Chapter XXX: Appendix (20)

It appears to be partly a defect in legislation, and partly a defect in the constitution of the existing authorities for the direction of public drainage, that their agency is never thought of for the superintendence even of work which can seldom be cheaply and efficiently executed by private individuals, and that can only be so executed and kept in order by the systematic application of science and skill. An order, that the landlords of all houses which have no drains communicating with the main drains shall make them, is an order, when viewed in its operation in a street or district where there are 50 or 100 different owners, that those 50 or 100 persons shall separately get plans possibly from as many different builders, and enter into contracts with them, and procure capital which, to poor owners, will be a serious amount of several hundred pounds in the aggregate, to be applied as a permanent investment on property in which a large proportion of them will only have various transitory interests. Viewed in its aggregate operation on all places requiring amendment, the simple compulsory enactment for house drainage, and without any previous care as to the means, would be, in effect, an order for the expenditure of several millions of money in the manner described by _Mr. Charles Oldfield_, a practical witness of great experience, whose evidence (corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses of extensive experience) has already been referred to on this important topic:—

“Have you as a builder had much experience in the drainage of
houses?—Very considerable experience, and I pay particular attention
to it; there is no part of a building to which I pay more attention
than to the drainage. I seldom allow the drains to be covered in
without seeing to them myself.

“Do you think it desirable that legislative provision should be made
for the drainage of the tenements of the labouring classes?—I think it
most necessary; but merely ordering the drains to be made will not do.
Drains made for the tenements of the working classes, if left to the
parties, are almost sure to be badly constructed, and badly
constructed drains might merely carry away the soil; they might not do
that; and they would probably let in as great an evil, namely, the
foul air from the sewer. In general, unless care be taken, what is
called making drains will be opening conduits for the escape of foul
air from the sewers into the houses. This is frequently so with the
houses of the better classes of persons, where the drains are not made
perfectly air-tight, and are not properly trapped at all the
apertures. I am frequently called upon to examine houses where they
say they are oppressed by unpleasant smells. Some time ago I was
called upon to examine a house in one of the principal streets in
London, belonging to a gentleman of distinction, who was about to
abandon it in consequence of the unpleasant smells which were
continually arising. He was particularly annoyed that this smell arose
in the greatest strength whenever he had parties; the drains had been
opened, and there was no lodgement of soil in them. People commonly
imagine that when they get rid of the soil they have got rid of the
stench; they do not see and do not conceive the effect of the foul
air, which is so much lighter than atmospheric air that it escapes
where the atmospheric air would not. On examining the drains at his
house, I found that they were imperfect, and that the foul air
filtered through them. Whenever he had a party there was a stronger
fire in the kitchen, and stronger fires in other parts of the house,
and the windows and the external doors being shut, and a greater
draught created, larger quantities of the foul air from the sewers
rose up. These stenches arise in the greatest strength in the private
houses when the doors and windows are closed, the fire and column of
light air in the chimney being at work. So it would be with drains
made from the house to the sewer, or from the sewer to the house of
the poor man, unless care were taken in the construction of the
drains. When the door was shut, and he sat down to enjoy his fireside,
he would have a stench. This would be the effect of merely ordering
the drains to be made by the owners of such tenements, who would get
the work done in the way they thought to be the least expensive. You
would have them made in a row of tenements with every difference in
faults,—different forms, different sizes, different falls, bad
materials, without traps at the apertures, and not air-tight;
therefore constantly conducting a stream of polluted air from the
sewers into the houses; and there will be faults which an inspector
will not easily remedy when work is done in this manner.

“In what way, then, would you recommend them to be done, for
efficiency?—They should be done entirely by the persons in charge of
the sewers, or under the control of officers of competent skill, who
should have power to enter upon the premises, and see that the whole
of the work was properly done. Neither should private persons have
power to make any alteration without giving notice, and making the
alteration according to well-tried and approved plans. I confine my
observations, however, to tenements of certain size,—to those for the
labouring man, who has no power to protect himself, and who stands in
need of protection. It might be deemed objectionable to exercise any
control over the higher class of tenements, and the wealthier people
are able to protect themselves; but all those things that are out of
sight are done in the worst manner in the smaller tenements.

“If such an authority were to contract for the drainage of a whole
street, how much more cheaply do you conceive the work might be done
under one contract than if the labour were to be done separately, by
perhaps as many different occupiers or owners as there are houses,
each employing his own bricklayer?—At the least, from 10 to 15 per
cent. difference. Serving a notice in writing on a poor occupier,
perhaps a shifting one, that he is to get a drain made, would be of no
use. Proceeding by serving notices on the owners of such tenements, is
a course beset with difficulties. Many of the small owners are not
readily to be found; the ownership to some of the poorest plots are in
dispute. Then, when the owners are found, every owner has to seek and
bargain with a bricklayer for what he does unwillingly, and whom he
tells to do the work in the cheapest way he can. The owner does not
usually know what instructions to give; and in nine cases out of ten
the work will be badly, and at the same time expensively done. It is
with the greatest difficulty that I can get the drains to my own
houses properly done. Frequent complaints are made of the state of the
sewers by occupants in some districts, but when they are examined it
is found, in many cases, that the cause of complaint arises from their
own drain not being properly made. The poorer or reluctant owner would
seek a cheap or needy bricklayer, and will get an expensive one.
Everything ordered of this kind may be made a job of; the bricklayer
may do more than is wanted, or may make larger drains than necessary,
and thereby incur useless expense. If it be done by the public
authorities, leaving to the private parties to do it if they please
within a limited period, under the inspection of a proper officer, it
can hardly fail to be much less expensively done for the private
individual himself, and it is very sure to be better done for the poor
owner. The certain obstacles to any mere general enactments to have
the work done by a multitude of persons will be immense, and the work
will certainly be badly done, whilst, if it is well done, it will be
of the greatest public advantage.”

