Chapter I: N T H E (2)

BODENSCHATZ: I was commissioned at that time by Reich Marshal Göring to attend the review of the Italian division at the Münster Camp and to tell Field Marshal Graziani that the men in that division were to be used to command flak guns. After Field Marshal Graziani had declared himself in disagreement with this, I was obliged to go to the Führer’s headquarters by air. It had been proposed that I should go by Mussolini’s special train which was in Münster, and on the night of 19 to 20 . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Answer my question, Witness. Just answer the question, please, and you will save us a great deal of time. Whose messages were you carrying to the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: I brought the message that Graziani was not disposed to hand over these soldiers of the Italian division.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And before you started for the Führer’s headquarters you communicated with Göring about it, did you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Before my departure, when I flew to Münster Camp—that was a few days before—I spoke to him and when I returned, before reporting to the Führer, I telephoned Hermann Göring in his headquarters and gave him the same message.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he instruct you to go to the Führer’s headquarters at that time and give the message to the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: This trip from Münster Camp I made on my own initiative because it was important for Adolf Hitler to know of this information before Mussolini, who was expected to arrive at the Führer’s headquarters at 3 o’clock in the afternoon on 20 July. . . .

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: As I understand you, Göring wanted a peaceful outcome of the negotiations at Munich?

BODENSCHATZ: He said that to me several times.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was highly pleased with the outcome that was achieved there?

BODENSCHATZ: He was very pleased. I emphasized that before when I said that when he came from the conference room, he said spontaneously, “That means peace.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you say that Göring wanted peace with Poland, he also wanted that same kind of a peace, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Regarding peace with Poland, I did not speak to him.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did he send someone or induce Hitler to take someone to Munich in order to countercheck Ribbentrop?

BODENSCHATZ: All I know personally on this subject is this: Here, in imprisonment, Captain Wiedemann told me that Hermann Göring had expressed the wish that Von Neurath should be taken, and Wiedemann told me that Hitler had granted that wish.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you were interrogated by the United States about this subject before Wiedemann got here, were you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Before?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Before Wiedemann was brought here.

BODENSCHATZ: I was not interrogated on this subject—the Munich Agreement and Von Neurath.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you interrogated on the 6th of November 1945, and did you not then say that Göring used very harsh words about Ribbentrop and asked Hitler to take Neurath to Munich with him in order to have a representative present? Did you not say that to the interrogators of the United States?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember at the moment. If that is in the record then it must be so.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This meeting as to which you have—oh, by the way, after Munich you know that Göring gave his word of honor to the Czechs that there would be no further aggression against them, do you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Please repeat the question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that after Munich, when Göring was pleased with the outcome, he gave his word of honor that there would be no further aggression against the Czechs. Do you know that?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I did not know that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This meeting that took place in London, I mean the meeting that took place when the Englishmen were present . . .

BODENSCHATZ: In Husum, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who was the Swedish person who was present?

BODENSCHATZ: Herr Dahlerus was the Swede who was present.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Who were the English who were present?

BODENSCHATZ: There were six to eight English economic experts. The names I do not know.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And at that time—by the way, have you fixed the time of that? What was the date?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say precisely. It was the beginning of August.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it not 7 August?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Mr. Dahlerus there?

BODENSCHATZ: The question as to whether Dahlerus was there—I cannot remember one hundred percent whether he was there. I know only that when I spoke to my lawyer he said that Dahlerus was there, but I cannot swear one hundred percent that he was there. I assumed he was, since the Defense Counsel Dr. Stahmer told me that he was there. That was the reason why I said previously that Hermann Göring and Dahlerus were present at that meeting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the subject under discussion was the Polish relations with the German Reich?

BODENSCHATZ: Polish relations were not discussed, but relations between England and Germany. There was no talk of relations with Poland.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Göring wanted the English gentlemen to see that England did not attack Germany?

BODENSCHATZ: He did not express it quite that way. He said, as I have already stated, the English gentlemen should, when they returned home, work in the same way that he was working—for peace, and to make their influence felt in important circles.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, was that not said in connection with the Polish negotiations that were then going on?

BODENSCHATZ: With the Polish negotiations? I cannot remember that any mention was made of Polish negotiations.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you with Hermann Göring when the Polish war broke out?

BODENSCHATZ: When the Polish war broke out I was in Berlin.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you still in your office under Hermann Göring’s command?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was at that time under Hermann Göring’s command.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When did you first begin preparing for a movement of your forces in the direction of Poland?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot make any definite statement on that subject; that was a matter for the General Staff. I know only that during the period before the outbreak of war the Chief of the General Staff several times visited the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, Hermann Göring, and that such matters were discussed. I, myself, was not informed as to how many forces were to be used in the Polish campaign.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Were you present at the conference in which Hermann Göring stated that he, right after Munich, had orders to multiply the Air Force by five?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot recall having been present at any such discussion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You know that the Air Force was greatly enlarged after Munich?

