Chapter II: Part 2

“The employment, the dispatch of the vessel,” says the learned Judge, “is no conclusive proof of the guilt, till going further, and showing that the party doing so did it for the illegal purpose charged.” But then, for the purpose of beginning the inquiry, without which there would have been no beginning of it, the foundation must be laid in the employment of the vessel by the person accused. If slave trading is intended, and the vessel be sent for the purpose, the important consideration then is, whether the person employing the vessel is cognizant of the intention. We have seen the large meaning of the terms slave trading. It is not like wine trade--dealing in wine: it is not dealing in slaves, but dealing in Manchester and Birmingham goods, adapted and purposely manufactured for the African markets, so long as it is found that slave traders, that is, as heretofore the term has been understood, dealers in slaves--resort to the port for which they are shipped. Of course the crime having been committed by some one, that is, by the person who intended that slave traders should use them for slave purposes--and no other will be supposed as possible--the existence of the law punishing such an intention demands that an inquiry should be made. For this purpose the commission-agent in England, who employed the vessel, must be laid hold of--not that in that one act there is a conclusive proof of guilt, until it be further shown that he was cognizant of and intended the illegal object, but because an inquiry is imperative under the Act. With whom the right and duty of making it rests it matters not--any one that may be so disposed from a philanthropic and public-spirited motive. It is not enough that a Parliamentary inquiry has been made already--it is not enough that the law-officers of the Crown see no reason to institute a further inquiry--it matters not, if the case has been lying in all its details before the public, the ends of public justice are never satisfied until the so-called inquiry takes the shape of a bill before the Grand Jury--_the inquisition_ of the country. There certain depositions are secretly made upon oath, which you shall never see; and upon this _mild_ and _fair_ procedure you will have your very life, and the life of every one dear to you placed in jeopardy, for I believe that there is nothing in the mercantile profession which is likely to prepare a man, and a man’s family, for his being treated as a felon. It is indeed true, that in the evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons merchants are treated by some of the witnesses in a tone and manner becoming only those times in which merchants were tolerated for the sake of the money that might be extorted from them, but otherwise were considered as a caste whose instinct was money-making by all means, right or wrong, and against whom every crime might be presumed; but, whatever may be in the heart of some, and whatever may rise to their lips, against a profession which England honours and distinguishes, a distinct avowal dare not be made such as will justify the insinuation that there is absolutely nothing in carrying a merchant, considered respectable, from his private office to a felon’s den, without his knowing his accuser, or upon what he is charged, which ought to shake his mind or that of his family.

But, then, unless you are proved to have been cognizant of the intended purpose, you will be acquitted. The nature of the offence has been explained and laid down to embrace a very wide compass. If there existed a slave adventure at the port of destination of a vessel, to accomplish which that vessel carried goods, the offence has been committed. The penalty, to whomsoever committed it, is by the Act only short of the greatest imposed by the law. You employed the vessel--this is not conclusive of guilt, until it is shown further that there was slave trading intended, and that you were cognizant of the intention. Let us see how both things are to be proved and brought home to you. Heretofore the way between your office and the Old Bailey is one which there is no merchant, trading with countries wherein the slave trade is allowed to exist, may not be dragged through without risk or responsibility by any ruffian in London. Now, perhaps, though not exactly at the earliest stage that may be desirable for the safety of the innocent and the repose of honourable families--still now, perhaps, the requirements of the law in regard to proof are commensurate with the facility afforded on the outset, and with the terrible penalty which follows a conviction.

The Judge proceeds upon this part of the evidence as follows: “It appears from the evidence, that the Gallinas is a place described by some witnesses of great experience--two captains in the navy, and Colonel Nichol, who was the governor of a district in the neighbourhood” (about 1,500 miles from it, see his evidence), “whose employment was mainly to watch the slave coast, of which the Gallinas forms a part, and to contribute to the putting down the slave trade--that the Gallinas is a place of slave trading, and of no other trade at all.” His Lordship continues as follows: “It is said, and I think with great probability, that the Gallinas is not generally known as a slave trading place, in fact, it seems very little known at all; it seems to be a place where any other description of felons may resort to concert their schemes and hide their stolen goods, and which, of course, they do not make public, and which is not likely to be known by honest and true people. Except those employed as police or otherwise in aid of justice, as these captains were, of course it would not be spoken of at all. There might be slave traders in London knowing it very well, but they would be perfectly silent probably, and hardly mention it by name even in speaking one to another. It is very probable, therefore, that the place was not very well known; that when these persons spoke of the Gallinas, they might say the Gallinas on the coast of Africa; and a person might be very conversant with the geography of Africa in an honest way, who had not been active in putting down the slave trade, and yet might not know where it was, except that it was on the coast of Africa.”