_Mr. Roe_, the engineer, was asked, with reference to house drainage—

“Have you found the system of cleansing the large drains by flushing
with proper supplies of water equally applicable to small drains?—Yes,
equally applicable. A gentleman has tried it on a private drain of
18–inch capacity, and 1200 feet length, and it answers equally well.
It is cleansed by the collection of refuse water from 30 or 40 houses.

“Might not the drains from private houses be also cleansed in the same
mode?—Yes, they might have a small and cheap apparatus for carrying
away all ordinary refuse. If in the small drain a brick fell in, it
could not be removed by the force of the small quantity of water which
could be obtained in such a situation. In our large sewers the heads
of water are in some cases strong enough to sweep away loose bricks.

“Would it not be of advantage to the occupier if the private drains
were under the same general superintendence?—I conceive it would in
management. They are frequently put to great expense by getting
persons to attend to them who really do not understand them. They are
often now obliged to have recourse to the contractor’s men. Private
property is often drained through other private property, and when the
drains are choked, if the parties are not on good terms, they will not
allow each other facilities for cleansing. Under the Finsbury Local
Act there is a power to enforce the cleansing of private drains, and
by way of appeal that power is sometimes resorted to by private
individuals.

“May we not presume that the same principles of hydraulics, as to the
advantages of a flow over a semicircular bottom, are as applicable to
small drains as to large ones?—More so from the flow of water being
smaller; the greater necessity for keeping it in a body to enable it
to carry away the common deposit.

“Then there is a proportionate loss in having the private drainage
made with flat-bottomed bricks or boards?—Yes, there is proportionate
loss from the extra cost of cleansing. Semicircular drains of tiles
would be better, and cheaper than brick for private houses.”

Supposing that only one-third of the existing tenements require drainage, the saving of 15 per cent. on the expenditure by the execution of the work by contract under the superintendence of a responsible engineer would be more than 1,500,000_l._ sterling on the outlay, independently of the difference in efficiency.

The necessity has previously been suggested of spreading the immediate cost over a number of years to make the charge coincident with the benefit. Were it left to the option of individuals to repay the cost at intervals of 20 or 30 years, and charge their tenants, as described in a supposed form of notice to them, which I have appended to illustrate the practical working of such a provision, (allowing them either to defray the whole cost at once, or execute the work themselves, under proper superintendence; if they thought they could execute it cheaper,) the immediate advantages of such improvements would then have some chance of being fairly estimated as against the immediate cost and inconveniences of a change, and resistance from latent motives of hostility would be obviated.

But however the charge may be diffused, and to whatever extent opposition on the part of the smaller owners may be obviated by care, it cannot safely be overlooked that in the poorest districts where it is most important that the works should be well executed, the superior direction of such expenditure will, in the ordinary course, fall into the hands of the owners of the worst-conditioned tenements, who have the greatest dread of immediate expenses, and who are under the strongest influence of petty jealousies; for in such districts it is precisely the class of persons who cannot agree to profitable measures of private drainage, who are the owners of the worst tenements, who, having leisure during the intervals of their weekly collections, and from other causes, are most frequently found in honorary offices for the direction of local expenditure. One officer, when asked how it was that in a district where fever had been rife nothing had been done under the authority of the law, which authorized its being cleansed? replied, that the Board had made precisely the same objections that were made when the cholera appeared; when it was proposed to cleanse the district, the answer made at the Board was, that “they did not believe it would do any good:” and those of the officers who were landlords of the weekly tenements said, “Why should we disturb and drive away our tenants?” and those who were shopkeepers said, “Why should we frighten away our customers by representing the neighbourhood as unhealthy?” consequently nothing was done.

The legislature, in making demands for such honorary services, has usually proceeded on the theory which views all those who may be called upon to render them, as persons qualified to understand the whole subject intuitively, and having no other interest or views than to perform the services zealously for the common weal; whereas, in the locality they are viewed in a totally different light, not as public officers, but in their private capacities, as owners or tradesmen, competitors for advantages of various kinds. However unjust this impression may frequently be, it is the impression that commonly prevails; and since all of one class cannot have a share in the administration of such funds, others of the same class, whether owners or tradesmen, view the persons exercising the power as rivals, and distrust their administration accordingly. As an owner, one member of a local Board is strongly indisposed to any line of operations that will apparently improve the property of another; and as an owner, too, he is under the strongest jealousy if he proposes or does anything which may appear to benefit his own property at the public expense.

