Chapter I: N T H E (28)

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: In other words, what you were trying to do from the 25th onwards was to get England to try and agree and help the Reich in the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor, wasn’t that right?

GÖRING: That, of course, is quite clearly expressed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember the interview with Mr. Dahlerus. It was the interview in which you colored the portions on the map. I only want you to have it in your mind. If I say 11:30 on the 29th of August it will not mean anything to you. I want you to see it so that I can ask you one or two questions about it.

You remember, at that time, that you were upset at the interview which had taken place when Hitler handed Henderson the German reply, and there had been the remark about the ultimatum. Do you remember that?

GÖRING: Yes, of course I was upset, since that had suddenly completely disturbed my whole position.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And is this correct? Mr. Dahlerus says on Page 72 of his book that you came out with a tirade, strong words against the Poles. Do you remember that he quotes you as saying: “Wir kennen die Polen”? Do you remember that?

GÖRING: Yes, of course. You must consider the situation at the time. I had heard about the excesses and I would not go and tell Dahlerus, a neutral, that I considered Germany wholly guilty and the Poles completely innocent. It is correct that I did say that, but it arose out of a situation.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Are you still an admirer of Bismarck?

GÖRING: I admire Bismarck absolutely, but I have never said that I am a Bismarck.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: No, I am not suggesting that. I thought you might have in mind his remark about the Poles. Do you remember: “Haut doch die Polen, dass sie am Leben verzagen”? (Let us strike the Poles until they lose the courage to live.) Is that what was in your mind at the time?

GÖRING: No, I had no such thoughts, still less because for years I had genuinely sought friendship with Poland.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You have been quite frank about your general intention, and I am not going to take time on it, but I just want to put one or two subsidiary points.

You remember the passage that I read from Mr. Dahlerus’ book about the airplane and the sabotage, that he said that you had said to him, mentioning the Defendant Ribbentrop—you remember that passage? You have given your explanation and I just want to . . .

GÖRING: Yes, yes, I gave that explanation and I made it quite clear.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, your explanation was that Herr Dahlerus was confusing your concern that his airplane should not be shot down in making his journey. That is putting your explanation fairly, isn’t it? You are saying that Herr Dahlerus was confused. What you were saying was your concern that his airplane should not be shot down. Isn’t that right? That is as I understood it.

GÖRING: No, I think I have expressed it very clearly. Would you like me to give it again? I will repeat it.

Dahlerus, who stood in the witness box here, used the words, “I must correct myself,” when he was asked about Ribbentrop. I am quoting Dahlerus. He said, “I connected it with Ribbentrop, since shortly beforehand the name was mentioned in some other connection.”

Thereupon I explained I was really anxious lest something might happen. I explained that very clearly and I need not repeat it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The question I put to you, Witness—I think we are agreed on it—was that your anxiety was about his plane, and the point that I want to make clear to you now is that that incident did not occur on this day when Dahlerus was preparing for his third visit, but occurred when he was in England and rang you up during his second visit. He rang you up on the evening of the 27th of August, and on Page 59 of his book he says:

“Before leaving the Foreign Office, I telephoned Göring to
confirm that I was leaving for Berlin by plane at 7:00 p.m. He
seemed to think this was rather late. It would be dark and he
was worried lest my plane be shot at by the British, or over
German territory. He asked me to hold the line, and a minute
later came back and gave me a concise description of the route
the plane must follow over Germany to avoid being shot at. He
also assured me that the anti-aircraft stations along our course
would be informed that we were coming.”

What I am suggesting to you is that your explanation is wrong, that you have confused it with this earlier incident of which Mr. Dahlerus speaks, and that Mr. Dahlerus is perfectly accurate when he speaks about the second incident which occurred 2 days later.

GÖRING: That is not at all contradictory. In regard to the first flight the position was that it was already dark, which means that the danger was considerably greater; and I again point out that, in connection with the second journey, preparedness for war in all countries had reached such a degree that flying was hazardous.

I emphasize once more that I had to correct Dahlerus when he was questioned by my counsel, that I did not tell him that Ribbentrop had planned an attack against him. I emphasize for the last time that Von Ribbentrop knew nothing about my negotiations with Dahlerus.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you really say that? Do you remember that on the 29th of August—first of all, on the 28th of August, at 10:30 p.m., when Henderson and Hitler had an interview. That was before the difficulties arose. It was the interview when Hitler was considering direct negotiations with the Poles. He said, “We must summon Field Marshal Göring to discuss it with him.” That is in our _Blue Book_, and as far as I know it has never been denied. You were summoned to the interview that Hitler and Ribbentrop were having with Sir Nevile Henderson.

GÖRING: No, I must interrupt you. The Führer said, “We will have to fetch him,” but I was not fetched and that is not said in the _Blue Book_ either.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But according to Mr. Dahlerus, he says:

“During our conversation Göring described how he had been
summoned to Hitler immediately after Henderson’s departure, how
Hitler, Göring, and Ribbentrop had discussed the conference that
had taken place with Henderson, and how satisfied all three of
them were with the result. In this connection Hitler had turned
to Ribbentrop and said mockingly, ‘Do you still believe that
Dahlerus is a British agent?’ Somewhat acidly Ribbentrop replied
that perhaps it was not the case.”

