Chapter XXI: Part 4: , Book 20, as follows (6)

(5) The treaty violations during the period from 1933 until the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 show the same factual and juridical picture. During these 2 years no important expansion of naval armament took place either. The only disputable accusation made by the Prosecution in this respect is contained in Document D-855, which was submitted during cross-examination. This is the report of Flottenintendant Thiele. According to this it was decided in March 1935, that is, a few months before the naval agreement, to prepare plans for the _Scharnhorst_ and the _Gneisenau_ with a displacement of 27,000 tons, although the maximum of 10,000 tons fixed by the Treaty of Versailles was still formally in force at that time for another 3 months, in contrast to a maximum displacement of 35,000 tons provided for in the Naval Agreement of 1935.

Here it should be taken into consideration that in March 1935 Germany could already count on the speedy conclusion of an Anglo-German agreement, whereas the period between the planning and the completion of a battleship is a much longer one, which cannot be counted in months, but only in years. As a matter of fact, the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ were only commissioned in 1938 and 1939, 3 and 4 years respectively after the naval pact (see Exhibit Number Raeder-2, Lohmann Affidavit).

The other matters submitted by the Prosecution are again trifles; for instance, the selection (not the construction, as the Prosecution says) of four or five merchantmen (see C-166), or the construction of 5 E-boats of 40 tons each (see C-151), which for technical reasons were built in place of 12 torpedo boats of 200 tons each. The Prosecution cannot in all seriousness turn these facts into grave accusations, especially as the afore-mentioned deviations from the Versailles Treaty were known to foreign technical specialists or—as the witness Schulte-Mönting correctly put it—were an “open secret.”

(6) And now I come to the decisive juridical aspect of all developments up to the summer of 1935. In the field of international law the same principle applies as in the field of internal commercial law: Breaches of agreement are considered adjusted and settled with the signing of a new agreement. In the present case the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of 18 June 1935—Exhibit Number Raeder-11—represents the new agreement. This naval agreement deviates completely from the Versailles Treaty both with regard to high-tonnage vessels and with regard to U-boats. It is only on the basis of what is permitted Germany by this new agreement that the insignificance of earlier violations of the Versailles Treaty, not at the time covered by existing agreements, becomes apparent.

10,000-ton cruisers were replaced by 35,000-ton battleships, and the ban on the construction of U-boats was replaced by the acknowledgement of equal rights with regard to U-boat tonnage. Germany’s demands were not unreasonable; on the contrary, in the document mentioned, His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom explicitly confirmed the German proposal to be “... an exceedingly important contribution to future limitation of naval armaments.”

This agreement between Britain and Germany concluded the debate on the Versailles Treaty both factually and juridically, as far as the Navy is concerned. This naval agreement was generally welcomed in Britain and Germany at that time, and it was supplemented by a new agreement on 17 June 1937 (see Exhibit Number Raeder-14). As proof of the fact that the Navy violated the naval agreement, too, with aggressive intentions, the Prosecution has raised two charges:

(1) In the Agreement of 1937 both contracting governments were bound to a mutual exchange of information, which was to take place annually, within the first 4 months of every calendar year, and was to contain details of the building program. According to Document C-23, the Navy violated this obligation insofar as it gave lower figures for the displacement and the draught of the battleships _Bismarck_ and _Tirpitz_ which were being built at the beginning of 1938, namely, as 35,000 tons instead of 41,700 tons. That this violation of the treaty did occur is openly admitted by Raeder, but again it is not such a serious violation as the Prosecution contends, that is, it is not a violation which shows proof of criminal intent. That is clear from the detailed evidence I have presented and from the testimonies of witnesses which I need not repeat here; it will be sufficient if I refer to the absolutely convincing expert testimony of the ship-building director, Dr. Süchting, which I have submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-15. According to this, the increase in tonnage demanded by the Navy during the construction served a purely defensive idea, namely, that of increasing the armor plating of the battleships and of arranging the bulkheads in such a way that the battleships would be virtually unsinkable. This defensive idea, Dr. Süchting emphasizes, actually proved to be correct during the attack on and sinking of the battleship _Bismarck_. If it was only a question of a defensive idea, no aggressive intentions can be construed from this treaty violation.

With regard to the juridical aspect, it must be added that in the Naval Agreement of 1937, Articles 24, 25, and 26 conceded to the contracting governments the right to deviate, under certain circumstances, from the contracted agreements and especially from the tonnage limitation of battleships, if any other sea powers should build or acquire larger battleships. This case, stated in Article 25, had actually arisen, and so the violation of the agreement consisted in the fact that the Navy, although now entitled to build larger battleships, neglected to inform Britain of her desire to make use of that right. It was, therefore, only a violation of the obligation to exchange information. How meaningless this measure was is proved by the alteration of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement by virtue of the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, which I have submitted as Exhibit Number Raeder-16.

Already on 31 March 1938, that is, only 6 weeks after the date of Document C-23, Britain on her part had stated, according to the London Protocol of 30 June 1938, that she must make use of the afore-mentioned right granted by Article 25, and therefore proposed that the battleship tonnage be increased from 35,000 to 45,000. This agreement was then signed by both countries on 30 June 1938, and thus the violation of the treaty evident from Document C-23, became illusory.