BODENSCHATZ: No, I do not know that. The Air Force was augmented according to plan. In this connection I can say for certain that the German Air Force, at the beginning of the Polish campaign, as regards leadership, planning, or material, was not equal to its task.

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Justice Jackson, would you like to adjourn now or would you like to go on in order to finish?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: This would be a convenient time. I am sure we cannot finish before lunch hour.

THE PRESIDENT: You would like to adjourn now?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Yes, Sir.

THE PRESIDENT: Very well.

[_The Tribunal recessed until 1400 hours._]

_Afternoon Session_

THE PRESIDENT: We will have no open session tomorrow.

GENERAL R. A. RUDENKO (Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R.): I want to say a few words with respect to the statement of Defense Counsel Stahmer. When speaking about the document concerning the German atrocities at Katyn, Defense Counsel Stahmer stated that it was not in his possession. I do not want to speak about the nature of this document. I want to report to the Tribunal that on 13 February this document, as Exhibit USSR-54—30 copies of it, all in the German language—was given to the Document Room for the purposes of the Defense. We did not think that we had to present the document to each Defense Counsel separately. We considered that if the document were given to the Document Room, the Defense would take the necessary steps concerning it. That is all I wish to say on this matter.

DR. LATERNSER: There must be a misunderstanding about the number of this document. It was submitted at that time in open session by the Russian Prosecutor as Exhibit Number USSR-64. USSR-64 has not been distributed. I have not received it, and upon request at Information Room of the Defense, upon two requests, I have not been able to obtain it.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we will inquire into the matter.

[_The witness Bodenschatz took the stand._]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Previous to the spring of 1943, as I understand you, Hermann Göring was a man of great influence in the councils of the Reich?

BODENSCHATZ: Before the year 1943—that is, until the year 1943—Hermann Göring always had access to the Führer, and his influence was important.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, it was the most important in Germany outside of the Führer himself, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Within the Reich he had great influence, very great influence.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Air power was his special mission and his special pride, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: As an old airman, he was very proud to be able to build up and lead the Air Force.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He had more confidence in air power as a weapon of war than most of the other men of his time, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: At any rate he was convinced that his Air Force was very good. But I have to repeat what I said before, that at the beginning of the war, in the year 1939, that stage had not been reached by the Air Force. I repeat that at that time the Air Force was; as far as leadership, training, and material were concerned, not ready for war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But ever since you first went with Hermann Göring you had been rapidly building up the Air Force, had you not?

BODENSCHATZ: The building up of the Air Force went relatively fast.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you first went with Göring—I have forgotten what year you said that was.

BODENSCHATZ: I came to Hermann Göring in April 1933. At that time there was no Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, but only a Reich Commissariat for Aviation. But even at that time, the beginning of the building up of the Air Force—the first beginnings—started. It was only after 1935, however, when freedom from armament restriction was declared, that it was speeded up.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And the building up of the Air Force was very largely in bombers, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: It was not mainly bombers; it was mixed, both fighters and bombers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring also had charge of the Four Year Plan?

BODENSCHATZ: He was commissioned by the Führer to carry out the Four Year Plan.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He also held several other offices, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring, besides being Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe, was put in charge of the Four Year Plan. Before that, at the beginning of the seizure of power, he was Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister of Prussia, President of the Reichstag and Reichsforstmeister.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I notice that you use here, as you have used in your interrogations by the United States, the expression “seizure of power.” That was the common expression used in your group, was it not, to describe the coming to power of Adolf Hitler?

BODENSCHATZ: It cannot be used in this sense. At that time it was completely legal because the National Socialist Party was then the strongest party, and the strongest party nominated the Reich Chancellor, and the strongest party had, as such, the greatest influence. It must not be interpreted to mean that they usurped the power, but that they had the most influential and prominent position among the parties, that is, by the completely legal means of election.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You want to change the word “seizure”?

BODENSCHATZ: I have to change that. It is only an expression which was common usage in the press at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring got along without any open break with Hitler until 1945, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Until the year 1945 there was no open break. The arrest was only quite at the end, as I have said before.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the arrest was the first open break that had occurred between them, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, the first big break between the two which was apparent to the public. But since the year 1943, as I have said before, there was already a gradual estrangement in the attitude of the two men.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But that was kept from the public, was it not, kept from the German people?

BODENSCHATZ: It was not so visible to the public. It was a development which took place gradually from the spring of 1943 to 1945—first to a small extent, and then the tension became greater and greater.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When the arrest was made it was made by the SS, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: I only heard that. It was said that in Obersalzberg a unit of SS had arrived which arrested Hermann Göring in his small house and confined him there. As to that, perhaps the witness who is going to testify later, Colonel Brauchitsch, who was present at this arrest and who was arrested himself, can give more details.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were not arrested by the SS?

