Chapter XXIII: Book 2: Page 144, Document Number Raeder-77 (1)

[60] Record of 26 November 1945, Volume II, Page 292.

[61] Raeder Document Book 2, Page 144.

[62] See Document 789-PS, USA-93.

[63] Document Book 2, Pages 116-117, Document Number Raeder-19.

ONE HUNDRED
AND EIGHTIETH DAY
Wednesday, 17 July 1946

_Morning Session_

DR. SIEMERS: Yesterday I dealt with the events before the outbreak of war. Now I shall turn to the events which occurred during the war.

I think I have shown that the Navy had an extremely insignificant part in all events prior to the war, and that the transactions in which the Navy was authoritatively involved were carried out on a peace basis, namely, on the basis of the naval agreements with England. When the war nevertheless ultimately broke out, involving England, too, on 3 September 1939, a regrettable incident occurred on the very first day, through the sinking of the _Athenia_, from which the Prosecution endeavors by the use of exaggerated terms to construe a grave moral charge against Raeder, not so much indeed on the basis of its actual military aspect, that is, the sinking, which my colleague Dr. Kranzbühler has already discussed, as on account of an article published in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ of 23 October 1939 entitled “Churchill Sinks the _Athenia_.” Were the facts as brought forward by the Prosecution correct, the moral accusations against Raeder and the Navy would be justified, even though, of course, an untruthful newspaper article is no crime. Consequently the accusation brought by the Prosecution is made for the sole purpose of vilifying Raeder’s personality in contrast to the lifelong esteem which Raeder has enjoyed in the whole world, in fact especially abroad.

I think the evidence has sufficiently revealed that the statement of facts presented by the Prosecution is not correct. It is quite plausible that at first sight the Prosecution should have believed that the odious article in the _Völkischer Beobachter_ could not have appeared without the knowledge of the naval command. The Prosecution believed this because, in view of their conspiracy theory, they are inclined to assume in every case that there was constant discussion and close co-operation among the various departments. The course of the Trial has shown that this assumption is far from correct. The contrast between the various departments, and especially between the Navy and the Propaganda Ministry, or Raeder and Goebbels, was far greater than the contrast between departments in a democratic state. In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses Raeder, Schulte-Mönting, Weizsäcker, and Fritzsche, together with the documents, establish the following facts absolutely clearly:

(1) In early September 1939 Raeder himself firmly believed that the sinking was not to be imputed to a German U-boat, because it was revealed by the reports that the nearest German U-boat was at least 75 nautical miles away from the spot of the sinking.

(2) Accordingly Raeder, as stated in Document D-912, published a _bona fide_ denial and gave statements to this effect to the American Naval Attaché and to the German State Secretary, Baron Weizsäcker.

(3) Raeder did not realize the mistake until after the return of _U-30_ on 27 September 1939.

(4) Hitler insisted, as evidenced by witnesses Raeder and Schulte-Mönting, that no rectification of the facts should be made to any other German or foreign department, that is to say, that the sinking should not be acknowledged as caused by a German U-boat. He apparently let himself be guided by political considerations and wished to avoid complications with the U.S.A. over an incident which could not be remedied, however regrettable it was. Hitler’s order was so strict that the few officers who were informed were put under oath to keep it secret.

(5) Fritzsche disclosed, that after the first investigation by the Navy in early September 1939, he made no further investigation and that the _Völkischer Beobachter_ article appeared as the result of an agreement between Hitler and Goebbels, without previous notice to Raeder. On this point the testimonies of Raeder and Schulte-Mönting coincide. It is consequently clear that Raeder—contrary to the claim of the Prosecution—was not the author of the article and, moreover, knew nothing about the article before its appearance. I regret the fact that in spite of this clarification the Prosecution are apparently intent upon persisting in their claim by the submission, on 3 July 1946, of a new document, D-912. This newly-submitted document only contains radio broadcasts by the propaganda Ministry, which are of the same nature as the _Völkischer Beobachter_ article. These radio broadcasts were a propaganda instrument of Goebbels and cannot, any more than the article, be brought up as a charge against Raeder, who in fact was at the time informed only of the article, not of the radio broadcasts. Even the fact that Raeder, after being informed of the article, did not attempt to obtain a rectification, cannot be made a moral charge against him, since he was bound by Hitler’s order and had no idea at the time that Hitler himself had had a hand in the article, which Weizsäcker aptly described as perverse fantasy.

In this connection I would remind the Tribunal that it is a well-known fact that precisely at the beginning of the war inaccurate reports also appeared in the English press about alleged German atrocities, which, even after their clarification, were not rectified, as for instance, the false report about the murder of 10,000 Czechs in Prague by German elements in September 1939, although the matter had been cleared up by a commission of neutral journalists.

The Prosecution professes to possess overwhelming material against all the defendants. If this presumption were correct with reference to Raeder, the Prosecution would scarcely have felt the need of bringing forward this _Athenia_ case, of all things, in such ponderous and injurious terms for the sole purpose of discrediting the former Commander-in-Chief of the Navy.

Concerning Greece, the Prosecution accuses Raeder of violation of neutrality and breach of international law on two counts, namely:

(1) On the basis of Document C-12, according to which Hitler decided, basing on a report by Raeder on 30 December 1939, that:

“Greek merchant ships in the zone around England which the
U.S.A. declared prohibited will be treated like enemy ships.”