You say that is not true, either?

GÖRING: Herr Dahlerus is describing the events without having been present. From that description, too, it becomes clear that I arrived after Henderson had already left. The description is a little colorful. Ribbentrop had no idea what I was negotiating with Dahlerus about, and the Führer did not inform him about these negotiations either. He merely knew that I used Dahlerus as a negotiator, and he was of course, opposed to him, because he, as Foreign Minister, was against any other channels being used.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was exactly the point, you know, that I put to you about 7 minutes ago, that Ribbentrop did know you were using Dahlerus, with which you disagreed. You now agree that he knew you were using Dahlerus, so I will leave it.

GÖRING: No, I beg your pardon. I still say—please do not distort my words—that Ribbentrop did not know what I was negotiating with Dahlerus about, and that he had not even heard of it through the Führer.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You said “distort my words.” I especially did not say to you that he knew what you were negotiating about. I said to you that he knew you were using Dahlerus, and that, you agree, is right. I limited it to that, didn’t I? And that is right, isn’t it?

GÖRING: He did not know either that I was carrying on negotiations with England through Dahlerus at that time. He did not know about the flights either.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well now, I want you just to help me on one or two other matters.

You remember that in January of 1937, and in October of 1937, the German Government gave the strongest assurances as to the inviolability and neutrality of Belgium and Holland. Do you remember that?

GÖRING: I do not remember it in detail, but it has been mentioned here in Court.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And do you remember that on the 25th of August 1938 the Air Staff put in a memorandum on the assumption that France and Great Britain—oh no, that France would declare war during the case of Fall Grün, and that Great Britain would come in? Do you remember that? It is Document Number 375-PS, Exhibit Number USA-84. I want you to have it generally in mind because I am going to put a passage to you.

GÖRING: May I ask whether the signature is Wolter? W-o-l-t-e-r?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I shall let you know. Yes, that is right.

GÖRING: In that case I remember the document exactly. It has been given to me here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is right. I only want to recall your recollection to one sentence:

“Belgium and the Netherlands in German hands represent an
extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air war
against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore, it
is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to
the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be
carried out, and how long it would take.”

Do you remember that? It is pretty obvious air strategy, but you remember it?

GÖRING: That is absolutely correct. That was the principal work of a captain of the General Staff, 5th Department, who, naturally, when making his report, must propound the best arguments.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Then, after that, on the 28th of April 1939, you remember that Hitler said that he had given binding declarations to a number of states, and this applied to Holland and Belgium? I think that was the time when he made a speech in the Reichstag and mentioned a number of small states as well as that; but he said it included Holland and Belgium.

GÖRING: Yes. It has, of course been mentioned repeatedly here.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes. Now, do you remember that on the 23rd of May, in the document that I have already put to you, at the meeting at the Reich Chancellery, Hitler said this: “The Dutch and Belgian air bases must be occupied by armed force. Declarations of neutrality must be ignored.”

Do you remember his saying that?

GÖRING: It says so in the document, yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And, on the 22d of August 1939, in the speech to the commanders-in-chief, which is Document Number 798-PS, Exhibit Number USA-29, he said:

“Another possibility is the violation of Dutch, Belgian, and
Swiss neutrality. I have no doubt that all these states, as well
as Scandinavia, will defend their neutrality by all available
means. England and France will not violate the neutrality of
these countries.”

Do you remember his saying that?

GÖRING: You can see for yourself from those words how often the Führer changed his ideas, so that even the plan he had in May was not at all final.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: They are perfectly consistent in my estimation. He is saying that they must be occupied; that declarations of neutrality must be ignored, and he is emphasizing that by saying that England and France will not violate the neutrality, so it is perfectly easy for Germany to do it.

GÖRING: No, what he means to say is that we on our part would not find it necessary to do so either. I merely want to point out that political situations always turn out to be different, and that at these interrogations and this Trial we must regard the political background of the world as a whole.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That was on the 22d. You have agreed as to what was said. Immediately after that, on the 26th, 4 days later, Hitler gave another assurance. Do you remember that, just before the war he gave another assurance?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And on the 6th of October, 1939, he gave a further assurance, and on the 7th of October, the day after that last assurance, the order, which is Document Number 2329-PS, Exhibit GB-105, was issued.

“Army Group B has to make all preparations according to special
orders for immediate invasion of Dutch and Belgian territory, if
the political situation so demands.”

And on the 9th of October, there is a directive from Hitler:

“Preparations should be made for offensive action on the
northern flank of the Western Front crossing the area of
Luxembourg, Belgium, and Holland. This attack must be carried
out as soon and as forcibly as possible.”

