Chapter XII: The Defence of Rivas (12)

The men who had agreed to go with Lockridge to Rivas descended the river more leisurely than the fugitives; but ill luck pursued them to the last. On the way to San Juan del Norte, the steamer J. N. Scott was blown up, and several of those proposing to go to Panama were killed and others were painfully and dangerously scalded. This accident entirely discouraged the men who yet adhered to Lockridge, and forthwith the idea of crossing the New-Granadian Isthmus was abandoned by them. It was an absurd plan at any rate; for it was folly to suppose, under the existing circumstances, that known enemies of Costa Rica, either armed or unarmed, would be permitted in numbers to cross the territory of a neutral State, or rather of a Republic, hostile to those called “filibusters.”

Of course the English were glad to furnish means to all the men who reached San Juan for leaving Central America. Accordingly a large number of the destitute and disappointed expeditionists were sent to New-Orleans on H. B. M.’s steamer, Tartar; and the passages of others were paid with drafts drawn by Capt. Erskine who held the arms of Lockridge’s command to secure himself against the loss on the drafts. In a few days nearly all the remains of Lockridge’s force had left the shores of Nicaragua; and most were bitter in their expressions concerning the weakness and incapacity of the man who attempted to lead them up the river. It may not be amiss, however, while concluding the narrative of Lockridge’s operations on the San Juan to say that Walker refused to listen to the censure passed on the unfortunate commander until he heard fully the facts of the case; and it was not until he heard from Lockridge himself the story of his undertaking that Walker formed an opinion as to the merits of the leader of the San Juan expedition.

During the attempt of Lockridge to open the Transit the efforts of the friends of Nicaragua in the United States were more active and fruitful than at any previous period. The Southern States, satisfied of their inability to carry slavery into Kansas, were then prepared to concentrate their labors on Central America; and not only were the men who went to the San Juan of good quality, but they were also furnished with excellent supplies and equipments. Had the same effort and expenditure been made three months earlier, the establishment of the Americans in Nicaragua would have been fixed beyond a peradventure.

Since the failure of Lockridge numerous agencies have been employed to re-establish the line of American travel across the Isthmus of Nicaragua: but all without avail. At the very time American youth was engaged in the attempt to force open the Transit for the benefit of those holding the Rivas grant of the 19th of February, 1856, these parties were treacherously dealing with the government of Costa Rica and attempting to secure the franchise from a power having no shadow of a right to bestow it. There have been rumors of grants from Costa Rica and grants from Nicaragua; and the authorities of the latter republic have actually made bargains with several different companies to re-open the Transit. The persons in Nicaragua who desire to keep the Americans out of the country are well aware of the importance to them of keeping the “highway of filibusterism” closed; and all their negotiations for transit grants are “a delusion and a snare.” Often, too, it has been semi-officially announced that the United States government was determined to force open the road across Nicaragua; but as no justification for so violent an act on the part of the United States has been presented, it must be presumed that such declarations are intended merely for popular effect. In fact the American authorities, by an arbitrary act of force, interrupted the only effort which, since December, 1856, has promised successfully to restore the passage across Nicaragua to citizens of the United States. In December, 1857, Col. Anderson, at the head of forty-five men, took the river boats and one lake steamer from the Costa Ricans and restored them to the agent claiming for the American owners; and but for the acts of the United States naval forces the transit across the Isthmus might have been re-established in thirty days. It was the enemies of the naturalized Nicaraguans who closed the Transit; and it is they also who keep it closed.

But it is time for us to return to Rivas, and follow the course of events on the Pacific side of the Isthmus.

Chapter Twelfth.

THE DEFENCE OF RIVAS.

On the 20th of December, 1856, nearly the whole body of Americans in Nicaragua was concentrated at Rivas, and the health and moral condition of the troops were favorably affected by the movement thither. The hospital was established in a large building, situated on a slight elevation near the edge of the town, known as the house of Maleaño. Under the efficient administration of Dr. Coleman, acting surgeon-general, the wards were kept clean, and the surgical attendance was good. The diet of the patients was of the best sort, and although the number of wounded was large, no disagreeable results followed from placing them all in the same building. The supplies of medicine and surgical instruments were ample, and the strength of the surgical staff was far greater than usual in any armies either of the eastern or western continent. The fictions which have been published concerning the want of medical and surgical attention to the inmates of the hospital were created for the purpose of pandering to a morbid public opinion, and of excusing the faults and crimes of those who deserted their countrymen in Central America. The quarters of the troops were comfortable, the subsistence varied and abundant, and the spirits of the force were cheerful and buoyant.

The reports from the enemy also tended to increase the confidence of the Americans. After the retreat of Henningsen from Granada was so triumphantly achieved, Belloso sullenly retired to Masaya, and there attempted to gather the remains of the shattered force which had attempted to cut off the troops charged with the destruction of the Legitimist stronghold. But the other Allied generals were no longer willing to act under Belloso. Defeated in their efforts to destroy Henningsen, the chiefs of the Allied army were naturally inclined to throw the responsibility of their discomfiture on the Salvadorian general. They accused Belloso not only of want of skill, but also of want of courage; and they intimated that his hasty withdrawal toward Masaya, soon after Waters reached the Guadalupe, was due to an over-anxiety for his own personal safety. The dissensions which thus arose in the Allied camp promised in a short time to dissolve the whole force, and the charges then made against Belloso were afterward examined by a military commission in his own State of San Salvador.