(2) According to Document C-176, on the occasion of the delivery of a report to Hitler on 18 March 1941, Raeder asked for confirmation that “all of Greece was to be occupied, even in case of peaceful settlement.”

In the course of the Trial both accusations have turned out to be untenable; in both cases there is no action which violated international law.

With reference to the first accusation it should be pointed out that Raeder and the German Naval Command learned in October or November 1939 that quite a number of Greek merchant ships had been put at the disposal of England, either at the request or with the approval of the Greek Government (Documents Number Raeder-53, 54). This fact cannot be reconciled with strict neutrality, and according to the principles of international law that gave Germany the right to take an equivalent countermeasure. This justified countermeasure consisted in treating Greek ships heading for England as enemy ships from the moment they entered the zone around England which had been declared prohibited by the United States.

With reference to the second accusation it must be noted that Germany, especially the High Command of the Navy, had received reports that certain Greek military and political circles had maintained very close connections with the Allied General Staff ever since 1939. As time went by more and more reports came in. What the Allies were planning in the Balkans is known; the intentions were to erect a Balkan front against Germany. For this purpose local conditions in Greece, as well as in Romania, were examined by Allied officers on behalf of the Allied General Staff in order to establish airplane bases there. Furthermore, preparations were made to land in Greece. As proof I have presented, as Exhibit Number Raeder-59, the minutes of the session of the French War Committee of 26 April 1940, which shows that the War Committee was at that time already examining the question of possible operations in the Caucasus area and in the Balkans and which further reveals the activity of General Jauneaud in Greece for the purpose of continuing investigations and preparations and shows how he endeavored to camouflage his trip by making it in civilian clothing (Document Number Raeder-63).

This attitude of Greece, and especially her falling in with Allied plans, represents a violation of neutrality on the part of Greece; for Greece did not appear as England’s ally but formally continued to maintain her neutrality. Therefore, Greece could no longer expect that Germany would fully respect Greek neutrality. Germany nevertheless did do so for a long time. The occupation of Greece took place in April 1941 only after British troops had already landed in southern Greece on 3 March 1941.

The fact that Greece agreed to the British landing is, according to generally recognized rules, without significance in international legal relations and with regard to the international legal decision between Germany and England and between Germany and Greece; it has importance only in the legal relations between England and Greece.

The British Prosecution tried to justify the occupation of Greece by pointing to the fact that Greek neutrality was menaced by Germany, especially by the occupation of Bulgaria on 1 March 1941. In this connection the Prosecution is overlooking the fact that not only did the occupation of Greece by British forces start considerably earlier than the German planning, but also the planning of the Allies. But be that as it may, in any case, no accusation whatever can be made against Raeder, because the date of the document submitted by the Prosecution is 18 March 1941, which means that it is 14 days later than the landing of the British in southern Greece. At that time Greece could certainly no longer demand that her alleged neutrality be respected. It is also an unjustified charge when the Prosecution points out that Raeder asks for confirmation that all of Greece will be occupied. This request by Raeder cannot be made responsible for the fact that all of Greece was occupied, for Hitler had already provided in his Directive Number 20 of 13 December 1940 that the entire Greek mainland was to be occupied, in order to frustrate British intentions of creating a dangerous basis for air operations under the protection of a Balkan front, especially for the Romanian oil district. In addition to that, the inquiry of Raeder on 18 March 1941 was justified on strategic grounds, because Greece offered many landing possibilities for the British and the only possible defense was for Greece to be firmly in the hands of Germany, as the witnesses Raeder and Schulte-Mönting have explained.

This strategic conception of Raeder had nothing to do with plans of conquest or thirst for glory, as the Prosecution thinks, for the Navy won no glory whatsoever in Greece, since the occupation was a land operation. The occupation of an originally neutral country is simply the regrettable consequence of such a large-scale war; it cannot be charged to one belligerent if both belligerents had plans concerning the same state, and carried out these plans.

I should like now to go on to the subject of Norway. On 9 April 1940 troops of all three branches of the German Armed Forces occupied Norway and Denmark. From this and the preceding plans, the Prosecution have brought the gravest accusation against Grossadmiral Raeder, together with the collective charge of participation in a conspiracy.

The British prosecutor pointed out that it was Raeder who first suggested the occupation of Norway to Hitler, and believes that Raeder did so out of a spirit of conquest and vainglory. I shall demonstrate that this argumentation is incorrect. One thing is true, that is that in this single instance Raeder took the initiative of first approaching Hitler on the subject of Norway, namely on 10 October 1939. However, I shall show that in fact in this connection he acted not as a politician but exclusively as a soldier. Raeder sensed purely strategic dangers and pointed out these strategic dangers to Hitler, because he assumed that the Allies were contemplating the establishment of a new front in Scandinavia and in Norway, in particular, and realized that an occupation of Norway by Britain might have militarily disastrous consequences for Germany. I shall show that Germany committed no violation of international law by the occupation of Norway. Before I state the legal foundation and connect the facts established by the appraisal of evidence with the principles of international law, I should like first to state an important fact:

As Raeder’s examination shows and as disclosed by Schulte-Mönting’s interrogations, he very reluctantly advocated the Norwegian campaign as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. Raeder had the natural feeling born of justice that a neutral state could not be drawn into the existing war without an absolutely imperative emergency. During the period between October 1939 and spring 1940, Raeder always upheld the theory that by far the best solution would be for Norway and all Scandinavia to remain absolutely neutral.