(2) The British prosecutor raised a second charge by submitting Document D-854 during cross-examination. It consists of notes made by Admiral Assmann for his historical writings; on Sheet 15 of these notes he writes that Germany abided by the terms of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement least of all in the sphere of U-boat building and that 55 U-boats were allowed by the treaty up to 1938, but 118 were actually completed or begun. These statements by Assmann are actually incorrect, and in reality Germany strictly followed all the stipulations of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement with regard to U-boat building. Despite the assurance of equality of rights Germany by the Naval Agreement of 1935 voluntarily limited herself to 45 percent; but the right to increase this percentage at any time by friendly agreement with Britain was reserved for her. The presentation of evidence has shown (see the testimony of Raeder and Schulte-Mönting) that in December 1938 corresponding negotiations took place between the British Admiral Lord Cunningham and Grossadmiral Raeder, during which His Majesty’s Government approved the increase to 100 percent. It was not clear at the time when this evidence was presented, whether this approval had also been given in writing, as was to be assumed. Meanwhile I have been able to establish that such a document must have existed; I was able to gather this from the afore-mentioned Assmann Document D-854 in which on Page 169, in connection with Page 161, the letter in question dated 18 January 1939 is mentioned. In conclusion it remains to be said that the figure of 55 U-boats mentioned by Assmann corresponds to 45 percent, whereas the figure of 118 U-boats corresponds to 100 percent; accordingly Assmann, and therefore the Prosecution as well, are wrong. Actually there was no violation at all of the naval agreement with regard to U-boats.

[_A recess was taken._]

DR. SIEMERS: I now come to the allegation of the Prosecution that Grossadmiral Raeder took part in a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, and in particular supported Hitler and National Socialism despite his alleged knowledge that Hitler from the beginning had the intention of waging wars of aggression.

(1) How did Raeder establish contact with Hitler, and was he able, or even bound, at that time to realize an intention on the part of Hitler to wage wars of aggression?

As I have said, it is a fact that Raeder before 1933 had nothing to do with National Socialism and knew neither Hitler nor his Party collaborators; he met Hitler on 2 February 1933, when he and the other commanders were introduced to Hitler by Baron von Hammerstein. As Chief of the Naval High Command Raeder had only one superior, Reich President Von Hindenburg, who, according to the Constitution and the Defense Law,[39] was the Supreme Commander of the whole Armed Forces. Hindenburg, as Reich President, had appointed Hitler Reich Chancellor, and thus a connection was of necessity created between Hitler and the Armed Forces. There was thus no question of any decision on the part of Raeder. As Hindenburg’s subordinate, he had as a soldier to submit to the political decision which Hindenburg had taken as President of the Reich. The constitutional basis with regard to the Armed Forces was in no way altered by the fact that Hitler came to power. As Chief of the Naval High Command Raeder took as little part in this political decision as he had done on previous occasions when Müller, who was a Social Democrat, or Brüning, who belonged to the Center Party, became Reich Chancellors.

Nor was there any cause for Raeder to resign his post on account of this internal political decision, for Hitler had explained to him and the other high officers at the first conference on 2 February 1933, and particularly also on the occasion of the first naval report in the same month, that nothing in the Armed Forces would be changed and that the Armed Forces must remain aloof from politics, as laid down in the Constitution and the Defense Law.

The testimony of Raeder and Schulte-Mönting proves that during the naval report Hitler explained his fundamental ideas in regard to a peaceful policy, in which connection, in spite of the amicable revision of the Versailles Treaty to which he aspired, it was essential to come to an understanding with England by means of a treaty providing for the development of the Navy within the general limitations of naval armament. During this conversation Hitler clearly indicated that he did not want a naval armament race and that the development of the Navy should take place only in friendly agreement with England. This principle was absolutely in line with the viewpoint of Raeder and the Navy, and it was therefore quite out of the question for Raeder to tell his superior, Hindenburg, that on account of Hitler he could no longer head the Navy.

Now the Prosecution maintains that the leading personalities in Germany at that time already knew Hitler’s true intentions from his book _Mein Kampf_, and has cited as proof several quotations, partly torn from their context, from Hitler’s propaganda book of 1924. This argument of the Prosecution does not seem to hold good, because Hitler wrote this book as a private individual belonging to an opposition party. In this Trial it has several times been pointed out that the statements of foreign private individuals are irrelevant even when these foreigners are well known, and subsequently—as in Hitler’s case—received a position in the government. Raeder could assume, as could anyone else, that as Reich Chancellor Hitler would not uphold all the Party doctrines which years before he had defended as a member of the opposition, particularly since the statements of Hitler on military matters contradicted these former Party ideas. Moreover, the Navy relations with England were always of foremost importance and in this connection Hitler himself had said in his book _Mein Kampf_, Page 154: “But for such a policy there was only one possible partner in Europe: England.” (Document Book 2, Document Number Raeder-20, Page 119.)