BODENSCHATZ: At that time . . . since 20 July 1944, when I was seriously injured, I had been in the hospital. I was close to Berchtesgaden, at Bad Reichenhall, convalescing.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whenever there were conferences which you attended, was it not the custom, at the conclusion of Hitler’s address to the group, for Göring as the ranking man present, to assure the Führer on behalf of himself and his fellow officers of their support of his plans?

BODENSCHATZ: Of course I was not present at all conferences. I only took the part of listener. At these discussions, or shall we say conferences, in which I took part, it happened from time to time that the Reich Marshal made a remark at the end and gave assurance that the will of the Führer would be carried out. But at the moment I cannot remember specifically any such conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You cannot remember any conference at which he did not do it either, can you?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. It was not always done; on the contrary, he did not do it as a rule. In the Reichstag Hermann Göring always made a concluding speech, after a session had ended, expressing his confidence in Adolf Hitler.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And did he not do that at every meeting of officers at which the Führer was present?

BODENSCHATZ: May I ask you to repeat the question? I have not quite understood it. I beg you to excuse me, but I would like to mention that owing to my injury I have lost 60 percent of my hearing, and therefore I beg you to excuse me if I ask for repetitions. Please, repeat your question.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Quite all right, Sir. Do you know of any conference between Hitler and his High Command at which Göring did not close the meeting, as the ranking officer present, by making assurances of support to Hitler’s plans?

BODENSCHATZ: Some of the conferences I attended were concluded by a declaration of that nature. There were, however, many conferences—in fact most of the conferences—when nothing further was said at the end. When the Führer had finished his speech, the meeting was ended.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In 1943, when Göring began to lose influence with Hitler, it was a very embarrassing time for Göring, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring suffered from this fact. He often told me that he would suffer very much on that account.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: From the fact that the Führer was losing confidence in him?

BODENSCHATZ: What was that?

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was suffering from the fact that the Führer was losing confidence in him? Was that what was causing his suffering?

BODENSCHATZ: That may have been part of the reason, but differences of opinion arose about the Luftwaffe.

MR. JUSTICE. JACKSON: Now, in the spring of 1943 it was apparent to you and apparent to him that the war was lost for Germany, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say that. The Reich Marshal did not tell me in 1943 that the war was lost, but that there were great difficulties, that it would become very dangerous; but that the war was definitely lost—I cannot remember that the Reich Marshal at that time, in the spring of 1943, made a statement to me of that kind, or a similar one.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Reich Marshal had given his assurance to the German people, had he not, that it would not be possible for them to be bombed, as Warsaw, Rotterdam, and other cities were bombed?

BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, he did not give the assurance in those words. Before the war, when our Air Force was growing—I mean at the beginning of the war, when the great successes in Poland and in France were manifest—he said to the German people that the Air Force would do its job and do everything to spare the country from heavy air raids. At the time that was justified. It was not clearly foreseen then that matters would develop differently later.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then he had given his assurance to the German people, had he not, that the Luftwaffe would be able to keep enemy bombers away from Germany?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that he gave an official assurance to the German people in the form of a decree or a big speech. At times it was said that the German Air Force, after the successes in Poland and France, was at its peak. I do not know of any official statement whereby it was made known to the German people.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: At all events, it became apparent in the spring of 1943 that any such assurance, if it had been given, was misleading?

BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 the conditions were entirely different, owing to the fact that the British and American Air Forces came into the picture in such large and overwhelming numbers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was also true that the air defenses of Germany were proving entirely inadequate to cope with the situation; is that not a fact?

BODENSCHATZ: The air defense of Germany was very difficult, as the entire defense did not depend on the air crews alone, but it was also a radio-technical war, and in this radio-technical war, it must be admitted frankly, the enemy was essentially better than we were. Therefore it was not only a war in the air, but if was also a radio war.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: It had become apparent that Germany could not cope with it—is that not a fact?—by 1943.

BODENSCHATZ: In the year 1943 it was not yet a hundred percent clear. There were fluctuations, low and high points. Efforts were made to increase the fighter strength at the expense of the bombers. It was not one hundred percent obvious that the enemy air force could not be opposed successfully. That became obvious only after the middle of 1944.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The Führer lost confidence in Göring as the bombing of German cities progressed, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, indeed, from the moment the British Air Force started with their large-scale attacks on German cities, particularly when the first heavy British air attack on Cologne took place. From that moment it was obvious that differences of opinion, at first not too serious, were arising between the two men.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Hitler accused Göring, did he not, of misleading him as to the strength of the air defenses of Germany?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know that the Führer ever accused the Reich Marshal of any offense in this respect. Discussions between Adolf Hitler and the Reich Marshal were, in spite of all tension, always very moderate. The criticism is said to have become more vehement only later, in 1944 and the beginning of 1945. But I was not present, because I had been off duty since 20 July 1944.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I asked you a question. I did not intend to imply that the Führer accused him of an intentional misstatement, but he had misled him or he had misunderstood the strength of Germany’s air defenses. Was that not generally understood in your circle?