Raeder and Schulte-Mönting were in agreement on this point during their interrogations; and it is, moreover, proved by documents. For this, I refer to Exhibit Number Raeder-69 where the conviction of Raeder is expressed that the most favorable solution would undoubtedly be the preservation of the strictest neutrality by Norway; this is entered in the War Diary on 13 January 1940. Raeder clearly saw that an occupation of Norway by Germany, for reasons of international law or strategy, could only be conceivable if Norway could not or would not maintain absolute neutrality.

The Prosecution has referred to the treaties between Germany and Norway, in particular to Document TC-31, by which the Reich Government, on 2 September 1939, expressly assures Norway of her inviolability and integrity. In this memorandum, however, the following legitimate remark is added:

“As the Reich Cabinet makes this declaration, it naturally also
expects that Norway in turn will observe irreproachable
neutrality toward the Reich and that it will not tolerate
breaches of Norwegian neutrality, should attempts along that
line be made by third parties.”

If, despite this fundamental attitude, Germany decided to occupy Norway, this was done because the plans of the Allies made imminent the danger of an occupation of Norwegian bases by them. In his opening speech Sir Hartley Shawcross declared that Germany’s breach of neutrality and her war of aggression against Norway remained criminal in the sense of the Indictment even if Allied plans for the occupation had been correct, and he added that in reality such plans were not true. I believe that the argument advanced here by Sir Hartley Shawcross is contrary to accepted international law. If Allied plans for the occupation of Norwegian bases existed and there was a risk that Norway neither would nor could maintain strict neutrality, then accepted standards of international law did sanction Germany’s Norwegian campaign.

I would first like to bring up the juridical viewpoints based on prevailing international law in order to create a foundation for my own statements, and thereby at the same time to set forth those legal viewpoints which contradict the Prosecution’s interpretation. In order to save time in this legal exposition and make the subject matter clearer I have submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-66 an opinion on international law with regard to the Norway campaign by Dr. Hermann Mosler, professor of international law at the University of Bonn. The High Tribunal will remember that I was given permission to make use of this opinion for purposes of argumentation, and I would therefore refer at this point to this detailed scientific compilation and findings. For the purpose of final plea I shall confine myself to a summary of the essential concepts of the opinion.

Articles 1 and 2 of the Hague Convention on Rights and Obligations of Neutrals in the event of warfare at sea stipulate that the parties at war are bound to respect the rights of sovereignty of neutral powers in the territory and coastal waters of the neutral power, and all hostile acts of warships of the belligerent parties within the coastal waters of a neutral power are strictly banned as violations of neutrality. Contrary to these stipulations Great Britain violated Norway’s neutrality through the laying of mines in Norwegian coastal waters for the purpose of obstructing the legitimate passage of German warships and merchantmen, especially in order to cut off shipments of iron ore from Narvik to Germany. In the letter from the British Foreign Office which I received in reply to my petition for authorization to submit files of the British Admiralty, confirmation as per Exhibit Number Raeder-130 was received to the effect that His Majesty’s forces laid mine fields in Norwegian waters, and in addition it was stated that this was a well-known fact (Documents Number Raeder-83, 84, 90).

The fact is presumably uncontested that thereupon Germany was justified in restoring the equilibrium between the belligerent parties, in other words by setting her Armed Forces to wrest from the enemy the benefit he was deriving from a violation of neutrality. Reaction against such a violation of neutrality is directed primarily against the enemy, not against the neutral. The legal relationship to neutrality ...

PRESIDENT [_Interposing_]: Dr. Siemers, the Tribunal would like to know what your contention is on this subject. Do you contend that any breach of neutrality of a warring state entitles one of the warring nations to enter that neutral state?

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, in this general way one certainly could not say that. It is a principle of international law that a violation of international law committed by one state only entitles the other warring nation to a countermeasure in proportion to the breach of neutrality committed. Certainly an occupation of Norway on the part of Germany would not be justified because Britain mined the coastal waters. The fact does not justify an occupation.

PRESIDENT: Would it be your contention that it made any difference on the rights of Germany if Germany were to be held to be an aggressor in the original war?

I will repeat it. According to your contention, would it make any difference that Germany was held, if it were held, to be the aggressor in the original war out of which the occupation of the neutral country occurred?

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I beg to apologize, but I am afraid I cannot quite understand the sense as it comes through in translation.

PRESIDENT: I will say it again more slowly. According to your contention, would it make any difference if the Tribunal were to think that Germany had been the aggressor in the war which led to the occupation of the neutral state?

DR. SIEMERS: My apologies, Mr. President. Now, if I understood that correctly, you wish me to answer the question whether the fact that previously a war had been begun by Germany against Poland would influence juridical attitude toward the question of Norway.

PRESIDENT: Assuming, I only say assuming that the war begun by Germany against Poland were to be held to be an aggressive war.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, I believe that I must answer in the negative, because the individual facts under international law must be dealt with separately. The fact that the Tribunal may possibly assume that an aggressive war was conducted against Poland cannot, from the point of view of international law, have any effect upon subsequent years.

That, incidentally, is the point of view which, I believe, was adopted by the Prosecution, for Sir Hartley Shawcross also, dealt with the question of Greece and the question of landings entirely under the aspect of Greek events and did not contend that Britain could occupy Greece because Germany had occupied Poland. He said, just as I did, that from the legal standpoint of international law Britain could occupy Greece because Greece was threatened by a German occupation. That is what I am saying from the point of view of international law with reference to Norway; as my further remarks will show, I am not trying to draw any other parallels.