Neither is such distrust as to trustworthiness from skill and adverse private interests confined to the administration of the public works of sewerage and drainage; it is fortified by the example of the local administration of the works of road construction and repair, a branch of administration so inseparably connected with drainage operations, as to justify and require a joint consideration with them.

Witnesses of the most extensive practical experience lay the greatest stress on the necessity of lifting these important branches of administration out of the influence of petty and sinister interests, and of doing so by securing the appointment of officers of superior scientific attainments, who (subject to a proper local as well as general control) may be made responsible for directing any new expenditure on a scale of efficiency as well as of economy. A competent, scientific, and efficient management, let it be applied to what part of these works it may, can scarcely fail to be immediately as well as ultimately the most economical management. But it will be found on examination that the consolidation of all the structural arrangements, comprising under-drainage and surface-drainage, road structure and repair, under one service, is most required for the sake of efficiency. Division of labour in the arts derives its efficiency from combination, adaptation, and subordination to direction to one end; but that which appears to be a division of labour in local administration is, in fact, an insubordinate separation, weakening the means of procuring adequate skill and power, occasioning obstructions and defective execution, and enhancing expense. Were pins or machines made as sewers and roads are constructed; shafts of pins would be made without reference to heads,—in machines screws would be made without sockets, and, it may be confidently stated, there would not be a safe or perfect and well-working machine in the whole country.

_Mr. Telford_, in a report on the Holyhead road, makes the following observations:—

“Perfect management must be guided by rules and regulations, and these
must be carried into effect by the unceasing attention of a judicious
and faithful surveyor who has by actual experience and attention
acquired a thorough knowledge of all that is required, and applicable
to the general and local state of particular districts, as regards
soil, materials, and climate; likewise the sort of wear to which the
surface is liable. A person possessed of all these requisites, and
otherwise properly qualified to level and set out new lines, &c.,
where necessary, must receive the remuneration such a character
merits, and may always obtain, in this active and industrious country.
But however convinced and well-disposed trustees maybe to give this
remuneration, the tolls of five or six miles do not afford the means
of giving it. The consequence is that the Shifnal Trust (four miles)
has hitherto been under the management of a person so little
acquainted with proper road business, that it becomes a serious
consideration whether it will be prudent to suffer the extensive
improvement at Priors Leigh to be entrusted to his care. Until the
Parliamentary Commissioners interfered and showed a practical example,
the Wellington Trust (seven miles) was managed almost wholly by the
clerk; he had a sort of foreman, who appeared to be only partly
employed on the road. And on the Shrewsbury Trust (seven miles), as
has already been stated, the surveyor and contractor were united in
the same person. All these managers proceeded, without regard to any
rules and regulations whatever, receiving only occasional directions
from some of the most active of the trustees, whose varying opinions
served more to distract than benefit the practical operations of the
workmen. I must beg leave to add that these observations are
applicable to all trusts of similar extent, and are evidences of the
propriety of establishing districts of a magnitude to justify a more
perfect arrangement, and the employing of a properly qualified
surveyor, whose sole occupation should be the road under his care, and
who should also be enabled to keep constantly employed a set of
workmen thoroughly conversant with road observations, and working
chiefly by contract.”—_First Annual Report on the Holyhead Road_, May
4, 1824. p. 25.

It need scarcely be necessary to observe that in the sense of that great engineer, care of the road implied the greatest care in respect to the drainage. In consequence of the limited areas of management, although great expense is incurred, the appointments of the surveyors to superintend works which are never well executed by any other than an experienced engineer, are inferior even to the appointments of the paid officers to superintend the sewerage. _Sir Henry Parnell_ in his work, “On the Formation and Management of the Public Roads,” thus compendiously describes the composition of the chief bodies by whom these officers are chosen and directed:—

“According to the provisions of every Turnpike Act, a great number of
persons are named as trustees; the practice is to make almost every
one a trustee, residing in the vicinity of a road, who is an opulent
farmer or tradesman, as well as all the nobility and persons of large
landed properly: so that a trust seldom consists of fewer than 100
persons, even it the length of the road to be maintained by them does
not exceed a few miles. The result of this practice is, that in every
set of trustees there are to be found persons who do not possess a
single qualification for the office, persons who conceive they are
raised by the title of a road trustee to a station of some importance,
and who too often seek to show it by opposing their superiors in
ability and integrity when valuable improvements are under
consideration, taking care, too frequently, to turn their authority to
account, by so directing the spending of the road money as may best
promote the interests of themselves or their connexions.

“It sometimes happens that if one trustee, more intelligent and more
public-spirited than the rest, attempts to take a lead, and proposes a
measure in every way right and proper to be adopted, his ability to
give advice is questioned, his presumption condemned, his motives
suspected; and as every such measure will, almost always, have the
effect of defeating some private object, it is commonly met either by
direct rejection or some indirect contrivance for getting rid of it.
In this way intelligent and public-spirited trustees become disgusted,
and cease to attend meetings; for, besides frequently experiencing
opposition and defeat at the hands of the least worthy of their
associates, they are annoyed by the noise and language with which the
discussions are carried on, and feel themselves placed in a situation
in which they are exposed to insult and ill-usage.”

