Chapter XII: Book 4: , Page 28 of the English book, and just look at Captain (3)

That very Russian-Finnish affair was making it particularly urgent for us to carry out a landing because the danger existed that the British, under the pretext of supporting the Finns, would carry out a bloodless occupation of Norway.

Then I go on to the question of the Führer, whether a landing by the British in Norway might be imminent. One must consider that Assmann had summarized all that from war diaries, and this question is explained by the fact that the Führer wanted to know whether the situation had changed in any way, because the peace had been signed. However, the situation had not changed at all, because we knew in reality that the landings by the British were not to be carried out to help the Finns, but for other reasons. That question, therefore, whether at the time, because of the peace treaty, the British landings might be particularly imminent, was answered by me in the negative. Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new moon, 7th April—Führer agrees. Everything remained as before. Only the question whether because of this peace treaty we ought to land at once, I answered “no.” That is completely different from what you have been telling me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You read out the entry for the 26th of March. What is the entry for the 26th of March? You read it out in German and we can translate it.

RAEDER: “Occupation of Norway by the British was imminent when
the Russian-Finnish peace treaty was signed. Apparently, because
of the treaty, it was postponed. Question by the Führer, whether
at that moment a landing by the British in Norway was imminent,
was answered in the negative by the Commander-in-Chief Navy....”

Yes, that did not mean that because of that we had to renounce the idea.

“Commander-in-Chief Navy suggests action by us at next new moon.” The reasons for our landing remained the same as before; only the Finnish business could no longer be used by the British.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The peace treaty, the end of the war with Finland, had taken place in the middle of March. That was off the map at that time?

RAEDER: Of course, it was no longer important for us, but our reasons remained as before.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, will you look at Document Number D-843. This will be Exhibit Number GB-466. This is a report from your diplomatic representative in Norway, dated the 29th of March, and at the end of the first paragraph you will see:

“The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves the
responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory and
Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out
warlike operations in them.”

That is a quotation from the Norwegian Foreign Minister. Then your diplomatic representative takes it up:

“The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things
quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I”—that’s the
German Foreign Minister’s representative—“have frequently
pointed out, that the British have no intentions of landing, but
that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial
waters perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke Germany. Of
course, it is also possible that the British behavior of last
week, which I have pointed out as well, will grow into more or
less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters
to attack our ore traffic off the Norwegian coast.”

And then Paragraph 3:

“The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to
insure that Norway’s neutrality rules be respected can be
accepted as a fact.”

Were you told that your diplomatic representative in Oslo was reporting that the British had no intentions of landing?

RAEDER: Yes. Dr. Breuer, the Minister to Norway, held a completely wrong view. He believed Foreign Minister Koht’s assurances even though our naval attaché kept reporting that Koht was completely on the side of the British and his assurances were not to be believed. At the same time, information had been received from Hagelin that the Norwegians were giving assurances on paper but they themselves had said that they were doing that only as subterfuge and that they would continue to co-operate with the British. That is contained in the documents which we have submitted.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let us look at another document. Look at Document Number D-844. This is what your diplomatic representative in Sweden was saying at the same time. That will be Exhibit Number GB-467, that is from your representative in Sweden and you will notice that he quotes Foreign Minister Guenther of Sweden, as first of all—about ten lines down, just after the name of “Weizsäcker,” you will see:

“The Swedish Government had no reason at all to believe in an
impending action by the Western Powers against Scandinavia. On
the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other
information, they considered the situation lately to be much
calmer.”

And then he says there is no prospect of a coup against Swedish ore. Then he goes on to deal with Norway. Without being Anglophile, Guenther did not believe in a British act of war against Norway either, but, of course, he could not speak of this with as much certainty as with regard to Sweden. At any rate, however, the Norwegian Government, with whom he was in close contact, was of the same opinion. And if you look two paragraphs farther on, it says:

“In conclusion, Guenther requested me to report his statements
to my government, and repeated that the Swedish Government
attached the greatest value to the German Government not
erroneously getting the impression of the existence of
circumstances which might evoke the possibility—he would not
use the word necessity at all—of special measures by Germany
with regard to Scandinavia.”

And then he says in the last paragraph that the Swedish Foreign Minister had probably heard of the German preparations.

Now, would you look at Document Number D-845 which will be Exhibit Number GB-468—that is the next day—from your diplomatic representative in Stockholm:

“Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government
circles regarding possible German military preventive measures
in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of war
measures by the Western Powers. Swedish and Norwegian military
and government authorities consider it unlikely that military
measures will be taken against Scandinavia by the Western
Powers. Press reports on this subject by the Western Powers are
attempting to provoke Germany.”

That is from your military attaché in Stockholm. Were you told about these reports from Stockholm, were you told of that?