BODENSCHATZ: There could be no question of misleading. The reports which the Air Force made to the Führer were always correct. The weaknesses of the Air Force were also reported to the Führer.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were the efforts that were made by Göring, which you refer to as tremendous efforts, to recapture his influence with the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal, whenever there were conferences, asked through me that he might participate. The Reich Marshal came more frequently than usual to the Führer’s headquarters, and he also said to me, “I will try everything to regain the right contact with the Führer.” He said that personally to me.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he was particularly careful after the spring of 1944 not to do anything that would offend the Führer?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot say anything more about the year 1944, because then I was no longer active. I had no further contact.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, this bombing of German cities had become very troublesome from the point of view of the German people’s criticism of the government, had it not, in 1944?

BODENSCHATZ: The German people suffered terribly under these bombing attacks, and I can only say one thing—that Adolf Hitler suffered most from them. When at night the bombing of a German city was reported, he was really deeply moved, and likewise the Reich Marshal, because the horror of such a bombing was indescribable. I have experienced a few such bombings in Berlin myself, and whoever has lived through that, will never forget it as long as he lives.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And this was all becoming very embarrassing to Hitler and to the Reich Marshal, was it not, to explain to the German people why this was going on?

BODENSCHATZ: That did not have to be explained, because the German people felt it. No explanation was given. It was only said that all possible measures would be taken to master this peril.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you knew at that time, and the Reich Marshal knew, that no measures could be taken that would prevent it?

BODENSCHATZ: No, no, no. I emphasized before that it was a radio-technical war, and there were moments when, in the defense, we could counter the measures of the enemy while constantly discovering a new means to hit him.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: When you made the announcement to the German people that all means would be taken, you had then no means at your disposal, that you knew of, to use, did you, to prevent the bombing of the German cities?

BODENSCHATZ: Oh yes, indeed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: What were they, and why were they not used?

BODENSCHATZ: There were, for example, the following means: The most important areas were protected by anti-aircraft guns. Then there were radio-technical means, jamming transmitters, which would have made it possible, and which partly did make it possible, to jam the radio sets in the enemy aircraft.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: The movement to satisfy the German people under the bombing attacks was a matter of great concern to the Reich Marshal, was it not?

BODENSCHATZ: The Reich Marshal was very anxious that the population should be informed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And see that the population was satisfied, was he not?

BODENSCHATZ: It is easy to say “satisfied.” He could only assure the German people that he would do everything in his power to master these attacks.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, have you seen the Reich Marshal and Hitler when the reports came in of the bombing of Warsaw and Rotterdam and of Coventry?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember whether I was present when the reports came.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You never saw any such reactions on their part on those bombings, I take it?

BODENSCHATZ: I only know that Warsaw was a fortress which was held by the Polish Army in very great strength, provided with excellent pieces of artillery, that the forts were manned, and that two or three times Adolf Hitler announced that civilians should be evacuated from the city. That was rejected. Only the foreign embassies were evacuated, while an officer with a flag of truce entered. The Polish Army was in the city defending it stubbornly in a very dense circle of forts. The outer forts were very strongly manned, and from the inner town heavy artillery was firing towards the outskirts. The fortress of Warsaw was therefore attacked, and also by the Luftwaffe, but only after Hitler’s ultimatum had been rejected.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was Coventry a fortified city?

BODENSCHATZ: Coventry was no fortress. Coventry, however, was a city which housed the key industry of the enemy air force, in which the aircraft engines were built, a city in which, as far as I know, many factories were situated and many parts of these aircraft engines were manufactured. In any case, the Luftwaffe had at that time received orders to bomb only the industrial targets. If the city also suffered, it is understandable, considering the means of navigation at that time.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were interrogated in November of 1945, were you not, by Colonel Williams?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I was interrogated.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Colonel Williams asked you about certain fictitious incidents along the German-Polish border late in August of 1939, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, he asked me about that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And would you care to tell the Tribunal what you know about the fictitious incidents along the Polish border?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know anything positive. I was asked by Colonel Williams whether I knew in advance about the incident of the Gleiwitz broadcasting section. I told him I knew nothing about it. It was only that the incidents on the Polish border were very similar to those which happened on the Czech border. It may have been presumed—that was only my opinion—that they were perhaps deliberate. But I had no positive proof that anything had been staged on our part.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Did you tell him on the 6th of November 1945, as follows:

“I heard about it, but I personally at that time had the feeling
that all these provocations that had taken place had originated
from our side, from the German side. As I said, I had no real
proofs of that, but I always had that feeling.”

Did you not say that?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And that you had talked with people about this, from whom you got that feeling. Is that right?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that very well now. I only know that the reports in the press gave me that suspicion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You were asked, were you not, this question and gave this answer:

“Question: But you are of the opinion that what appeared in the
press and these incidents that were reported were not true, but
done merely to cause an incident as an excuse for an invasion?”

