Command Staff, Admiral Raeder, made to the Reich Chancellor Hitler.

Hitler said to Raeder that the basis of his future policy was to live in peace with England and that he intended to demonstrate that by trying to conclude a naval agreement with England. In this he wanted the German Navy to be kept relatively small. He wished to recognize Britain’s naval superiority because of her position as a world power. He would accordingly suggest an appropriate ratio of strength. He wanted an understanding with regard to the construction of our Navy; and we should take these, his political points of view, into consideration. Raeder was impressed with the statements, for they were completely in accordance with his own basic attitude.

DR. SIEMERS: Within the framework of this policy the German-British Naval Agreement was then concluded in 1935. Was the Navy as a whole and Raeder in particular pleased with this agreement, or did they see certain disadvantages in it?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Raeder and the Navy were very pleased with this agreement, although we had to impose voluntarily upon ourselves severe limitations for a certain length of time. By this agreement, in comparison with the Washington conference, I should say we ranged among the smallest sea powers. In spite of that, this agreement was generally welcomed, because friendly relations with the British Navy were desired, and it was believed that if we followed a wise and moderate policy, England in return would show her appreciation.

DR. SIEMERS: Do you know whether at that time Hitler as well approved of the agreement in that form and was pleased about it?

SCHULTE-MÖNTING: Yes, I can affirm that. Raeder and I happened to be together with Hitler in Hamburg the day this agreement was concluded, and Hitler said to Raeder when this fact was reported to him:

“This is the happiest day of my life. This morning I received
word from my doctor that my throat trouble is insignificant, and
now this afternoon I receive this very gratifying political
news.”

DR. SIEMERS: You have already stated, Admiral, that the naval agreement was welcomed by the Navy. You will recall that in the year 1937 a modified naval agreement was concluded with England. Was the attitude of the Navy to that question still the same at that time?