In rebuttal of the quotations submitted by the Prosecution it must also be said that they are all taken from the 1933 edition and that, in spite of great pains, the General Secretary’s office has been unable to procure an earlier edition, particularly the first edition of 1925 and 1927. It is a known fact that in later years Hitler himself made changes on many points in numerous places in his book, consequently the quotations from the 1933 edition cannot be taken as a basis on their face value.

Ought Raeder in the following years to have realized that Hitler desired to abandon the fundamental idea of an understanding with England, and is it possible to agree with the argument of the Prosecution that Raeder should have refused further collaboration at some time before 1939? I believe that this question must be answered in the negative for reasons which appear quite naturally from various facts which the Prosecution or the Defense submitted in evidence:

Hindenburg died on 2 August 1934, and the Prosecution reproaches Raeder because he thereupon took an oath in which he named the Führer in the place of the fatherland. (Record of 15 January 1946, Volume V, Page 262.) This point was sufficiently clarified in the presentation of evidence. Therefore I need only refer to the error which the Prosecution made in its assertion; the Prosecution itself produced Document D-481 which shows the oath of allegiance taken by the soldiers of the Armed Forces on Hitler’s orders. The document is a law signed by Hitler, Frick, and Blomberg and it shows that it was not Raeder who replaced the word “Vaterland” by “Hitler,” but that Hitler himself demanded that all soldiers should take the oath to him as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Before Hitler demanded this oath, which he had cleverly devised and which proved so fateful in the future, Raeder had neither been informed nor had his advice been asked on the wording. He was simply summoned to the Reich Chancellery without knowing the reason. The question as to what kind of oath is to be taken by a soldier is again a political one, a question of legislation, upon which Raeder as a soldier and Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had no influence.

The Prosecution charges Raeder with having been informed of many political decisions and with having, as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, made strategic plans and preparations on the occasions of such political measures. The Prosecution referred to the withdrawal from the League of Nations on 14 October 1933, the occupation of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936, the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938, the incorporation of the Sudetenland in the autumn of 1938, and the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939.[40]

The documents in question are in the main those marked in the footnote, and I can refer to them jointly in this connection. There is one fact common to all of these decisions, namely, that Raeder did not politically take part in any of them. Raeder was never consulted beforehand and as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy he had no authority to participate in such decisions. Raeder did nothing more than take note of these documents and reports, and then issue the orders necessary for precautionary military measures in case the country became involved in war. It seems quite incomprehensible that the commander-in-chief of a branch of the Armed Forces should be reproached for having made strategic preparations in the event of political complications. I imagine that it is customary all over the world that an admiral never takes part in political decisions, while at the same time he is obliged to make certain precautionary preparations depending upon such political decisions of the government. This is another example of the discrepancy I have already mentioned affecting the position of a military commander, which, although the Prosecution considers it to be a political one, is in reality purely military. There is hardly any doubt that the military commands of foreign countries involved in these political decisions or interested in them were also at the same time taking precautionary military measures.

A military commander could not judge whether these political decisions of Hitler were crimes or even violations of international law, all the less since he was never summoned to the consultations. Neither the withdrawal from the League of Nations, as a result of the failure of all endeavors to induce the other countries to disarm in the spirit of the Versailles Treaty, nor the occupation of the Sudetenland or the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, can be regarded as criminal activities, in the sense of the Indictment, of a disinterested commander-in-chief. They were certainly deviations from the Versailles Treaty, but even the British Prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, declared on 4 December 1945 in this courtroom that “many objections against Versailles were possibly justified.”[41] And even Justice Jackson, as quoted above, said that the boldest measures would have been justified for the purpose of revising this treaty, but not a war.

All these measures taken by Germany were in fact carried out without a war, and therefore come under the heading of measures which Justice Jackson considers justified, all the more so since they were all silently condoned by foreign countries, or even agreed upon by treaty, as for instance in the case of the incorporation of the Sudetenland by the Munich Agreement of September 1938, or, as in the case of Austria, by agreement with that country.

In the cases of Austria and of the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the Prosecution quite justifiably, looking at these cases objectively and retrospectively, points out that Hitler employed extremely dubious and possibly criminal means to achieve his aims; however, this can have no significance as far as the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy is concerned, since it has been firmly established that he was not informed of these activities, much less of the means employed therein. It has been established in particular that Raeder was neither informed of the details of the Austrian Anschluss nor of the kind of conference which ultimately led to an agreement with President Hacha. He was not told of the discussions with Hacha, nor of the threat of a bombardment of Prague, which was made in the course of these discussions; I refer in this connection to the testimony of the witnesses Raeder and Schulte-Mönting. In the eyes of Raeder, therefore, these constituted measures permissible under international law, or else agreements which gave him no cause to interfere or to question Hitler, quite apart from the fact that as a military commander he had no right whatsoever to do so.

Moreover, had military complications arisen, land operations only would have been involved, as is quite obvious from the location of the countries concerned. It would have amounted to an impossible situation if the disinterested Commander-in-Chief of the Navy had seen fit to concern himself with these things although hardly any naval preparations were required. In the case of Czechoslovakia, for example, Document 388-PS lays down, as far as the Navy was concerned, only that it was to participate in possible Army operations by commitment of the Danube flotilla which for this purpose was placed under the orders of the High Command of the Army; this flotilla consisted of very small ships, a few gunboats, if I remember correctly.

