Chapter III: Moral Government of God

As the structure of the world shows _intelligence_, so the mode of distributing pleasure and pain, shows government. That is, God’s _natural_ government, such as a king exercises over his subjects.

But this does not, at first sight, determine what is the _moral character_ of such government.

I. _What is a moral or righteous government?_

=1.= Not mere rewarding and punishing.

=2.= But doing this according to character.

=3.= The perfection of moral government is doing this _exactly_.

_Objec._ God is simply and absolutely benevolent.

_Ans._ Benevolence, infinite in degree, would dispose him
to produce the greatest possible happiness, regardless of
behaviour. This would rob God of other attributes; and should
not be asserted unless it can be proved. And whether it can
be proved is not the point now in hand.

The question is not whether there may not be, in the
universe, beings to whom he manifests absolute benevolence,
which might not be incompatible with justice; but whether he
treats _us_ so.

=4.= It must be owned to be vastly difficult, in such a
disordered world, to estimate with exactness the overplus of
happiness on the side of virtue: and there may be exceptions to
the rule. But it is far from being doubtful that _on the whole_,
virtue is happier than vice, in this world.

II. _The beginnings of a righteous administration, are seen in nature._

=1.= It has been proved (ch. ii.) that God _governs_: and it is
reasonable to suppose that he would govern _righteously_.

1.) Any other rule of government would be harder to account for.

2.) The Bible doctrine that hereafter the good shall be happy,
and the wicked miserable, is no more than an expectation that a
method of government, now begun, shall be carried on.

=2.= The opposite consequences of prudence and rashness, show
a right constitution of nature; and our ability to foresee and
control these consequences, shows that we are under moral law.

=3.= God has so constructed society that vice, to a great degree,
is actually punished by it.

1.) Without this, society could not exist.

2.) This is God’s government, through society; and is as
_natural_, as society.

3.) Since the course of things is God’s appointment, men are
unavoidably accountable for their behaviour.

_Objec._ Society often punishes good actions, and rewards
wickedness.

_Ans._ 1. This is not _necessary_, and consequently not
natural.

2. Good actions are never punished by society as _good_, but
because considered bad.

=4.= By the course of nature, virtue is rewarded, and vice
punished, _as such_, which proves a moral government; as will
be seen if we rightly distinguish between actions and their
qualities.

1.) An action may produce present gratification though it be
wrong: in which case the gratification is in the act, not the
morality of it: in other cases the enjoyment consists wholly in
the quality of virtuousness.

2.) Vice is naturally attended with uneasiness, apprehension,
vexation, remorse, &c.

--This is a very different feeling from that produced by mere
misfortune.

--Men comfort themselves under misfortune, that it was not
their own fault.

3.) Honest and good men are befriended _as such_.

4.) Injuries are resented as implying fault; and good offices
are regarded with gratitude on account of the _intention_, even
when they fail to benefit us.

--This is seen in family government, where children are
punished for falsehood, fretfulness, &c., though no one is
hurt.

--And also in civil government, where the absence or presence
of ill intention goes far in determining the penalty of
wrong-doing.

5.) The whole course of the world, in all ages and relations,
turns much upon approbation and disapprobation.

6.) The very fact of our having a moral nature, is a proof of
our being under God’s moral government.

--We are placed in a condition which unavoidably operates on
our moral nature.

--Hence it arises that reward to virtue and reprobation of
vice, as such, is a _rule_, never inverted. If it be thought
that there are instances to the contrary, (which is not so,)
they are evidently monstrous.

--The _degree_ in which virtue and vice receive proper
returns, is not the question now, but only the thing itself,
in some degree.

7.) It is admitted that virtue sometimes suffers, and vice
prospers; but this is _disorder_, and not the order of nature.

8.) It follows, that we have in the government of the world,
a declaration from God, for virtue and against vice. So far
as a man is true to virtue, is he on the side of the divine
administration. Such a man must have a _sense of security_, and
a hope of _something better_.

=5.= This hope is confirmed by observing that virtue has
necessary tendencies beyond their present effects.

1.) These are very obvious with regard to individuals.

2.) Are as real, though not so patent, in regard to society.

--The power of a society under the direction of virtue, tends
to prevail over power not so directed, just as power under
direction of reason, tends to prevail over brute force.

--As this may not be conceded, we will notice how the case
stands, as to reason:

· Length of time, and proper opportunity, are necessary for
reason to triumph over brutes.

· Rational beings, disunited, envious, unjust, and
treacherous, may be overcome by brutes, uniting themselves
by instinct: but this would be an inverted order of things.

--A like tendency has virtue to produce superiority.

· By making the good of society, the object of every member
of it.

· By making every one industrious in his own sphere.

· By uniting all in one bond of veracity and justice.

3.) If the part of God’s government which we see, and the part
we do not see, make up one scheme, then we see a _tendency_ in
virtue to superiority.

4.) But to _produce_ that superiority there must be

--A force proportioned to the obstacles.

--Sufficient lapse of time.

--A fair field of trial; such as extent of time, adequate
occasions, and opportunities for the virtuous to unite.

5.) These things are denied to virtue in this life, so that its
tendencies, though real, are _hindered_.

6.) But it may have all requisite advantages hereafter.

--Eternity will be lasting enough.

--Good men will unite; as they cannot do now, scattered over
the earth, and ignorant of one another.

--Other orders of virtuous beings will join; for the very
nature of virtue is a bond of union.

7.) The tendency of such an order of things, so far as seen by
vicious beings in any part of the universe, would be to the
amendment of all who were capable of it, and their recovery to
virtue.

8.) All this goes to show that the hinderances to virtue are
contingent, and that its beneficial tendencies are God’s
declarations in its favor.

9.) If the preceding considerations are thought to be too
speculative, we may easily come to the same result by
reflecting on the supremacy which any earthly nation would
attain, by entire virtue for many ages.

REMARKS.

Consider now the general system of religion. The government of the world is one; it is moral; virtue shall in the end prevail over wickedness; and to see the importance and fitness of such an arrangement we have only to consider what would be the state of things, if vice had these advantages, or virtue the contrary.

_Objec._ Why may not things be now going on in other worlds, and
continue always to go on in this world, in the same mixed and
disordered state as at present?

_Ans._ We are not proving that God’s moral government is
_perfect_, or the truth of religion, but only seeing what
there is in the course of nature, to confirm it, supposing it
to be known. Were there nothing to judge by, but the present
distribution of pleasure and pain, we should have no ground
to conclude that hereafter we should be rewarded or punished
exactly according to our deserts. But even then there would
be no indication that vice is better than virtue. Still the
preceding observations _confirm_ the doctrine of future
retribution; for,

1.) They show that the Author of nature is not indifferent to
virtue and vice.

2.) That future distributive justice would differ not in
_kind_, but in degree only, from God’s present government. It
would be the _effect_, towards which we see the _tendency_.

3.) That higher rewards and punishments _may be_ hereafter.

4.) That we should _expect_ it to be so; because the
tendencies of vice and virtue are immutable, while the
hinderances are only artificial.

SUMMARY.

[This enumerates the steps of the argument, in the foregoing chapter, in as condensed a form as possible.]