Chapter XXII: Part 4: , Book 20, as follows (7)

Raeder was shocked by this speech, and was only calmed by the private conversation which he had with Hitler directly after the speech, when Hitler assured him that he would under all circumstances settle the case of Poland in a peaceful manner, too. Raeder believed him, and he had every right to assume that Hitler was telling him the truth in answer to his very precise question. I draw attention to the very exact statements made on this document during the examination of Raeder and the examination of the witness Schulte-Mönting.[58] I especially refer to the statement of Schulte-Mönting that Hitler used the comparison that nobody would go to court if he had received 99 pfennig when claiming one mark, and added that in the same way he had obtained what he had demanded politically, and that consequently there could be no question of war on account of this last political question, that of the Polish Corridor. That Raeder himself was absolutely opposed to a war of aggression, and that in this respect he relied on Hitler’s assurances, is proved by the statements of all witnesses, not least by the deposition by Dönitz that on the occasion of the U-boat maneuvers in the Baltic Sea in July 1939 Raeder, expressed his firm conviction that there would be no war. Raeder, furthermore, knew that the Navy was absolutely unfit for a war at sea against Britain; he had explained that to Hitler again and again. But he was confident that in the Polish question Hitler, as he had said, would again negotiate; the testimony of the witness Dahlerus shows that negotiations did in fact take place, and they were even successful at the beginning. The reason why nevertheless the attempt finally failed and the second World War began, was explained in detail by the witness Dahlerus who illustrated the terrible tragedy of this event.

It seems to me important that up to August 1939 not only the witness Dahlerus, but also Chamberlain still believed in Hitler’s good will. It must be said again therefore that one cannot expect Raeder as a soldier to have been more farseeing and to have recognized Hitler’s dangerous ideas, if men like Chamberlain, Halifax, and Dahlerus did not even at that time see through Hitler.

I have myself referred to the seriousness and the incriminating character of this document, but I ask the Tribunal to take into consideration that the incriminating material in this document, just as in the document of 5 November 1937, is of a political nature. As defense counsel for the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, I have to judge the facts not from a political but from a military point of view. From a military point of view, however, it is absolutely impossible to follow the arguments of the Prosecution, because military leaders are not authorized to take part in decisions about war and peace, but merely obliged to carry out such military preparations as the political leaders consider necessary. In no country of the world does an admiral have to give his opinion on whether some future war, for which he has to make plans, will be a war of aggression or a defensive war. In no country of the world does the decision of the question whether war will be waged rest with the military, but on the contrary it is always left to the political leaders, or to the legislative bodies.

Accordingly, Article 45 of the German Constitution stipulates that the Reich President shall represent the Reich in international relations and continues: “The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace are decreed by a law of the State.”

Therefore, the question whether a war was to be waged against Poland rested with the Reichstag, not with the military leaders. Professor Jahrreiss has already explained that in view of the constitutional development of the National Socialist State this decision rested in the last analysis exclusively with Hitler. For the case of Raeder it is of no consequence whether Hitler could be regarded as constitutionally authorized to start a war on his own decision, as he actually did in the autumn of 1939. The decisive factor is only that at all events the military leaders were not authorized, either in practice or constitutionally, to participate in this decision. The Prosecution cannot possibly maintain that every act of military planning on the part of Germany was a crime; for the military leaders, who merely receive the order to work out a certain plan, are neither authorized nor obliged to determine whether the execution of their plans will later on lead to an aggressive or a defensive war. It is well known that the Allied military leaders rightly hold the same view. No admiral or general of the Allied armed forces would understand a charge being brought against him on the basis of the military plans which were made on the Allied side, too, a long time before the war. I do not have to elaborate this point; I believe it will suffice if I refer to Document Number Ribbentrop-221. This is a secret document, which, according to the title, deals with the “Second Phase of the Anglo-French General Staff Conferences.” This document shows that exact plans, regarding the Allied forces, were worked out for a war embracing many countries; plans which, according to this document, include a war in Europe and a war in the Far East. The document expressly says that the French and British commanders-in-chief in the Far East—I quote—“worked out a joint plan of operations,” and it expressly speaks about the importance of possessing Belgian and Dutch territories as a starting point for the offensive against Germany. The decisive point about this parallel military case seems to me to be the fact that this document bears a date from the same month as Hitler’s much-discussed speech to his commanders-in-chief, namely, May 1939. The document bears the caption: “London, 5 May 1939.”