RAEDER: I assume the Führer told me this. But we had no reason at all to believe these assurances because obviously, quite obviously, Sweden had considerable interest in our not going to Norway, because Sweden believed that by so doing we would be able to exercise pressure on Sweden also. That was what the British wanted, according to the information we received later. Our minister was completely misinformed and as a result was not informed by us because it was known that he sided with Foreign Minister Koht. Our information was so clear, so frequent and so unequivocal, that we could certainly carry out our landing with a clear conscience and in fact this proved to be true. Therefore, there is no point in discussing whether the order on the part of the British to land in Norway—it was Trondheim, Stavanger and, I believed, Kristiansand—whether this order was given on 5 April. On the 7th, during the night of the 7th to 8th, as the British reported in a wireless message, the mine-laying in Norwegian waters was completed by British ships and on the 7th, troops were shipped on cruisers, the names of which I forget.

Therefore, this actually took place and my conception was correct and not Herr Breuer’s who was dismissed immediately after this because he was a failure. Thereupon, we carried out the landings on the strength of quite positive information which we can prove in detail. Sweden’s action is thoroughly understandable.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not going to argue with you although you ought to know and I think you do know that there was no British order for an invasion at all; there was an order for laying mines; but you took this course as I suggested, you, knowing quite well that no British invasion was imminent, contrary to your own Chief of Operations, Captain Fricke, and contrary to all the information from your diplomatic representatives in Norway. Now, I want to come to another point with regard to Norway and then I am finished with that. You told the Tribunal that in your view, using the enemy’s colors was a permissible _ruse de guerre_ so long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember saying that?

RAEDER: I did not understand.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember telling the Tribunal that morning that using the enemy’s colors on a warship was a permissible _ruse de guerre_ so long as you stopped before you went into action. Do you remember saying that?

RAEDER: Yes; of course, that is the principle which is absolutely recognized in naval warfare, that at the moment of firing you have to raise your own flag.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you telling the Tribunal that it is a recognized procedure in naval warfare to use another country’s colors in making an attack on a neutral country, an unannounced attack on a neutral country? There was no war between you and Norway and there was no reason for there to be any ruse. You were at peace with Norway. Are you saying that?

RAEDER: It was all a question of pulling down the flag and raising the German flag if we met the British. We did not want to fight with the Norwegians at all. It says somewhere that we should first of all try to effect a peaceful occupation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Can you give me a precedent even where the German Navy, before this operation, had ever attacked a neutral country with which it was at peace, using enemy colors? You tell me when you did it before?

RAEDER: I do not know. I cannot tell you whether any other navy did it. I have...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can assume any other navy—I even ask—have you ever done it?

RAEDER: No, we have not done it and apart from that, we did not do it because on 8 April, we gave the order by wireless—and you know from our War Diary—that this should not be done, so it is quite useless to talk here about what might have been done if it has not been done.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I wanted to get clear on what your views on the permissibility of naval warfare were. I want to come to one other point, and then I am finished with this section of the case. With regard to the attack on the Soviet Union, I am not going to ask you about all your own views and what you said to Hitler, because you told us that at length; but I would just like you to look at Document Book 10a, Page 252 of the English book and Page 424 of the German book.

RAEDER: Which document is it, please?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The big one.

RAEDER: I have not got that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Document Number 447-PS.

I am so sorry, My Lord, this is entirely my fault. I beg the Tribunal’s pardon. I have given the wrong reference. I really wanted him to look at Page 59 in Document Book 10, Document Number C-170. I am very sorry, My Lord.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, that is the extract from the Naval War Diary, the one that I want you to look at is on Page 59, for the 15th of June. “On the proposal of the Naval Operations Staff (SKL) the use of arms against Russian submarines south of the northern boundary of Öland warning area...”

Have you got it?

RAEDER: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: “...is permitted immediately, and ruthless destruction is to be aimed at.”

Now, would you mind, before I ask you a question, turning back to Document Number C-38, which is on Page 11, which is Page 19 of your own document book, German document book, Document Number C-38; Page 11 of the British document book, and Page 19 of the German. That is an order of the same date, signed by Defendant Keitel, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

“Offensive action against submarines south of the line Memel to
the southern tip of Öland is authorized if the boats cannot be
definitely identified as Swedish during the approach by German
naval forces. The reason to be given up to ‘B’ Day”—that is
Barbarossa—“is that our naval forces are believed to be dealing
with penetrating British submarines.”

Why did you suggest that you should attack the Soviet submarines 6 days before your own invasion when they wouldn’t be expecting any attack and there was no question of any war?