In this connection I also quote Sir Hartley Shawcross when on 4 December 1945 he spoke of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934: “By entering into it”—Hitler—“persuaded many people that his intentions were genuinely pacific ...”[42]

Accordingly, Raeder too had reason to be convinced. It is true that Raeder belonged to the Secret Cabinet Council created in February 1938. But it is also true, and has been proved in the meantime, that the Secret Cabinet Council was just a farce. It is therefore unnecessary to deal with this point which the Prosecution originally considered so important.

The claim of the Prosecution that Raeder was a member of the Government and a Reich minister has been refuted in the same way. This assertion of the Prosecution has from the outset been somewhat incomprehensible. Document 2098-PS, presented by the Prosecution, only states with absolute clarity that Von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, held—I quote—“a rank equivalent to that of a Reich minister.” This proves that he was not a minister, although for reasons of etiquette he held a rank equal to that of a Reich minister, and it follows that this decree of Hitler did not assign a political task to Raeder, as the Prosecution would like to have it.

Moreover, this decree does not even give him the right to participate in Cabinet sessions at his own will, but only, as Hitler says in the above-mentioned document, “upon my order.” This simply means that Raeder might have been called upon by Hitler to participate in a Cabinet session when technical naval problems were being discussed. In reality this hypothetical and politically insignificant case never arose.

Nor can membership in the Reich Defense Council—Document 2194-PS[43]—be considered incriminating. In the first place the council was concerned, as the text says, only with “preparatory measures for the defense of the Reich,” that is, neither with political activities nor with activities connected in any political sense with aggressive war. Furthermore, according to Document 2018-PS, a later Führer decree of 13 August 1939, and contrary to the claim of the Prosecution, Raeder never belonged to the Ministerial Council for the Defense of the Reich set up at that time, for the simple reason that he was not a minister. Actually other countries, too, possess institutions like a defense council or defense committee. I call attention to the fact that already long before the first World War the British Government had a defense committee which was of much greater importance[44] than the equivalent institution in Germany.

As the final matter in this connection, I wish to point out that the claim of the Prosecution that Raeder was a Party member has also proved untenable. It is true that Raeder received the gold insignia of honor from Hitler; but this was only a decoration; it could not mean anything else, because a soldier could not be a member of the Party. That is clear beyond all doubt from Paragraph 36 of the Reich Defense Law, which forbids soldiers to engage in politics and to be members of a political organization.[45]

I also refer to the evidence, which proved amply that Raeder never had connections with the Party, that indeed he more than once had arguments with Party circles and that he was unpopular with typical National Socialists because of his political and particularly his religious attitude. Goebbels, for instance, positively detested him, and this was not surprising, because on the one hand he always prevented the Party from gaining any sort of influence on the officers’ corps of the Navy, while on the other, in contrast to the Party, he supported the Church to the greatest extent, and saw to it that the morale of the Navy was founded on a Christian basis. I refer in this connection to the typical National Socialist phrase of Bormann:

“National Socialist and Christian concepts are incompatible.”[46] In the same document Bormann, as he so often did, expressed views devoid of all civilized standards and attacked Christianity so strongly, and so violently advocated the elimination of all Christian ideas, that this attitude by the Party is sufficient proof that Raeder, as a devout Christian, could never have entertained relations with the Party.[47]

I have already stated that in 1933 Hitler said that it would be one of the fundamentals of his policy to make Germany sound and strong by peaceful means, and that for such peaceful development it was absolutely necessary to acknowledge British hegemony and come to an agreement with Britain about the size of the German fleet—if possible, even to come to an alliance. These ideas coincided with Raeder’s fundamental attitude, which he explained in detail during his examination here. As far as my defense is concerned, it may remain an open question whether and when Hitler abandoned that basic thought. In any case, Hitler always emphasized this basic thought to Raeder and actually supported it with deeds; this ever-recurring thought can be traced through all the years up to the outbreak of war, and it was in the pursuit of this basic principle that the Anglo-German Naval Agreement was concluded in 1935 and the second Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1937, that an agreement on submarines was reached with Lord Cunningham in 1938, and that the London protocol on the subject of battleships was signed on 30 June 1938. Thus, throughout the years of the reconstruction of the German Navy the same idea was always predominant, namely, of achieving agreement with Britain, of acknowledging Britain’s supremacy and of avoiding any difference which might lead to a break with Britain.

Looking back now in cognizance of all the documents and all the facts proved during this Trial, Hitler may be assumed at some time, probably in 1938, to have become unfaithful to his own principles and thereby guilty of bringing about the tragic fate of Germany. However, in judging the accusations made against Raeder, the decisive issue is not what must subsequently, in the light of all known facts, be acknowledged as objectively true; the real issue is only whether Raeder realized, or was even able to realize, Hitler’s deviation from his own ideas, and the answer to that is “no.” Raeder could not have guessed, much less have known, that Hitler at some time became untrue to his own political ideas which he had repeatedly stressed and demonstrated, and thus guilty of kindling the frightful conflagration of World War II.