I now come to the address of Hitler to the commanders-ih-chief on 22 August 1939 at the Obersalzberg.[59] Regarding the evidential value of Documents 1014-PS and 798-PS submitted by the Prosecution, I should like first of all for the sake of brevity to refer to the statements which I made to this Tribunal in connection with the formal application to withdraw Document 1014-PS. Although the Tribunal denied this application, I still maintain that the evidential value attached to these documents, and particularly to Document 1014-PS, is infinitesimal. The American Prosecution, in presenting these documents pointed out at the time[60] that the Tribunal should take into consideration any more accurate version of this speech which the Defense might be able to submit. I therefore submitted Exhibit Number Raeder-27,[61] the version of the witness Generaladmiral Böhm, and I believe that when I submitted it, I showed convincingly that it is in fact a more accurate version than those provided by the Prosecution documents. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe then put in two documents where Böhm’s version is very scrupulously compared with the versions 1014-PS and 798-PS; in this way he considerably facilitated the comparison of these documents for all of us. So as on my part to assist the Tribunal and the Prosecution in making this comparison, I requested Generaladmiral Böhm in the meantime to compare these versions himself and in doing so to use the compilation of the British Prosecution which I mentioned just now. The result is contained in Böhm’s affidavit.

When surveying all this material, it becomes clear that Document 1014-PS is extremely incomplete and inaccurate, all the more so as, apart from its formal deficiencies, it covers only one and a half pages, and for this reason alone cannot be an adequate reproduction of a 2½ hour speech.

Document 798-PS is no doubt more satisfactory, but it also contains numerous errors, as Böhm’s affidavit shows. Not every sentence may be of importance, but the point is that some of the most important passages from which a charge against the commanders-in-chief might at best be deduced were actually, according to Böhm’s sworn statement, never spoken at all. According to Böhm’s affidavit, it is not true that Hitler said that he had decided as early as the spring of 1939 to attack the West first and the East later. Nor did he use the words: “I only fear lest at the last moment some swine will come to me with an offer of mediation; our political aims reach further.” And, most important of all, the following words were never used either: “Annihilation of Poland ranks foremost; the aim is to liquidate the living forces, not to reach a certain line;” Hitler only spoke of the breaking-up of the military forces.

These differences in individual words and phrases are very important, because they concern the sharp phrases to which the Prosecution has frequently drawn attention, and from which the intention of a war violating international law, and even the intention to murder civilians, can be derived. If these phrases had been spoken, one could justly accuse the commanders-in-chief who were present of having waged the war and carried out Hitler’s orders in spite of the criminal end in view. However, if these sentences were not used but, as Böhm testified under oath, other sentences referring merely to military aims, then the Prosecution cannot reproach any of the commanders-in-chief present for having remained at their posts. No one can in earnest demand of an admiral that he should resign his post a few days before the outbreak of a war, and thus shake the military power of his own country. I am quite aware of the fact that the most serious reproaches can be made against Hitler’s attitude following the time of the Munich Agreement until the outbreak of the war in Poland, although, and this is decisive for the Raeder case, not against the military command, but exclusively against the political leader. We know that Hitler himself realized this and for that reason evaded all responsibility by his suicide without, either during or at the end of the war, showing the slightest regard for the life and the welfare of the German people.

I come now to Hitler’s speech to the commanders-in-chief on 23 November 1939.[62] I shall deal with it quite briefly, and if you will permit me, Mr. President, I should like to do this now before the Tribunal adjourns, because the subject which follows is rather longer.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