And did you not make this answer:

“I had that feeling. I cannot prove it, but I definitely know I
had a feeling that the whole thing was being engineered by us.”

Did you not make that answer to that question?

BODENSCHATZ: The minutes will show it. If it is in the minutes, I said it. At the moment I cannot remember the exact words.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You do not deny the fact, however?

BODENSCHATZ: I had that feeling, but it was a purely subjective opinion.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But it was your opinion?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now then, I ask you whether you were not interrogated about the Führer’s desire to make war on Poland, and whether you did not give this answer:

“Gentlemen, this question is very hard to answer, but I can
state under my oath that the Führer actually wanted the war
against Poland. I can prove that he actually wanted a war of
aggression against Poland by the circle surrounding the Führer
and the remarks that were made. I was present during the night
when Hitler gave Henderson his conditions that he wanted Danzig,
and I concluded from all the conferences that the Führer had
with the Ambassador—I had the impression that the Führer did
not really want the Poles to accept those conditions.”

And I ask you if you made those answers to Colonel Williams?

BODENSCHATZ: I can make the following answer to that:

I was not present at the conference. If I said that, I did not express myself correctly. I was not at the conference that the Führer had with Henderson, but I was standing in the anterooms with the other adjutants, and outside in the anteroom one could hear the various groups, some saying one thing, some another. From these conversations I gather that the conditions which Henderson received for the Poles in the evening were such, and that the time limit for answering these questions—which was noon of the next day—was so short, that one could conclude there was a certain intention behind it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, that is the impression that you received from being in the anteroom and talking with the people who were about Hitler that night?

BODENSCHATZ: There were adjutants, the Reich Press Chief, and the gentlemen who were waiting in the anteroom without taking part in the conference.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask you, in order to make this very clear, one more question about your interrogation on that subject. Were you not asked this question:

“Then we can summarize your testimony this morning by saying
that you knew in 1938, several months before Germany attacked
Poland, that Hitler fully intended to attack Poland and wage an
aggressive war against her; is that right?”

And did you not make this answer:

“I can only say this with certainty that from the night when he
told Henderson that he wanted Danzig and the Corridor, from that
moment, I was sure Hitler intended to wage an aggressive war.”

Were you asked that question, and did you make that answer?

BODENSCHATZ: If it is in the minutes, I said it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, if it were not in the minutes, it would still be your testimony now, would it not? It is a fact, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: My definition is precisely this: From the handing over of Adolf Hitler’s demands to Henderson and from the short time that Henderson was granted, I conclude that there was a certain intention. That is how I should like to define it precisely now.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I will ask that you be shown Document Number L-79, United States exhibit in evidence, Number USA-27. You have seen that before, witness?

BODENSCHATZ: A copy of this document was shown to me by Colonel Williams, and I told him that I myself could not remember having been present. But if my name is on the minutes, then I was there.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But your name is on the document, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Then I was there. I cannot remember the subject of this conference. I told Colonel Williams that that must have been discussed because Colonel Schmundt, whose handwriting I know—I was shown a copy—I told him that Colonel Schmundt was a man who was very conscientious in making his notes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all in his handwriting?

BODENSCHATZ: That is it as I see it here.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is signed by Colonel Schmundt?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is signed by Colonel Schmundt—Lieutenant Colonel Schmundt. The corrections are not in his handwriting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: But the body of the document is his handwriting?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is his own handwriting. I know it; yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And when you were asked about that by Colonel Williams, you took time to read it, and then you said, did you not: “I think that the thoughts are right as they are expressed here; these are the thoughts that the Führer usually voiced to us in a small circle.” You made that statement?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I did say that, yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you said: “I cannot remember whether these things were expressed on that day. However, it is possible that the thoughts which are put down here are the thoughts of Adolf Hitler.” You said that to Colonel Williams, did you not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, I said that to Colonel Williams.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all I care to ask about that, Sir.

I now ask to have shown to you the original exhibit, Document Number 798-PS, Exhibit USA-29 in evidence.

BODENSCHATZ: As far as I know, a copy of this speech by the Führer was also shown to me by Colonel Williams.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is right. You said, did you not, that you did not recall whether you were present but that the thoughts that were expressed . . .

BODENSCHATZ: The thoughts expressed there are correct.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: They are correct. That is all about that.

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, but I must say one more thing. I tried to speak to Colonel Williams again and could not reach him. Probably I attended this meeting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, we will take that statement now and excuse you from looking for Colonel Williams.

I ask to have shown to you Document 3474-PS, United States exhibit in evidence, Number USA-580. Is that your handwriting?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is my handwriting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And signed by you?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it is a note of a conference of the 2d day of December 1936, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You prepared this memorandum for your files; is that right?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know to whom I gave this.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it says the notes for the files on that discussion; is that correct?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, that is a note for the files.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was present at that conference; is that correct?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. He must have conducted it. It states here, “Present: Generaloberst Göring.”