Isn’t it quite clear from that, that all along you knew, as Hitler stated on the 22d of August, that England and France would not violate the neutrality of the low countries, and you were prepared to violate them whenever it suited your strategical and tactical interests? Isn’t that quite clear?

GÖRING: Not entirely. Only if the political situation made it necessary. And in the meantime the British air penetration of the neutrality of Holland and Belgium had taken place, up to October.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You say not entirely. That is as near agreement with me as you are probably prepared to go.

Now I want to ask you quite shortly again about Yugoslavia. You remember that you have told us in your evidence in chief that Germany before the war, before the beginning of the war, had the very best relations with the Yugoslav people, and that you yourself had contributed to it. I am putting it quite shortly.

GÖRING: That is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And that was emphasized, if you will remember, on the first of June 1939 by a speech of Hitler at a dinner with Prince Paul.

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, 80 days after that, on the 12th of August 1939, the Defendant Ribbentrop, Hitler, and Ciano had a meeting, and just let me recall to you what Hitler said at that meeting to Count Ciano.

“Generally speaking . . .”

GÖRING: I beg your pardon, what is the number of the document?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am sorry, it was my fault—Document Number TC-77, Exhibit Number GB-48. It is the memorandum of a conversation between Hitler, Ribbentrop, and Ciano at Obersalzberg on the 12th of August.

GÖRING: I merely wanted to know if this was from Ciano’s diary? That is important for me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Oh no, not from Ciano’s diary, it is a memorandum. This is the official report.

“Generally speaking, the best thing to happen would be for
uncertain neutrals to be liquidated one after the other. This
process could be carried out more easily if on every occasion
one partner of the Axis covered the other while it was dealing
with an uncertain neutral. Italy might well regard Yugoslavia as
a neutral of this kind.”

That was rather inconsistent with your statement as to the good intentions towards Yugoslavia, and the Führer’s statement to Prince Paul, wasn’t it?

GÖRING: I should like to read that through carefully once more and see in what connection that statement was made. As it is presented now it certainly would not fit in with that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You know I do not want to stop you unnecessarily in any way, but that document has been read at least twice during the Trial and any further matter perhaps you will consider. But you will agree, unless I have wrenched it out of its context—and I hope I have not—that is quite inconsistent with friendly intentions, is it not?

GÖRING: As I said, it does not fit in with that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, it was 56 days after that, on the 6th of October, Hitler gave an assurance to Yugoslavia and he said:

“Immediately after the completion of the Anschluss I informed
Yugoslavia that from now on the frontier with this country would
also be an unalterable one and that we only desired to live in
peace and friendship with her.”

And then again in March 1941, on the entry of the Tripartite Pact, the German Government announced that it confirmed its determination to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia at all times.

Now, after that of course, as I have always said when you dealt with this, there was the Simovic Putsch in Yugoslavia. But I think you said quite frankly in your evidence, that Hitler and yourself never took the trouble, or thought of taking the trouble, of inquiring whether the Simovic Government would preserve its neutrality or not. That is right, is it not?

GÖRING: I did not say that. We were convinced that they were using these declarations to mislead. We knew that this Putsch was first of all directed from Moscow, and, as we learned later, that it had been financially supported to a considerable extent by Britain. From that we recognized the hostile intentions as shown by the mobilization of the Yugoslav Army, which made the matter quite clear, and we did not want to be deceived by the Simovic declarations.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I would like to say one word about the mobilization in a moment. But on the 27th of March, that was 2 days after the signing of the pact I have just referred to, there was a conference in Berlin of Hitler with the German High Command, at which you were present, and do you remember the Führer saying:

“The Führer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty
declarations of the new government, to make all preparations to
destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unit. No
diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented.
Assurances of the Yugoslav Government, which cannot be trusted
anyhow in the future, will be taken note of. The attack will
start as soon as means and troops suitable for it are ready.
Politically it is especially important that the blow against
Yugoslavia is carried out with unmerciful harshness and that the
military destruction is effected in a lightning-like
undertaking. The plan is on the assumption that we speed up
schedules of all preparations and use such strong forces that
the Yugoslav collapse will take place within the shortest
possible time.”

It was not a very friendly intention toward Yugoslavia to have no diplomatic negotiations, not give them the chance of assurance or coming to terms with you, and to strike with unmerciful harshness, was it?

GÖRING: I have just said that after the Simovic Putsch the situation was completely clear to us, and declarations of neutrality on the part of Yugoslavia could be regarded as only camouflage and deception in order to gain time. After the Putsch, Yugoslavia definitely formed part of the enemy front, and it was therefore for us also to carry out deceptive moves and attack as quickly as possible, since our forces at that time were relatively weak.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You realized, of course, that you said that General Simovic was inspired by Moscow. I am not going to argue that point with you at all. But I do point out to you that this was 3 months before you were at war with the Soviet Union. You realize that, do you?