PRESIDENT: Yes. There is one other question which I should like to ask you. Is it your contention that Germany was entitled under international law to use the territorial waters of Norway, either for her warships or for the transport of ore, or for the transport of prisoners of war?

DR. SIEMERS: In my opinion, from the standpoint of international law, the situation is that Germany was entitled to use the coastal waters, observing at the same time the various international rules, such as for instance, only brief stays in ports and similar rulings like the obligation to submit to investigation by neutrals in the case of the _Altmark_. But basically, carrying on shipping operations from Narvik was justified according to international law as far as I know.

PRESIDENT: Continue.

DR. SIEMERS: Mr. President, with reference to the last point, may I add one thing? Should the view be adopted that Germany was not allowed to use these coastal waters, then the mining of these coastal waters would have been a justified breach of neutrality on Britain’s part, so that, as far as I am concerned, the mining operation as grounds for this would have to be left out of my plea, though not the other facts I am citing. Mining the waters is in equivalent proportion to the use of the coastal waters. I myself consider that the mining operation was not permissible, while passage through coastal waters was; but this does not affect the entire subject of the occupation of Norway. I hope I shall be understood as not meaning that Germany was justified in occupying Norway because Britain had mined the coastal waters.

PRESIDENT: But you are saying, are you, that Germany was entitled to use the coastal waters, first of all, for the transport of ore; secondly, for her warships?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes.

PRESIDENT: And thirdly, for the transport of prisoners of war?

DR. SIEMERS: Yes. It is my opinion, Mr. President, that as to ore shipments there is no prohibitive clause in international law, so that this shipping was permissible.

With reference to prisoners of war, may I point out that only one case arose and that is the case of the _Altmark_. If Germany was not deemed authorized to use coastal waters for the transport of prisoners of war, then that could at most lead to Britain’s adopting an equivalent single countermeasure; but she would not be justified in mining the entire coastal waters. The mining of the entire coast, from the point of view of international law, is only justified if you adopt the point of view that Germany’s merchant shipping was prohibited from entering those coastal waters by international law. But that, in my opinion, is not the situation.

PRESIDENT: You may continue.

DR. SIEMERS: Reaction against such violation of neutrality is primarily directed against the adversary, not against the neutral party. Legal relationship deriving from neutrality exists not only between the neutral party and the two belligerent parties, but the neutrality of the state in question is at the same time a factor in direct relations existing between the belligerent parties. If the relationship of neutrality between one of the belligerent parties and the neutral power suffers disturbance, the neutral power can in no way file complaint if the other belligerent power takes appropriate action; at the same time it is entirely immaterial whether the neutral state is unable or unwilling to protect its neutrality (Document Number Raeder-66).

The legal title under which the belligerent power thus placed at a disadvantage can proceed to take countermeasures is the “right of self-defense” (_das Recht der Selbsterhaltung; le droit de défense personelle_). As brought out in detail by this opinion, this right of self-defense is generally recognized by international law. It suffices to point out here that this basic law is not affected by the Kellogg Pact, which has so often been mentioned in this Court. In this connection I ask permission to offer the following brief quotation from the circular memorandum of the U.S. Secretary of State, Kellogg, dated 23 June 1938:

“There is nothing in the American draft of an antiwar treaty
which restricts or prejudices the right of self-defense in any
manner. That right is inherent in every sovereign state and is
implied in every treaty.”

Justice Jackson will permit me to mention that he himself, in his opening speech of 21 November 1945, referred to the “right of legitimate self-defense.”

It is interesting that in his address before Parliament on 8 February 1940, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Guenther, recognized this concept, although he represented the interests of a state whose neutrality was endangered at the time, and in addition was speaking before Germany proceeded to retaliatory measures in Norway (Document Number Raeder-66). In that address Guenther expressed his opinion with regard to the British declaration that Sweden’s neutrality would be respected only as long as it was respected by Britain’s enemies. Guenther recognized the fact that Sweden, in her relationship to England, would lose her neutrality should Germany violate Sweden’s neutrality and should Sweden be neither willing nor able to prevent such violation of her neutrality by Germany. Consequently, Guenther said, Great Britain would no longer be required to treat Sweden as a neutral country. It is obvious that the conclusions drawn by Guenther in the event of a breach of Sweden’s neutrality by Germany must also apply to the three-cornered legal relationship between Great Britain, Germany, and Norway. What was involved, however—and this I shall set forth in my presentation of evidence—was not Great Britain’s mine-laying activity in Norwegian coastal waters but a much more far-reaching Anglo-French scheme aiming at the occupation of Norwegian bases and of a portion of the Norwegian home territory. The mine-laying activity enters into the picture merely as a part of the total plan.

According to Mosler’s opinion and in the light of the above remarks, it is absolutely clear that Germany was justified in occupying Norway had the Allies carried part of their plan into effect by landing at a Norwegian base before German troops made their appearance. This, however, was not the case. Rather, as I will show, was the situation such that Germany anticipated an Anglo-French landing; in other words, she decided on countermeasures in anticipation of the imminent danger which threatened.

Another legal question arises therefrom: Assuming the same conditions, are countermeasures by a belligerent permitted only after the opposing belligerent has proceeded to violate neutrality, or is a reaction permitted beforehand in view of the imminently threatening violation of neutrality, in order to head off the enemy’s attack which can be expected at any moment?