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: In fact, the note says he conducted it does it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, there were also present Milch, Kesselring, and all of the others who are named in the list at the head of the note.

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you then recorded that Göring told—oh, by the way, all of those men were men connected with the Armed Forces of Germany, were they not?

BODENSCHATZ: Those were all men from the Air Force, the leading men at the time. General Milch was concerned with armament; Lieutenant General Kesselring was, I believe, Chief of Staff; they were all officers who were in leading positions.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: All concerned with the Air Force you say. And this meeting was held on the 2d of December 1936. Are we correct about that?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Göring opened the conference by saying: “The press all over the world is excited about the landing of 5,000 German volunteers in Spain. Great Britain protests officially and takes up the matter with France.” Refreshing your recollection, that is what occurred, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Then Göring said, “The general situation is very serious,” and that he took full responsibility, did he not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes. The general situation was very serious. England was rearming intensively, and a state of readiness was desired.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, he next said, did he not, “Silence until 1941 is desirable. However, we cannot know whether there will be implications before. We are already in a state of war. It is only that no shot is being fired so far.” Did he say that?

BODENSCHATZ: That is recorded in these minutes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And he also said, did he not, that “beginning 1 January 1937, all factories for aircraft production shall run as if mobilization had been ordered.”

BODENSCHATZ: Yes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, it is there in the text, is it not?

BODENSCHATZ: Yes, it is contained here in the minutes.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Now, you have testified that Göring had no prior knowledge of the action taken against the Jews on the night of November 9th and 10th of 1938.

BODENSCHATZ: I gathered that from the fact that on the next day he came to me and was very dismayed.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: He was informed about them the next day?

BODENSCHATZ: The next day that was in the press, in the newspapers.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: You said that he complained about the people who instigated them?

BODENSCHATZ: That I was told by Captain Wiedemann, who was here with me in captivity. He told me that a few days later Hermann Göring came to the Führer with proof and complained about what had occurred.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Whom did he complain about?

BODENSCHATZ: He did not tell me that. Wiedemann told me that Göring complained about Heydrich and Goebbels.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: I did not get that answer.

BODENSCHATZ: Wiedemann told me—this I did not learn myself from Hermann Göring, but Wiedemann told me he had complained about the instigators, and that the instigators were Heydrich and Goebbels.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And Heydrich and Goebbels were both officials in Hitler’s regime, were they not?

BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Goebbels was Reich Minister of Propaganda, and Heydrich was Chief of the Gestapo.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: So, immediately following these pogroms Göring knew and complained to Hitler that they had been incited by officials of the Nazi regime?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know the details as to what he said there. Captain Wiedemann knows about that and can testify to it.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Göring was then at the height of his influence, both with the Führer and with the country, was he not?

BODENSCHATZ: He had at that time the greatest influence.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And I understand you to say that he immediately called a meeting of Gauleiter?

BODENSCHATZ: The meeting of Gauleiter was a few weeks later. I heard about it from the former Gauleiter of Styria, Dr. Uiberreither, who is imprisoned here with me. This Gauleiter Uiberreither took part in that meeting.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: How long did he wait before he called the meeting?

BODENSCHATZ: Dr. Uiberreither told me that it was a few weeks afterwards.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Well, did you know about his holding a meeting on the 12th of November 1938 at his offices in the Reich Ministry for Aviation?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember that.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And do you remember that he had present at that meeting Heydrich, Goebbels, and many others? Is that the meeting to which you refer?

BODENSCHATZ: In this case it might be necessary to ask Dr. Uiberreither who was at that meeting. He told me that Dr. Goebbels was present as well as the Gauleiter.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And it was the custom of Göring to keep minutes of the meetings that he conducted?

BODENSCHATZ: Hermann Göring always had stenographers present, and these stenographers took minutes of such meetings.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: And you want us to understand that Göring was shocked and offended by what had happened to the Jews on the nights of the 9th and the 10th of November 1938?

BODENSCHATZ: He did not agree with it because, as I mentioned previously, he said it would be a great wrong; it would be unreasonable economically, and it would harm our prestige abroad. I was told by Dr. Uiberreither that Göring had spoken in these terms to the Gauleiter.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: Was it known to you that on November the 12th, 2 days after those pogroms, Göring promulgated the order fining all of the Jews a billion Reichsmark, confiscated their insurance, and passed a new decree excluding them from economic life? Did you know about that?

BODENSCHATZ: I have heard of it, but I personally had nothing to do with the idea and with this decree, as I was only the military adjutant.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: These decrees were promulgated 2 days after this pogrom that you say he complained about, is that right?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know the connection.

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: That is all.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL J. M. G. GRIFFITH-JONES (Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom): May it please the Tribunal, I have only one matter which I want to make clear.