RAEDER: As it has already been explained once here, it had happened just before, that is before the 15th of June, that a submarine had penetrated into the area of Bornholm, which is a long way to the west, and then had given wrong recognition signals when the patrol boat near Bornholm called it. If the wrong recognition signals are given, then it means that it could not be a German submarine but it must be a foreign one. In this case, the course of the ship and the location would bring us to the conclusion that it must be a Russian boat. Apart from that, Russian submarines at that time had repeatedly been located and reported off German ports—Memel, for instance, and others. Consequently, we had the impression that Russian submarines were already occupying positions outside German ports, either to lay mines or to attack merchant or warships. For that reason, as a precaution, I had to report this and I had to propose that we should take action against non-German submarines in these areas outside German ports. That suggestion was passed on the same day and this additional statement was made, which, in my opinion, was not necessary at all, but which prevented complications from arising.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is still not an answer to my question. I will put it this way. You considered it right to attack and urge the ruthless destruction of Soviet submarines 6 days before you attacked the Soviet Union? You consider that right? And then, to blame it on penetrating British submarines—this is Keitel’s suggestion—is that your view of proper warfare?

RAEDER: Well, I consider the first point right because it is always important to get in before one’s opponent, and this was happening under certain definite conditions. The second point was ordered by the Führer. Neither of the two points was ever carried out, and therefore it is useless, in my opinion, to discuss this matter.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is something for the Tribunal, and I will decide what is useful to discuss.

Do I take it, then, that you entirely approve of attacking Soviet submarines and ruthlessly destroying them 6 days before you start the war? That is what the Tribunal is to understand, is it?

RAEDER: Yes, if they appeared in our waters to reconnoiter or to carry out some other war action, then I considered it right. I considered that better than that our ships should run into Russian mines.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, let us just come, for a short time, to your views on U-boat warfare. Do you remember the document which I put to the Defendant Dönitz about the memorandum of the Foreign Office, Document Number D-851, which became Exhibit Number GB-451?

RAEDER: I have it before me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Right. Well, I will ask about that in a moment. This is what you said about it when you were answering Dr. Kranzbühler, I think on Saturday. You said:

“Since the war against England came as a complete surprise to
us, we had up until then dealt very little with detailed
questions of submarine warfare. Among other things, we had not
yet discussed the question of so-called unrestricted submarine
warfare which had played such a very important part in the
previous war. And from that fact it developed that on 3
September, that officer who was recently mentioned here was sent
to the Foreign Office with some points for discussion on the
question of unrestricted submarine warfare, so that we could
clarify with the Foreign Office the question as to how far we
could go.”

Now, do you think that is...

RAEDER: So far as I can recollect, that is the way it happened. Unrestricted warfare had not been considered.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Have you got the document in front of you?

RAEDER: You mean the one regarding the Foreign Office, Document Number D-851?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Dönitz 851, yes.

RAEDER: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t think this is in any copy, My Lord. Has Your Lordship a copy?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don’t think so.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, I did put it in when I was cross-examining the Defendant Dönitz.

THE PRESIDENT: It is very likely with our Dönitz papers.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Perhaps Your Lordship will allow me to just read it slowly, for the moment. The document says this:

“The question of an unrestricted U-boat warfare against England
is discussed in the enclosed data submitted by the High Command
of the Navy.

“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage
to England which can be achieved with the forces available can
only be attained if the U-boats are permitted an unrestricted
use of arms without warning against enemy and neutral shipping
in the prohibited area indicated on the enclosed map. The Navy
does not fail to realize that:

“(a) Germany would thereby publicly disregard the agreement of
1936 regarding the conduct of economic war.

“(b) Conduct of the war on these lines could not be justified on
the basis of the hitherto generally accepted principles of
international law.”

Then, I ought to read this, or point it out. I have dealt with it before, it is the second last paragraph:

“Points of view based on foreign politics would favor using the
method of unrestricted U-boat warfare only if England gives us a
justification by her method of waging war to order this form of
warfare as a reprisal.”

[_Turning to the defendant._] Now, I want you to take it by stages. You see the paragraph that says:

“The Navy has arrived at the conclusion that the maximum damage
to England which can be achieved with the forces available can
only be attained if U-boats are permitted an unrestricted use of
arms without warning in the area...”

Is that your view? Was that your view on the 3d of September?

RAEDER: No, it is not my view; it is a conditional view. We had given submarines the order to wage economic war according to the Prize Ordinance, and we had provided in our War Diary that if the British were to arm merchant ships or something like that, then certain intensifications...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please give me an answer to the question I asked you? It is a perfectly easy question.

RAEDER: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, isn’t it your view?

RAEDER: In theory, of course, considering the small resources that we had, the greatest possible damage to England could only be achieved through—we had to discuss with the Foreign Office just how far we could go with this intensification. For this reason, this officer was sent there. The discussions with the Foreign Office resulted in the submarine memorandum which shows, from beginning to end, that we were trying to adhere to the existing law as far as possible. The whole memorandum is nothing more than just that sort of discussion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you answer my question? When this document says “the Navy has arrived at the conclusion,” is it true that the Navy had arrived at that conclusion?

RAEDER: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that true or not?