It is impossible more correctly to state, in stronger language, or more clearly, the possibility of the place of destination of a vessel being a slave trading place, and that exclusively, without in the least diminishing the great probability of its being unknown to the party in England who ships goods for that place as a commission-agent, by order and for account of somebody else abroad. Thus, the great probability of my statement before the Committee of the House of Commons of the ignorance of the character of the trade carried on at Gallinas was completely vouched for, and the observation, that those who knew were not likely to tell, and not likely to as much as name the place, was forcible in my favour, since the house had entered and cleared the Augusta _for Gallinas_, and not for _Africa_, as ships with destinations for the West Coast are generally dispatched, and as the Augusta might most certainly have been, had the house even suspected an improper object which required concealment. It is singular that, in the explanations prepared for instructing counsel, the case is stated in nearly the same terms as to the ignorance of the character of the place, as those used by Judge Maule. Merchants easily understand this, because it is the case more or less with every one. In shipping goods by foreign order and for foreign account to distant ports in all parts of the world, with which there is hardly any communication, and with which the shipper himself has none, and need not have any for the purpose of such a transaction, it most frequently happens, that the nature of the trade carried on at that particular port is very imperfectly or rather not at all known. In the multitude and the rapidity of operations which must be disposed of almost without thinking, the inquiry (not being either interesting or profitable, and of course quite unnecessary) is not made, or indeed as much as thought of, especially when heretofore, I believe, it will be acknowledged that it has not been considered that the nature of the trade carried on at any place could involve the mere shipper, without a connexion or any interest in that place, in the slightest responsibility.

But what follows? The character of the place is thus settled: “That it is itself a slave trading place appears to be very evident from the case on the part of the prosecution. Probably those honest persons, those honestly dealing persons, who know best about it, are those who have been called upon by their public duty to ascertain it. Such persons have been called, and they give it this character and description, and they state that it is distinguished from other parts of the coast of Africa; for on other parts of that coast, it is said, slaves are sold as one article of export, but that other things, such as palm-oil--I believe that is the principal thing--and ivory, and wood, and other things, are sold in immense quantities on the coast of Africa; but that that is not the case at the Gallinas. They might be carrying out goods to other parts of Africa, intending to bring home palm-oil, or slaves, as might be most profitable; they might intend to bring home an honest commodity, and not have to do with this dishonest and perilous commodity; but it appears difficult to conceive what a person, carrying a cargo of goods to the Gallinas, could intend to do with it, unless he intended to have those goods employed in the slave trade. The prisoner might say they were to be employed by others in the slave trade; that would be plain and simple: it is wrong, but it is a plain and simple account of that which was intended to be done. It is a place, as it appears, without any trade; and if there be an obvious plain interest in a person carrying goods to that place, it appears to me that it may be taken that they were for the purpose of the slave trade. If that be the plain and obvious inference, it appears to me that might be the inference very properly drawn by Colonel Nichol, that this was a slave adventure, unless the contrary were proved.” Here the character of the place seems the only point upon which the observations of the learned Judge bear; and that character having been laid down as very probably indeed unknown to any one but the dealer in slaves, and the police employed against them, they do not seem to touch the prisoner. But at the same time an answer is suggested which the prisoner might give about what was intended, thus seeming to imply, that he ought to be furnished with evidence in answer, capable of accounting for what was intended, without which the full weight of an inference by one of the witnesses must remain, so far attaching to him the knowledge that he must necessarily be supposed to entertain of what was intended by others. I had said before the Committee, in the evidence read in Court, that the house knew nothing of what was to be done with the goods. Therefore, this not being admitted, it seems to follow that the law, as laid down by Judge Maule, requires some plain and simple account of what was intended to be done with the goods from the commission-agent in England who ships them by order and for account of a merchant residing abroad. It had before been laid down, that to ship the goods for slave trade purposes is an offence under the Act, if the shipper was cognizant of the intent: it is now said, that the port is an exclusively slave trading port, and it is not suggested that this was probably unknown, as it had before been said, to any but the dealer in slaves and the police employed against them, nor any account taken of the statement of the accused before the House of Commons, which had been read in Court, disclaiming the very possibility, as a mere shipping-agent, of any knowledge of what was to be done with the goods: the only answer suggested is one which may give a plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intended to do with the goods at such a port. It seems to follow, therefore, that the mere shipping-agent in England is bound by the Act to be provided with such an account; and if he does not give it, the inference, to be drawn as to the object of the shipment from the character of the port, will not only attach to the adventure, but will cut deeper, since if you are bound to have and to produce a knowledge, and you do not produce it, it seems that the account is to be held not to be producible.