GÖRING: Yes, that is correct. It was precisely the Simovic Putsch which removed the Führer’s last doubts that Russia’s attitude towards Germany had become hostile. This Putsch was the very reason which caused him to decide to take quickest possible counter measures against this danger. Secondly . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Just one moment. Do you know that it appears in the documents quite clearly, that the attack on the Soviet Union was postponed for 6 weeks because of this trouble in the Balkans? That is quite inconsistent with what you are saying now, isn’t it?

GÖRING: No. If you will read again my statement on that point, you will see I said that a number of moves on the part of Russia caused the Führer to order preparations for invasion, but that he still withheld the final decision on invasion, and that after the Simovic Putsch this decision was made. From the strategic situation it follows that the military execution of this political decision was delayed by the Yugoslavian campaign.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I want to ask you one other point about Yugoslavia.

You remember your evidence that the attack on Belgrade was due to the fact that the war office and a number of other important military organizations were located there. I am trying to summarize it, but that was the effect of your evidence, was it not?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, do you remember how it was put in Hitler’s order which I have just been reading to you:

“The main task of the Air Force is to start as early as possible
with the destruction of the Yugoslavian Air Force ground
installations . . .”

Now, I ask you to note the next word “and”:

“. . . and to destroy the capital of Belgrade in attacks by
waves. Besides the Air Force has to support the Army.”

I put it to you that that order makes it clear that the attack on Belgrade was just another of your exhibitions of terror attacks in order to attempt to subdue a population that would have difficulty in resisting them.

GÖRING: No, that is not correct. The population of Belgrade did defend itself. Belgrade was far more a center of military installations than the capital of any other country; and I would like to draw your attention to this.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, now, I am going to pass from that matter to one or two points on which you gave evidence—I think at the instance of counsel for the organizations. You remember you gave evidence in answer to Dr. Babel about the Waffen-SS? Do you remember that—a few days ago?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I would just like you to look at a document which has not got a number, but it is the Führer’s ideas about the Waffen-SS, and to see if you agree. It is Document Number D-665, and it will be Exhibit Number GB-280. It is a document from the High Command of the Army, General Staff of the Army—statements of the Führer regarding the future state military police—and the covering letter of the document says, “After the Führer’s proposals for the Waffen-SS had been passed on, doubts arose as to whether it was intended that they should be given wider distribution.” If you will pass to the documents, perhaps you will follow it while I read it. I do not think it has been introduced before:

“On 6 August 1940 when the order for the organization of the
Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler”—Adolf Hitler Bodyguard—“was
issued, the Führer stated the principles regarding the necessity
for the Waffen-SS as summed up below:

“The Greater German Reich in its final form will not include
within its frontiers only those national groups which from the
very beginning will be well disposed towards the Reich. It is
therefore necessary to maintain outside the Reich proper a state
military police capable in any situation of representing and
imposing the authority of the Reich.

“This task can be carried out only by a state police composed of
men of best German blood and wholeheartedly pledged to the
ideology on which the Greater German Reich is founded. Only such
a formation will resist subversive influences, even in critical
times. Such a formation, proud of its purity, will never
fraternize with the proletariat and with the underworld which
undermines the fundamental idea. In our future Greater German
Reich, a police corps will have the necessary authority over the
other members of the community only if it is trained along
military lines. Our people are so military-minded as a result of
glorious achievements in war and training by the National
Socialist Party that a ‘sock-knitting’ police, as in 1848, or a
bureaucratic police, as in 1918, would no longer have any
authority.

“It is therefore necessary that this state police proves its
worth and sacrifices its blood at the front, in close
formations, in the same way as every unit of the armed forces.
Having returned home, after having proved themselves in the
field in the ranks of the Army, the units of the Waffen-SS will
possess the authority to execute their tasks as state police.

“This employment of the Waffen-SS for internal purposes is just
as much in the interests of the Wehrmacht itself. We must never
again allow the conscripted German Wehrmacht to be used against
its fellow countrymen, weapon in hand, in critical situations at
home. Such action is the beginning of the end. A state which has
to resort to such methods is no longer in a position to use its
armed forces against an enemy from without, and thereby gives
itself up.

“There are deplorable examples of this in our history. In future
the Wehrmacht is to be used solely against the foreign enemies
of the Reich.

“In order to ensure that the men in the units of the Waffen-SS
are always of high quality, the recruitment into the units must
be limited. The Führer’s idea of this limitation is that the
units of the Waffen-SS should generally not exceed 5 to 10
percent of the peacetime strength of the Army.”

Do you agree with that? Is that a correct description of the purpose of the Waffen-SS?

GÖRING: I am absolutely convinced that he did say that, but that does not contradict my statement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want you, while we are on the SS, to look at a note which is Document D-729 and will be Exhibit Number GB-281. It is on the conversation between you and the Duce in the Palazzo Venezia on 23 October 1942. At that time you were still in good odor with the Führer and still retained your power; is that right?

I will read it: It is Page 35, Paragraph 1.