These dissensions were also increased by the disheartening effects on the Allied officers of the great losses they had sustained in the campaign against the Americans. It is difficult to estimate the numbers the Allies had actually brought into the field before the retreat from Granada was accomplished, but it is certainly no exaggeration to place the troops they had employed from the beginning of October to the middle of December at seven thousand. In addition to the losses at Granada on the 12th and 13th of October, on the Transit road, by the affairs of the 11th and 12th of November, and at Masaya, during the three days fighting there, the Allies must have lost near two thousand men by the attack they made on Henningsen. Reports concur in the fact that Belloso had not more than two thousand under his command after he retired to Masaya. Thus, even placing the deserters at fifteen hundred—and you must place these at a high figure, considering the forced character of the service in Central America—the enemy must have lost thirty-five hundred in killed and wounded during the ten weeks immediately succeeding their march from Leon.

Nor did Belloso entirely escape the cholera after he reached Masaya. Hence fear of the pestilence as well as of the deadly rifles of the Americans, stimulated desertion among the Allies. So disorganized did Belloso’s force become, that the propriety of a retreat on Leon was discussed among the chiefs of the several contingents; and the Salvadorian troops, particularly, were disposed to withdraw from the contest. The Salvadorian cabinet were, it seems, not well pleased with the censures some of the generals of the other States had passed on the commander-in-chief; and a large portion of the Liberal party of that State, unmoved by the passions which prompted Cabañas’ friends to revenge themselves on the Americans for the refusal to re-establish his power in Honduras, consistently refused to support the war waged against the naturalized Nicaraguans.

Such was the general condition of the respective parties on the 2d of January, 1857, when the steamer San Carlos, as heretofore narrated, crossed the lake with the passengers from California to the Atlantic States. The morning report of the troops at Rivas on the 3d will give an accurate idea of the American force at that time. The total, including those employed in the several departments, is reported at 919. Of these, 25 were employed in the ordnance department; 15 in the quartermaster’s department; 20 in the commissary’s and 12 in the band; thus leaving an aggregate in the line of 847. Of the aggregate 8 were of the post and division field and staff, while 1 captain and 29 privates were on detached duty; 3 captains, 3 lieutenants, and 2 privates, on furlough; and 2 privates absent without leave. Thus the aggregate present was reduced to 788; and of these 60 were on extra duty, and 197 sick. The number for duty, officers and men, was 518; but many of those reported sick had only chigoës in their feet, and were fully able to aid in the defence of the town. Laziness and a disposition to shirk duty placed many on the sick list, who in an emergency might have proved among the best fighting men in the garrison.

Henningsen had been promoted to the rank of major-general, and Sanders to that of brigadier; so that O’Neal had command of the First Rifles, with Leonard as lieut.-colonel, and Dolan as major, while Jaquess was in command of the Infantry, and Lewis of the Second Rifles. The Artillery, as well as the Rangers were very much thinned by the hard service through which they had passed; and Col. Schwartz, being in bad health, soon after reaching Rivas, obtained leave of absence to visit California. Col. Waters kept the small companies of Rangers under his command, riding constantly in search of supplies and information.

In a few days after the San Carlos left Virgin Bay with the passengers, uneasiness was felt on account of the non-arrival of the steamers from the river. There were several causes which might be assigned for their detention, one being the misunderstanding between the two agents of the company, Scott and Macdonald. The improbabilities, too, of all the steamers falling into the hands of the Costa Ricans were so many, that in the event of the enemy’s appearance on the river, it was supposed some news of the fact would soon reach Rivas. It was many days before the steamers finally appeared on the lake, and then their movements indicated that they were in the hands of the Allies. In the meantime, the steamer Sierra Nevada, which had been waiting at San Juan del Sur for the passengers, sailed for Panama; and it was not until her return on the 24th of January, that Walker heard definitely the events which had transpired on the river, and of Lockridge’s presence at Punta Arenas, with a body of immigrants for Nicaragua.

Previous to the return of the Sierra Nevada from Panama, Capt. Finney had been sent with about fifty Rangers as far as Nandaime, in order to ascertain what news the people near Masaya had in reference to the steamers; and also to learn whether or not the enemy were making any movements of importance. Finney returned, reporting that he had gone as far as Nandaime without seeing the enemy or hearing any news indicating either an advance of Allies or a knowledge on their part of the capture of the steamers. The country between Nandaime and Rivas was quiet; the people were engaged in their usual domestic pursuits, and had not been troubled by detachments of the Allies.