RAEDER: But of course, everybody would arrive at that conclusion.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is much easier to say “yes” than to give a long explanation.

Now, let us come to another point. Is it true that you had arrived at that conclusion without consulting the Flag Officer, U-boats, as the Defendant Dönitz said when he gave evidence?

RAEDER: Regarding these matters? We only agreed before the submarines put to sea that they should wage war according to the Prize Ordinance. I did not ask him whether he wanted to carry out unrestricted U-boat warfare, because I did not want that. First of all I had to discuss it with the Foreign Office to find out how far we could go. That was the purpose of this affair, which was to give individual orders, such orders which we were entitled to give, step by step, in accordance with the behavior of the British. This was a question of international law, which I had to discuss with the expert on international law in the Foreign Office.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Isn’t it correct that you continued to press this point of view, the conclusion of which you had arrived at, with the Foreign Office for the next 3 months? Isn’t it correct that you continued to press for an unrestricted U-boat warfare within the area for the next 3 months?

RAEDER: I hardly think so; otherwise I would not have issued the memorandum of 3 September. Maybe we did go to the Foreign Office and put on pressure, but what we did is contained in the memorandum and our measures were intensified step by step, following steps taken by the British.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, the next step with the Foreign Office was a conference with Baron Von Weizsäcker, on the 25th of September, which you will see in Document Number D-852, Exhibit Number GB-469. You see Paragraph 3 of that document:

“The High Command of the Navy will submit to the Foreign Office
a proposal, as a basis for a communication to the neutral
powers, in which those intensifications of naval warfare will be
communicated, the ordering of which has already taken place or
is impending in the near future. This includes, particularly, a
warning not to use wireless on being stopped, not to sail in
convoy, and not to black-out.”

That was your first step, was it not? That was put up to the Foreign Office, with a number of other proposals?

RAEDER: Of course! The first measure was that armed merchant ships could be attacked because as early as 6 or 8 September, a submarine had stopped a merchant ship, the _Manar_, had fired a warning shot, and had at once been fired on by the British steamer. Thereupon the submarine started firing at the merchant ship. Such cases were known. And since one cannot recognize in every case whether the ship is armed or not, we assumed that it would lead to all ships being fired at. However, at that time it was ordered that only armed British merchant ships should be fired at. Secondly, that ships which sent a wireless message when stopped could also be shot at, because this use of wireless which was done by order of the Admiralty would immediately bring to the spot both naval and air forces, especially the latter which would shoot at the U-boat.

The first step, therefore, was firing on armed merchant ships—the passenger steamers were still excepted—and secondly, firing on blacked-out vessels and firing on those who made use of wireless. Blacked-out vessels are...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you look at Document Number D-853. I only want you to look at the next document, which will be Exhibit Number GB-470. I want you to come as soon as possible to this memorandum of which you talked.

D-853, if you will look at Section II, is a report by the Under Secretary of State of the Foreign Office, dated the 27th of September, which goes through these matters which you talked about just now, the sinking at sight of French and British ships, under the assumption that they are armed. In Paragraph II it is said:

“The Naval Operations Staff indicated anew that the Führer will
probably order ruthless U-boat warfare in the restricted area in
the very near future. The previous participation of the Foreign
Office remains guaranteed.”

Were you still pressing for absolutely unrestricted warfare within a large area to the west of Britain and around Britain?

RAEDER: Yes. Insofar as we took intensification actions step by step on the basis of our observations regarding the attitude of enemy forces, and that is in those cases where intensification was perfectly justified and was legally proved.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Would you look at Baron Weizsäcker’s minutes of the 14th of October which is Document Number D-857, which will be Exhibit Number GB-471.

Now, you see, this is after these measures have been taken, which you have just explained to the Tribunal. Baron von Weizsäcker reports to the Defendant Von Ribbentrop:

“According to my information, the decision on unrestricted
U-boat warfare against England is imminent. This is at least as
much a political decision as it is a technicality of war.

“A short while ago I submitted my personal view in writing, that
unrestricted U-boat warfare would bring new enemies upon us at a
time when we still lack the necessary U-boats to defeat England.
On the other hand, the Navy’s attitude of insisting on the
opening of unrestricted U-boat warfare is backed by every
convincing reason.”

Then he says that it is necessary to ask for certain information. On that you put in—on that point you put in your memorandum of the 15th of October, which, My Lord, is Document Number C-157, and Exhibit Number GB-224.

RAEDER: First of all, may I say something about the previous document? This expression “unrestricted U-boat warfare...”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You can do it later on, because we have got a lot of ground to cover here.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, the Tribunal thinks he ought to be allowed to say what he wants to say on that document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, My Lord, if Your Lordship pleases. Please go on, Defendant, my fault.