“The Reich Marshal then described Germany’s method in fighting
the partisans. To begin with, all livestock and foodstuffs were
taken away from the areas concerned, so as to deny the partisans
all sources of supply.”

GÖRING: Just a second please. Where is this?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is Page 35, Paragraph 1, but I will find it for you if you have any difficulty. I think it is marked, and it begins “The Reich Marshal . . .” Can you find it?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I will start again if I may.

“The Reich Marshal then described Germany’s method in fighting
the partisans. To begin with, all livestock and foodstuffs were
taken away from the areas concerned, so as to deny the partisans
all sources of supply. Men and women were taken away to labor
camps, the children to children’s camps, and the villages burned
down. It was by the use of these methods that the railways in
the vast wooded areas of Bialowiza had been safeguarded.
Whenever attacks occurred, the entire male population of the
villages were lined up on one side and the women on the other.
The women were told that all the men would be shot, unless
they—the women—pointed out which men did not belong to the
village. In order to save their men, the women always pointed
out the nonresidents. Germany had found that, generally
speaking, it was not easy to get soldiers to carry out such
measures. Members of the Party discharged this task much more
harshly and efficiently. For the same reason armies trained
ideologically, such as the German—or the Russian—fought better
than others. The SS, the nucleus of the old Party fighters, who
have personal ties with the Führer and who form a special elite,
confirm this principle.”

Now, is that a correct description?

GÖRING: Yes, certainly.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And this expresses correctly your views on how war against partisans should be carried out?

GÖRING: I have transmitted this.

Just a second, please. May I ask what the number of this document is?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, I will give it again: Document Number D-729, and it becomes Exhibit Number GB-281.

Now, I just want you to help me on one other matter on these organizations. You will remember that in answer, I think, to Dr. Servatius, you made some remarks about the Leadership Corps. Do you remember that? I just want you to have them in mind.

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, will you look at the document which will be presented to you, Document Number D-728, Exhibit Number GB-282. This is a document from the Office of the Gau Leadership for Hessen-Nassau. I am sorry; there is a reference to an order of the Party Chancellery dated 10 February 1945, its subject is, “Action by the Party to be taken for keeping the German population in check until the end of the war.” It is signed by Sprenger, Gauleiter and Commissioner for Reich Defense.

GÖRING: The date is 15 March 1945, is that right?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am grateful to you. I knew it was just after 10 March. I have not got it in my copy, but if you say it, I will take it.

GÖRING: 1945.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes.

[_Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe then read from the document excerpts which were withdrawn and stricken from the record on 16 August 1946._]

DR. STAHMER: I must object to the use of this document, since I cannot recognize that it is genuine. I have not yet seen the original, and the doubts as to its being genuine are due to the fact that expressions are used which are most unusual in the German language.

GÖRING: I was going to raise the same objection. It is not an original as it says at the top, “copy,” and there is no original signature, but only the typewritten words “Sprenger, Gauleiter” at the bottom.

DR. STAHMER: For instance the expression “Gerichtlichkeiten” is used. This is an expression completely unusual and unknown in the German language, and I cannot imagine that an official document originating from a Gauleiter could contain such a word.

GÖRING: I can draw your attention to yet another point showing that this is evidently not an original document. If there had been an increase in meat or fat rations, I would have heard something about it. Not a single word of these two documents is known to me. It does not bear a rubber stamp either, the whole thing is typewritten, including the signatures. Therefore, I cannot accept this document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: This is a file copy which, to the best of my knowledge, was captured at the office of the Gau Leader. It was sent to us by the British Army of the Rhine. I shall make inquiries about it, but it purports to be a file copy and I have put the original document which we have, which is a file copy, to the witness.

THE PRESIDENT: Dr. Stahmer, I have the original document in my hands now, together with the certificate of an officer of the British Army stating that the document was delivered to him in the above capacity, in the ordinary course of official business, as the original of a document found in German records of files captured by military forces under the command of the Supreme Commander. Under these circumstances it is in exactly the same position as all the other captured documents. The defense, of course, can bring any evidence which it thinks right, to criticize the authenticity of the document. The document stands on exactly the same footing as the other captured documents, subject to any criticism to support which you may be able to bring evidence.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Witness, I want you to deal with the sentence in paragraph 6.

Now, this paragraph is certainly directed to all administrative levels down to the Kreisleiter, county leaders of the Nazi Party, and it assumes they knew all about the running of concentration camps. Are you telling the Tribunal that you, who up to 1943 were the second man in the Reich, knew nothing about concentration camps?

GÖRING: First of all, I want to say once more that I do not accept this document, and that its whole wording is unknown to me, and that this paragraph appears unusual to me. I did not know anything about what took place and what methods were used in the concentration camps later, when I was no longer in charge.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Let me remind you of the evidence that has been given before this Court, that as far as Auschwitz alone is concerned, 4,000,000 people were exterminated. Do you remember that?