In the meantime Rivas was prepared for defence. Soon after occupying the place, in December, Walker had given orders to Henningsen to strengthen the natural advantages of the position, so that a small garrison might be left there without risk to the military and other stores gathered in the town. In fulfilment of these orders, Henningsen had burnt most of the small huts on the edges of the town, and had cut away the thick tropical undergrowth which might conceal and protect an attacking foe. The nature of the ground in and about the place was well ascertained, and the numerous trails and by-paths of the neighborhood were examined. Strobel was, at the same time, engaged in surveying a more direct road than the one usually travelled from Rivas to Virgin Bay; and for this service he principally employed natives, who, with their machetes, are able to clear away rapidly the dense brushwood of that luxuriant soil and climate.

A small schooner, which had once belonged to the chief of the Mosquitos, was brought up the river and across the lake during the month of December; and having been purchased by the government, this vessel was undergoing repairs at the time the steamers made their appearance at Omotepe. On the 16th of January, Walker sent for Fayssoux to come to Rivas, in order to have his opinion as to the feasibility of using the schooner for re-taking the steamers. Fayssoux, although suffering at the time from fever, reached Rivas a few hours after he received the message; and on his arrival he said he thought the schooner would be of very little use for such a purpose. Afterward the vessel was burned, to prevent her from falling into the hands of the enemy; to hold the vessel securely it would have been necessary to keep a strong garrison at Virgin Bay.

Of course, the knowledge that the enemy held the river and the lake, diminished greatly the spirits and confidence of the troops at Rivas. But, although difficulties appeared to gather about the Americans in Nicaragua, they never for a moment relaxed their resolution to maintain strict order and discipline wherever they held sway. An extract from the log of the Granada for the 19th of January, shows the assistance her commander gave to a vessel of the very power which in a few short weeks manifested its gratitude for such services by capturing the Nicaraguan schooner. The log reads: “Crew employed on ship’s duty. Sent five men and an officer to assist the civil authorities to place the mutinous crew of the Narraganset (an American ship) on board of her. Lent her four hand-cuffs to iron them.” The fact may appear trifling, but, when read by the light of after events, it becomes instructive and characteristic.

After Mora had secured the San Juan river and the lake steamers, he established his headquarters at Fort San Carlos. Some days elapsed before he communicated with the Allies across the lake. His object, probably, was to get all the force he could command to the river, and so secure his communications between San Carlos and San José, previous to taking any step which might give Walker an opportunity of ascertaining the occurrences on the San Juan. When, however, he had, as he supposed, put the river in a proper state of defence, he crossed to Granada, and there met the chiefs of the allied forces. By the success of Costa Rica on the San Juan, she had obtained a preponderating influence in the counsels of the confederates, and hence there was little difficulty in having Cañas placed in command of the army at Masaya. The possession of the lake and river, and the closing of the Transit, gave new life to the leaders of the allied troops, and they determined to advance into the Meridional Department.

On the 26th of January Walker received news of the advance of the Allies toward Obraje, a small village on the south side of the Gil Gonzales, and about three leagues distant from Rivas. The same afternoon O’Neal with his Rifles, about 160 strong, and with a twelve-pound howitzer and a small four-pound brass piece, went to meet the enemy, reported as numbering 800 or 1,000 men. A company of Rangers also accompanied O’Neal; and Finney riding to the edge of Obraje came suddenly on a strong picket of the Allies and received their fire, himself mortally wounded, almost before he was aware of their presence. When O’Neal ascertained that the enemy held Obraje he halted for the night about a mile from the village. The next morning he sent forward a skirmishing party to feel the strength of the Allies, and the latter came out to meet the skirmishers in such force that O’Neal judged it prudent to recall his riflemen. In the skirmishing with the enemy O’Neal lost several men; and when his report of the apparent strength and confidence of the Allies reached Rivas, Henningsen was sent to Obraje to reconnoitre the position of the enemy. After a short time Henningsen reported the Allies occupying the principal square of the village, strongly barricaded and also protected by earthworks; and that the place could not be carried without a loss entirely disproportionate to its value and importance. On the receipt of Henningsen’s report Walker ordered the Rifles to fall back to Rivas.

The enemy remained in Obraje during the morning of the 28th; but about nightfall of that day some Americans from San Jorge brought the news of small bodies of the Allies being seen in the outskirts of this village, situated near the lake shore and about two miles to the east of Rivas. By eight o’clock in the evening Cañas was in San Jorge, and his force was busily engaged in building barricades and other defences. The rapidity with which Central American troops throw up barricades is almost incredible, and long practice has made them more expert at such work than even a Parisian mob. Hence, in a few hours, all the streets leading into the square of San Jorge, as well as the houses around the Plaza, were strongly barricaded. The secrecy, however, of the march from Obraje, no less than the rapidity with which the barricades at San Jorge had been built, showed that the Allies were not disposed to meet the Americans in the open field or to come to a decisive action. It was clear that they desired to hold San Jorge in order to communicate with Mora on the lake, and thus to secure more strength for future offensive operations. Therefore, Walker determined to attack them at once.