According to the well-founded opinion of Dr. Mosler preventive countermeasures are permissible; and an impending violation of neutrality, which can be expected with certainty, is considered equal to a completed violation of neutrality.

The well-known English specialist on international law, Westlake, states with regard to the question of measures:

“Such a case in character resembles one where a belligerent has
certain knowledge that his opponent, in order to gain a
strategic advantage, is just about to have an army march through
the territory of a neutral who is clearly too weak to resist;
under the circumstances it would be impossible to refuse him the
right to anticipate the attack on the neutral territory.”

The justification for such a preventive measure, according to Westlake, lies in the right of self-defense, which applies equally against a threatening violation of neutrality. Any other concept would fail to meet the facts of life and would not correspond to the character of the society of nations as an aggregation of sovereign states with an as yet incompletely developed common code of law. In the domestic law system of every civilized country the prevention of an immediately threatening attack is a permissible act of defense, although in such a contingency even the help of the state against the law-breaker is available. In the community of international law, where this is not the case—at any rate not at the beginning of and during the second World War—the viewpoint of self-defense must apply to an even greater extent. In keeping with this concept, the British Government during this war also considered the preventive measure justified when it occupied Iceland on 10 May 1940. The British Government justified this measure clearly and correctly in accordance with international law in an official announcement of the Foreign Office, as follows:

“After the German occupation of Denmark it has become necessary
to count on the possibility of a sudden German raid on Iceland.
It is clear that the Icelandic Government, in case of such an
attack, even if it were only carried out with very small forces,
would be unable to prevent the country from falling completely
into the hands of the Germans.”

The preventive measure was carried out by Britain, although Iceland expressly protested by a note against the occupation. I also ask to note that the United States agreed with this standpoint of law, as is proved by the well-known message from the President of the United States to Congress of 7 July 1941, and the subsequent occupation of Iceland by armed forces of the American Navy.

In accordance with these basic principles of law, the facts at hand must be examined. I have tried to clarify the facts in the presentation of evidence, and I would like to summarize the major factors which actually indicated a closely impending violation of neutrality on the part of the Allies by a partial occupation of Norway, and thereby justified the German campaign in Norway.

At the end of September and early in October 1939, Admiral Raeder, as the evidence has shown, received various items of information through the regular reports of Admiral Canaris as chief of intelligence and through Admiral Carls, which gave reason to believe in the danger of the Allies’ proceeding to occupy bases in Norway, in accordance with their plans to encircle Germany in order to put a stop, in particular, to ore imports from Scandinavia.

British flying personnel camouflaged in civilian clothing had been seen in Oslo; and survey work by Allied officers on Norwegian bridges, viaducts, and tunnels up to the Swedish border had been identified. Furthermore, the quiet mobilization of Swedish troops, owing to the danger to Swedish ore territories, had become known. Raeder was justified in considering himself obliged to report these facts to Hitler and to point out to him the danger which would arise for Germany if British and French armed forces were to gain a foothold in Scandinavia. The dangers were clear. They consisted of the cutting-off of all imports from the industrial areas of Scandinavia, in particular of the ore imports, as well as in the fact that the Allies would obtain a favorable base for air attacks, and last but not least, in the fact that the German Navy would be threatened on its flank and its operational potentialities would be limited.

The blockade of the North Sea and Baltic would have had strategically disastrous consequences. As the information did not yet allow of a final over-all picture, Raeder did not suggest immediate occupation, but only pointed out the dangers, intending to await further developments for the time being. Neither did Hitler make a final decision during this discussion of 10 October 1939 but agreed to wait. Similar information was received during the months of October and November, this time also from the naval attaché, Korvettenkapitän Schreiber, who had in the meantime been sent to Oslo, whose affidavit (Document Raeder-107) I would like to cite. It shows that the Norwegian shipping association had made tanker tonnage of about one million tons available to Britain with the consent of the Norwegian Government (Document Number Raeder-68).

In the winter of 1939-40, information took on a more definite form concerning espionage missions given by the British and French Secret Service to Norwegian agents and British harbor consulates for the purpose of reconnoitering landing facilities and examination of Norwegian railroads with regard to their capacity, particularly the Narvik line, and missions concerning information about land and sea airports in Norway. From the fact that the information from two different sources, namely, the naval attaché in Oslo and Admiral Canaris, checked and became more and more certain during the period from October to December 1939, the danger indicated appeared to keep increasing.

In addition, in December 1939 Quisling and Hagelin sent to Rosenberg—entirely independently of the sources of information which had existed up to that time—the same and similar information concerning the landing intentions of the Allies. This did not go to Raeder for the sole reason that Raeder did not know either Quisling or Hagelin at that time. Since the question involved was a purely military-strategic one, Rosenberg asked Raeder to discuss things with Quisling so that Raeder could examine the military-technical possibilities in consideration of the fact the aggression by the Allies in Scandinavia must be expected according to the information received. This is evident from the letter from Rosenberg to Raeder of 13 December 1939, which I submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-67. Raeder considered it his duty from the purely military point of view to inform Hitler, with whom he had not discussed this question in the meantime, that coinciding information had since been received from Canaris, the naval attaché in Oslo, and Quisling. Hitler asked to speak with Quisling personally, whereupon he decided, in order to meet the threat, to make the necessary preparations for an eventual preventive measure, namely, the occupation of Norway (Document C-64, Exhibit Number GB-86).