Raeder could not have suspected or known that during the period immediately preceding the war Hitler spoke to him, too, in words which were at variance with his thoughts and also different from his actions. As far as the Navy in particular was concerned, the relatively slow rebuilding of the German fleet showed that Hitler proposed to remain faithful to the ideas which I described. There was no indication at all of a change of mind on Hitler’s part in this field, for a change of mind would surely have resulted in a naval rebuilding program bigger than the one which Hitler actually carried out. At the very least he would then have made full use of possibilities offered by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement. According to the Naval Agreement, the German fleet was allowed a total tonnage of 420,595 tons,[48] yet actually this maximum was never utilized. Even with regard to battleships, Germany remained short of the Naval Agreement, with the result that the battleships _Bismarck_ and _Tirpitz_ were not available in the first year of the war, and thus could not take part in the occupation of Norway; the _Bismarck_ was completed only in August 1940, and the _Tirpitz_ in 1941.

According to the Naval Agreement, Germany was allowed the same tonnage in submarines as England. In reality, however, U-boat construction was so slow that at the beginning of the war in 1939, as the evidence has proved, Germany had only the small number of 26 U-boats available for Atlantic service. And further, according to Document L-79, known as the “Little Schmundt,” it was laid down as late as the end of May 1939 that—I quote—“no change will be made in the ship-building program.”

All this must have firmly convinced the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy from his personal point of view and his sphere of work that Hitler wanted to stand by his much-stressed basic principle of avoiding war.

Raeder’s firm conviction in this respect—this seems to be an important consideration—was to a large extent confirmed by the attitude of foreign countries. Winston Churchill, in his book _Great Contemporaries_, wrote in 1935:

“It is not possible to form a just judgment of a public figure
who has attained the enormous dimensions of Adolf Hitler, until
his lifework as a whole is before us ... We cannot tell whether
Hitler will be the man who will once again let loose upon the
world another war in which civilization will irretrievably
succumb, or whether he will go down in history as the man who
has restored honor and peace of mind to the great Germanic
nation, and brought it back serene, helpful, and strong to the
forefront of the European family circle.”

One year later, at the Olympic Games in Berlin in 1936, the representatives of the foreign countries appeared in a body and greeted Hitler in a manner which, in its approval bordering on enthusiasm, appeared incomprehensible to many skeptically inclined Germans. Subsequently, the foremost politicians and members of various governments visited Hitler and reached complete understanding with him, and finally, in the autumn of 1938, agreement was again reached under Chamberlain and Lord Halifax; an agreement which strengthened Hitler immeasurably, and by which he sought to prove to the Germans how expedient all his actions had been, since they were thus approved by foreign countries. The joint declaration, which Chamberlain and Hitler issued in Munich on 30 September 1938, can never be overestimated in its importance. I would, therefore, like to quote the first two decisive sentences from it:

“We have had a further discussion today, and are agreed that the
question of Anglo-German relations is of primary importance for
both countries and for Europe.

“We regard the agreement signed last night and the Anglo-German
Naval Treaty as symbolic of the desire of our two nations never
again to wage war against each other.”

I think that these references are sufficient. Now, can one demand of a German admiral, who has never been a politician, but always only a soldier, that in judging Hitler he should have looked farther ahead than the great British statesmen, Chamberlain and Churchill? Surely the very question indicates that the answer is “no.”

The Prosecution can seriously confront these numerous aspects only with a few documents which might indicate Raeder’s knowledge of Hitler’s aggressive plans. The Prosecution has indeed presented innumerable documents of which Raeder or the Naval Operations Staff or the High Command of the Navy were stated to have received copies, but in a considerable number of instances the Prosecution could not say anything beyond the fact that Raeder received a copy of the documents; for the most part no real connection existed, nor was it alleged by the Prosecution. Naturally, it is not surprising that for the sake of uniformity military documents went to all branches of the Armed Forces, even if in certain cases one branch of the Armed Forces was not at all, or only vaguely, concerned with them. Of all these documents which have been submitted in the case of Raeder, only the four documents which, because of their importance, the Prosecution described as key documents, could be really incriminating. These are Hitler’s four speeches to the Commanders-in-Chief of 5 November 1937, 23 May 1939, 22 August 1939, and 23 November 1939.[49]

The Prosecution claims that these speeches prove participation in the conspiracy, and that it is clearly evident from them that Hitler wanted to wage wars of aggression. I would therefore like to deal with these documents individually and in detail, and in doing so, show why they cannot modify the general picture I have presented.

Undoubtedly these key documents are of the utmost importance for the subsequent historical findings on what trains of thought motivated Hitler; they are important because they are expressions of Hitler’s opinion and because, in spite of the tremendous amount of captured documentary material, there are hardly any written notes of Hitler. One is tempted, of course, to accept the conclusion that the contents of these documents must be true because they are statements made before a small circle, where Hitler would naturally express himself more openly than in his public speeches. Even though I by no means fail to recognize their value, I nevertheless believe that the Prosecution overestimates the importance of these four documents by far. Certainly, they are to some extent key documents, since they provide the key to an understanding of Hitler’s mind and methods, but they are not a key to the real intentions of Hitler, and more particularly they do not provide a scale for any conclusions which those who listened to the speeches must, in the opinion of the Prosecution, needs draw from them.