On the morning of the 29th, Henningsen marched to San Jorge with the 1st and 2d Rifles, Jaquess’ Infantry, some Rangers, a twelve-pound howitzer, and a six-pounder. Next in command to Henningsen was Sanders. They soon succeeded in driving the enemy behind the barricades of the Plaza; but by some misunderstanding of Henningsen’s orders, Sanders, with a part of Lewis’ Rifles, became separated from the rest of the command, and reached a position to the north of the main square and near the road leading to the lake. Confusion ensued; and as the Americans had suffered rather severely from the enemy’s fire, they were drawn off to gain time for new dispositions. It appears that several of the officers had taken too much liquor during the morning, and did not apprehend clearly the purport of the orders they received. Besides this, there was a jealousy on the part of Sanders toward Henningsen, and the latter averred that the former afterward admitted he had done all in his power to frustrate the attack on San Jorge. It is certain Sanders was of a jealous disposition; and though he denied having made the admission above referred to, there can be little doubt that he was not altogether displeased at any incidents which tended to diminish the confidence of the general-in-chief and of the army in the skill and capacity of Henningsen.

After getting his force as far as possible out of the enemy’s fire, Henningsen reconnoitred more exactly the position of the Allies with a view of another attempt to carry their defences. Early in the afternoon, and before Henningsen had prepared for a second attack, the enemy sallied in strength from the barricades and made a vigorous effort to drive the Americans out of some plantain patches they were occupying. The number of riflemen among the plantains was not large at the time the Allies came suddenly and rather unexpectedly upon them; but the 12-pound howitzer was on the spot, and its discharges of cannister were very destructive to the enemy. Nothing can be more effective than this arm for brushing away a harassing foe from the plantain fields scattered around the edges of the towns and villages of Central America. On the occasion of the sortie the enemy made at San Jorge, the howitzer did the service—to make a moderate estimate—of at least fifty riflemen.

The repulse of the enemy among the plantains raised the spirits of the men; and late in the afternoon Henningsen again attacked the barricades. Lewis was to attempt to get a foothold on the north and east side of the Plaza, near the church, where the enemy kept its ordnance and other stores, while Jaquess with the Infantry was to try to effect a lodgment on the south side near the road leading toward Virgin Bay. Lewis’ men could not be brought to advance nearer than within eighty or a hundred yards of the barricades; but the Infantry made a gallant effort, though an unsuccessful one, to perform the part assigned it in the general assault. The Infantry had hitherto lacked opportunities for meeting the enemy; and some jests had been passed at their expense among the other corps of the army. Therefore Jaquess was now put on his mettle. He, followed by Major Dusenberry, led the men up toward the barricade with more courage than conduct; and for several seconds the Infantry received, without wincing, a most galling fire from the Allies. Jaquess was struck down by a ball in the loins, while Dusenberry fell at about the same moment mortally wounded. Thus losing their chief officers, the Infantry were checked at a critical moment and were obliged to retire, leaving several killed near the barricades and bringing off a number of wounded.

From the reports Walker received he was led to suppose that the ill success of the attack on San Jorge might be due in some degree to the want of cordial co-operation on the part of Sanders and other officers with Henningsen. There was always some little prejudice against the latter because of his European birth and education; and it is impossible even with the aid of long military habits to conquer or destroy such prejudices. Therefore Henningsen was recalled; but as Walker had little confidence in the capacity of Sanders for independent command, Waters was sent to San Jorge with orders which gave him the real control of the troops there. Soon, however, Waters reported that he thought it impossible to carry the place with the force then before it; and Sanders was accordingly ordered to return to Rivas.

The loss of the Americans on the 29th January was about eighty killed and wounded. Captains Russell and Wilkinson, both valuable officers, were killed; while Major Dusenberry died in a short time after he was brought to Rivas. Jaquess’ wound made him unfit for duty for many weeks; and Lieut. Col. Leonard was confined to his bed for months from the effects of that day at San Jorge. The loss of the enemy was also large, especially in the plantain patches where they met the howitzer. But it was difficult to get even an approximative report of the losses of the enemy. They kept their wounded carefully out of sight, sending them to Omotope and other points, and scattering them so as to make the numbers seem less than they were. So, too, when inquiries were made for men who disappeared, instead of letting it be known they were killed, the officers would represent that they had been ordered to some distant point. Thus the lake steamers were very serviceable to the Allies by enabling them to keep their wounded out of sight, and to prevent their large losses from affecting the spirits of those who escaped the American rifles.

On the afternoon of the 30th, Walker marched with the 1st and 2d Rifles (about 250 men in all) and a 12-pound howitzer to San Juan del Sur, with the double view of inspiring the troops with confidence by showing them that the Allies feared to meet them in the open field and of communicating with the steamer Orizaba, expected in port about the first of February. The march to San Juan was made in good time and with cheerful spirits, and no signs of the enemy appeared on the road. On the evening of the 1st of February the Orizaba arrived from San Francisco, bringing Captain Buchanan and some forty others for Nicaragua. The vessel was coaled, as usual, by men in the service of the State; and without aid from the government it might have been difficult for the steamers to get labor at reasonable rates. A marginal note in the log of the schooner Granada, written by Captain Fayssoux, shows whether or not American commerce had reason to be thankful to the authorities then at San Juan. In the body of the schooner’s log for the 2d of February we read, “Eleven of the crew employed coaling the Orizaba;” while in the margin we find the note: “M. Mars being drunk on board the Orizaba, and urging our crew to strike for higher wages, which they did, the captain and he got into a fight; I separated them, and sent Mars on shore, and persuaded the men to go on coaling.”