GÖRING: This I have heard as a statement here, but I consider it in no way proved—that figure, I mean.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If you do not consider it proved, let me remind you of the affidavit of Hoettl, who was Deputy Group Leader of the Foreign Section, of the Security Section of Amt IV of the RSHA. He says that approximately 4,000,000 Jews have been killed in the concentration camps, while an additional 2,000,000 met death in other ways. Assume that these figures—one is a Russian figure, the other a German—assume they are even 50 percent correct, assume it was 2,000,000 and 1,000,000, are you telling this Tribunal that a Minister with your power in the Reich could remain ignorant that that was going on?

GÖRING: This I maintain, and the reason for this is that these things were kept secret from me. I might add that in my opinion not even the Führer knew the extent of what was going on.

This is also explained by the fact that Himmler kept all these matters very secret. We were never given figures or any other details.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, Witness, haven’t you access to the foreign press, the press department in your ministry, to foreign broadcasts? You see, there is evidence that altogether, when you take the Jews and other people, something like 10,000,000 people have been done to death in cold blood, apart from those killed in battle. Something like 10,000,000 people. Do you say that you never saw or heard from the foreign press, in broadcasts, that this was going on?

GÖRING: First of all, the figure 10,000,000 is not established in any way. Secondly, throughout the war I did not read the foreign press, because I considered it nothing but propaganda. Thirdly, though I had the right to listen to foreign broadcasts, I never did so, simply because I did not want to listen to propaganda. Neither did I listen to home propaganda.

Only during the last 4 days of the war did I—and this I could prove—listen to a foreign broadcasting station for the first time.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You told Mr. Justice Jackson yesterday that there were various representatives in Eastern territories, and you have seen the films of the concentration camps, haven’t you, since this Trial started? You knew that there were millions of garments, millions of shoes, 20,952 kilograms of gold wedding rings, 35 wagons of furs—all that stuff which these people who were exterminated at Maidanek or Auschwitz left behind them. Did nobody ever tell you, under the development of the Four Year Plan, or anyone else, that they were getting all these amounts of human material? Do you remember we heard from the Polish Jewish gentleman, who gave evidence, that all he got back from his family, of his wife and mother and daughter, I think, were their identity cards? His work was to gather up clothes. He told us that so thorough were the henchmen of your friend Himmler that it took 5 minutes extra to kill the women because they had to have their hair cut off as it was to be used for making mattresses. Was nothing ever told you about this accretion to German material, which came from the effects of these people who were murdered?

GÖRING: No, and how can you imagine this? I was laying down the broad outlines for the German economy, and that certainly did not include the manufacture of mattresses from women’s hair or the utilization of old shoes and clothes. I leave the figure open. But, also I do want to object to your reference to my “friend Himmler.”

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Well, I will say, “your enemy Himmler,” or simply “Himmler” whichever you like. You know whom I mean, don’t you?

GÖRING: Yes, indeed.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, I just want to remind you of one other point: Exhibit Number USA-228, Document Number 407(V)-PS, “. . . I have the honor to report to you that it was possible to add 3,638,056 new foreign workers to the German war economy between April 1st of last year and March 31st of this year. . . . In addition to the foreign civilian workers 1,622,929 prisoners of war are employed in the German economy.” Now, just listen to this, “out of the 5,000,000 foreign workers who have arrived in Germany, not even 200,000 came voluntarily.” That is from the minutes of the Central Planning Board on the 1st of March. Do you say that you, in your position in the State and as the great architect of German economy, did not know that you were getting for your economy 4,800,000 foreign workers who were forced to come? Do you tell the Tribunal that?

GÖRING: I never told the Tribunal that. I said that I knew quite well that these workers were brought in and not always voluntarily, but whether the figure of 200,000 is correct, that I do not know, and I do not believe it either. The number of volunteers was greater, but this does not alter the fact that workers were forced to come to the Reich. That I have never denied, and have even admitted it.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You admit—and I want to put it quite fairly—that a large number of workers were forced to come to the Reich and work there?

GÖRING: Yes, certainly.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, would you like to adjourn now?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Yes, sir.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you remember what you said about the relations between you and the Führer? May I repeat your words:

“The chief influence on the Führer, if I may mention influence
on the Führer at all, was up to the end of 1941 or the beginning
of 1942, and that influence was I. Then my influence gradually
decreased until 1943, and from 1943 on it decreased speedily.
All in all, apart from myself I do not believe anyone else had
anywhere near the influence on the Führer that I had.”

That is your view on that matter?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I think you told the Tribunal that right up to the end your loyalty to the Führer was unshaken, is that right?

GÖRING: That is correct.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Do you still seek to justify and glorify Hitler after he had ordered the murder of these 50 young flying officers at Stalag Luft Number III?

GÖRING: I am here neither to justify the Führer Adolf Hitler nor to glorify him. I am here only to emphasize that I remained faithful to him, for I believe in keeping one’s oath not in good times only, but also in bad times when it is much more difficult.