He observes, that “Although this turnpike system has led to the making of many new roads, and to the changing of many old ones into what may be called good roads in comparison with what they formerly were, this system has been carried into execution under such erroneous regulations, and the persons who have been entrusted with the administration of them have uniformly been either so negligent or so little acquainted with the business of making or repairing roads, that at this moment it may be stated with the utmost correctness that there is not a road in England, except those recently made by some eminent civil engineers, which is not extremely defective in the most essential qualities of a perfect road.” To the varying extent of these defects the public are forced to ascend unnecessary heights, travel unnecessary distances, employ more horse-labour than would be necessary in travelling over roads that are kept hard, dry, and level, instead of wet, soft, and rugged. From the Report of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the subject, it appears that for every 200 miles of turnpike road there are, on an average, ten surveyors: whereas, if the highways and turnpike trusts were consolidated, one properly qualified surveyor might perform much better the service with which the ten are charged. There are, it appears, 1,116 turnpike trusts, comprehending about 22,000 miles. The officers employed consist of 1,120 treasurers, 1,135 clerks, and 1,300 surveyors: total, 3,555. The annual cost of the _repair_ of the turnpike roads is 51_l._ per mile: total expenditure of 1,122,000_l._ per annum. The debts amounted to upwards of 9,000,000_l._ and they appeared to be rapidly increasing. The average expense of the _management_ of the highway and the turnpike roads is estimated at 10_l._ per mile per annum; but it is calculated that if the management of the turnpikes and highways were consolidated, they might be better managed at an expense of from 30_s._ to 2_l._ per mile per annum. On comparing the actual expense of the repairs of roads under a scientific management of the highways with the common cost, it appears probable that by management on an extended and appropriate scale, upwards of 500,000_l._ per annum may be saved on that branch of administration alone.

The Committee of the House of Commons, which sat in 1834, examined some of the most able engineers in the country, and a Commission subsequently appointed, at the head of which were the Duke of Richmond and the Marquis of Salisbury, coincided in recommending the adoption of the principle of consolidation as the only means of retrieving that branch of administration.

I venture humbly to submit the grounds for the opinion in which I believe their Lordships would concur, that the principle of consolidation may be carried still further, and include all public works within the locality, as the best means of obtaining for each or for all, at the least expense, the most efficient scientific direction.

It has been shown, in respect to drainage as well as road construction, that the economy and efficiency of the works will be according to the qualifications, the powers, and responsibilities of the officers appointed to execute them, secured by legislative means, and that new labour on the old condition, without skill, will be executed in the old manner, extravagantly and inefficiently. But engineers or properly qualified officers having the science of civil engineering could not be procured for every separate purpose in every part of the country, as is generally assumed in Acts of Parliament for effecting particular objects. When such connected work is divided and separated, the remuneration necessary to obtain properly qualified officers to attend to the fragment of service is too high; the separation, therefore, in most places, amounts to the exclusion of science from public work, or, in other words, to its degradation. It will be found, when the works of draining and road making and maintenance are examined, that the common practice of making sewers on plans independently of the construction of roads, and roads independently of the arrangements for cleansing and keeping them dry, is always to the disadvantage of the work and to the public. The same surface levels and surveys serve for drainage and for road construction. The construction of the drains for roads and streets, and the maintenance of them, are the primary and most important works; the construction and maintenance of the surface of the road is a connected work, subsequent in order, and can be best superintended by the same officer. In every part of the country inconveniences and losses are experienced from the separation of such work on almost every occasion where repair or new construction is needed. In the towns a road is broken up by the bursting of a sewer or the necessity of cleansing or repairing it; the sewer is repaired, but the road is left broken, because the road surveyor and his separate set of workmen are engaged in some other work. In the metropolis, the breaches left in the roads by the delay and want of concert amongst the various officers are a source not only of great obstruction but of frequent accidents. In replacing the pavements the water and the gas-pipes are not unfrequently put out of order, and these again occasion another opening and another expense to the public, for repairs. In the rural districts a road is out of repair, but the first remedy is drainage; the road surveyor cannot proceed because the sewers’ surveyor has his men elsewhere occupied. In various other particulars the consolidation of the same work under the same officer, acting with a combined staff of foremen and workmen, is attended with advantages in efficiency and economy to which it were unnecessary to advert, if the opposite arrangements were not the most frequent. In the few instances that have taken place of a combination of duties, the experience of the advantages of the combination would occasion a proposal for separating them to be viewed as an increase of trouble and expense, and a hinderance to the proper execution of the work.