About 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the 2d, Walker marched from San Juan to Virgin Bay. At the latter place he ascertained that Cañas had been there with some four or five hundred men, and had retired as soon as he heard of the approach of the Americans. Early on the morning of the 3d the steamer La Virgen appeared off Virgin Bay, and the troops then in the village were carefully concealed, with the hope that the steamer might come up to the wharf. When, however, she got within a few hundred yards of the wharf, she stopped her engines, yet did not drop anchor, as if regarding the aspect of affairs on shore. After a while several tried to strike her pilot-house with the Minié musket; but their efforts were not very successful; and in a short time the steamer turned away from the wharf and proceeded toward San Jorge. Then the Americans resumed their march and reached Rivas about midday of the 3d.

On their return to Rivas the Rifles were ordered to get as much rest as possible during the afternoon and the early part of the night, since their services might be required before daybreak of the 4th. Not long after midnight of the 3d, Walker marched with about 200 of the Rifles toward San Jorge; and near a mile from Rivas, taking a road to the left, he entered the village, where the enemy lay, at 4 o’clock on the morning of the 4th of February. The Allies were taken entirely by surprise, and a select corps of volunteers, led on by Dr. McAllenny, penetrated to one of the main barricades of the Plaza and fired over its top at the enemy, running hither and thither across the square. But the main body could not be brought to sustain the advancing party before the enemy recovered from their surprise. Then it was too late to carry the barricades without great loss, and the Americans were drawn off to the edge of the village beyond the reach of the enemy’s small-arms. During the assault on the barricade Lieutenants Blackman and Gray were mortally wounded; and while the Americans were on the edge of the village O’Neal received his death-wound. By eight o’clock A.M. on the 4th, the Americans had returned to Rivas.

During this attack on San Jorge, Jerez was wounded in the face, and for some days there were reports of his death; but the hurt was less dangerous than represented, and he soon recovered from its effects. The loss of O’Neil was a more severe blow to the Americans than any they inflicted on the Allies. Young and enthusiastic, he was not without the quick perception and rapid decision which fit a man for command in moments of danger. He was almost a boy in age, not twenty-one, at the time of his death; but the mind matures rapidly on the battle field, and he had by nature the true sentiment of the soldier which tells him that it matters little whether death comes soon or late, so it finds him in the performance of duty. He lingered for several days after he was carried back to Rivas, and probably his gallant spirit would have preferred to go forth from the world amid the storm of battle. But anxious eyes watched over his last agonies, and there was none in camp who was not saddened when the news of his death spread through the town.

It was while Walker was at San Juan del Sur that printed proclamations from Rafael Mora—promising deserters protection and free passage to the United States—were first scattered in the suburbs of Rivas. At the same time letters were addressed to Americans, signed by those who had deserted from Granada and elsewhere, urging officers and men to desert Walker and go over to the enemy. This was an entire change in the policy of Costa Rica. Not a year before, Mora had declared a war of extermination against the “filibusters;” now he attempted to make the war one against a single person, and besought the Americans to desert their leader. This change of policy, while it tacitly admitted that the war had failed in its objects, was also indicative of new counsellors in the cabinet of Costa Rica; it proved that other than Central American heads were busy in plotting the removal of the naturalized Nicaraguans from their adopted country. All Americans, however, are interested in having the names of these counsellors remain in the obscurity their deeds deserve.

While barricades were being built at Rivas and the town was more thoroughly prepared for defence, Col. Swingle was engaged in labors which added much to the efficiency of the artillery. The mechanical genius of Swingle was extraordinary. Besides the well-organized work-shops he established at Rivas, he got a small engine from San Juan del Sur and succeeded in producing a blast of air which enabled him to smelt iron, and thus he cast the first cannon-balls ever made in Central America. The scanty supply of balls had been a serious obstacle to the employment of the artillery, and for some time it was necessary to use such as could be moulded with lead. As the supply of lead was limited, it would not do to put a great deal of it into the shape of cannon balls. A number of bells had been gathered from the towns and villages of the Meridional Department, and from these Swingle cast round shot, more effective, though also dearer, than those made of iron.

On the morning of the 7th of February, a supply of round shot having been procured, Henningsen, supported by the Rifles, proceeded to San Jorge to give the enemy a cannonade. He prepared some empty musket-boxes in order to construct a breastwork rapidly and without annoyance from the enemy. While it was yet dark he reached a point about six hundred yards from the lines of the Allies, and before daybreak his work was so far complete as to enable the men to proceed without interruption by the fire from the Plaza. The breastwork being finished, the six-pounders were fired rapidly and with much accuracy. The impression made on the Allies was apparent, though they affected to say that the balls did small damage. None of the Americans was hurt, and they returned to Rivas in good spirits at the work which had been done with so little expense. The object of these frequent attacks on the enemy was to keep them in a state of constant alarm, and besides the actual loss of the Allies in killed and wounded, the confusion into which they were thrown by the appearance of the Americans always enabled a few of the soldiers to desert. It was important, also, for Walker—while waiting the result of Lockridge’s effort to open the Transit—to let his troops see that they were not thrown entirely on the defensive.