RAEDER: Now the two documents are gone. What I wanted to say was that the expression “unrestricted submarine warfare” on the part of the Foreign Office originated from the previous World War. In reality, and during the entire war, we did not wage unrestricted U-boat war in the sense of the unrestricted submarine warfare of the first World War. Even there, where he says “unrestricted submarine warfare might be imminent”—are only ordered very restricted measures, which always were based on the fact that the British had ordered something on their part. The chief action on the part of the British was that of militarizing the entire merchant fleet to a certain extent. That is to say, the merchant fleet was being armed, and they received the order to use these arms.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I don’t see how that arises out of the last document at all. Unless the Tribunal wants to go into it, I think we might pass on.

Doesn’t Your Lordship think so?

RAEDER: Out of both documents. Not out of one only...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have put that point, I should think, at least seven times this afternoon. I am going to suggest to you that your real object of the submarine war was set out in the first paragraph of the memorandum. Would you just look at it? You see “Berlin, 15 October...”

RAEDER: No, I must still say that there was not any unrestricted U-boat warfare but merely an intensification of measures, step by step, as I have repeatedly said, and these were always taken only after the British took some measure. The British...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest that that is an entire untruth, and that I will show you out of this document. Look at your own document, this memorandum. In the first paragraph:

“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration...”

RAEDER: I am not telling untruths, I would not think of doing it. I do not do that sort of thing.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, that is what I am suggesting to you, and I will show it out of this document.

“The Führer’s proposal for the restoration of a just, honorable
peace and the new adjustment of the political order in Central
Europe had been turned down. The enemy powers want the war, with
the aim of destroying Germany. In this fight, in which Germany
is now forced to defend her existence and her rights, she must
use her weapons with the utmost ruthlessness, at the same time
fully respecting the laws of military ethics.”

Now, let’s see what you were suggesting.

“Germany’s principal enemy in this war is Britain. Her most
vulnerable spot is her maritime trade. The war at sea against
Britain must therefore be conducted as an economic war, with the
aim of destroying Britain’s fighting spirit within the shortest
possible time and forcing her to accept peace.”

Now, miss one paragraph and look at the next.

“The principal target of our naval strategy is the merchant
ship”—now, let’s look—“not only the enemy’s, but in general
every merchant ship sails the seas in order to supply the
enemy’s war industry, both by way of imports and exports. Side
by side with this the enemy warship also remains an objective.”

Now, wasn’t that the object which you in the Naval Command were putting up to Hitler and to the Foreign Office, to use utmost ruthlessness to destroy Britain’s fighting spirit, and to attack every merchant ship coming in or going out of Britain? Wasn’t that your object?

RAEDER: Of course, but attacks on neutrals only insofar as they were warned and advised not to enter certain zones. Throughout the centuries in economic warfare the enemy merchant ship as well as the neutral merchant ship has been the object of attack.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You are not telling the Tribunal that you were suggesting use of warnings. Are you seriously suggesting to the Tribunal that what you meant by that paragraph was that neutral ships were only to be attacked with warning?

RAEDER: Of course, and that happened. Afterwards we issued the warning to neutral ships, after our blockade zone was established in accordance with the American blockade zone. We warned them that they should not enter this zone because they would run into most serious danger. That I am saying, and I can prove it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I suggest to you that that is untrue, and I will show it out of the document. Now, just turn to page...

RAEDER: On 24 November that warning was issued.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you will turn to Section C of the document, “Military requirements for the decisive struggle against Great Britain.”

“Our naval strategy will have to employ to the utmost advantage
every weapon at our disposal. Military success can be most
confidently expected if we attack British sea communications
where they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness;
the final aim of such attacks is to cut off all imports into and
exports from Britain. We should try to consider the interest of
neutrals, insofar as this is possible without detriment to
military requirements. It is desirable to base all military
measures taken on existing international law; however, measures
which are considered necessary from a military point of view,
provided a decisive success can be expected from them, will have
to be carried out, even if they are not covered by existing
international law.”

Wasn’t that the view you were putting up to the Foreign Office and the Führer, “Use international law as long as you can, but if international law conflicts with what is necessary for military success, throw international law overboard.” Wasn’t that your view?

RAEDER: No, that is quite incorrectly expressed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then explain these words. Explain these words:

“We should try to consider the interest of neutrals insofar as
this is possible without detriment to military requirements.
However, measures which are considered necessary from a military
point of view, provided a decisive success can be expected from
them, will have to be carried out even if they are not covered
by international law.”

What did you mean by that if you didn’t mean to throw international law overboard?

RAEDER: It says “If the existing rules of land warfare cannot be applied to them.” It is generally known that international law had not yet been co-ordinated with submarine warfare, just as the use of aircraft at that time. It says:

“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is
effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some
legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new
code of naval warfare”—that is, a new code of naval warfare on
the basis of actual developments.