In the districts where the greatest defects prevail, we find such an array of officers for the superintendence of public structures as would lead to the _à priori_ conclusion of a high degree of perfection in the work from the apparent subdivision of labour in which it is distributed. In the same petty districts we have surveyors of sewers appointed by the commissioners of sewers, surveyors of turnpike-roads appointed by the trustees of the turnpike trusts, surveyors of highways appointed by the inhabitants in vestry, or by district boards under the Highway Act; paid district surveyors appointed by the justices, surveyors of paving under local Acts, surveyors of building under the Building Act, surveyors of county bridges, &c.

The qualifications of a civil engineer involve the knowledge of the prices of the materials and labour used in construction, and also the preparation of surveys, and the general qualifications for valuations, which are usually enhanced by the extent of the range of different descriptions of property with which the valuator is conversant. The public demands for the services of such officers as valuators are often as mischievously separated and distributed as the services for the construction and maintenance of public works. Thus we have often, within the same districts, one set of persons appointed for the execution of valuations and surveys for the levy of the poor’s rates; another set for the surveys and valuations for the assessed taxes; another for the land tax; another for the highway rates; another for the sewers’ rates; another for the borough rates; another for the church rates; another for the county rates, where parishes neglect to pay, or are unequally assessed, and for extra-parochial places; another for tithe commutation. And these services are generally badly rendered separately at an undue expense.

It is in the ordinary course that local bodies would have the power of appointing surveyors for seeing to the execution of provisions for the regulation of buildings, on the precedent of the Metropolitan Building Act; and these officers are paid by fees varying from 1_l._ to 3_l._ 10_s._ each building. In the towns, it is rare that one-story houses are erected where the ground is of much value; and it will be a low average to take all the new houses as of two stories, that, is, fourth-rate houses, for which a fee of 2_l._ has been proposed to be paid. Before the building surveyor can proceed, the sewers’ surveyor must have seen that the drains are properly laid, and the builder have obtained a certificate from him to that effect. The labour of the budding surveyor, if properly performed, may require as much as an hour for the inspection of each new building. But the amount of the proposed fee would in general more than pay, in ordinary cases, for the construction of an efficient drain for such a tenement. Any speculating builder who is building a fourth-rate street of fifty houses, would, by removing out of the limits of the jurisdiction, save by the removal the means of erecting an additional house or drains for the whole of them.

No past or proposed legislative measures prescribe any securities for appropriate skill, or trustworthiness for the performance of such services. It is matter of complaint in one extensive district in the metropolis, that the duty of examining the premises is performed by young men, junior clerks to the district surveyor.

In proportion as science is securely allied to local administration is its respectability enhanced and the attainment of its objects ensured. It is dangerous to legislate in detail, for the information is not usually available for legislative preparation against all existing local difficulties, still less all future important contingencies. Where detailed regulations are prescribed arbitrarily, the danger is incurred of creating an obstacle to the work intended to be forwarded. For example, it has been proposed that Parliament shall not only provide “That every outer wall of every building shall be built of good, sound, well-burnt, bricks, or good sound stone, and set in good mortar,” but shall direct and instruct the builders, and fix, against any alteration or improvement, the mode in which good mortar shall be made, viz., “And the mortar and cement shall be _well_ compounded in the proportion of _one_ part of good fresh-burnt lime or cement, and _three_ parts of clean sharp sand;” there, however, are large tracts of country where neither clean sand, nor sharp sand, nor sand of any sort is to be had, and where they use smiths’ ashes for the purpose. But the use of this material is thenceforward illegal, and no new discovery can be adopted without the sanction of an Act of Parliament. In one large parish it was lately desired to try a pavement of wood, when it was discovered that the local Act prescribed the use of granite for pavement. In the impracticability of carrying out all such detail, or from default of defining the ends and prescribing the attainment instead of the means, or stating the means generally, as that a wall shall be built “of incombustible materials,” it is in the usual course to require that important work shall be done in such manner as “shall be satisfactory to the surveyor who shall inspect the same,” or “according to the directions of the surveyor of the district;” _e. g._, that no chimney shall be built more than six feet high, “unless the same shall be secured by sufficient iron stays of such strength and dimensions, and to be fixed in such manner as shall be approved of by the surveyor who shall inspect the building.” The objections entertained by builders of respectability to the granting of such large powers, is founded on the certainty as to the character of the appointments of surveyors to be hereafter made if no other securities than mere general directions be taken in respect to them for the public protection. It may be a rival builder who is appointed, and it is very certain to be generally a person in trade by whom the power is exercised, whose dissatisfaction with work really fair and good may be governed by sinister considerations against which a fair builder will feel he has no defence; but the greater danger is to the public, that no dissatisfaction may be expressed with work that is cheap but unsound. The building covers bad drains, and hides rotten walls, and the effects in the calamities of spreading fires and falling houses, and calamities of sufferings, and deaths, occur in after years, when the original defect may not be detected by the closest examination, and when all concerned may have departed.

If the services of men of independent position, with the science and qualifications of engineers, were secured, their inspection of works would often be invited, and the notice they could not fail to take of unintentional and profitless errors, such as wrong levels, which detract from the convenience and value of tenements, would be of much value and be received cordially, and the exercise of discretionary authority in such hands would meet with comparatively respectful obedience.