DR. SIEMERS: I think I can be relatively brief with regard to this last key document, which again fails to give the date on which the record was made and lacks a signature; we do not therefore know the author of this document. It is not an official transcript; and it again pursues a special objective. Early in November 1939 a serious difference had arisen between Hitler and the generals because Hitler wanted to start the offensive in the West immediately, whereas the generals were of a different opinion, and apparently hoped that the outbreak of a real World War might still be avoided. Hitler’s dissatisfaction and annoyance with his generals are clearly evident. In consequence, by repeating, as usual, his past deeds, he strives to show what he has accomplished, and also to show that he has always been right. It is an absolutely typical Hitler speech reminiscent of his public speeches, in which he also loved to boast and to glorify himself as a genius. Hitler, after all, belonged to those people who always believe themselves to be right, and avail themselves of every opportunity to prove it. He also took the opportunity of using threats in order to nip in the bud the resistance in high military circles which had become known to him, thus strengthening his dictatorship. It is absolutely typical when he says in this document, literally: “I shall not shrink from anything and I shall destroy anyone who is against me.” This was recognized by foreign military leaders, too. I draw attention for example to General Marshall’s official report,[63] which speaks about the “lack of far-reaching military planning” and about the fact that the German High Command did not have an all-embracing strategic plan, and points out in this connection that “Hitler’s prestige reached the stage at which one no longer dared to oppose his views.”

Finally it remains to be mentioned that this last key document dates from a time when the war was already in progress, and that the military leaders cannot be blamed if in all their plannings during a war they strove to attain victory. The Allies too were planning at the same time. I refer to Documents Number Ribbentrop-222 and Exhibit Number Raeder-34; the former dates from 1 September 1939 and is a secret letter from General Gamelin to Daladier containing the basic idea that it was necessary to invade Belgium in order to wage the war outside the French frontier. The other document also deals with military plans; it is a secret letter from General Gamelin to General Lelong, Military Attaché to the French Embassy in London, dated 13 November 1939, and also concerns the operation which the Allies had planned in Holland and Belgium.

[_The Tribunal adjourned until 17 July 1946 at 1000 hours._]

NOTES

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[12] Vanselow, _Völkerrecht_, Berlin, 1931, Figure 226 i.

[13] In 1935, the American Senator Ney demanded the prohibition of operational areas. In 1937 Charles Warren made a request for discussion of the subject in the Society for International Law. And also the afore-mentioned draft of a convention by American jurists of 1939 deals with this question.

[14] Théories stratégiques IV, Page 323: “Même en zone de guerre n’aura-t-on pas contre sol le damné article 22 du traité de Londres?”

[15] Bauer, Das U-Boot, 1931, Report on it by Captain G. P. Thomson, R.N. in _The Journal of the Royal News Instruction 1931_, Page 511.

[16] Sperrgebiete im Seekrieg, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Volume VIII, 1938, Page 671.

[17] French Yellow Book, La Conférence de Washington, Page 88.

[18] Report of 8 October 1940, Page 3: “One thing is certain, namely, apart from vessels in declared war zones, destruction of a merchant vessel is envisaged if even only after capture.”

[19] Commander Russel Grenfell, R.N., _The Art of the Admiral_, London, 1937, Page 80. “The neutral merchants, however, are not likely to relinquish a highly lucrative trade without a struggle and thus there arises the acrimonious wrangle between belligerents and neutrals which is a regular feature of maritime warfare, the rules for which are dignified by the name of international law.”

[20] _De jure pacis ac belli_, Book III, Chapter I, Paragraph 6, citation Augustin: “One may conceal the truth wisely,” and Cicero: “Dissimulation is absolutely necessary and unavoidable, especially for those to whom the care of the state is entrusted.”

[21] Admiral King, _Report of the American High Command_.

[22] John Chamberlain, “The man who pushed Pearl Harbor,” _Life_, of 1 April 1946.

[23] Manual for Courts Martial U.S. Army, 1928, Page 10.

[24] In this connection I mention the extensive literature dealing with the right of self-preservation in cases of urgent necessity. The surprise attack on the Danish fleet, 1807, as well as the hunger blockade against Germany are based on that.

[25] Freiherr von Freytagh-Loringhoven, _Völkerrechtliche Neubildungen im Kriege_, Hamburg 1941, Page 5.

[26] Quoted from “_Neue Auslese_,” 1946, Number 1, Page 16.

[27] Not always acknowledged by English authors. Compare for instance A. C. Bell, _A History of the Blockade of Germany_, et cetera, London, 1937, Page 213: “The assertion that civilians and the Armed Forces have been treated only since 1914 as a uniform belligerent body is one of the most ridiculous ever made.”