It was necessary to inspire the Americans with confidence in their own strength, and to show them the weakness of the enemy in order to cure, if possible, the fearful epidemic—for it is a disease—of desertion which had begun to demoralize the force at Rivas. Early in February a number of Rangers, with a commissioned officer, deserted and took the road to Costa Rica, carrying off their horses, saddles, and arms. The morning report of the 6th of February shows twenty desertions in twenty-four hours; that of the 8th of the same month shows six. Desertions at that time were the result of pure fright and restlessness; for the subsistence was unexceptionable, a large supply of flour and other provisions having been received from California during the month of January. Besides, the Rangers were then passing in bodies of ten and twelve through most parts of the Meridional Department and were able to bring in supplies of corn, tobacco, and sugar, for the troops. The spirit of desertion was rifest among those who had been in California; and the wandering habits there engendered made them restive under the restraints of military life. Americans, too, are accustomed to discuss public affairs with entire freedom; and it is difficult to cure them of the habit—most dangerous in camp—of expressing their opinions about public acts and events. Such discussions may often be fatal to the safety of an army; and thus, the habits of freedom, while they add to the courage of the citizen, may also diminish the fortitude unlicensed speech too often shakes. Foolish speech and the spread of absurd reports did more to foster desertion among the troops at Rivas than all the promises of the enemy or any privations to which they may have been subjected. Unfortunately, many officers were not much wiser than the men in this respect, and their discouraging remarks produced most pernicious effects. Such military faults, too, on the part of officers are hard to deal with; for the punishment of them may increase the evils they produce.

On the 6th of February, the United States sloop-of-war St. Mary’s, Commander Charles Henry Davis commanding, cast anchor in the port of San Juan del Sur; and a few days thereafter, on the 10th, Her Britannic Majesty’s steamer Esk, Commander Sir Robert McClure commanding, also anchored in the same harbor. On the 11th the log of the Granada reads: “At 9 A.M. the commander of the English ship sent on board to know my authority for flying a flag. He was answered by the authority of our government. At 6 P.M. he again sent on board using threats that he would take me prize or sink me if I did not proceed on board of him with my commission, which I refused to do. After making me three visits and threatening everything, the lieutenant insisted on my making a friendly visit to the commander, which I did.” As soon as the conduct of Sir Robert McClure was known at Rivas, orders were sent to Fayssoux not to hold or allow any of his officers or men to hold communication with the English commander, his officers or crew, and not in any manner to notice the presence of the Esk in port. In a few hours Sir Robert was in Rivas; and when informed that his conduct should be properly reported and brought to the attention of Her Majesty’s government, he was profuse in his apologies, saying he had not intended any insult to Fayssoux or his flag. After his apology, the order to Fayssoux was revoked. In the schooner’s log for the 13th we find: “At 11 A.M. Capt. Davis of the American sloop-of-war paid us an official visit. At 12 M. Capt. McClure returned my friendly visit.” The course of Sir Robert McClure illustrates the conduct of the British naval officers toward Nicaragua. Whenever they were properly met and resisted in the first instance they would draw back from their arrogant demands; but if they found only hesitation and concessions they pressed their interference with more determination after each successful act. On the 19th the Esk left for Punta Arenas.

Commander Davis, having sent word that he desired to visit Rivas on business, an escort was ordered to conduct him to the town, and on the 18th he arrived at headquarters. He spent the afternoon and night in Rivas, and in his conversations with Walker studiously addressed him as President. During his stay the officers who accompanied him passed freely through the camp, and seemed surprised at the cheerful aspect of the place. The commander stated to Walker that the captain of the Narraganset, a coal-ship at San Juan, would require her small boats, then in Rivas, before going to sea. These boats had been brought from the Transit some weeks previously, with a view of using them on the lake, but as they were now useless for this service, Walker told Davis he did not object to return them to the Narraganset. At the same time Walker mentioned to Davis that the lake and river steamers, belonging to the American owners of the ocean steamships between Nicaragua and the United States, were precisely analogous to the boats of the Narraganset, and if he asked for the latter he should also demand the former from the Allies. Morgan and Garrison could no more carry on their business of transporting passengers between the Atlantic and Pacific ports of the United States without the property then in the hands of the Allies, than the Narraganset could go to sea without her small boats. Davis appeared to see the analogy of the cases, and said he would visit San Jorge after leaving Rivas, and speak with the Allied general on the subject.

From Rivas Davis went to San Jorge; but if he mentioned the lake and river steamers it must have been casually, and it was certainly without any result. He demanded to know from the Allied general whether the Americans on the small steamers were held against their will, for such was the current report through the country at the time. But he was satisfied with the simple assurance that these men served the Allies voluntarily. Of course any one familiar with the character and morals of Spanish-American officers, know that such assurances are readily given and really mean nothing. Davis, however, took no farther steps to ascertain the facts in relation to the Americans on the steamer, and this, with other facts, led Walker to see that the United States commander was more desirous of pressing demands against him than against the Allies. Hence, when the lieutenant of the St. Mary’s came up for the Narraganset’s boats, Walker told him he could not give them up unless Davis treated both parties to the war alike, and pressed his demands against the Allies with as much vigor as those he might make on the Nicaraguans.