No one can have had occasion to examine much of the business of local administration, without being aware of other evils entailed by the multiplication of badly appointed officer’s in addition to the evils of excessive cost and bad quality of the service to the ratepayers. One of the evils is the fuel they add to the flames of local parties, by which both parties are generally losers. Where special and scientific qualifications are not defined, or, if defined, not secured—where the most fatal errors, as in this instance, are shrouded by the nature of the work from detection—all the idle dependents of election committees who have time to spare, because they have failed in their own business for want of steady application, and because their time is worthless, are let in as candidates, and in proportion to the absence of security for qualifications is the extent of expectation created and disappointment ensured. The dreadful state of the labouring classes in the most important towns,—the entire neglect of existing sanitary regulations,—the apathy to repeated remonstrances that have been made by eminent medical practitioners, as by Dr. Ferrier in Manchester and by Dr. Currie of Liverpool,—the entire neglect of recommendations made by them, which, if carried out, would have protected those communities from immense burdens, from pestilence and slaughters worse than many wars, and from an enfeebled, diseased, and, by physical causes, a degraded generation of workpeople,—the resistance made from no other manifest cause than a blind jealousy of interference, to the exercise of powers that can have no other object than to prevent the like evils for the future,—all indicate the conclusion as to the nature of the arrangements to be expected from those who have by familiarity become insensible to the means of preventing the evils which fall with the greatest weight on the least protected classes.

Supposing population and new buildings for their accommodation to proceed at the rate at which they have hitherto done in the boroughs, and supposing all the new houses to be only fourth rate, the expense, at the ordinary rate of payment of surveyors’ fees, would be about 30,000_l._ per annum for the new houses alone. Fees of half the amount required for every new building are allowed for every alteration of an old one, and the total expense of such structures would probably be near 50,000_l._ in the towns alone—an expense equal to the pay of the whole corps of Royal Engineers, or 240 men of science, for Great Britain and Ireland.[43]

But at the rate of increase of the population, of Great Britain, which is 230,000 per annum, (_i. e._ equal in population to the annual addition of a new county, such as Worcester or the North Riding of Yorkshire,[44] and to accommodate them 59,000 new tenements are required, or a number equal to that of two new towns annually such as Manchester proper, which has 32,310 houses, and Birmingham, which has 27,268 houses,) affording, if all that have equal need receive equal care, fees to the amount of no less than from 80,000_l._ to 100,000_l._ per annum. This would afford payment equal to that of the whole corps of sappers and miners, or nearly 1000 trained men, in addition to the corps of engineers.

From a consideration of the science and skill now obtained for the public from these two corps for general service, some conception may be formed of the science and skill that might be obtained in appointments for local service, by pre-appointed securities for the possession of the like qualifications, but which are now thrown away in separate appointments at an enormous expense, where qualifications are entirely neglected.

The officers of the engineer corps have the execution and care of structural works, docks and dock-yards, fortifications, military roads, and barracks, in addition to the ordinary military duties. One captain of engineers fills the office of hydraulic engineer to the Admiralty, and to his superintendence is intrusted the construction and repairs of all the docks, buildings, and other public works.

The officers of the engineers have been distinguished for their services on some of the most important civil commissions. As collateral services which they have rendered to the public, may be mentioned the trigonometrical survey of Ireland, and that now in progress for England under the Board of Ordnance, and also the geological survey. The levelling, however, and the whole of the detail of the trigonometrical survey in England, is taken by the privates, corporals, and sergeants of the corps of sappers and miners, who have been instructed in geometry, drawing, and mensuration at the school at Chatham. The triangulation for the detail of this work is executed by the engineer officers under the direction of the superintendent of the survey, Colonel Colby. The great majority of the surveys obtained under the Parochial Survey and Valuation Act from private surveyors have been inferior to the surveys executed under superintendence by the privates and non-commissioned officers of the sappers and miners serving at a pay of from 1_s._ 2_d._ to 3_s._, per diem. Out of 1700 first-class maps received under the Parochial Assessment and Tithe Acts, not more than one-half displayed qualifications for the execution of public surveys without superintendence. Amongst the most satisfactory maps of the first class of parochial surveys were those executed by a retired sergeant of sappers and miners. The Commissioners for the colonization of South Australia found it difficult to proceed satisfactorily with persons of the ordinary qualifications of surveyors or civil engineers for that country; and deemed it requisite to obtain the services of an engineer officer, with a suitable number of trained men, sappers and miners, under his command.

But for the construction and care of local works, sewers, roads, and drains and houses, no qualification whatsoever is usually conceived to be requisite. The chairman of the Holborn and Finsbury Commission of Sewers, where a change of management so beneficial to the health, and so economical of the funds of the ratepayers, was obtained by placing the work under the direction of an engineer, informed me that when that commission advertised for a person to act as surveyor to the works who understood the use of the spirit level, the candidates, who were nearly all common housebuilders, were greatly surprised at the novel demand, and several of them began to learn the use of that instrument in order to qualify them for the appointment. In the canvassing letters which I have seen for parochial or local surveyorships, I never observed qualifications for skill or science even adverted to; and where a special qualification happens to be prescribed by statute, it is not regarded. For example, the Act of the 5 and 6 _Wm._ IV. enables the parochial vestries to appoint as surveyor a person of “skill and experience” to serve the office of surveyor of such parish. As an example of this description of appointments, I may mention one where, in an important district, the person appointed was an illiterate tinman, a leading speaker at parish meetings, who, for a service occupying a part of his time, receives a salary of 150_l._ per annum, _i. e._, as much as a lieutenant of engineers and a private, or as much as three sergeants of sappers and miners, whose whole time is devoted to the public service.