Therefore, in order fully to explain the value of the documents, I would like first of all to mention several general points which apply generally to each of these four documents and limit their evidential value, which the Prosecution has overestimated. None of these speeches was taken down in shorthand, so that the actual text of the speeches is not available. Accordingly, in the record of the address of 5 November 1937, Hossbach correctly chose the indirect form of speech, and Generaladmiral Böhm in his record of the speech of 22 August 1939[50] did the same. Surprisingly and not quite correctly, Schmundt chose the direct form of speech in his record of 23 May 1939, although it was not a verbatim record; however, he was at least careful to state at the beginning that Hitler’s words were being reproduced “in essence.”

The feeblest documents, that is to say, the two versions of the speech of 22 August 1939 which the Prosecution has submitted, are written in the direct form of speech, and the authors of these documents, whose names are unknown, have not even deemed it necessary to add some sort of note as Schmundt did. However this may be, in considering the documents it must be kept in mind that they were not reproduced word by word and that therefore the reliability of the reproduction depends on the manner of work and attitude of the author of the document, especially on whether and to what extent he made notes during the speech, and when he prepared his record. In this connection it is important to note that, as Document 386-PS shows, Adjutant Hossbach wrote the record a full 5 days later, namely on 10 November, though the speech itself had already been made on 5 November. In the case of Schmundt, the date of the record is missing altogether, and in the two Prosecution documents on the speech of 22 August 1939 there is also no date. The last two documents also lack any signature, so that in this case it is not even possible to say who bears the responsibility for the record. The same applies to the document on the speech of 23 November 1939. All these formal deficiencies allow considerable doubt concerning evidential value and reliability of the documents to be entertained.

It is different in the case of the Böhm document, who in his affidavit certifies that he wrote down Hitler’s speech as it was being made, that he noted down the exact text of particularly important passages, and that he edited the final draft, submitted here, on the same evening. Since in all these documents the true text is not available, it is obvious how important it is if one can at least establish that the record was made simultaneously with the speech, or at least on the same day and not, as in the case of Hossbach, 5 days later. Even with the best of memories the best adjutant, who has to handle many new matters every day, cannot possibly after 5 days give an absolutely reliable reproduction of a speech.

The second point is just as important, namely, that unlike other military documents these are not official documents with a distribution list, that is, they are not documents which were subsequently sent to those concerned. That the documents were not sent to Raeder was established in the evidence by him and by the witness Schulte-Mönting, apart from the fact that it is already apparent from the lack of a distribution list on the document. This point, in particular, seems to me of great importance. Listening to a speech once—and it will be recalled that Hitler spoke extremely quickly—does not induce the listener to draw conclusions in a way which the reading of the record might, since the record allows for a check and recheck of the contents of the speech. We who have come to know these speeches in the proceedings in their written form and have again and again checked their wording, naturally invest certain words and phrases with more importance than we would have done if we had heard them as part of a quickly delivered address. In addition, all of us are readily inclined to lend more importance to the various phrases, because from our present standpoint and in view of our more extensive knowledge we can now survey everything much more easily; for we have not only one speech on which to base our opinions, but all of them and in addition all the many other documents showing the historical development. In discussing these documents it must always be borne in mind that listeners are inclined to react to the spoken word quite differently, and that often, even after only a few hours, the reports of various listeners differ from one another.

The Prosecution considers these speeches of Hitler to be the basis of the conspiracy, and says that on these occasions Hitler consulted with the commanders, reached a certain decision, and concluded a certain plan of conspiracy with them. The Prosecution is bound to maintain this, because one can only speak of a conspiracy when something is being planned in common. In reality, the assertion of the Prosecution that an influential group of Nazis assembled to examine the situation and make decisions is incorrect; the occasion took the form of an address by Hitler alone, and no discussion and no consultation took place. Nor was any decision reached, either; Hitler just spoke quite generally about—I quote—“possibilities of development.”[51] If one can speak of decisions at all, it was a decision solely on the part of Hitler. All this contradicts the existence of a real conspiracy. Altogether I have the impression that, in its conception of a conspiracy to wage wars of aggression, the Prosecution has conceived an entirely false picture of the real distribution of power within the National Socialist State. In my opinion the Prosecution fails to recognize the characteristics of a dictatorship, and indeed it may be very difficult to understand the immeasurable dictatorial power of Hitler if one has not personally lived through all of those 12 years in Germany, in particular the growth of Hitler’s power from its first beginnings until it finally developed into a dictatorship wielding the most cruel and horrible terror. A dictator like Hitler, who moreover quite obviously exercised immense powers of suggestion and fascination, is not a president of a parliamentary government. I have the impression that in judging the situation as a whole the Prosecution has never completely relinquished the idea of a parliamentary government nor taken the uncompromising ways of a dictator into account.