During the latter part of February there were several encounters between the Rangers and small parties of the enemy. A few riflemen, too, would go out at night and alarm the camp of the Allies by firing on their pickets, and the enemy would, in the same manner, scatter small parties through the plantain patches and fire up the streets of Rivas. The Rangers in the employ of the commissary (of whom at one time there were about thirty) had some skirmishes with the Allies while the former were collecting subsistence for the Americans, and on the afternoon of the 4th of March the enemy took two wagons, several carts, and a number of oxen which had been sent out, in charge of the Rangers, for corn. This capture was made not more than a mile from Rivas, and on an estate belonging to the family of an officer in the Allied army.

On the evening of the 4th of March, Caycee, with some forty Rangers, was sent to San Juan del Sur as an escort to Col. Jaquess, Mrs. Dusenberry, the widow of the major mortally wounded at San Jorge, and others going to the United States. They arrived at San Juan without seeing the enemy; but on the 5th, as Caycee was returning to Rivas, he found himself unexpectedly in the presence of 200 of the Allies, just after he passed the Half-way House, and was about to leave the Transit road. The enemy took Caycee by surprise, and he lost six of his men, four killed and two wounded, before he was able to extricate himself from the fire of the Allies. He fell back to San Juan, and remained there until the 7th. In the meantime, Walker having learned, through a native boy, that a Costa Rican force had left San Jorge, and was on the way to the Transit, ordered Sanders to get the Rifles ready for marching. The boy who brought the information to Walker had seen the Costa Ricans pass along the hill-side while he lay hid in the bushes, and he had thus been able to count almost every man. He reported them about 200 strong, and Sanders was sent out to join Caycee with 160 of the Rifles. In the afternoon of the 5th, Sanders, while on the march toward the Transit, met the enemy near a league from the Jocote farm. The Rifles were much scattered when the Costa Ricans first appeared, and Captains Conway and Higley were engaged in deploying their companies on either side of the road when they received the enemy’s attack. The Costa Ricans came on briskly and with confidence; the Rifles, on the contrary, hesitated, and in spite of the efforts of their officers began to give way. Waters, who was with Sanders, made several ineffectual attempts to check the disorder into which the Americans fell, but he could not get the Rifles to make head against the Costa Ricans, and the latter continued to press the rear of the Americans until they reached the point where the road forked—one fork leading to Rivas, the other to San Jorge. The enemy took the road leading to San Jorge; and no doubt the idea that they were cut off from their main body, and the necessity of forcing their way back to Cañas, increased the vigor of their attack, and made them fight with more appearance of courage than was usual to them. Sanders’ loss was 28, of which there were 20 killed and 8 wounded. The large proportion of killed is explained by the fact that a number of the wounded were left on the field, and the enemy killed these when they came up. Higley and Conway, both excellent officers, were among the killed. For many hours there were numbers both of men and officers missing, but the most of these came into Rivas during the next day.

The Allies, elated by the result of the conflict with Sanders, marched a strong body into the plantain patches, to the east of Rivas and near the Plaza, about ten o’clock P.M. of the 5th. A deserter, who was with them, called out to the sentry not to fire as “they were Rangers;” but the fellow’s over-anxious tone betrayed his plans and the alarm was given. Some rounds of canister fired among the plantains soon scattered the allied force stationed there; and though the bugles continued to sound the charge, the spirit of the enemy did not seem equal to the attempt. The fire into the town had been short and rambling; but a musket-ball struck Dulaney, of the Artillery, in the throat, inflicting a painful though not dangerous wound.

On the afternoon of the 7th Caycee returned to Rivas with his Rangers and 70 footmen from California, in charge of Capt. Stewart. Arms had been furnished to the new men from the supply aboard of the Granada; and the steamer which brought these immigrants from California, also bore a quantity of arms and ammunition for the service of Nicaragua. Stewart’s men were formed into a corps called the Red Star Guard, and they were put under the command of Major Stephen S. Tucker, formerly of the U. S. Mounted Rifles. Tucker was an excellent officer, punctual in the discharge of his duties, and rigid in exacting from others the performance of theirs. The captain of the Guard, Stewart, was a noisy, talkative man, whose ideas about public affairs had been derived principally from grogshop assemblies in the mining villages of California; and Tucker’s ideas of discipline and duty were quite distasteful to a man whose habit it was to fawn on people in order to secure their good-will and favor. From the beginning, Tucker was strict with his men, and aspired to make them the best soldiers in Rivas. For a time he succeeded admirably; and it is probable he might have done more with the Guard in the end, had it not been for the foolish talkativeness of its captain.