Throughout the war a new code of naval warfare was developing, starting with the neutrals themselves. For instance, the Pan-American Security Conference defined a safety zone 300 miles around the American coast, thereby barring a tremendous sea area for overseas trade.

Likewise, the United States fixed a fighting zone around the British Isles which was not at all to our liking, and on 4 November 1939, the United States themselves maintained that it would be extremely dangerous for neutral ships to enter it, and they prohibited their own ships and their own citizens to enter this area.

We followed that up by asking the neutrals that they too should proceed in the same way as the United States, and then they would not be harmed. Then only those neutrals sailed to Great Britain which had contraband on board and made a lot of money out of it, or which were forced by the British through their ports of control to enter that area and nevertheless submit themselves to those dangers. Of course, they were quite free to discontinue doing that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now tell me, what changes had taken place in the development of either airplanes or submarines from the time that Germany signed the Submarine Protocol of 1936 to the beginning of the war? You say that international law had to adapt itself to changes in weapons of war. What changes had taken place between 1936 and 1939?

RAEDER: The following changes took place: The Submarine Protocol of 1936 was signed by us because we assumed that it concerned peaceful actions...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is not an answer to my question. My question is quite clear. It is: What changes in weapons of war, either in the air or in the submarines, had taken place between 1936 and 1939? Now, there is a question. You are a naval officer of 50 years’ experience. Tell me, what were the changes?

RAEDER: It turned out that because of the airplane the submarine was no longer in a position to surface and to investigate enemy ships or any other merchant ships, particularly near the enemy coast where the U-boats carried on their activities at first. There was no regulation at all issued about airplanes.

THE PRESIDENT: Defendant, that is not an answer to the question. The question you were asked was, what changes had taken place in the weapons of war, either airplanes or submarines.

RAEDER: But Mr. President, the changes took place in the airplane. The ever-increasing efficiency of the airplanes and the extension of their activities also over the seas led to the situation where it became impossible to examine any merchant vessel without aircraft being called to threaten the submarine. That got worse and worse, so that later on even rescuing had to be restricted because of enemy aircraft, and the entire submarine warfare was completely turned upside down in that manner.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Is that the only change that you can say in order to justify your statement that international law was to be thrown overboard where it didn’t fit in with military necessities? Is that the only change, the increase in the power of aircraft between 1936 and 1939?

RAEDER: I have already said once it was not thrown overboard. It was to be limited and changed and that was done by others too.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now would you just look at the next paragraph. You talked about your consideration for neutrals. At the top of Page 5 in the English text; it is the paragraph that follows the one that I have just read. You say:

“In principle, therefore, any means of warfare which is
effective in breaking enemy resistance should be based on some
legal conception, even if that entails the creation of a new
code of naval warfare.

“The Supreme War Command, after considering the political,
military and economic consequences within the framework of the
general conduct of the war, will have to decide what measures of
a military nature are to be taken, and what our attitude to the
usage of war is to be. Once it has been decided to conduct
economic warfare in its most ruthless form, in fulfillment of
military requirements, this decision is definitely to be adhered
to under all circumstances. On no account may such a decision
for the most ruthless form of economic warfare, once it has been
made, be dropped or subsequently relaxed under political
pressure from neutral powers, as took place in the World War to
our own detriment. Every protest by neutral powers must be
turned down. Even threats from other countries, especially the
United States, to come into the war, which can be expected with
certainty should the war last a long time, must not lead to a
relaxation in the form of economic warfare once embarked upon.
The more ruthlessly economic warfare is waged, the earlier will
it show results and the sooner will the war come to an end.”

RAEDER: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you now agree with that suggestion and that point of view expressed in the paragraph which I have just read to you?

RAEDER: It has to be understood quite differently from the way you are trying to present it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Quite differently from what it says...

RAEDER: No, not what it says. This is the point. We had the experience during the first World War that, as soon as the order for intensification had been given and communicated, as soon as the first neutral had raised a finger to object, these measures were immediately cancelled, particularly when the United States had a hand in it. And here I am saying that under all circumstances it must be avoided that we always withdraw our measures at once; and I give a warning to the effect that we should consider our measures as carefully as possible. That is the reason for the discussion with the Foreign Office and others, namely, to avoid the situation where later on they might be withdrawn, which would mean a considerable loss of prestige and the results would not be achieved.

That is the reason. Numerous protests were received by Britain too, and in most cases they were unanswered. I can quote from the Document Number C-170, Exhibit Number USA-136, where there are a lot of figures, Number 14, where it says: “Sharp Russian note against the British blockade warfare on 20 October 1939;” and Number 17, on 31 October, where it states: “Political Speech of Molotov.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: All that I ask is, was that a proper procedure?