The notion that the Act of Parliament must be understood, not only as punishing a proved guilty knowledge, but as demanding from the accused party proof of an innocent knowledge of the plans and objects of a foreign merchant residing abroad, in respect of a transaction, in which the former has had no other share than that of a simple shipping agency in England, by order and for account of the latter, pervades the whole of the proceedings, and shows itself more clearly in the remarks that follow. “It is possible,” continues the Judge, “that this might be an adventure, not slave trading; if so, nothing can be more simple than to prove it: Martinez & Co. might prove that it is an honest adventure. If it was a dishonest adventure, it could not be expected that Martinez & Co. should be called to give evidence at all; but if it were an innocent adventure, it would be very easy for them to be called. It is true that persons are to be convicted, not by evidence they did not produce, but by evidence produced against them--not on suspicion, but on conviction; but where such evidence is offered of the trade being slave trading, as is offered here, namely, that the vessel was loaded with goods” (in itself, as the learned Judge had formerly stated, not conclusive of guilt)--“that a cargo of goods was dispatched” (to which the same former observation applies) “to a place, where slave trading is the only known object for which vessels _ever_ go” (known to slave traders and the police employed against them, as was also aptly remarked by his Lordship; although one of these, Captain Denman, seems to have known of 800 tons, according to his evidence (see p. 329); and upwards of 1,000 tons, according to his official dispatch to the Governor of Sierra Leone, dated 12th December, 1840[2], as having been landed at Gallinas, without being able to say that the object was slave trading)--“a slave-mart and nothing but a slave-mart--you have a case, though it is an answerable case; but if the answer, which if it exist could be easily given, is not given, it may very fairly be inferred that the vessel was proceeding on a slaving voyage, a voyage either for the purpose of bringing home slaves, or of landing those goods for the purchase of slaves.”

[2] Vide “Report. West Coast of Africa. Part II, Appendix,” &c. p.
460.

The learned Judge is still upon the point of the nature of the adventure, as indicated by the nature of the trade said to prevail at Gallinas; and as in the former observations, since the name of Gallinas has been laid down as probably conveying no information to any but slave dealers and the slave police, the prisoner seems to remain untouched. But then it is laid down that an answer, which of course somewhere must exist, could be easily given by the accused. How so? but that the law, this special Act of Parliament, must be so understood as to require the simple shipping-agent in England to prepare himself with a full knowledge of the plans and the objects of the foreign merchant abroad, who orders certain goods to be purchased and shipped for his account. The learned Judge has not lost sight that in the universal practice of law, a conviction is only justifiable by evidence produced--that is, produced against, not by that which the accused party does not produce: but he feels it his duty, under the Act of Parliament he was expounding, to warn the Jury that the case is not so to be treated; for the operation of that Act, when to be applied to a commission-agent in this country, shipping goods to a place about which such evidence is offered as that it is a slave-mart, and a slave-mart only, even although the knowledge of that fact has been previously stated to be most probably confined to dealers in slaves, and the police employed against them, upon whose testimony alone it stood before the Court--in such a case, when dealing with the 5th Geo. IV, the _onus probandi_ lies with the accused. In the course of mercantile transactions, the commission-agent, who buys and ships goods by order and for account of a foreign merchant residing abroad, and to a port with which the former has no intercourse of trade whatever, would not be supposed nor could be expected to possess any further knowledge than that necessary to complete, in England, his own part of the transaction; but not so for the purposes of the Act in question. The reasoning seems to be this: here is a law which makes a certain knowledge guilty, if the object of the party abroad, originating the transaction be in deed and in fact a guilty one. In order to give force and strength to the operation of this law, it must be so laid down as to render necessary some knowledge of either an innocent or of a guilty nature, in the party residing in England, of the plans and objects of the party abroad by whose order and for whose account he has shipped goods to the port indicated to him. This or that knowledge must exist in the agent: he must be called upon to produce even the very foreign merchant himself, over whom the Court can give the accused no control, over whom he himself is not shown to possess any, and whose testimony after all could not be trusted; since that of the accused, as recorded before the Committee, is not. If in this, or in some other way, he does not prove knowledge of an innocent object, the object must be taken to be a guilty one; and as the law must be understood to require a knowledge, and he shows no innocent knowledge, the inference remains of a guilty knowledge: from which it seems evident that shipping agency business cannot be safely undertaken, as has been heretofore done, at least for merchants residing in countries in which slave dealing still exists, not only in Africa, but Cuba, Brazils, the United States, and other places. But merchants in England are required to master the whole object and plan of their correspondents abroad; and that the sincerity of his endeavours will be measured only by the result, is what common prudence will teach a man to expect from the machinery which is set on foot in order to apply to this Act of Parliament that notable remark, that _who wills the end wills the means_.