The final decision was still deferred, and further information was awaited as to whether the danger appeared to increase. This caution and delay will readily be understood in the case of Raeder. As I have already observed, Raeder would have preferred to see the neutrality of Norway maintained, especially since he was against any conquest just for the sake of conquest. He knew, on the other hand, that an occupation required the commitment of the whole Navy, thus involving the fate of the entire Navy, and that the loss of at least a third of the whole fleet had to be reckoned with. It must surely be clear how difficult, from such political and strategic viewpoints, such a decision was for a responsible man and soldier.

Unfortunately, during the first months of the year 1940, the reports multiplied and kept becoming more certain. In March 1940 uncommonly many English-speaking persons could be seen in Oslo, and Raeder received very serious and credible information about impending measures by the Allies against Norway and Sweden. As far as landing intentions were concerned, Narvik, Trondheim, and Stavanger were mentioned. In this manner the military planning actually was not undertaken until February and March 1940, and final instructions were issued to the Wehrmacht only in March 1940. In addition, numerous violations of neutrality occurred in March 1940, which have been collected in the War Diary (Documents Raeder-81 and 82), and also the mine-laying in Norwegian territorial waters at the beginning of April.

The Prosecution has put in only a few documents against this comprehensive informative material, according to which the German Minister in Oslo, Breuer, did not look upon the danger as being so great but believed that British activities, which he also reported, tended merely to provoke Germany into opening war operations in Norwegian waters (Documents Number D-843, Exhibit GB-466; D-844, Exhibit GB-467; D-845, Exhibit GB-486).

Baron Weizsäcker’s point of view in cross-examination was that at first he did not consider the danger so great either; but he admitted that later on the facts proved that he and Breuer were wrong, while Raeder had been right in his apprehension.

This objective accuracy of the opinion of Admiral Raeder, and of the information on which he based his opinion, is shown in the various documents submitted by me and accepted by the Court.

Since 16 January 1940, the French High Command had been working on a plan which had in view, among other things, the occupation of harbors and airfields on the west coast of Norway. The plan provided, in addition, for an eventual extension of operations to Sweden and occupation of the mines of Gallivare (Document Number Raeder-79). Efforts have been made to justify this plan by stating that it was elaborated solely to help Finland against the Soviet Union.

To begin with, it might be argued in contradiction to this that an action in support of Finland does not justify any occupation of Norwegian territory. Moreover, the documents show that it was not only a question of altruistic measures in favor of Finland. During the inter-Allied military conferences on 31 January and 1 February, which preceded the meeting of the Supreme Council on 5 February, the question of direct help for Finland was relegated by the British to second place; they showed themselves to be determined supporters of an enterprise against the mines of northern Sweden. This is confirmed by General Gamelin in a note of 10 March 1940 (Document Raeder-79), and he adds that this opinion obtained the majority vote in the Supreme Council and that preparations for the Scandinavian expedition should be started immediately.

And so it came about that the Franco-British fighting forces had been ready for transportation since the first days of March; according to Gamelin, the leadership of the proposed operations in Scandinavia was in the hands of the British High Command. Gamelin adds finally that the Scandinavian plans must be resolutely pursued further in order to save Finland—I quote, “or at least to lay hands on the Swedish ore and the northern harbors.”

Lord Halifax informed the Norwegian Minister on 7 February that Britain wished to obtain certain bases on the Norwegian coast in order to stop German transports of ore from Narvik (Document Raeder-97). By mid-February, British and French General Staff officers were, in agreement with the Norwegian authorities, inspecting landing places (Document Raeder-97). According to a report by the German Legation in Stockholm, dated 16 February 1940, British intentions in this respect were to land troops simultaneously at Bergen, Trondheim, and Narvik. On 21 February 1940 Daladier communicated to the French Ambassador in London, Corbin, that the occupation of the most important Norwegian ports and the landing of the first body of the Allied fighting forces would give Norway and Sweden a feeling of security; and he goes on to say that this operation must be planned and executed at shortest notice, “independently of Finland’s call for assistance.” In the event of this _démarche_ meeting with refusal by Norway, which was likely, the British Government was to take note of the Norwegian attitude and immediately seize control of the bases it needed for the safeguarding of its interests, doing so in the form of a “surprise operation.” Whether Sweden would refuse passage through to Finland did not appear important; what is being emphasized is rather—and I quote:

“... the advantage of having secured a dominating position
against Germany in the North, interrupted the sea transport of
Swedish ore, and brought the Swedish ore districts within range
of our aviation” (Documents Raeder-77 and 80).

On 27 February 1940, Churchill declared in the House of Commons that he was “tired of considering the rights of neutrals” (Document Raeder-97).

It is interesting to note that unanimity was achieved in the sixth session of the Supreme Council on 28 March 1940—I quote:

“Every endeavor on the part of the Soviet Government to obtain
from Norway a position on the Atlantic coast runs counter to the
vital interests of the Allies and results in appropriate
counteraction” (Document Raeder-83).

The view thereby adopted by the Supreme Council with reference to the vital interests of the Allies coincides exactly with the legitimate notions of the “right of self-defense” as presented by me and is in complete contradiction to the interpretation of international law propounded by the Prosecution.