You have referred to a meeting which took place in Schleswig-Holstein in July or August of 1939, at which Göring met a number of Englishmen, and you described those Englishmen, the first time you mentioned them, as members of the government, and the second time you mentioned them—I think you mentioned them as economic specialists?

BODENSCHATZ: So far as I know now, they were English leading men in economics, not members of the government.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: I am obliged to you. Would it be correct to say that they were leading industrial and business gentlemen with no connection with the government whatsoever?

BODENSCHATZ: I do not know to what degree these gentlemen were influential. At any rate, Hermann Göring asked at the end that the gentlemen should exert their influence on the authorities in England in the interests of peace.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: Do you know that that conference between Göring and those gentlemen took place at the instigation of Dahlerus?

BODENSCHATZ: Dahlerus is said to have brought about this meeting, but I first learned of that in a conversation with Defense Counsel Dr. Stahmer, who discussed the matter with me. Doctor Stahmer said he knew that Mr. Dahlerus had asked these gentlemen to come to Germany. It is only on the basis of this information that I assume Dahlerus asked these gentlemen to come.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: And do you know that it was the object of Mr. Dahlerus that leading German and English personalities should meet, in order that they should understand one another’s points of view?

BODENSCHATZ: Mr. Dahlerus later . . . he was again in Berlin after that meeting. On that occasion I met him in Berlin, and in conversations with him there I gained the impression that he was greatly interested in peace being maintained between Germany and England, and that he, assisted by Reich Marshal Göring, tried to establish this connection with influential British circles.

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: One last question to you. Do you know that, in arranging that meeting and throughout the course of the negotiations thereafter, Dahlerus stressed the British point of view to Göring and in particular tried to impress Göring with the fact that the English were losing their patience with the policy of aggression being pursued by the German Government?

BODENSCHATZ: I cannot remember having discussed with Dahlerus this line of thought which you mention now.

THE PRESIDENT: Any other questions to ask?

LT. COL. GRIFFITH-JONES: No.

DR. STAHMER: I have only one more question.

[_Turning to the witness._] In the minutes of 2 December 1936, which were shown to you before and which you have before you, there is one paragraph which has not been read entirely. In my opinion it is very important for the interpretation and for the purpose and meaning of that meeting.

It says there:

“The general situation is very serious. Russia wants war.
England is rearming strongly. Therefore, the order is: ‘From
today on, highest degree of readiness, no consideration for
financial difficulties. Generaloberst assumes full
responsibility.’”

Was this order, “highest degree of readiness from today on,” issued merely because Russia, as it says here, wants war and England is rearming strongly? Was that the motive?

BODENSCHATZ: What do you mean?

DR. STAHMER: Was the gravity of the general situation the motive for the order, “highest degree of readiness from today on”?

BODENSCHATZ: At any rate, there was no intention of attack involved, but a measure for defense.

DR. STAHMER: If it says here “Generaloberst assumes full responsibility,” could that be understood to refer to the words “no consideration for financial difficulties” which would be a permissible literal interpretation?

BODENSCHATZ: That refers to financial difficulties, because the Reich Marshal had frequent controversies on that point with the Reich Finance Minister because the Luftwaffe had slightly exceeded its budget.

DR. STAHMER: Thank you. I have no more questions.

THE PRESIDENT: The witness may retire.

[_The witness left the stand._]

DR. STAHMER: I should like to call as the next witness General Field Marshal Milch.

[_The witness Milch took the stand._]

THE PRESIDENT: What is your name?

ERHARD MILCH (Witness): Erhard Milch.

THE PRESIDENT: Repeat this oath after me: I swear by God—the Almighty and Omniscient—that I will speak the pure truth—and will withhold and add nothing.

[_The witness repeated the oath in German._]

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down if you wish.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, did you take part in the first World War?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: In what position?

MILCH: First I was an artillery officer and at the end a captain in the Air Corps.

DR. STAHMER: When did you leave the Army after the end of the first World War?

MILCH: In the spring of 1920.

DR. STAHMER: What were your activities after you left the Army?

MILCH: I went into civil aviation.

DR. STAHMER: When did you join the Wehrmacht again?

MILCH: 1933.

DR. STAHMER: Did you go straight into the Air Force?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: What position did you have when the second World War began?

MILCH: I was General and Inspector General of the Air Force.

DR. STAHMER: When did the military construction of the Luftwaffe start?

MILCH: 1935.

DR. STAHMER: To what extent?

MILCH: A defensive air force was built up.

DR. STAHMER: Can you give us more details about that?

MILCH: In the year 1933 Germany had left the League of Nations and consequently also the Disarmament Conference. Hitler attempted to discuss with the individual nations whether or not disarmament should continue. These attempts to disarm failed, and Germany began to rearm. It was questionable whether the other nations would approve of that. Consequently Germany considered that it was imperative to have military strength in the air also, and to achieve that, the Air Force was itself to create an air power which would be sufficient for the defense of Germany. This is shown by the fact that principally fighters and anti-aircraft artillery were provided.