And thus, after having laid down that the Act requires a proof of innocence in the party accused, a knowledge of something innocent intended--which, if not given, must leave the inference of guilty knowledge, inasmuch as _no knowledge_, ignorance of the object, cannot be taken as an answer--the accused, if he cannot produce his correspondent, or if he did not possess himself at the time of making the shipment, of a plain and simple account of his plans, is left to the mercy of such inferences as may be drawn; and upon this view of the requirements of the Act of Parliament he is to be considered as withholding something which cannot be supposed to be favourable to him. This inference will not be counterbalanced--it cannot be when once admitted; it must either be destroyed by the plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intended, or its edge will be blunted by nothing else. The accused’s character may be “of the very highest,” perfectly unassailable; the position he occupies in the mercantile profession may be very high, the profession itself in this country being reckoned on a level for honour and principle with the highest; and men of unblameable character, of considerable standing and independence, conscientious and upright, moving in society where good taste and right feeling prevail, are not likely to put their property, their character, their consciences, in jeopardy, especially by partaking in transactions to which their habits and feelings, and those of persons around them, stand opposed, and all that for very paltry advantage. It is pointed out by the learned Judge, that although a very grave charge, and of a very highly penal nature, still the slave trade--the dealing in slaves--“is a trade, which till a recent period was lawful for persons in this country, and many persons of very good character certainly did engage in that trade, and a great number of persons justified it. I suppose,” he continues, “those same persons would now say it is not to be engaged in, because it is a prohibited thing--it is a regulation of trade enforced by very severe penalties made by this country--but that the dealing in slaves is in itself a lawful, right, good, and proper thing, which ought not to be prohibited. Those persons would now consider slave trading as a thing prohibited only by positive regulations. There is no one who does not at once perceive that practical distinction between them. There is no person who, in point of feeling and opinion, does not perceive the difference there is between a thing which is prohibited by positive law, and that kind of thing, against which, if there were no law at all against it, the plain natural sense and conscience of mankind would revolt. This trading in slaves, in the opinion of a great many persons, is itself an abomination, a thing which ought to be considered with the greatest horror, whether prohibited or not; but those who think it was right when it was not prohibited, probably do not think it so very bad if it be committed now, since it has been prohibited by law, only that it is to be avoided on account of the penalty to which it subjects the individuals engaged in it. This has some bearing on the question of how far considerations of character would have weight with respect to such an offence.” The opinion entertained by the individual in question against the slave trade may be as strong as the strongest for any thing that appears, who has stated without its having been contradicted, that neither himself nor his family have ever been suspected of having the smallest interest in slave dealing, or in slave property, about which he has stated how his fathers have proceeded: an individual, who may, perhaps, have a very strong opinion as to the moral and religious duty of obedience to positive enactments by competent authority, and who said something to that effect in the evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, which had been read in Court.

This as to the character of the party. As to the inducement, when it is alleged that the smallness of the agency commission charged shows that the transaction was considered to be one in the ordinary course of shipping business, that consideration is pressed down by the weight of the radical defect in not having given a plain and simple account of what was intended by the foreign merchant. “It is alleged,” says the Judge, “that the profit on this transaction would be extremely small. I do not think that the petty gain of this one transaction is the matter, for it appears that Pedro Martinez & Co. do a great deal of business, and it is possible that whenever persons have a large and valuable business to conduct, _there is some small portion that the correspondent and agent would willingly get rid of if he could_; but he is not allowed to pick and choose, but he must take the whole.” In short, a London merchant, of the character which has been described, is to be supposed as not at all unlikely to commit a felony, if the alternative be to lose a valuable connexion.