The ultimate execution of the operation in Norway, that is, the landing and the construction of bases, was decided on 28 March 1940 between the authoritative British and French offices. This date was indicated at a session of the French War Council by the French Prime Minister (Document Raeder-59); and General Gamelin added that he had, on 29 March, impressed upon General Ironside the necessity of having everything ready for a swift occupation of the Norwegian ports. He said he had also informed Mr. Churchill to the same effect on the occasion of a visit to Paris.

One day later, 30 March, Churchill declared on the radio—I quote, “It would not be just if, in a life-and-death struggle, the Western Powers adhered to legal agreements” (Document Raeder-97).

On 2 April 1940 at 1912 hours, London notified Paris by telegram that the first transport was “to sail on J. 1. day,” and that J. 1. day was in principle 5 April (Document Raeder-85). On 5 April, Earl de la Warr stated that neither Germany nor the neutrals could be certain that “England would allow her hands to be tied behind her back in complying with the letter of the law” (Document Raeder-97).

The British Minister of Labor, Ernest Brown, on 6 April 1940 declared that neither Germany nor the neutrals could count on “the Western Powers’ adhering to the letter of international law” (Document Raeder-97).

On the same day—this was one day after the laying of mines by British combat forces in Norwegian territorial waters—a secret British operational order was given “concerning preparations for the occupation of the northern Swedish ore field from Narvik” (Document Raeder-88).

In this order it was specified that the mission of the “Avon” Force consisted first of all in “securing the port of Narvik and the railway to the Swedish border.” It was added that it was the intention of the commander “to advance into Sweden and to occupy the Gallivare ore fields and important points of that territory as soon as an opportunity occurs,” a formulation strikingly reminiscent of the words in the Prosecution Document L-79, “to attack Poland at the first suitable opportunity.”

The original plan of dispatching the first transport to Norway on 5 April was changed; for on the evening of 5 April the British High Command informed the Commander-in-Chief of the French Navy that—I quote:

“... the first British convoy could not depart before 8 April
which with respect to the time schedule established would mean
that the first French contingent would leave its embarkation
port on 16 April” (Document Raeder-91).

To complete the story it may be mentioned that the Norwegian operation was designated by the Allies by the camouflage name of “Stratford Plan,” while the German Norwegian operation was referred to by the camouflage name of “Weser Exercise” (Weserübung) (Document Raeder-98).

All these facts go to show that, since the autumn of 1939, preparations for possible action in Norway were made by studying landing possibilities, _et cetera_. As from January and February 1940 the danger of an occupation of bases in Norway by the Allies was imminent. In March 1940 the execution of the scheme was ultimately decided upon and the departure of the first convoy was scheduled for 5 April. Simultaneously, mine-laying was carried out in the Norwegian territorial waters and troops were at the same time concentrated in British and French ports for the Norwegian operation. Thus factual evidence of imminent neutrality violations existed from the point of view of international law; and neutrality violations had indeed been already committed to a certain extent, as by mine-laying. This was the point where Germany, in accordance with the international concept of the right of self-defense, was entitled to resort to equivalent countermeasures, that is, to occupy Norway in order to prevent the impending occupation by other belligerent states. It was, in fact, as was shown later, high time; for Germany forestalled the Allies only because the British High Command had postponed the departure of the first convoy, originally scheduled for 5 April. The German operation in Norway must therefore be considered as legitimate according to the principles of international law.

I have the firm conviction that the High Tribunal, in view of the circumstances just presented in connection with existing international law, will conclude that Admiral Raeder, with regard to the occupation of Norway, acted from purely strategic points of view and in due consideration of international legal standards, and accordingly will acquit him of the charge made by the Prosecution.

With reference to Norway, the Prosecution has moreover charged against Raeder—and also against Dönitz—that a violation of international law is involved in the fact that, according to an order dated 30 March 1940, the Naval Forces were to fly the British ensign until the troops had been landed (Documents C-151, Exhibit GB-91; C-115, Exhibit GB-90).

This too is an error of the Prosecution as regards international law in sea warfare. The Hague Regulations on Land Warfare do expressly forbid the misuse of flags. In sea warfare, on the other hand, the answer to this question according to prevailing international law is definitely that, until hostilities begin, ships may sail with their own or with enemy or neutral flags or with no flags at all. I take the liberty, in this respect, of availing myself of Dr. Mosler’s juridical treatment of the question in his opinion (Document Raeder-66), appearing under Item 7, and in particular of his references to legal literature on the subject, according to which the use of a foreign flag is universally considered as a legitimate ruse of war and is allowed and especially condoned by British practice; this is in accordance with the historical precedent when Nelson, in the Napoleonic wars, flew the French flag off Barcelona to lure Spanish ships. This dispute is, however, superfluous in the present case, because actually these orders to fly the British flag were according to documentary evidence canceled on 8 April, that is to say, prior to the execution of the Norway operation (Document Raeder-89).

