Chapter VIII

OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT.

If all made up their minds with proper care and candor, there would be no need of this chapter. But some do not try to understand what they condemn; and our mode of argument is open to objections, especially in the minds of those who judge without thinking. The chief objections will therefore be considered. They are these:--it does not solve difficulties in revelation to say that there are as great in natural religion:--it will not make men religious to show them that it is _as_ important as worldly prudence, for showing that, does not make them prudent:--the justice of God in the system of religion, is not proved by showing it is as apparent as in his natural providence:--no reasoning from analogy can carry full conviction:--mankind will not renounce present pleasures, for a religion which is not free from doubt. To each of which a reply will now be given.

I. _As to requiring a solution of all difficulties._

=1.= This is but resolving to comprehend the nature of God, and
the whole plan of his government throughout eternity.

=2.= It is always right to argue from what is known, to what is
disputed. We are constantly so doing. The most eminent physician
does not understand all diseases, yet we do not despise what he
does know.

=3.= It is very important to find that objections against
revelation are just as strong, not only against natural religion,
but against the course of nature.

II. _As to men’s having as little reason for worldly pursuits, as they have for being religious._

=1.= If men can be convinced that they have as much reason to be
religious as they have to practise worldly prudence, then _there
is_ a reason for being religious.

=2.= If religion proposes greater than worldly interests, and has
the same reasons for belief, then it has proportionally a greater
claim.

=3.= If religion being left doubtful, proves it to be false, then
doubts as to the success of any worldly pursuit show it to be
wrong. Yet we constantly act, even in the most important affairs,
without _certainty_ of being right.

III. _As to the justice and goodness of God in religion._

=1.= Our business is not to vindicate God, but to learn our duty,
governed as we are; which is a very different thing. It has been
shown that if we knew all things, present, past, and future, and
the relations of each thing to all other things, we might see to
be just and good what now do not seem so: and it is probable we
should.

=2.= We do not say that objections against God’s justice and
goodness are removed by showing the like objections against
natural providence, but that they are not _conclusive_, because
they apply equally to what we know to be facts.

=3.= The existence of objections does not destroy the evidence
of facts. The fact for instance that God rewards and punishes,
though men may think it unjust. Even necessity, plead for human
acts, does no more to abolish justice than it does injustice.

=4.= Though the reasonableness of Christianity cannot be shown
from analogy, the truth of it may. The truth of a fact may be
proved without regard to its quality. The reasonableness of
obeying Christianity is proved, if we barely prove Christianity
itself to be possible.

=5.= Though analogy may not show Christian precepts to be good,
it proves them to be credible.

IV. _The analogical argument does not remove doubt._

=1.= What opinion does any man hold, about which there can be no
doubt? Even the best way of preserving and enjoying this life,
is not agreed upon. Whether our measures will accomplish our
objects, is always uncertain; and still more whether the objects,
if accomplished, will give us happiness. Yet men do not on this
account refuse to make exertion.

=2.= This objection overlooks the very nature of religion.
The embracing of it presupposes a certain degree of candor
and integrity, to try which, and exercise, and improve it, is
its intention. Just as warning a man of danger, presupposes a
disposition to avoid danger.

=3.= Religion is a probation, and has evidence enough as such;
and would not be such, if it compelled assent.

=4.= We never mean by sufficient evidence, such an amount as
necessarily determines a man to act, but only such as will show
an action to be prudent.

V. _As to the small influence of the analogical argument._

=1.= As just observed, religion is a _test_, and an _exercise_,
of character; and that some reject it is nothing to our purpose.
We are inquiring not what sort of creature man is, but what he
should be. This is each man’s own concern.

=2.= Religion, as a probation, accomplishes its end, whether
individuals believe or not.

=3.= Even this objection admits that religion has some weight,
and of course it should have some influence; and if so, there is
the same reason, though not so strong, for publishing it, that
there would be, if it were likely to have greater influence.

FURTHER. It must be considered that the reasoning in this treatise is on the principles of other men, and arguments of the utmost importance are omitted, because not universally admitted. Thus as to Fatalism, and the abstract fitness or unfitness of actions. The general argument is just a question of fact, and is here so treated. Abstract truths are usually advanced as proof; but in this work, only _facts_ are adduced. That the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is an abstract truth: but that they so appear to us, is only a matter of fact. That there is such a thing as abstract right and wrong, which determines the will of God in rewarding and punishing, is an assertion of an abstract truth, as well as a fact. Suppose God in this world rewarded and punished every man exactly as he obeyed or disobeyed his conscience, this would not be an abstract truth, but a fact. And if all acknowledged this as a fact, all would not see it to be right. If, instead of his doing it now, we say he will do it hereafter, this too is not an abstract truth, but a question of fact. This fact could be fully proved on the abstract principles of moral fitness; but without them, there has now been given a _conclusive practical proof_; which though it may be cavilled at, and shown not to amount to demonstration, cannot be answered.

Hence it may be said as to the force of this treatise,

=1.= To such as are convinced of the truth of revelation, as
proved on the principles of liberty and moral fitness, it will
furnish a full confirmation. To such as do not admit those
principles it is an original proof.

=2.= Those who believe will find objections removed, and
those who disbelieve will find they have no grounds for their
scepticism; and a good deal beside.

=3.= Thus though some may think _too much_ is here made of
analogy, yet there can be no denying that the argument is _real_.
It confirms _all facts_ to which it can be applied; and of
many is the only proof. It is strong on the side of religion,
and ought to be regarded by such as prefer facts to abstract
reasonings.