Likewise, the organization of the German Air Force was constructed for defense. It consisted at that time of four “air districts” (Luftkreise), which one can picture as a kind of cross over Germany. There was a Northeast section, Southeast, Northwest, and Southwest. Moreover the strength of the Air Force, as it was organized, was not planned for an aggressive war or for a large-scale war. Besides fighter planes there were also bombers, but we always called these bomber formations the Risiko Luftwaffe (Risk Air Force), that is to say, their function was to prevent, if possible, any of Germany’s neighbors from entering a war against Germany.

DR. STAHMER: What were the relations of the German Air Force with the air forces of foreign countries during the period beginning with the year 1935?

MILCH: During the first years after 1935 Germany had no air force worth mentioning. There were only the first units and the first larger schools that were established. Also during these years, our industry was built up. Before the rearmament started, our industry had been on a very small scale. I happen to know that the number of workers in the entire German air force industry at the time of the seizure of power by the National Socialists was about 3,000 to 3,300 men—constructors, business men, technicians, and workers.

The first contacts with foreign countries in the field of aviation started in 1937. This was when, in January 1937, an English commission led by Air Vice Marshal Courtney and three other high-ranking officers—Courtney was the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the British Air Force—came to Germany. I myself accompanied this commission and acted as guide during the entire time. We complied with every request of these gentlemen as to what they wanted to see. Those were the first units which were established. We especially showed our training units, in which all new forms and models were first tried out, the industries, the schools, and anything else about which the gentlemen wanted to know. At the end of our conference the English vice marshal suggested that we should start a mutual German-English exchange of plans. I asked for the approval of my commander-in-chief and it was granted. At the time we forwarded to the British the plans of the German Air Force for 1937, 1938, and, I believe, 1939, and, on the other hand, we also received from the British the corresponding figures. We agreed that in the future also, should changes in plans occur or new units be established, an exchange of data should again take place. The visit was animated by a spirit of comradeship and was the beginning of further contacts.

In May of the same year, 1937, I was invited to Belgium with some other gentlemen, as representative of my commander-in-chief, to visit the air force there. Then in July . . .

DR. STAHMER: What happened on this visit to Belgium? Can you give me more details about that?

MILCH: It was a very cordial reception. I made the acquaintance of the Minister of War, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Prime Minister, and also of His Majesty the King, besides the officers of the air force, who, of course, were of main interest to me. The discussion was friendly on both sides, and the Belgians assured us of their personal feelings of friendship for Germany.

DR. STAHMER: Was there also an exchange of data?

MILCH: No. Not in the same way; but later in Germany we also showed the Belgians everything, when the Chief of the Air Force, General Duvier, returned our visit. Then there was a big international meeting in the summer, in July 1937, on the occasion of the aviation meeting in Zurich, which was held every five years. At this meeting we purposely showed our latest models of fighters, bombers, and Stukas, also our new engines which had just been produced, and anything else that would be of international interest. There were large French, Italian, Czech, and Belgian delegations present, besides the German one; and a commission of British officers also attended to see the material displayed by us, but did not take part in the contests as representatives of Great Britain. We showed our material to the French, the British, and to the other nations, in a spirit of comradeship. There was, for instance, the Messerschmitt Fighter 109 with the improvements of the time, more or less as it was flown until the end of the war; the newest Dornier bomber type; the newest Stuka by Junkers; also the Daimler-Benz 600 and 601 engines, and also of Junkers . . .

THE PRESIDENT: I do not think that this amount of detail is of any interest to the Tribunal.

DR. STAHMER: Witness, please, no details; make it short.

MILCH: Yes. Then in October 1937, there was an invitation to France from the French Government to inspect their air force also. The inspection is said to have been made in a very friendly spirit. Shortly after that, about one week later, a visit at the invitation of England took place in return for Air Vice Marshal Courtney’s visit. Here, also, factories, organizations, schools and the War Academy were shown; also, as regards industry, the “shadow factories” were shown, that is, industries which produce peacetime goods in time of peace, and switch over to building aircraft and aircraft engines in time of war. There were also reciprocal visits with Sweden. I think I can conclude with that.

DR. STAHMER: Did you take part in a discussion with the Führer on 23 May 1939?

MILCH: Yes.

DR. STAHMER: In what way did that happen?

MILCH: I was suddenly ordered to come on the morning of that day, because the Reich Marshal was not there.

DR. STAHMER: Do you remember the course of this conversation?

MILCH: The Führer made a long speech to the three commanders-in-chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and their chiefs of staff. Several other persons were also present. The gist of it was that Hitler declared he had decided to solve in one way or another the question of a corridor across the Corridor to East Prussia, and in connection with that he discussed the possibility of complications which, in consequence, might arise in the West. It was only a speech, not a discussion or a conversation.