In conclusion I wish to emphasize, with reference to the subject of Norway, that after the occupation of Norway Raeder and the German Navy did everything they could to give a friendly character to the relations with Norway, to treat the country and the people decently during the occupation, and to spare them every unnecessary burden. Raeder and the commanding admiral in Norway, Admiral Böhm, moreover endeavored to conclude a peace with Norway guaranteeing Norwegian national interests. Their efforts were frustrated through the creation by Hitler and Himmler of a so-called civil administration under Reich Commissioner Terboven which, unlike the Armed Forces, was linked with the Party, the SS, SD, and Gestapo (Documents Number Raeder-107 and 129). As confirmed by Böhm in his affidavit, Raeder repeatedly intervened with Hitler in favor of treating the Norwegian people well and for an early conclusion of peace and, together with Böhm, proceeded with the utmost vigor against Terboven. Here again, the tragic fact is that the Armed Forces, despite its utmost efforts, was neither able to oppose Hitler’s dictatorial methods nor the dictatorial methods employed, with Hitler’s knowledge, by such a mediocre Reich Commissioner as Terboven. The Norwegian people who had to suffer under the occupation know—and this is the only gratification for Raeder—that the Navy was not the cause of these sufferings. On the other hand, it is interesting to know that the differences which cropped up between Hitler and Raeder with reference to Norway are precisely among the chief motives which ultimately caused Raeder to insist upon his resignation in September 1942. Other motives were that Raeder also had differences with Hitler over France, because here again Raeder urged the conclusion of peace, while Hitler, with his extreme nature, was opposed to conciliatory steps of that kind in occupied territories. Raeder also had differences with Hitler regarding Russia, because he was in favor of observing the German-Russian treaty, and declared himself opposed to breaking the Treaty and going to war with Russia.

THE PRESIDENT: We will adjourn now.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to the charge of the Prosecution with regard to a war of aggression against Russia. The charge of the Prosecution on this subject cannot be very well understood. Land warfare only was concerned, so that the Navy did not have to make any preparations, with the exception of a few in the Baltic Sea. The Prosecution itself has furthermore stated that Raeder had been opposed to the war against Russia. The only thing which might be left of the charge of the Prosecution is its claim that Raeder had fundamentally been in favor of the war against Russia also and had only been opposed to Hitler with regard to the time factor. With reference to Document Number C-170 the Prosecution states that Raeder had only recommended the postponement of the war against Russia until after the victory over Britain. In the light of Document C-170 this actually might appear plausible. In reality, however, the case is different, and the true state of affairs has been cleared up by the detailed presentation of evidence. The witness Admiral Schulte-Mönting has clearly stated, without being contradicted in cross-examination, that Raeder not only raised objections with regard to the time but that he argued with Hitler about a campaign against Russia and did so for moral reasons and reasons of international law, because he was of the opinion that the Non-Aggression Pact with Russia as well as the trade agreement should be observed under all circumstances. The Navy was especially interested in deliveries from Russia and always tried to observe the treaties strictly. Besides this basic principle of observing treaties, that is, besides this general reason, Raeder was of the opinion that a war against Russia would also be wrong from the strategic standpoint. His own testimony and that of Schulte-Mönting show that in September, November, and December 1940 Raeder tried again and again to dissuade Hitler from contemplating a war against Russia. It is correct that in Document C-170 only the strategic justification for his opposition has been recorded. However, this is not at all surprising because in the papers of the Naval Operations Staff naturally only justifications were recorded which were of naval-technical and strategic importance, but not political reasons.

I have already shown that as a general principle Hitler did not permit Raeder, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, to intervene in questions concerning foreign policy, that is to say, in things which did not belong in his department. If Raeder did on occasion undertake this contrary to the will of Hitler in cases of special importance, then he could do so only privately, and was then unable to record these conversations in the War Diary. However, he always told everything to his Chief of Staff as his closest confidant. As a result Schulte-Mönting could absolutely confirm that Raeder in this case opposed Hitler because of misgivings with regard to morality and international law, and furthermore also employed strategic reasons in the hope of thus being able to bring more influence to bear on Hitler. Schulte-Mönting even stated—just like Raeder—that in November the latter had gained the impression, after a discussion, that he had dissuaded Hitler from his plans. I believe that this has clarified the matter, and only the tragic fact remains that Hitler paid just as little attention to Raeder’s political objections with regard to Russia as with regard to Norway and France.

A similar situation obtains with regard to the charge of the Prosecution referring to the war of aggression against the United States and the violation of the neutrality of Brazil. Both of these charges are sufficiently refuted within the framework of the evidence, so that I am only going to discuss them very briefly.

According to the statement of the Prosecution, Raeder somehow collaborated in the plan to induce Japan to attack the United States. As a matter of fact no naval strategic conferences were held between Japan and Raeder. Raeder always held the conviction that a war against the United States must be avoided just as much as a war against Russia. This attitude is understandable seeing that he had always held the opinion that Hitler should under no circumstances wage a war against Britain. Since the war against Britain had now come about, it was Raeder’s duty as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy to use all his strength to fight successfully against Britain. Raeder knew the limitations of the fighting capacity of the Navy; and it was, therefore, quite out of the question that he should have collaborated in an extension of the naval war, considering, as he did, that the conduct of a war against Britain was already a too difficult task. Document C-152 submitted by the Prosecution therefore mentions only a proposition that Japan should attack Singapore and is based on the assumption that the United States should be kept out of the war. This suggestion made to Hitler that Japan should attack Singapore was correct in every respect. After all, we were at war with England, and Raeder was forced to try to concentrate all his forces against that country. He was thus justified in suggesting that Japan—as Germany’s ally—should attack England. Moreover this, the only discussion by Raeder, was not held until 18 March 1941, while Hitler had already in his Directive Number 24 of 5 March 1941 established the guiding principle that Japan must attack Singapore, which he considered a key position of Britain (Document C-175).

I should like to interpose one sentence here. It can be seen from the report by General Marshall that no common plan had been found to exist between Germany and Japan.