And thus, whilst the most unimpeachable character is not a proof to any extent against the suspicion of a felonious knowledge and intent, and whilst the token of innocence afforded by the charge of the ordinary rates allowed in legitimate business is not considered of weight--as a compensation in some other way is possible, and the disposition to barter conscience and duty for money is such a thing as people who conduct a large business are not quite unlikely to lend themselves to if they are not allowed to pick--so, likewise, the supposed extent of the connexion of the merchant is no bar to their being supposed anxious to retain one more under felonious conditions. Neither the superiority of his knowledge and education, nor his skilfulness, are likely to make him either apprehensive or disinclined to the commission of a crime, whilst these qualities render him obnoxious to the remark, “that it may very generally be taken, that people know what they are about, unless they can show there was some particular concealment, some hinderance to their knowledge;” “unless they,” so accused, “can show,” that they did not know (not if those who accuse them have shown that they _did_ know), then all the qualities of character, station, extent of business, education, are against the accused; and unless the accused can show, that he had a knowledge of something innocent having been intended by the foreign merchant, any peculiar circumstances of the case, which may appear to be of a favourable nature to the accused, must be considered only in that light which may diminish the improbability of his having had a guilty knowledge. Thus, as the employment of the British flag for the purpose of dealing in slaves stares every body in the face, and was a very strong feature in the present case, not only against any knowledge on the part of the charterer of the vessel and shipper of the goods in England, but even against there having been any guilty intent in the merchant abroad, who had the choice of other flags equally secure and less easy of detection and punishment, the favourable inference hence arising must be neutralised. “If Jennings” (the master of the vessel) “was an adventurer, if he were, as suggested, a very clever and intelligent person, and very conversant with every thing to be done on this occasion, a competent master of the vessel, supposing the slave trade to be intended, a thing which requires qualities one is sorry to see exercised so ill--a great deal of courage, sagacity, and presence of mind, and an unscrupulous readiness to employ them for the commission of this felony, not to be found in everybody--a man of such a description would be the paramount object of a slave trader, whose aim would be, whoever the owner may be, to elude all search, so to manage the thing as that the cruizers of any country shall not stop him. Probably, if the adventure succeeds, it must succeed by such means, so that one sees a perfectly good reason why, consistently with this being a slave trading voyage, it may have been English owned.” Not a word appears in the proceedings against the character of this man, neither does it seem intended by the learned Judge to impugn it, simply to say that _if_ the man did possess the qualities of cleverness and courage attributed to him, these qualities being very serviceable for wicked purposes, it is to be inferred that they were intended to be applied to a slave trade adventure, since no plain and simple account of a lawful intent on the part of the foreign merchant has been given by the charterer in England, with whom the law is to be supposed to make a knowledge imperative. The prosecutor knew, although it was not before the Court, that this man had been tried for the very identical offence in this matter of the Augusta at Sierra Leone, and had been acquitted; for _the chief witness in this prosecution_, in which, be it observed, Jennings is coupled with me (see the indictment, page 211), _was the prosecutor in the proceedings against him before the criminal court of that colony_; and he himself stated before the Committee of the House of Commons (see Lieutenant Hill’s evidence, page 84), that Jennings had been acquitted. And here, by the way, let it be noticed, that _Jennings is at this moment under a prosecution in London for the very crime for which he was tried at Sierra Leone and there acquitted_, the chief and really the only witness, upon whose sworn depositions before the Grand Jury here the bill against Jennings has been found, being the very same person who instituted the prosecution at Sierra Leone, which terminated in the acquittal of Jennings. And thus, while the individual so acting is at this moment on his way to take possession of his appointment as governor of the Gold Coast, the unfortunate man, who he knows cannot be tried a second time, is in prison.

Further, as the vessel had been admitted (how reluctantly may be easily seen) by one witness not to have been furnished with equipment of any sort for slaving purposes, and had been rescued from the attempt to raise a doubt upon this point, by the evidence of another witness, this is shown also as in no way serving the shipping-agent in England without giving the plain and simple account of what was intended by the foreign merchant residing abroad. “I should think it would be quite a matter of course, even if the vessel was intended to be sent to promote the slave trade, that she should not go out with shackles or leagers, or any thing of that kind on board; for if they are on board, the vessel would be at the mercy of any Custom-house officer.”

The vessel had, however, been at Cadiz, where, according to the representation made on behalf of the prosecution she was really meant to go first, in order to provide herself with the slave instructions, which the Court would not receive, though strongly pressed, as evidence against the agent who had managed the vessel in England so far as chartering and loading her; and yet, although it had been said by Serjeant Bompas “that wherever a vessel leaves a place such as Spain, or some place where she may leave with impunity, with all her equipments complete,” she does so; and although this vessel, which has been charged by the prosecution to have gone into Cadiz for the very purpose of helping the illegal object imputed: she is found not to have been there equipped--and that not from any great attention to the safety of the adventure, for the letters contended to be so clearly slave instructions for the voyage seem to have been there put on board--still the observation is not the less applied, that she was not equipped for the slave trade, because she could not have been so in an English port, without any reference to the fact that the prosecution had contended she could and would have so been at a Spanish port. There she had, however, touched; and that too, according to the prosecution, for the very express purpose of helping the illegal object in a manner more condemnatory than any other. The thing demanded from the prisoner is, however, a plain and simple account of the intent of the foreign merchant in this transaction, and without his being able to give that, every other circumstance which may be favourable to him, either vanishes away, or converts itself into a weapon against him.