The mode in which such emoluments are at present wasted in the course of administration under the Building Acts, and the extent of science and skill that might be obtained for all purposes by the same amount of money, may be seen by the rate of surveyors’ emoluments for a single town. I submit, for example, the town of Leeds. There the average rate of increase of houses having been 855 per annum, and of families 940, it may be assumed that they will continue to increase at the same rate, that is, of two new houses and three-tenths per diem, which, if they were only fourth-rate houses, would be required to pay in fees 4_l._ 12_s._ per diem for two or three hours’ service at the ordinary rate of payment to private surveyors. If we bear in mind the evidence as to the character of the past appointments, and of the works themselves, and consider that, where no securities are taken for qualifications, none will be found except by accident, the contrast with the payment for the services of men of superior qualifications will be clearly perceived. Such an amount of emolument would defray the expense of a whole Board of superior officers at the rate of pay to the officers of the corps of engineers:—

_Board of Officers._

£. _s._ _d._
1 Colonel 1 6 3
1 Lieutenant-colonel 0 18 1
2 Captains, at 11_s._ 1_d._ 1 2 2
2 First lieutenants, at 6_s._ 10_d._ 0 13 8
2 Second ditto, at 5_s._ 7_d._ 0 11 2
—— —— ——
4 11 4

Or if unity of direction and execution were required, the staff of officers and men at the rate of pay for general service from the public would be as follows. The rate of pay therein stated is subsistence pay: the half-fees for every alteration made in a building would in most cases suffice for the extra pay given to officers and men in active service:—

£. _s._ _d._
1 Captain 0 11 1
2 First lieutenants 0 13 8
3 Second ditto 0 16 9
1 Colour-sergeant 0 3 0½
3 Sergeants, at 2_s._ 6½_d._ 0 7 7½
6 Corporals, at 2_s._ 2½_d._ 0 13 3
22 Privates, at 1_s._ 2½_d._ 1 6 7
—— —— ——
4 12 0

The high rates of remuneration ordinarily given for fragments of practically irresponsible service, would not only serve to defray the expense of direction by scientific officers, but of execution by trained subordinate officers.

The following return will afford a display of the comparative rate of emoluments in other towns from fees on the ordinary scale of surveyors’ fees:—

Rate of Rate of No. of New Rate of
Increase of Increase of Houses per Surveyors’ Fees
Families per Houses per Diem. per Diem for
Annum. Annum. Fourthclass
Houses.

£. _s._ _d._

Liverpool 1205 638 1‑7/10 3 8 0

Leeds 940 855 2‑3/10 4 12 0

Manchester 590 589 1‑6/10 3 4 0

Birmingham 561 474 1‑3/10 2 12 0

For the construction of efficient works for drainage, it is shown that science is indispensable. If scientific officers be chosen for this one purpose, if the objectionable mode of remuneration by fees be preserved, since they are required to inspect the foundations of houses for the purpose of drainage, they might for one-fourth of the proposed fee be required to give inspection to the remainder of the work, and the process of double certificates and divided responsibility be saved. Even if the amount of work were in particular places too great to be performed by one person, it would be better, and less expensive, that it should be performed by him through an assistant, for whose defaults he should be responsible. A reduction of the accustomed fees to one-fourth, or of the aggregate emoluments obtainable under a general Building Act to 15,000_l._ or 20,000_l._ per annum would still entail the loss of so much money that might serve to secure superior scientific service; whilst in the less populous districts the payment for the separate duty of verifying the fact of compliance with the provisions of the Act would be too small to ensure the service of competent and responsible officers.

Besides the evils inherent in narrow districts, and the splitting of connected functions which prevent the application of science by preventing the appointment of scientific officers, there are other evils attendant on such small jurisdictions and separation of functions, namely, in the mode in which the money for such expenditure is levied. The popular jealousy is excited by the further multiplication of unnecessary offices, as of clerks and collectors, but real annoyance is given by the consequent increased expense of separate collections. The prevalent repugnance to direct taxation in any shape has hitherto been greatly owing to the cause of grievances experienced in the number and oppressiveness of the collections incidental to the ordinary local taxation. Those collections confuse and obstruct the rate payers’ economy. Where there are a number of rates collected at different periods, some are forgotten and not provided for; and when demanded, they fall with the inconvenience and create the irritation of a new tax. The householder may have paid the collector of his poor’s rates, then the collector of his assessed taxes, then the collector of the land tax, then the collector of the watch rates, then the collector of his paving rates, then his lighting rates, then his water rates, and then he thinks he has done, when a collector calls to demand the payment of the church rates; he may have paid him, when another collector appears to demand the payment of a sewers’ rate for two years, probably for the period of a former tenant, and for which the tenant on whom the demand is levied receives no apparent advantage. A witness says[45] (2231), “In Limehouse there had not been a sewer built for 100 and odd years, and there are 2000 houses, and not a sewer to them.” Another states (2066), “In one case a sewer rate of 6_d._ in the pound was levied for 10 years, without even surface drainage;” and in that case the party paid another rate to a trust for paving, lighting, and making drainage. “We could claim six years,” says another witness (860); “three years’ rates in arrear, as against former occupiers, were levied on the incoming tenants” (1798).