The idea of a conspiracy between him and the members of the Cabinet or between him and the commanders was quite contrary to Hitler’s own nature, as the testimony of several witnesses showed in the course of the Trial. This was proved with particular emphasis by the testimony of the Swedish industrialist, Dahlerus, who by reason of his excellent and extensive connections both with Britain and Germany was in the course of time able to obtain an objective picture of both countries, and who during his negotiations with Chamberlain and Halifax on the one hand, and Hitler and Göring on the other, was best able to recognize the difference between the parliamentary British Government and the German dictatorship of Hitler. The account of Dahlerus proves convincingly that the difference was irreconcilable. After he had spoken with Chamberlain and Halifax, a discussion with the Cabinet naturally took place before a final decision was taken. On the other hand, when in the night of 26 to 27 August 1939[52] Dahlerus had a discussion of decisive importance with Hitler, at which only Göring was present, Hitler at once made six propositions, without saying a word to any of the Cabinet members or any of the military commanders, without even consulting Göring who sat by silently; proposals, moreover, which did not exactly tally with what he himself had told Sir Nevile Henderson a short time before. A stronger argument against a conspiracy with commanders or members of the Cabinet can hardly exist, unless it be the equally important fact which the witness Dahlerus added, namely, that during the entire 2½ hours Göring did not dare say a single word, and that it was humiliating to see the degree of servility which Hitler demanded even of Göring, his closest associate.[53]

All these Hitler speeches are full of contradictions. Such contradictions naturally impair clarity of thought, and they rob individual ideas of their importance. When reading the documents in their entirety, the number of contradictions becomes evident, as the witness Admiral Schulte-Mönting correctly pointed out during his examination and cross-examination. It is just because of such contradictions and often illogical thinking that the evidential value of the documents is diminished. Naturally it is difficult for a military adjutant like Hossbach or Schmundt to record unclear and contradictory trains of thought; and it is also easy to understand that a military adjutant will be inclined to introduce as clear a line of thought as possible, and will in consequence be misled into applying to certain ideas which have become clear to him more stress than they were actually given in the speech itself. To this can be added a remark of Raeder, who not only points to the contradictions, but especially to Hitler’s overactive imagination, and very appropriately calls him a “master of bluff.”[54]

Moreover, in every speech of that type Hitler followed a very definite tendency. He had a definite purpose in view, namely, to bring about the desired impression on all or some of his hearers, either by intentional exaggeration or by making things appear deliberately harmless. While he spoke, Hitler followed the intuition of the moment; as Schulte-Mönting termed it, he wandered from his notes. He thought aloud and wished to carry his hearers away, but he did not want to be taken at his word.[55] Everyone will agree with me that such practices and such purposefully designed speeches give no clear indication at all of Hitler’s true views at the time. In addition, there is this to be said about all these documents in general:

Following his address of 23 May 1939—known as the “Little Schmundt”—Raeder had an interview with Hitler alone in which he called Hitler’s attention to contradictions in his address and also to the contradiction arising out of Hitler’s assurance to Raeder personally that he, Hitler, would under all circumstances settle the case of Poland equally peacefully. Hitler thereupon put Raeder’s mind completely at rest and told him that he had a firm hold on matters, politically. This was stated by the witness Schulte-Mönting[56] who added that Hitler allayed Raeder’s misgivings about the contradiction between the speech of 23 May 1939 and his other statements by telling him that for him, Hitler, there were three grades of keeping matters secret: Firstly, by private conversation with one partner; secondly, the thoughts he kept to himself; and thirdly, some ideas which he himself did not fully think out.

I believe this way of thinking as explained by Hitler himself illustrates most strikingly how little reliance could ultimately be placed on statements which he made before a small or a large group of people. It seems to me quite plausible, therefore, that Raeder based his deliberations neither on Hitler’s general speeches nor on the address before the commanders which was discussed here, but went solely by what Hitler told him in private discussion. In this respect, the statements of Sehulte-Mönting, Böhm, and Albrecht[57] all prove that as late as 1939 Hitler was still, in private conversation, repeatedly giving Raeder the explicit assurance that there would be no war; and he did this whenever for some reason or other Raeder was particularly anxious and drew Hitler’s attention to the dangers ahead.

In conclusion, therefore, I believe it may be said that the so-called key documents are extremely interesting in assessing Hitler from a psychological point of view, but that their evidential value as regards Hitler’s real intentions is very limited and slight. One cannot reproach Raeder for not letting himself be guided by the tendentious and deliberate speeches which Hitler made before his commanders on the spur of the moment, and preferring to rely on assurances which Hitler himself gave him and on the fact that until the summer of 1939, until the very outbreak of the war, these assurances were in perfect accord with the facts and with Hitler’s actions, that is, with the four naval agreements and the Munich Pact.

It is understandable that Raeder did not permit this basic attitude to be shaken by these speeches to the commanders-in-chief, though they were undoubtedly of a questionable nature, but that he held steadfastly to his belief that Hitler would not deceive him. The fact that we now subsequently realize that Hitler did after all deceive Raeder in his private conversations with him, and also by his special second and third grade of secrecy, does not indicate any guilt on Raeder’s part, but solely on Hitler’s. The vast amount of material in this connection does not indicate that in 1938 and 1939 Raeder planned a war of aggression in violation of international law, but reveals only that Hitler planned a war of aggression in violation of international law.