Again, the counsel for the defence had put the following case to the Jury:--“You may be manufacturers of guns or gunpowder, or commission-agents living in this country, who, for the purpose of shipment, purchase those goods; in either case a party comes and says--I want 1,000 muskets and six tons of gunpowder to be shipped to a certain place on the coast of Africa. I ask you, are you first to consult the map to ascertain the place, and, having ascertained where it is, are you to go to Captain Hill or Captain Denman and inquire whether they have been upon the coast of Africa, and can tell you the character of the trade carried on there? Are you next, the person being a Spaniard or a Portuguese, to inquire whether they ever deal in slaves; and if you find they do, are you to say, I will execute no order you give me?”

Upon this the learned Judge remarks:--“That Zulueta & Co. stand in a very different situation from that of a person who is simply the manufacturer or dealer in goods, and who has those goods ordered, and who, inquiring Where shall I send them? is answered, Send them on board the ‘Augusta,’ now lying at Liverpool. It would be a strong thing from that circumstance to infer that a person sending those goods on board had any thing to do with slave trading; but that appears not to be the nature of this transaction. In regard to there being a slave trading, all that is done, is done by Zulueta & Co. It is not merely that they had goods sent on board the ship, but they chose the number of the goods to be sent on board the ship, goods which they had bought, for which they had negotiated; and they made out such charter-party, and that charter-party provides that the ship shall proceed to Gallinas on the coast of Africa.”

In the case of the manufacturer of the goods, described as receiving an order and executing it, and shipping the goods on board a vessel for the Gallinas, it would be _strong_ to infer that he had any thing to do with the slave trade. Why so, but because every one of these acts is compatible with ignorance of the objects that are or may be intended? Now, the learned Judge had previously established that the acts of buying and shipping, chartering, and dispatching, are not necessarily in themselves conclusive of guilt, which of course they are not; how, then, is the inapplicability of the comparison put by the counsel for the defence to be maintained, but by laying down the principle, that for the purpose of a defence under this charge, the commission-agent must, at all events, be required to be possessed of, and therefore to be able to give, a plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intended; and this once laid down, nothing that comes short of it must be suffered to tell in his favour.

The preceding remarks are scattered over the whole of the summing up, and accompany a recapitulation of the particulars of the case. They are here brought together in succession, for the purpose of showing the manner in which the circumstances of the case, in a proceeding of this kind, are treated. It is very true that an introductory remark precedes, laying down “that it is necessary undoubtedly, on the part of the prosecution, that there should be a case made of knowledge, on the part of the prisoner, of the purpose for which this adventure was meant.” The whole process which follows is of a nature which would appear contrary to this principle, unless with the qualification that the proof is to consist in the prisoner not giving himself a plain and simple account of something innocent meant by the foreign merchant residing abroad; and as if the law left no alternative to the shipping-agent, who buys and ships the goods in England by his order, but to do this; or, _ipso facto_, by not doing so, to stand self-convicted of the guilty knowledge.

Under this view of the requirement of the law, which I have now followed throughout this charge, the concluding remarks of the Judge seem to be dictated. “Now, inasmuch as there are two other partners, and it is probable there might be some other persons in the concern, there arises this consideration. It is true, supposing that there were a case made, but that the prisoner was innocent of it, that he could not call Martinez & Co. on that supposition, as he might on the supposition of there being no slave trading; for Martinez & Co. would not be innocent persons, and they would not be willing to come into this country and say, ‘We carried on the slave trading, but it was disguised from our correspondent, Zulueta & Co.’ If you think there is a case requiring an answer, the question then is, would there have been any difficulty in the prisoner calling his two partners, and others conversant with the business of the firm, and proving that Zulueta & Co. knew nothing at all about this, that they had not the least suspicion, that Martinez & Co. never communicated the fact to them, and that the illegal purpose was utterly unknown to them, for some reasons which the prisoner cannot give, but which his partners could? It would be extremely desirable they should do it, if the defence existed in point of fact.” And lastly, the learned Judge concludes his address to the Jury, by directing their attention to the evidence of the character of the prisoner, remarking, that it is “a character I should say very strong indeed, and almost conclusive, supposing the case were one that did not admit of an answer in point of fact.”

Here the same principle of demanding a justification of innocence is carried out, which pervades the whole of the summing up, and of every part of the management of the case by the Court. It is not said, in any one part of the charge, that the prosecution have made out either a case of slave dealing, or any knowledge of such a thing being intended, or known to be intended by the prisoner, against which a contrary case should be opened and proved; but only that evidence which the prisoner should give of innocence is pointed out; and, what is most remarkable, the following circumstance was not thought worthy of notice.