RAEDER: I must give an explanation on that matter, and I was just about to do that. Sharp attacks on the British blockade, in violation of international law—these attacks were made by M. Molotov. Here too, protests were made which were turned down. But I wanted to prevent protests and the entire document shows that our deliberations always aimed at taking measures in such a way that they could not be objected to, but were always legally justified.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you tell me, Defendant, how it was going to prevent protests if you suggest in this paragraph to use the most ruthless measures and disregard every protest that neutrals made? How is that going to prevent protests?

RAEDER: These measures were to be taken in such a way that no objection was possible. If I tell the neutrals: “This is a dangerous area in every way,” and nevertheless they go there because they want to make money or because they are being forced by the British, then I need not accept any protest. They are acting for egotistical reasons, and they must pay the bill if they die. I must also add...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is true. They must pay the bill if they die. That was what it came to, was it not?

RAEDER: They received large premiums for exposing themselves to that risk, and it was their business to decide about it.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, we might break off now for 10 minutes.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: Are you going to be much longer, Sir David?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I thought about half an hour, My Lord.

[_Turning to the defendant._] Defendant, in this document the Naval Command suggests that it calls for a siege of England, that is, the sinking without warning of all ships that come into a big area around England.

Didn’t you hear? Sorry. In this document the Naval Command suggests what is called the siege of England, on Pages 10 to 13. And that is, the sinking of all merchant ships, including neutrals and tankers, which come into an area around England. Isn’t that so?

RAEDER: No, that is not true. The Navy Command does not suggest that, but discusses the idea of a siege after the blockade had been discussed and rejected. It likewise comes to a conclusion why the siege, which until that time had not been accepted as a recognized idea by international law, should not be undertaken; and it draws the inference from all these discussions by setting out on the last page, the last page but one, what shall now be considered the final conclusion. These are only those measures which can be justified by the actions already taken by the British. And during the entire discussion about blockading, the consideration was always in the foreground as to whether the neutrals would not suffer too much damage by that. And the whole idea of a siege is based on the fact that Prime Minister Chamberlain had already said—on 26 September—that there would not be any difference between a blockade on the seas and a siege on land, and the commander of a land siege would try to prevent with all means the entry of anything into the fortress. Also, the French press had mentioned that Germany was in the same situation as a fortress under siege.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: What I am suggesting is that you come down in favor of a siege, but you do not want any siege area declared. Will you look at Paragraph 2 of the conclusions, and then I will leave the document to the Tribunal. That is the point I suggest. In paragraph 2 of the conclusions you say:

“For the future conduct of economic war, the basic military
requirements demand the utmost ruthlessness. The employment of
the siege by sea as the most intensified form of economic
warfare meets this demand. Even without the public announcement
of a state of siege, after it has been clearly defined as a
concept, a declaration which would have drawbacks militarily and
from the point of view of international law, and even without
the declaration of a prohibited zone, it seems perfectly
possible at the moment, as has been explained in this
memorandum, to take military measures to introduce the most
intensive form of economic warfare, and to achieve what are at
present the greatest possible results in the interruption of
enemy trade”—now the last words—“without the Naval Operations
Staff being tied in all cases, to special forms and areas.”

That is your final conclusion, that you should have as effective a siege as possible without proclaiming any area. Isn’t that so?

RAEDER: No, that is not the conclusion. The conclusion is that we cannot carry out a siege, and that it would be a matter for the political leadership of the State to decide. The political leadership of the State has never suggested to decree a siege, and it can be seen here quite clearly what, on the basis of the memorandum, is suggested for the time being, and then how the intensification gradually took place.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: We must not take time arguing about it, I want you to make clear...

RAEDER: But...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me finish. My suggestion to you is—and there I leave it—that you rejected a formal siege, but you claimed the right to sink at sight, without warning, all neutral vessels in an area which the High Command may choose.

Now, I want to pass on to another subject, because I am afraid time is getting on.

RAEDER: That is no siege, however. That was a directive issued after neutral ships did not heed our warning and continued to enter the sea around Britain in order to support Britain in the economic warfare which she, with the greatest ruthlessness and severity, was conducting against us. It was a measure of self-defense.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I put it that the document speaks for itself, now that the attention of the Tribunal has been drawn to it. I want to come to another point. You have mentioned certain matters, in answer to Dr. Horn this morning, with regard to the treatment of American ships in the summer of 1941. In April 1941 you were pressing for German naval forces to operate freely up to three miles of the American coast instead of the 300-mile safety limit which the Americans were suggesting, were you not? Well to save time I will give the witness Document Number D-849, Exhibit Number GB-472.

[_The document was handed to the defendant._]

That says you couldn’t get in touch with the Defendant Von Ribbentrop and therefore you asked Baron Von Weizsäcker to get a decision on these points:

“1) Authorization for the German naval forces in the western
part of the Atlantic Ocean to operate freely as far as the
international customary 3-mile boundary.

“2) The cancellation of the preferential treatment which
American merchant vessels have been enjoying so far in our
warfare at sea.”