In a house receiving no benefit, the occupier, having refused to pay the rate ten years, and having paid it but once in 1827, the commissioners, when he left (1834) the house, “distrained on the new comer, and tore down the corn-bin,” &c. His solicitor previously wrote to them that the occupier was out of town, and wished them to abstain from taking any violent measures, at the same time offering on his part to refer the matter to any competent person (2328). In another case of aggravated proceeding, Mr. William Baker, who was clerk to a like commission, complained of the state of the sewerage, and of the rates in another commission. He did not resist the rate, “for he knew very well what the powers of the commissioners are, and it was not worth his while to resist so strong a body.” The assessments of sewers’ rates are seldom strictly legal.

Such rates, being small in amount, they are levied at long intervals, for the collection at once of a sum sufficient to defray the expense of collection; and because they are collected at long intervals, the irritation and resistance and trouble is great, and an additional sum is paid by the public for the collector’s share of the trouble of the collection. For the collection of the assessed taxes 3_d._ in the pound is paid; for the collection of the sewers’ rates from 6_d._ to 1_s._ in the pound is usually paid. I venture to state, that by a consolidation of the collection of such charges, enough may be saved of money (independently of the saving of oppression and irritation) from the collection of the one local tax, the sewers’ rate, to pay the expense of the services of scientific officers throughout the country. At present the high constable collects the county rate from every parish, and carries it to the county treasurer, in the county town, and charges for the expense of a journey. By an easy alteration, by payment by cheques from the union treasurer to the county treasurer, in one county (Kent) 1000_l._ per annum might be saved, or enough to defray the immediate expense of constructing permanent drains for upwards of 500 tenements. What might be gained on this head for immediate expenditure, in most towns, will be shown in the following extract, from the evidence of _Mr. Simkiss_, the auditor of the Wolverhampton union:—

What are the amounts of the chief local rates collected, in round
numbers?—The poor’s rates are about 4000_l._, the highway rates about
2000_l._, and there are rates levied by commissioners under a local
Act for lighting, watching, and improving the town, amounting to about
3000_l._ in round numbers.

On his admission of the practicability of combining with advantage the superintendence of all this expenditure by one Board in such a town, a combination of which there are several examples, he observes:—

The greatest public advantage in having those duties united would be
the collection of the whole of the rates in one sum by the same
individual, and payment afterwards to the several purposes.

What are the present disadvantages of a separate collection of these
rates?—First, that there are three collectors to pay instead of one.
1_s._ in the pound is paid to the collector of the highway rates,
which is supposed to produce 100_l._ per annum. The collector of the
poor’s rates is paid by a fixed salary of 150_l._ per annum. The
collector of the commissioners’ rates is paid 8_d._ in the pound, and
he gets upwards of 100_l._ per annum. If the collection of the rates
were consolidated, they might be collected for 200_l._ per annum, and
upwards of 150_l._ per annum might be saved in salaries alone; but a
much larger sum might be saved by a more efficient collection of the
smaller rates. The surveyor’s rates and the commissioners’ rates not
being sufficient to occupy the whole time of separate individuals,
they attend to other things, and consequently much money is lost by
the delay in the operation. Parties remove, or die, or leave the town.
Three times the amount has been lost in Wolverhampton on the
collection of the highway rate as compared with the poor’s rates. The
highway rate and the commissioners’ rates, each being made for twelve
months, the collectors usually collect from the large rate payers
first; considerable time elapses before the smaller payers are called
upon, consequently much is lost by the delay. I have known it that the
highway rate has not been demanded in some parts of the town for seven
or eight months after it has been granted. The surveyors of highways,
and the commissioners of improvements, not taking so much care in
obtaining securities for the smaller rates, run greater risks of
defalcation. I do not advert to the collectors of the smaller rates in
our town, but the collectors of the smaller rates, being tradesmen,
usually use the public money in their trades, and there is frequently
much peculation. The accounts of the collection and expenditure of the
smaller rates are generally badly kept.

What I have already submitted will, I hope, suffice to sustain the recommendation, that at the least nothing should be done to aggravate the existing state of complication and waste, by new divisions of service and the unnecessary additions of new and unqualified officers, and that everything should be done to guard against the continued reproduction of the evils in question in districts where there is clear ground. It would, I apprehend, be practicable in the old districts to superadd the appointments of officers, with proper qualifications, without any diminution of the emoluments of the existing paid officers or any material disturbance of them.