Mr. Fitz-Roy Kelly (the counsel for the defence) had in the outset, when Mr. Serjeant Bompas was opening the evidence for the prosecution, brought into Court every book, letter, and paper of the firm of Zulueta & Co., with the clerks in whose keeping these documents constantly are: they consisted of the journals, ledgers, letters, bill-books, memorandum-books, original letters of the house of Martinez & Co., of the Havannah, and Martinez of Cadiz, since 1839, one year before these transactions originated, up to 1841, one year after their termination; and, as will be found in page 303, Mr. Kelly made the following tender:--“I ought to add, as the notice to produce has been referred to, and is now upon the table, that the notice calls upon the prisoner, Mr. Zulueta, to produce all the books, documents, and accounts of his house, between certain dates, at all relating to the transaction in question; and all letters written, and copies of letters written by this house, or any body for them in relation to this matter. My Lord, every document there mentioned is here in Court, and in two minutes ready to be put upon the table.... The greater part are in Spanish, and the prisoner at the bar can distinguish them; but the clerks who kept these books, the corresponding clerk, and the clerk in whose handwriting they are, are ready to speak to any thing my learned friend may call for from the beginning to the end.” This is not taken any notice of by the learned Judge, when pointing out that the prisoner should have called his own father and his own brother, the only partners in the house, to prove that Zulueta & Co. had no knowledge of any slave trading being intended, although the prisoner himself had so stated the fact to be before the Committee of the House of Commons, in the evidence which had been read in Court; and if the statement was objectionable, as being from the party now deeply interested himself, when in a very different situation, it is not perceived how that objection would not have held with tenfold strength at that moment against their evidence. Thus it remains on record, that nothing short of a plain and simple account of what the merchant abroad intends, made out by the defendant, will answer any purpose of the slightest advantage to himself. It is enough in the case of a vessel employed by an agent in England to carry goods, bought and shipped by himself, by order and for account of a foreign merchant residing abroad, if the prosecutor show a general slaving at the port of destination.

And thus have I disposed of the last point which I proposed to illustrate out of the summing up of Justice Maule, in order to show the position of merchants who have intercourse of business with countries wherein slavery, and the slave trade, is still permitted to exist.

I began by showing the facility afforded by the law to any individual whomsoever, who may choose to undertake a prosecution, not only without the consent, but against the recorded judgment of the Legislature, and the known opinion of those officers of the Crown who are especially charged with the prosecution of public offenders. I have shown, that this may be done by any man--whether from motives of private resentment, or of private interest, or of wanton malice--whether under a fanatical hallucination, or from a desire of vain-glory, or from a combination of all or of some of the very worst passions of the heart with the less inexcusable errors of the head, it matters not: the search for the particular motive operating in any one given instance is indeed unprofitable, and whilst it cannot do much towards reclaiming the perpetrator of the mischief, would but little improve the moral tone of mind of his victim, yet the fact itself remains unaltered, _viz._ that a prosecution of this kind, in the name of the Queen, which the forms of justice require to be used, and on the plea of a public spirit, may be taken up by any man in defiance of a recommendation to the contrary by the House of Commons, upon a case canvassed and decided upon by a Committee of that House, and against the opinion of the law officers of the Crown. It has also appeared, that to the general and very powerful objections which are suggested by the common sense and reason of mankind against this practical reversion to the state of savage life in which a man can take such means of attack upon his fellow-man as he thinks will effect his purpose best, with this sole difference, that the self-appointed public prosecutor may inflict even greater mischief with the weapon of the law than the savage with the knife, and more securely, this evil is added, _viz._ that this private avenger of public wrongs may adopt the form of a secret information before a Grand Jury, thus avoiding the necessity of appearing as the accuser, unless he chooses so to do, at his own most convenient time, and always preserving the secrets of his own statements, by means of which the first blow at all events will have been successfully, irremediably, and fatally inflicted, and thus placing himself above any responsibility on that account. Then it has been seen, that at this stage of the proceedings, and under all the ignorance as to the prosecutor and as to the depositions upon which he is charged, inseparable from the nature of the proceedings, a man, reputed honourable, as unsuspecting himself as unsuspected by his fellow-citizens, may be dragged from his office and from the bosom of his family, with imminent risk to his business, and with still more fearful effect upon his dearest connexions; and under the shock of his own feelings, which so awful a situation must naturally produce, is conducted as a common felon under charge of the police to the station-house, and thence to the Old Bailey, whence he can only be suffered to depart (of course in exactly the same state of ignorance under which he entered the Court), when the person who arrested him shall have consented, and on such terms as he shall consent to; and then only will he be allowed to return to his distracted family and prepare his defence--against what? against a technical definition of some facts in which he has played some part, but which being so defined as to square with the application which may be meant to be made of a certain Act of Parliament, is sure to bear no kind of resemblance to the real manner in which the said facts occurred, and of course none at all to the impression which they left on the mind of the accused, or to the form in which alone they can present themselves to his mind; and, therefore, such a definition can convey no information of the nature of the depositions secretly made against him, and cannot consequently assist him in preparing evidence against them. He must launch into the regions of imagination for every possible construction which may be given by any man to those facts which have been really done by him, and prepare evidence upon every one of such possible constructions, at an expense and amidst perplexity which may be supposed, and after all most likely to no purpose, for probably the construction to which the proof will be directed by the prosecution may be one against which no counterproof has been prepared; and indeed it will be so, for with this very object the proof will be directed to the construction least likely to occur to the accused, and that upon which a counterproof will be most difficult--for all which the nature of the Act of Parliament has been seen to afford peculiar advantages.