As to your reference to the 50 airmen, I never opposed the Führer so clearly and strongly as in this matter, and I gave him my views about it. After that no conversation between the Führer and myself took place for months.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The Führer, at any rate, must have had full knowledge of what was happening with regard to concentration camps, the treatment of the Jews, and the treatment of the workers, must he not?

GÖRING: I already mentioned it as my opinion that the Führer did not know about details in concentration camps, about atrocities as described here. As far as I know him, I do not believe he was informed. But insofar as he . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am not asking about details; I am asking about the murder of four or five million people. Are you suggesting that nobody in power in Germany, except Himmler and perhaps Kaltenbrunner, knew about that?

GÖRING: I am still of the opinion that the Führer did not know about these figures.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, you remember how Mr. Dahlerus described the relations between you and Hitler on Page 53 of his book:

“From the very beginning of our conversation, I resented his
manner towards Göring, his most intimate friend and comrade from
the years of struggle. His desire to dominate was explicable,
but to require such obsequious humility as Göring now exhibited,
from his closest collaborator, seemed to me abhorrent and
unprepossessing.”

Is that how you had to behave with Hitler?

GÖRING: I did not have to behave in that way, and I did not behave in that way. Those are journalistic statements by Dahlerus, made after the war. If Germany had won the war, this description would certainly have been very different.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Mr. Dahlerus was your witness, though.

GÖRING: Mr. Dahlerus was not asked to give a journalistic account. He was solely questioned about the matters with which he, as courier between myself and the British Government, had to deal.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: My Lord, on Tuesday of last week, the defendant called General Bodenschatz, who gave general evidence as to his character and reputation. He, therefore, in my respectful submission, makes me entitled to put one document to him which is an account by the Defendant Raeder of his general character and reputation. In accordance with the English practice, I make my submission and ask the Court’s permission to put it in.

DR. STAHMER: I object to the reading of this document. It would be considerably easier to question Admiral Raeder, as witness, on his statements, since he is here with us. Then we shall be able to determine in cross-examination whether and to what extent he still maintains this alleged statement.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I have to put it in cross-examination to give the defendant the chance of answering it. The Defendant Raeder can give his explanations when he comes into the witness box.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal would like to look at the document before it is put in.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: That is the English translation. I will show Dr. Stahmer the German.

DR. STAHMER: Mr. President, I should like to point out, that the document bears no date and we do not know when and where it was drawn up.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: It is signed by the Defendant Raeder.

DR. STAHMER: When and where was it drawn up? The signature of Raeder is unknown to me.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: The date is in Raeder’s handwriting as is the signature; the 27th of July, I think it is 1945. Each page of the document is signed by the Defendant Raeder.

THE PRESIDENT: Sir David, you said the defendant has put his character in issue through Bodenschatz?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Lordship will remember he was asked by Doctor Stahmer: “Will you now tell me about the defendant’s social relations?” And then he proceeded to give an account of his character and his kindness and other qualities at that time; and I notice that Doctor Stahmer has just included as an exhibit still further evidence as to character in the form of a statement by one Hermann Winter.

THE PRESIDENT: Would it not have been appropriate, if the document was to have been put in evidence, to have put it to Bodenschatz, who was giving the evidence?

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: But, My Lord, the rule is that if the defendant puts his character in issue, he is entitled to be cross-examined on his character and his general reputation, and of course it is permissible to call a witness to speak as to his general reputation.

DR. STAHMER: May I make the following remark? I did not call Bodenschatz, neither did I question him as witness for Göring’s character. I questioned him about certain facts and happenings from which Bodenschatz subsequently drew certain conclusions. In my opinion, all these questions should have been put to Bodenschatz when he was here. These statements could then have been used to prove that it was Bodenschatz who was not telling the truth, not that Göring had told an untruth. To prove this the document should have been used during Bodensehatz’s interrogation. Then we would have been able to question Bodenschatz about it too.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: He may prefer that Bodenschatz be brought back and it be put to him, but I think I am entitled to put it to the defendant who called for the evidence as to his character and reputation.

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal will adjourn.

[_A recess was taken._]

THE PRESIDENT: The Tribunal rules that at the present stage, this document cannot be used in cross-examination.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: If Your Honor pleases, I understand that Your Lordship leaves open the question for further argument, whether it can be used for the Defendant Raeder in the witness box.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: I am much obliged.

[_Turning to the witness._] Now, Witness, you said before the Tribunal adjourned, that Hitler, in your opinion, did not know about—broadly—or was ignorant about, the question of concentration camps and the Jews. I would like you to look at Document Number D-736. That is an account of a discussion between the Führer and the Hungarian Regent Horthy on the 17th of April 1943, and if you would look at Page 4, you will see the passage just after “Nuremberg and Fürth.”

GÖRING: Just a moment. I should like to read through it very quickly to determine its authenticity.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Certainly.