[28] Grenfell, _The Art of the Admiral_, London, 1937, Page 45: “By the early part of 1918, the civil population of Germany was in a state of semistarvation, and it has been calculated that, as a result of the blockade, over 700,000 Germans died of malnutrition.”

[29] See also protest of the Soviet Government to the British Ambassador of 25 October 1939, printed as Number 44 in “_Urkunden zum Seekriegsrecht_,” Volume I, edited by the High Command of the Navy.

[30] See for instance _Wheaton’s International Law_, 5th Edition, Page 727, Liddell Hart, “The Revolution in Naval Warfare,” _Observer_ of 14 April 1946.

[31] Oppenheim, Die Stellung des Kauffahrteischiffes im Seekrieg, _Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht_, 1914, Page 165.

[32] Concerning the execution of these orders in the first World War, Vidaud, in “_Les navires de commerce armés pour leur défense_,” Paris, 1936, Pages 63-64 says as follows: “Les équipages eux-mêmes sont militarisés et soumis à la discipline militaire, ainsi que le capitaine Alfred Sheldon, appartenant à la réserve de la Marine Royale, a été condamné, le 8 Septembre 1915 par le conseil de guerre de Devonport, pour n’avoir pas attaqué un sousmarin allemand.”

[33] Compare for instance “Submarines in the Atomic Era” in the _New York Herald Tribune_, European Edition, of 27 April 1946, Page 2.

[34] A. C. Bell, Historical Section, Committee of Imperial Defense, _A History of the Blockade of Germany and of the Countries Associated with Her in the Great War 1914-1918_—The introduction contains the remark: “This history is confidential and for official use only.” (Quoted from the German edition by Böhmert, _Die englische Hunger-blockade im Weltkrieg_, Essen, 1943).

[35] Hugo Grotius, _De jure pacis ac belli_, Book II, Chapter XXI.

[36] Hugo Grotius, _De jure pacis ac belli_, Book II, Chapter XXVI. Paragraph 4, “He can believe that in a matter of doubt he must obey his superior.”

[37] See _Wheaton’s International Law_, 5th Edition, Pages 543-5.

[38] Claud Mullins, _The Leipzig Trials_, London, 1921.

[39] See Document Book 1, Documents Numbers Raeder-3 and 4, Page 9 et sequentes.

[40] Especially the following documents are concerned:

C-140, USA-51 of 25 October 1933; C-159, USA-54 of 2 March 1936; C-194, USA-55 of 6 March 1936; C-175, USA-69 of 24 June 1937; 388-PS, USA-26 of 20 May 1938; C-136, USA-104 of 21 October 1938.

[41] Record of 4 December 1945, Volume III, Page 95.

[42] Record of 4 December 1945, Volume III, Page 110.

[43] Reich Defense Law of 4 September 1938.

[44] For instance under Balfour and Churchill.

[45] Document Book 1, Document Number Raeder-4, Page 12.

[46] Document Book 6, Document Number Raeder-121, Page 524.

[47] Refer also to Ronneberger Affidavit, Document Book 6, Document Number Raeder-126, Page 543 et sequentes which point to the same subjects, especially to the strong Christian belief of Raeder and to the pronounced opposition to Christianity and Church by Bormann.

[48] Second Lohmann Affidavit, Document Number Raeder-8, Document Book 1, Page 41.

[49] Refer to Documents 386-PS, USA-25; L-79, USA-27; 798-PS, USA-29; 1014-PS, USA-30; 769-PS, USA-23.

[50] Document Book 2, Document Number Raeder-27, Page 144 et sequentes.

[51] See Hossbach Document.

[52] Record of 19 March 1946, Volume IX, Page 463.

[53] Record of 19 March 1946, Volume IX, page 481.

[54] Record of 16 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 35.

[55] Record of 22 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 314.

[56] Record of 22 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 306.

[57] Record of 22 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 306.

Affidavit Generaladmiral Böhm, Document Number Raeder-129.

Affidavit Generaladmiral Albrecht, Document Number Raeder-128.

[58] Record of 22 May 1946, Volume XIV, Page 306.

[59] See Documents Numbers 798-PS, USA-29; 1014-PS, USA-30, Document