In this state of things the trial comes on. The facilities thus far given to an unknown accuser have been seen, and to so frightful an extent, that even if the trial proceeds no further, an amount of incalculable and irreparable evil and misery may have been perpetrated. These facilities, it has been further seen, are not at all balanced by the strictness of the requirements of the law from the prosecution, they are all applied against the accused. The definition of the crime by the Act of Parliament is itself loose and capable of an unlimited application, and it is understood and laid down in the very largest, thereby including acts which are notoriously and expressly admitted to be in themselves perfectly innocent: the only qualification is the _knowledge_. This is brought to a lower point in the scale, _viz._ _suspicion_. With a show of ingenuousness, as if to put down _a quibble_, which in Court sounds like a zeal for the truth, the question is made to be, not whether _you knew_, but whether _you suspected_; and next, whether _you had reason to suspect_; the tendency really being towards the real point, to which you are only being gently let down, _viz._ whether witnesses can be found who will say that they themselves _knew_ very well a great many things, which ought therefore to have been known by yourself, and that therefore you must at least _have suspected_.

Then the prosecution is not limited to the proof of one particular charge: here it is suffered to remain quite at large--they need not define the act they mean to charge, whether it is this, or that, or any thing else, upon the accused. The knowledge of the intent, in which every lawyer in the land whom you may consult previous to entering into any operation, will tell you, _before you are indicted_, that the guilt consists, after being brought down to a lower point, as observed before, is made out to be, 1st, any knowledge, not the knowledge in the particular case; 2nd, the knowledge of _others_, not _your_ knowledge; and the proof of it is no further put upon the prosecution than so far as to make out a case of _probable knowledge_, founded upon evidence of some general acts done by certain persons on other occasions, not the one in question, in distant countries--acts to which you are not shown to have been a party, or even probably acquainted with--persons in respect of whom all your proceedings in England are admitted to be in themselves, and as done towards them, perfectly innocent; such acts being done upon such other occasions by such persons in countries far away, little known, with which no regular means of communication exist--countries almost unknown to every one in England, and not at all proved to be known to yourself: and all this evidence given by individuals not in circumstances analogous to those in which the accused stands, but by individuals, and by no others, who in the exercise of a peculiar duty have sometimes visited the countries in question; and therefore leaving the whole of the case open to this remark, that whilst it is not at all shown, either from your own acts, or from the facts themselves, that you in England must necessarily _have known_, there is an evident impropriety in pushing the witnesses to the extent of proving, that nothing but what they said to have happened on other occasions in other places, could have been the ultimate issue of an unaccomplished speculation, intercepted by one of the witnesses, to his evident advantage.

It has lately been shown that such a case of probable knowledge, so made out, and so substantiated, will go to the Jury; and in going to the Jury nothing will avail you, as far as the law goes, but your being able to give “a plain and simple account of what was intended by a foreign merchant residing abroad,” whom you must even bring over to give evidence of what he intended to do with goods shipped by yourself in England, in consequence of a simple order as a mere commission-agent, or to show an impossibility of your being aware of that intent whatever it may be. Without complying with one or other of these two requirements, your case shall go to the Jury, accompanied by every unfavourable inference; and what should have been for your advantage is turned against you. The readiness and openness of the party accused in giving every explanation upon the very first intimation of a suspicion existing on the subject--the credit attached by every one capable of correctly estimating those explanations, whatever circumstances of a favourable nature may lie on the very surface of the case itself--the respectability of the accused, his rank in society, and high character, as vouched by men of the first standing, and who have every opportunity of knowing him and his acts--his wealth, his education, his knowledge--qualities peculiarly adapted to this kind of felony, which is intimated to be the felony of the honest, the wealthy, the educated, the well-informed--all these things seem in the exposition of the law to be literally against him. Nevertheless, these circumstances, combined with the impression produced by the inquisitorial nature of the original proceedings, together with the irresistible force of that axiom, that “a man must be proved to be guilty, and not called upon to prove himself innocent,” may--and thanks be to God, did, in the instance before us--blunt the edge of the murderous weapon brandished over the head of the accused.