GÖRING: Page 4.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Page 4—Exhibit Number GB-283. You see, after the mention of Nuremberg and Fürth, Hitler goes on:

“The Jews did not even possess organizational value. In spite of
the fears which he, the Führer, had heard repeatedly in Germany,
everything continued to go its normal way without the Jews.
Where the Jews were left to themselves, as for instance in
Poland, the most terrible misery and decay prevailed. They are
just pure parasites. In Poland, this state of affairs had been
fundamentally cleared up. If the Jews there did not want to
work, they were shot. If they could not work, they had to
perish. They had to be treated like tuberculosis bacilli, with
which a healthy body may become infected. This was not cruel—if
one remembers that even innocent creatures of nature, such as
hares and deer, have to be killed so that no harm is caused by
them. Why should the beasts who wanted to bring us Bolshevism be
more preserved? Nations which do not rid themselves of Jews
perish. One of the most famous examples is the downfall of that
people who were once so proud, the Persians, who now lead a
pitiful existence as Armenians.”

And would you look at Exhibit USSR-170, Document Number USSR-170, which is a conference which you had on the 6th of August 1942.

THE PRESIDENT: Before you pass from this document, is there not a passage higher up that is important? It is about 10 lines down, I think, in the middle of the line . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Your Honor is correct.

“To Admiral Horthy’s counterquestion as to what he should do
with the Jews, now that they had been deprived of almost all
possibility of earning their livelihood—he could not kill them
off—the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that the
Jews should be exterminated, or taken to concentration camps.
There was no other possibility.”

GÖRING: I do not know this document.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Now, this is a conference which you had with a number of people, and on Page 143, if you will turn to it, you get on to the question of butter. If you will look where it says: “Reich Marshal Göring: How much butter do you deliver? 30,000 tons?”

Do you see that?

GÖRING: Yes.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: And then Lohse, who is in the conference, says, “Yes,” and you say, “Do you also deliver to Wehrmacht units?” and then Lohse says, “I can answer that too. There are only a few Jews left alive. Tens of thousands have been disposed of, but I can tell you that the civilian population gets, on your orders, 15 percent less than the Germans.” I call your attention to the statement that “there are only a few Jews left alive, tens of thousands have been disposed of.” Do you still say, in the face of these two documents, that neither Hitler nor yourself knew that the Jews were being exterminated?

GÖRING: I beg that the remarks be rightly read. They are quite incorrectly reproduced. May I read the original text? “Lohse:”—thus not my remark, but the remark of Lohse—“I can also answer that. The Jews are left only in small numbers. Thousands have gone.” It does not say here that they were destroyed. From this remark you cannot conclude that they were killed. It could also mean that they had gone away—they were removed. There is nothing here . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: About the preceding remark, I suggest that you make quite clear what you meant by “there are only a few Jews left alive, whereas tens of thousands have been disposed of.”

GÖRING: They were “still living there.” That is how you should understand that.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You heard what I read to you about Hitler, what he said to Horthy and what Ribbentrop said, that the Jews must be exterminated or taken to concentration camps. Hitler said the Jews must either work or be shot. That was in April 1943. Do you still say that neither Hitler nor you knew of this policy to exterminate the Jews?

GÖRING: For the correctness of the document . . .

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Will you please answer my question. Do you still say neither Hitler nor you knew of the policy to exterminate the Jews?

GÖRING: As far as Hitler is concerned, I have said I do not think so. As far as I am concerned, I have said that I did not know, even approximately, to what extent these things were taking place.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: You did not know to what degree, but you knew there was a policy that aimed at the extermination of the Jews?

GÖRING: No, a policy of emigration, not liquidation of the Jews. I knew only that there had been isolated cases of such perpetrations.

SIR DAVID MAXWELL-FYFE: Thank you.

GEN. RUDENKO: If I understand you, Defendant Göring, you said that all the basic decisions concerning foreign, political, and military matters were taken by Hitler alone? Do I understand you rightly?

GÖRING: Yes, certainly. After all, he was the Führer.

GEN. RUDENKO: Am I to understand that Hitler took these decisions without listening to the opinions of the experts who studied the questions, and the intelligence reports on those matters?

GÖRING: It depended upon the circumstances. In certain cases he would ask for data to be submitted to him, without the experts knowing the exact reason. In other cases, he would explain to his advisers what he intended to do, and get from them the data and their opinion. Final decisions he took himself as Supreme Commander.

GEN. RUDENKO: In that case, do I understand you correctly when you say that when making important decisions, Hitler used the analysis and material given to him by his close collaborators, who advised him according to their speciality. Is that correct?

GÖRING: Given to him partly by his collaborators, partly as in the case of communication and intelligence, by other members of the departments concerned?

GEN. RUDENKO: Will you tell me then, who was the closest collaborator of Hitler as far as the Air Force was concerned?

GÖRING: I was, of course.

GEN. RUDENKO: And on the questions of economics?

GÖRING: In economic matters, it was also I.

GEN. RUDENKO: And on political matters?

GÖRING: It depended on what question came up for discussion, and on whether the Führer had consulted anybody or asked his opinion.

GEN. RUDENKO: Can you tell me, who were these collaborators and associates?