Chapter III

OUR INCAPACITY OF JUDGING WHAT SHOULD BE EXPECTED IN A REVELATION FROM GOD.

Beside the objectors to the _evidences_ of Christianity, there are many who object to its _nature_. They say it is not full enough: has in it foolish things: gives rise to superstition: subserves tyranny: is not universally known: not well arranged: figurative language, &c.

It is granted that if it contained _immoralities_ or _contradictions_ they would show it to be false. But other objections against religion, aside from objections against its evidences, are frivolous: as will now be shown.

Let the student look to the _force_ of the proofs, rather than any _consequences_ which may be drawn from them.

I. _The Scripture informs us of a scheme of government, in addition to the material laws of the world._

=1.= If both these schemes, the physical and the moral, coincide
and form one whole, then our inability to criticise the system of
nature, renders it credible that we are incompetent to criticise
the system of grace.

=2.= Nature shows many things we should not have expected, prior
to experience.

=3.= Hence it is altogether likely it would be so in religion.

=4.= If a citizen is incompetent to judge of the propriety of
the _general_ laws of his government, he is equally incompetent
to judge when and how far those laws should be suspended, or
deviated from.

II. _We are no better judges of how revelation should be imparted._

Whether to every man, or to some for others; or what mode or degree of proof should be given; or whether the knowledge should be given gradually or suddenly.

=1.= We are not able to judge how much new knowledge ought to be
given by revelation.

=2.= Nor how far, nor in what way, God should qualify men to
transmit any revelation he might make.

=3.= Nor whether the evidence should be certain, probable, or
doubtful.

=4.= Nor whether all should have the same benefit from it.

=5.= Nor whether it should be in writing, or verbal. If it be
said that if not in writing it would not have answered its
purpose: I ask, what purpose? Who knows what purposes would best
suit God’s _general_ government?

=6.= All which shows it to be absurd to object to particular
things in revelation as unsuitable.

III. _Hence the only question, concerning the truth of revelation is, whether it is a revelation._

=1.= No obscurities, &c. could overthrow the authority of a
revelation.

=2.= It can only be overthrown by nullifying the proofs.

=3.= Though the proofs could be shown to be less strong than is
affirmed, it still should control our conduct.

IV. _Modes of arguing, which are perfectly just, in relation to other books, are not so as to the Bible._

=1.= We are competent judges of common books, but not of
Scripture.

=2.= Our only inquiry should be to find out the sense.

=3.= In other books, internal improbabilities weaken external
proof; but in regard to revelation, we scarcely know what are
improbabilities.

1.) Those who judge the Scripture by preconceived expectations,
will imagine they find improbabilities.

2.) And so they would by thus judging in natural things.

--It would seem very improbable, prior to experience, that
man should be better able to determine the magnitudes and
motions of heavenly bodies, than he is to determine the
causes and cures of disease, which much more nearly concerns
him.

--Or that we should sometimes hit upon a thing in an instant,
even when thinking of something else, which we had been
vainly trying to discover for years.

--Or that language should be so liable to abuse, that every
man may be a deceiver.

--Or that brute instinct should ever be superior to reason.

V. _Such observations apply to almost all objections to Christianity, as distinguished from objections against its evidence._

For instance, the disorderly manner in which some, in the apostolic age used their miraculous gifts.

=1.= This does not prove the acts _not_ miraculous.

=2.= The person having any such gift, would have the same power
over it which he would have over any other ability, and might
pervert it.

=3.= To say why was he not also endued with prudence, to restrain
its use, is but saying why did not God give a _higher degree_ of
miraculous endowment? As to which we are not competent judges.

=4.= God does not confer his _natural_ gifts, (memory, eloquence,
knowledge, &c.) only on those who are prudent and make the best
use of them.

=5.= Nor is worldly instruction, by educators, commonly given in
the happiest manner.

VI. _There is a resemblance between religion and nature in several other respects._

=1.= In both, common and necessary things, are plain; but to “go
on to perfection” in either, requires exact and laborious study.

=2.= The hinderances to both religious and physical knowledge,
are the same in kind. A more perfect knowledge may be brought
about,

1.) By the progress of learning and liberty.

2.) By students attending to intimations overlooked by the
generality.

=3.= It is not wonderful that our knowledge of Bible truth should
be small; for the natural world has laid open to inspection, for
thousands of years, and yet only lately are any great discoveries
made.

=4.= Perhaps these scientific discoveries, are to be the means of
opening and ascertaining Bible truth.

_Objec._ The cases are not parallel; for natural knowledge is
of no consequence, compared to spiritual.

_Ans._ 1. The cases _are_ parallel; for natural knowledge
is as important to our natural well-being, as spiritual
knowledge is to our spiritual well-being.

_Ans._ 2. If the cases were not parallel, there are plenty of
other analogies, which show that God does not dispense his
gifts according to _our_ notions of their value.

_Objec._ 2. If Christianity be intended for the recovery of
men, why not sooner introduced, and more widely diffused?

_Ans._ The objection is just as strong against the natural
sciences. Nay, if the light of nature and of revelation are
both from the same source, we might _expect_ that revelation
would have been introduced and diffused just as it is.

1.) Remedies for disease are known but to a few, or not
known at all, nor to any without care and study.

2.) When proposed by discoverers, they have been treated
with derision, and the use rejected by thousands whom they
might have cured.

3.) The best remedies have been used unskilfully, and so
made to produce more disease.

4.) Their benefit may come very slowly.

5.) In some cases they may be wholly ineffectual.

6.) They maybe so disagreeable that many will not submit to
use them, even with the prospect of a cure.

7.) Sometimes the remedy may be entirely out of reach if we
were ready to take it.

All this reasoning may be applied to Christianity.

VII. _Having obviated all objections to Christianity, from its containing things we should not have expected, we will now consider the objections against its morality._

=1.= Reason may judge, as to whether revelation contains things
contrary to justice, and wisdom, &c. as those attributes are
taught by natural religion. But no such objections are advanced,
except such as would equally condemn the constitution of nature.

=2.= There are indeed particular precepts, to particular persons,
which _would_ be immoral, but for the precept. The precept
changes the nature of the action.

=3.= None are contrary to immutable morality. We are never
commanded to cultivate the principles of ingratitude, treachery,
&c.

=4.= God may command the taking of life or property because these
are _his_.

=5.= The only real difficulty is, that such commands are liable
to be perverted by the wicked to their own horrid purposes; and
to mislead the weak. But such objections do not lie against
revelation, as such, but against the very notion of _religion as
a trial_.

=6.= The sum of the whole is, objections against the _scheme_
of Christianity do not affect its truth; since there are no
objections against its morality. Hence objections against it,
aside from its evidences, are frivolous. Objections against the
_evidence_, will be considered in a subsequent chapter, [_i.e._
ch. vii.]