The day after Stewart and his men arrived, the whole force in Rivas was paraded on the Plaza, and Walker addressed them with a view of raising their spirits after the depression of Jocote, and Caycee’s mishap on the Transit. He reviewed the course the Costa Ricans took in the opening of the war, and contrasted it with the policy the Allies had since adopted, thereby showing that they had been humbled in their conflict with the Americans. He also alluded to the efforts made to seduce the troops from their allegiance to the flag, by representing their chief as selfish and ungrateful. It was, he said, an insult to Americans to suppose, that they served a chief; they served a cause and not a man; and when the Allies asked, what reward they had received or what thanks had been bestowed for the sufferings at Rivas, at Masaya, and at Granada, they recalled names that should fill the souls of soldiers with devotion and enthusiasm to the cause in which they were engaged. The address was brief; but it had an effect on those who heard it, and for several days the spirit of the garrison was better than it had been.

On the 13th, Caycee, with his Rangers, went to San Juan for the purpose of bringing to Rivas the letters and papers brought by the Sierra Nevada from Panama. Titus was a passenger on the steamer, and had been intrusted, so Lockridge afterward said, with the official report of events on the river; but Walker did not get this report until many days after Titus’ arrival at Rivas, and then in the shape of duplicates by the next vessel with mails from San Juan del Norte. Hence, for some time, the chief information as to affairs on the San Juan was derived from Titus, and this, as may be readily imagined, was of very inaccurate character. This person, Titus, had not been at Rivas long, before his reports were regarded as wholly worthless; for, during the sickness of one of Walker’s aides, Titus was requested to act, for the time, on the staff of the general-in-chief. The first duty on which he was sent, required him to approach a point where the Allies and Americans were in presence of each other; and Titus, not venturing within range of the enemy’s fire, received a statement from a soldier and brought it to headquarters as a report of facts. A moment after Titus’ return, Henningsen rode up, and reported to Walker a state of facts entirely the reverse of Titus’ report. Of course, the services of Titus were immediately dispensed with.

From the first, Walker placed no confidence in the statements of Titus about affairs on the river. No commission was given to Titus; on the contrary, when he requested to be sent to the United States with authority to act for Nicaragua, his application was refused. Although possessed of some plausibility, he could lead only superficial observers astray as to his real character. He had too much the air of the bully, to gain credit for either honesty or firmness of purpose. His future conduct will hereafter be related; and from it may be learned something of the man who, when he left New-Orleans, boasted that in not many days the San Juan river would be open to the Americans.

At two o’clock on the morning of the 16th, Walker marched for San Jorge, with about 400 effective men, two iron six-pounders, one twelve-pound howitzer, and four small mortars. Henningsen accompanied the force with the view of directing the operations of the artillery. The force of the enemy had been swelled to upward of 2,000 men, by fresh troops from Guatemala and Costa Rica; and only the day before a body of 400 or 500 had been carried on the lake steamer from Tortugas, about ten leagues south of Virgin Bay, to the camp at San Jorge. By daybreak, however, the Americans had possession of a small church, about six hundred yards from the Plaza, where the enemy lay. Soon after the position was secured, the six-pounders opened on the Allies, men being stationed in the trees so as to watch where the balls struck; for the dense vegetation about the town made it impossible to get an open view of the square, and thus the pointing of the guns was to some extent conjectural. Twelve-pound shells were also thrown from the mortars; and had there been a larger supply of shells, the fire of the mortars would have accomplished much. Even the small number of shells thrown were not without effect on the enemy. As one of the characteristic incidents of the day, it may be mentioned, that while the artillery firing was going on, Col. Henry, who had been left in bed at Rivas, rode up on his mule, and received another bullet from the enemy before the day was over.

While the artillery was engaged in pouring round shot and shell into the Plaza, Tucker, with the Red Star Guard, was throwing up a breastwork some seventy or eighty yards to the left, and in advance of the church Walker occupied. The ground where Tucker was at work touched the road leading straight into the Plaza; and he was preparing it for the reception of a gun which might thence have told with much effect on the Allies. The enemy, however, observed Tucker’s men, and before the breastwork was complete, several hundred of the newly-arrived Costa Ricans sallied from the Plaza, and advancing through the plantain walks, fell with fury on the Red Star Guard. Tucker fought fiercely for several minutes, his men showing fine spirit, and doing good work with their Minié muskets. But the strength of the enemy was such, as to force him to retire to the church, after the loss of several killed and wounded.

The several roads and bye-paths in the rear, and on the flanks of the American main position at the church, were well watched and guarded by the Rangers, as well as by some companies of Infantry and Rifles. Captain Northedge’s company on the left, was assailed about the same time with Tucker; but he held his position, and the enemy retired. There was more or less skirmishing on the flanks and rear, while the Artillery was exhausting its supplies of shot; after some three hundred and fifty rounds had been fired, it was clear that few of the enemy remained in the Plaza, and that they were taking positions on the road between San Jorge and Rivas, with a view of harassing, if not of preventing the return of the Americans to the latter place. The delay in the re-appearance of some Rangers sent to Rivas to ascertain whether the road to that place was open, showed that the Allies were attempting to occupy it. The enemy thus having almost entirely deserted San Jorge, and offering action along the road to Rivas, Walker decided to accept the offer.