Now, I hand you Document Number 850, that will be Exhibit Number GB-473. Your suggestion, which had been made in April, was turned down by Hitler in June. It is a memorandum from Ritter in the Foreign Office and it reads:

“General Jodl informs me that at the recent report of
Grossadmiral Raeder to the Führer, the more far-reaching orders
to the naval forces, as they were discussed in connection with
the Raeder interview, have been postponed until further notice.

“In the same way, permission to attack United States’ merchant
vessels within the framework of the prize law has not been
granted.”

Your suggestion was to abandon the policy then existing and attack up to the 3-mile limit. Now, I want you to come to another point...

RAEDER: No, please may I make a statement concerning that? I should like to say something, even if you do not put a question to me. It is not right.

At that time, in March 1941, and on the 1st of April and the following dates in 1941, a whole number of intensifications were introduced by the United States, which I mentioned this morning, from the document which I had before me. Therefore, it was clear that I, on behalf of the Naval Operations Staff, which was supposed to conduct the most effective naval war, urged that also with respect to the United States those steps should be taken which were permissible according to international law, and that we should start slowly. Those steps included:

First: that we should no longer respect that 300-mile limit, but go as far as the 3-mile limit, where according to existing international law, it was possible to attack. That is to say, not against international law, but it was just discontinuing certain favorable conditions which we had granted the United States. And Point 2: The cancellation of the preferential treatment...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That’s exactly what I suggest to you. There is no dispute between us. I was just establishing that point.

RAEDER: Yes—no...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I want you to come...

RAEDER: I only wanted to say that during the hearing of Grossadmiral Dönitz the Prosecution demanded of us that we should not treat certain neutrals better than others, but we should treat them all alike; that is to say in plain language, we must sink them all, no matter whether we wanted to do so or not, and of course we were not bound to do that. The second thing: it was a matter of course that a thoroughly justified suggestion on my part from the point of view of the Naval Operations Staff had been rejected by the Führer if, with regard to the political situation, he decided that at that time he did not desire to adopt a more severe attitude towards the United States.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I want you to come to quite a different point. Do you say that you did not know anything about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern Territories?

[_There was no response._]

Do you say that you did not know about the extermination of Jews in the Eastern Territories?

RAEDER: I say clearly under oath that I had not the slightest inkling about it. I might add in explanation that on no account would Hitler have spoken about such things to a man like myself, whose opinion he knew, especially because he was afraid that on my part there would be very serious objections. I explained the other day why I used the word “Jews” in my memorial speech. In my opinion, I was obliged to do so. But that had nothing at all to do with an extermination of Jews. About the Jewish matter I have only learned...

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well...

RAEDER: Excuse me, please, one moment. I only learned something about the Jewish matter when Jews who were known to me, mostly friends of my old parents, approached me and told me that they were about to be evacuated from Berlin. And then I intervened for them. That was the only thing I knew. On occasions I was told in answer to my questions that they were to be evacuated to cities where ghettos had been established. I always understood that a ghetto was a district in a city where all the Jews lived together, so that they would not have to mingle with the rest of the population.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, you know, my question was only: Did you know or did you not, and you could have answered that yes or no. I want you now to answer about that point...

RAEDER: Yes, but I must—so many questions have been asked about this very point and as every man in my position who held the same views says the same, that he does not know anything about it, I should like to explain once for all that one did not hear about these things, because civilians certainly did not talk to us about that, because they were always afraid that they would get into difficulties. The Führer did not speak about it. I had no connection with Himmler nor with other agents of the Gestapo. I did not know anything about it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to tell the Tribunal your chain of command for the Baltic coast. Is this right that you had the naval chief command, and then the Flag Officer of the East Baltic coast Tallinn and, under him, you had a command at Libau; is that right? Was that your chain of command?

RAEDER: I did not understand that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Was your chain of command for the East Baltic coast, Kiel, Flag Officer Tallinn, and a detachment under him at Libau? You had...

RAEDER: I assume, so—that depends on various things. If they were operational matters, then it had to do with the Naval Group Commander East or North; and as far as matters of organization were concerned, then it might have gone through the Station Chief of the Baltic Sea.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, then, at any rate, you had got in 1941 a naval command at Libau, had you not?

RAEDER: Yes, of course.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I would like you just to look at Document Number D-841, which is a deposition on oath by one of the naval employees at Libau.

My Lord, that will be Exhibit Number GB-474.

This witness says: “Deposition on oath of Walter Kurt Dittmann.”

And then it says:

“I was Naval Administration Inspector and officer in charge of
the Naval Clothing Depot at Libau in Latvia.

“I held this position from the beginning of August 1941 to the
end of March 1942.

“The Jewish population of Libau at that time was supposed to be
about 7,000 people.

“Up to the end of March 1942 many thousands of them had already
been ‘evacuated’ by the Gestapo and the Latvian Police.