This completes my general treatment of the key documents and I now ask the Tribunal’s permission to add a few points on each individual document, since the Prosecution again and again stressed these documents as the basis for the charge of conspiracy.

Hossbach Document, discussion of 5 November 1937 in the Reich Chancellery:

The crucial passages of this document are obvious, and the Prosecution has cited them often enough. But in dealing with this document it should be taken into consideration that both Göring and Raeder stated here that Hitler announced in advance his intention of following a certain trend or purpose in his speech. Hitler was dissatisfied with the measures taken by Field Marshal Von Blomberg, and especially by Generaloberst Von Fritsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, and felt that progress in the rearmament of the Army was too slow. Hitler therefore intentionally exaggerated, and since this was known only to Göring and Raeder, it is natural that the impression which the speech made on Neurath, who had no idea of this intention, was entirely different and considerably alarming.

It is interesting to note that apparently Hitler did not fully get what he wanted, because the last two paragraphs of the document indicate that to some extent Blomberg and Fritsch saw through Hitler’s scheme, and that his exaggerations did not deceive them. Though Hitler did not permit discussion on such occasions, Blomberg and Fritsch intervened in this instance and pointed to the need for preventing Britain and France from becoming Germany’s adversaries. Blomberg explained the reasons for his protest, and in the penultimate paragraph of the document Fritsch showed unmistakably that he was skeptical of Hitler’s words by remarking that under such circumstances he would not be able to take his planned vacation abroad scheduled to begin on 10 November. It is also significant that Hitler thereupon came round and, in contrast to his earlier statements, said that he was convinced of Britain’s nonparticipation, and that consequently he did not believe in military action against Germany on the part of France either.

That Hitler’s ideas in this document are quite impossible is also evident from the fact that he based his statements on a truly fantastic notion, namely, an Italian-French-British war or, equally fantastic, a civil war in France. In contradictory terms Hitler spoke in his speech on the one hand of an application of force, on the other of an attack by Poland against East Prussia, which could only refer to a defensive aspect—and in regard to Czechoslovakia he said that in all probability Britain and France had already privately written that country off. This reference is an indication that Hitler was prepared to negotiate, which was borne out by actual developments. He said that Austria and Czechoslovakia would be brought to their knees, but nevertheless in the following year, in March and September 1938, he carried on negotiations and settled both questions without war. This fact in particular seems significant, because it proved to Raeder in the course of later events that he was right in not ascribing undue importance to Hitler’s strong words of 5 November 1937, for in spite of these words Hitler in reality did carry on negotiations at a later date.

During his interrogation Raeder also rightly pointed out that the second extensive naval pact had been concluded with England only a few months earlier and that as a result he could not seriously expect Hitler to abandon a line of policy which he himself had initiated.

And finally, there is this point: The whole document deals with political questions on the one hand, and with possible land operations on the other. Raeder had nothing to do with political questions because he is no politician, while Neurath as Foreign Minister naturally had reason to give Hitler’s political attitude more consideration. It is also significant that Neurath testified here that as a result of this speech he too asked Hitler about his personal attitude, and that he refused to remain Foreign Minister because Hitler told him that those were his true intentions. To me it seems typical of Hitler to tell one person, Neurath, that perhaps he would go to war, and to tell another, Raeder, that he would under no circumstances wage war. This divergence in explaining his position was obviously caused by the fact that at that time he no longer relished Neurath as Foreign Minister, because he realized that with regard to the foreign policy which he proposed to follow, Neurath would not be as submissive as the successor whom he had in view, Ribbentrop. On the other hand at that time he still wanted at all events to retain Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy. This is another instance of how Hitler’s actions were determined by a certain ultimate purpose, and how he always and without the slightest inhibition followed the principle that the end justifies the means.

Hitler’s speech of 23 May 1939, the so-called “Little Schmundt,” USA-27: Here again Hitler expressed himself in a highly questionable fashion; he speaks of a program of attack, of the preparation of a systematic attack, and of the decision to attack Poland. I fail in no way to recognize that there is good reason for the Prosecution to consider this document as particularly good evidence. I believe, however, that taking into account the numerous aspects which I pointed out, the value of this document as evidence in the case of Raeder is very much smaller than the Prosecution maintains, and very much smaller than a first glance at the wording of the Schmundt version might warrant. Schmundt obviously made an endeavor to formulate Hitler’s contradictory, fantastic, and incongruous statements in a clear way in accordance with his own precise military manner of thinking. This gives the document a clarity which does not correspond to Hitler’s speech. We do not know when Schmundt prepared the document, and he neglected to show the record he had made to the other participants.

During his examination and cross-examination the witness Admiral Schulte-Mönting pointed to the contradictions in this particular document, which I need not repeat here. Paramount importance must however be given to the contradiction between these words and the words which Hitler at the same time again and again used in conversation with Raeder, and which always followed the same line, namely, that he did not intend to wage war and that he would not make excessive demands.